D3.2
WP3
Integration issues Report

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Executive Summary

This deliverable maps the integration issues in Berlin, Rotterdam and Malmö according to the four dimensions of integration as developed in Deliverable D3.1: socio-economic, socio-cultural, legal-political and spatial. It is an important part of the UniteEurope project as it provides a backdrop and contrast to the public discussions in social media and the deliverable on policies and measures (D 2.3). We find similarities and differences between the cities. Socio-economic issues are important in all three cities, but even more so in Malmö. In the other cities the socio-cultural (Berlin and Rotterdam) and legal-political (Berlin) issues are more strongly on the agenda than in Malmö.

Grouping Berlin's migrant integration issues according to the four-dimensional taxonomy, we find that social-economic issues are most relevant. Therein the problems of high unemployment and poor education of migrants are most important. However, also the issue of health care for migrants attracts more and more attention by integration specialists in the city administration. In the socio-cultural dimension the issue of migrant delinquency is often communicated in the media even though the relevance and magnitude of this issue is contested by migrant integration researchers. Also the provision of religious education and the execution of religious practises by the Islamic community appear of high importance. Various forms of local political participation – particularly through migrant associations and through the participation of migrants in local advisory boards – as well as the debate on local voting rights for migrants mark most prominent issues in the legal-political dimension. However, the intercultural opening of the Berlin public administration is also understood by the latter as an important key to migrant integration. In the *spatial dimension*, we find an on-going controversy on the supposed positive and negative effects of the *spatial segregation of the migrant population* in certain districts in Berlin. While some scholars and politicians point out the integrative potential of supportive neighbourhoods, other researchers and public administrators emphasise that the concentration of migrants in particular areas of the city leads to their isolation.

In Rotterdam, a number of issues in the four dimensions are found. For the socio-economic dimension we find that ethnic minorities are lagging behind within education compared to the native Dutch. However, the difference is decreasing. Labour market participation of non-western women is low and welfare dependencies are high among ethnic minorities. Deficiencies in knowledge of the Dutch language are most prevalent amongst Turkish and Cape Verdean. In the socio-cultural dimension we find that delinquency still is a problem among ethnic minorities in Rotterdam. In particular Antillean and Moroccan youth has been suspect of crime more often than Dutch nationals. In terms of acceptance of values and norms, few statistics are available. Ethnic minorities in Rotterdam strongly identify with the city but feel less attached to the Netherlands. Interethnic contact remains relatively low. In the legal-political dimension we find that turnout rates at the municipal and sub-municipal elections are lower for ethnic minorities than for the native Dutch. Finally, for the spatial dimension, we see that ethnic segregation of housing in Rotterdam is fairly large. This trend is changing to a more balanced city.

In Malmö the large inflow of unemployed migrants since the 1990s has contributed to a strong focus on the socio-economic dimension, and employment is seen as the key to solve most other integration issues. At the moment only 42 percent of the foreign born population is employed, compared to 75 percent of the Swedish born. The low employment rate is reflected in other areas, like social assistance where a large majority of the recipients are foreign born households. Some of the differences between foreign and native born in employment is related to the education level. Foreign born are clearly overrepresented among low-skilled and under-represented among the highly educated. These differences in educational level will be sustained because the migrants and their children are doing considerably worse in school. But not all issues are directly related to socio-economic issues. Crime has been a large problem in Malmö for a long time and it has escalated with riots and a series of murders the last couple of years. The discussion is heated if this has anything to do with migration or not. Also, the precarious situation for the Jews in Malmö has been recognised internationally. Other issues that are acknowledged are a lack of participation in civil society and discrimination. As the city has become more and more segregated along ethnic and socio-economic lines, the spatial dimension has become an aspect of almost all local issues, integration related or not.

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Abbreviations

COS: Centre for Research and Statistics of the municipality of Rotterdam
CBS: Statistics Netherlands
GBA: Rotterdam Municipal Citizen Administration
SCP: Social and Cultural Bureau

1 Introduction

The integration of migrants is a complex process. It is well understood that integration is a multidimensional, mutual process, which includes all members of society and is supposed to enable migrants to fully participate in all areas of society. In each area there are numerous aspects to be taken into account. Although all of these aspects are interconnected, it is necessary to arrange them according to an analytical framework to enhance the understanding of integration issues and processes. The Unite Europe Project works with a categorisation of four dimensions that embraces various indicators of integration (see deliverable D 3.1).

- Socio-economic dimension: Labour market participation; Educational participation; Health care position; Policing; Use of social benefits; Participation through voluntary work or parenting; Income level; Language comprehension; Educational achievement;

- Socio-cultural dimension: Socio-cultural dimension: Identity formation; Accommodation of migrant cultural practices/institutions; Acceptance of basic values and norms; Ethnic contact; Mutual perceptions; Public attitudes toward migrants; Delinquency;

- Legal-political dimension: Citizenship (naturalisation, social/civic/political rights); Anti-discrimination; Group specific legal provisions; Political participation; Political organisation; Participation in civil society; Consultative structures;

- Spatial dimension: Housing position; Spatial dispersion vs. segregation; Symbolic uses of space;

This analytical framework enables us to make comparative studies on integration issues and policies in cities. It is also a central component in the social media analysis tool that UniteEurope is developing, that will help policy makers and researchers to make sense of the public discussion on integration.

In this deliverable we introduce integration issues relevant in Berlin, Rotterdam and Malmö and categorise them according to the dimensions above. Each issue embraces one or more indicators. Corresponding policies are to be explicated in deliverable D2.3.

2 Methodology

This deliverable is based upon three methodological pillars: 1) analysis of the existing academic literature and city documents on migration and integration, 2) interviews with migration specialists working for the city administrations and 3) statistical data.

As the focus of this deliverable is on the current state of migrant integration rather than on the historical development, we chose to mainly select articles, books and documents that had been published in this century even though we are completely aware of the fact that some current issues in the realm of migrant integration are linked to developments taking place in earlier decades. What type of literature that has been studied largely depends on what has been available in the three cities. There are, for example, a lot of academic literature on Berlin and an abundance of policy documents in Malmö. Some newspaper articles are also used to exemplify certain integration issues in Malmö.

We undertook several semi-structured interviews with migration specialists working for the city administrations. In Berlin interviews were conducted with nine district Commissioners for integration and migration as well as one senior policy advisor working in the Ministry of Work, Integration and Women. In Rotterdam the municipality of Rotterdam themselves made the choice of respondents themselves on the basis of what they deemed to be important and key actors in the field of integration related to the administrative workflow. The municipality strived to interview a diverse group of informants. They are working as senior policy makers, strategic advisors, and as governors in politics. In Malmö interviews were done with a manager at Rosengård city district, four senior civil servants working at the Immigrant service and the Unit for integration and employment and a political secretary at the Commissioners unit. In addition to persons employed in the city administration, interviews were done with people responsible for local integration policies at the Employment service and the County administrative board.

Statistics

The goal in this deliverable is to identify the main integration issues in the respective cities, not to provide comparable statistics. To produce comparable statistics has never been the goal and to do that would have been a totally different project. The three cities are working with different categories when it comes to integration, and statistics are available for different issues in each of the cities which reflect the national ideological contexts and statistical frameworks in the respective countries.

In Berlin, the statistical data was provided either by the Bureau of the Commissioner for integration and migration of the Berlin Senate or by the Statistical Office Berlin-Brandenburg. While these statistics are in themselves coherent and meaningful in their specific contexts, they refer to different data sets and can therefore not be analysed comparatively. Furthermore, in many cases, the described migrant groups differ from each other. While in some cases Germans are compared to non-Germans or foreigners, in other cases citizens without a migration background are compared to inhabitants with a migration background, i.e. either

having migrated themselves to Germany or being the children or grand-children of people who migrated to Germany. The question of nationality is for the latter group considered important.

For Rotterdam, the municipality of Rotterdam has provided us with statistical overviews on several public issues concerning ethnic minorities that are in their perception issues of integration. These data come from several sources. The municipality of Rotterdam has its own research centre collecting data on public issues and demographic developments: the Centre for Research and Statistics (COS). The Rotterdam administration uses different types of data collected by COS for (sub-)municipal policies (COS, 2011). Also data from Statistics Netherlands (CBS) distinguished for Rotterdam were provided. Statistics Netherlands is a privatised autonomous agency that is responsible for collecting and processing (official) national statistics to be used by Dutch policy makers. In addition to this, two recent publications on the position of ethnic minority groups are used to identify key integration issues. One is a biyearly report from the Netherlands Institute of Social Research (SCP) based on data from Statistics Netherlands (Gijsberts et al., 2012). This report statistically describes the position of ethnic minority group in the Netherlands. The other is a one-off initiative of comparing the position of immigrants in the two largest cities of the Netherlands: Rotterdam and Amsterdam (Entzinger & Scheffer, 2012). This report is based on data from the Amsterdam Department of Research and Statistics (O&S) and the Rotterdam Centre for Research and Statistics (COS). Both focus primarily on structural aspects of integration. The emphasis is on education, employment, income, housing and crime. They focus on and distinguish between the largest minority groups in the Netherlands and Rotterdam: Surinamese, Antilleans, Turkish and Moroccans.

The statistical overviews and figures presented in research reports concern ‘ethnic minorities’ as defined by Statistics Netherlands: people of non-Dutch origin or people who have at least one parent born outside the Netherlands. Thus, the figures do not only concern third-country immigrants but also their children. In the Netherlands the terms ‘autochthonous’ and ‘allochthonous’ citizens are used to denominate respectively native Dutch people and people of non-Dutch origin or people who have at least one parent born outside the Netherlands. Mainly for political reasons, an additional distinction is made between Western and Non-Western allochthonous citizens. Non-Western allochthones have their roots in African, Latin-American and Asian countries – with the exception of Indonesia and Japan but including Turkey (Statistics Netherlands, 2012). Western allochthones originate from Europe, North-America and Oceania – with the exclusion of Turkey and including Indonesia and Japan. These distinctions are adopted in this deliverable for practical reasons and they are used in a descriptive sense.

For Malmö the statistics are mainly collected from the authorities responsible for statistics in their respective area. The most important source is Statistics Sweden, the official authority for statistics in Sweden. At their website it is possible to use a database that is specifically

built to analyze integration and segregation.[1] Statistics in the database are register-based and include the entire population in areas such as labour, demographics, income, housing, internal migration patterns, education, health, and elections for the whole country, counties, municipalities, and for the districts covered by the local development agreements and urban development efforts. The data is divided by background variables such as gender, age, educational background, region of birth, length of stay and reasons for immigration. Other statistics were collected from The Swedish national council for crime preventions database and from the city of Malmö's website.

Most official statistics about integration in Sweden follow the guideline set down in 2002 by Statistics Sweden, the Swedish Integration Board and the Swedish Migration Board (SCB, 2002). The main categorisations are based on where the persons were born: native born or foreign born. Foreign born and Swedish born with two foreign born parents are categorised as having foreign background while Swedish born persons with one or two Swedish born parents are categorised as having Swedish background. Ethnicity and religion are seen as sensitive and personal information and it is therefore not allowed by law to collect data on those variables.[2]

[1] http://www.scb.se/Pages/List____275836.aspx

[2] §13 i personuppgiftslagen (PuL 1998:204), in English Personal data act

3 Berlin

3.1 Demographics

In 2010, a total number of 859.788 officially registered people with a migration background lived in Berlin. These include foreigner as well as Germans with a personal history of migration. As the figures below reveal, the great majority of people with a migration background have their origin in Turkey (altogether 175.816 people in 2010). Furthermore, most migrants come from European countries – in the case of Berlin especially Poland (91.834) and Italy (19.792). Also, 96.063 people from countries of the former Soviet Union decided to settle in Berlin.

Table 1 Number of Berlin inhabitants in 2010 with a migration background in Berlin according to their origin (Source: Statistical Office Berlin-Brandenburg)

District	Total	EU			Former Soviet Union				Former Jugo-slavia	Turkey	Arabian Countries	Vietnam	USA
Among these			Poland	Italy		Russian Federation	Ukraine	Kazakh-stan					
Mitte	146.029	35.288	12.848	2.831	10.011	4.583	1.998	877	11.083	38.894	14.809	1.977	2.217
Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg	92.516	23.145	4.701	2.836	4.170	1.784	756	474	4.366	30.184	7.362	2.142	2.139
Pankow	40.148	18.025	3.951	1.643	5.472	2.437	754	866	1.376	1.600	1.278	1.541	1.597
Charlottenburg-Wilmersdorf	105.801	33.546	10.616	3.362	12.171	4.650	3.247	651	7.165	12.084	6.343	1.177	3.459
Spandau	54.920	14.027	8.222	829	9.126	4.438	924	2.664	4.341	11.869	3.848	588	390
Steglitz-Zehlendorf	64.849	21.806	8.805	1.734	5.412	2.361	1.186	544	4.422	6.592	3.046	400	3.884
Tempelhof-Schöneberg	103.325	29.573	12.882	2.702	9.426	4.075	1.880	1.398	8.241	22.271	7.158	705	2.107
Neukölln	119.168	27.402	13.901	1.947	4.710	1.868	833	910	12.817	36.816	14.914	908	1.096
Treptow-Köpenick	17.159	6.246	2.391	310	3.386	1.338	536	743	1.197	1.463	685	1.011	233
Marzahn-Hellersdorf	25.898	4.570	1.970	112	14.345	6.465	1.018	4.991	831	616	545	2.821	64
Lichtenberg	35.118	7.160	2.611	251	12.813	5.728	1.138	3.784	2.603	951	1.741	5.449	160
Reinickendorf	54.857	15.849	8.936	1.235	5.021	2.327	621	1.159	4.705	12.476	3.907	819	402
Berlin	859.788	236.637	91.834	19.792	96.063	42.054	14.891	19.061	63.147	175.816	65.636	19.538	17.748



Figure 1: Overview inhabitants with migration background in Berlin according to their origin (Source: Statistical Office Berlin-Brandenburg)

While most of the Turkish migrants arrived in Western Berlin in the economically booming 1960s and 1970s (see deliverable D 2.3), most migrants from the former Soviet Union and from Eastern Europe moved to Berlin after the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989. On the one hand the Treaty of Maastricht made it easy for citizens of the European member states to settle in Germany. On the other, third-generation German emigrants to the former Soviet Union have the right to easily acquire German citizenship and made use of it since the 1990s. In contrast to other major European cities such as Paris or London, in Berlin most migrants live in the central districts *Mitte, Neukölln and Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg.*



Figure 2: Share of people with a migration background in the districts of Berlin (Source: Statistical Office Berlin-Brandenburg)

This distribution can be attributed to the former separation of the city. Until the fall of the wall, those districts that are today the centre of Berlin were formerly border districts close to the wall and thus unpopular and cheap. This attracted immigrants who still live there. We shall expand on this issue when we further discuss the spatial dimension of migrant integration in the last part of the Berlin city case.

3.2 Socio economic issues

3.2.1 Labour market participation, income levels and the use of social benefits

Labour market participation is seen as one of the most important, not to say crucial factors for the integration of migrants (Hillmann 2001; Bartelheimer/Pagels 2009). For a long time labour market participation was the only aspect of immigration policy in Germany. From the first agreement on labour recruitment in 1955 till the recruitment ban in 1973, large numbers of foreigners immigrated to compensate the labour shortage in Germany. Those immigrants were invited as “guest workers” and their residence in Germany was supposed to be limited. Therefore social or political integration was no issue at that time. The only relevant question was how they were to be integrated (temporarily) in factories and businesses: “Integration was therefore spelled out as labour market integration” (Hillmann 2001: 189).

Contemporary policies define integration as a multidimensional and mutual process that includes all areas of society. Still labour market integration is one of the most prominent issues in municipal integration concepts. But although labour market integration is highlighted in those concepts, there are often few concrete suggestions for the implementation (Bartelheimer and Pagels 2009). According to Bartelheimer and Pagels, Berlin is one of the few exceptions.

Nevertheless the labour market situation for migrants in Berlin is worse than in other large cities in Germany. Since the reunification of the divided city, numerous industrial jobs have been lost. The following job shortage could not be compensated by the tertiary sector to this day. Especially the migrant population was affected by this negative development: “The economic situation of migrants in Berlin is worse than in other large cities: the extent of underemployment is even dramatic” (Gesemann 2009a: 319). The unemployment rate of migrants in Berlin is approximately twice as high as that of Germans. Among the migrants, 25,2% were unemployed in the year 2011, whereas the overall unemployment rate in Berlin was at 13,3%. This relation itself is not unusual and comparable with other large cities in Germany. But since the unemployment rate is generally higher in Berlin than in other cities, the extent of underemployment among the migrant population is alarming (Brenke 2008). However, it can also be noted, that the employment situation for migrants has improved during the past years. While in 2005, almost every second migrant was unemployed, in 2011 the percentage decreased significantly.

Table 2 : Number and ratio of unemployed citizens in Berlin: Germans and foreigners (Source: Statistical Office Berlin-Brandenburg)

Year	Total	in %	Total Non-German	Non-German in %
2005	319.178	21,5	59.515	44,1
2007	261.042	17,9	52.957	37,4
2009	237.035	14,1	48.234	26,6
2011	288.823	13,3	49.059	25,2

Considering their underprivileged position in the labour market it is hardly surprising that migrants are, by average, much more often depending on social benefits than Germans (Brenke 2008).

In spite of the various efforts of the municipal administration to enhance labour market participation of the migrant population, Bartelheimer and Pagels remind us that labour market participation at all cost is "no sufficient integration concept" (Bartelheimer and Pagels 2009: 486). Many migrants who actually participate in the labour market are working under worse conditions than the average of the German population. Migrants are hired far more often than Germans as low skilled workers. Furthermore they usually have a lower income than German workers (Brenke 2008). Therefore labour market participation is not a self-sufficient goal. Rather it is the "quality of the labour market integration that counts" (Bartelheimer and Pagels 2009). Also during the interviews our interlocutors have confirmed that real participation in the labour market would reduce both obstacles against integration as well as the economic vulnerability of migrants.

3.2.2 Migrant entrepreneurship and ethnic economies

The rising unemployment rate among migrants after the reunification of Berlin was accompanied by an increased incidence of migrant entrepreneurship (Hillmann 2001). Some researchers even see a direct correlation between the labour market crisis in Berlin and the growing number of business start-ups of migrants. In their opinion, migrants who were excluded from the labour market have reacted by founding their own business (Reimann/Schuleri-Hartje 2009).

Migrants in Berlin are, by average, more often starting a business than Germans. This is, compared with other large cities in Germany, unusual (Brenke 2008) and seems to confirm the presumption mentioned above, since the labour market situation for migrants in Berlin is worse than elsewhere. In 2010, 49.500 foreigners in Berlin were self-employed, thus making up for approximately 19% of all the self-employed people in Berlin. However, only 13% of the population in Berlin are foreigners. Former figures from 2005 show that – distinguishing between citizens with and without a migration background – the context of migration correlates with the decision to start a business.

Table 3 Number of self-employed people in Berlin in 2005 with and without a migration (Source: DIW Berlin)

Self-employed People in Berlin (Share of all employees in Berlin)		
	Without Migration Background	With Migration Background
Berlin Total	14,5%	21,3%
Berlin-West	17,2%	20,1%
Berlin-East	11,3%	28,0%

In academic literature such enterprises are often referred to as *ethnic economies.* This notion not only suggests that such businesses are founded by migrants, but also that they are in-

tending to satisfy “migrant specific” demands (Hillmann 2001; Reimann/Schuleri-Hartje 2009). Yet this notion is highly contested. Some researchers reject such an ethnicisation respectively culturalisation of economic activities (Reimann/Schuleri-Hartje 2009). However, some studies on *ethnic economies* indicate that there are indeed some specific features of many businesses founded by migrants. In her extended research on Turkish entrepreneurship in Berlin, Felicitas Hillmann found out some interesting features of these ethnic economies. The majority of the businesses lead by Turkish migrants was sited in city areas with a high population of people with a Turkish migration background. Most of them were small businesses, service companies and restaurants. Most of the entrepreneurs she talked to intentionally founded their businesses near the “Turkish community” (Hillmann 2001). According to the small size of most of the businesses, they did not have many employees. However, in most of the cases the whole staff consisted of people who themselves had a Turkish migration background. Four out of five Turkish entrepreneurs hired members of their own family. Furthermore nearly all of the entrepreneurs stated that their business would not survive without the help of family members (Hillmann 2001).

This seems to be a common feature of *ethnic economies*, which is not limited to businesses founded by Turkish migrants. While the support of family members is not unusual for small businesses, for those managed by migrant entrepreneurs this seems to be the rule (Reimann/Schuleri-Hartje 2009). Usually the employment of family members is intended to save time and personnel costs. Firstly this seems to be a competitive advantage for ethnic economies. But the downside of this procedure is that the children of migrant entrepreneurs often neglect their education in school for the sake of the family business (ibid.)

3.2.3 Education

There is no doubt that education plays a crucial role in modern societies. The education system is one of those institutions that not only determine chances in the lives of individuals, but also the economic competitiveness and the social cohesion of society as a whole (Gesemann 2009b). In his study on education of young migrants in Berlin, Werner Schiffauer clearly points out the comprehensive significance of this institution. In his view school is the place in which all members of society are being prepared for the active participation in society in “economic, political and socio cultural terms” (Schiffauer 2001: 233). Migration and the resulting linguistic, ethnic, cultural and religious heterogeneity of society are challenging the German education system in many ways. But recently there has been a growing understanding of the chances this development includes, for example multilingualism and growing intercultural competence. In any case there is a broad consensus in politics and science that education plays a key role for sustainable integration of migrants, respectively children with a migration background (Gesemann 2009b). The fact that most district integration commissioners regard education as the key to successful integration highlights its importance. In this context, the integration commissioner of Neukölln, for example, also points to the fact that the German employment market needs skilled and trained labour. He emphasises that jobs for unskilled workers are becoming rare in Berlin.

However, the educational opportunities of children with a migration background in Germany are still worse than those of children without a migration background. This means lower school leaving credentials, over-representation in schools with lower academic demands, over-representation in special education or disproportionally high drop-out and expulsion rates. The figure below confirms this finding. The share of foreign students leaving school without any school diploma is considerably higher than the share of German students. Furthermore, the higher the school education level gets, the lower the share of foreign students. In 2009/2010, only 6,73% of all students leaving the *Gymnasium* (highest school level in Germany enabling enrolment in universities) were foreigners. As a result they have smaller chances on the job market, lesser training participation and are more often reliant on transfer payments (Gesemann 2009b). The reasons for this inequality may lie in the general deficits of the German education system. The PISA study (Programme for International Student Assessment) indicates that the educational success of students in Germany highly depends on the socio-economic background of their parents. Accordingly the, by average, lower socio-economic position of migrants in Germany directly influences the possibilities of their children in regard to education and qualification. But it is not only the socio-cultural position of parents, but also their general interest in the education of their children that determines the educational success of students with a migration background. The earlier and the more parents communicate with teachers and school administrations, the more the educational chances of their children increase (Nohl 2001). Furthermore the three-tier school system in Germany and the early separation of students into different school types makes it impossible for lower attaining young people to benefit from the higher attaining students (Gesemann 2009b). Thus the German school system, in its current form, seems to perpetuate social inequality.

In this context, Neukölln's integration commissioner points to the fact that social segregation and the consequential inequalities in education are especially discernable in the Northern parts of Neukölln. In this area, children and teenagers with a migration background constitute the majority of the pupils attending schools – especially on the lower education level. The schools are not sufficiently equipped, underdeveloped and overburdened with the task to integrate migrant pupils. A particularly dramatic example was the Rütli School where the teaching staff demanded police protection against aggressive students.

Table 4 German and non-German school leavers in Berlin (Source: Statistical Office Berlin-Brandenburg)

Total Number of School Leavers			
School Year	**Total**	**Thereof foreign**	**Thereof foreign in %**
2004/05	35.527	5.041	14,19%
2005/06	33.923	4.669	13,76%
2006/07	32.719	4.597	14,05%
2007/08	31.780	4.651	14,63%
2008/09	30.233	3.828	12,66%
2009/10	28.677	3.966	13,83%

Table 5 Graduation figures of German and non-German pupils in Berlin (Source: Statistical Office Berlin-Brandenburg)

School Year	Without Graduation			Secondary Education (Hauptschulabschluss)			Extended Secondary Education (Erweiterter Hauptschulabschluss)			Advanced Secondary Education (Realschulabschluss)			University Entrance Diploma (Abitur)		
	Total	Thereof foreign	Thereof foreign in %	Total	Thereof foreign	Thereof foreign in %	Total	Thereof foreign	Thereof foreign in %	Total	Thereof foreign	Thereof foreign in %	Total	Thereof foreign	Thereof foreign in %
2004/05	3.468	1.158	33,39%	1.964	468	23,83%	5.052	1010	19,99%	13.030	1.628	12,49%	12.013	777	6,47%
2005/06	3.220	975	30,28%	2.250	558	24,80%	5.212	1129	21,66%	10.995	1.241	11,29%	12.246	766	6,26%
2006/07	3.175	963	30,33%	2.340	517	22,09%	4.862	1103	22,69%	10.234	1.334	13,03%	12.108	680	5,62%
2007/08	3.127	957	30,60%	2.287	565	24,70%	4.313	1024	23,74%	9.644	1.393	14,44%	12.409	712	5,74%
2008/09	2.777	659	23,73%	2.048	449	21,92%	3.733	839	22,48%	9.349	1.183	12,65%	12.326	698	5,66%
2009/10	2.730	711	26,04%	1.963	388	19,77%	3.792	888	23,42%	8.556	1.173	13,71%	11.636	806	6,93%

With regard to the administrative responsibility, in Germany usually the *Bundesländer* and not the municipal administrations are in charge of education policies. Due to the exceptional status of Berlin as *Stadtstaat* this differentiation makes no difference. Yet there appears to be an administrative conflict between the senate and the district level. In the district *Charlottenburg-Wilmersdorf*, where many schools with a “good reputation” are sited, the district commissioner for integration and migration is personally committed to education policy. During our interview he regretted that the district administration is not primarily responsible for education policies. In spite of that he organised informal meetings with the principals and insists on the continuous dialogue with the schools in his district.

3.2.4 Health care for migrants

Integration – understood as full participation of migrants in all areas of social life – includes equal access to health care services. But this very area is particularly sensitive, since here “communication problems and misunderstandings can lead to grave consequences” (Salman/Djomo 2009: 555). Health care in general includes the best possible diagnosis and therapy, but also psychosocial support and prevention. Due to their often disadvantaged socio-economical position migrants are above average exposed to health risks. Apart from that there are also some migration specific factors, like insecure residential status or the separation from family members, which may lead to higher stress levels and therefore to higher health risks.

To ensure full health care for the migrant population, the health care system has to adopt to the specific life circumstances and needs this people may have. Although they form a heterogeneous target group, Salman and Djomo (2009) make some general suggestions for the improvement of health care for migrants. The first step would be a better “understanding of different cultural attitudes towards body, intimacy and disease” (2009: 556). Therefore intercultural competence training for all relevant actors in the area of health care is needed. This includes not only medicinal staff in clinics, but also members of public health departments, counselling centres and other institutions. To overcome possibly existing language barriers it is also necessary to work with interpreters, who are specially trained and familiar with medicinal matters. Needless to mention that information material, digital or printed, should also be provided in different languages (Salman and Djomo 2009).

In the context of health care for migrants, there is one issue of growing importance: health care for elderly migrants. This is a major challenge which has been pointed out by the integration commissioners of Berlin. As the figure below shows, the migrant population is growing older and fewer children are born. Even though the demographic situation might not appear as dramatic as among the non-migrant population, particularly first-generation migrants reach an age in which assistance for the elderly is often required. While, as shown above, health care for migrants is itself a very sensitive area, the appropriate health care for older migrants is even more complicated. Since the political debate on integration in Berlin is more or less “youth-oriented” (Zeman 2002: 2), the specific needs of older people are often not fully recognised. At the same time research indicates, that the negative effects of the ageing process and the specific living situation of migrants mutually reinforce each other (Zeman 2002). The idea, that migrant families always being supportive towards their older members is a common but stereotypical presumption (ibid.).



Figure 3: Population in Berlin with and without migration background according to age and gender in 2010 (Source: Statistical Office Berlin-Brandenburg)

According to Zeman (2002) an intercultural opening of elderly care respectively geriatric care is desperately needed to bring together supply and demand: “Neither do the providers of elderly care have sufficient knowledge about the living situations and needs of older migrants, nor are older migrants sufficiently informed about the possible services elderly care may offer to them.” (Zeman 2002: 19) As well as in other areas, intercultural sensitivity train-

ing is needed in the field of elderly and geriatric care to know “where cultural and ethnic differentiation has a subjective significance and where not”. (ibid. 20) Since the general ageing of society naturally includes the migrant population, this matter becomes urgent.

The integration commissioner for the Berlin district of Kreuzberg has emphasised repeatedly this issue as one relevant to her work. Many of the migrants in her district arrived in Berlin as young and healthy workers during the economic boom period of the 1960s and were now approaching or exceeding their 70th birthday. It is, however, difficult e.g. to address the issue of specific intercultural needs in the context nursing homes.

One promising development in the context of health care for migrants is the fact that more and more people with a migration background are founding small nursing services. In many cases the managers of such services intentionally address patients of the same nationality or religion. Due to their respective language skills and their cultural knowledge they are able to better fit the needs of their target group (Reimann and Schuleri-Hartje 2009). Here it becomes strikingly clear that a migration background is not necessarily a disadvantage, but might be an additional qualification.

3.3 Socio cultural issues

3.3.1 Migrant delinquency

The criminal statistics published by the police in Berlin reveal a higher delinquency rate among foreigners compared to the German population. Generally, one third of the suspects in Berlin are non-German (see figure below). The rate has been constant during the past few years.



Figure 4: Share of non-German suspects among all suspects 2001 – 2010 (Source: Criminal Statistics Police of Berlin)

The police of Berlin also regularly points at the high delinquency rates among teenagers with migration backgrounds. However, the public debate on the delinquency of young migrants is highly controversial. While crimes committed by foreigners are themselves constantly scandalised, especially the delinquency of young people (under the age of 21) with a migration background is often seen as a proof for failed integration. Especially in districts with a high concentration of migrant population the situation is believed to get "out of hand". Accordingly during our interviews with different members of the Berlin administration it was the integration commissioner of *Neukölln* that highlighted juvenile delinquency among migrants as an important issue in his district.

According to Gesemann it is important to mention a statistical bias in the usual reports on crimes committed by foreigners. The statistical category "Crimes committed by foreigners" generally includes those crimes which are committed by tourists and other foreigners who are not permanently living in Germany. Furthermore there are some crimes that can only be committed by foreigners, because they are part of residential respectively asylum law (Gesemann 2004). But it is not only the statistical bias that distorts the public debate on the criminality among foreigners. Especially when it comes to migrant juvenile delinquency it seems to be the one sided and selective attention of the media that shapes the debate. According to Gesemann the media coverage on the delinquency of young migrants suggests a constantly rising crime rate and increasing brutality. On the other hand "contrary developments or positive examples for the prevention of criminality and violence" (ibid. 31) make no good news and are hardly mentioned. In fact, at the time Gesemann published his study on juvenile delinquency in Berlin, the crime rates of young migrants significantly decreased. Yet the crime rates of young migrants are still relatively high, compared with their proportion of the population. The reasons for this situation are complex and diverse. But most of them do not necessarily go back on the migration background of the young people. Reasons like a low socio-economic position or less perspectives for the individual future (regarding chances in the education system and the labour market) rather indicate that the marginalisation respectively discrimination of people generally leads to higher crime rates among those parts of the population (Gesemann 2004).

Andreas Kapphan comes to a similar conclusion. In his view it is not surprising that non-German youths react with frustration and aggression when they have no access to training and labour market (Kapphan 2000). The reasons for migrant juvenile delinquency can therefore not be limited to the migration background of young people. Rather it is an identity conflict, which results from "social and economic exclusion-experiences combined with a redefinition of their ethnic affiliation" (ibid. 41) that leads to deviating behaviour.

3.3.2 Dialogue with the Islamic community

After the publication of Samuel Huntington's *Clash of Civilisations* and the global political developments after the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 the religion of Islam is often seen as one party in a global conflict with "western" societies. The Muslim religion is suspected to have an inherent fundamental, even violent, tendency and became the object of

national and international intelligence agencies. This supposed global conflict and the supposed incompatibility of Islamic faith and western values clearly influences national and local debates on integration. In Germany, there is an on-going debate whether Muslims are able or willing to integrate in German society, which constantly refers to their religious beliefs (Gesemann/Kapphan 2001).

Obviously there is not *one* Islam but many different Islamic persuasions. There is no evidence, why this religion should have a greater tendency for fundamentalism or violence than others. Furthermore researchers constantly remind us, that cultural or religious identities are constantly changing and no static feature (Gesemann/Kapphan 2001). Nevertheless national and local controversies about Islam seem to be strongly influenced by such ideas.

In Berlin there are three recurring conflicts to which the Islamic community is exposed. One is about the erection of mosques, the second about religious education in schools and the third about religious Islamist radicalism. When we look at the spatial distribution and organisational structure of the Islamic community in Berlin we find that mosques (actually mostly just prayer rooms) are almost exclusively run by Sunnis. More than fifty per cent are maintained by people of Turkish origin. Their distribution over the city corresponds with the distribution of the Muslim population. Accordingly they are mostly concentrated in inner-city districts in West Berlin. The majority is sited in *Mitte, Kreuzberg-Friedrichshain* and *Neukölln*. Studies have shown that the social function of mosques in Berlin is not limited to religious purposes. Rather they provide a number of social services to the community. These services range from language and computer courses to tuition and various leisure activities (Gesemann/Kapphan 2001). Nearly all mosques in Berlin are organised in mosque-associations, who are themselves organised in umbrella associations. This hierarchic organisation is, as it is pointed out in academic literature, unusual for Islamic communities and can be understood as an adjustment to the host society (Gesemann and Kapphan 2001). Two-thirds of the mosque-associations are part of Turkish-Islamic umbrella associations. The most influential ones are the DITIB (*Türksich-Islamische Union der Anstalt für Religion*) – a transnational organisation that is closely linked to the Turkish government, the IFB (*Islamische Föderation Berlin*) and the VIKZ (*Verband islamischer Kulturzentren*).

Usually the municipal administrations in Germany are supposed to assign space to churches and religious associations for the building of adequate facilities. But since mosque-associations are not recognised as public bodies, they are an exception. Nearly all mosques in Berlin are actually prayer rooms, established in business premises. These business premises are more expensive than other available spaces. But the use of common flats would be considered as a misappropriation of housing space. Although these prayer rooms are hardly visible from the outside, their existence consistently arouses protest from other neighbours (Gesemann and Kapphan 2001; Leggewie 2009).

When it comes to the erection of mosques as new buildings, mosque associations (respectively their umbrella associations) are constantly confronted with two arguments. First, the buildings should not be recognisable as a mosque, which means that they should not have,

for example, a minaret. Second, the mosques should not be sited in districts with an already high concentration of migrant population. This is contradictory to the interests of the Islamic community, since they demand representative buildings in their respective neighbourhoods (Gesemann and Kapphan 2001; Leggewie 2009).

Pankow's integration commissioner exemplifies the conflicts about the erection of mosques by pointing to the Khadija Mosque in Pankow-Heinersdorf, the first mosque to be built on Eastern Germany territory. Once the Muslim community decided to settle in Pankow, protests against the construction of the Mosque emerged. Remarkable about this protest was the fact that no right-winged radical group initiated the protest; rather it came from the middle of the society.

When it comes to religious education the German constitution allows religious communities to organise and carry out teaching in schools. In practise, accepted religious communities used to be catholic and protestant Christians. Islam, however, has not officially been recognised as a religious community, also due to the organisational fragmentation. In 1998 the upper administrative court in Berlin (OVG) finally recognised the IFB as a religious community in the sense of the constitution, after a lawsuit that had been going on for almost twenty years. The decision of the court led to massive protest by German conservatives, but also by migrant associations. The conservatives pointed out, that the relation between the IFB and Milli Görüs, an Islamic association that is considered as fundamentalist, is not clear. They were apprehensive of a radical Islamic organisation in German classrooms. The migrant associations on the other hand rejected the IFB as representative for the whole Islamic community in Berlin. They insisted that Islam is not a monolithic religion and consists of various persuasions. Therefore Islam cannot be represented by one association (Gesemann and Kapphan 2001). Today it is still unclear, how Islamic religious education in schools should be organised, and who should be in charge. In other German federal states Islam teachers are trained in German universities. However none of the Berlin universities offers such courses.

The current public debate on the role of Islam in the German society is strongly influenced by the publication of *Deutschland schafft sich ab* (“Germany abolishes itself”) written by Thilo Sarrazin in 2010. In his publication, Islam is described as a religion of “aliens”, that is violent and oppressive towards women (Ramadan 2011). Especially in Berlin, the book gained a lot of media coverage and aroused massive protest by some members of the public administration. Nearly all of our interview partners mentioned it and expressed their anger. The integration commissioner for the district *Marzahn-Hellersdorf* said, that the controversy initiated by this book “destroyed the work of years”. She implicitly suggested, that the recent rise of hostility against foreigners in her district is to some extend stimulated by this book. The integration commissioner of the district *Tempelhof-Schöneberg* even sued the author for sedition.[3]

Although the allegations made in this book had quickly been unmasked as wrong, it dominated the media for months. One reason for the broad attention this book gained may be the

[3] It is important to mention, that she sued him as a private person and not as a member of the public administration, or even in public capacity.

fact that the author is no typical right-wing extremist, but a member of the social democratic party and long-term member of the city government heading the Ministry for Finances.[4] It appears that the opinion of many members of the middle class towards Muslims is shaped by a mixture of xenophobia on the one hand and ideas that can be traced back to media coverage of the global events after the events of September 11th 2001 on the other hand**.** In this context it is noteworthy that the integration commissioner of Treptow-Köpenick points to the fact that the discussion about the Islam in Germany is dominated by a fear towards islamisation.

Just recently, the issue of Islamist radicalism re-entered the public sphere in Germany due to the distribution of the Koran on public places in Berlin by the Salafist community. Yet already before this event, the integration commissioner of Neukölln already made clear in one of our interviews that the district's public administration eschews contact with Islamist groupings ass this would be part of the work of the security services.

3.4 Legal political issues

3.4.1 Political participation and participation in civil society on the local level

Equal political participation of migrants is seen as a key feature of real democracies (Baran 2011). Political participation basically ranges from indirect forms of political participation – e.g. participation in civil society or political organisations – to direct forms of participation like the exercising of voting rights. Since in Germany foreigners have no right to vote, neither on the national level, nor on the local level (see further deliverable D 3.2), they can only participate in democracy trough indirect forms of political participation.

For the public administration political participation of migrants has diverse functions. On the one hand it is a necessary requirement to adapt the actions of the public administrations to the needs of the migrant population. On the other hand it helps to legitimate the respective decisions of the administration and improves their acceptance among the migrant population (Baran 2011).

In his analysis of integration through political participation Roland Roth basically distinguishes between problem-orientated forms of political commitment and institutionalised forms of political participation on the local level (Roth 2009). In the context of problem-orientated forms of political commitment he describes the formation of political protest and civil disobedience in regard to specific events or certain conditions. While migrants in Germany during the 1960s and 1970s mainly protested against political conditions in their home countries, during the 1980s and 1990s their protest focused on asylum law, deportation, racism, and naturalisation procedures. While the mass protests of the 1990s are over, today there are still several issues that mobilise political protest by the migrant population. Those

[4] Not that the sociodemocratic party as a whole would share the positions expressed in the book. On the contrary, the publication has been publicly condemned and the party even tried to expel the author.

issues range “from veil to mosque building, from voting rights for foreigners to dual citizenship” (ibid. 200). In Berlin most demonstrations initiated or joined by migrants are against racism and right wing extremism.

Apart from the problem orientated forms of political participation, there are several more or less institutionalised forms and possibilities for the political participation of migrants on the local level. The most important ones are advisory boards of the municipal administration, migrant associations, general participation in civil society and participatory political programmes.

The advisory boards for integration and migration fulfil various functions for the municipal administration. They form a “pre-parliamentary institution” (Baran 2011: 239) that supports the municipal administrations in decision-making processes and the coordination of public private partnerships in the field of integration (see deliverable D 2.1). The first institution of this kind in Germany was founded in Berlin, in the district *Kreuzberg*, in 1971 (Baran 2011). This is hardly surprising, since this district was (and still is today) one of those with a significantly high density of migrant population. However, at that time there were few migrants participating in this council. Historically the *Ausländerbeiräte* were coordination councils for all institutions that somehow dealt with foreigners. Apart from the public administration itself, this included welfare associations, labour organisations, companies, police and others. The coordination council was supposed to improve the cooperation of these different actors and, furthermore, served as an “early warning system against discontent” (239) and social unrest.

Over the years this advisory boards changed in many ways. They became more and more participatory and more migrants were included as members (Baran 2011). Today they are an important actor in the field of integration politics on the local level. Nearly all of our interview partners pointed out their significance for the political participation of migrants and expressed their appreciation of the constructive cooperation with such boards. Nevertheless, advisory boards for integration and migration are in a difficult position. On the one hand they are supposed to represent the interests and needs of the migrant population. At the same time they have to cooperate with the municipal administration and help with the implementation of its policies (Baran 2011).

Another strategy to foster political participation of migrants is the cooperation of the public administration with migrant associations. In Berlin there are various migrant associations with different agendas and interests (see deliverable D 2.1). The self-organisation of foreigners in Germany started shortly after the arrival of the first so called “guest workers” in the 1950s. Back then various German welfare associations were in charge of the social care for foreigners. Each welfare association was responsible for a certain group of foreigners, divided along their respective nationality. This representation of interests by the welfare association was often criticised and seen as paternalistic. As a consequence, foreigners started to organise themselves in associations along their respective nationality or religion in order to emancipate from the social care by the welfare associations and formed a “second system of social care” (Roth 2009: 202).

Research on the self-organisation of migrants often points to the ambivalent effects of migrant associations for the integration of their members. Regardless of whether such associations are more orientated towards the host society or towards the respective country of origin, they are perceived as caught between “identity politics and diaspora politics” (Roth 2009: 203). In his study on migrant associations in Berlin Jürgen Fijalkowski points out positive and negative effects of the self-organisation of migrants. On the one hand migrant associations are the site at which political emancipation and mobilisation takes place. Furthermore they form supportive networks of people with a migration background and newly arriving immigrants. On the other hand Fijalkowski points out that this self-organisation can lead to mutual isolation of the respective migrant community and the German population (Fijalkowski, 2001). In his view, the self-organisation of migrants in Berlin can impede mutual contact with the host society and, at worse, lead to the development of “psychological ghettos” (ibid. 175). Referring to recent studies Roth disagrees with Fijalkowski and reminds us, that the different associations have divergent interests and are constantly changing. According to Roth, today migrant associations fulfil various functions like identity formation, establishment of supportive networks, cultural heritage preservation and the fostering of social competence. Furthermore they serve as mediators and form a bridge for the political participation of migrants (Roth 2009).

Nearly all of the district commissioners for integration and migration we interviewed confirmed this assessment. They regarded the frequent contact with the respective associations in their district as an important part of their work. It is via these associations that the public administration can best reach out the migrant population. Nevertheless, migrant associations, especially Islamic associations, are often suspiciously watched. The district commissioner for integration and migration of *Charlottenburg-Wilmersdorf* revealed an interesting detail in the context of migrant associations, when he told us about his former political life. He himself was member, sometimes chairman, of different associations. He told us that associations founded by foreigners are generally watched by the domestic intelligence service. Thus they looked for naturalised migrants among their supporters to found the association. Even though members of such associations did not intend to break the law, they also did not want to be under suspicion due to a categorisation as an association of foreigners. The integration commissioner of Neukölln explains yet another challenge for migrant associations. Most of them depend on one person, whose network is essential for the continuance of the association. Once this person decides to retire from her or his involvement the association’s work also comes to an end. Consequently, the districts administration’s cooperation with migrant organisations is perceived as a complicated matter. Neukölln’s integration commissioner states that “if an association is smart, then it ensures that following generations are included in its activities. The associations should develop from mere heritage societies to institutions that implement measures. That way, they will be accepted”.

Studies indicate that the participation of migrants in civil society and specific participatory political programmes varies depending on the social profile of the respective individuals. Accordingly the education level and the social status of a person determine his or her tendency

to participate in such voluntary initiatives and programmes. Thus, there is no significant difference in the commitment of the German and the migrant population (Roth 2009).

Despite of all these problems and challenges with regard to the cooperation with associations, most integration commissioners emphasise how essential the migrants' associations are for their daily work. Lichtenberg's integration commissioner pinpoints that "the support and conveyance of associations has always been an important issue in our district".

3.4.2 Debate on voting rights for local elections for third country nationals

Although there are many different forms of political participation of migrants on the local level, many researchers and politicians agree, that they form no sufficient substitute for a real voting right. Riza Baran reminds us, that they can just help to compensate an on-going political inequality (Baran 2011). However the crucial forms of political participation are linked to actual citizenship. Thus foreigners are not able to participate in elections, citizens' initiatives or referendums, regardless of how long they have lived in Germany. Yet it is important to understand that, due to the citizenship laws based on kinship (ius-sanguinis) in Germany, even a person who was born in Germany is a foreigner (in a legal sense) if no parent is a German citizen.

The debate on voting rights for local elections for foreigners goes back to the 1970s. Back then the so-called "guest workers" started to become permanent residents. As such they demanded the right to participate in the democratic system, at least on the local level. It is surely no coincidence, that the advisory boards for integration and migration were first initiated during this period. For some activists this was nothing but an attempt to distract from the general problem of a lack of democratic participation. Although the advisory boards were constantly extended and became more participatory during the following decades (Baran 2009: 241 et seq.) their influence remained fairly limited. Even today advisory boards have but little influence on the political decision making process, so that many migrants see them as "stairway to nothing" (Roth 2009: 199).

Recently the current commissioner for integration and migration of the Senate of Berlin, Günter Piening, published an essay on voting rights for third country nationals.[5] It starts with a harsh critique of the fundamental political inequality between German citizens and foreigners: "The exclusivity of the German voting right leads to the situation, that migrants are only marginally involved in the distribution of power and political resources. This also shapes the debate on immigration. This represents a fundamental imbalance, since a majority decides over a minority and excludes it from democratic processes at the same time" (Piening 2011: 215). Piening points out that 16,5% of the adult inhabitants of Berlin are, due to their nationality, not allowed to vote even, in local elections. In certain districts the foreign proportion of the population is even higher. For example, in *Mitte* 28% of the population is excluded from political elections. With regard to the high degree of political inequality, Piening defines the re-

[5] The essay was not published in in public capacity. Piening submitted it privatly as a contribution to an academic publication.

spective districts provocatively as “democracy free zones” (ibid. 217). In his view, for a society that calls itself democratic, this situation is unbearable.

The following example clarifies how this fundamental political imbalance influences the debate on integration. In 2008 there was a referendum on the Islamic religious education in Berlin schools. The Islamic community of the city was not very much interested in this plebiscite. This is not surprising as a large part of the community was, due to the lack of a right to vote, not able to participate. Yet the media coverage suggested – with regard to this lack of interest – Muslims would be unwilling to participate in the democratic process (Piening 2011).

One important question in the context of voting rights for third country nationals is the one about the naturalisation of foreigners. First, it is to mention that the naturalisation rate in Germany is, compared to other states in the European Union, significantly low.[6] Berlin on the other hand for a long time was the city with the highest naturalisation rate across the country. Gesemann even sees the high naturalisation rates in Berlin in the past as one of the most remarkable achievements of the local integration policy (Gesemann 2009a). But after the introduction of the new naturalisation laws in 2000 the rates rapidly declined (see figure below). For Gesemann the denial of multiple citizenship – a central part of the new regulations – is the most important reason for this development. In contrast, in other states of the European Union multiple citizenship is a usual practice[7] and widely tolerated (Piening 2011).

Table 6 Total numbers of naturalisations in Berlin 1998-2009 (Source: Statistical Office Berlin-Brandenburg)

Total Numbers of Natualization in Berlin	
1998	12.045
1999	12.278
2000	6.867
2001	6.273
2002	6.700
2003	6.626
2004	6.507
2005	7.097
2006	8.186
2007	7.710
2008	6.866
2009	6.309

Since 1992, due to the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty, at least foreigners from other states of the European Union are allowed to vote in local elections. But still third country nationals are excluded from this form of political participation. The last attempt to push through a general voting right for foreigners in local elections failed due to a legal assessment by the Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) in 1989. For Roth, however, the decision of the court,

[6] In 2006 Germany had a naturalisation rate of 1,8 per cent, while Great Britain had a naturalisation rate of 5,1 per cent. In Sweden the naturalisation rate in 2006 even was at 10,7 per cent (see Piening 2011: 218).

[7] In this context Piening names France, the Netherlands, Italy and Great Britain (2011).

linking popular sovereignty with the idea of the “German people”, does not seem very convincing (Roth 2009).

The debate on voting rights for third country nationals is still going on. In 2007 the Senate of Berlin decided to participate in a respective initiative in the *Bundesrat* (upper house of the German parliament) that has been submitted by state *Rheinland-Pfalz*. Although there has not been a final decision yet, there is still hope that sometime in the future all inhabitants of Germany are able participate in elections.

3.4.3 Intercultural opening of the public administrations

The intercultural opening of the public administration appears to be one of the most prominent issues in the contemporary debate on integration in Berlin. Nearly all of our interview partners on the district level pointed out the importance of an intercultural opening and assured us they would be personally committed to it. Most of the commissioners' efforts are directed at enabling a better service to the migrant population. For example, the integration commissioner of the district Steglitz-Zehlendorf highlights the importance of the intercultural opening of the public administration by referring to the employees of the citizen centres. "Sometimes they [the employees] are completely helpless. In those cases it is not about an official accreditation or an approval of a right to residence, but about human conduct. […] Sometimes, they are unable to cope with migrants because cultural differences remain unknown." Yet a brief look into the academic literature on intercultural opening shows, that this concept is heavily disregarded. It shows that intercultural opening is a very narrow concept or, as Tatiana Curvello puts it, no concept at all in a strict sense (2009).

Intercultural opening basically includes four approaches. First, more migrants should be employed in the public administration. Second, migrants should have easier access to public services. Third, administrative relevant non-profit organisations should cooperate with migrant associations. Fourth, all employees in the public administrations should acquire more intercultural competences through further trainings (Curvello 2009). We shall return to this in more detail in deliverable D 2.3, however the more scrutiny one applies, the more questions arise. Curvello asks: “But on which knowledge do these aspects rely, on which integration-relevant experiences are they based on, which integrating solutions do they promise?” (Curvello 2009: 248) Furthermore it is not clear to her on what concrete measures are to be used.

In her own research on programmes of intercultural opening in the public administration Curvello found out, that many members of the administration regard intercultural opening merely as “staging of integration measures” (2009: 252). Programmes of intercultural opening were carried out because they were demanded by higher political authorities. When she asked her informants about the sense of the respective measures, the members of the administrations replied they would not be responsible for the questioning of such instructions. In this context it is not surprising that for Filsinger intercultural opening seems to be but a convenient formula (Filsinger 2002).

Until recently the trainings for intercultural competence for members of public administrations and social services were designed similar to those for international development cooperation workers. Such training programmes were meant to prepare these workers for their sejour in a different country. They were supposed to help them cope with cultural differences they might encounter abroad. But this situation is hardly applicable to the communication with migrants who live in Germany for years. Thus, such programs unintentionally tend to enhance cultural prejudices (Curvello 2009).

While researchers agree that intercultural opening is to be embedded in a broader organisational development (Curvello 2009), it is still unclear how this organisational development is to be conceptualised. There are few publications that try to promote intercultural opening as a coherent concept. In Berlin the TiK project group (*Transfer interkultureller Kompetenz*) submitted an extensive documentation of its approach on intercultural opening. The group defined intercultural opening as a "process oriented organisational development" (ibid 249) that cannot be limited to occasional trainings of members of the organisation. But although the documentation of their experiences might be useful, they did not provide a coherent strategy.

It is astonishing that such a crucial concept of contemporary integration policy is so undefined and strategically underdeveloped. Obviously the implementation of intercultural opening as part of a broader organisational development is just at the beginning.

3.5 Spatial issues

3.5.1 Spatial dispersion versus segregation of migrant population in Berlin

In the context of urban planning there is a persistent controversial debate on the supposed effects of spatial segregation of migrants. Many researchers and politicians are convinced that the segregation of migrants in certain areas has a negative effect on integration. On the other hand there are some indications that point to positive influences of migrant density in certain neighbourhoods.

The debate on the supposed negative and respectively positive effects of segregation goes back to the 1970s when the concentration of the migrant population in certain districts was first recognised by the city administration of Berlin. In his study of Berlin as a city shaped by integration Stephan Lanz points out that this debate was not limited to Berlin, but influenced the perception of immigration all over Germany. Accordingly social science research on immigration to cities widely focused on the segregation of migrants within the city area (Lanz 2007).

Most researchers distinguish between two basic forms of segregation: *functional segregation* and *structural segregation*. Each form goes back to specific reasons and is supposed to have different effects on the integration of migrants.

Functional segregation refers to the voluntary concentration of migrants in particular districts. This category is based on the assumption, that migrants tend to live in neighbourhoods that are already populated with people of the same origin. Here they find supportive networks and neighbours with a similar cultural background. Especially new immigrants are supposed to benefit from a familiar environment. There, they can get in touch with people who speak their language and may have made similar experiences during their migration process. In this context people help newly arriving immigrants to interact with the public administration and provide useful advice for a life in Germany. Therefore they help new immigrants to find their way into the host society. In so far segregation can, under certain circumstances, enhance integration. This voluntary concentration of migrants in certain districts, accompanied by the development of a specific infrastructure – i.e. ethnic economy, religious institutions and migrant associations – is often referred to as the development of *ethnic colonies*. However, functional segregation is supposed to be but temporarily. Once the new immigrants have adapted to the new society, they no longer depend on informal networks (Häußermann and Siebel 2001).

Structural segregation on the other hand goes back to external constraints. Discrimination of migrants in the housing market often forces them to move to particular areas where the demand of the German population is comparatively weak. Migrants' often lower socio-economic position enhances this tendency even more. The supposed struggle over space between the German and the migrant population leads to the concentration of migrants in particular, less desired areas. In a second step – due to the growing concentration of the migrant population – these areas become even less attractive for Germans. Therefore more and more Germans, who can afford to move away, leave the neighbourhood. The outcome is a widely segregated area, populated with migrants and Germans of a low socio economic position. In this constellation common values and standards become less important. Finally it comes to the development of ghettos with increased ethnic cultural conflicts. Hence, structural segregation is seen as a reason for the isolation of the migrant population and therefore as a barrier for successful integration (Häußermann and Siebel 2001).

Regardless of the possible positive effects of ethnic colonies, many researchers fear that they foster and perpetuate mutual isolation of the different parts of the population. With regard to the segregation of migrants in certain districts of Berlin, Andreas Kapphan points out that ethnic colonies themselves are not necessarily a barrier for the integration of migrants. But he also points out that enforced spatial isolation enhances the negative effects of limited labour market participation and social mobility: “Only the combination of ethnic orientation and poverty makes the concentration a problem for the members of the colony” (Kapphan 2001: 104). With regard to the respective districts of Berlin, he finds an unlucky combination of negative developments. After the reunification of Berlin high unemployment rates and growing poverty would be characteristic for the situation in the respective city areas with a high concentration of migrant population. Facing the lack of adequate chances for social participation and blocked social mobility migrants would withdraw into the ethnic colony (Kapphan 2001). Their frustration might also lead to fundamentalist tendencies. Especially young

migrants are affected by this development: “Especially in *Kreuzberg* and *Wedding* Islamist and Turkish nationalist groups attract youths in a strong way.” (ibid. 105)

Due to the culmination of unfortunate circumstances Kapphan clearly identifies segregation and the development of ethnic colonies as a barrier for the integration of migrants in Berlin: “Unemployment and poverty in combination with ethnic segregation form a constellation, where the positive effects of ethnic colonies are becoming less important.” (ibid. 106)

For Kapphan the significance of ethnic identities grows with the lack of chances for participation in society. German residents and migrants would get involved in a “fight for cultural hegemony” (ibid.) that takes place in the respective neighbourhood: “[...] and the district is the place, where this battle is carried out” (ibid.)

The integration commissioner of Neukölln expresses the same concerns about the northern areas of the district. In some streets many unregistered migrants settled. However, the biggest problem in this context is that the houses are not administered carefully. Consequently, nobody knows exactly how many migrants actually live in one apartment (also due to illegal sub tenancy). Most flats are overcrowded, the houses' locks are broken, the street is dirty, the trash cans overfilled, etc. As another consequence more and more Germans but also well-integrated migrants move away advancing social segregation.

Another issue in this context is the gentrification in Berlin. As mentioned above, many migrants used to live near the Berlin Wall. Today, those districts are right in the city's centre and thus become more and more popular. As a consequence, the rents increase as well forcing migrants to move away to districts further away at the suburbs of the city. Traditionally, most suburban districts of Berlin do not have particularly high shares of migrants, thus also lacking the infrastructure to cope with and integrate those migrants. The district of Reinickendorf, in which the public administration still resists to establish an integration commissioner due to the reasoning that the migrant population is still a minority, is an example for this development. Also the commissioner of the district Treptow-Köpenick hints at this issue. Integration issues related to social segregation are becoming more prominent due to the fact that more and more migrants formally living in Neukölln now move to the adjacent northern parts of Treptow-Köpenick.

However, not all researchers share this harsh view on segregation. Stephan Lanz reminds us, that the debate on segregation distracts from the various processes of inclusion and exclusion of migrants that take place within society. In his view integration has nothing to do with the spatial distribution of the population. Such discourses would rather tend to create the “ghettos” they claim to describe. For Lanz no district in Berlin is in danger of becoming a battlefield for “ethnic” or “cultural” conflicts (Lanz 2009).



Figure 5: Foreigners in the districts of Berlin in 2010 (Source: Statistical Office of Berlin-Brandenburg)

4 Rotterdam

4.1 Demographics

Over the past decade, the share of the non-Dutch inhabitants in Rotterdam has slowly increased, whilst the share of native Dutch citizens has decreased. In 1975 the immigrant percentage of the Rotterdam population was 6%. Their share grew to 20% in 1985 and 30% in 1990 (Veenman, 2000). Currently, the percentage of allochthonous citizens has more or less stabilised with 45% in 2000 and 47,7% in 2012. Rotterdam currently counts 166 nationalities. 47.7% of the population is of non-Dutch origins or has at least one parent born outside the country (Centre for Research and Statistics Rotterdam, 2012).

The largest ethnic minorities in Rotterdam are respectively: Surinamese, Turkish, Moroccans, Antilleans and Cape Verdeans. Most statistics distinguish for those groups. Over the past years, the Surinamese and Cape Verdean groups in Rotterdam have rather stabilised in their size. The other groups still show a minor growth. Other EU and other Western minorities show the largest increase over the past years. Rotterdam is expected to become the city with the largest share of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands. 37% of them are considered to be non-Western.

The term ‘immigrant groups’ is becoming outdated as the first generation of immigrants is relatively shrinking in comparison with the second generation of children of immigrants. Growth in size of the largest immigrant groups in Rotterdam (Surinamese, Antillean, Turkish, Moroccan and Cape Verdean) is almost fully accounted for by growth of this second generation. Other ethnic minorities such as eastern Europeans and other non-Western groups are still growing due to recent immigration.

Table 7 Ethnic groups in Rotterdam (absolute numbers of inhabitants on January 1st 2012) ((Source: Rotterdam Municipal Citizen Administration (GBA))

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Surinamese	50,053	50,879	51,872	52,146	52,291	52,521	52,100	51,956	51,885	52,206	52,632
Antillean	15,593	17,555	19,075	20,096	20,348	20,026	19,406	19,290	19,562	20,261	21,066
Cape Verd-ean	14,377	14,567	14,742	14,835	15,015	15,123	15,080	15,023	14,971	15,103	15,299
Turkish	40,277	41,276	42,450	43,327	44,637	45,029	45,175	45,459	45,699	46,203	46,868
Moroccan	30,238	31,531	33,018	34,151	35,355	36,145	36,686	37,141	37,476	38,158	38,982
Other Non-Western	30,184	32,989	36,193	38,709	40,125	40,675	40,126	39,696	40,257	42,115	44,080
Native Dutch	355,438	349,300	342,676	337,373	332,327	327,761	321,634	317,426	313,765	311,778	310,163
Other EU	30,937	31,244	31,638	31,912	31,900	31,784	31,293	31,108	32,134	33,909	36,069
Other Western	25,563	26,048	26,803	27,310	27,546	27,533	27,218	26,947	27,200	27,428	27,780



Figure 6: Ethnic groups in Rotterdam with exception of native Dutch (absolute numbers of inhabitants on January 1st) (Source: Rotterdam Municipal Citizen Administration (GBA))

4.2 Socio-economic issues

4.2.1 Education

In general, educational attainment of minors in Rotterdam is lagging behind compared with the Dutch population in general. This is reflected in level scores when children leave primary school (CITO scores). A majority of the children attends secondary school at a maximum level of VMBO plus. When we compare figures from 2000 and 2008, we observe that the educational attainments of Rotterdam citizens have improved. This also concerns ethnic minorities. However, large differences in educational achievement remain between the largest minority groups and the native Dutch population if we look at people who have already left the education system. Turkish and Moroccan citizens lag behind the most in comparison with native Dutch citizens. Other minorities take in a position in between (Entzinger & Scheffer, 2012).

In secondary education, the percentage of non-Western allochthonous students in higher levels of education is increasing. Especially on the lower level of pre-vocational secondary education (VMBO) the number of non-Western allochthonous students has reduced sharply. The SCP describes how non-western allochthonous students are increasingly entering higher education but are less successful in earning a diploma. Some have transferred from vocational education (MBO) to higher professional education (HBO) and from there to university education.

Table 8 Achieved level of education in percentages distinguished for ethnicity of citizens of Rotterdam between 15 and 64 years of age in 2000 and 2008 (Source: Statistics Netherlands (CBS))

	2000			**2008**		
	Low	Intermediate	High	Low	Intermediate	High
Surinamese	57	34	9	44	43	13
Antillean	63	32	6	52	38	11
Turkish	79	18	3	63	30	7
Moroccan	78	18	4	66	26	8
Other non-Western	68	23	8	52	35	14
Other Western	40	38	22	29	41	30
Native Dutch	40	37	23	31	38	30
Total	49	33	18	40	37	23

Several factors may account for ethnic differences in educational attainment. First, immigrants from the four largest minority groups (the first generation) often had no or little education in their countries of origin. This particularly concerns Turkish and Moroccan immigrants (Gijsberts et al., 2012). Second, non-Western children perform less well at primary school in comparison with their Dutch counterparts because of their lower language proficiency (Gijsberts et al., 2012). Third, the numbers of allochthonous minors dropping out of high school or vocational education without a diploma are relatively higher than those of autochthonous minors. This decreases their opportunities to enter the labour market. The chairman of SPI-OR mentions drop outs in particular as an important immigrant issue in Rotterdam. Fourth, segregation of primary education is present in Rotterdam. Schools in mixed ethnic neighbourhoods tend to become primarily 'white' or 'black'. Although schools with mainly allochthonous pupils do not necessarily offer less quality of education, but there is less interethnic contact amongst children. Also, a former Alderman observes that allochthonous parents are less involved in their children's education. Their children are less supported in their efforts in school.

A more nuanced picture is drawn when we distinguish for immigrants and children of immigrants (the second generation). The percentage of minors of Non-Western immigrants (which includes the five largest minority groups in Rotterdam) achieving intermediate of higher level of education has increased over the years and approaches the native Dutch population more closely although differences remain.

Table 9 Achieved level of education in percentages distinguished for first and second generations of immigrants in Rotterdam between 15 and 64 years of age in 2000 and 2008 (Source: Statistics Netherlands (CBS))

	2000			2008		
	Low	Intermediate	High	Low	Intermediate	High
Native Dutch	40	37	23	31	38	30
Western Immigrants	48	34	18	34	40	26
Western Children of immigrants	31	43	26	23	42	34
Non-Western Immigrants	70	23	7	56	34	10
Non-Western Children of Immigrants	59	34	7	50	38	12
Total	49	33	18	40	37	23

The percentage of children leaving secondary school or vocational education without a diploma in Rotterdam has generally decreased over the past years. Children of non-Dutch ori-

gins leave school without a diploma more often. The differences with Dutch children are bigger for Non-Western ethnic minorities.

Table 10 Percentage of children in secondary school or vocational education in Rotterdam (up to 23 years old) leaving school without a diploma, distinguished for ethnicity (Source: Statistics Netherlands, Youth Monitor)

	2004/2005	2005/2006	2006/2007	2007/2008	2008/2009
Native Dutch	6.4	5.2	5.7	5.0	4.9
Other Western	7.9	5.9	6.3	6.5	5.8
Non-Western	9.0	7.4	8.0	7.6	7.2

4.2.2 Labour market participation, income and welfare benefits

The net employment rate measures the proportion of the country's working-age population (ages 15 to 64) that is employed. In table 5 we read that labour market participation of non-Western minority groups is lower than that of the native citizens of Rotterdam. In general, employment rates have increased when we compare the three year averages. A notable exception is the Antillean minority whose employment rate has decreased.

According to national employment figures, the net participation rate of non-Western migrants has fallen more sharply since 2008, and the unemployment rate among ethnic minorities has risen more steeply than among Dutch natives. This points at a widening gap between autochthonous and allochthonous labour market participation over the past years of economic recession (Gijsberts, 2012).

Table 11 Net employment of ethnic groups in Rotterdam (three year average; based on samples; Source: Statistics Netherlands)

	2001-2003	2008-2010
Surinamese	54	60
Antillean	56	48
Turkish	43	47
Moroccan	36	44
Other non-Western	45	57
Total non-Western	47	53
Other Western	60	65
Native Dutch	65	69
Total	58	63

The second generation of non-Western allochthonous has succeeded in climbing the occupational ladder over the past ten years. The proportion of them who have senior positions has climbed from 19% to 25% (Gijsberts, 2012). The position of young immigrants and children of immigrants however remains precarious. Youth unemployment, especially of Moroccan and Surinamese minorities is much higher than that of the native Dutch youth.

The former program manager of the policy program 'Multi-coloured City' between 1998 and 2002 still considers socio-economic participation to be an important prerequisite for social and cultural integration. The current integration policies have again a socio-economic focus. The current senior policy advisor of the team integration and civic integration states that the policy however not only focuses on immigrants, but on all citizens of Rotterdam. It aims to decrease all citizens' deficiencies with regard to language, education, labour market access et cetera.

The employment figures the municipality provided us with pay attention to the labour market participation of women. In general, their participation is lower than that of men. This is particularly the case for women of non-Dutch origin. The table below shows the labour market participation of women for various ethnic groups. For the unemployed, it shows whether they are unemployed due to circumstances or choice (the latter means that they do not consider themselves to be part of the labour force).

Table 12 Net employment of women by ethnicity (25-34 years old) in Rotterdam from 2008-2010 (Source: Statistics Netherlands)

	Net employment	Unemployment	Not part of labour force
Surinamese and Antillean women	68	12	23
Turkish and Moroccan women	48	10	47
Other non-Western women	58	12	34
Other Western women	74	11	16
Native Dutch women	88	2	10

From this, we can conclude that the net employment of native Dutch and other Western women in Rotterdam is much higher than that of non-Western groups. Non-Dutch women (including Western minorities) are more often unemployed against their choice than Dutch women. Non-Western women are more often unemployed by choice. The labour market participation is particularly low amongst Turkish and Moroccan women. The general low employment rates of Moroccans and Turkish groups can largely be accounted for by the lower

labour market participation of women in these groups. Among the second generation the participation of women has increased significantly, but is still less than that of native Dutch women. In contrast to other European countries, women in the Netherlands often work part time. In these statistics people working more than 12 hours a week are considered to be employed.

Table 13 Net employment of non-Western women (25-34 years old) in Rotterdam by generation from 2008-2010 (Source: Statistics Netherlands)

	Net employment	Unemployment	Not part of labour force
First Generation Non-Western women	48	13	45
Second Generation non-Western Women	72	9	21
Non-Western women total	56	12	37

When we distinguish labour market participation of non-Western women by immigrants (first generation) and children of immigrants (second generation), we see that second generation non-Western women's employment rates are significantly higher. This is the same for non-Western men.

The income position of non-Western minorities in the Netherlands is much weaker than that of the Dutch. They are more often dependent on benefits, have a lower average income, are more often poor and have fewer assets (Gijsberts, 2012). In Rotterdam, about 9% of allochthonous households receive social welfare. That is higher than the number of autochthonous households. The number of welfare recipients amongst children of immigrants is much less; even relatively less than the number of autochthonous Dutch who receive social welfare. Part of this can be explained because they are relatively young (Entzinger & Scheffer, 2012).

Welfare dependency among first generation non-Western citizens is much higher than that of native Dutch citizens. Welfare dependency of second generation non-Dutch citizens is often lower than that of native Dutch citizens in Rotterdam (See table 14).

Table 14 Type of income of Rotterdam citizens of 23-64 years old (percentages) (Source: Statistics Netherlands)

	2007				2008			
	Native Dutch	First generation Non-Dutch	Second generation Non-Dutch	Total	Native Dutch	First generation Non-Dutch	Second generation Non-Dutch	Total
No income	6	13	5	9	7	14	6	9
Income from labour	74	56	71	67	76	59	72	69
Income from social welfare	16	27	14	20	14	25	12	18
Other sources of income	4	3	11	4	3	3	11	4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Income levels of employed non-Dutch groups are lower than that of native Dutch citizens in Rotterdam, with exception of that of Western minorities. The Native Dutch population of Rotterdam earns a yearly €22.900 on average. Western minorities closely approach this figure. The Moroccan minority earns the least in comparison with the Dutch. They only earn €16.100 a year on average. The Surinamese minority is in the most favourable socio-economic position, although they are still lagging behind the native Dutch. The risk of falling below the poverty line is almost four times as high for non-Western migrants (18%) than for native Dutch (Gijsberts, 2012). Their income is lower, they are more often dependent of welfare and they are less able to build up assets.

Table 15 Average income of people between 20-64 years old by ethnicity (excluding students) in 2008. (Source: Statistics Netherlands)

	% with income	Average yearly income
Native Dutch	91	22.9
Moroccan	79	16.1
Turkish	79	16.9
Surinamese	91	18.3
Antillean	89	17.3
Other Non-Western	80	17.0
Other Western	84	21.8
Total average	88	20.9

In the second generation, income differences are even larger, although we have to take into account that the second generation of ethnic minorities is relatively young in comparison with the population of native Dutch. The Antillean second generation is performing better than their parents in terms of their earned income. The second generation of the Western minority is remarkably affording more on average than the native Dutch population.

Table 16 Average income of people between 20-64 years old by ethnicity distinguished for first and second generation (excluding students) in 2008 (Source: Statistics Netherlands)

	First generation	Second generation
Moroccan	16.3	15.1
Turkish	17.2	15.9
Surinamese	19.0	16.1
Antillean	17.2	18.1
Other Non-Western	17.0	16.9
Other Western	20.5	23.4
Total average	18.0	19.2

4.2.3 Participation in voluntary work

Since 2008, COS asked the citizens of Rotterdam in the social survey about their participation in voluntary work. That is: voluntary work for one or more organisation which is not paid for. In general, we see that people from ethnic minorities are not participating in voluntary work as much as the native Dutch do. The Moroccan minority contains the smallest share of people participating in voluntary work. We observe a small increase in the participation in voluntary work over the three years when this was monitored.

Table 17 Percentage of people that participates in voluntary work for one or more organisations by ethnicity (Source: COS Social Survey)

	2008	2009	2010
Surinamese	16	16	15
Turkish	13	16	16
Moroccans	12	13	13
Other ethnic minorities	17	19	19
Native Dutch	27	27	27
Total	22	23	23

4.2.4 Health

Statistics on the perceived and actual health of ethnic groups in Rotterdam are available. For instance, obesity and depression have a higher prevalence among certain groups. It goes beyond the purpose of this report to elaborate on this. In general, minority groups consider their health to be worse than native citizens do. They also visit the general practitioner more often (Health Survey, 2008).

Although allochthonous citizens perceive their health to be worse than autochthonous citizens, figures show that their life expectancies are actually higher than that of native Dutch. This is probably due to the 'healthy migrant effect': healthy people are more likely to migrate than unhealthy people. Based on research on obesity and psychological health, Entzinger (2012) states that although comparable data is limited, allochthonous citizens are in general less healthy, and that cleavages between healthy autochthonous and unhealthy allochthonous citizens risk to become deeper. Their worse (perceived) health could be a sign of discomfort in their new (socio-cultural) environment.

Table 18 Percentage of people of 16 years or older in Rotterdam who consider their health to be moderate or worse in 2008 according to ethnicity (Source: Health Survey 2008 in the four largest Dutch municipalities)

Surinamese	20
Antillean	22
Turkish	41
Moroccan	31
Other Non-Western	18
Western allochthones	18
Autochthones	16

4.2.5 Language proficiency

Data from the Rotterdam Social Index show how deficiencies in the use of Dutch language are most prevalent amongst Turkish and Cape Verdean people. Surinamese and Antillean minorities suffer less deficiency as these were Dutch colonies where the Dutch language was spoken by parts of the population. Among the native Dutch, 4% of the people does not read and write their language sufficiently.

Table 19 Percentage of people in Rotterdam with language deficiencies by ethnic group (average over 2008, 2009 and 2010) (Source: Social Index Rotterdam)

Dutch	4%
Turkish	48%
Moroccans	35%
Antilleans	19%
Surinamese	9%
Cape Verdean	47%
Other	30%
Total	15%

4.3 Legal political issues

4.3.1 Political Participation

An important indicator of political participation are turnout rates with elections. Turnout Rates for municipal and submunicipal elections in Rotterdam are generally low. More or less 50% of the population casts their vote. For ethnic minorities, this percentage is even lower but this has fluctuated for municipal and submunicipal elections over the past years. This can be explained by the political climate and the prominence of integration measures in election campaigns. When integration and the position of ethnic minorities in society was subject of discussion in the election campaigns in 2002 and 2006, we see that this motivated more people from ethnic groups to cast their vote whilst they normally would not. The statistics show how political participation by voting in municipal elections is lowest for Surinamese, Antillean and Cape Verdean citizens of Rotterdam.

Table 20 Turnout municipal elections in Rotterdam by ethnicity (Source: IMES (2006) and department of Public Affairs (2002 and 2010))

	2002	2006	2010
Turkish	53	56	46
Moroccans	39	58	47
Surinamese	33	41 (together)	26
Antilleans	19		23
Cape Verdeans	24	-	22
Other Non-Western	32	-	31
Other Western	44	-	43
Native Dutch	62	-	58
total Rotterdam	55	58	48

A notable fact is that allochthonous citizens report higher confidence in the municipal administration than autochthonous citizens. Perhaps their lower turnout can be explained by this larger confidence in the municipal governance (Entzinger & Scheffer, 2012).

4.3.2 Discrimination

In Rotterdam, Moroccan people feel most discriminated (38%) in comparison with the Turkish (32%) and Surinamese (26%). Eleven per cent of the autochthonous citizens reported that they have felt discriminated against at least once (Entzinger & Scheffer, 2012).

4.4 Socio-cultural issues

4.4.1 Delinquency

In Rotterdam there is a strong overrepresentation of allochthonous citizens among suspects of crimes. This can partly be explained by age: ethnic minority groups are relatively young compared with the autochthonous majority. Also among the allochthonous suspects there are non-Dutch citizens such as criminals active in international networks. Even though, the numbers of allochthonous suspects are relatively high, particularly for Antillean and Moroccan people. Particularly citizens of Antillean origin are more likely to commit a crime. Other figures show that particularly Antillean and Moroccan youth is more likely to be delinquent in comparison with older people with the same ethnicity.

Table 21 Suspects of delinquent behavior in Rotterdam, distinguished by ethnicity (Source: Report Antillean and Moroccan Citizens in Rotterdam - Risbo, 2011)

	Antillean	Moroccan	Surinamese	Turkish	Other Non-Western	Other Western	Native Dutch	Total
% Suspects of this origin in 2010	5.9%	4.3%	3.5%	2.5%	2.2%	1.2%	1.0%	1.8%
- from 12 to 17 years old	7.8%	7.2%	3.6%	3.2%	3.2%	2.2%	1.9%	3.4%
- from 18 to 24 years old	7.0%	8.3%	6.2%	4.5%	3.7%	2.2%	2.3%	3.8%
% of those who earlier had been suspected of a crime	70.6%	70.3%	67.3%	63.1%	57.4%	52.6%	58.0%	62.5%
% Suspects of this origin in 2006-2010	22.6%	16.5%	15.1%	11.4%	10.9%	6.3%	5.7%	8.6%
- from 12 to 17 years old	20.7%	18.3%	11.9%	10.0%	10.7%	8.6%	7.5%	10.9%
- from 18 to 24 years old	26.4%	30.6%	24.3%	18.7%	15.6%	10.4%	12.1%	16.5%

On the other hand, non-Western persons more often reported being victims of crime than Dutch natives. They also feel more unsafe. This can probably be explained because they are younger and live more often in an urban setting (Gijsberts et al., 2012).

4.4.2 Acceptance of norms and values

We have one indicator of acceptance of norms and values by various ethnic groups in Rotterdam from the yearly survey of COS. This is a statement regarding homosexual teachers: '*I disapprove of children in schools being taught by a homosexual teacher*'. About 85% of the

native Dutch population disagrees or fully disagrees with this statement. This percentage is less among people from ethnic minorities. Acceptance of homosexuality is the least among Turkish and Moroccan people. Acceptance among Surinamese and Antillean people seems to be increasing over the years.

Table 22 Percentage of people in Rotterdam who accept homosexual teachers at schools by ethnicity (Source: COS Survey)

	2007	2008	2009	2010
Surinamese	65	57	57	75
Antilleans	58	72	50	75
Turkish	38	43	37	39
Moroccans	44	50	35	47
Other non-Western	69	61	60	63
Other Western	81	88	81	82
Native Dutch	84	87	85	88
Total	78	78	77	81

Statistical information on other issues concerning acceptance of norms and values is at this point not available.

SPIOR actively deals with projects about conflicting cultural norms and values such as tolerance towards homosexuality, arranged marriages, revenge crimes of honour that particularly come with Islamic minorities. The former leader of the political party 'Liveable Rotterdam' has a strong focus of this cultural aspect of integration. He states that '*Our integration policy was strongly norm and value-oriented. It was derived from the belief that our norms are good but people do not know them yet.'*

In this period after 2001, the fear of (mainly Islamic) extremism and radicalisation grew. A former Alderman advisor states that '*Radicalisation is an expression of not feeling at home'*. Preventive policies were developed that mainly involved dialogue to increase mutual acceptance and understanding. The current Alderman of Labour Market, Higher Education, Innovation and Participation does not aim for integration but focuses on a tolerant city with space for individual religiosity, sexuality and norms and values. She tries to stimulate this with positive measures. *'Citizens have something to gain'.* She explicitly does not focus on problems that maybe relate to integration.

4.4.3 Identification with Rotterdam

Allochthonous citizens feel less attached to their city, neighbourhood and to the Netherlands than native Dutch citizens. They feel particularly less attached to the Netherlands as a whole (Dagevos et al., 2007; Entzinger & Dourleijn, 2008). The chairman of SPIOR states that the attachment of both allochthonous and autochthonous citizens to Rotterdam is an important socio-cultural issue of integration: '*With an equal position in housing, labour and education, we have not yet achieved a shared society.'* Also a former Alderman advisor sees a lack of involvement with the Rotterdam society as one of the main problems of integration: '*This society is experiences discomfort'.*

4.4.4 Inter-ethnic contact

Inter-ethnic contact is considered to be an important indicator of social integration. Most people from ethnic minorities report that they are in contact with native Dutch citizens and other ethnic minority groups. Table 17 shows that the native Dutch population is the least in contact with people from other ethnic groups. 62% of them report to have been in contact with someone with another ethnicity over the past year in 2010. For different ethnic minorities in Rotterdam these numbers differ between 70 and 80 per cent. The Turkish group reports less inter-ethnic contact. Their in-group ties are stronger than those of for instance Moroccans and Surinamese.

Table 23 Percentages of Rotterdam citizens who are in contact with people from other ethnicities in their spare time (Source: COS Social Survey)

	2008	2009	2010
Surinamese	82	80	79
Turkish	69	67	70
Moroccans	78	81	75
Other ethnic minorities	74	75	74
Native Dutch	60	61	62
total	66	67	68

A specific 'type' of inter-ethnic contact is of course inter-ethnic marriages. Table 18 shows how people from other EU countries and other Western groups include most inter-ethnic marriages: about 74% respectively 48%. Moroccan and Turkish people have most in-group marriages. The number of inter-ethnic marriages for Surinamese and Antillean people seems to be slightly increasing over time.

Table 24 Percentage of households in Rotterdam consisting of inter-ethnic married couples per ethnic group (Source: Rotterdam citizen's administration)

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Surinamese	15%	15%	15%	16%	16%	16%	17%	17%
Antillean	42%	43%	43%	44%	44%	43%	42%	42%
Cape Verdean	13%	13%	13%	14%	14%	14%	16%	17%
Turkish	4%	4%	4%	4%	4%	4%	4%	5%
Moroccan	5%	5%	5%	4%	4%	5%	5%	5%
Other Non-Western*	21%	21%	21%	21%	21%	21%	21%	21%
Native Dutch	12%	12%	13%	13%	13%	14%	14%	14%
Other EU 2007*	75%	75%	75%	74%	74%	73%	71%	70%
Other Western*	47%	48%	48%	48%	48%	49%	48%	50%

*These categories are considered to be one group. This means that when someone from the United States marries someone from Australia (Both considered to be other Western), this is not counted as an inter-ethnic marriage.)

4.5 Spatial issues

4.5.1 Spatial segregation

Immigrants primarily settled in the sub-municipalities Feijenoord, Delfshaven and Charlois. Ethnic minorities in Rotterdam live moderately geographically segregated from native Dutch citizens: 45% of native Dutch citizens should move to create an equal distribution of ethnic groups over the neighbourhoods of Rotterdam. Segregation can (partly) be explained by the housing stocks and specifically the high availability of social housing in certain neighbourhoods.

Although this segregation-index is high, figures show that segregation is decreasing (Entzinger & Scheffer, 2012). This is possible due to the trend that citizens of non-Western origin are increasingly moving to municipalities on the periphery of Rotterdam. There, concentrations of non-Western people are arising, albeit to a less degree than in Rotterdam (Gijsberts, 2012). Home ownership and a higher quality of housing are increasingly prevalent among non-Western minorities (Gijsberts et al., 2012).

Segregation in schools is not directly solved when spatial segregation decreases. The number of 'black schools' involves schools that have a high share of allochthonous pupils compared with the neighbourhood's population.

4.5.2 Symbolic uses of space

With regard to the spatial dimension of integration, a former Alderman describes how before 2002, the diversity of the population of Rotterdam was symbolised by building mosques, a Moroccan style fountain on a central square and the Mediterranean style neighbourhood 'Le Medi'. Currently, this is more contested. '*Autochthonous citizens have a hard time accepting this cultural change'.* Particularly the build of new mosques often leads to public debate.

5 Malmö

5.1 Demographics

The population in Malmö has grown dramatically in the last 10 years, from 262.000 to 302.000 persons from 2002 to 2012. In 2011 the city of Malmö announced that they passed the landmark population of 300.000. The increase is primarily due to a fast growing foreign born population, which increased with almost 50 per cent since 2002. In January 2012, over 30 per cent of the population in Malmö was born in another country, of which about two thirds were born outside EU/EFTA. An additional 10 per cent of the population was born in Sweden of foreign-born parents.

The foreign born population is diverse and comes from over 170 countries. The largest immigrant groups in Malmö are from Iraq (9.940), Denmark (8.972), former Yugoslavia (8.426), Poland (7.053), Bosnia (5.969), Lebanon (3.780) and Iran (3.375). Other countries with over 1000 persons living in Malmö are, in order: Turkey, Hungary, Rumania, Afghanistan, Germany, Finland, Somalia, Chile, Vietnam, Pakistan and Macedonia (1 January 2011, Statistics Sweden).

Table 25 Population in Malmö, 1 January 1995-2012 (Source: Malmö City office, original data source: Statistics Sweden)

Year	Total population	% foreign born	% born in Sweden with foreign background	% total foreign background
1995	242 706	20	5	**25**
1996	245 699	21	5	**26**
1997	248 007	21	6	**26**
1998	251 408	22	6	**27**
1999	254 904	22	7	**29**
2000	257 574	23	7	**30**
2001	259 579	23	7	**30**
2002	262 397	24	7	**31**
2003	265 481	24	8	**32**
2004	267 171	25	8	**33**
2005	269 142	25	8	**34**
2006	271 271	26	8	**34**
2007	276 244	27	9	**36**
2008	280 801	28	9	**37**
2009	286 535	29	9	**38**
2010	293 909	30	10	**39**
2011	298 963	30	10	**40**
2012	302 835	30	10	**41**

The city is ethnically segregated. In Västra Hamnen and Limhamn-Bunkeflo less than 20 percent of the population has foreign background, while it is 86 percent in Rosengård. There is also ethnic segregation within the foreign born population. The Danes are the largest group in the districts with the least people with foreign background, while people from non-western countries tend to live in the districts where the share of foreign background is high. While about 44 percent of the population lives in the four districts Rosengård, Fosie, Södra

Innerstaden and Hyllie it is more than 80 percent for people from Iraq, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Somalia and Syria.



Figure 7: Percentage with foreign background in Malmö´s 10 city districts, 2009 (Source: Malmö City office, original data source: Statistics Sweden)

5.2 Socio-economic issues

5.2.1 Labour market participation

The socio-economic dimension, and especially employment, is seen as most crucial when it comes to the city's challenges in general and integration issues in particular. This is also reflected in the interviews.[8] Even when the informants mention other integration dimensions and areas, like participation, they point out that employment and education is the key to solve those issues. Thus, employment and education are the underlying problems.

The basic thought in most of the interviews is that if individuals receive an income from employment, it improves other aspects of everyday life, like accommodation, security and education for the children. For people with an ethnic background other than Swedish, employment is also seen as a faster way to acquire the Swedish language. Thus, the integrated migrant cannot be anything else but a person in full employment (Scuzzarello, 2010, p.262). When you are unemployed you get stuck in ethnic enclaves and this breeds crime, one civil servant told in the interview. The strong focus on employment has been criticised by some.

[8] The following issues were mentioned in the interviews: Rosengård city district: employment, education, participation, housing, young people; Immigrant service: employment, ethnic segregation, crime, schools, discrimination; INAR I: employment, participation, young people, housing, segregation; INAR II: employment, housing, discrimination, newly arrived; Employment service: housing, education, women, child care; Commissioners unit: employment, newly arrived, school, children and youths; CAB: Unaccompanied children, ethnic segregation, employment, youths, negative attitudes, shootings

There is a worry that other integration policy goals, like participation, are forgotten and that there a rather large number of migrants with very limited option to take up paid work (Suter, 2010). In the light of the statistics it is quite natural that employment is the main integration issue in Malmö.

The employment rate in Malmö was 62 percent in 2010, an increase of one percentage points over the previous year. The figures are much lower than for the whole country where the employment rate was 76 percent. But the main problem in Malmö is the situation for the foreign born. The difference is 33 percentage points between the employment rates of foreign-born and Swedish-born (Malmö stad 2012). Among those born in Sweden, 74.6 percent were employed, while only 42.2 of them born outside the EU/EFTA. This is also reflected in the city districts. For example, Västra Innerstaden had an employment rate of 74 percent while it was 35 percent in Rosengård.



Figure 8: Employment rates[9], 20-64 years, in Malmö 1997-2010 by region of birth (Source: Statistics Sweden)

The low employment rate for foreign born has persisted since the economic crisis in the 90s. Between 1990 and 1994 one in four jobs disappeared when much of what was left of the manufacturing industry was closed. In the late 1980s the number of jobs in Malmö was

[9] RAMS is register-based and does not compile data on persons working in other countries who do not declare income in Sweden. A relatively high proportion of cross-border workers lower the total employment rate in Malmö with about 5 percent.

146.000. Only 118.000 were left in 1993 and it took until 1997 before the number of jobs in Malmö started to increase again. In 2010 the City of Malmö was back to about 150.000 jobs (Malmö stad, 2011). But even if the number of jobs has increased since then, the influx of people to the city has been quite large.

"Between 90 and 95 the employment rate in Malmö sank from 78% to 60% in a short time, actually in a period of 3.5-4 years. … When we did go out and check what really happened, we discovered that the Swedish-born population had an employment rate of 70%, which was pretty close to the national average of 73%, while foreign born was at 34%, awareness was increasing about "what is happening?", and we could also see that there were two reasons for this. One was that the labor migrants' jobs had disappeared, and the other is that the immigration to Malmö that began in 1985 begun to have a major demographic impact, and was at its highest during the years that we lost the very most jobs." (Kent Andersson, Commissioner with responsibility for integration issues between 1998-2010, translated from Broomé 2007)

The total employment rate has only increased marginally, by 1.6 percentage points, since 1997. This is largely explained by Malmö's changing demographic composition. Malmö has experienced a steady flow of migrants throughout the 90s and 00s and few of them have a job or secure income when moving to Malmö. For a long time most have been humanitarian or family migrants and there are no requirements on them to have a job or to be self-sufficient when moving to Sweden.

Table 26 Employment rates for foreign born, 20-64 years, in Malmö 1997-2010 by duration of stay (Source: Statistics Sweden)

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Foreign born	34,7	35,9	37,4	39,8	41,4	41,3	41,1	41,6	41,9	42,8	43,2	42,9	39,9	41,5
duration of stay < 2 years	10,8	11,1	11,1	11,6	11,8	11	10,2	10,5	11	11,5	12,4	13,2	11,2	12,8
duration of stay 2-4 years	11,4	16,1	18	19,4	22,6	21,4	20,8	20,9	19,7	21,3	23,7	22,7	20,7	21,8
duration of stay 4-10 years	24	23,5	26,7	32,2	36,6	38,6	38,4	33,5	34,2	35,7	36,3	35	31,9	32,3
duration of stay > 10 years	47,1	47,7	47,2	48,3	49	49	49,6	50,9	51,9	55	56,2	56,4	53,5	55,6

The inflow of migrants has also been largest from those groups with the worst situation on the labour market. So even if most groups have improved their situation on the labour market it has had a small impact on the total employment rate for foreign born. The composition effect is very obvious. Since 1997 the employment rate for Swedish born increased by 4.9, for persons from EU/EFTA by 5.3 and for people from the rest of the world with 14.9 percentage points. That the total employment rate has not increased more is because, despite positive developments, groups that still have low employment rates have grown faster than the gen-

eral population. In addition, cross-border commuting has grown very rapidly since the Öresund Bridge opened on 1 July 2000 (see footnote 7). The importance of cross-border commuting can be seen clearly for the group that is born in another Nordic country where the employment rate has decreased since 2000.

The unemployment shows the same general pattern as the employment, but with some notable differences. The unemployment has decreased more (5.3 percent points) than the employment has risen (1.6 percentage points). Migrants from Scandinavia, with the lowest employment rates, have the lowest unemployment of all groups. Since 2008, we find an interesting development where both the employment and the unemployment has increased, which indicates fast rising participation rates the last couple of years.



Figure 9: Unemployment, 20-64 years, in Malmö 1997-2010 by region of birth (Source: Statistics Sweden)

5.2.2 Income and social assistance

The average disposable income has increased in Malmö since 1997. The positive trend in disposable income has occurred for all groups except for those from other Scandinavian countries, whose income often is not registered in Sweden. The largest increase in income has been for the native born.



Figure 10: Average disposable income, number of price base amount[10] for native and foreign born in Malmö, 20-64 years, 1997-2010 (Source: Statistics Sweden)

But the average income level says little about poverty or households with low income. The annual report on child poverty from *Save the children* provides a less positive picture of income trends in Malmö (Salonen, 2012). It shows that the proportion of children in economically disadvantaged households increased from 11.5 to 13.0 percent between 2008 and 2009. The risk of living in a poor household is nearly five times as high among children of foreign background, compared with children of Swedish background. Child poverty in Malmö is the highest of all municipalities in Sweden with over 33 per cent of all children in the municipality. In the city district Rosengård it is even higher (64.3 percent). According to the report, there are six districts where child poverty exceeds 50 percent of the children of foreign origin. Three of them are situated in Malmö: Rosengård, Södra Innerstaden and Fosie. Problems with low income among foreign born are also visible in the statistics on social assistance. In 2009 68 percent of the households with social assistance were foreign born and those households received 78 percent of the money. Social assistance is intended to act as a last-resort safety net for people who have temporary financial problems, but has more and more become a long-term source of income for a significant part of the migrant population in Malmö.

[10] In 2010 the price base amount was 42400 SEK

Table 27 Social assistance for native and foreign born in Malmö 1998-2009 (Source: Statistics Sweden)

	Households receiving social assistance		Social assistance, thousand SEK	
	Native born	Foreign born	Native born	Foreign born
1998	8607	13042	231102	640239
1999	7705	12727	221281	668249
2000	6293	11897	189894	653457
2001	5839	11378	170614	600264
2002	5413	10881	167182	586918
2003	5262	9961	170117	525562
2004	5104	9456	171748	519034
2005	4944	9102	174679	485927
2006	4469	9063	161932	467950
2007	3917	9031	148872	468060
2008	3883	8997	148911	490757
2009	4374	9634	180524	644128

Table 28 Percentage social assistance of the net income in Malmö, 20-64 years, 2002-2009 (Source: Statistics Sweden)

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Total	2,2	2,1	2,1	2	1,8	1,5	1,5	1,7
Sweden	0,8	0,9	0,9	0,8	0,7	0,6	0,6	0,7
Scandinavia, excl. Sweden	1,4	1,4	1,2	1,1	0,9	0,7	0,7	0,9
EU/EFTA, excl. Scandinavia	2,9	2,8	2,9	2,9	2,5	2	2	2,3
Rest of the world	9,4	8,5	8,3	7,8	6,7	5,8	5,5	5,8

5.2.3 Education and skill levels

In Malmö, pupils perform worse in both compulsory school and upper secondary education than the national average. A common way of measuring school performance in Sweden is to see how many students are eligible for upper secondary education and higher education. Only 76 percent of the students that finished compulsory school in Malmö were eligible to apply to upper secondary education in 2011, a drop by four percentage points since 2009 (Malmö stad 2012). The national average was 88 percent. There is considerable variation between districts and between schools. At the four schools in Rosengård only 43 percent of the students were eligible to apply to upper secondary school, while it was over 90 percent in the district Limhamn-Bunkeflo. The difference between the students in Malmö and the rest of the country has been rather consistent since the late 90s. Other outcome measures show similar results. The proportion of pupils in Malmö that got approved in all subjects in compulsory school in 2011 was 65 percent, compared with 77 percent nationwide.[11] The results in upper secondary school are also lower than the national average. For pupils finishing upper secondary education in Malmö 83 percent were eligible for higher education compared to 87 percent for the whole country in 2011. Another indicator on performance in upper secondary education is how many pupils complete the education within four years. In Malmö it was 68 percent in 2010 compared to 76 percent in Sweden (Malmö stad 2012). This is, according to the municipality, a major problem because those who lack, or drop out of, secondary education are less likely to succeed in the increasingly knowledge intensive labour market.

The variations in performance between schools are in large part explained by socio-economic factors. The parents' education and economic situation reflects in their children's school performance. This explains in part the poor school performance in districts like Rosengård, where unemployment is high and education levels low. But the socio-economic segregation between schools is also reinforced by the free school choice system which allows ambitious students from socio-economic weak neighborhoods to seek for schools in other areas. Most students commute from Rosengård to schools in other districts. In Rosengård schools there are only about half as many pupils as children that actually live in the district.[12]

There are no statistics on the municipal level that show the performances for pupils with a migration background, but it is known that Malmö has a higher percentage of students with foreign background and low educated parents than the national average. Malmö's poorer school performance is partly explained by these factors. At the same time statistics show that pupils with foreign background and low educated parents get poorer results in Malmö than the national total (Malmö stad, 2011a). Given that the municipality of Malmö, on average, has both a higher staffing ratio, a higher proportion of teachers with university degree than the rest of the country and that the costs per pupil are higher in the municipality than the national total the results are worse than could be expected.

[11] The National Agency for Education, Siris database

[12] Sydsvenska dagbladet, 20120215

In 2008 the school situation for Roma children and youths came into attention after a report from the city of Malmö showed that 400-600 of the 1000 Roma children of mandatory school age are not in school whatsoever (Malmö stad, 2008). Of the 1000 in age for secondary education only about 50 study there and on average only five of these finish secondary school with full marks every year. A follow up study at the request of the Delegation for Roma Issues was made (Liedholm and Lindberg, 2010). The researchers questioned whether indeed 600 Roma children are not in school, but find that sporadic presence or absence is far more common among Roma children. They also found very few examples of Roma pupils who completed secondary education.

Table 29 Education level in Malmö, 25-64 years, foreign born and total population, 2010 (Source: Statistics Sweden)

	Gender	Population	Unknown	Secondary education		Upper secondary education		Post-secondary education	
				<9 years	9 years	<=2 years	3 years	<3 years	3+ years
Foreign born	Men	33 130	13%	8%	9%	21%	15%	14%	20%
	Women	31 043	10%	12%	8%	16%	16%	14%	24%
	Total	64 173	12%	10%	9%	19%	15%	14%	22%
Total population	Men	83 857	6%	4%	10%	20%	18%	16%	26%
	Women	81 023	4%	6%	8%	18%	17%	16%	32%
	Total	164 880	5%	5%	9%	19%	18%	16%	29%
Swedish born	Män	50727	0%	2%	11%	20%	20%	17%	30%
	Kvinnor	49980	0%	1%	8%	19%	18%	17%	37%
	Totalt	100707	0%	1%	9%	20%	19%	17%	33%

The average education level in Malmö has risen in the last decade, but more so for Swedish born than foreign born (Malmö stad 2012). Foreign born have, on average, lower education and they are clearly overrepresented in the category with very low education. While only 1.4 per cent of the native born have less than nine years education, it is about 10 per cent of the foreign born. This means that 82.2 per cent of the very low skilled are foreign born. Studies have also shown that about 70 per cent of the people in the unknown category have nine years education or lower, so the proportion of low educated amongst the foreign born is probably even higher (SCB, 2011). The foreign born are most underrepresented in the category 3+ year post-secondary education: only 22 per cent of the foreign born, compared to 33.5 of the native born. Like employment, the education level differs a lot between the city districts, which is partly the result of the significant differences between foreign-born and Swedish-born. Something that worries many is that the educational level of the humanitarian

migrants who arrived in Malmö in recent years has become lower. More and more migrants in this category lack basic education and are illiterate.

5.2.4 Health

Issues about health, particularly public health, have received more attention in Malmö in recent years. The latest major welfare initiative from the city of Malmö, the Commission for a socially sustainable Malmö, is based on public health and its determinants. In the preparatory documents of the Commission they highlight three major health divisions in the city: between men and women, between those with short or long education and between foreign-born and those born in Sweden. Health is also the main point of departure in the city's yearly report on welfare.



Figure 11: Rate of ill health in Malmö, 20-64 years, 1997-2009 by region of birth (Source: Statistics Sweden)

The rate of ill health is one way to describe the health situation. But we must be careful not to interpret too much into these data. The reduction we see in the number of ill health days can just as well be a result of recent reforms in the rules governing sick leave as people's actual health situation. At the same time, these data are of the few available that show the health situation for different migrant groups in Malmö. What the statistics show is that immigrants,

apart from those from other Scandinavian countries, generally have more sick days. The number of days the average Malmö citizen was reported “ill health” in 2009 was 29, four days less than the national average of 33. The health situation gradually got worse up until 2004, and decreased thereafter. People from the EU, outside of the Scandinavian countries, have had the worst health-situation during the whole period. The rapid decrease in bad health for the Scandinavian group is in large part explained by the large influx of Danish citizens after the Öresund Bridge was completed in 2000. Another measure of ill-health is early retirement pension. Those data are broken down into Malmö's districts. As always, the district Rosengård stands out. In Rosengård, 11 percent of the population between 20-64 years has retired due to health reasons while the average across Malmö is 7 percent (Malmö stad 2012).

5.2.5 Policing

There are no local statistics on policing. But this does not mean that policing is an unimportant integration issues in Malmö. The police in Malmö have taken part in a project with the goal of promoting gender equality and ethnic and cultural diversity within the police (Rikspolisstyrelsen, 2011). But most of the police work has been focused on the riots in Rosengård and the shootings which will be described in the socio-cultural dimension.

5.2.6 Language comprehension

Language and employment are the two integration related issues that the Integration minister most often highlights as most important. After the reform for newly arrived migrants came into force in December 2010 much of the efforts in central government is to improve the language tuition for migrants. The situation in Malmö is somewhat different. None of the informants that were interviewed mentioned language as an important integration issue. This does not mean that language comprehension is unimportant in Malmö. There have been several reorganisations and evaluations of Swedish for immigrants which signal that the issue of language comprehension is still on the table (Frölisch, 2011). Some of the issues are about making the language training more efficient, flexible and compatible with other activities like labour market programs or child care.

5.3 Socio-cultural issues

5.3.1 Cultural practices and religion

Religion is not a big issue in Malmö and was not mentioned in any of the interviews. This is also reflected in the study of inter-cultural policies in European cities where Malmö was one of the few cities where religious issues - religious buildings, burials, education, religious dress codes and food - were not seen as important (CLIP, 2010). Religious needs like religious buildings and burial grounds are, unlike in most of the other 31 cities, accommodated on the local level. The largest mosque in the city is the Malmö mosque which opened up in

1984. The municipality assisted with a 32 000 square meter plot. A part of the center was destroyed by fire in April 2003 but the mosque was restored in less than one year. A concern for many is that the police failed to find the cause of the fire, though this has not hampered the good relations between the mosque and the municipality.

While the CLIP study showed that religious needs are met and therefore not on the agenda in Malmö, it pointed to other concerns relating to gender roles and relations in Muslim families. According to informants in Malmö and other cities the problem is that some Muslim families are very traditional in terms of customs and habits and live in paternalistic family structures. This is expressed in discussions between parents and teachers about sexual education at school, women's rights, threats towards other family members and also cases of female genital mutilation and arranged marriages. In the report they highlight the situation in Malmö to illustrate the perceived clash between the society and Muslim beliefs in relation to gender roles.

The issues surrounding perceived gender roles are … complex. On the one hand, new arrivals are unfamiliar with Swedish gender equality legislation, which conflicts with some traditional aspects of the Muslim faith. An academic at Malmö University suggested that a key issue for the Muslim communities in the city is their inability to compromise or be flexible over conflicting ideologies such as gender roles. It was further suggested that Swedish society has compromised a step too far and is afraid to debate conflicting issues for fear of being labeled racist. At the same time, the majority population is unfamiliar with traditional aspects of the Muslim faith and this also creates conflict. This evidence suggests that there is a lack of understanding on both sides. (CLIP, 2010, p. 42)

5.3.2 Attitudes

In Sweden there are some surveys on attitudes towards immigration and immigrants, for example the SOM-survey[13] and the annual diversity barometer[14], but few of them have results on the city level. The SOM-survey on attitudes towards refugee reception, immigration and multiculturalism showed that people in Skåne, where Malmö is situated, are more negative than in the rest of Sweden (Sannerstedt, 2010). While in the last couple of decades about 45-50 percent would like to decrease and 25 percent increase the number of refugees accepted in Sweden, the negative attitude in Skåne is even more negative to refugee reception. In Skåne, those who live in rural areas have the most negative attitudes towards refugee reception and the least negative are those living in Malmö. All in all, the attitude survey shows that the people in Skåne are quite negative towards immigration and refugees. There is strong support for the proposal to accept fewer refugees, and an even slightly stronger resistance to increase the number of labour migrants. Reluctance to accept refugees is strongest among those who position themselves on the right on a political scale, those with low to medium education, men who belong to the working class, those who are unsatisfied

[13] http://www.som.gu.se/undersokningar/riks-som/

[14] http://www.immi.se/rasism/files/mangfaldsbarometer_2011.pdf

with democracy in Sweden, those with little interest in politics in general and those who are negative towards the EU. When the people in Skåne are asked to assess the effects of multiculturalism in different areas, they distinguish both positive and negative effects. Large agreement exists that the impact on food is positive and the impact on law and order is negative.

In addition to this, The European Commission ordered an opinion survey in 75 cities that was published in 2010 (European Commission, 2010). Some of the questions were about attitudes towards immigration and immigrants and they show that most respondents in Malmö believe that foreigners are good for the city even though they are not well integrated. 72 per cent agree that the presence of foreigners is good for Malmö. It is a higher share than in the other partner cities in the project. At the same time it is far from the 88 per cent that agrees with the statement in Stockholm, the city that top the 75 city-list. Less people agree that foreigners who live in Malmö are well integrated, 35 per cent compared to 49 per cent for the 75 city average. Another local study of attitudes is a recent thesis on interracial marriages in Malmö (Osanami Törngren, 2011). The survey showed that the majority of respondents of white European background could imagine dating or marrying interracially. The respondents of non-European origin expressed much more negative attitudes towards interracial dating and marriage.

Table 30 : Attitudes towards foreigners (Source: European Commission)

The presence of foreigners is good for [CITY NAME]

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	DK/NA	Total N
Berlin	19%	50%	19%	7%	5%	501
Rotterdam	16%	45%	23%	7%	10%	500
Wien	16%	42%	25%	10%	8%	500
Malmo	30%	42%	14%	7%	7%	500
All 75 Cities	25%	42%	15%	10%	8%	37626

Foreigners who live in [CITY NAME] are well integrated

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	DK/NA	Total N
Berlin	4%	25%	53%	12%	6%	501
Rotterdam	7%	36%	39%	10%	9%	500
Wien	3%	23%	50%	14%	10%	500
Malmo	4%	31%	37%	23%	5%	500
All 75 Cities	12%	37%	24%	11%	16%	37626

5.3.3 Crime and delinquency

The level of crime in Malmö is higher than the national average. The overrepresentation of crime in Malmö is especially high for more serious crimes, like violent crimes and robberies. Robberies are over three times more common in Malmö. In Sweden there is a strong reluctance to report crime statistics in an integration context. The latest statistical report from a state authority focusing on crime among immigrants at the national level is from 2005 (Martens, 2005), which showed that it is two times more likely that a person born abroad commits a crime, but there is no statistical information on foreign-born crime at the local level in Malmö.

Table 31 Crime per 100 000 inhabitants in Malmö and Sweden 2001-2011 (Source: Brottsförebyggande rådet (Brå), database)

		2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Total crime	Sweden	13304	13761	14013	13885	13753	13490	14280	14945	15117	14613	14988
	Malmö	19595	20560	20877	23210	20232	20360	21134	20607	21386	20696	20420
Violent crime	Sweden	881	890	935	957	1043	1081	1144	1175	1187	1192	1236
	Malmö	1490	1483	1460	1492	1587	1617	1678	1643	1745	1719	1804
Robbery	Sweden	96	101	96	96	104	95	95	97	103	98	103
	Malmö	270	287	260	290	360	314	285	265	333	332	364

Crime has been one of the main issues in Malmö in recent years. Some of the most talked about events has been a series of riots and attacks on firefighters in the city district Rosengård, criminal gangs that have "taken over" the inner city Seved-neighborhood and an increase in shootings. The discussion that followed these events has partly been about the question if these phenomena are about integration and migrants or not. There has been reluctance on the local and national level to link these events to migration and integration. When the Minister of Integration visited Malmö in the midst of the 2008 riots in Rosengård, she received a lot of criticism. This is an issue for the Minister of Justice, not Integration, one manager in Rosengård told me at the interview. But some of the crimes obviously are linked to migration. In 2009-2010 a serial shooter targeted immigrants. A 38-year-old white male was later arrested on suspicion of three murders and ten attempted. But others are more difficult to interpret. There has been a sharp rise in the numbers of shootings and killings, most of them linked to gangs and organised crime and almost all perpetrators and victims are of foreign background.[15]

Regardless whether the crimes and social unrest are integration related or not, it worries people. A survey asked people why they left Malmö. The most important reason was lack of security. They wanted a safer environment, with fewer problems and a good environment for the children. Three quarters of those who moved from Malmö indicated that a safer environment was one reason to leave the city.[16] The situation affects the perceptions of many that integration has failed. And it is a fact that the most blatant and public social unrest are taking place in the city district Rosengård where 86 percent of the population has foreign background, and especially in the neighborhood Herrgården in Rosengård where 96 percent has foreign background. Rosengård has, ever since the district was built 1967-74 been a district in perceived crisis. The district has become a symbol of what is currently seen as the most problematic in the community (Ristilammi 1994). It is therefore unavoidable to discuss the situation in Rosengård since it continually has been in media spotlight. The major conflicts in

[15] http://www.sydsvenskan.se/malmo/atta-dodsskjutningar-pa-ett-ar/

[16] Malmö stad, 2005, Flyttlassen kommer och går: Fakta och attityder kring hushåll som flyttat till och från Malmö under år 2004.

the part of Rosengård called Herrgården between young men and policemen and firefighters during the winter of 2008 were followed by a team of researchers, who wrote the study *Det är inte stenarna som gör ont* (Hallin 2010, in English: It is not the stones that hurt). The researchers studied what was written about Rosengård in the media between 2003 and 2010 and interviewed youths, adults and civil servants in the district. In short, they find that Rosengård has long been subject to fires and stone throwing, but it was not often reported in the media until after the fire in the Malmö Mosque in 2003. During 2007 the riots and stone and egg throwing were systematically observed. In the coming years youths developed a conscious conflict strategy, where arsons, egg and stone throwing - in some cases bombs and rockets - was directed at emergency services and police. During the first half of 2008, the number of arson attacks increased dramatically in Herrgården and Rosengård. In 2008 up until the beginning of May, 90 fires were noted in Rosengård of which 22 were classified as arson. Firefighters were threatened and had to await police escort before they could intervene. A cellar mosque suddenly became the center of attention. After a conflict between the Islamic cultural association and the property owner the police came to evict the members of the association which led to an escalation of the violence in the whole area surrounding the cellar mosque. During the winter of 2008 youths were shooting rockets and throwing firecrackers at the police. The conflict also attracted left-wing extremists to the area. At nights, hundreds of people gathered to continue the riots. They threw stones at passing cars set and cars and buildings on fire. Eight trailers from the gas station ignited. Policemen and firemen were attacked with tube bombs, stones and firecrackers. After reinforcement was called from other parts of Sweden it eventually calmed down. But unrest continued in 2009, even if the number of fires decreased. The police reported a pattern where arrests of criminal youths led to subsequent riots and fires in Rosengård. During autumn 2009 and spring 2010 the unrest and fires became increasingly linked to criminal gangs. Although the media did not write as much about events in Rosengård, reports from the police showed that between May and November 2010 there occurred more than 100 incidents of threats, harassment or violence against police officers. The same year a local pre-school was closed because staff felt threatened after youths threw stones and bottles at employees.

Rosengård has also been at the center of attention when it comes to Islamic radicalisation. At the end of 2007 the government instructed the Swedish National Defence College and the Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies to conduct research on the prevention of violent extremism and radicalisation. The study (Ranstorp 2009) was done in Malmö and concluded a general increase in Islamic radicalisation in the past five years but that it is difficult to pinpoint the exact extent of the increase. They emphasise that the radicalised people are few, but have a relatively large impact on the environment. The “basement mosques” were identified as a prominent radicalisation environment. All the respondents stated that many cultural associations are not what they claim to be. In some cases they are engaged in religious activities with a radical orientation. Some respondents indicated that there is a group of ultra-radical men acting as enforcers that threaten people who do not follow a strict interpretation of the Qur'an. Newly arrived families get visits from radical groups telling them the rules which apply in Rosengård. The most vulnerable area is, according to the authors,

Herrgården, where the living conditions in general are the worst. The government later did more comprehensive studies about violent extremism and radicalisation in Islamist (Säkerhetspolisen 2010) and left- and right-wing extremist groups (Brå 2009:15). The situation in Malmö is not highlighted in those reports.

5.3.4 Inter-ethnic contact

Ever since the action plan for integration (1999) there has been an emphasis on participation in civil society as an important integration issue. Participation in civil society is understood as a natural arena for integration, a tool for contextual learning of language and social codes in the new society (Scuzzarello, 2010:160). It is not only important for the individual but is seen to have important social functions because associations are places where people can socialise and meet, and that sheer encounters are seen as good enough to increase integration.

But not all encounters are good. In recent years, Malmö was the scene of some series of inter-ethnic conflict and a rise in anti-Semitic hate crimes that also attracted attention abroad.[17] Ilmar Reepalu, Mayor in Malmö, has come to play a central role in the conflict. After Jews in Malmö got attacked and harassed, mostly by left-wing activists and Muslims, his remarks were interpreted as anti-Semitic which worsened the conflict. The Simon Wiesenthal Center issued a warning to Jews travelling to Malmö, specifically pointing to his remarks. In response to the criticism and to try to solve the conflict and improve the situation for the Jews in Malmö, the Mayor set up a dialogue forum (Feb. 2010) and, later, a conflict council (May 2010).[18] But it is obvious that the interventions did not solve the issue, because the Jews' situation remains precarious and the criticism of the mayor continued after recent statements that can be interpreted as anti-Semitic. The issues have not been resolved. In April 2012 Hannah Rosenthal, U.S. President Barack Obama's special envoy on issues of anti-Semitism, came to Malmö to meet Reepalu. Afterwards she told the press: "I do not know what's in his head or heart. But I know that the language he uses is anti-Semitic."[19]

5.4 Legal political issues

5.4.1 Political participation

Participation is one of the main goals, and an important issue, of the integration policy in Malmö, but it is not primarily focused on political participation or voluntary work but more about participation in civil society.

[17] http://www.cbn.com/CBNnews/556299.aspx, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/sweden/7278532/Jews-leave-Swedish-city-after-sharp-rise-in-anti-Semitic-hate-crimes.html, http://www.thelocal.se/37306/20111111/

[18] http://www.malmo.se/download/18.6e0fe7e512c888cbc5280009130/Dialogforum+eng.pdf, http://www.malmo.se/download/18.6e0fe7e512c888cbc5280009132/konfliktr%C3%A5det+eng.pdf

[19] http://www.sydsvenskan.se/malmo/-reepalus-sprak-ar-antisemitiskt-

Table 32 Naturalisation and foreign citizens in Malmö and Sweden 2000-2011 (Source: Statistics Sweden)

		2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Malmö	Naturali-sations	3404	2845	2954	2384	1895	2442	3437	2433	2058	2012	2110	2355
	Foreign citizens	26396	26196	26167	26329	27578	28556	30913	34044	36950	40171	41993	42808
	Naturali-sation rate	12,9%	10,9%	11,3%	9,1%	6,9%	8,6%	11,1%	7,1%	5,6%	5,0%	5,0%	5,5%
Sweden	Naturali-sations	43474	36399	37792	33222	28893	39573	51239	33629	30461	29525	32457	36634
	Foreign citizens	477312	475986	474099	476076	481141	479899	491996	524488	562124	602893	633292	655100
	Naturali-sation rate	9,1%	7,6%	8,0%	7,0%	6,0%	8,2%	10,4%	6,4%	5,4%	4,9%	5,1%	5,6%

Foreign nationals who have lived and been registered in Sweden for three years have voting rights in local elections. It is also easy to become a Swedish citizen and obtain full political rights. There are no requirements to learn the Swedish language or have an income to be naturalised. That political rights are so easy to obtain for migrants is probably an explanation why the city of Malmö has not established any consultative structures for migrants. Another reason is that there seems to be a reluctance to accept leaders of migrant associations as representatives of the migrant population (Scuzzarello, 2010). Therefore, the issue of political participation has been about increasing election participation rates for migrants rather than the development of consultative structures.

There are no specific data on turnout rates for migrant groups but the election participation rates for the city districts give us an estimate of their political participation. While over 83 percent of the electorate in the relatively affluent districts Västra Innerstaden and Limhamn-Bunkeflo voted in the latest municipal election, only close to 59 percent voted in the poorer and immigrant dense Rosengård. Malmö is not only a politically divided city in terms of turnout, but also in terms of political sympathies. At the national election the established parties gathered in two major coalitions, with four center-right parties against three socialist/green parties. The center-right “alliance” won the national election, but lost the majority they had since 2006, and they now rule as a minority government. In Malmö the Social democratic party won their fourth election in a row and has been in power since 1994, with support from the Left and the Green party. The center-right parties got the majority of votes in two districts but did not even get 10 percent in Rosengård. The populist and anti-immigration party The Swedish Democrats, included in the “other” category, got 10.4 percent of the votes, lowest (4.9 percent) in Rosengård and highest (16.2 percent) in Oxie.

Table 33 Election participation rate, municipal election 2010 (Source: Malmö 2011d)

	Turnout		Results		
	2010 municipal election	Change since 2006 election	Center-right alliance	Socialist-green parties	Other
Centrum	77,1	4,3	41,6	46,1	12,2
S Innerstaden	69	3,7	19,6	66,2	14,3
V Innerstaden	83,6	2,1	51,4	33,7	14,7
Limhamn-Bunkeflo	83,5	0,1	59	26,5	14,6
Hyllie	75,2	2,4	30,7	49,4	19,8
Fosie	62,5	-0,5	20,3	60,8	18,9
Oxie	77,8	-0,7	37,1	41,9	21
Rosengård	58,9	2,7	9,7	82,1	8,3
Husie	81,1	0,6	39,6	38,8	21,7
Kirseberg	70,9	1,3	26,7	54,7	18,8
Malmö	74,3	0,8	36,8	47,6	15,7

5.4.2 Civil society participation

Participation is one of the main goals of the integration policy in Malmö. But it is a special form of participation that is wanted. The goal is not to increase voluntary work or to stimulate voluntary organisations as service providers. Voluntary organisations have, traditionally, a subordinate role in the integration activities on the local level (Socialstyrelsen, 2008). They rarely work as providers of services which municipalities are obliged to offer to immigrants. By contrast, they relatively often have a role in the city districts working with social needs for specifically vulnerable groups. In other cases they are partners in projects financed by state authorities and/or municipalities. Municipality's financial support for associations encourages and sponsors the associations that work with issues related to integration, focusing on employment, education, housing, safety and dialogue. So even if they sometimes are involved in integration efforts, it is on an ad hoc basis and not as a regular part of public services.

Even though the voluntary organisations are not providers of traditional services, participation in civil society is seen as important for the achievement of migrants' integration. Policy documents issued after 2004 tend to stress that voluntary associations are important for fostering civic engagement and creating opportunities to meet across ethnic divides (Scuzzarello, 2010). It is the participation itself, for example in sports associations, and not the services that they provide to other migrants that is encouraged.

5.4.3 Anti-discrimination

When ILO did a practice test to determine discrimination in Sweden they found inequalities in the Swedish labour market regarding access to employment for Swedish employment seekers with an immigrant background and a foreign sounding name (Attström, 2007). The test found a net discrimination rate of 14% for women and 15% for men, which was lower than results obtained in other countries. A higher level of discrimination was observed in the sectors that had a significant prevalence of foreign born in the labour force. On the other hand, foreign-born applicants are occasionally favored over the native-born in the Hotel and Restaurant sector, as well as in other private services. The testing did not show significant differences among cities with regard to the net discrimination rates. However, the study found some notable differences concerning overall labour market conditions that affect both majority and minority employment seekers. In Malmö, where employment levels are generally low for both majorities and minorities, the testers needed to apply to considerably more vacancies to be given preference. This indicates a problem on the demand side of the labour market, which equals out the net discrimination rate, since it appears to be harder for both (majority and minority) to be given preference.

Discrimination is an ongoing issue for the city of Malmö. In September 2010 an action plan against discrimination was adopted by the Malmö City assembly.[20] The plan is a part of the city of Malmö's undertaking based on membership of the European coalition of cities against racism.The plan does not only acknowledge individual discrimination. According to the plan the norms and structures in the municipal sector are a problem that exposes people to discrimination. This is not a new concern in Malmö. There has been considerable work in the city since the 1990s to increase the ethnic diversity and act against discrimination (Rönnqvist, 2008). Increased representation of persons with different ethnic backgrounds is seen as valuable for development of the organisation's activities. The belief is that the organisation must adapt itself to the conditions prevailing in the surrounding community in order to be able to improve the services provided for citizens of the municipality. To achieve this, the organisation must be more open and tolerant towards persons of different ethnic backgrounds. The action plan on integration (1999) recognises the importance of the city's own organisation. It states that "local authorities must lead by example" and that "the municipality has a big responsibility and can be a model for the rest of society". Therefore the city must increase the proportion of persons with foreign background in municipal operations and all employees should be given support in their professional capacity and the necessary training

[20] http://www.malmo.se/download/18.72bfc4c412fc1476e02800026022/HPMD+och+OMSLAG+ENGELSKA.pdf

so that they feel safe and secure in the face of Malmö residents of different origins. To achieve the goals, the city of Malmö participated in the research project Diversity as the Human Resource Philosophy (Broomé, 2004). Despite good intentions the implementation throughout the city administration did not go as planned (Broomé 2007). And as the current plan against discrimination indicates, the topic of diversity and anti-discrimination in the city is still an issue.

5.5 Spatial issues

In her thesis, Scuzzarello (2010) identifies four recurring narratives which define the issue of integration in Malmö between 1997 and 2007: employment, community engagement, the city's own responsibility and meeting spaces narrative. Indeed, if we look at the most important policies and programs for integration, those are among the issues that are most often singled out. But the more overarching issue is, and has been, the ethnic and socio-economic segregation; the fact that the ethnic and socio-economic gaps coincide and make such clear imprint in the city's geography. The income polarisation at the neighborhood level in Malmö labour market region has increased in the last 20 years (Andersson, 2010). The tendency towards increasing socio-economic segregation is intertwined with the emergence of a rather distinct pattern of ethnic residential segregation where almost all poor neighborhoods are immigrant dense, although not all foreigners live in poor neighborhoods. But the concepts of class and ethnic segregation have become conflated. Hence, the idea of combating segregation also has a different meaning today compared to 30 years ago; ordinary people who talk about 'segregation' today typically mean 'ethnic segregation' (Andersson, 2010). This can already be seen in the 1999 action plan for integration:[21]

There exist today significant differences among the population with respect to jobs, economic resources, access to culture, the social network and good health. Ethnic and socio-economic segregation between different neighbourhoods is a fact – one which impedes integration into society for many residents of Malmö. Segregation threatens to make alienation, unemployment and social exclusion permanent. It undermines people's opportunities to exert democratic influence and to participate in social development. It entails significant difficulties for children who need to develop good skills in the Swedish language. (p.19)

The dangers of ethnic and socio-economic segregation are a reoccurring theme throughout the last decade. The 1999 definition of the problem does not differ significantly from those in the two major welfare initiatives since, Welfare for all (2004) and Commission for a Socially Sustainable Malmö (2010). Welfare for all was an action plan decided by the city assembly on 25 March 2004 with the aim to increase economic growth and improve the general welfare for the citizens in Malmö. Formally it was not an integration program, but in the description of problems and actual policies the integration aspect was central. Welfare for all identifies the same basic problem as the action plan on integration.

[21] http://www.malmo.se/download/18.6e0fe7e512c888cbc52800012689/action%2Bplan%2Benglish.pdf

There are groups of people who are socially and economically disadvantaged and who rely heavily on support from society to manage their everyday lives. Many are concentrated in specific areas of Malmö. The problem therefore has a strong geographical link. But there is also a strong ethnic dimension of different groups of foreign origin that are especially affected. (p. 1-2)

In October 2010, the City assembly decided on yet another major initiative to improve the socio-economic situation in Malmö, the Commission for a Socially Sustainable Malmö.[22] The Commission is appointed because of the large differences in health and welfare that exist between different population groups - men and women, short and long education, foreign and native born - and between different districts.

Thus, the spatial dimension issue plays an important role in local integration issues, but is hard to separate from other issues because almost all integration issues in Malmö are understood in connection to ethnic and socio-economic segregation. This is reflected in the interviews where housing issues and spatial segregation are, after the social-economic issues, most often mentioned as important integration issues. The city is becoming more and more segregated along ethnic and socio-economic lines. Many civil servants are frustrated that they cannot control the influx of foreigners, what they consider as reinforcing the social-economic and ethnic segregation. The possibility for asylum seekers to find their own housing during the asylum process is adding to the problems. We do not know our own population anymore, one employee said in an interview. "*There are many needs that are not registered because the people actually are not officially here. And their housing condition is really bad. The municipality does not know who they are and hardly the Migration board either*." The lack of suitable apartments has led to overcrowding which causes additional problems. "*If you have nowhere to live and no money for food, it is difficult to control your own lives and then it's hard to get involved in the community*." Housing problems are also an issue when the Employment service works with newly arrived migrants. It is difficult to successfully participate in the introduction program when you are living in precarious housing conditions.

To give an idea of the welfare of Malmö's ten city districts the city compiles a welfare index from 40 of the indicators in the yearly welfare report. For each indicator the district is ranked on a scale of one to ten where, to give an example, the district with the highest employment rate gets a 10 and the district with the lowest employment rate gets a 1. All ranked values are summed for each neighborhood and divided by the number of indicators. This gives an average value that indicates the district's development.

[22] http://www.malmo.se/download/18.72bfc4c412fc1476e02800069085/Direktiv+kommission+101015+ENG.pdf

Table 34 Welfare index in Malmö city districts 2009-2011 (Source: City of Malmö)

City district	Index 2009	Index 2010	Index 2011
Västra Innerstaden	7,3	7,6	7,4
Husie	7,1	6,9	7,4
Limhamn-Bunkeflo	7,6	7,1	7,3
Centrum	5,7	6	6
Oxie	6,1	5,9	5,8
Hyllie	5,8	5,5	5,5
Kirseberg	4,7	4,8	5
Södra Innerstaden	4	4,5	4,2
Fosie	3,4	3,3	3,3
Rosengård	3,2	3,4	3,2

As we have seen, almost all general welfare programs in Malmö, like Welfare for all (2004) or the Commission for a Socially Sustainable Malmö (2010) have a very strong spatial dimension to it. In addition to these programs there have been several large programs directly focused on the issue of ethnic and socio-economic segregation. Between 1995 and 2003 two state financed programs, Blommanpengarna (1995–1999) and Metropolitan Development Initiative (1999-2003), and one EU financed program, Urban (1995-1999), were introduced to turn the negative development in immigrant dense areas in Malmö. The strategies in these programs may have changed, but the problems remain (Malmö stad, 2011b). Some of the neighbourhoods seem to be in constant trouble. Next to Rosengård, Seved, with its 4000 inhabitants, is the second most notorious geographical area when it comes to media reporting and social unrest. There have been specific projects in Seved ever since it was a part of the Metropolitan Development Initiative in 1999-2002. The Seved Initiative then emerged out of this national context and was subsequently taken on by the city district Södra Innerstaden. The initiative is targeted on a small spatial area and aims to tackle socio-economic disadvantage and enhance democratic involvement. In the Seved Initiative the key problems were identified as poor environment, ethnic segregation, crime, levels of unemployment, and a major drugs problem (DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, 2009). The current Neighborhood program (2010-) is dealing with the same issues, of improving living conditions in areas where welfare is at its lowest in order to counteract segregation.

6 Summary and Conclusion

6.1 Berlin

About one out of four people living in Berlin has a migration background. Most of them or their close ancestors come from Turkey, Poland or the former Soviet Union. The districts Mitte, Neukölln and Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg are the areas where most of them settle, however other districts also are home to a considerable share of migrants.

There are relevant issues in all four dimensions of migrant integration. Historically, the socio-economic dimension was considered the most important in the past as most first generation migrants arrived in Berlin at a time when Germany was in need of low-skilled labour. However, since the onset of mass unemployment in the last decades of the 20th century it was particularly those migrants who faced difficulties in the job market. Until today, the unemployment rate of foreigners in Berlin is about twice as high compared to Germans. In this context it is noteworthy that more citizens with as compared to without a migration background decide to start their own business. In part, the difficulties in the job market can be explained by the poorer academic performance of children with a migration background. Overall, they more often quit school without a degree and those who finish graduate with lower-valued certificates. Over the last years, the issue of health came more into the focus of migrant integration. On the one hand, it seems that migrants are more exposed to health risks as compared to ethnic Germans. Therefore intercultural aspects of health care provision become more exigent. Even though the demographic situation is less strained for the population with as compared to without a migration background, many of the first generation migrants reach an age in which health care services become more important.

In the socio-cultural dimension of migrant integration we find two areas which appear most relevant: migrant delinquency and the dialogue with the Islamic community. The former topic is controversial as foreigners appear to be and are often reported in the media as more involved in criminal behaviour. While the police are particularly concerned about juvenile delinquency, academic research points to biased statistics – some delicts can only be committed by foreigners – as well as an over-representation of bad news in the mass media. The dialogue with the Islamic community mainly centres on the erection of mosques as well as on the issue of religious education in schools. This dialogue – according to our interviewees – has been negatively influenced by the publication of a book authored by a former member of the Berlin government – Thilo Sarrazin. Ever since, both issues – mosques and education – were more difficult to address.

Three issues are predominant in the legal-political dimension of migrant integration in Berlin: the political participation and participation in civil society, the debate on voting rights for local elections for third-country nationals and the intercultural opening of the Berlin public administration. It is the local advisory boards which are one of the most important forms of political participation of migrants in Berlin. In fact, the district *Kreuzberg* was the first to introduce this institution in Germany in 1972. With the integration and participation law in 2010 the parlia-

mentarian committees on integration now include migrants into the political system, too. Furthermore, it is also the migrant associations themselves which offer a platform for political participation. The latter are important in processes of consultation for the integration commissioners in Berlin. Also the second issue in this dimension – the debate on voting rights – is becoming more important. This political demand is highly contested though receives backing from researchers and senior public administrators in the field of migrant integration – particularly in the context of decreasing naturalisation rates in Berlin. The issue of the intercultural opening of the Berlin public administration is firmly on the political agenda of the public sector itself, even though the concept itself is contested in academic literature. Researchers argue that the latter is neither fully understood in the administrative practise, nor has it – until recently – been developed into an appropriate training.

Issues in the spatial dimension of migrant integration appear to centre on the segregation of migrant communities in Berlin. This subject matter is particularly relevant for questions regarding urban planning. One side in this debate claims that functional segregation fosters the integration of migrants into the German society via mutual support in ethnic networks. Newly arriving immigrants can rely on a community with which they share a cultural background. They are provided an assistance, e.g. in the communication with local public administration. Functional segregation is considered voluntary and temporarily limited. The other side of the debate considers segregation as structural and due to the discrimination of migrants in the housing market. Local concentration of migrant communities causes the departure of those parts of the ethnic German population that can afford their relocation into “better” neighbourhoods. As a consequence socially disadvantaged Germans as well as migrant communities remain in the quarters that then become socially problematic. The integration of migrants thereafter becomes more and more difficult.

6.2 Rotterdam

This deliverable aims to identify key integration issues in Rotterdam. In the following, we draw some conclusions for each of the dimensions of integration as identified in the taxonomy report.

Socio-economic dimension of integration

The educational attainments of ethnic minorities are generally lagging behind educational achievements of the native Dutch. This particularly concerns Turkish and Moroccan students. A notable issue in this regard is the higher incidence of dropping out of secondary school and vocational school among non-western minorities. However, the educational position of ethnic minorities is improving. More people with immigrant backgrounds participate in higher education and fulfil senior positions on the labour market. Also many persons from ethnic minorities are successful as entrepreneurs or in middle-class jobs. However, in education and on the labour market, ethnic deprivations remain present and are likely to increase due to the current economic recession

Specific issues in this area of integration are the relatively low labour market participation of non-western women which remains (albeit in smaller numbers) prevalent among the second generations. For some of them (mostly the first generation of immigrants) this is by choice. Youth unemployment, especially of Moroccan and Surinamese minorities is much higher than that of the native Dutch youth. Income deficiencies and a higher welfare dependency remain present among non-western minorities. Lastly, ethnic minorities in Rotterdam participate in non-paid voluntary work less often. Particularly the labour market position of Moroccan immigrants remains precarious. The Surinamese minority is in the most favourable socio-economic position, although they are still lagging behind the native Dutch.

The health care position of immigrants is identified as one of the socio-economic areas of integration in the UniteEurope taxonomy. Although there are no statistics on health care access of ethnic minorities, we have figures about their actual health. Notable are the high prevalence of obesity among the Turkish minority and the higher prevalence of certain psychic problems such as schizophrenia among Moroccan people.

Deficiencies in the use of Dutch language are most prevalent amongst Turkish and Cape Verdean people in Rotterdam. Surinamese and Antillean minorities suffer less deficiency as these were Dutch colonies where the Dutch language was spoken by parts of the population. Among the native Dutch, 4% of the people does not read and write their language sufficiently.

Legal-political dimension of integration

The turnout rates of ethnic minorities in Rotterdam at municipal and submunicipal elections are generally lower than those of native Dutch in Rotterdam. However, we observe that in years when minority policies were subject of election campaigns in 2002 and 2006, larger proportions of ethnic minority populations were motivated to vote.

People from ethnic minorities in Rotterdam often report to feel being discriminated. Moroccan people feel most discriminated.

Socio-cultural dimension of integration

Delinquency is a persistent problem among ethnic minorities in Rotterdam. In particular Antillean and Moroccan youths have been suspected of a crime more that Dutch nationals. This mostly concerns children of immigrants.

Although the acceptance of basic norms and values is a very prominent integration issue in political debates, only one indicator of acceptance of norms and values by various ethnic groups in Rotterdam is available. This is a statement regarding homosexual teachers: '*I disapprove of children in schools being taught by a homosexual teacher*'. About 85% of the native Dutch population disagrees or fully disagrees with this statement. This percentage is less among people from ethnic minorities.

A positive trend is that people from ethnic minorities in Rotterdam strongly identify with their home town. However, they feel less attached to the Netherlands as a whole and their attachment to their neighbourhood, city and country is less than that of native Dutch.

The degree of inter-ethnic contact in Rotterdam can be measured in various ways. A first indicator is the degree of spatial segregation. This is high in Rotterdam but decreasing over the past years. Another indicator is the number of inter-ethnic marriages. Figures show that this number is generally low in all ethnic groups, excluding the Antilleans.

Spatial dimension of integration

Ethnic segregation in housing is relatively large in Rotterdam. Concentration of autochthonous citizens in certain neighbourhoods is the largest. However, overall segregation as measured by the segregation index is decreasing and housing conditions of ethnic minorities improve. As their socio-economic positions improve, many people from ethnic minorities are moving to the suburbs and municipalities in the periphery of Rotterdam.

6.3 Malmö

In the last decade the city of Malmö has experienced a large increase of the number of foreign born migrants, from about 62.000 in 2002 to 91.000 in 2012. Most of them are coming from outside the EU as humanitarian or family migrants. They are seldom self-sufficient when they arrive and few speak the Swedish language. It is this inflow of migrants that has contributed to the strong focus on the socio-economic dimension when integration issues are discussed.

Socio-economic dimension

Employment is seen as the key to solve most other integration issues in Malmö. If this is true the city of Malmö can be considered to have big problems in this regard, as only 42 percent of the foreign born population is employed, compared to 75 percent of the Swedish born. Even though the number of jobs has increased, the inflow of unemployed migrants has been at least as large which has maintained a high unemployment rate among foreign-born and large socio-economic gaps between the native and foreign-born population. And even though most migrants groups and the native born have increased their employment rate since the 1990s, the changing composition of the population has led to a modest increase of 1.7 percentage points in total employment rate since 1997. The low employment rate for foreign born is reflected in their income and social assistance. For example, 78 percent of the social assistance is paid out to foreign born households.

Some of the differences between foreign and native born in employment is related to the education level. Foreign born are clearly overrepresented among low-skilled and underrepresented among the highly educated. These differences in educational level will be sustained because the migrants and their children are doing considerably worse at school. Far fewer are eligible for secondary school and higher education. Other reasons for lower em-

ployment rates amongst foreign born are their health situation and language comprehension. While health is often mentioned as a current integration issue, language comprehension is not.

Socio-cultural dimension

The two main socio-cultural integration issues in Malmö are crime and interethnic contact. Religious or cultural practice issues are hardly ever mentioned on the local level and although the Populist Party *The Swedish Democrats* is represented in the City assembly, "attitudes" is not one of the most prominent issues on the agenda. Crime has been a large problem in Malmö for a long time and it has escalated with riots and a series of murders the last couple of years. The discussion is heated whether this phenomenon is related to migration or not. Most people in politics and media link criminal activities to socio-economic issues. At the same time no one can deny that youth delinquency, like the riots in the district Rosengård, takes place in certain immigrant dense areas or that a large majority of the perpetrators and, especially, victims of the recent shootings have foreign background.

The precarious situation for the Jews in Malmö has become an international issue. They are being harassed and attacked in the streets and few dare to openly show that they are Jewish. The Simon Wiesenthal Center has issued a warning to Jews travelling to Malmö and the United States special envoy in anti-Semitism has visited the city. The conflict has been fueled by the remarks of the mayor which many have been interpreting as anti-Semitic.

Legal-political dimension

Both the fact that there is a low threshold to attain Swedish citizenship and that foreigners can vote in local elections make political participation a marginal integration issue. Instead, the main ambition is to increase participation in civil society in order to activate people and foster civic engagement. Discrimination is a problem which the city is trying to address through an action plan against discrimination. The plan identifies discrimination on an individual and structural level. The city's own organisation has for a long time been singled out as part of the problem. It has to be more open and tolerant towards persons of different ethnic backgrounds.

Spatial dimension

As the city has become more and more segregated along ethnic and socio-economic lines the spatial dimension has come to play an important role in almost all local integration issues. From the 1999 action plan on integration, through the general welfare and anti-segregation programs up until today, this dimension is highlighted. While some city districts are affluent, other districts with a large majority of migrant groups suffer from low employment, high dependency of welfare, bad health, low election turnout and delinquency. It is in the latter districts where most newly arrived humanitarian and family migrants settle down which leads to overcrowding and that the process of segregation is reinforced.

Conclusion

The city of Malmö has struggled with integration issues since the economic crisis in the 1990s coincided with an increased influx of migrants. A lot of documents have been produced and several major programs have been implemented by the city to improve the situation, mostly concerning the socio-economic and spatial dimension. Even though a lot has been implemented, statistics and interviews show that the welfare gaps between native and foreign born remain large and that the socio-economic and ethnic segregation are apparent in the city's geography.

The most prominent integration issues in Malmö seem to be:

- A very low employment rate amongst foreign born;
- High drop-out rates and lower educational achievements in primary and secondary education;
- Youth delinquency in immigrant dense neighbourhoods;
- Violent crimes that may, or may not, be linked to migration;
- A precarious situation for the small Jewish community;
- Most integration issues have a strong spatial dimension which is assumed to worsen the situation and result in tensions in the city;

6.4 A comparative perspective

The migrant population differs between the three cities. In Berlin and Rotterdam, a large number of immigrants came as guest workers during the 1960s and 70s. Other large-scale immigration to Berlin and Rotterdam has historical roots. A substantial part of the migrant population in Berlin consists of ethnic Germans who lived in the former Eastern bloc, whereas in Rotterdam, many migrants come from former colonies. Also Malmö experienced a considerable labour migration in the 1960s, but the migrant population comprises to a great extent refugees that have come to the city more recently.

While the migrant populations differ, most of the issues are similar: The three cities have a more problematic situation on the labour market than the national average and this especially affects the migrant population. And while some issues seem to improve, the low educational achievement of migrants in schools allows the conclusion that their subordinate status on the labour market will be maintained.

However, there are contextual differences based on how integration issues are discussed and what rights are granted to migrants in the three cities. Whereas there seems to be a stronger focus on socio-cultural integration issues in Berlin and Rotterdam, integration issues are more often discussed in a socio-economic context in Malmö. The most obvious example is crime, which is often interpreted as a socio-cultural issue in Berlin and Rotterdam. Other contextual differences are due to immigrants' rights in different countries. In Berlin, where many immigrants do not have voting rights, the question of political representation is more important than in Rotterdam and Malmö.

The similarities and differences between cities is a challenge for UniteEurope. The tool should be developed so that comparative studies can be made, and thereby enhance our understanding on how integration issues in different cities are discussed and evolve. At the same time it must be locally adapted so it can be used by local officials and policy makers. This study of integration issues is also important because it enables comparisons between the discussions in social media. It makes it possible to examine the differences between real problems and perceived problems and how the rhetoric is different from practice. This way, we can not only make comparative research on integration issues, but also on the relationship between the public discussion and integration issues/measures in different cities. Furthermore, the study of integration issues is an important backdrop to the deliverable on policies and measures (D 2.3). It can help to explain the different integration measures the cities are adopting. In addition it can show whether or not the municipalities are addressing the issues with policies and measures, and if they have the political tools to do so. This deliverable has also been important to identify the integration related keywords (D 3.3) which is central in the development of the social media analysis tool.

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