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## **EU RESEARCH ON SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES**

***EU Enlargement and Multi-level Governance in  
European Regional and Environment Policies:  
Patterns of Learning, Adaptation and  
Europeanization Among Cohesion Countries  
(Greece, Ireland, Portugal) and Lessons for New  
Members (Hungary, Poland)***

***ADAPT***

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**Coordinator of project:**

Panteion University of Social Sciences of Athens, Institute of Urban Environment and  
Human Resources (UEHR)  
Athens, Greece  
Prof. Panayiotis Getimis

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**Partners:**

London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), Hellenic Observatory of the  
European Institute, London, UK, Loukas Tsoukalis  
Institute for World Economics (IWE) of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest,  
HU, Dr Tamas Fleischer  
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Janusz Swierkocki  
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## Preface

Within the Fifth Community RTD Framework Programme of the European Union (1998–2002), the Key Action 'Improving the Socio-economic Knowledge Base' had broad and ambitious objectives, namely: to improve our understanding of the structural changes taking place in European society, to identify ways of managing these changes and to promote the active involvement of European citizens in shaping their own futures. A further important aim was to mobilise the research communities in the social sciences and humanities at the European level and to provide scientific support to policies at various levels, with particular attention to EU policy fields.

This Key Action had a total budget of EUR 155 million and was implemented through three Calls for proposals. As a result, 185 projects involving more than 1 600 research teams from 38 countries have been selected for funding and have started their research between 1999 and 2002.

Most of these projects are now finalised and results are systematically published in the form of a Final Report.

The calls have addressed different but interrelated research themes which have contributed to the objectives outlined above. These themes can be grouped under a certain number of areas of policy relevance, each of which are addressed by a significant number of projects from a variety of perspectives.

These areas are the following:

- ***Societal trends and structural change***

16 projects, total investment of EUR 14.6 million, 164 teams

- ***Quality of life of European citizens***

5 projects, total investment of EUR 6.4 million, 36 teams

- ***European socio-economic models and challenges***

9 projects, total investment of EUR 9.3 million, 91 teams

- ***Social cohesion, migration and welfare***

30 projects, total investment of EUR 28 million, 249 teams

- ***Employment and changes in work***

18 projects, total investment of EUR 17.5 million, 149 teams

- ***Gender, participation and quality of life***

13 projects, total investment of EUR 12.3 million, 97 teams

- ***Dynamics of knowledge, generation and use***

8 projects, total investment of EUR 6.1 million, 77 teams

- ***Education, training and new forms of learning***

14 projects, total investment of EUR 12.9 million, 105 teams

- ***Economic development and dynamics***

22 projects, total investment of EUR 15.3 million, 134 teams

- ***Governance, democracy and citizenship***

28 projects; total investment of EUR 25.5 million, 233 teams

- ***Challenges from European enlargement***

13 projects, total investment of EUR 12.8 million, 116 teams

- ***Infrastructures to build the European research area***

9 projects, total investment of EUR 15.4 million, 74 teams

This publication contains the final report of the project 'EU Enlargement and Multi-level Governance in European Regional and Environment Policies: Patterns of Learning, Adaptation and Europeanization Among Cohesion Countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal) and Lessons for New Members (Hungary, Poland)', whose work has primarily contributed to the area 'The challenge of EU enlargement'.

The report contains information about the main scientific findings of ADAPT and their policy implications. The research was carried out by six teams over a period of two years, starting in September 2001.

The abstract and executive summary presented in this edition offer the reader an overview of the main scientific and policy conclusions, before the main body of the research provided in the other chapters of this report.

As the results of the projects financed under the Key Action become available to the scientific and policy communities, Priority 7 'Citizens and Governance in a knowledge based society' of the Sixth Framework Programme is building on the progress already made and aims at making a further contribution to the development of a European Research Area in the social sciences and the humanities.

I hope readers find the information in this publication both interesting and useful as well as clear evidence of the importance attached by the European Union to fostering research in the field of social sciences and the humanities.

J.-M. BAER,

Director

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Professor Panayiotis Getimis,

Coordinator of the project

## **Abstract**

This report is a collection of final reports to signal the completion of the ADAPT project by presenting the conceptual and methodological framework of the project, the europeanisation and learning challenges in the five case-study countries, summarizing the main comparative results on the two policy-areas and the five countries under consideration and providing some lessons for the CEECs, some patterns of learning and adaptation in the five countries and some broader policy recommendations for European, national and regional/local policy-makers.

More specific, this final report consists of four Parts and totally eleven chapters.



## **I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

### **Part A**

**Chapter One:** This chapter summarises the theoretical, conceptual and methodological framework on adaptation and Europeanisation. It explains how the project has focused on facilitating the adaptation process of the prospective new member states of the EU (CEECs-Hungary, Poland) to the multi-level system of governance in the regional and environmental policy areas, by conceptualising learning, institutional and policy adaptation within the EU system of governance and by drawing lessons from the experience of previous enlargement waves –Cohesion- countries (Ireland, Portugal and Greece). Hence, its main goal has been twofold: first to evaluate, on a comparative basis, the impact of Europeanisation of public policy on governance structures of three traditionally unitary previous enlargement waves –Cohesion- countries (Ireland, Portugal and Greece), and their response, in terms of learning and adaptation, to the European environment in the regional and environmental policies; and second, to utilize this research outcome in identifying the appropriate reforms that the new members states (Poland and Hungary) should undertake, in order to facilitate the adaptation and adjustment of their public policy structures the new European environment in the selected policy areas.

### **Part B**

**Chapters Two-Six:** These five chapters are the national case-study reports of the five selected countries and refer to both regional and environmental policy. They include a socio-economic situation, historical and political context of the country, the National context of policy-making prior to accession/association, the Regional context and the Social Network Analysis implementation and findings in each case-study area. Furthermore these report facilitate the Adaptational pressures, the Resistance to change, the Evolution of central state policy-making structures, the role of Non-state actors and the Civic culture and finally provide an assessment of learning capacity including patterns of learning and policy recommendations in the selected policy areas.

### **Part C**

**Chapters Seven-Eight:** In these two reports we look comparatively at the Europeanisation of regional and environmental policy in the cohesion and CEECs states, focusing on the domestic governance structures and adaptation. The report analyses and compares the adaptational pressures and reactions in the cohesion states (Greece, Ireland and Portugal) and the CEECs (Hungary and Poland). We consider the degree to

which the pre-existing domestic governance structures in the cohesion states enabled adaptation to EU policy, and whether the domestic structures fitted with EU policy, or created policy misfits. It is often assumed that EU policy is a major catalyst for policy adaptation and institutional change, and that the reform of the EU's structural funds in 1988, created pressures for such change in the cohesions. This assumption, however, needs to be examined in the overall context of the domestic structures and civil society in each of these states.

## **Part D**

This part consists of three chapters and refers to the policy implications of Coping with Multi-level Governance and concludes with some policy recommendations.

**Chapter Nine:** This chapter facilitates the assessing policy outcomes and implementation - patterns of learning and adaptation in the Cohesion and the CEE countries.

**Chapter Ten:** The major perspective of this chapter is to present a model of coping with multi-level governance in public policy-making concerning Hungary, Poland and the 'other' CEECs.

**Chapter Eleven:** The last chapter of the final report provides some useful policy recommendations concerning both regional and environmental policy totally in the five case-study countries.

The reports included in this final report have been based on the work undertaken by all the project's participants throughout the duration of the project and have been revised following the comments received by the external participants during the final workshop of the project in Brussels on the 13<sup>th</sup> of October 2003. External participants included: Dr Fisch (DG Research), Dr Rodolfi (DG Regio) and Mr Saramandis (DG Regio).

The project's participants are the following:

**Institute of Urban Environment and Human Resources (UEHR), Panteion University (Coordinator)**

Panayotis GETIMIS [pget@uehr.panteion.gr](mailto:pget@uehr.panteion.gr)

Leeda DEMETROPOULOU [leedem@uehr.panteion.gr](mailto:leedem@uehr.panteion.gr)

Aimilia ALEXANDROPOULOU [emalex@hotmail.com](mailto:emalex@hotmail.com)

Vasilis MARKANTONIS [markanton@panteion.gr](mailto:markanton@panteion.gr)

**Hellenic Observatory of the European Institute of LSE**

Robert LEONARDI [R.Leonardi@lse.ac.uk](mailto:R.Leonardi@lse.ac.uk)

Christos PARASKEVOPOULOS [C.Paraskevopoulos@lse.ac.uk](mailto:C.Paraskevopoulos@lse.ac.uk)

Justyna ANDRZEJEWICZ [J.Andrzejewicz@lse.ac.uk](mailto:J.Andrzejewicz@lse.ac.uk)

**University of Limerick**

Nicholas REES [nicholas.rees@ul.ie](mailto:nicholas.rees@ul.ie)

Brid QUINN [brid.quinn@ul.ie](mailto:brid.quinn@ul.ie)

Bernadette Connaughton [Bernadette.Connaughton@ul.ie](mailto:Bernadette.Connaughton@ul.ie)

**National Administration institute (INA) of Portugal**

Helena RATO [helena.rato@ina.pt](mailto:helena.rato@ina.pt)

Miguel RODRIGUES [miguel.rodriques@ina.pt](mailto:miguel.rodriques@ina.pt)

João António SALIS GOMES [joaosalisgomes@netcabo.pt](mailto:joaosalisgomes@netcabo.pt)

Rui GODINHO [rui.godinho@valorsul.pt](mailto:rui.godinho@valorsul.pt)

**European Institute in Lodz**

Maria KARASINSKA-FENDLER [mkf@ie.lodz.pl](mailto:mkf@ie.lodz.pl)

Anna Jedrzejewska [ajedrzejewska@ie.lodz.pl](mailto:ajedrzejewska@ie.lodz.pl)

Monika SLUPINSKA [mślupinska@ie.lodz.pl](mailto:mślupinska@ie.lodz.pl)

Kazimierz Sobotka [ksobotka@ie.lodz.pl](mailto:ksobotka@ie.lodz.pl)

Malgorzata Czernielewska-Rutkowska [mczernielewska@ie.lodz.pl](mailto:mczernielewska@ie.lodz.pl)

Dr Szlachta [jacek.szlachta@acn.waw.pl](mailto:jacek.szlachta@acn.waw.pl)

**Institute for World Economics (IWE) of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences**

Tamas FLEISCHER [tfleisch@vki.hu](mailto:tfleisch@vki.hu)

Krisztina VIDA [kvida@vki.hu](mailto:kvida@vki.hu)

Marianna SZAITZ

Peter FUTO [futo@mixolid.hu](mailto:futo@mixolid.hu)

**Centre for Regional Studies (CRS) of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences**

Ilona Palne-Kovacs [palne@dti.rkk.hu](mailto:palne@dti.rkk.hu)

Gyula Horvath [horvath@dti.rkk.hu](mailto:horvath@dti.rkk.hu)

## **II. SCIENTIFIC DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT RESULTS AND METHODOLOGY**

### **A. PART A**

#### **1. Chapter One: EU Enlargement and Multi-Level Governance In European Public Policy-Making: Actors, Institutions And Learning**

##### **1.1. Introduction**

This chapter discusses the transformation of the governance structures in the EU member states –with emphasis on the new prospective members of Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs)- as a result of the Europeanization of public policy-making, in the light of the EU’s new wave of enlargement. The underlying assumption is that although the Europeanization process plays a crucial role in the transformation of the national systems of governance and in the improvement of their institutional capacity, the success or failure in the implementation of EU public policy in general and in the regional and environment policy areas in particular, especially during the first post-accession period, is significantly dependent on the learning capacity of the pre-existing institutional infrastructure. Thus it attempts to conceptualise and exemplify the notion of institutional thickness as a fundamental precondition for social learning within the EU public policy environment, and thus to enrich and substantiate the so called “goodness of fit” approach to the adaptation and Europeanization processes within the multi-level system of governance of the European Union.

##### **1.2. Changing Conceptions of Governance**

Governance has become a state of the art but also a popular concept in much of the contemporary debate in the social sciences. A key reason for this popularity is attributed to its capacity for capturing the multiplicity of actors, institutions and relationships involved in the process of governing, given that the narrower term ‘government’ has gradually become almost obsolete, having been outflanked by rapid technological, social and political changes of the last quarter of the century. In particular, the globalization of economic activities, information and finance, as a consequence of the rapid technological change and the gradual transformation of the technological paradigm since the late 1960s, has led to the emergence of a changing, globalizing new political economy, conceptualize by increasing, internationally-driven, interdependence among the actors, accompanied by high levels of risk and uncertainty, which derive mainly from technological change, knowledge and diversified information management capacities (Boyer, 1988). This, in turn, has important implications for almost all sectors of public policy, by challenging the traditional role of the state as guarantor and provider of

collective (public) goods and undermining the pattern of corporatist arrangements for capital-labour relations. Both the key role of the state in the provision of public goods and the corporatist model of interest intermediation are considered intrinsic elements of the dominant –at least in Europe- regulatory regime based on mass production and state interventionism during the first post-war period. Hence, there is a debate about the diminishing role of the state in the provision of public goods as a consequence of the predominance of supply-side economics and the increasing importance of fiscal discipline imposed through cuts in public spending for securing international competitiveness. Moreover, these international-competitiveness considerations seem to have led to the fundamental shift from interventionist to regulatory state (Majone, 1998).

On the other hand, it has been argued that the undermining of corporatism at the national level and the gradual transformation of the pattern of collective action and interest intermediation have been brought about by three interrelated developments. First, there is a growing demand for regulation at the global/transnational or supranational levels by multinational companies and other private interest organizations who prefer centralization of regulation at the supranational level because it reduces transaction costs and therefore they do not see any reason for participation in the corporatist bargaining at the national level. Subsequently, there has been a gradual transfer of crucial regulatory functions from national to transnational (i.e. World Bank-WB, World Trade Organization-WTO) or supranational (i.e. EU Commission) institutions (J. Pierre, 2000; J. Pierre and B. G. Peters, 2000). Second, in a similar vein, public interest organizations, such as environmental or consumer groups, view regulation at the global or supranational levels as less costly and perhaps more effective than the national structures of interest intermediation, and therefore they try to secure substantial resources to pursue lobbying strategies at the global level. Finally, and perhaps more importantly, post-industrial society is no longer simply divided between capital and labour and class has declined as major determinant of individuals' political, economic and social interests and values. Conversely, post-industrial society is characterized by complexity and multiplicity of interests which cannot be captured by corporatism. This is the case of individuals with 'post-material' value orientations, who, being excluded from corporatist arrangements, tend to join 'new social movements', such as the civil rights or the ecology movements. Further, the hierarchical and top-down structure between peak and grassroots associations and the closeness of tripartite meetings with state officials, as identical features of corporatist intermediation, inhibit dialogue, communication and flow of information between actors on a horizontal basis and may constitute a major impediment to policy change and innovation in crucial public policy areas, while the policy outcomes of corporatist arrangements cannot be seen as reflecting a broad social

consensus in post-industrial societies (Schmitter and Lehbruch, 1979). In sum, globalization seems to have challenged corporatism as the dominant, class-based pattern of collective action and interest intermediation, especially in the post-war Europe, and brought about important economic and societal changes that favour a more pluralistic model at both the international and national/domestic levels. Thus, despite the presence of a mix of representation styles currently in Europe combining elements of corporatism, pluralism and neo-pluralism, as a consequence of the well-known co-existence of Anglo-Saxon pluralism and European corporatism (Hix, 1999), it seems there is a trend towards a rather pluralistic model of interest representation at both the supranational and national levels (Streeck and Schmitter, 1991).

As the above analysis suggests, globalization is supposed to have definitely eroded the traditional domestic political authority of the state. However, it would be superfluous to assume that the state has become absolutely irrelevant as a meso-level of governance. Instead, what does really take place in this transitional period is a transformation of the state, which still remains a functional locus of public policy and governance (Pierre, 2000) especially with regard to the notions of legitimacy and redistribution. Additionally, as the recent literature on globalization (Swank, D., 2002) points out, domestic institutional structures, in the form of the so called "*social corporatism*", play a crucial role in mediating and/or counterbalancing the global pressures. Thus the debate about governance has been brought about by a wide range of developments, as diversified as, in abstract terms, the limited capacity of state hierarchy to 'govern' and regulate the rapid technological change, the significant deregulation of the economy and the 'marketization' of policy-making and, on the other hand, in parallel, the crisis of the "principal-agent" model in policy-making and consequently the increasing role of societal (civil society) actors in the policy process (see Table 1.). In that sense, governance has become an umbrella concept for a wide variety of empirical phenomena about governing. In structural terms, these include *governance by hierarchies*, *governance by markets*, *governance by networks*, *governance by (policy) communities* and so on, while, in procedural terms, governance is conceptualized as *steering* and co-ordinating (see *inter alia*, Hood, C., 1998; Rhodes, R. A. W., 2000; CEC, 2001).

**Table 1.** Forms of governance

Forms of governance	Modes of interest intermediation	Types of actors	Citizenship
State	Representative majority decisions/hierarchical administrative interventions	Political actors (governmental institutions, local and regional authorities, guangos)	Vote
Market	Bargaining/market exchange	Economic actors (individuals, enterprises)	Choice
Associations	Bargaining/political exchange	Collective/corporate actors (associations, chambers)	Right to organize or join a collective corporate actor
Civic interaction	Arguing	Civil society actors, social movements	Voice (direct actions)

*Source: H. Heinelt, et. al., 1999, Participatory Governance, Project Proposal submitted to the EU Commission, 5<sup>th</sup> Framework Programme, First Call for Proposals.*

### 1.3. Europeanization and Domestic Governance Structures

The *problematique* about governance in the EU is raised as a crucial issue for public policy planning and implementation, since the governance structures of the member states are facing the additional challenge of adapting to a multi-layered policy-making environment at the EU level. The notion of "*multi-level governance*" in the EU (Marks, 1993; Kohler-Koch, 1996; Caporaso, 1996; Marks et. al., 1996) implies that sub-regional, regional, national and supranational authorities interact with each other in two ways: first, across different levels of government (vertical dimension); and, second, with other relevant actors within the same level (horizontal dimension). Although it could be argued this system of governance might merely reflect the multiplicity of the governance structures among the member states in any sphere of public policy, the multi-level system of governance is considered as an outcome of the Europeanization of public policy. Yet, the notion of Europeanization may take several meanings and refer to a wide variety of processes, i.e. historical, cultural, institutional (see Featherstone, K., 2003) and therefore there is need for definition/clarification. In the context of public policy-making in general and of this project in particular Europeanization is viewed as a process of institutional and policy adaptation as a response to EU policies. Europeanization is also often related to the notion of modernization. Modernization, however, is also a rather ambiguous concept that may take several connotations and mean different things to



different people (Hood, 1998). For, in the contextual framework of this project –Cohesion and CEE countries- it should primarily be interpreted as synonymous to institution building. Thus, the Europeanization process refers to the complementary notions of opening up the structures of the traditional nation state to the supranational level, and, consequently, to their adaptation to the EU multi-level system of governance. In that respect, the Europeanization of public policy constitutes a rather enduring and long-standing challenge for the administrative structures of the member states and hence it is viewed as a positive external shock for promoting institution-building, learning and policy-making innovation at the domestic –national and subnational- levels.

Within this framework, in regional policy –and especially in the case of the Cohesion and CEE countries- Europeanization is viewed as an *independent variable* that crucially affects and challenges well-established structures within the domestic systems of governance and plays an important role in the administrative restructuring and devolution processes within the member states and in enhancing the institutional capacity at the subnational (regional and local) levels. In particular, its impact on the regional and local policy-making arenas is supposed to be twofold: a direct one, by providing increased resources through redistribution; and an indirect one, by shaping intra-regional interactions and thus promoting local institutional capacity through the creation of intra, inter and transregional networks that support local development initiatives. In that respect, the Europeanization function in regional policy may be considered as almost synonymous to “subnational mobilization” at the European level (Hooghe, 1995).

In the environmental policy Europeanization has traditionally been interpreted as a process by which new member states, either contribute to the formulation and/or advancement of the EU environmental policy towards their own national priorities (higher standards in environmental protection), or adopt the already more advanced European regulations into their domestic policies. This takes place within the framework of the intergovernmental bargaining between the so called “pioneers-forerunners” group, consisting –prior to the last enlargement- mainly of Germany, Denmark and Netherlands, and the “latecomers” group, which comprises mainly the cohesion countries (Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece) (Andersen and Liefferink, 1997). This, in turn, has led to important institutional innovations in almost all cohesion countries. In this respect, especially in the case of the Cohesion and CEE countries, Europeanization is, again, viewed as an *independent variable* that crucially affects and challenges well-established structures within the domestic policy-making structures in environmental policy.

Given the complexity of the MLG structures –an outcome of the multiplicity of governance structures, organizational routines, norms and policy styles among the

member states- within which the adaptation process takes place, however, the notion of "goodness of fit" between the Europeanization process of policy-making, on the one hand, and the domestic (national, regional, local) institutional settings, rules and practices, on the other, has been identified as a crucial parameter for the adaptation process of the national governance systems to the European policy-making structures in public policy in general and regional policy in particular (Risse, T., et. al., 2001; Cowles, Green M. and Th. Risse, 2001; Boerzel, T., 2001, 1999). What the term implies is the degree of "adaptational pressures" that domestic institutions and policy-making structures will face in order to comply with the European rules and practices. In particular, given the distinctive character of the policy-making structures at the European level<sup>1</sup> on the one hand, and the fact that Europeanization is fundamentally conceived of as a system of continuous interactions between EU policy-making rules and regulations and domestic policy structures on the other, the better the "goodness of fit" between EU rules and domestic practices the weaker the adaptational pressures will be for the domestic institutional structures (Risse, et. al., 2001). Conversely, policy and/or institutional misfits between the supranational and domestic levels of governance are expected to exert high *adaptational pressures* which, in turn, lead to domestic structural change (ibid: 6-9). However, the presence of *institutional and policy misfits* and, consequently, of high *adaptational pressures* is considered a necessary but not sufficient condition for domestic institutional and policy change, given that there is evidence to suggest that the latter is crucially conditioned by the presence of specific institutional structures at the domestic level of governance that may facilitate or inhibit the adaptation process (Boerzel, T. and T. Risse, 2000; Paraskevopoulos, C. J., 1998, 2001). What becomes clear from the above analysis –and coincides with the underlying assumption of the project- is that although the Europeanization process plays a key role in the transformation of the domestic systems of governance in general and the public/regional policy-making structures, domestic institutions and especially specific features of the pre-existing institutional infrastructure at the national and subnational levels of government matter for adaptation (Garmise, 1995, a, b; Lenschow, 1997; Jeffery, 2000; Paraskevopoulos, 1998, 2001, a, b; Risse, et. al, 2001; Boerzel, 2001). Moreover, this importance of the pre-existing institutional infrastructure has become evident in the transition of the CEECs as well (Offe, C., 1996; Goetz, K., 2001; Goetz, K. and Hel. Wollmann, 2001).

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
<sup>1</sup> Although significant variation from one policy area to another is considered as the main feature of the EU policy-making structures and practices, it has been argued that the EU institutional structure is more federal than unitary and its policy-making processes more pluralist than statist (Schmidt, V., 1997). In that respect, it has been predicted, that the more centralized and unitary member states is likely to face stronger adaptational pressures than the decentralized and federal ones (ibid.).

In this respect, this chapter explores the academic and political debate on the EU multi-level system of governance in public policy in general and in regional policy in particular, with emphasis on exemplifying the notion of *institutional "goodness of fit"* as a crucial *intervening variable* affecting policy and institutional change at the national and subnational levels of government. The outcome of this exploration is expected to be a comprehensive theoretical framework for understanding any possible differentiation in the transformation of governance structures between the three Cohesion countries (Ireland, Greece and Portugal) and the CEECs (Poland and Hungary).

#### **1.4. Two Logics of Domestic Policy Change and Learning**

In exemplifying the notion of *"goodness of fit"* as crucial intervening variable between Europeanization and domestic policy/institutional change the new institutionalist literature has identified two broadly different mediating mechanisms/logics of domestic institutional and policy change in response to Europeanization: the rational choice and the sociological (Boerzel and Risse, 2000) (see Figure 1.). The former, based on the *"logic of consequentialism"*, points to the role of redistribution of resources and subsequently differential empowerment of actors at the domestic level and conceives of important institutions for the domestic policy-making arena the presence of *multiple veto points* and existing *formal institutions* as crucial mediating factors that affect domestic actors' capacity for action and hence policy and institutional change. This process has been conceptualized as *"single-loop learning"* (Argyris and Schoen, 1978), whereby actors acquire new information, alter strategies but they pursue given, fixed interests. The latter focuses on the process of *social learning* as a fundamental mechanism of domestic change and identifies *networks* (either epistemic communities, or advocacy and/or issue-specific) and *informal institutions*, namely political and organizational cultures and social norms, as "thick" mediating mechanisms that affect actors' preferences through the *"logic of appropriateness"*, leading to the re-conceptualization of their interests and identities and thus facilitating the learning and socialization processes (Risse, et. al, 2001; Checkel, 2001). As it is obvious, this differentiation corresponds to the broader distinction [within the academic debate about how "paradigm change" occurs in public policy] between *interests*, *ideas/norms* and *institutions* as fundamental conceptual tools/variables affecting change in public policy styles in general (Hood, 1994).

**Figure 1.** New Institutional Approaches to Europeanization and Domestic Change



*Source: Adapted from Tanja Boerzel and Thomas Risse, 2000, p.14*

The theoretical hypotheses of the project are based on the fundamental assumptions of the so called "actor-centred" version of sociological institutionalism as the appropriate framework for analysis, mainly because this approach is better equipped for capturing the actor (interests, preferences, identities) – structure (norms, institutions)

interaction(s) in two important ways. First, although institutions may provide opportunities or incentives to actors or even affect their preferences and identities and thus facilitating or inhibiting structural change, they cannot bring about change on their own. This is done by actors and in that sense the crucial actors-related process here is *learning*. Second, the incremental logic of Europeanization fits well with the learning and socialization processes, as well as, with the "thick" interpretation of institutions (*institutional "goodness of fit"*) (Goodin, R., 1996; Paraskevopoulos, C. J., 1998, b, 2001, a, b; Risse, T. et. al., 2001). In that sense the *agency-centred* sociological approach contrasts substantially with both the liberal intergovernmentalist and the rational choice institutionalist approaches to integration<sup>2</sup>, in two important respects: first, both liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik, A., 1993, 1998) and rational choice institutionalism (Shepsle, K., 1989; North, D., 1990; Hall, P. and R. C. R. Taylor, 1996; Schneider, G. and Lars-Erik Cederman, 1994; Garret, G. and G. Tsebelis, 1996; Pollack, M., 1996, 1997), based to a significant extent on Olson's (1965) collective action and interest group theory, view actors as purely rational self-interested utility maximizers and accordingly their preferences as exogenous from the broad institutional environment; and second, consequently, they adopt a "thin" interpretation of the role of institutions which are viewed: as factors simply contributing to the enforcement and credibility of the agreements between actors by the former; and as merely intervening variable between actors' preferences and policy outcomes within the fundamental equation of political science<sup>3</sup> by the latter<sup>4</sup>. Nonetheless, the role of multiple veto points and formal institutions –conceptualized as key components of the "goodness of fit" by the rational choice approach- in the policy-making process cannot be ignored, given that both constitute key variables determining the degree and level of resistance to change, thus facilitating or inhibiting the policy innovation and adaptation processes, as it has been recently illustrated by the case of Germany (Knill, A. and A. Lenschow, 1998; Thielemann, E., 2000, 2002).

In public policy the learning process, in both its "*single loop*" and *social* versions, has implications for the organizational structure of the domestic politico-economic system. On the one hand it requires that the involved actors are flexible to make the appropriate

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<sup>2</sup> New institutionalism has emerged relatively recently in EU studies, "borrowed" from political science, as a new and perhaps dominant theoretical framework of regional integration (see Aspinwall, M. and Gerald Schneider, 2001).

<sup>3</sup> Institutions constitute a crucial component of this equation, a synopsis of which is: Actors' preferences x Institutions = Policy Outcomes.

<sup>4</sup> Adr. Windhoff-Heritier's (1991) notion of institution as 'restriction and opportunity' shows the compatibility between new institutionalism and rational choice approach and hence it may be seen as the foundation of rational choice institutionalism (see also Keith Dowding, 1994; James Coleman, 1988; Moe, Terry, 1990; and G. Peters, 1999).

structural adjustments to exploit the benefits of learning. On the other, it is crucially dependent on experts who specialize in specific policy areas (P. Hall, 1993; J. Checkel, 1999). Because this combination of flexibility and specialization is best achieved in networked organizations, the network paradigm constitutes the appropriate organizational form for the learning process (Storper, 1995). Finally, since it is a process of 'waking up and catching up' (Sabel, C., 1994) and therefore usually undermines the stability of relations between the transacting actors, informal social norms and conventions play a crucial role in providing the glue that cements and re-stabilizes the relations among the involved actors.

Within the EU public policy environment, "*single loop*" learning is significantly affected by the intended and unintended consequences<sup>5</sup> of the redistribution of power and resources between the supranational, national and subnational levels of government within the EU, and subsequently by the degree of decentralization and administrative restructuring of the state. *Social learning*, on the other hand, implies that compliance with the EU policy-making norms and regulations is achieved through the transformation of actors' identities and interests that the changes of the broad institutional environment bring about (Checkel, J., 2001, b). Additionally, since intergovernmental relations constitute a dynamic system which cannot be simply reduced to a symptom of the state structure (Klausen and Goldsmith, 1997), certain capacities for collective action that facilitate the shaping of interactions and the process of coalition-building among key social and economic actors are raised as the most important prerequisite for both versions – "single loop" and social- learning and adaptation (Jeffery, Ch., 2000; Paraskevopoulos, C. J., 1998, a, b)<sup>6</sup>. In that sense, both formal and crucial informal institutional arrangements play the decisive role in determining the learning capacity of regional and local systems of governance and subsequently the degree of their mobilization at the European level. Further, the increasing importance of capacities for collective action for learning and adaptation processes is underlined by the emergence of the network paradigm as an operational element of the institutional infrastructure at all stages of policy-making in the EU (Grote, J., 1997; B. Kohler-Koch, 1996; Kenis, P. and V. Schneider, 1991; Windhoff-

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<sup>5</sup> The impact of the 1988 reforms of the Structural Funds on the redistribution of power between the levels of government, by strengthening the role of the subnational level and establishing direct linkages between supranational, national and subnational authorities through their role in managing and monitoring Operational Programmes (OPs) of the Community Support Frameworks (CSFs) constitutes a characteristic case of unintended consequences initialised by institutional or policy reforms at the EU level. Moreover, the core of these reforms remained almost unchanged even after the 1993 reform put forward after the negotiations over the 1994-99 Structural Funds programme (see Pollack 1995).

<sup>6</sup> This point has been particularly strengthened by relatively recent research outcomes showing that the strength of associational culture and regional identity, rather than a funding/resource focusing logic, is the underlying factor of regional mobilization at the European level, (Marks, G. et. al., 1996, b).

Heritier A., 1993; Peterson, J., 1995). Therefore, institutional networks and social norms are crucial conceptual tools for facilitating the learning and adaptation processes through their capacity for resolving collective action problems: by structuring institutional interactions the former, and by providing stable rules and procedures (social norms) that facilitate exchange and flow of information and reduce uncertainty the latter.

### **1.5. Bridging the Gap: Institutional Thickness as “Goodness of fit” and the role of Social Capital**

Although the emergence of the network metaphor on the study of policy-making in the EU has been initially conceived of as a reflection of the necessity for mapping the exchange relations among the actors (Rhodes, R. A. W., 2000), the real added value of the network analysis is linked to its capacity for capturing the system of institutional interactions (Knoke and Kuklinski, 1982). This key contribution of the network paradigm is related to the re-conceptualisation of power within networks, and to its implications for the processes of exchange and interdependence. In particular, given that power within networks is ‘the ability to attain higher levels of collective action’ (Metcalfe, L., 1981) and the high degree of resource interdependencies among the actors within inter-organizational networks, power relations within networks are mainly based on the process of exchange (Marin, B., 1990). The exchange process, in turn, involves a variety of resources (money, information, knowledge) and constitutes one way to achieve collective action among the actors. Thus, institutional networks are defined as systems of interactions involving both public and private institutional actors, which are linked around a certain policy domain or territory and hence bounded by it (Garmise, S., 1995; Paraskevopoulos, C. J., 2001). In that sense, the network paradigm overrides the rational choice new institutionalist approach in a constructive way, on the one hand by taking into account and mapping the rationality-based exchange process, and on the other, by capturing the main features of the broad institutional environment in terms of interactions and interdependencies among the actors. In doing so, it becomes an important component of the socialization function and hence of institutional thickness which assumes that exchange relations do not depend on the availability of resources but on actors’ perceptions about their value and usefulness, and, therefore, the shaping of the exchange process is profoundly influenced by the broad social context. In this respect, the emergence of the network paradigm is viewed as consistent with economic sociology’s criticism about the under-socialized character of rational choice new institutionalism and particularly the functional-neoclassical explanation of the origin of social institutions (Granovetter, 1985).

Within this theoretical framework, social capital has emerged as the second important component of the socialization function. It is theoretically based on a limited rationality model, similar in many respects to Axelrod's evolutionary approach to norms<sup>7</sup> (Axelrod, 1997), and refers to 'features of social organization, such as trust, norms and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated action' (Putnam, R. D., 1993). Trust constitutes the first important form of social capital. It is linked to the volatility and hence uncertainty of modern institutional settings and seen as a crucial conceptual mechanism to resolve this uncertainty by shaping the relations between partners and facilitating collective action. Social trust in modern complex settings, however, can arise from two related forms of social capital: norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement. The most important norm is generalized reciprocity, which is based on continuing relationships of exchange, involving mutual expectations that a benefit granted now should be repaid in the future (Coleman, J., 1990). Thus, it is associated with dense networks of social exchange<sup>8</sup>, through which the core relationships between reciprocity, reputation and trust are developed in a mutually reinforcing way (Ostrom, El., 1998). In that sense, norms, and hence social capital, are sustained by socialization and by sanctions.

Therefore, social capital, being initially itself a by-product of the exchange process, is transformed into a public good, namely a resource for action available to individual actors. In that sense, it is viewed as the appropriate conceptual tool 'for introducing social structure into the rational action paradigm' (Coleman, J., 1988) and hence for bridging the gap between rational or purposive action and social structure (J. Coleman, 1988; El. Ostrom, 1995) and for facilitating the socialization function. Although

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<sup>7</sup> R. Axelrod's (1997:40-68) evolutionary approach to norms is based on a 'limited rationality' model which assumes that when actors make choices within complex institutional and social settings, they are more likely to use the 'trial-and-error' approach rather than a fully rational choice approach based on short-term calculations of utility maximization. Thus, individual actors tend to make long-term choices based on adaptation of their behaviour to successful paradigms of the environment rather than short-term, methodological individualism calculations-based choices. Within this framework, while norms may emerge through interactions among small number of players, they endure and become dominant through other actors' adaptive behaviour. In this way, the most effective norms are more likely to survive over time. Among the mechanisms used for the enforcement and strengthening of norms (i.e. law, internalization, dominance) the most important is a specific mechanism called "metanorms". This mechanism is based on the willingness of cooperating actors to punish not only the violators of a norm, but also those who do not enforce the norm, namely they do not participate in the punishment of the violators. As it is obvious, sanctions and reputation are the most important components of the metanorms mechanism. The function of the metanorms mechanism is better understood by reference to paradigms from the area of international relations (i.e. Yugoslavia).

<sup>8</sup> It should be noted that generalized reciprocity as a form of social capital constitutes the most important prerequisite for the process of political exchange. Given that the norm is rooted in the complexities of the social exchange in broad sense, it is considered as a crucial function in which the process of political exchange is embedded. Thus, in the field of regional policy, generalized reciprocity, by sustaining the process of political exchange among the actors at the regional level, is viewed as a precondition for network creation and institution-building (see Cooke and Morgan, 1998).



Coleman's (1990) definition of social capital as 'a set of inherent in the social organization social-structural resources that constitute capital assets for the individual' implies that it refers to individual actors (persons), it has been acknowledged as crucial factor for facilitating collective action among corporate actors as well: 'because purposive organizations can be actors just as persons can, relations among corporate actors can constitute social capital for them as well' (Coleman, J., 1988). Hence, voluntary cooperation is easier in institutional settings that have inherited a substantial stock of social capital and the pursuit of collective goods is not seen as in contradiction with the pursuit of maximizing individual wealth.

To sum up, social capital and institutional networks constitute important components of the socialization function, by influencing actors' preferences and identities the former, and by structuring the exchange process the latter. Subsequently, social capital constitutes a semi-independent variable (in the sense that it depends on the exchange process) that, by affecting the formation of actors' preferences, facilitates the stability of intra-network relations and hence the learning and adaptation processes within institutional networks, which, in turn, function as an intervening variable between actors' preferences and policy outcomes. As crucial components of institutional thickness, social capital and institutional networks are seen as important conceptual tools for both the "*single loop*" and *social* learning processes and thus for bridging the gap between the *rational choice* and the *historical/sociological* institutionalist approaches. The latter, without denying the rational and purposive character of human behaviour, emphasize path dependence and unintended consequences as features of institutional development (Rose, R., 1990; Thelen Kathleen and Sven Steinmo, 1992; and Pierson, Paul, 1997) and the role of cultural norms and social appropriateness in affecting individual action (March, J. and J. Olsen, 1989; Checkel, J., 1999, 2001; Cowles and Risse, 2001; DiMaggio P. and W. Powell, 1991). Thus, they view institutions as an independent variable, which affects actors' perceptions about their interests and identities.

In the field of the EU public policy, social capital and institutional networks are considered as important components of the local institutional infrastructure that play an important role in building forms of collective governance at the national and especially at the subnational level. Social capital, in particular, is widely recognized as intrinsic element of the institutional infrastructure that sustain political and technological innovation and competitiveness of European regions (Cooke and Morgan, 1998).

Yet, the arising crucial issue is related to the role of history and path dependence logic in the creation of social capital and hence in the enhancing of the learning process. The inherent in institutional learning evolutionist approach does not contradict the path

dependence analysis, since the function of 'learning to cooperate' (Sabel, Ch., 1993) should be considered as a rather evolutionary process and, in that sense, it is familiar with historical institutionalism (Rose, R., 1990; Pierson, Paul, 1996; Bulmer, S., 1998). However, it should be distinguished from the deterministic interpretations of history, since it is based on the process of making collective action a rational choice. Additionally, the notions of civic engagement and strong civil society, based on the presence of social capital, constitute intrinsic elements of Western culture, which cannot be confined within the dualism of the rationality-based models of markets and hierarchies (Finnemore, M. 1996). In this respect, Sabel's optimism, based on the notion of "studied trust"<sup>9</sup>, is relevant. It points to the bottom-up process for the creation of social capital and hence redefines the role of public policy in encouraging initiatives, rather than imposing collective action and coordination.

Overall, social capital and institutional networks are identified as key components of the notion of institutional thickness and consequently of the learning and adaptation processes in the European public policy environment. Therefore, they constitute crucial conceptual tools for the "goodness of fit" approach to adaptation and Europeanization processes in EU public policy<sup>10</sup>.

As it is obvious, under the above considerations, the ideal theoretical model of a learning institutional infrastructure in the multi-level system of governance in European public policy should be based on the presence of multiple networks at any level of governance and social capital endowments providing for the stability of the relations among the actors and enhancing the capacity of institutional networks to adapt to changes of the environment (see Paraskevopoulos, C. J., 2001, a, b).

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<sup>9</sup> C. Sabel's notion of studied trust constitutes his rather optimistic answer to the question. *Studied trust* refers to a 'kind of consensus and the associated forms of economic transactions' that theoretically result from 'associative' or 'cooperative' or 'autopoietic' -that is self-creating- 'reflexive' systems. These are systems in which 'the logic governing the development of each of the elements is constantly reshaped by the development of all the others: the parts reflect the whole and vice versa'. Sabel's optimistic view on the creation of trust is based on the hypothesis that 'trust is a constitutive -hence in principle extensive- feature of social life' (see Sabel, Ch., 1993).

<sup>10</sup> However, the notion of network, as it is employed in the theoretical framework of governance, needs to be understood as a mainly ethnocentric concept, in the sense that it is closely related to the country-specific broad institutional environment. Thus its applicability and usefulness may be strongly constrained by qualitative features of the countries' institutional infrastructure in terms of institutional capacity and therefore its appropriateness as an analytical tool may vary accordingly. In particular, there is evidence to suggest that the degree of validity and hence applicability of the network analysis is rather high in institutionally developed societies and relatively low in the less developed ones. What this implies, is that the relevance of the traditional models of social organization, namely state and market, should not be easily overlooked, given that the reform of any of these may have to be subject of careful consideration with regard to the necessary "investment" in institution-building for the participating countries. Moreover, these reforms may involve a combination of traditional and new organizational structures, such as network development. This may be proved a necessity, especially for the CEECs. [We owe this comment to J. Grote's thoughtful contribution to the ADAPT Workshop organized at the LSE in February 2002].

In this respect, in both policy areas, we focus on capturing all aspects of the “goodness of fit”, namely on both strands of the “new institutionalist divide”. In that sense, the project’s research in all participating case study countries/regions involves:

- Analysis of central state policy-making structures, that is *formal institutional* structures;
- Analysis of patterns of interest intermediation/representation and subsequently identification of *multiple veto points* –if any- at the national and regional levels through SNA;
- Identification of the presence or lack of the relevant forms of governance, i.e. *epistemic/advocacy/issue networks*, at the national and subnational levels through SNA. And,
- Identification of *social capital*, as crucial informal norm/institution playing a key role in the creation of co-operative (political and/or organizational) culture at the national and subnational levels of government.

This comprehensive account of the notion of “goodness of fit” provides for a thorough investigation of the role of institutions in facilitating or inhibiting the learning process, by incorporating both rational choice and sociological approaches to the institutional function. Moreover, this has become evident in almost any field of public policy, where it is widely accepted that there is no any pan-European convergence paradigm, but rather domestic institutions, and, in particular crucial and sensitive aspects of the institutional structure, such as cooperative culture, matter for the adaptation and Europeanization processes (Jeffery, Ch., 2000; Paraskevopoulos, 1998, a, b; 2001 a, b; Keating and Hooghe, 1996; Boerzel, T., 2001).

### **1.6. The Logic of Comparison**

The social learning-based evolutionary approach to the adaptation and Europeanization processes makes the comparative research on the experience of the previous enlargement waves –Cohesion- countries relevant for drawing the necessary reforms that the CEECs should undertake in preparing for full membership. Beyond the similarities (for Greece and Portugal) in terms of experiences of post-authoritarian transition, such a comparative analysis will allow CEECs to learn from past successes and failures of the Cohesion countries and make the necessary adjustments in their public policy-making structures, by adapting to the successful paradigms of the environment. The same –i.e. learning from their own past successes and failures- applies to the Cohesion countries as well. In addition, although it is clear that the Europeanization of public policy should be

viewed as an external shock for promoting institution-building, learning and policy-making innovation at the domestic -national and subnational- levels, and hence as an *independent variable* that crucially affects the domestic institutional and policy-making structures in both the Cohesion and CEECs, the pace of the adaptation process is influenced by the capacity of pre-existing institutional infrastructure at the domestic level of governance.

### **1.7. The Choice of Cases in Regional Policy**

The choice of the specific cases in regional policy has been based on several criteria. All the selected Cohesion countries (Ireland, Greece and Portugal) are considered as traditional unitary and centralized nation states (Loughlin, 1996). However, they are characterized by a differentiation regarding their starting point in relation to the Europeanization of their public policy and governance structures, since they belong to different waves of enlargement (Ireland joined the EC/EU in 1973, Greece in 1981 and Portugal in 1986). With regard to their economic structure, the three Cohesion countries are characterized by diversified patterns of structural adjustment in terms of crucial issues, such as the centre-periphery relations and regional disparities, the specific weight of agriculture in their economic structure, the share of unregistered economic activity, the level of Direct Foreign Investment, the capacity of public administration, and so on. Poland and Hungary, on the other hand, constitute the front-runners among the CEE countries in terms of confidence in liberal democracy and subsequently in the durability of democratic institutions, according to the New Democracies Barometer (Rose and Haerpfer, 1998b). However, they are also considered as unitary and centralized states, characterized -especially Hungary- by the orientation of their economic structure towards agriculture and high levels of unregistered economic activity (CEC&EUI, 1999). In addition, the selection of the specific regions for carrying out the fieldwork research in the Cohesion countries has been based on the criterion of better reflecting the domestic governance structure in each policy area, while the selected regions in Poland and Hungary are border regions in which PHARE projects are currently under implementation. Finally, as the country profiles below reveal, although there is no evidence yet on privatization in the regulation of waste management in our case study countries, there are crucial problems related to the conflict of interest among actors between different levels of governance or within the same level, as well as between formal institutions and civil society actors.

Since, however, the degree of adaptation/Europeanization of the systems of governance and of subnational mobilization is not always analogous to their constitutional position or the structure of intergovernmental relations within specific member states, and hence,

there can be perfectly clear patterns of differentiation within a particular -even centralized- member state, it makes sense to undertake comparison between states with similar structures. Thus, given the increasing importance of other variables, such as the qualities of the system of intra-regional interactions (institutional networks), in determining the degree of adaptability of regions across Europe, this comparison may allow for greater theoretical sophistication, for exploiting the feedback that the comparison creates and for a subsequent redefinition of the initial research hypotheses. Furthermore, in this research study the almost complete Europeanization of structural policy constitutes a shared contextual *independent variable* that can validate general theoretical conclusions.

### **1.8. Choice of Cases in Environmental Policy: Why Waste Management**

In the light of growing environmental concerns (global climate change, pollution, soil degradation etc.) environmental risks and sustainable environmental management and governance are viewed as becoming increasingly central to political and social issues, debates and approaches (i.e. Beck, 1992, a, 1992, b). Arguably, one of the most important sources of risk and uncertainty in environment policy, which requires urgent attention in terms of its governance, is waste. Waste issues have traditionally been approached from a predominantly engineering, economic or managerial point of view and little attention has been paid to the central role of social and political questions related to waste management, such as the role of participatory governance and the position of citizens or civil society vis-à-vis waste governance. However, there are important key themes related to the socio-political aspects of waste governance.

These include:

- The often trans-national/international character of the issue and hence the associated high levels of risk and uncertainty;
- The range of actors involved in the governance of waste, including supranational (EU), as well as national and sub-national institutional and civil society actors;
- The pressure towards a greater role of market forces in the regulation and management of Waste. And finally
- The often emerging conflict of interest among actors between different levels of governance or within the same level.

On the other hand, Waste management constitutes a key policy area within the EU Environment policy and simultaneously a crucial issue for the policy-making at the

national and sub-national levels of government in both the three Cohesion countries and the CEECs. The framework directive 75/442 to promote the safe disposal of hazardous substances was one of the earliest pieces of EC environmental legislation. In addition, further steps in the development of the EU waste management policy refer to certain policy areas, such as the trans-boundary shipment of hazardous substances (Council Regulation EEC/259/93), hazardous waste (91/689/EEC) and the disposal of waste oils (75/439/EEC), while other agreements, i.e. on recycling and the re-utilization of waste has not had significant impact. In 1994 a directive on packaging and packaging waste (94/62/EC) introduced a harmonized waste management policy, designed to reduce the impact of packaging waste on the environment. Most member state governments were given until 1999 to recover and recycle around 50% of their waste. Ireland, along with Greece and Spain, were given derogations and more attainable targets of 25% recovery of all household and commercial waste before the same deadline. In addition, Ireland, Greece and Portugal have the poorest record in the EU when it comes to dealing with waste management, while for Poland and Hungary waste management constitutes the most crucial issue within the environment policy in terms of both the administrative (institutional) and financial resources needed to tackle the problem. Finally, although there is no evidence yet on privatization in the regulation of waste management in our case study countries, there are crucial problems related to the conflict of interest among actors between different levels of governance or within the same level, as well as between formal institutions and civil society actors.

### **1.9. The Methodology**

The methodology is based on comparative public policy research methods focusing on measuring the impact of the Europeanization process on domestic institutional structures and systems of governance. In particular, it involves quantitative and qualitative analyses of a wide range of socio-economic data (national and regional) of the relevant case studies in the participating countries and Social Network Analysis (SNA) at the domestic (national and subnational) levels of governance. This methodological approach enables a comparison between complicated systems of interactions, focusing on both interactions among actors and interactions between structural and cultural features. Thus in regional policy the research concentrates on the implementation of Structural Funds programmes (National and Regional Operational Programmes) in selected regions of the three Cohesion countries, while in the CEECs specific regions have been selected as well, according to relevant criteria (i.e. border or disadvantaged regions, PHARE regions). In environmental policy, a specific policy area (Waste Management) has been selected for facilitating the comparative analysis among the countries.

Given the specific criteria that have been identified for measuring the impact of the Europeanization process on domestic institutional structures and systems of governance, the research focuses on evaluating the following aspects of public policy, which correspond to the six research objectives of the project: a) qualitative and quantitative analysis of policy implementation; b) policy change/policy adaptation; c) contribution of the private sector to the implementation of the EU programmes; and d) level of network development/institution-building. Additionally, for capturing all aspects of the "goodness of fit" -namely on both strands of the "new institutionalist divide"- the research has also concentrated on the following crucial aspects of public policy-making: a) identification, through SNA, of points of resistance to change, that is *multiple veto points* -if any- at the national and regional levels; b) identification, through SNA, of the level of expertise (i.e. think-tanks, professionals) involvement in the policy-making process and subsequently of the presence of relevant forms of governance, i.e. *epistemic/advocacy/issue networks*, at the national and subnational levels; and, c) identification of *social capital*, as crucial informal norm/institution playing a key role in the creation of co-operative (political and/or organizational) culture at the national and subnational levels of government.

The measuring of institutional and/or policy change-adaptation involves the carrying out of national case study reports and creation of a database with relevant socio-economic data referring to the national and subnational levels of the three Cohesion countries, Poland and Hungary, as well as, qualitative and quantitative analyses of this data. For the Cohesion countries, the evaluation of policy adaptation starts from the Single European Act and the 1988 reform of the Structural Funds and covers the period of both the first (1989-93) and second (1994-99) CSFs, but it primarily concentrates on the Multi-Regional and Regional Operational Programmes (ROPs) of the latter. In the case of Poland and Hungary the research covers mainly the post-1990 transitional period.

The network analysis involves semi-structured in-depth interviews with representatives of all prominent organizations at the national and subnational levels, such as subnational governments, development agencies, chambers of commerce, universities, and other institutions having a say on planning and implementing EU programmes. The choice of actors is based on: a) positional identification, and b) reputational identification. According to the former, the selection of actors is linked to their position within the policy domain at a specific level of governance, whereas, according to the latter, actors' selection is based on information collected during the interview process or on preliminary information. Respondents are asked with whom they had regular interactions to exchange resources (information) and with whom they had interactions within the framework of EU programmes and initiatives. Because of the difficulty to identify the presence or absence of linkages -given that the lack of regular meetings does not

necessarily mean absence of linkage- the research has added a second question: with whom did they undertake joint general activities, and with whom did they jointly participate in EU programmes or initiatives. Moreover, elite interviewing has long been recognized as an important methodological tool for testing hypotheses and carrying out qualitative research (Oppenheim, 1996). Based on the responses, the research created adjacency matrices: a statistical tool that identifies the presence or absence of linkages among actors. The emerging pattern of linkages reveals the role and the position of each organization and the nature of the inter-organizational relationships (Knoke and Kuklinski, 1982)<sup>11</sup>. By using adjacency matrices and by employing the UCINET software programme (Borgatti, et., al., 1992) the research performed Social Network Analysis (SNA) to measure the degree of institutional thickness (density calculations), the distribution of power among the actors (centralization measures), the structural equivalence among the actors (structural equivalence measurements), and finally to graph the network structure through multi-dimensional scaling (MDS). Density measurement refers to the degree of connectedness of the entire network whereby zero indicates no connections between any actor and one means that all actors are linked to one another. Because density demonstrates the strength of ties, it can be used as a partial measurement for thickness. However, thickness has qualitative features, which will be explored during the interviews. Centralization refers to the extent to which this cohesion is organized around specific actors: those with the greatest number of linkages (Scott, 1994). Centrality measurement reveals actors' involvement in network relations and demonstrates the structure -horizontal or vertical- of the networks and also constitutes an indicator of the distribution of power among the actors. Finally, structural equivalence reveals the network structure by categorizing the actors in their relational linkages and according to their common structural positions (Scott, 1994). The research has used the CONCOR technique of structural equivalence because it 'produces a classification of network actors into discrete, mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories' (Knoke and Kuklinski, 1982:73) based on the nature of their inter-organizational relations.

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<sup>11</sup> A 0-3 ratings' scale has been used for codifying the strength of ties between actors within networks, according the following criteria:

value (3): a) co-operation in projects; b) formal (institutionalised) links and relationships; and, c) frequent or infrequent contacts;

value (2): a) formal (institutionalised) links and relationships; and b) frequent or infrequent contacts;

value (1): a) informal meetings; and b) frequent or infrequent contacts; finally,

value (0): no contacts at all.



For the social capital –and cooperative culture- measurements, on the other hand, the research has relied on data from secondary literature and on qualitative analysis of the fieldwork research.

Finally, for the evaluation of the learning capacity of the domestic institutional infrastructure (institutional networks), the following criteria have been used:

- a) The presence of fora for dialogue and consultation, such as conferences and committees focusing on specific policy fields (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1993).
- b) The building of new institutions and/or the expansion of the already existing institutional networks, bringing in new actors in response to changing external conditions that necessitate new sources of information and knowledge.
- c) The problem identification procedures and the gradual achievement of general consensus among the actors about the problem (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1993).
- d) The presence of a good amount of formal and informal communication channels among the policy actors of the public sphere, broadly defined, and private interest actors (firms), whereby the public/private divide is being overcome, as well as, the involvement of experts (think-tanks), professionals and NGOs in the policy-making process.

However, although the methodology for investigating the research hypotheses is the same in both policy areas, the specific research agenda for environmental policy has explored the following aims and objectives:

- 1) Charting the recent history of waste politics and waste management in all the participating countries.
- 2) Documenting the socio-environmental process which “produced” the “waste crisis”, the regulatory problems, the key actors and the emergence of new systems of governance.
- 3) Documenting the characteristics and types of social and political conflict and the strategies of key actors at the local, regional, national and European levels.

More specifically, for each case study, the following aspects have been examined:

- 1) The institutional and organizational framework at the local, regional, national and European levels.
  - National policies and regulatory frameworks.
  - Evolution of institutional configurations and relationship with other levels of governance.
  - Assessment of key actors at each level; changing actors in relationship to changing levels of governance.
  
- 2) The organization and management of the urban waste sector.
  - The urbanization of waste; political-economic and political-ecological analysis.
  - Organization of waste services (technological policies, subsidies).
  - Socio-ecological footprint of the urban waste economy.
  
- 3) Governance and citizenship
  - Assessment of the position of particular social groups in the decision-making and regulatory environments.
  - Conflict of interest, struggles and resolution.

Overall, finally, the empirical evidence from the three Cohesion countries, Poland and Hungary is assessed on a comparative basis for drawing lessons and thus facilitating the restructuring process in the two CEE countries in regional and environmental policies.

### **1.10. Conclusions**

This chapter has discussed the implications of the changing conception of governance, as a result of globalization and Europeanization, for public policy-making in general and regional and environmental policies in particular, in the light of the EU enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe. In particular, the chapter has focused on the role of the learning capacity in facilitating the processes of both institutional and policy adaptation within the multi-level system of governance of the European Union. In that respect, it has conceptualized and exemplified the notion of institutional thickness as a fundamental precondition for learning within the EU public policy environment, in order to enrich and substantiate the content of the notion of the so called "goodness of fit", which has been identified as *intervening variable* between the Europeanization of public policy and domestic change. Within this framework, the capturing of the role of both formal and informal institutions -by integrating the main aspects of the rational choice and

sociological institutionalist approaches- as components of the notion of institutional thickness and crucial mediating factors between Europeanization of policy-making and institutional and policy change at the domestic (national and subnational) level of governance is the main contribution of this chapter. Moreover, this constitutes the core of the project's comparative research in regional and environmental policies.

In the light of this analytical discussion, the choice of cases and the logic of comparison between the project's Cohesion and CEE case study countries, as well as, the methodological approach of the project have also been exemplified.

## **B. PART B: DOMESTIC GOVERNANCE IN REGIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES - CHALLENGES OF EUROPEANIZATION AND LEARNING: NATIONAL CASE-STUDIES**

### **1. Chapter Two: Greece**

#### **1.1. Introduction**

Greece lies at the south-eastern tip of Europe and has no common borders with the EU. The most recent census (2001) recorded a population of 10,939,605, as well as an increasing number of immigrants. The country has an area of 131,957 km<sup>2</sup>, which includes a peninsula and over 2,000 islands. This multi-fragmentation of space has played a considerable role in the uneven economic and social development of the country leading to considerable intra- and inter-regional disparities, which are however, not as intense as in other EU member states.

The Modern Greek state was established in 1830. Monarchy was externally imposed in 1832 and parliamentarism was introduced in 1875. In the 20<sup>th</sup> century, modern Greek history has been stigmatised by the bitter post-WWII civil war resulted in acute instability and eventually led to the imposition of the 1967 military dictatorship. Following the Turkish invasion in Cyprus in 1974 the colonels' regime collapsed and democracy was restored. In 1975, a new Constitution was introduced signalling the birth of the Third Hellenic Republic. Today, Greece is a unitary country characterized by a strong centralistic tradition. The new Constitution of 1975 made Greece a representative democracy with a parliamentary regime and President as Head of State. It was amended in 1986 to reduce certain of the President's powers and to reinforce the role of the Prime Minister who is also the head of the parliamentary majority.

State administration is organized on the basis of decentralization meaning that the central bodies coordinate and monitor the regional ones which are responsible for the implementation of the domestic and European policies for the socio - economic development of their respective geographic regions. Throughout Greece there are today 13 administrative regions each one headed by a government-appointed representative who is assisted by a regional council, a collective semi-corporatist advisory organ comprising representatives of the local government and of the socio-economic partners of each region. Within each region, first (less than 1,000 municipalities and communities) and second level (54 prefectures) local authorities ensure the administration of local affairs. The former hold the overall responsibility for the administration of local matters and are headed by mayors who are elected by the people through a universal and secret ballot. Regarding the latter, they hold responsibility only for those subjects that do not

fall within the responsibilities of a municipality/community. A prefectural council and a directly elected (since 1994) prefect run each prefecture.

Greece had been the first country to sign an Association Agreement with the EEC in 1959. However, this agreement was suspended in 1967 following the abolition of democracy by the military junta. In the immediate post-dictatorship years, EEC membership became intrinsically linked to the consolidation of the new democratic regime and the socio-economic modernisation of the country. Following tough diplomatic manoeuvres, and despite the reservations of the European Commission (which required a pre-accession period prior to membership), the European Council opened negotiations that led to the signing of the Treaty on Greece's Accession in 1979.

The entering into force of the Accession Treaty marked the beginning of a long and complex adaptation process in Greece. Despite the initial Greek reluctance, the EU with the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes (IMPs) and the three Community Support Frameworks (CSFs) deeply changed the face of the country in politico-economic terms and welfare indicators. Attempting to assess the positive impact of Greece's accession, suffice it to say that the net transfer of financial resources to the country, even prior to the implementation of the 3<sup>rd</sup> CSF, exceeded GRD 11-12 trillion. The macroeconomic environment has considerably improved to the point that Greece entered in 2001 the Economic and Monetary Union. The reduction of inflation, public sector deficits and public debt and the adoption of EURO are indicative of the economic improvement. The 1<sup>st</sup> and particularly the 2nd CSF set the bases for the modernisation of the infrastructures, the productive environment and the working force of the country, led to extensive organisational and institutional reforms and significantly increased the participation of all social actors, local authorities and the private sector.

## **1.2. Part I: National and regional context of policy-making prior to accession**

### **1.2.1. Section 1: National context of policy-making prior to accession/association**

The Greek administrative system (since the emergence of the modern state) had been characterised by a low degree of legitimisation and institutionalisation. As possible explanations one could refer to the 'volatile' political scene, the civil war, the political autocracy of the post-civil war governments and the political exclusion of a considerable part of the Greek society (Spanou 2001:62). The administrative system, traditionally centralised and dominated by the governing party, could not achieve continuity (Sotiropoulos 1993, Spanou 1995 and 1996). The system of patronage undermined the

legalisation of the Greek public administration. A number of political powers eventually started functioning at the borders of the centralised politico-administrative system resulting in acute multi-fragmentation which further undermined the administrative and policy-making system and hindered its European adaptation.

In Greece, centre-periphery relations have traditionally been much centralised and hierarchically structured. The strong centralised structure of the Greek state was based on decentralised administrative units at the level of the prefecture. The prefect was nominated and controlled by the central government and played a considerable role in local affairs since local self-government remained fragmented and weakened by limited power, responsibilities and financial resources (Spanou 2001:67).

Not ignoring the existence of five-year development plans, Greece lacked the planning-programming experience and the necessary mechanisms. The high level of centralisation and partisanship in decision-making and the extensive clientelistic practices did not allow the decentralised administrative units to develop the necessary management and decision-making know-how. In almost all policy areas there was a functional interference by the central state. In fact, the centralist administrative system had left, up to the 1994 reforms, only limited responsibilities with the prefectures or the municipalities. Important decisions on local issues were taken at a higher level and at best, local problems, demands and interests were brought to the attention of central government by local representatives in the national parliament. In this way a broad network of traditional relations could further develop in the form of party clientelism (Paraskevopoulos 2001).

Starting in the 1980s, and especially from the 1994 onwards, a transformation of the centre-periphery relations that increases the influence of the local government is taking place in Greece. Prefectural councils were established in 1984, and since 1994 self-regulated committees and the prefect have been directly elected; a new regional tier has also been created with the introduction of the regional administration in 1987 and the upgrading of its role in 1997. However, the political system of Greece is still characterised by a high degree of centralisation of power, as basic competences and financial resources have not been transferred to the regional and local institutions created by the decentralisation reforms. With the preservation of the key role of central government, the clientelistic mechanisms of privileged interest groups continue to operate with negative consequences for the political processes in regional and local agencies (Getimis & Economou 1996).

Following many recent analysts, the Greek public policy pattern has three main characteristics: a) a strong involvement of public authority in most policy areas

(extensive public sector), b) a multi-fragmentation of interest politics (many examples of sectoral corporatism) and c) centralised process of policy-making and implementation (Lavdas 1995:250-251). A number of structural characteristics can be identified underlying the weak policy performance of the Greek state mainly prior to EU membership. These include among others the following (ibid: 253-256):

- a) The existence of a mixture of patterns of interest politics including sectoral traditions of statist/authoritarian corporatism and areas of pluralist bargaining. Greece lacked a culture of elite accommodation and party leadership reconciliation and subsequently it is deprived of long-term societal corporatist arrangements capable of negotiating social pacts.
- b) The existence of widespread clientelist practices and subsequently of largely controlled trade unions. The multi-fragmentation of interests and the development of close relations with the dominant party allow certain interests to exercise considerable influence over policy-making (outside the established bureaucratic procedures).
- c) The absence of peak associations capable of achieving compliance and agreement among their members and overcoming sectoral divisions. This has often rendered associations incapable of brokering social pacts and inter-sectoral agreements.

The lack of an effective multiplicity of policy power centres which means that policy knowledge communities did not develop as a result of debate and competition of ideas. Such communities often sustain a superficial coherence of policy views leading to the atrophy of policy debate and the shrinking of the policy menu.

### **1.2.2. Section 2: Regional context**

The region of Notio Aigaio has been selected as the case-study for the Europeanisation of the Greek regional policy-making due to the fact that it constitutes one of the most converging Greek regions in economic and welfare indicators, demonstrating a relatively good ranking among other NUTS II regions and being the receiver of considerable EU funding and support within the framework of the IMPs and the CSFs. Other reasons for its selection included: a) the involvement of the regional authorities in the planning and implementation phases of the EU Structural Policy for a considerable time-period, b) the lower levels of institutional and economic development prior to the implementation of the Community programmes, c) the indication of a speedy adjustment of the regional economic structure in the development of the tertiary sector and especially tourism, d)

the considerable Western European influence on the local institutions and culture; and e) the existence of a similar study covering the period of the 1<sup>st</sup> CSF (1989-1993) in the region and thus providing a good ground for comparisons between the two time periods.

Notio Aigaio region consists of the island-complexes of two prefectures (Cyclades and Dodecanese). Situated at the south-easternmost corner of Greece and the EU, the region is characterized by multi-fragmentation of space comprising a large number of islands situated at a great distance from each other and from the region's economic and administrative centres. In demographic terms, it constitutes one of the most dynamic Greek regions and in economic and welfare indicators it is among the most converging ones. During the last decade both the GDRP and its contribution to the national GDP have significantly increased while the per capita GDRP has been higher than the Greek average. However, this enhanced picture conceals considerable intra-regional and intra-prefectural differences. The multi-fragmentation of space and the island character of the region prevent the spill over of income and know-how to the whole of the geographic space leading to different levels of development and significant disparities. The good regional economic performance should be linked to the EU allocation of funds and to the pre-existing development trends, particularly to the prompt adaptation of the economic structure, characterized by the shift towards development of the tertiary sector of the economy (tourism). The region demonstrates a good policy-making environment, especially at the prefectural level (Paraskevopoulos, 2001).

The Region of Attica has been selected as the most representative case of the way solid waste management policy is implemented in Greece. The region of Attica is a large and densely populated area, which produces large quantities of waste but lacks available space at a reasonable distance from inhabited areas and is characterised by highly competitive uses of land. This problem has long troubled authorities and public bodies. The need for an immediate and practical solution has throughout the last twenty years led to a series of meetings, conferences, parliamentary discussions and public actions, while in an attempt to locate suitable sites for sanitary landfills numerous studies involving different expertise have been assigned (Andreadakis & al., 2000:182). However, the problem remains unresolved, as the search is limited in scope and focuses on the selection of an appropriate landfill site without considering alternative schemes.

The Region of Attica is located in the central part of Greece and gathers more than one third of the population of the country. The administrative Region coincides with the geographical division of the Prefecture of Attica, which is divided in four prefectural self-government institutions (Athens, East Attica, West Attica and Piraeus), while there is also the Unitary Prefectural Self-Government of Athens - Piraeus. During the last 20 years



Attica has presented a significant increase in the tertiary sector. Today it accommodates the biggest part of all government and administrative, economic, scientific and research, political and cultural activity of the country. Due to its international airport and to the international port of Piraeus, it is also a significant transportation hub at the supra-national level. It produces the approximately 40% of the GDP.

### **1.2.3. Section 3: SNA implementation**

Social Network Analysis concerned those characteristics (density, centrality, structural equivalence) and graphs (MDS Diagram, structural equivalence blocked matrix), which were used to describe the basic structure of the regional (Notio Aigaio Region) and waste management (Attica Region) policy networks in both regions. The analysis of the findings that occurred after the completion of the interviews with key local, regional and national actors was based on the UCINET software. Data imported in UCINET was based on the semi-structured interviews and represented the relations (in terms of contacts and participation) between all the main actors involved in regional and waste management policy in a scale from 0(min) to 3(max) (valued matrixes). The analysis of Social Networks was based on the valued data (scale 0 to 3), because valued analysis is considered to more objectively depict the relations between actors than the binary one.

The overall policy network centralisation in Notio Aigaio is 61.58% compared to 58.33% in the Dodecanese and 80.56% in the Cyclades. These measures, when compared to those of a past SNA, indicate a certain decentralization trend<sup>12</sup> in all three networks concerning the way funds are allocated and programmes are monitored. At the regional level, despite the low centrality degree, the policy network has a more vertical structure with an uneven distribution of power and resources. This occurs because of the ROP Managing Authority being in fact a department of the Regional Secretariat and under the jurisdiction of the CSF Managing Authority, which is a special department of the Ministry of National Economy that takes all decisions for funds allocation. At the prefectural level the centralization measures indicate a stable trend towards the establishment of horizontal networks that allow resources interdependence and create the conditions that are favourable to collective action.

Regarding the most central actors, at the regional level, these are the ROP Managing Authority, the Regional Secretariat, the Cyclades Development Agency, the Cyclades

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<sup>12</sup> The implementation of the 3rd CSF required institutions to increase transparency in the allocation and management of the funds and improve monitoring and implementation of the sectoral and regional operational programmes. The establishment of the CSF Managing Authority and of the operational programmes' Managing Authorities has created an impression of decentralisation.

Prefecture and the Dodecanese Prefecture. In the Cyclades Prefecture the most central actors is the Cyclades Development Agency, the Cyclades Prefecture and the Cyclades Association of Municipalities and Communes, while in the Dodecanese Prefecture the most central actors is the Dodecanese Prefecture and the Dodecanese Association of Municipalities and Communes.

What should be mentioned is the increased centrality of the Cyclades and Dodecanese Development Agencies very much linked to their increasing role in the implementation of the Community Initiatives, such as URBAN and INTERREG, which are centrally allocated and which allow them to have relations with a number of national actors above the regional level. The University has not managed to improve its position while the national public actors seem to enjoy particularly central positions, a further indication of the centralisation of the Notio Aigaio network. Overall, it could be argued that the public actors or the new public-private actors dominate the scene. The centrality of other private or associational actors, such as the chambers and the municipal unions, is very much the result of their participation in the Regional Council and the ROP Monitoring Committee. Furthermore, it is obvious that the NGOs have only a limited presence.

Next to the re-centralisation trend, at the regional level, the density measure indicates a rather low policy network average density. Density average is 1.1429 compared to 1.533 in the Dodecanese and 1.6889 in the Cyclades Prefecture. The Region's policy network density measure is significantly low given that fewer of the actors are connected to each other. Thus collective action at the regional level is difficult to achieve, even with the seemingly decentralised environment of the policy network: the low density of the network does not facilitate the exchange of information and the more even accumulation and transfer of knowledge and experience.

Looking at the structural equivalence, at the regional level, with the exception of the University, which remains marginalized, all other actors seem to be more or less connected. Public actors (especially the Regional Secretariat and the ROP Managing Authority) provide the leadership mainly due to their position in the administrative state structure. The Local Association of Municipalities and Communes, which is a public, associational actor plays the most leading role indicating a strong and active presence of the city councils and mayors, especially with reference to Community Initiatives. The Dodecanese Chamber has lost its eminent position, while the Dodecanese Development Agency has emerged through its participation to the implementation of various works and initiatives as a significant private actor.

Looking at the structural equivalence, in the Prefectures of Dodecanese and Cyclades, with the exception of the University, which remains marginalized, all other actors seem to be more or less connected. Public actors provide the leadership mainly due to their position in the administrative state structure. The Local Associations of Municipalities and Communes, which are public, associational actors play important role indicating a strong and active presence of the city councils and mayors, especially with reference to Community Initiatives. The Development Agencies have emerged through their participation to the implementation of various works and initiatives as significant private actors that could play an alternative leading role in the future facilitating synergies across the public-private divide and despite the spatial fragmentation of the prefecture. The Prefectural Secretariats also play leading roles that have been reinforced by the decentralisation reforms.

The most central actors in the Attica Region are: YPEHODE, ATREG, ESDKNA, YPESDDA, MAOPE and TEDKNA. No doubt, public actors play a decisive role in the waste management sector of the Attica region. This reflects the increased extent of centralisation of the Greek state and the strong dependence of the region on the central government. The highly centralised structure of the policy network is linked to the fact that a new institution (Managing Authorities) has been created under the 3<sup>rd</sup> CSF to increase transparency in and improve the management of the allocation of funds. Each Operational Programme Managing Authority constitutes a special department of the Regional Secretariat and is placed under the jurisdiction of the CSF Managing Authority, which is a special department of the Ministry of the National Economy.

The network is centralised mainly around two actors: YPEHODE and ATREG. In addition, the network centralisation degree is quite high: 99,26%. This indicates a rather vertical structure of the policy network which prevents the flow of information and the more even distribution of resources, thus hindering learning and consequently adaptation at the regional level. Another significant finding of the SNA is the relevant absence of private actors and NGO's from the policy network.

Regarding network's density, the mean network's density (average value within blocks) is 0.7059. That low network's density indicates the existence of mainly weak links between the actors leading to limited flow of information.

Regarding the structural equivalence of the policy network, actors are classified in four different groups according to their structural similarities.

These groups are the following:

- Strong groups: 1st (YPEHODE, PARGEO, MAOPE, TEE, EASTAT, KER), 2nd (YPESDDA, ESDKNA, ANLIOS, ATREG, TEDKNA, GSEE).
- Weak groups: 1st (HERRA, ERA, HSWMA), 2nd (EPEM, HWMCA, EBEA).

In the first strong group the leading actor is YPEHODE, while in the second strong group the leading actor is ATREG. Of course, from the above analysis there is no doubt about the existence of strong disequilibria between the policy network's core and periphery actors.

### **1.3. Part II: Europeanisation processes (objectives and implementation)**

#### **1.3.1. Section 1: Adaptational pressures (types, components and mechanisms)**

Greece has been commonly considered to be a country with a weak civil society and a weak state bureaucracy. In fact, Greece has been often used as an example of peculiar state-civil society relations, different from both eastern and western European models (Sotiropoulos, 1995). Post-1974, successive single party governments in Greece have managed to control both bureaucracy and civil society (especially farmers' movement, labour unions and public employees associations), thus preserving the pre-1974 state corporatist arrangement of state-civil society relations. Having said that, while organized interests in Greece are still largely controlled in the fashion of state corporatism, the consolidated Greek democracy has allowed for the emergence of pluralism in the representation of interests other than purely economic ones (ecological, feminist, etc.) (ibid).

This combination of a centralised state structure and a weak civil society constitutes a major impediment to the adaptation and Europeanisation processes (Paraskevopoulos & Rees 2002). It can be argued that following the accession of Greece to the EU in 1981, the incompatibility between the Community procedural, administrative and normative requirements and the Greek political, cultural and institutional tradition of a conventionally centralised and weak state bureaucracy, a relatively weak civil society with actors fairly incapable of building institutions to articulate their demands and a society with limited capacity to consensus building, have created major adaptational pressures for Greece. These major adaptational pressures have set in motion a set of incomplete adaptation procedures leading to what is called 'half-way Europeanization.

With reference to regional policy-making, in the first post-accession period, one has to stress the point that the introduction of the new institutional structures were not designed as a step towards Europeanization, nor as a response to European rules for the

provision of funding. *'On the contrary, the shift was based on the anti-European rhetoric, which emphasized national pride and national autonomy against the so-called 'EEC directorate', especially during the first half of the 1980s. It is ironic that these domestic changes corresponded to changes occurring also in most of the other member states under a completely different rhetoric, which highlighted the reduction of the role of the state, the liberalization of the economy and the promotion of the entrepreneurial spirit'* (Kafkalas & Andrikopoulou 2003). The post-1981 reforms were in fact part of a broader 'democratisation' programme and not a response to the adaptation needs of membership (Verney 1994).

However, eventually, the Greek regional policy coincided with the Community Structural Policy and the CSF as planning instrument replaced all other forms of development plans. To that end also contributed the economic difficulties of the 1990s and the austere EMU convergence programme, which prevented the financial survival of development policies outside the CSF and led to a de facto dependency of development policy upon the Community funds (Kafkalas & Andrikopoulou 2003). This dependency has considerably affected the evolution of Greek regional policy and public administration in the last decade.

The incompatibility between the Community Structural Policy requirements and the peculiarities of the Greek administrative structure and regional policy making procedures and institutions created considerable adaptational pressures to Greece. Even more in the 1990s, when the introduction of the principles of 'subsidiarity' and 'partnership' and the promotion of the integrated approach to planning completely misfit with the Greek centralized and interventionist administrative tradition, the predominance of the state and the limited participation of social and private actors.

The introduction of the IMPs in the mid-1980s and the first considerable Community allocations marked a significant turn in the Greek stand and led the way to adaptation by demonstrating the financial benefits of membership and revealing the problems of the above-mentioned incompatibility. It could be indicatively mentioned that, during the formulation of the IMP, the existence of a deconcentrated state bureaucracy instead of regional horizontal and vertical institutional networks led to a piecemeal drafting of the programmes by the Ministry, which mostly ignored the local needs and demands causing significant difficulties during the functional phase and resulting in the lowest absorbance rates among the beneficiary states.

With reference to the Greek environmental policy, the turning point of the EU impact was the Single European Act. *"The importance of the Act was that it incorporated within the*

*founding Treaty of the Community, and thus de jure into the Greek legislation, specific and self-inclusive environmental clauses. Furthermore, a stream of environmental Commission Directives had to be incorporated in the Greek legislation (Botetzagias 2001)."* With the Single European Act, legislative pressure on Greece increased as the EC moved towards new initiatives and integrated pollution control.

According to Liefferink and Jordan (2002), EU member states can be grouped into two categories regarding the Europeanisation of their national environmental policy: the 'policy shapers', which seek to ensure that the two logics of action – the European and the national – are as closely aligned as possible, and the 'policy takers', which struggle to achieve such a fit and consequently find themselves under pressure from national actors and EU bodies to adapt their policy systems to EU requirements. Greece belongs to the 'policy takers' or so called 'laggards' group of EU member states that consists mainly of the Cohesion countries that face considerable policy misfits and subsequently adaptational pressures in environmental policy. These policy misfits concern not just the Greek policy content (instruments, mechanisms, goals), but also the Greek policy structure (institutions, networks, etc.) and style (norms and values) (ibid.)

More specifically, the EU has been promoting a more preventive, source-based approach to policy-making, has introduced new policy instruments and tightened the level at which these instruments are formally set placing considerable adaptational pressures to Greece which had a more regulatory and less tight environmental policy-making content. Furthermore, the EU requires new coordination mechanisms and networks at national and European level and demands a more pro-active and less state-led policy-making style which considerably misfits with Greece.

### **1.3.2. Section 2: Resistance to change**

The Greek patterns of interest intermediation and policy-making have been characterised by an incoherent and asymmetric corporatism. As already mentioned in (1.2.1.) what can be described as the Greek public policy pattern has three main characteristics: (a) the involvement of public authority has been nominally strong in most policy areas resulting in a politicised economy and an extensive public sector; (b) interest politics have been fragmented and have included examples of sectoral corporatism; and (c) processes of policy formation and implementation have been ineffective and centralised (Lavdas 1995:251). Centralised systems tend to enhance defensiveness in implementation processes, the actors trying to diffuse responsibility and avoid scrutiny (Bardach 1977:37).

In fact, frequent regime changes during the 1900s in Greece have created a variety of patterns of interest politics, combining state corporatist elements with elements of pluralistic bargaining. As Lavdas (1995:253) argues, the lack of a culture of elite accommodation and of conciliatory party leaderships prevented the consolidation of long-term societal corporatist arrangements capable of negotiating social pacts. Moreover, in the 1970s extensive clientelistic practices and transition from authoritarian corporatism led to trade unions that were vastly controlled and interest associations that were unable to adapt to the democratic rules of the game and gain influence in policy making. Consequently, *"organised interests have lacked the capacities which would enable them to assume responsibilities for policy implementation as private governments thereby depriving the state of the means for collective policy-making (ibid)"*.

In Notio Aigaio, as in Greece, the development of structural policy and the participation in European programmes, have led to the gradual involvement of a number of sub-national actors playing major roles in the implementation and formulation of regional policy. The opportunity for participation in European policy-making and for gaining access to significant funding has appealed to many public administrative units, private actors, NGOs, trade unions and social associations which have been incorporated in policy making. The broader Greek trend has been that of coalitions putting pressure for greater adaptation to the EU framework. These coalitions involved sub national units, business interests, regional development agencies and policy knowledge communities which anticipated benefits from fuller absorption of structural aid from the Community and, perhaps most crucially, from their strengthening of their direct links with European level processes (Lavdas 1995:258).

In Notio Aigaio, as in the whole of the country, the regional secretariat and the ROP CSF Managing Authority (division of the state) have enjoyed the most central positions and constituted the single veto player for regional development. Sub-regional self-government and private and social actors and NGOs have been particularly active at the implementation phase, often pressing for greater participation and more adaptation seeking the special gains (financial, power etc.) that participation in the European structural policy brings. Within the generally co-operative tradition of the Notio Aigaio region, it can be argued that resistance to change by these actors has been limited, as the vast majority of them seem to agree on the benefits of the implementation of the EU regional policy and the nature of the development problems of the region. Differences are limited to the ways solutions to these problems should be pursued.

In the Attica region, the great concentration of population and economic activities, as well as the everyday commuting of the population has led to serious environmental

problems. The total quantity of Athens solid wastes is estimated at 3,500 tones with most of this quantity (95%) being disposed to the sanitary landfill of the Municipality of A. Liosia and the remainder in several and mostly uncontrolled/illegal landfills and dumpsites. However, the sanitary landfill in A. Liosia has already been saturated. Needless to say the NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) syndrome predominates; the lack of progress has resulted in a continuation of the existing practices of uncontrolled dumping and the only serious political threat which is taken into consideration is the strong opposition of the organized local communities in the vicinity of the selected landfill sites (Andreadakis & al. 2000:182).

The local authorities have not adopted a common stand regarding the spatial allocation of the sanitary landfills. Some of the local authorities tolerate the current situation trying to gain benefits contributing this way to the perpetuation of the problem. Some others act condescendingly to the solution of the problem, while others react by creating conflicts and shifting the blame to the state. In this situation, ESDKNA, a strong association gathering 89 out of the 150 Attica municipalities, which partly assumes the responsibility for solid waste management in the region, is the only actor trying to find a sustainable solution. Thus, considerable resistance to change exists by municipal and prefectural actors depending on the narrow party politics that dominate in each case.

### **1.3.3. Section 3: Evolution of central state policy-making structures**

Greece acceded to the EU in 1981, after being an associate member since 1961. The application for accession was pursued as the means towards *achieving political stability consolidating democracy, strengthening external security, as well as securing the conditions for the modernization of the Greek socioeconomic system* (Tsoukalis 1979; Ioakimidis 2001). Within this framework, modernization was interpreted as 'westernization', or more precisely 'Europeanization'.

According to Ioakimidis (1998), the Europeanization process in Greece has deeply penetrated the Greek political system and has brought about redefinitions in at least four different levels (regulatory, functional, territorial and institutional). These redefinitions have led to the rebalancing of state-society relations in favour of the latter. As Ioakimidis (2001) argues, the rebalancing process resulted in enhancing the civil society, a phenomenon exemplified in loosening the state's grip on the social institutions, broadening opportunities for the participation of interest groups in policy-making, promoting regional decentralization and diminishing the role of the traditional patronage system.



As a result of EU membership the economic role of the Greek state was generally diminished and some of its economic functions were abandoned. Simultaneously, however, it assumed new policy functions in various fields including those of the environment and structural policy. Moreover, according to Verney and Papageorgiou (1993), EU membership considerably altered the territorial distribution of power, choices and resources allowing actors/institutions at all levels of governance to be involved in policy-making. Various private actors were also reinforced and gained access to policy domains from which they had previously been excluded. Eventually, a number of new institutions and administrative units emerged to render public administration more efficient and facilitate the adoption of the Acquis.

Next to the establishment of these new institutions and administrative divisions, the Europeanization process altered the morphology of the Greek state with the enhancement of the formation of an increasing number of social associations. As Ioakimidis (2001) argues, coupled with the proliferation of new social associations and interest groups was the equally important phenomenon of gradually opening the national policy-making process to society. The widening of the policy-making processes to actors other than solely the executive bureaucratic institutions eventually embraced even the domain of foreign policy-making (ibid).

In the beginning of the 1990s Greece made a pro-European turn and within the context of the CSF underwent considerable alterations in the following broad domains (Getimis, et al. 2002):

- a) The administrative structure of the Greek state and the evolution of decentralization. The impact can be traced back to the enactment of Law 1622/86 for the establishment of thirteen administrative Regions, each one headed by an appointed general secretary, to monitor the implementation of the programmes. The impact has increased with the CSFs and the introduction of the principles of 'programming' and 'partnership', which required the Greek sub-national structures to play new roles. To solve the problems of inadequate delegation of power and resources (which limited the ability of local government to implement the development projects) and of extreme fragmentation and lack of expertise and bargaining power (which prevented the elaboration of serious proposals) a number of power decentralization reforms have been introduced from 1993 onwards significantly altering the administrative physiognomy of Greece.

b) The regional planning procedures. Following the introduction of the CSF, the very essence of the Greek centralized planning procedures has been challenged by the integrated approach of the European Structural Policy which led to the opening up of procedures of democratic planning at each spatial level and the maintenance of the hierarchical, 'top-down' structure, within which coherence and complementarity of plans was hoped to be achieved (Paraskevopoulos 2001). What the decentralization and democratic planning reforms implicitly brought about has been the identification of specific projects at each level of government, subject to the expenditure constraints of the higher tier (ibid 87-89). This structure of regional planning and budget management proved a major impediment to the implementation and monitoring of the CSFs and was recently modified to increase the effectiveness of the 3<sup>rd</sup> CSF.

- Extensive institution-building, broadening of actors and redefinition of roles. The EU structural policy and the implementation of the CSFs have led to the establishment of a variety of new planning and management institutions at all the levels of governance. The CSF system increasingly demands strict bureaucratic procedures and controls, which emphasize the participation of regional authorities, the learning process and the diffusion of technical expertise, the inclusion of social partners and NGOs and the co-operation of public and private sector (Kafkalas & Andrikopoulou 2003). The regional councils and the Monitoring Committees, in accordance with the partnership principle, require partnership formation among a large number of partners coming from different economic sectors and different levels of government, often with different objectives and considerably different action. Moreover, the arena has been transferred from the local level to the regional level broadening the scope of activity of the concerned actors and demanding extensive learning to ensure efficiency in the new ways of networking, lobbying and partnership formation.

The Thematic Evaluation Report of the Partnership Principle argues that the Structural Funds programmes have created the phenomena of regional partnerships in Greece (Kelleher, Batterbury & Stern 1999:90). Up to the 1990s, Greece had no experience in actors' involvement at regional level. The regional government used to play only a limited role in development issues. Attempts to decentralization had been made prior to the introduction of the EU regulations, however reforms soon proved obsolete and the country had to introduce a new regional structure to apply the partnership principle. During the 1990s, a deconcentrated state structure emerged alongside a more centralized system of control. Next to the central government departments, there

emerged a system of Regional Secretariats (which eventually became responsible for the departments) accompanied by a number of elected Prefectural and local authorities. Today, Regional Secretariats have territorial responsibilities for policy making, planning, regional budget management and service delivery and are in charge of the planning and management of the CSF regional operational programmes (assisted by a Monitoring Committee). At the sub-regional level, prefectural and local actors and specially created development agencies have been responsible for implementation (ibid:90-91).

With reference to environmental policy-making and especially waste management it is quite indicative that up to the Greek accession, environmental policy was considered a branch of spatial and urban planning. It was only following accession that it was formulated as a distinct and coherent policy area under the EU pressure. Greek environmental policy as a whole has been modernized and driven by EU environmental legislation. Throughout the 1980s, Greece's record on Directive ratification had been a poor one. *"Measures were put in place slowly, though relatively accurately, and often fail 'on the ground, due to shortcomings in the application of legislation by regional and local administrations which lack qualified staff, equipments and other resources (Collins & Earnshaw 1992:218)"*.

Accordingly, the impact of the EC legislation on the Greek environmental protection during the eighties had been minimal since the most important directives had not been ratified and those that did had been rather poorly implemented. Moreover, the impact of EC membership on Greece had not been entirely positive, since many EC-sponsored, development projects and policies, such as the CAP and the IMPs, posed serious threats to the natural environment (Botetzagias 2001).

With the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty, the term of 'sustainable development' came into being as the guiding principle of the EU and its member states. This was followed by the 5<sup>th</sup> Environmental Action Programme, which had a great impact on Greece's environmental policy making by linking all Community's policies (including funding) to compliance. This proved to be of paramount importance for the greater participation of the environmental NGO sector. *"Since funding for all policies and sectors became connected to environmental protection and because, due to the weak condition of the Greek economy, the Community co-funded most, if not all, of the major projects, the environmentalists could 'defeat' a plan originating from Athens in Brussels"* (Botetzagias 2001).

As the EU funds for the protection of the environment increased throughout the 1990s, the terms 'environmental protection' and 'ecology' entered the Greek political debates

and discourses. Public environmental awareness increased and environmental NGOs role was reinforced. Nevertheless, Greece has been slow in transposing the Directives and inefficient in implementing them. As Weale et al. (2000:160) argue, "*while the EU has been by far the most significant factor behind Greek environmental policy in the past decade and more, its impact on policy principles has been largely superficial and that on policy style minimum*" (Botetzagias 2001). Thus, the following problems remain:

- a) Legislation alignment remains slow and often takes place without prior consideration of the special needs and conditions of the country. Thus, there is often a gap between the Greek reality and the European legislation leading to considerable implementation problems. These implementation problems are further aggravated by the lack of strong enforcement mechanisms and institutions.
- b) The policy-making process is shared among the Ministry of Environment and other sectoral ministries. This fragmentation of environmental responsibilities at the central level is combined with a lack of effective coordination mechanisms.
- c) The problematic institutional infrastructure at the central state level is further aggravated by the centralized nature of the Greek state, the considerable lack of decentralization measures and the complete absence of independent bodies capable of ensuring efficient monitoring and control duties. Furthermore, authorities at regional and local level play only a consultative or secondary executive role since they are deprived of necessary financial, technical and scientific resources for effective monitoring and control.

With special reference to waste management there is no doubt that it constitutes one of the most serious environmental problems in Greece. The adoption of the National Waste Management Plan and especially the introduction of planning for solid waste management at the regional level has been an important innovation and led to several rearrangements among which the assignment of this responsibility to the Regional Council. This was decided in an attempt to alleviate problems occurred at the prefectural and local levels, such as the disputes over the location of the disposal or recycling areas. Considerable problems in this field include:

- The lack of an integrated management/coordination strategy that would link the national, regional and local levels and the intense conflict among social and institutional actors that creates conditions for a misregulated policy-making environment at the local level.

At the regional and local levels, the lack of co-ordination and the intense conflict between local authorities - an outcome of few formal arrangements for policy coordination other than collective work teams and monitoring committees dealing with EU legislation and funding programmes - leading to short term political decisions and ineffective types of governance.

#### **1.3.4. Section 4: Non-state actors**

In Greece there are no effective mechanisms established to ensure the participation of actors, such as experts, professionals and NGOs in the planning, implementation and co-ordination of policies. Even in the cases where such mechanisms have been created, there has been a gradual reduction of participation processes in the institutional planning framework in order to increase effectiveness and transparency and limit any time-consuming processes. Subsequently, it could be argued that the democratic institutions are being undermined, while conflicts are intensified and plans are being delayed or even recalled. According to Lavdas (1995:255), in Greece, the relative lack of an effective multiplicity of policy power centres has meant that policy knowledge communities did not develop as a result of debate and competition of ideas. Such communities often result in deliberative intervention in state action. Their weakness and the existence of a mandarin technocratic elite rationalizing state activity and sustaining superficial coherence of policy views led to the atrophy of policy debate and the shrinking of the policy menu (ibid 1995: 255).

The analysis of the regional policy-making network in Notio Aigaio agrees with the above statements. The situation is better at the Prefectural level where the structure of the networks allows the accumulation and exchange of knowledge ensuring learning and facilitating adaptation.

With very few exceptions there is very limited participation of regional and local actors at European fora for dialogue and negotiation. At the regional level, the most important fora for dialogue and negotiation are the Regional Council and the ROP Monitoring Committee, both by-products of the Structural Funds implementation in Greece. The Regional Council is a significant collective body that brings together a considerable number of sub-national public actors, associational actors and private-interest institutions to make proposals for works and measures for the regional development programmes and take decision over the prefectural development programmes and the allocation of the public investments at the sub-regional level. It has proved to be a very useful forum for the exchange of information and negotiation between the participating actors.

The ROP Monitoring Committee has been an extension of the Regional Council. From its initial composition of the regional secretary, the two prefects, the representatives of the two associations of municipalities and communes, the two Chambers, tourist agents and trade unions, it has now grown with the addition of a larger number of social and economic actors to fully comply with the Structural Funds regulation amendments. It has become a fairly decentralized and dense intra-regional horizontal network for the exchange of information and discussion, and despite the fact that under the 3<sup>rd</sup> CSF it has lost much of its previous power and responsibilities, it remains a significant negotiation place for public and private actors across the region.

Fora for dialogue also exist at the local level (prefectural or municipal) though they are much smaller in scope. They concern specific economic sectors, for example tourism, and bring together mainly sectoral actors from the private sector, Development Agencies and the Local Associations of Municipalities and Communes, themselves important fora.

With special reference to the participation of the private sector, the evaluation of the 2<sup>nd</sup> CSF reveals its limited character and the very restricted public-private partnership formation. Interviewees repeatedly pointed out the problem of the lack of public-private partnerships and networking at all the levels of governance. This limited participation of the private sector is also evident in the limited allocation of private funds. Under the 2<sup>nd</sup> CSF, the foreseen private contribution for the ROP was estimated at 81,200 thousand ECU but up to 1997, no part of this amount had been absorbed.

For the 3<sup>rd</sup> CSF, the Commission has emphasized even more the need to increase private funding. In fact, the ROP 2000-2006 foresees a much more extensive contribution of the private sector estimated at 113,219 thousand EURO. During the previous ROP, the greatest attention of the private sector had been given on the measure for the tourist development of the marine and cultural resources. The current ROP has further elaborated this measure securing a private contribution of 48,750 thousand EURO and seeking much greater absorption levels in the following years, as well as a much more active involvement of the private sector in the implementation of actions and works.

In fact, the extensive requirements of the CSF for public-private partnership building and networking and the constant demands for new institutional mechanisms have revealed some major weaknesses of the Greek institutional system which had little previous experience in this domain. Even in those cases where public-private partnerships did form (especially for the implementation of specific works) these were on an ad-hoc basis lacking a well-defined institutional framework to support them; thus they were all of short duration and could not ensure the continuation of knowledge and learning.

Moreover partnerships and networks emerged in an overall framework of legal and institutional modernization that was in a way imposed by the EU and the central state and were rarely locally driven.

The Monitoring Committees of the Operational Programme "Environment" and the Regional Operational Programme of Attica are two of the main formal fora, introduced by the EU for discussing the effectiveness and implementation of the respective programmes. Nevertheless, it should be taken into consideration that their role has been considerably limited with the introduction of the institution of the Managing Authorities.

At the regional and local level, the Regional, Prefectural and Municipal Councils are the formal fora for dialogue and negotiation. Among them, the Regional Council is the most important one as it consists of a great variety of actors who participate in the process of planning and approving the regional waste management plan. Moreover, ESDKNA, HERRA and HSWMA may comprise strong fora for dialogue in the Region of Attica.

Nevertheless, it has to be stressed that, overall, there is a lack of systematic dialogue on issues related to solid waste management between government officials, regional and local authorities and representatives from the civil society. An approach based on bargaining is often adopted between officials and local communities and negotiation takes place on the basis of networks of personal relations. Furthermore, citizens' involvement and awareness of their responsibilities in the decision-making process is restricted, due to the lack of information and intermediary institutions that promote dialogue.

The main reasons of the absence of fora for dialogue in the Region of Attica are the following:

- Public actors are afraid of the potential political cost of a competing debate with other actors that would provide a solution to the waste management problems. However, it should be mentioned that that the political cost is overestimated.
- There is only a limited flow of information to the citizens leading to a weak environmental awareness.
- Communication between the actors is not always direct. Each actor is often informed about other actors' opinion indirectly, often obtaining a distorted information
- Actors' attitude often changes.

- There are actors who intentionally hide crucial information.

Despite these difficulties, the need for an immediate solution to the waste management problem and the foreseen involvement in the future of the appropriate actors, capable to control the whole issue, are expected to lead to the formation of stronger and more extensive fora for dialogue and negotiation.

Although it is widely accepted that co-operation facilitates the development of relations based on trust and on the sharing of responsibilities and economic risks, the creation of partnerships between actors from all sectors, in the field of waste management, has been marginal. More often, the municipalities have provided waste and wastewater management services directly, without co-operating with private specialized companies. Nevertheless, in some cases, local actors have entered inter-municipal co-operation schemes to organize the collection, processing and disposal of wastes in order to benefit from economies of scale.

The private sector has been involved in waste management in several ways. Private sector's main role has been to undertake projects included in EU's action programs. Also, some companies have been involved in manufacturing and trading waste collection equipment, also offering, in some cases, services for waste collection. Moreover, specialised offices have undertaken waste management studies and associations/chambers with special divisions have dealt with environmental issues. Also, some private companies have been involved in the sector of production of new technology used for waste management. Nevertheless, the private sector's role in waste management remains limited, as the main bodies responsible for the implementation of projects come from the public sector. However, it seems that several actors are seriously considering the possibility of extending the private sector's involvement, e.g. through the adoption of voluntary agreements in order to enhance the flexibility of specific organizational choices. Finally, the intention of the Ministry of National Economy to formally encourage public-private cooperation and to finance companies related to the waste management sector should be mentioned.

Within this context, HERRA has been created by the aluminium industry in 1992, in order to produce and distribute consumer goods and packaging materials through the operation of recycling programmes. Moreover, the Hellenic Waste Management Companies Association has been recently created, seeking, among other things, to co-operate with the Ministry for the Environment, Spatial Planning and Public Works and communicate the private sector's views in waste management.



### 1.3.5. Section 5: Civic culture

The presence of civil society and NGOs in Greece has always been poor. A significant characteristic of the Greek state is the limited involvement of citizens and the very restricted awareness of their rights and obligations. Broadly speaking, decision-making processes are characterized by complexity and opacity and do not facilitate citizens' participation. The problem is directly linked to the lack of information and intermediary institutions that promote dialogue and participation of different social groups in the planning procedures. Furthermore, the clientelistic relations reinforce citizens' passiveness: citizens' role is limited to the point of raising their demands and wait to be satisfied. Hence, in Greece, instead of encouraging capacity-building, especially with regard to vulnerable social groups, a "learned helplessness" is being cultivated from the political system (UEHR, 2001, p. 89). Consequently, there is a lack of sensitisation concerning important issues and problems while, at the same time, there is a growing vagueness regarding citizens' duties.

According to Lyberaki and Paraskevopoulos (2002:19-20) the poor presence of the Greek civil society can partly be attributed to the long tradition of authoritarian statism and the problematic democratisation up to the mid-1990s, which created difficulties in institution-building. As it is obvious, this has had implications for almost all aspects of public life, the most important of which have been the lack of clearly defined boundaries between state, market and civil society and subsequently the dominant role of central state and political parties as mediating mechanisms in state-society relations.

The building of the modern State (first half of the 19th century) involved the introduction of Western, liberal political institutions and their implantation into traditional and pre-capitalist, indigenous structures of Byzantine (Church, law) and Ottoman (state) heritages (Diamandouros 1994). This process required a fundamental political and cultural reorientation in state-society relations, which inevitably was marked by intense struggle between potential beneficiaries and potential losers. According to Diamandouros (ibid), the highly contested process of Greek state-building constituted the major critical juncture in modern Greek history whose lasting legacy has been the emergence of two powerful and conflicting cultural traditions, embedded in the novel and antecedent elements of the modern Greek historical experience which have remained identifiable over time and have shaped the dynamics of modern Greek society and politics.

Following Diamandouros (1994), the two cultures have a cross-sectional nature meaning they cut across Greek institutions, strata, classes, or political parties in Greek society. It is precisely because of their cross-sectional nature that *"both cultures have historically*

*reproduced themselves within the quasi-totality of Greek institutions, structures, and social arrangements. In the process, they have furthered their own entrenchment, have imparted their conflictual logics on social and political interactions, and have commensurately impeded the emergence of alternative, consensual, and more integrative arrangements capable of acting as effective mechanisms of interest representation or aggregation in the country” (ibid).* The lack of more integrative and consensual arrangements between state and society, as well as among society actors creates a climate of distrust and insecurity not favourable to partnership building, networking and co-operation.

According to Putnam (1993:167), social capital refers to “features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated action.” Despite the fact that a social capital research has not been conducted in the region of Notio Aigaio, we have attempted to make qualitative evaluations about the lack or existence of social capital endowments in the region by including in the questionnaires some relevant questions to the actors that we interviewed. Past research demonstrated the existence of a civic policy-making environment in the region. This environment is still present and seems to play a significant role in facilitating relations based on trust and reciprocity in Notio Aigaio.

Social capital endowments seem to be limited in the Region of Attica. Although most of the actors agree on the importance of the existence of a strong civil society, this seems to be rather weak. Public participation either in the planning and implementation processes of environmental programmes or in voluntary associations and organizations is very limited, although several NGOs have been trying to provide information to the citizens and motivate them. In addition, there is a general distrust on the part of the private sector and civil society to governmental actions taken for addressing the issue of waste management. It is generally believed that the so called “political cost” has had an especially strong influence on decision-making in this field as the two major political parties have adopted a populist behaviour that has resulted in wrong decisions or no decisions at all.

#### **1.4. Part III: Assessment of learning capacity**

##### **1.4.1. Section 1: Outcome**

A number of commonalities and differences become apparent from the above analysis of the two case studies. **Commonalities** concern the broader national and European contexts. More specifically, regarding the **national context** the following common confining conditions can be identified:

- 1) The centralised state structure: Despite recent reforms, the centralized nature of the Greek state has not been eliminated. The maintenance of hierarchical deconcentrated bureaucratic structures of planning and decision-making hinders horizontal co-ordination, while the existence of vertical governmental networks tends to reproduce more conservative trends and norms; the state could no way function as a change agent. The centrally controlled allocation of resources and powers deprives other actors (local self-government, social and private actors, NGOs) of the necessary material and ideational resources for independent action and networking.
- 2) The existence of a weak civil society and of limited social capital endowments: The presence of civil society and NGOs in Greece has always been poor. In fact, the limited involvement of citizens and the restricted awareness of their rights and obligations have constituted intrinsic elements of the modern Greek state. Next to this weak civil society, limited social capital endowments, insufficient intermediary institutions and scarce integrative and consensual arrangements among social actors and between state and society have traditionally characterized the Greek state. All these have created a climate of distrust and insecurity that hinders social participation and discussion, partnership building, networking and co-operation.
- 3) The limited involvement of experts, professionals and NGOs in policy-making: In most cases, no effective mechanisms have been established to ensure the participation of actors, such as NGOs, research centres, professionals, etc. in policy planning, implementation and co-ordination. Even in the cases where such mechanisms have emerged, there has been a gradual reduction of participation processes in the institutional planning framework in order to increase effectiveness and transparency and limit any time-consuming processes. More often, the role of these actors remains marginal and restricted to the bare minimum that is legally required (participation in state led committees and networks).
- 4) The inexperience in partnership formation and networking: Greece has very limited experience in partnership formation and networking and lacks formal participation mechanisms and incentives. Partnerships and networks do emerge in some cases but only on an ad-hoc basis and outside a well-defined legal framework. The state mostly dominates and designates partnership emergence and operation. A point that deserves mentioning here is the traditionally limited involvement of the private sector, which has been traditionally absent from

policy-making processes. One should also mention the relevant inexperience of the newly formed regional authorities and the limited experience of the now directly elected prefectural self-governments.

Regarding the **European context** the following can be said: In general, the above mentioned confining conditions can be used to explain the incompatibility between the Greek norms and practices and the European post-accession policy making, institutional and administrative requirements. This incompatibility has caused considerable pressures to Greece leading to the initial reluctance and the subsequent piecemeal adaptation and half Europeanisation of the country. High adaptational pressures have been evident in both the policy areas analysed above.

In the field of regional policy making, pressures mostly concerned administrative decentralization, institution building, greater participation of non-state actors at all levels of governance, changes in planning and implementation, partnership formation and networking. In the field of environmental policy-making and particularly waste management, adaptational pressures primarily concerned legal harmonization towards a less regulative, looser, more pro-active and non-state policy-making environment, institution building, partnership formation and greater participation of private and social actors at all levels of governance.

However, this more or less common background did not lead to common outcomes in the two policy areas. In the case of regional policy-making Greece underwent considerable administrative restructuring, a certain (though limited) decentralization of power and resources, extensive institution building to facilitate the implementation of the CSFs, considerable opening of the planning procedures and to a certain extent greater participation rates, partnership formation and networking at all levels of governance. Regarding Greek environmental policy-making, it could be argued that its Europeanisation has been rather superficial. Important pieces of legislation have been deliberately stalled and the public has been devoid of any substantial role in the decision-making. The Greek administration has tried primarily to secure the needed funding without touching on the vested interests that could alter the electoral status quo. According to Kazakos (1999), the unavoidable gap is more evident in the implementation phase, where development imperatives as they are perceived by politicians and clientelistic traditions more often counter environmental policy innovation.

This difference is clearly manifested in the two case study regions. The case of Notio Aigaiο is indicative of the fact that the introduction of the subsidiarity and the programming principles necessary for the planning and implementation of the CSFs have

completely altered the policy-making environment at the national and regional level. The implementation of the Structural Policy set in motion a number of reforms that considerably altered the domestic opportunities structures in Notio Aigaio. The authorities of the region and the regional and sub-regional social, private actors and governmental self-governments gained considerable financial resources (especially the regional authorities), access to policy-making, communication channels and networks of influence and experience exchange. A number of networks involving new actors emerged and certain public-private partnerships were formed.

In the case of Attica, the governance structures in solid waste management have only slightly changed. The creation of co-operative networks has been minimal and limited to the requirements of the EU programmes implementation (e.g. Operational Programme of "Environment") or national legislation enforcement (e.g. Regional Council composition). The majority of contacts between the concerned actors have been informal and based on personal relations and short-term interests. Moreover, there is a general distrust on the part of the private and social actors vis-à-vis governmental actions and proposals. With regard to waste management, the government's weakness to control the illegal dumping of waste in combination with the significant delay in the establishment of a comprehensive legal framework did not allow the adoption of European practices.

Within this context, a great part of the explanation of the different Europeanisation outcome undoubtedly lays with the **regional** and **sub-regional** contexts. At this level, one can find considerable variations directly related to the local institutional capacity of the two regions:

- 1) In both policy areas, the central state assumed new responsibilities following accession. However, in the case of regional policy-making in Notio Aigaio, significant decentralization reforms allowed a certain withdrawal of the state and the greater involvement in policy-making of social, private actors and NGOs. In the case of waste management in Attica, the lack of formal arrangements for policy co-ordination, the fragmentation of responsibilities among various governmental agencies and the hierarchical nature of the public administration hindered legal harmonization, delayed implementation and prevented public participation in policy-making.
- 2) Strong resistance to change emerged in the attempt to deal with Attica's waste management problems. The lack of a well-defined legal framework, the inefficiency of the institutional monitoring, coordination and enforcement mechanisms and the multi-fragmentation of policy-making and responsibilities

among governmental actors, reinforced rivalries and competition along short-term political considerations. The Attica Waste Management Plan has been under constant revision for the last twenty years. The so-called 'political cost' has had an especially strong impact on waste management decision-making. The two major political parties have adopted a populist behaviour that has resulted in wrong decisions or no decisions at all. As a result, the establishment of another sanitary landfill and compost plant in the region, which is necessary since the increasing amount of waste can no longer be treated in the existing one, has been significantly delayed. This has not been the case in Notio Aigaio. The European context and the more funding and negotiating power 'carrot' facilitated the development of co-operation, networking and partnerships among different regional and sub-regional actors and the acceptance of new European practices. Non-state actors have even complained about delays in the adaptation process. Moreover, the existence of common understanding over the region's development problems, the clearer allocation of responsibilities and obligations (establishment of special institutions such as the MA and the MC) and the greater participation of social and private actors and NGOs in policy-making, limited clientelistic practices and allowed actors to discuss and find a common ground for action. In the case of Attica, the numerous local authorities concerned hold different views and are unable to agree on a common basis. The main difference relates to organizational choices to be adopted and specifically whether the responsibility for solid waste management should be assumed by a single actor (i.e. ESDKNA) or by several actors in specific geographical units of Attica.

- 3) Participation of experts, professionals and NGOs in the policy-making process has been limited in both policy areas. However, in the case of Notio Aigaio, the planning and implementation of the CSFs led to the establishment of significant fora for dialogue and negotiation at the regional level: the Regional Council and the ROP Monitoring Committee have proved to be useful fora for the exchange of information and negotiation between the participating actors. Especially the latter has become a fairly decentralized and dense intra-regional horizontal network for the exchange of knowledge and information bringing together a number of private and social actors, professionals and experts and NGOs. Fora for dialogue and negotiation also exist at the local level (prefectural or municipal councils, development agencies, municipal or issue specific associations) though they are much more specific in scope. Not ignoring the predominance of the

state in most of these fora, one should consider the significance of participation of so many different actors at all the levels of governance.

In the case of Attica, similar fora have emerged (Monitoring Committees, Regional, Prefectural and Municipal Councils) complemented by a significant number of issue-specific networks, such as ESDKNA, HERRA and HSWMA. However, it has to be stressed that, overall, there is a lack of systematic dialogue on issues related to solid waste management between government officials, regional and local authorities and representatives from the civil society. An approach based on bargaining is often adopted between officials and local communities and negotiation takes place on the basis of networks of personal relations.

- 4) Social capital endowments have been more numerous in the case of Notio Aigaio than in the case of Attica and there is no doubt that the presence of the civil society has been much stronger in the former. These very much relate to the existence of a more consensus building culture and a co-operative tradition in Notio Aigaio, where research indicated the existence of trust vis-à-vis other actors, administrative units and politicians and more collaborative state-society relations. In the case of Attica, state and local actors are viewed with distrust while great antagonisms emerge among the concerned actors. It is no coincidental that clientelistic practices continue to dominate in Attica (which anyway constitutes the administrative, financial and decision-making centre of Greece gathering the majority of governmental actors) while interviewees in Notio Aigaio have expressed their satisfaction for the withdrawal of such practices in their region.

#### **1.4.2. Section 2: Patterns of learning and adaptation**

No doubt the national context places significant constraints for the local institutional capacity. However, theories accept that local institutions have a certain room for maneuver depending on their political, economic and cultural features, as well as on the system of intra- and inter-regional relations and connections. All these impact upon the learning capacity of the regions directly influencing their adaptation potential. Concluding the above discussion and the analysis of the two case-study regions, the following local characteristics emerge as particularly significant verifying the above theoretical argument:

- a) The pre-existence of a good institutional infrastructure and of local authorities capable of finding their way around the new financial resources and opportunities created by the European context.
- b) The presence of a more active civil society with actors that have managed to build associations and other institutions to serve their needs and demands outside the state corporatist Greek trends.
- c) The existence of a consensus-building culture and of a more co-operative culture among state and society.
- d) The decentralisation of power and resources and the clear distribution of responsibilities and obligations among governmental and nong-governmental actors.
- e) The strong involvement of private actors in the public things.
- f) The common understanding of problems and the abandonment of clientelistic practices.
- g) The existence of horizontal, functional networks and fora for dialogue that bring together a great number of actors (professionals, experts, social, private, NGOs,) facilitating the exchange of knowledge and information gained by participation in the European programmes.

The formation and institutionalization of durable partnerships able to facilitate the accumulation of knowledge and experience and its distribution to other public and private actors.

#### **1.4.3. Section 3: Policy recommendations**

Official Commission documents indicate that the European enlargement will considerably increase the regional and income disparities seriously threatening the Community regional policy and subsequently the social and economic cohesion of the enlarged territory. However, as Getimis (2002) argues, the challenge to the new European regional policy is not so much quantitative. It is also a matter of establishing institutional structures at all the levels of governance that are able to effectively use the Structural Funds resources in the accession countries (ibid:84). Limited institution building and administrative capacity at the regional level characterize these countries. This is also typical of lagging EU regions or lagging areas of converging EU regions. The lack of a stable multi-level governance system and of horizontal functional networks and lasting



public-private partnerships at the regional level will seriously undermine the future capacity of the accession regions to get access to the Structural Funds. It is already diminishing absorption and effectiveness in lagging areas of converging regions, which will no longer have access to the Structural Funds post-2006 (e.g. some of the Notio Aigaio islands).

The preliminary results of the above analysis allow the authors to draw some general points that should be considered when building new institutions and exporting policies not only in accession regions but also in member-states regions (or parts of current regions) that following enlargement will no longer be eligible for structural financing (Getimis & Demetropoulou, 2002):

- Institutional and political traditions do matter and should be taken into consideration. It should always be kept in mind that it is fairly difficult to substantially decentralize a centralized state structure. Instead of trying to put aside central state institutions and governmental bodies it would be more useful to clarify competencies and responsibilities among different levels of governance allowing the central authorities to have the overall coordination.
- Special attention should be given on not replacing old demons by new ones. More specifically the institutionalization of the intermediate, regional level of governance should be promoted in a way that enhances the active involvement of sub-regional authorities and facilitate networking and partnership building at regional level. This means it should have a good legitimacy basis and enjoy a relative autonomy rather than simply functioning as a deconcentrated bureaucratic state agent.
- Each region once institutionalized should be seen as a unique entity with special characteristics and qualities, a different environment for policy-making and implementation with varying institutional learning and adaptation capacity. This means that different mechanisms should be used in different cases to promote adaptation and enhance rapprochement with the Community requirements.
- The slow emergence of networks and their domination by the central state should be avoided with the promotion of more direct contacts between the local and regional governments with the Commission. Special attempts should be made to 'educate' social actors and regional and local authorities on the Structural Policy principles and requirements, networking, lobbying at a higher level and partnership building in order to create the necessary knowledge basis. The implementation of works should have a tangible outcome creating new opportunities and bringing new resources for local and regional actors.

- Avoid over-institutionalization in order to reduce the fragmentation of policy-making and the overlapping of competencies that will most probably delay financial allocations and the implementation of works and will most probably lead to frustration among sub-regional actors.

Concluding, it is worth reminding that local, regional and national institutions emerge and operate within the broader European context. It is important to stress that Europeanisation itself is not a cohesive process (Heinelt & Smith 1996). Europeanisation has rather been characterized by vertical and horizontal fragmentation indicating a lack of a cohesive single policy network at the Community level (Heinelt, Lang, Malek & Reissert 2001). The lack of cohesive mechanisms is itself an impediment to the emergence of horizontal, synergistic regional networks and subsequently of more effective regional governance.

## 2. Chapter Three: Ireland

### 2.1. Introduction

In assessing the changes, adaptation and learning which has come about in Ireland as a result of involvement in EU regional and environmental policies it is important to bear in mind key features of the Irish political and administrative system that distinguish Ireland from other EU states. It is also important to note that we are looking at a small state with a population of 3.6 million people, with a high degree of concentration in and around the capital city. Ireland has moved from being a rural society to an urban one, with significant societal changes underway. It is also a state that has benefited greatly from EU funding, especially from the structural funds which contributed significantly to Ireland's economic growth during the 1990s. The Economic and Social Research Institute estimate that funding under the CSF 1994-99 resulted in an increase of 1.6% GDP in 1994 and 2.4% by 1999. However, regional disparities have not lessened as a result of spending, and the latest CSO figures<sup>13</sup> suggest that they may even have been growing.

The Irish system of government is highly centralised. The range of functions carried out by local government in Ireland is more restricted than in many other less centralised EU states, such as Germany, Italy and Belgium. Formal relations between local authorities and central government are largely regulated through a single central government department - the Department of the Environment and Local Government - which has administrative, financial and technical control over the lower units (Coyle, 2001; Daemen and Schaap, 2000). Because of the absence of local taxation systems subnational government in Ireland is financially dependent on the centre. Furthermore, the absence until the mid-1990s of any semblance of a regional tier reinforced the dominance of the centre.

The Irish system retained many of the effective elements of the 19<sup>th</sup> century Westminster model on which it is based. After an initial spurt of institutional adaptation, following independence from British rule in the 1920s, the Irish system remained largely unchanged until reforms in the late 1990s. Thus Ireland's structures evolved in a context of deliberate isolation and independence. By contrast, the process of state and institution building during the transition to democracy in Portugal and Greece was linked to incipient or imminent membership of the European Community.

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<sup>13</sup> Reported in the *Irish Times*, 1 March 2002; also see the report in the *Irish Times*, 28 February 2002.

Traditionally, Irish society has been characterised by a spirit of co-operation and self-help fostered historically by community agricultural practices and, since the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the establishment of philanthropic societies and voluntary organisations including the cooperative movement. This trend continued throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century and in 1998 it was estimated that one third of all Irish adults were involved in some form of voluntary community activity (Ruddle and Mulvihill, 1999). Although the Irish political system is characterised as a clientilistic/personalist system it is also underpinned by a strong sense of civil society, a civil society that has emerged as both a partnership with government and a substitute for perceived failures of government.

## **2.2. Part I: National and regional context of policy-making prior to accession**

### **2.2.1. Section 1: National context of policy-making prior to accession/association**

Ireland's public administration comprises a strong central administration, weak local authorities and significant state sponsored bodies. The powers and functions of the executive, legislature and judiciary are strictly separate and constitutionally defined. A bicameral system, namely the Oireachtas, operates with the Dáil (parliament) having 166 members elected from 41 constituencies and the Seanad (upper house) having sixty members, forty nine of whom are elected from vocational and university panels with the remaining eleven being nominated by the Taoiseach (prime minister).

Cabinet collegiality is and has always been central to government decision-making, but the 15 government departments are structured on sectorally differentiated lines with each government minister heading a specific department. Prior to EU membership there was little collaboration or integration between the various departments. In the period prior to accession and for twenty-five years afterwards, Ministers were legally responsible for the administration of their departments and each minister was regarded as a 'corporation sole' until the Public Services Management Act of 1997. Indeed, prior to and for a long time after membership of the European Community, there appeared to be a resistance to change amongst senior officials.

The county is the chief sub-national administrative unit, although sub-county municipal structures exist in eighty of Ireland's towns. Prior to EC accession the twenty-six county councils and the five county borough corporations were the most significant local structures. These local authorities are limited in function and, unlike the other member States in the European Community to which they acceded in 1973, did and still do not have responsibility for health, education, policing or social welfare for example.

Furthermore, until 1991 Irish local authorities were constrained by the doctrine of *ultra vires* and were considered to be acting outside their powers if they performed any functions not specified in law. Local authorities were not traditionally the motors of local economic development and although assigned the role of facilitating industrial and commercial development by the Local Government (Planning & Development) Act 1963 they were not proactive in this sphere until long after accession to the EC.

Over the years central government has installed a large number of regional and local bodies, some of them operating separately from local authorities and some linked to local authorities (e.g., fisheries boards, health boards, etc.), but all operating within a system controlled by central government. A 1971 study carried out by the IPA refers to 'a rapid and uncoordinated growth both of regional authorities and systems of regional administration' and suggests that 'the rather haphazard tangle of regional boundaries' needed to be ordered (1971: 28). Such ordering has yet to be implemented.

### **Institutions involved in policy-making**

Chubb (1992) adopts Lindblom's 'proximate policy-makers' classification for the Irish context and identifies government members, Oireachtas members and senior civil servants as those who share the immediate authority to decide on specific policies. This would accurately reflect the policy-making process prior to and during the early years of EC membership. However, the proximate policy makers were influenced to varying degrees by 'ecclesiastical and lay interest groups and local pressure in the context of a highly competitive electoral process' Garvin (1999: 357). The media also played a role in the process, both as purveyors of information and formers of opinion. From the late 1950s 'an organisational infrastructure that would provide some alternative sources of advice for policy-makers' (Lee, 1989: 365) had gradually emerged. The Institute of Public Administration, An Foras Taluntais and the Irish Management Institute had been set up during the 1950s, the Economic Research Institute was established in 1960 and the National Industrial and Economic Council (later to become NESCI, the National Economic and Social Council) was created in 1963. In the era before membership of the European Community policy-making in Ireland was entirely sectoral and all policies were constrained by annual budgets and the uncertainties of the annual budgeting process.

### **Distribution of power and resources**

Ireland's system is based on a strong parliamentary democracy and voters have opportunities to participate in 'four domestic decision-making procedures' (Chubb, 1992: 131) – presidential elections, every seven years; general elections to the Dáil every five years; local elections, usually every five years in the pre-accession era and referenda on constitutional amendments, as necessary.

Because of the centralised nature of the Irish system the functioning and financing of local authorities is and has been quite restricted. The Report of the Public Services Organisation Review Group published in 1969 describes central-local relations thus: '... the central Departments engage in such strict control that the responsibility and initiative of local bodies and thus, their adaptability to change, has been diminished' (Chubb and Lynch, 1969: 353). The degree of centralisation of financial control has increased in recent years and while central government always held the purse-strings, the situation for local authorities was distinctly better in the era prior to accession. Walker's 1962 review of local finances could assert that 'local authorities in Ireland have a certain freedom of action and should not be regarded purely as agencies of the central government' (Roche, 1982: 151). In summary, financial resources in Ireland have been concentrated at the centre with local authorities depending on central government for much of their income, a dependence that increased following the abolition of domestic rates in 1978.

### **Patterns of interest intermediation**

Ireland, from the 1920s to the late 1960s, could be described as a traditional, family-centred, patriarchal, authoritarian society. Any overview of patterns of interest intermediation in Ireland needs to include reference to the influence of the Catholic Church on the Constitution, the type of laws enacted and the type of social policy which emerged. The prevalence of conservative Catholic social thinking during this period co-existed with stolid economic and social policies and political leaders who saw little need for public consultation or negotiation. However, from the end of World War II the Irish state slowly expanded its role and during the 1950s introduced a number of new social policies. The adoption of economic planning from 1958 onwards marked a seismic change in attitude. During the 1960s industrialisation, urbanisation, expanding educational opportunities and changing social mores combined with the changes emerging in the Catholic Church to broaden Irish horizons. The first National Wage Agreement in 1970 marked a change in government-industry relations and began the tripartite process of

agreement between state, employers and employees which would later serve as the foundation for a broader partnership.

**2.2.2. Section 2: Regional context**

The region selected for the regional policy study is the Mid-West region, a NUTS III region with Objective 1 in Transition status.

**Table 2.** The Mid-West Region

	<b>Mid-West</b>
<b>Area</b>	7,870 sq. km
<b>Counties</b>	Limerick, Clare, Tipperary North
<b>Population (1996)</b>	317,069 <sup>14</sup>
<b>Urban %</b>	42
<b>Agriculture %</b>	11.7
<b>Industry %</b>	33.6
<b>Services %</b>	54.7
<b>GVA/% of EU Average (1996)</b>	89.7

*Source: Midwest Regional Development Plan, 2000-2006*

The Mid-West is the third wealthiest region on the basis of GVA per capita, behind Dublin and the South West. However, development in the region is uneven, with rural areas in West Clare and West Limerick characterised by high unemployment and socio-economic deprivation. The region benefits from the presence of Shannon Development (a unique regional development body), Shannon International Airport and the Shannon Trade Zone. The region is well endowed with natural resources, scenery and arable land and has a strong foreign industry/service base, particularly in electronics, computer manufacturing, instruments, metals and engineering, food processing, and pharmaceuticals, as well a strong base of SMEs and a focus on tourism. Good educational levels and facilities underpin the region’s development and both a regional telecommunications consortium and a knowledge network linking high technology business to the third level institutions have been created.

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<sup>14</sup> The census results for 2002 are currently being analyzed but the preliminary reports have recorded the population for the Mid-West region as 339,930, an increase of 13.8% on the 1996 census figures.

This region was selected for study as the Mid-West has a distinctive regional identity and structures, whereas Ireland has not traditionally had a strong regional level of identity. The Mid-West Region has also been perceived as a dynamic and leading region, pursuing regional development initiatives and also with a development body noted for bringing together local and regional actors. Thus, the Mid-West region provides an important case for study, as it should exemplify strong European tendencies, significant institutional learning, as well as being underpinned by strong social capital. The region has also had a strong involvement in European programmes and projects (e.g. Shannon Regional Innovation Strategy, Analysis of Spatial Planning and Emerging Communication Technologies (ASPECT) and Regional Information Systems).

It needs, however, to be noted that the Mid-West waste management region differs from that described above. The rationale provided for the current division of waste management regions in Ireland in 2000 was prescribed by central government and aimed to maximise economies of scale. Consequently, the regions designated do not coincide with regions used for other purposes (e.g., NUTS III). The Mid-West Waste Region comprises the counties of Limerick (including Limerick City), Clare and Kerry. All counties include disadvantaged areas but the problems of Kerry are more acute in that it is predominantly rural with a dispersed population and poor road infrastructure whereas Limerick and Clare benefit from the industrial hub of the Limerick/Shannon/Ennis axis.

**Table 3.** Mid West Waste Region

	<b>Characteristics of the Limerick, Clare, Kerry Region</b>
<b>Area</b>	1.08 million hectares
<b>Counties</b>	Limerick, Clare and Kerry
<b>Population</b>	385,178 (1996 Census) <sup>15</sup>
<b>% Population</b>	10.6
<b>Agriculture</b>	11.7% workforce
<b>Industry</b>	33.6% workforce

*Source: Limerick County Council (1999)*

There is a mix of public and private arrangements whereby local authorities and private collectors in the region operate the domestic waste collection service. Despite some

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<sup>15</sup> The census results for 2002 are currently being analyzed but the preliminary reports have recorded the population for the Mid-West region as 411,286, an increase of 6.7% on the 1996 census figures.



conflicts within the Limerick, Clare, Kerry region the counties share similar problems in relation to waste management.

### **2.2.3. Section 3: SNA implementation**

In looking at the Mid-West region, we would expect to find a high degree of network centralisation, high density and strong evidence of a high degree of structural equivalence in the regional policy arena. Such a finding would support the view that the domestic structures have been an important factor in Ireland's success in attracting European structural funding and adapting to Europe. In contrast, in the environmental policy arena, where Ireland has been among the laggards, one would expect to find lower degree of network centralisation, lower density and less structural equivalence reflecting the underdevelopment of domestic structures and slower adaptation to Europe.

#### **Regional policy**

In looking at the valued matrix for the Mid-West region, the network centralisation measure was found to be 137.09 (Freeman's Degree of Centrality Measures, see Table 23.), suggesting a high degree of network centralisation, when the overall intensity of the relations between the actors are examined. It is notable that the two main regional actors, Shannon Development and the Mid-West Regional Authority, have high out degrees, along with other county and national actors. This highlights the importance of these actors in the regional process and suggests that they are central to the policy network. Again, this is graphically represented in the MDS Diagram (Figure 10.), where the dominance of the central actors is evident. In particular, the Mid-West Regional Authority claims to have the most links with other actors but when the rank orderings are examined the highest-ranking actors are Limerick County Council and Shannon Development. In the matrix, we find that there is relatively high degree of network centralisation. It is notable that certain key actors from all levels, such as Limerick County Council, Shannon Development, the Mid-West Regional Authority, the Departments of Finance and the Environment, Ballyhoura Development clearly initiate significant contacts. In contrast, most of the local LEADER groups, regional state agencies and private organisations have fewer contacts, as would be expected, given their more localised and formal roles in the region.

In terms of density within the Mid-West region, in the first quadrant of binary matrix it was found that the network had a relatively high degree of density with a value of 0.80. In the valued matrix the degree of density increases to 1.76 in the first quadrant, reflecting the greater level of involvement of the regional actors, such as Shannon Development and the Mid-West Regional Authority, and the County Councils.

In examining the common structural positions among actors with respect to their linkages the network was split into blocks of structural equivalence, whereby members of the same block are positively correlated, and members of different blocks are negatively correlated. Four blocks of actors are identifiable in the Mid-West (see Figure 12.):

- The first includes five members: Shannon Development, the Mid-West Regional Authority, Limerick County Council, Clare Enterprise Board, and Tipperary Enterprise Board. This block includes three of the principal actors in the region, as well as two enterprise boards, which would share connections with many actors.
- The second includes the South East Regional Assembly, Tipperary NR County Council, the Industrial Development Authority, Teagasc, Tipperary Leader Group, Limerick, FAS, Nenagh Community Network, Paul Partnership, West Limerick Resources, Ballyhoura Development, Rural Resources Ltd., and the Irish Travel Agents Association. It is notable that many of the actors in this group are either regional level state bodies or community groups. These actors are clearly closely connected but less central than in the previous group.
- The third covers Clare County Council, Limerick City Council, Limerick Enterprise Board, the Irish Confederation of Trade Unions, Forfas, Fisheries Board, Irish Farmers Association, Irish Business Employers Confederation, Limerick Chamber of Commerce, Ennis Chamber of Commerce, Aer Rianta, Bus Eireann, the Irish Hotel Federation and the Economic and Social Research Institute. The actors in this group include two county councils and many of the interest groups and associations. The anomaly, in this case the county councils, is explained by their failure to complete questionnaires, whereas the other actors do not share many links.
- Finally, the fourth comprises the national-level actors: the Department of the Environment, the Department of Finance, the Cabinet Committee on Europe, the Joint Committee on European Affairs, and Environmental Resource Management. Such actors are not represented in the region and therefore have the most distant relations with the local and regional actors.

In summary, the Irish case shows a high degree of network centrality and a relatively high degree of density for specific regional and local actors. In relation to the structural equivalence of the policy-making network a number of groups were identified as holding strong relationships with other actors in the region. The regional bodies concerned with structural fund interventions were shown to have leading roles, whereas the national actors were seen as having more distant links with local and regional actors.

## **Waste Management**

In looking at waste management in the Mid-West region, it was found that the most central actor in the region was Limerick City Council. However, the leading local authority for the implementation of the waste plan, Limerick County Council, records a lower degree of centrality in the network. The actors with the smallest values are the regional authorities and the regional assembly, in tandem with consulting companies, NGOs and several national actors, which are considered to be marginal actors in the network at a regional level. This would imply that the newly created organisations at regional level and the city and county development boards do not play a central role or make an impact in the functioning of the waste management network at regional level to date. The results also reflect the centrality of state actors, principally the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of the Environment and Local Government and IBEC. This is in line with comments from interviewees as most actors consulted acknowledged links with the EPA and the Department. This emphasizes the significant role national actors, play in the direction of waste management policy and confirms that central government is expected to lead, support and direct major initiatives at all levels. In the valued matrix the network centralisation measure is 121.43% suggesting a higher degree of network centralisation, when the overall intensity of relations is examined, but lower than in the regional policy arena.

Again multidimensional scaling was used to look at the similarities or differences among the set of actors. Using the valued matrix, Figure 12. illustrates the links (or ties) that exist between the different organisations, with those in the core representing those organisations with the greatest number of ties, while those on the edges have the least number of ties. It should, however, be noted that those organisations not interviewed are also likely to be represented on the periphery of the diagram. In looking at this representation it can be noted that the newly created public bodies at the regional and local level are engaged in an early learning process and do not have a critical or central role in the development of the waste management network to date. In fact, the 'regional approach' to waste does not realistically reflect the situation on the ground as the most significant actors are the pre-existing institutions, namely the local authorities and the Department of the Environment and Local Government. The EPA, established in 1993, has also acquired a prominent position. Private sector actors are becoming more significant at regional and local level and their input and projects will provide further impetus for the future development of the network. From the perspective of pre-existing institutions there has been considerable learning, though not evenly distributed across the network, and the significance of central government leadership in waste policy is evident. In addition, consultation between actors at regional and local level could be

improved. It may be suggested that there are competition conflicts between the different levels of government and between different public authorities.

In terms of density, which refers to the completeness and degree of connectedness of the entire network, the results suggest a low density in the network and imply that links are typically weak between actors. For the valued network the density is the total of all values divided by the number of possible ties. In this case the density gives the average value. In the valued matrix the degree of density is 1.65 in the first quadrant. The level of involvement of regional bodies is weak and network density is higher amongst the local authority actors who have the responsibility for the implementation of the waste plan (in particular Limerick City Council and Limerick County Council). It is also high at central government level whereby actors such as the Department of Environment and the Environmental Protection Agency have more dense connections. Overall, density is not distributed evenly among the cluster of actors.

In considering structural equivalence in the network Figure 13. depicts the links between the actors and the way they are clustered. It suggests four clusters exist:

- The first includes the regional authorities and assemblies, Wheelie Bin Services, Limerick and Ennis Chambers of Commerce and Limerick City Development Board that in the context of the waste management plan are not deemed to be significant actors and have not to date developed strong ties with other stakeholders in the implementation of the waste management plan. In the case of the regional authorities this may be explained to some degree by the composition of the waste region.
- The second and third groups have the most connections (relevant local authorities and central government actors such as the Protection Agency and Department) and are the most significant groups for policy making and implementation.

The fourth cluster is not homogenous and is composed of a mix of central government actors: the Joint Committee on Environment, the Department of Finance, IBEC, Comhar with regional/local actors including Kerry County Council and NGO actors. The majority of the actors in this group did not return questionnaires. The representation of several of these actors in the region would in any case be deemed residual. The reason Kerry County Council appears in this group may be explained by the composition of the region and its more isolated position in relation to the other local authorities in the functioning of the waste management network.

## **2.3. Part II: Europeanisation processes (objectives and implementation)**

### **2.3.1. Section 1: Adaptational pressures (types, components and mechanisms)**

With regard to regional policy, the early years of Ireland's membership brought little adaptational pressure. This, of course, mirrors the situation throughout the European Community with the incipient nature of the Community's regional policy. During the 1970s and early 1980s Ireland made only a limited and half-hearted commitment to regional policy and local development. The state apparatus remained highly centralised, with the Departments of Finance and the Environment acting as the main interlocutors with the Commission. Adaptational pressure increased during the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, with successive Irish governments working with the EU in developing the National Development Plans. This process has contributed to stimulating a change in the basis on which intergovernmental relations operates in Ireland as well as changes in the processes and mechanisms for regional policy. The adaptational pressures experienced in Ireland can be classified as medium, since Irish players were actively involved in the design and negotiation of EU regional policy although much of the adaptation as and when it has occurred has been in response to demands made by Brussels. Institution building has been manifested in the form of the eight regional Authorities (1994) and the two Regional Assemblies (1999), following a decision to split Ireland into two regions.

In relation to Environmental policy adaptational pressure has been high. One reason for this is that regulatory policies such as environmental policy are particularly prone to administrative impacts as concrete administrative implications are transmitted via both substantive and procedural obligations defined in EU legislation (Knill and Lenschow, 2001:116). In Ireland, as elsewhere, Europeanisation has acted as a positive external shock for promoting legal change, institution building and policy making innovation. Despite this, Ireland belongs to the category of environmental 'laggards' (McGowan, 1999) and the adaptation of Irish policy and administration to EU requirements is largely characterised by pragmatic and ad hoc reactions as opposed to pro-active policy-making and radical change. Until the 1990s the level of Government activity in the environmental policy sphere in Ireland was relatively low, with public awareness of environmental issues low.

In the case of waste management, all levels of government have been challenged by the necessity to secure a 'goodness of fit' between European policy requirements and the performance of pre-existing institutional structures and procedures. The need for legal

compliance with EU decrees has been an important catalyst of adaptation. Irish policy on the environment derives its guidelines and legal framework from EU legislation and is driven by EU policy initiatives. In recent years significant new legislation, such as the Waste Management Act 1996, several policy statements and the introduction of new policy instruments have been adopted. In the context of waste management the construction of a regional framework for local authority co-operation has come about in order to achieve compliance with EU directives. In addition, the steady output of EU directives and increasing harmonization programmes played a large part in creating demand for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), created in 1992, which serves as the focal point for all EEA activities in Ireland.

### **Partnerships**

Ireland's social partnership model, which emerged in response to the national economic and social problems of the 1980s, has been reinforced by involvement in EU affairs. The partnership approach at sub-national level has promoted a territorial rather than a sectoral approach. Furthermore, EU structural funds and interventions such as the LEADER programmes have added financial and authoritative impetus to the local partnerships, which emerged as part of the bottom-up development process.

### **Private participation**

In the area of waste management, some of the most significant initiatives have come from the private sector although capital funding and support from central government is minimal and inadequate. With regard to the maintenance and operation of environmental services there is clearly more scope for contracting out which is a relatively new concept in the context of domestic municipal waste. Whereas in the regional policy sphere private actors have tended to play a small part at the planning and implementation stages - at the planning stage submissions have been made by private actors while at the implementation stage, private actors have availed of the opportunities for support under the different interventions.

### **Administrative decentralisation**

The allocation of management responsibility for the two Regional Operational Programmes in the National Development Plan 2000-2006 to the two Regional Assemblies marks the first time that non central government bodies have been given responsibility for such programmes. This is the cumulative outcome of the continuous championing of devolved administration by Brussels. Whatever decentralisation had taken place previously was most evident at the planning and implementation stages of

the EU regional policy process. This evolved through the cosmetic regional consultative structures created in 1988, the creation of the Regional Authorities in 1994 and their being given responsibility for leading the consultation process in their regions during preparation of the 2000-2006 CSF. Adaptation is also evident in the way in which membership of the Operational Programme Monitoring Committees has gradually expanded to include sub-national actors and in the ever-increasing role of sub-national actors in the implementation of Structural Fund interventions.

Although local authorities are at the coalface in dealing with the difference between the intent of EU legislation and the practice of environmental protection, the sphere of waste management remains a 'top-down' driven strategy and one in which there is a deficit of democracy and participation both in its construction and implementation. The principal responsibility for the direction of environmental policy in Ireland has continued to reside with the Department of the Environment and Local Government despite the fact that local authorities are the principal agents responsible for the implementation of legislation. The practical effect of consultation on national government's environmental policies is questionable and the weakness of local government is problematic as it enjoys only consultative power in the EU decision-making process.

Europeanisation has brought about institution building and legal adaptation in both the regional and environmental spheres. Irish institutions and structures have adjusted incrementally and pragmatically to the exigencies and opportunities of EU membership. Policies and mechanisms reflect the dominant discourse in Brussels and the required modifications have been implanted in the political and administrative processes.

### **2.3.2. Section 2: Resistance to change**

Europeanisation has been a positive process for Ireland but there has too, been resistance to various aspects of the process. Central government, while adopting an innovative approach in some spheres has shown dogged resistance to change in others. Local government has not specifically resisted change but neither have local authorities actively embraced change. The reaction among the general public has also been mixed with resistance evident on some issues. The resisting actors have varied from issue to issue while the spheres arousing resistance fall into two categories - 'hardy perennials' and one-off issues.

## Issues of resistance

The deconcentration of power and resources continues to be a source of contention and successive Irish governments have resisted any real devolution. Initial attempts at involvement of sub-national actors in the implementation of EU regional policy were judged by Brussels to be 'cosmetic'. Even still the limited functions and financing allocated to the Regional Assemblies and Authorities are indicative of central government's continuing reluctance to devolve real power. Equally, local government have viewed the creation of regional structures as a threat and as an extra layer of bureaucracy. This limited commitment to a regional approach is further evidenced by the lack of coherence in the designation of regions for different purposes. For the ADAPT project although the Mid-West is the focus for both the regional and environmental policy dimensions the geographical entities being studied differ for the two policy areas.

Until the mid-1990s there was considerable resistance to change with regard to implementation of EU environmental policy and Ireland is still a laggard. The implementation gap between the national and European level legal requirements and Irish environmental performance is further evidence of resistance to change, as is the slow pace of integration of environmental considerations into other policy areas. Ireland's environmental performance at EU level is perceived of as only average and Ireland is being prosecuted for its failures to implement EU directives on water, waste and habitat protection. The Irish practice seems to be to delay the implementation process for as long as possible, reaching compliance only at the point where court action is likely to result in decisions against the Irish position.

Although Irish environmental policy in general shows an enhanced positive awareness of civil society and numerous NGO/independent environmental organisations exist, there is still a resistance to change among a significant proportion of the public. The response to policies continues to focus on the local rather than general dimensions with NIMBYism ('Not in My Back Yard') prevailing. Irish local authorities have sometimes exhibited resistance to change and continue to show reluctance to act and have problems in controlling illegal dumping activities and securing convictions. The pace of change has varied across Ireland, with the Mid-West region having adopted its regional waste management plan at an early stage, with little public discussion or controversy.

Other EU policy areas which have spawned resistance to change in Ireland include agricultural issues (with the farming lobby resisting each phase of reform of CAP); competition policy (controls on state-aid have been resisted particularly by sectoral employees, for example, workers in the national airline); equality legislation,



employment legislation and health and safety directives all encountered resistance from government and employer organisations because of the high cost of implementation; misgivings about EMU were expressed by some respected economists and by the small industry lobby, among others; the issue of CFSP and its potential impact on Ireland's neutrality has frequently caused controversy; similarly the perceived democratic deficit and the EU's bureaucratic *lourdeur* have frequently provoked negative reaction and may have contributed to the rejection of the Nice treaty in the first referendum. Opposition to European integration remains limited in Ireland, although it has been consistent over time and particularly evident in referenda.

### **Strength of reactions and how reactions have evolved over time**

Those who seriously resist change or who wish to influence the type of change have displayed significant learning capacity over the years. The agriculture lobby strongly advocated membership prior to accession but have frequently resisted reform of the CAP in a combative manner and have professionalized their lobbying capacity. At the time of accession Irish trade unions expressed serious reservations about membership of the European Community (O'Donovan, 1999). However, once Ireland had become a member the trade unions adopted a pragmatic approach, became involved in advisory and consultative committees and affiliated to ETUC. Since then, trade union support for the European Community has fluctuated relative to the degree of the Union's focus on social issues. However, the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) has campaigned for a 'Yes' vote for both the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties. Whereas Chambers of Commerce, industry and employer groups have tended overwhelmingly to support Europeanization.

### **Patterns of interest intermediation**

Laffan and O'Donnell (1998) assert that economic interests likely to be affected by EU policies were quick to establish a presence in Brussels; hence, the social partners have long been well poised to make their views known. The professionalisation of the agricultural lobby and the proactive stance of the business lobby is illustrated by their strong presence in Brussels and the manner in which they feed into the EU and Irish policy-making processes. Other groups have also adopted the Brussels route and environmentalists, consumer groups and voluntary groups are among the Irish interest groups who have been active.

Other examples of the effective use of networking include the creation of NASC (a partnership of organisations concerned with preserving the cultural fabric of Gaeltacht, i.e., Irish speaking, areas) in 1992 and the partnership's establishment of a European liaison office in Brussels one year later. Although NASC does not function in the Mid-West

area it serves as an example of effective Europeanisation of the partners' functions and has established valuable links with similar regions in the EU.

### **2.3.3. Section 3: Evolution of central state policy-making structures**

The Europeanisation process has impacted on Ireland's national policy making processes. There has been an intertwining of domestic and EU policy-making and EU business has been successfully grafted on the normal business of the various government departments (Laffan 2000). The type of administrative restructuring that has come about included adaptation in the role of sectoral departments, increased co-ordination and improvements in policy mechanisms. The Irish approach to EU policy mirrors the domestic approach to policy-making and is based on the system of a 'lead department' with each government department managing the area of policy falling within its ambit. The role of three particular government departments, Finance, Foreign Affairs and the Department of the Taoiseach has been enhanced and they play significant co-ordinating roles in European issues while the sectoral/line departments administer specific aspects of European business. Increased co-ordination is evident in policy-making with a consequent diminution in the sectoral approach.

The mechanics of policy-making have also been influenced by Europeanisation, particularly the EU's regional policy processes. A more analytical approach to policy-making can be perceived. A culture of evaluation has been fostered within the Irish administrative system with Ireland being praised for its innovation in methods of analysis. Another policy-making adaptation instigated by Brussels, but now an integral part of Irish policy-making, is the move from annual to multi-annual budgeting. This has become the norm for all aspects of public administration and has been welcomed by Irish administrators.

### **Decentralisation of power & resources**

In the first two national development plans, central government departments and their regional bodies were principally responsible for the implementation of the operational programmes. The 2003 Evaluation Report of the 1994-99 Plan noted "The Irish CSF was administered through a generally well established, experienced, and effective public administration system. However, the 'vertical' nature of these departments and agencies led to some inflexibility and resistance to change and re-programming" (Fitzpatrick Associates 2003: 3). The allocation of management responsibility for the two regional operational programmes in the NDP 2000-2006 to the two Regional Assemblies marks the first time that non central government bodies have been given specific responsibility

for such programmes. However the power that has been given to the regional assemblies is restricted and their resource base is quite limited.

The process of Europeanisation has done little to increase the power of Irish local authorities although their resources have been enhanced by the financial opportunities inherent in some regional policy interventions. The fact that Ireland was regarded as a single region and structural funds were dispersed via central government did little to decentralise power (Keogh, 1994; O'Donnell 2000). The obligations imposed by the EU's environmental and waste management policies have also increased the resource pressures on local authorities. Again, the capacity of such bodies to respond to such pressures needs to be considered, as there is a risk that local authorities are being asked to take on responsibilities for which they lack sufficient personnel and money to ensure a successful outcome.

### **Establishment of new institutions and procedures**

At the national level a number of new institutions and procedures have been adopted over time to cope both with the EU and specifically regional policy. A Task Force entitled Communicating Europe was established in 1992 and continues to increase and analyse levels of understanding of European affairs in Ireland. Within the national civil service a European Communities Committee was established prior to Ireland's membership of the EU and operated intermittently during the 1980s and 1990s. Currently, a Senior Officials' Group meets regularly to deal with European issues within the different government departments and feeds information to the Cabinet sub-committee and the various Oireachtas committees. An Interdepartmental Co-ordinating Committee on EU Affairs was established in 2002. Further institutional innovations have included the establishment of a European Structural Funds Information Unit (1996), the creation of a National Development Finance Agency (2003) and the formation of a sub-committee on the scrutiny of EU legislation as a part of the Joint Committee on European Affairs (2002). A National Forum on Europe was established in the wake of the first referendum on the Nice Treaty and has enhanced understanding of EU issues as well as fostering discussion and debate.

In the environmental policy sphere a significant institutional change was the establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1992 act. The steady output of EC directives and increasing harmonization programmes played a large part in creating a demand for such an agency. Comhar – The National Sustainable Development Partnership - was established by the Government in 1999 to provide a forum for national consultation and dialogue on all issues surrounding Ireland's pursuit of sustainable

development. Most recently the government has moved to establish a new policing body, the Office for Environmental Enforcement (OEE), to oversee the prosecution of pollution cases and to audit local authority activity. It will operate as a part of the EPA and will be resourced by professionals from within the EPA.<sup>16</sup> The remit of the OEE will be broad but waste management policy will account for a substantive amount of its activities.

The most significant institutional change at the sub-national level was the gradual creation of a regional tier of government. Eight Regional Authorities were established in 1994 and they co-ordinate some of the county/city and sub-county activities and monitor the use of EU structural funds. A decision was made to designate Ireland as two regions for structural funding purposes for 2000-2006 with the two regions qualifying for different designations under allocation regulations. Subsequently, two regional authorities, known as Regional Assemblies, were established in July 1999 under new structures for regionalisation. They promote co-ordination of the provision of public services in their areas and monitor the general impact of all EU programmes of assistance under the CSF. Significantly, the Regional Assemblies have been given responsibility for managing Regional Operational Programmes under the new Community Support Framework 2000-2006. A national representative organisation of regional bodies, the Association of Irish Regions, has been created and provides a forum for discussion and co-operation.

### **Partnerships and networks**

Since the economic crisis of the late 1980s the consensual social partnership approach has been the dominant approach to policy-making. The strong emphasis on partnership incorporated in EU regional policy since 1988 has reinforced and supported the consensual approach to policy-making in Ireland and has legitimised and entrenched the culture of concertation at both national and local levels.

In the realm of environmental policy, Comhar – The National Sustainable Development Partnership - Comhar was established by the Government in 1999 to provide a forum for national consultation and dialogue on all issues surrounding Ireland's pursuit of sustainable development. It may be argued that European considerations were amongst those which prompted its establishment. Membership includes both state and non-governmental representatives. It may be noted, however, that sub-national actors do not have any significant input to Comhar and vice-versa.

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<sup>16</sup> See *Irish Times*, 21 July 2003

Reference has earlier been made to the importance of partnership at national level and to the emergence of a number of non-governmental bodies, which facilitated the process of 'bottom-up' development. EU structural funding provided financial windows of opportunity for such bodies and fostered the development of local partnerships, through the local development programmes. Recently, these local development bodies have been formally integrated into the reformed local government structures through the creation of County Development Boards and Strategic Policy Committees. Another institutional innovation, which has resulted from involvement in EU regional policy, is the creation of a number of networks of these local partnerships. Foremost among these are Comhar LEADER na hÉireann, a representative body for the LEADER companies in Ireland (established during LEADER I) and ADM (Area Development Management Ltd.) which serves both as a management agency for Partnership and Community Group programmes (often funded from the ESF) and as an umbrella body for the Partnerships and Community Groups.

### **Establishment of new actors in policy-making**

Involvement in EU programmes as well as the practices and procedures required by the Brussels bureaucracy have combined with the nationally promoted neo-corporatist approach to involve a wider range of actors in policy-making. Consultation of the wider public has also become the norm with calls for submissions on policy areas regularly appearing in national newspapers – such consultation was imposed following the 1988 reform of EU regional policy and was initially reluctantly received but is now perceived as a commendable element of Irish policy-making. Notably, as part of the preparation for the 1994-99 National Development Plan, an extensive consultation process took place involving the social partners, Chambers of Commerce of Ireland, the Council on the Status of Women, the eight regional authorities, as well as other actors (Fitzpatrick Associates 2003: 40).

The consultation mechanism is also widely used at sub-national level during the planning phase. For the Mid-West waste management plan submissions were received from 37 private individuals, four governmental/non-governmental organisations and one commercial. During preparation of the NDP 2000-2006, in the Mid-West Region the consultation process involved written invitations for submissions from regional interests, face-to-face consultations with key stakeholders from all sectors, telephone interviews with managers and industrialists and seminars with various interests (Quinn, 1999).

At the implementation phase the range of actors has widened considerably with local development bodies, private actors and NGOs playing decisive roles. The monitoring

phase also involves a significant range of actors. Each Operational Programme (OP) is monitored by a Monitoring Committee comprised of government officials, representatives of the European Commission, statutory agencies, the social partners and the Regional Assemblies. Independent private actors such as consultancy firms frequently carry out evaluation of policies and programmes. The widening of the range of actors in the various phases of policy-making has been influenced by but is not totally attributable to Europeanisation.

#### **2.3.4. Section 4: Non-state actors**

The formal involvement of non-state actors in the policy formation process is limited, although it increases at the implementation stage. NGOs, such as the local Chambers of Commerce, IBEC and ICTU, have usually been critical observers of the process and lobbyists on behalf of their members, but have more recently become partners in the policy process. Again, organisations such as IBEC usually lobby at the national level rather than at the local or regional levels. It is also notable that the 1994-99 CSF did expect to include private sector expenditure of €2,428 million.

In the regional policy arena actors interviewed were largely from the public sector and little specific reference was made to the role of the private sector. There was, however, a welcome for the formal networks and informal collaboration between the two sectors, which has been fostered by involvement in EU regional policy processes. There is no evidence of formal public/private partnerships for the 1994-1999 period, although private contributions did form a part of the investment in the productive sector and to a lesser extent in the areas of economic infrastructure and local development. In the late 1990s organisations, such as IBEC and the Construction Industry Federation, began to lobby for the introduction of PPPs as essential to the achievement of NDP objectives.

The current National Development Plan (2000-2006) includes provision of €2.34 billion (of a total of €52 billion) for public private partnerships, mainly on waste management (69%) and roads (23%), as well as in public transport, education, and water services. As of 2003 only 11 of 57 projects approved were operational.<sup>17</sup> It is projected that 134 PPPs will be developed over the 2000-2006 period, but this appears optimistic in light of the current economic climate in Ireland. In the Mid-West region two PPPs are currently at varying stages of development, with respect to road development.<sup>18</sup> At national level

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<sup>17</sup> For further details on PPPs in Ireland see <http://www.ppp.gov.ie>; or for details on the roads programme <http://www.nra.ie>

<sup>18</sup> These include the N7 Limerick South Ring Concession which is at a preliminary stage of development and the N7 Nenagh to Limerick

some interviewees see involvement in EU regional policy as having brought about a significant increase in participation by fostering the notion of public private partnerships. This phenomenon was not mentioned by the local and regional actors when interviewed as part of the ADAPT study.

The involvement of the private sector in the implementation of the 1996 Waste Management Act mirrors the trend set in the EU's Fifth Environmental Action Programme, whereby it is deemed that there is ample scope for the private sector to contribute to achieving some of the goals set. At local and regional level there are several large private waste contractors who have obtained an EPA licence (e.g. Mr. Binman in the Limerick region). Smaller operators are increasingly entering the market and though local authority collections remain the only service in rural areas in particular, it is apparent that their share of 'the market' has decreased in urban areas.<sup>19</sup> To the extent that in the view of one local official "Local authorities do not control waste any more" (Interview, Kerry County Council, July 2002). In the area of waste management, some of the most significant initiatives have come from the private sector although capital funding and support from central government is minimal and inadequate. There has been considerable frustration on the part of the private sector at the slowness of government to act and at the lack of disposal and treatment facilities.<sup>20</sup> In regard to the maintenance and operation of environmental services there is clearly more scope for contracting out which is a relatively new concept in the context of domestic municipal waste. In regard to the network analysis undertaken in this study, private sector actors have a moderate degree of centrality within the network, reflecting the greater role they are undertaking in the provision of services.

Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) have been slow to develop in the Limerick, Clare and Kerry region; though the National Development Plan 2000-2006 anticipates significant capital investment towards the provision of waste management infrastructure in Ireland. This is to be achieved through a combination of funding from the Public-Private partnership method, local authority own sources and through the exchequer and EU co-funded grants for major regional infrastructure and capital costs of recycling and recovery infrastructure as provided for in the regional and local waste management plans. PPP initiatives remain, however, in infancy with details of approval available only for Dublin waste management facilities. The questionnaire did not yield any information on PPPs in the Mid-West region with IBEC indicating that they are not in existence as no facilities have been built. It may be noted that in the integrated strategies for social,

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<sup>19</sup> In the case of Limerick County Council, the council has recently opted to privatise refuse collection.

<sup>20</sup> See reports in the *Irish Times*, 12, 13 14 and 15 August 2002 on waste management in Ireland

economic and cultural development prepared by each City/County Development Board, the role of the private sector is not clearly indicated in the area of waste management. Limerick County Development Board recognises private sector representatives as supporting agencies for the implementation of waste management plans whereby the strategies for Clare and Kerry do not acknowledge them at all.

In Ireland central government and regional actors, as well as private actors, have championed the idea of public-private partnerships and CSF documents reinforce this commitment. However, the process is still under-developed with Ireland at an early stage of development. One of the principal problems seems to have been the slowness with which contracts can be negotiated and the overall complexity of such schemes. In particular, the procurement and consultation processes have been very slow and a number of projects have been delayed by legal challenges. Nevertheless, there is an acceptance that PPPs offer a way forward in the face of limited public finances, as in other EU states, where these have become the norm. The introduction of PPPs have also led to some institutional innovation, with the establishment of a Public Private Partnership Unit in the Department of Finance (1999), the creation of an Inter-departmental Group and an Advisory Group on PPPs. The latter group brings together representatives of IBEC, ICTU, Confederation of Ireland, Forfás, other government departments and agencies, again illustrating the consensual approach to policy-making in the Irish case.

### **2.3.5. Section 5: Civic culture**

Irish society has been characterised by a spirit of co-operation and self-help fostered historically by community agricultural practices and by the establishment of philanthropic societies and voluntary organisations. This trend continued throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century with the establishment of Muintir na Tíre (a parish-based organisation) in the 1930s and an upsurge of community organisations since the 1970s. Some of these were issue driven (e.g., the trade union movement or women's organisations), some aiming to combat social exclusion and others focused on animation, capacity building and fostering innovation (Adshead & Quinn, 1998). From the 1970s to the mid 1990s many of these organisations sought to redress the perceived gaps in government policy and provision and articulate the concerns and perspectives of the marginalised. Organisations such as the INOU (Irish National Organisation for the Unemployed), the Justice Commission of CORI (Conference of Religious in Ireland), the Combat Poverty Agency and the Community Workers' Co-op emerged to highlight the concerns of the marginalised.



In 1993 NESF (the National Economic and Social Forum) was created by the government and sought to achieve wide consensus on social and economic initiatives. The community and voluntary sector was formally represented on NESF and from 1996 the Community and Voluntary Pillar has been involved in the negotiation of national partnership deals. In 2000 the government published a White Paper *Supporting Voluntary Action* which sought to develop '...and make more explicit the participation of the Community and Voluntary sector in partnership and consultation mechanisms, within the overall constitutional and legal framework that governs public administration (Government of Ireland, 2000: 57). This sought to provide an enabling framework. However, Healy and Reynolds draw attention to the 'implications in structural and resource terms for social partners in the community and voluntary sector' (2002 81) and the changes they have had to make in their own organisations to fulfil their formalised role in a responsible way.

In addition to the formalised involvement of civil society in policy-making there is a significant voluntary involvement in sporting, social and charitable organisations. In 1998 it was estimated that one third of all Irish adults were involved in some form of voluntary activity (Ruddle and Mulvihill, 1999). However, O'Donoghue's (2001; also see O'Donoghue 2002) analysis of volunteering during the 1990's found a decrease in the proportion of the population volunteering (from 39% to 33%) and a doubling of the hours spent serving on committees (from 379 to 830). Such change may have implications for social capital.

Although the Irish political system is characterised as a clientilistic/personalist system it is also underpinned by a strong sense of civil society, a civil society that has emerged as both a partnership with government and a substitute for perceived failures of government. Recent reforms of local government have integrated local government and local development and facilitated the establishment of community fora to feed into the work of County Development Boards, thereby institutionalising the contribution of the voluntary and Community sector at local authority level. Europeanisation has further helped to reinforce Ireland's civic culture. The opportunities inherent in some EU programmes have given financial support and ensured legitimacy for local groups. The changing emphases in EU policy also supported the thrust of civic engagement in Ireland. EU anti-poverty programmes, for example, emphasised empowerment, participation and inclusion while the LEADER programme supported innovation and a territorial approach. Such themes were the mantra of Ireland's civic community. Furthermore, the positions articulated by organisations 'chimed in with aspects of European economic policy' (Larragy 2002: 17) such as the EU employment policy articulated in the mid 1990s. Thus developments within Ireland's civil society and the EU's policy arena were mutually reinforcing.

The existence of a strong civic culture, an active civil society and the highly developed patterns of voluntarism and civic engagement suggest significant social capital endowment. An issues paper developed by NESF (2002), for a social capital project, overviews levels, trends and international comparisons of key elements of social capital. With regard to inter-personal trust, levels in Ireland are average to above average – 36% compared with 30% in Great Britain and 55% in most Scandinavian countries (NESF, 2002: 16). The same document cites the European Values Survey finding with regard to trust in specific institutions and Ireland's level of trust in various types of institution was the highest of any country in 1999. However *Eurobarometer* data places Ireland further down the scale with Ireland ranked sixth of the 15 member states with regard to trust in four types of institutions (political parties, civil service, national government and national parliament).

The general assertions about Ireland's civic culture are echoed in the empirical data collected in the Mid-West. Actors involved in waste management policy agreed that a strong civil society is necessary and that, in general, trust is not deemed to be an issue within the system. However, the majority did not deem levels of citizen participation as satisfactory. They also saw power and influence concentrated at the centre but there was some differentiation between the answers from central level actors and subnational actors with central level actors generally seeing all groups as having considerable power.

Similarly, actors involved in the regional policy arena indicated a strong belief in the consensual approach to dealing with issues in the region and a view that a strong civil society is necessary. The issue of trust with regard to elected authorities was not a concern for interviewees. There was also conviction that citizens should be involved in the collective life of their communities and a strong belief that a philosophy of neighbourliness operates within the region. Nevertheless, levels of satisfaction with citizen participation varied, with the NGO sector expressing most dissatisfaction while many state actors were satisfied with the degree of citizen participation. There was universal dissatisfaction with the level of citizen involvement in the planning and implementation of regional development programmes – no interviewee considered the level of involvement as being satisfactory and only a small minority considered it more or less satisfactory.

## **2.4. Part III: Assessment of learning capacity**

### **2.4.1. Section 1: Outcome**

The process of Europeanisation has impacted significantly on administrative and policy practices in Ireland leading to widespread learning. It is, nevertheless, important to note that other factors contributed to learning. Such factors included radically changing economic situations which warranted learning to deal with a near-disaster in the 1980s and unequalled prosperity during the 1990s; changing social mores with Irish society moving from a conservative outlook at the time of EC accession to a more liberal, cosmopolitan outlook which has been fuelled by wider educational opportunities, internationalisation and increased affluence; a changing political culture which began to question the secretive, personalist approach which had been the norm; a changing administrative culture which reflected not only the obligations imposed by Brussels but also the global trends of new public management and the desire for openness, transparency and accountability.

The nature and pace of learning has been affected by the political and administrative cultures and structures, the level of institutional embeddedness of those structures, the system of institutional interactions, the procedures determining information and communication flows, the range of actors involved and their respective roles, the types of network which exist and the levels of social capital and civic engagement. The type of learning, which can be extrapolated from the Irish experience, includes attitudinal as well as actual learning as well as "learning by doing" and "learning by past successes and failures" (Garmise, 1995). The learning led to multiple outcomes – changed roles; the involvement of new actors; the creation of new networks, partnerships and coalitions of actors; the adoption of new ideas and approaches and some alteration in the distribution of power and resources. Among the tangible outcomes of this learning were new or extended partnerships, the widening of the role of NGOs in policy-making, increased involvement of the private sector, some reallocation of power and resources and the creation of new institutions.

The concept of partnership has become widely accepted as a mode of governance at all levels in Ireland. Initially, promulgated as a means of solving serious economic issues, the practice of partnership at national level has become firmly established as the accepted form of problem solving. The partnership approach has led to new forms of public advocacy - as Healy and Reynolds assert 'in place of the old forms of bargaining we now have analysis, dialogue and shared understanding' (2002: 49). Although the emergence of partnership at national level was not directly influenced by Europeanisation

the machinations of involvement in the EU policy process have reinforced the usefulness and appropriateness of the partnership approach. The partnership approach facilitated those involved to develop a shared understanding of issues and recognition of their mutual dependence. It also led to a change in the approach by government from the traditional centralised, *dirigiste* approach to one where it was willing to share some of its authority with the social partners. Initially focussed on the economic sphere, the partnership approach has spilled over into other policy areas. While the partnership approach has been enormously beneficial, tensions and reservations have arisen about the scope of partnership, the relationship of partnership to the representative democratic structures and allocative and sectoral issues.

If the emergence of partnership at national level cannot be attributed directly to the Europeanisation process, the same is not true at sub-national level. Adoption of partnership at local level was undoubtedly assisted and impelled by EU developments. Gradually, pressures from local community groups and associations coupled with pressure for change from Brussels and a slow changing of attitude by central government resulted in sustained, if still limited, local-led economic development (see OECD 1996). The 'bottom-up' approach has been adopted by many groups in Ireland - some community driven (Community Development Projects and Local Development groups), some motivated by the opportunity to avail of EU funding (LEADER and Local Development Programme), and others fostered by a change in the government's approach to development (Operational Programmes for Local, Urban and Rural Development, County Enterprise Boards and County Strategy Groups).

The partnerships have fostered co-operation and integration. They have contributed significantly to the level of development and have addressed problems which had previously been ignored or inadequately addressed by the centralised authorities and agencies. The synergy created within and between the groups has impelled a multi-dimensional approach to development. The local knowledge and understanding increases the effectiveness of interventions. However limitations to the partnership approach exist and concern exists about the prospects for continuity in view of the limited life-span of programmes which generated some local partnerships (OECD 1996; Varley & Curtin 2002; McDonagh 2001). Concerns have also been raised about the structures and representativeness of partnerships and their place in the democratic and institutional structures.

The EU programmes, which have facilitated the creation of local partnerships, have strengthened the role of NGOs and they have become involved in the policy process, generally at the implementation and planning stages. Issue specific NGOs have also

emerged both nationally and locally. National-level NGOs such as the ESRI and NESF play substantial roles in policy analysis and policy-making. The role of local or regional NGOs varies according to the issue. The research carried out in the Mid-West region found numerous NGO/independent environmental organisations in existence that in turn break down to (very) localised branches. These networks and groups attempt to monitor the full implementation of European environmental law as part of their objective to promote positive solutions to environmental problems. Another important NGO, the Waste Working Group, has contributed significantly to the waste management planning process by making comprehensive submissions to local authority plans for waste management. With regard to regional policy issues the research found a variation in the core-periphery positioning of some NGOs with similar functions, this probably reflects their varying regional profiles.

Similarly, the role of the private sector in policy formation and implementation is growing in Ireland. Fostered through the introduction of PPPs, the private sector tends to either be directly involved in the implementation of projects, or involved in the policy formation stage through a variety of representative organisations. Private sector participation, however, remains limited, and our interviews revealed, there is limited private participation in the regional policy arena in the Mid-West region, although it is growing in the waste management area.

#### **2.4.2. Section 2: Patterns of learning and adaptation**

As Laffan has asserted 'although the EU dimension has been in large measure grafted on to the processes and procedures of domestic policy-making, it has been a source of change and experimentation' (2000:138). Ireland is generally regarded as successful in adapting to Europeanisation. Among the conditions for success have been an enthusiasm for involvement; a willingness to innovate and experiment, evident from accession among local actors but emerging more incrementally at national level; the ability to turn obligation into opportunity, for example, the imposed regional structures are gradually being put to positive use and the requirements for evaluation procedures, wider consultation processes and multi-annual budgeting are now perceived as enviable facets of the Irish approach; a facility for networking and learning from systems and processes in other member states; a creative approach to exploiting the opportunities inherent in various EU programmes. The 'goodness of fit' between Ireland's socio-political needs and the EU's changing priorities whether economic, social or environmental has contributed to successful integration.

Initial failure may have resulted from the absence of a social base for political action prior to the late 1960s, the underdevelopment of political institutions, particularly at sub-national level and the "fossilising tendencies" of some traditional public actors. Lee (1984), for example, has criticised the lack of 'intellectual infrastructure' for dealing with Europe. The decision to regard Ireland as a single region for Structural Funding purposes contributed to the failure to develop effective regional structures. Until the mid-1990s Ireland's economic situation and limited resources led to a failure to implement measures in the environmental sphere, for example, which would have improved our compliance record.

Aside from the tangible benefits of CAP, cohesion policies and equality measures, the less perceptible benefits have included a 'psychological liberation' which led to the growth of Ireland's confidence as a player on the international stage. European added value was also very important for sub-national actors and partnerships, an assertion borne out by the SNA analysis. The accumulation of knowledge and strategies by actors at all levels has been tremendous. Civil servants, politicians, NGOs and local actors have all actively engaged in learning and applying the fruits of their learning to improving practices, policies and procedures.

However, institutional learning patterns at sub-national level in Ireland have been sporadic and uneven but learning has certainly taken place. Among the formal governmental institutions EU regional policy impacts seem to have been more indirect than explicit, while among NGO's the learning has been affected by the local context, the efficacy of networks and the calibre of local leaders. The SNA analysis suggests that some of these actors have done well, adapted and become more significant players, while others have been slow to change and seem to have lacked the capacity to take on new commitments. There is also a more general problem arising out of central-local relations, concerning the degree to which such learning enables local and regional actors to pursue and direct their own development, in a context where much still depends on finance from the national level. For example, while in the SNA analysis of the Mid-West region Shannon Development is identified as a critical player, the organisation's overall future is far from clear, and in some spheres its functions have been claimed by other national and regional organisations.

In the case of Ireland's environmental policy the process of adaptation and learning is ongoing, taking the form of administrative reform, changing roles and relationships between government regulators and business, reshaping of the way in which government defines and implements environmental quality and strengthening the role of civil society. The relationship between central and sub-national government has been subject to

change through the creation of the EPA and other institutional mechanisms such as the initiation of a regional approach to waste management. European policy has clearly driven up environmental standards in Ireland but the extent of regulation is putting increased strain on facilities, human and financial resources. There was consensus among interviewees that the impact of EU policy on knowledge and learning has been high in the context of developing an environmental policy in Ireland. There was also agreement that there had been an increase in public awareness of environmental issues and a significant amount of self-learning.

### **2.4.3. Section 3: Policy recommendations**

A number of policy recommendations may be considered when designing and implementing future European policies in the regional and environmental policy domains.

#### **General**

- Recognition of the importance of pre-existing structures, institutions and social capital, as well as the state of the economy, to the likely success of European policies and programmes. Such elements need to be carefully examined before embarking on policies that necessitate further institutional and policy change.
- The importance of strategic planning also needs to be noted. Ireland failed to adopt a strategic approach to planning in the 1994-99 NDP (Fitzpatrick Associates 2003: 2). Future planning exercises need to reflect genuine strategic priorities agreed by all the partners rather than pre-existing national spending plans. Monitoring Committees might also be given a role in strategic planning.
- The overall distribution of powers and responsibilities among national, regional and local actors is important in understanding who can do what, where and when. In the Irish case, there seems to be some overlap and duplication of responsibilities at the local and regional levels. Such a system appears somewhat inefficient and bureaucratic as well as creating ambiguity about the locus of responsibility. There is a need to rationalise structures and clarify responsibilities.
- There is a need to consider the lessons derived from good practice elsewhere, both in Ireland and other EU states, in respect to policy formation and implementation. Despite the existence of a national level EU structural funds unit, there is little evidence of formal repositories of knowledge where local and regional officials can acquire examples of good practice.

- Finally, a balance needs to be struck between ensuring good governance, including consultation, accountability, and openness, and ensuring programmes and projects are undertaken in an efficient manner. In the Irish case the latter now seem to be in place, but sometimes the processes seem to have been created more to satisfy formal requirements than to achieve better policy, whereas other procedures, such as those relating to public consultation and planning, appear to lead to unduly lengthy delays in implementing policy.

### **Regional Policy**

- At the national level, strong national institutions provide a professional level of administration that has underpinned Irish success in winning EU structural funding. However, the role of Regional Authorities and Regional Assemblies needs to be reinforced. These institutions need additional financial resources and personnel, as well as an elected element, if they are to develop as effective regional level actors.
- The Irish system of local and regional administration is complex, with some overlapping responsibilities and conflicts. The development of new structures at the county level, namely the county development boards, appears to be addressing and supporting a more coordinated approach. However, whether such intervention ensures a coordinated use of EU funds needs to be considered, as otherwise there is a risk of duplication and poor value for money spent. Fitzpatrick Associates note that "There is an issue in relation to the efficiency of the partnership process in Ireland. In relation to local development a number of partnership structures now co-exist including the Local Partnership Companies, County Enterprise Boards and Leader companies under more recent City/County Development Boards" (2003: 78).
- The introduction of multi-annual programming, the use of the partnership approach, and formal monitoring and evaluation, have had an ameliorative impact on public administration in Ireland. Such positive outcomes need to be maintained, enhanced and embedded in the country's institutional structures and practices.
- The growing role and importance of local and regional networks have also been highlighted, but there is still a need to foster, support and recognise the importance of such networks as part of the development process. It is noticeable that many of the participants still have limited experience of other states' experiences and there is a need for a greater exchange of experience. As the 1996 OECD report noted "...the Irish state has been better at allowing innovation than at learning from its protagonists about how to generalise local successes" (op. cit.:85).



- It is also important to involve NGOs and private actors at the earliest stages of policy design and implementation to ensure both their participation and their input into the process. In order to increase the involvement of the private sector in PPPs simplified contractual, procurement and public consultation procedures need to be introduced.

### **Environmental**

- The development and implementation of Irish waste management policy remains difficult, reflecting the nature of the problems, as well as a mismatch between objectives, institutional structures and resources. The Irish approach to 'regional' waste management planning needs to be evaluated and reviewed relative to the experience of other small EU states, as the current approach fails to adequately address local and regional waste management problems in Ireland.
- At the local and regional level, greater attention needs to be focussed on forming an integrated approach to waste management and this needs to be linked with other spatial policies for population growth, industrial placement, physical infrastructure and other socio-economic factors. All of this must be achieved within a legal framework established at the national level, but which seems to fit poorly with the situation on the ground in the local authority areas.
- As of 2003 many of the local authorities have now adopted regional waste managements plans, however, the fundamental issues that arise in the waste management arena such as priorities, strategies and resourcing have not been successfully resolved.
- The framework outlined in the Programme for Government 2002-2007 for strengthening of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms needs to be fully implemented.
- There also needs to be an improvement in the public consultation mechanisms, which unlike those in the regional domain, appear weak and lead only to limited consultation and are prone to 'hijacking' by particular interest groups claiming to represent the interests of the locality. There is a need to compare the Irish case to that of Northern Ireland, other EU states and to identify good practice that may be usefully put to work in the Irish context.
- There is considerable private interest in waste management and it appears to offer new business opportunities, but the level of bureaucracy and the overall uncertainty in the area acts as a brake on new developments.

- Waste management policy can also be seen as an issue of good governance and the extent to which policy meets the criteria of openness, responsiveness and accountability needs to be monitored.

In the waste management area there needs to be a stronger level of partnership not only between local and regional actors, but also vertically with the national-level government department and agencies, in order to actuate long-term policy solutions.

### 3. Chapter Four: Portugal

#### 3.1. Introduction

Portugal is a unitary State with two autonomous regions, the archipelagos of Madeira and Azores, corresponding to a total area of 92,141.5 km<sup>2</sup>. The resident population amounts to 10.2 millions, including 2.2% of immigrants. During the last three decades Portugal attained a very accelerated social and economical development. Nevertheless, it is yet the European Union (EU) country with the lowest Gross Domestic Income (GDI) per capita. This situation is originated by low levels of productivity, which are related to the dominant patterns of production and deficient educational and training qualifications. Briefly, Portuguese journey for modernity is not achieved (Machado e Costa, 1998).

Through the history the first politico-administrative consistent organisation concerning the present Portuguese territory, was built up by Romans that created the municipal system of local governance (Matoso, 1993). This system is considered as a structural factor of Portuguese nationality because municipalities had a stable historical existence.

Another important factor for the Portuguese nationality has been the stability of its mainland geographical area, as since 1297 the border lines didn't change. Moreover, it must be emphasized that since the recognition of the Portuguese Kingdom, in 1143, Portugal has been always an independent state.

At the end of the XIV century, the alliance between the Portuguese crown and the mercantile urban *bourgeoisie* allowed for the implementation of a maritime expansion policy. The result was the creation of a large maritime empire. The management of such an empire by a small country, which population didn't exceed one million of people, had four major issues, namely the early centralisation of political power, the externalisation of economic dynamics, the depopulation of the inland and the development of a civic miscegenation culture.

The independence of Brazil in 1822 was a severe coup on the Portuguese economy based on a colonial emporium. Nevertheless, colonial lobbies induced the constitutional monarchy to consider the building up of a new "Brazil" in Africa as a political priority (Serrão e Marques, 1998). Accordingly, Portugal was early engaged in the European colonial course for Africa, what involved very high costs in terms of either underdevelopment or social and political instability and so leading to the fall of the monarchy (1910) and later to the failure of the 1st Republic regime. This one was overthrown by a *coup d'état*, in 1926, which established the *Estado Novo*, a political

regime similar to the Italian fascism though less concerned by industrial development (Brandão, 2001).

After the Second World War, the *Estado Novo* faced several contestations either internal or external that induced a few changes. The most relevant changes were the adhesion to EFTA and consequently the opening to foreign investments, in 1957, and the support to economic groups engaged in the development of industries supported by raw materials imported from the Portuguese African colonies. These industries were essentially located in the vicinity of Lisbon.

However, the economic underdevelopment of the inland, the locking-up of social improvement and the colonial war led to a huge Portuguese emigration flow to European Community (EC) countries (Sousa Ferreira and Rato). The colonial war, which began in 1961, blocked any attempt of political liberalisation and finally led to the overthrowing of the regime, in 1974, allowing the settlement of democracy, the de-colonisation and later on, the adhesion to EC.

### **3.2. Part I: National and regional context of policy-making prior to accession**

#### **3.2.1. Section 1: National context of policy-making prior to accession/association**

The essential characteristics of the policy-making in Portugal, before the accession to the EC reflect the deep changes that took place in the country after the revolution of the 25<sup>th</sup> of April 1974 and the institution of the democratic regime. During the last period of the dictatorship, the relationships between Portuguese social and economic were strongly imbalanced, being characterised by the political prevalence of an elite of capital owners to the prejudice of workers' rights. This situation conditioned the economic and technologic pattern of production, which major consequence was the persistence of low productivity levels (Brandão de Brito, 1989).

The revolutionary process which took place between 1974 and 1975 brought about significant changes at all levels of collective life which culminated with the constitutional definition of a democratic state based on the rule of law and provided with adequate instruments for the functioning of a renewed social pact (Ferreira, 1993).

During the revolutionary process, forms of interests' organisation and socialisation arose supported by a strong civic participation, which quickly faded away. In Portugal, civil society is developed undercover of State and active citizenship has no roots. Once democracy was institutionalised and the radical discourse of political parties promoting

antagonistic ideologies was exhausted, civil society was once again faced up with its incapacity to find political solutions corresponding to the social internal relation of forces. Such incapacity enables us to understand why, in spite the fact that the patterns of interest intermediation evolved towards stability, the Portuguese political system was not, prior to the accession, a stable system (Barroso, 1983; Viegas, 1998).

Generally speaking, the structural reforms carried by the democratic State face up the weakness of civil society. The distance between the constitutional and the legal framework, defined in Lisbon by the dominant political elites, and the reality (law in books *versus* law in action), has been frequently very significant.

Thus, decentralisation appears, in such context, as an exemplary case. The Fundamental law of 1976 defines Portugal as an unitary state which includes two autonomous regions – the archipelagos of the Azores and Madeira – with their own institutions of self-government. According to the Constitution, the state must respect in its structure and activities the principle of subsidiarity, the autonomy of local authorities and the democratic decentralisation of public administration. These principles mean an absolute cut with the past, as historically Portugal is a centralised country in terms of the political process of decision and the centralised patterns of public life have been reinforced during the dictatorship.

The Fundamental law established three tiers of local government: the parishes, the municipalities and the administrative regions. Among these administrative structures, municipalities are the main level and have performed the highest continuity: they are the only form of local government with a stable historical existence and have a strong connection with the Portuguese own idea of nationality. The parishes have very narrow functions, scarce resources and limited technical and administrative capacity. As to the administrative regions, which only exist in the mainland, they were established in the Constitution to brought into being by law at a later date, which never occurred. Of course, the non-existence of administrative regions does not mean the non-existence of supra-municipal institutions. Several associations of municipalities emerged, a national association of municipalities was created and acts as an organized group of interests and formal and official pressure (Ruivo, 2000).

The reformulation of the local political system has thus been one of the major modernisation and decentralisation measures of the democratic state, which redefined its political legitimation forms, functional competencies and financial resources. But if decentralisation emerged as a key element for the political and institutional reorganisation, the truth is that, in the field, the deep dualities which divide the country –

coastal and inland areas, North and South, city and country -, as well as an unbalanced distribution of resources and incomes continued to favour a concentration of powers and civil servants, mainly in Lisbon.

The reform of Regional State administration with the creation in 1979 of the Regional Coordination Commissions in order to promote a coordinated strategy of deconcentration made no substantial changes regarding centralized and top-down policy-making procedures.

When Portugal accessed the EC, there was still no clear regional development policy (Lopes, 1987). It is interesting to note that the negotiation process for Portugal's access to the EC was exclusively undertaken by the State, which has never admitted the possibility for entrepreneurs or workers organisations to play an active role in the process. None of these entities, most of them in favour of the European option, had the institutional strength enough to impose its presence.

The European option has also been supported by the Catholic Church, which historically plays a key role in Portuguese society as it determines the major values along which the policy-making is implemented. Its close involvement in areas ranging from education to the business world has significantly influenced the course of the events after the democratic revolution.

The other major institution that is also an historical reference for the Portuguese society are the Armed Forces, which were protagonist of the democratic revolution as they had been of the dictatorship's maintenance. Its progressive subordination to the civil power legitimated through elections, made it no longer possible to talk about a military question when Portugal accessed.

In synthesis, considering the general situation of the country over this period, we can say that several key issues of the Welfare State, both regarding the distribution and the democratisation of the political system, went unsolved. The State kept its authoritarian characteristics in the policy-making area. Such characteristics have always existed with distinct forms throughout its history (Santos, 1988).

With the access to the European Community, the rules of the game had to change in the political and administrative arena. Nevertheless cultural changes occur more slowly although they are certainly the most important regarding the effectiveness of governance.

### 3.2.2. Section 2: Regional context

The Lisbon and Tagus Valley Region (LTVR) was selected for illustrating the Portuguese regional development policy. This region includes one of the two only Portuguese metropolitan areas, the Lisbon Metropolitan Area (LMA) that was chosen for the environmental study case centred on the urban waste management policy.

LMA involves the Greater Lisbon (city of Lisbon and its metropolitan periphery) and the Setúbal Peninsula at the Tagus left-bank. LMA accounts for 75% of the population living in the LTVR, which concentrates 1/3 of Portugal's resident population and presents the highest density of population, namely 278 inhabitants by Km<sup>2</sup>, which is 2.6 times the national average mean.

LTVR is the wealthiest Portuguese region as its Gross Value Added (GVA) per capita is 30% over the national average, though the coastal sub-regions have higher levels of development than the inland. LTVR is also the Portuguese region with the highest educational profile, presenting the lowest percentage of illiteracy (5,7%), the highest percentages of population with secondary and high school levels (22 and 15%, respectively) and comprising most of the university establishments as well as Research & Development (R&D) institutions. Moreover, with regard to healthcare, LTVR clearly outstands in relation to the national average. Meanwhile, the growth of wealth has been followed by the increase of social disparities.

Concerning economic activities, the sector of services is the most important contributing to 70% of the regional GAV and employment. Most of the service activities are located in the LMA. It's also in the LMA that are concentrated the most important enterprises of the secondary sector, which represents 28% of the regional GAV and employment. Regarding manufacturing LTVR withholds a distinguish national position as for firms with higher technological added value. Agriculture presents the lowest share concerning both GAV and employment in LTVR. However, LTVR is the region which contribution to the Portuguese agricultural GAV is the highest, i.e. 29%.

Actually, agriculture is a profitable activity in Tagus Valley and West sub regions as it is based on high added value products, mainly fish, fruits and vegetables, wine and breeding. Briefly, LTVR is an interesting case study due to its high national relative performance and its diversity and disparities either in socio-economic, geo-economic and institutional terms. Besides the rapid development of LTVR, in the late past, produced serious problems for social, economic and territorial cohesion.

Two other reasons justified the LTVR selection, namely the fact that this region was one of the two main beneficiaries of EU funds and because it includes the Portuguese metropolitan area that was selected for the study on the urban waste management policy (LMA).

This last selection is justified by the two following major reasons: the high level of urban waste production and the solutions implemented for its management. In terms of urban waste LMA accounts for 20% of the total mainland production, although it concerns only 3,39% of the total mainland area. Moreover LMA was pioneer in order to implement integrated waste management systems at technical and institutional levels.

### **3.2.3. Section 3: SNA implementation**

#### **Regional policy**

For the regional policy case study, the research selected the Lisbon and Tagus Valley region, and 23 actors were selected as important for the study. However, due to lack of interest in cooperating with the project, some institutions declined the invitation to participate, and only 13 actors were interviewed. Three of them are agricultural development associations and they have been interviewed later in the research. These three Associations did not produce relevant quantitative information for the Social Network Analysis (SNA) and the corresponding data was therefore not included in the subsequent analysis. However, they produced very important information in terms of *apport* for the qualitative analysis. The distribution of actors which interviews were considered for the SNA in terms of administrative and institutional sector, as well as according to their roles is as follows:



Regional Level	Institutional Sector	Actor	Role
National	Public	Ministry of Planning	Definition and national coordination of regional policies
		Regional Development Directorate-General	Responsible for drafting and executing regional development policy, for coordinating and monitoring implementation of community funded projects
Regional	Public	Regional Coordination Commission – Lisbon and Tagus Valley	Responsible for execution of relational planning and development policies
		Lezíria do Tejo Municipality Association	Coordinate common interests of municipalities in the region
		Lisbon Metropolitan Area (authority)	Coordinate transversal issues to the metropolitan area
	Private	Leiria Region Business Association	Associations of private companies; defends their associates interests
		Portalegre Region Business Association	
Local	Public	Oeiras municipality	Management of local public interests
		Ourém municipality	
		Abrantes municipality	

### **Centrality**

The research identified a 105,56% value for the network centrality, representing a relatively concentrated network. In terms of actors' centrality *per se*, the most central actors are the Ministry of Planning, the Regional Development Directorate-General and the Lisbon and Tagus Valley Coordination Commission (which is integrated in the Ministry of Planning). This was expectable, since the first two are the only national level actors in the network and the last one is a regional «extension» of the central government with a wider geographical and influential range. This is in fact the main reason for the diminished importance of regional public actors in terms of policy making, since they are integrated in their correspondent central level Ministry, and having to follow top-down directives and guidelines.

These results demonstrate the lack of empowerment in regional and sub-regional structures, mainly linked to the non-existence of formal administrative regions in the

country, and thus concentrating policy-making knowledge and power in central and national level actors.

### **Network density**

In terms of density, the research determined a value of 1.27, which represents a relatively high degree of density. Nevertheless, this density is differentiated amongst national level actors (with high density) and local actors (with lower density), indicating underdeveloped communication flows within sub-national actors, and maintaining knowledge in the national level structures. Even the density levels between public national and regional level actors is somewhat biased and has to be analysed with some attention, due to their institutional and hierarchical relation. As stressed before, communication flows are obviously intense between the national level ministry and its regional branches.

However, at the local level, civic organisations like the Agricultural Development Associations tend to have strong links with other local actors in their geographical area of influence, namely with local Non-Governmental Associations (NGO), Municipalities and Associations of Municipalities.

### **Structural equivalence**

Four distinct groups of actors were found, but the only homogeneous one (due to similarities in relationship characteristics) is the first, which includes national level actors (Ministry of Planning and the Regional Development Directorate-General) and the regional actor with responsibilities in regional policy (Lisbon and Tagus Valley Coordination Commission). This configuration shows the most central actors in the network as having the same typology of relationships.

Central Government and its bodies played a major role in the institutional networks established among and between regional and local actors. The network analysis shows that relationships between Municipalities do not exist outside Municipality Associations. Briefly, the process of adaptation and learning was determined by Central Government policy in that field.

The lack of administrative regions was a determining aspect for the prevalence of national actors as the most important policy-making structures and power holders in the domain of regional development.

### **Environmental policy**

For the environmental policy case study, the research selected the Lisbon Metropolitan area and 40 actors were selected as important for the research. As in the case of Regional policy, and due to the same reasons, only sixteen actors were in effect interviewed, leaving out of the study mainly civil organizations like Trade Unions and some private companies. Their distribution in terms of administrative and institutional sector, as well as their roles is as follows:

Regional Level	Institutional Sector	Actor	Role	
National	Public	Ministry of Environment	Definition of national environment policy (in collaboration with the Environment Directorate)	
		Waste Institute	Regulating, planning, licensing and monitoring at the national level, as well as coordinating the management operations; collaborates in the inspection and controlling with the Environment Inspection, and promotes R&D at the national level	
		Water and Waste Regulation Institute	Regulating, inspecting and controlling the municipal/multimunicipal waste management systems	
	Private	National Environmental Sector Business Association	Association of private companies and local associations in the environmental area; defends their associates interests	
	NGOs	Quercus NGO	Environmental NGO, which has a waste management studies group. Promotes debate and produces reports on the subject	
		GEOTA	Environmental NGO, with emphasis on land-use issues	
		Environmental Engineering College	Contributes to regulating the environmental engineers activity and scope of responsibility	
		Environmental Engineers Association	Represents the environmental engineer's professional class, defends their interests	
	Regional	Public	Lisbon Metropolitan Area	Coordinate transversal issues to the metropolitan area
			AMTRES	Waste management systems; run by public management
Private		AMARSUL		
Local	Public	Almada Municipality	Management of local public interests	
		Lisboa Municipality		
		Oeiras Municipality		
	Privado	IPODEC	Local waste management company	
		TRIU		

### **Centrality**

The research identified a 81.9% value for the network centrality, which represents a moderately concentrated network. In terms of actors' centrality *per se*, the most central actors are the Ministry of Environment and the Waste Institute, followed by Quercus NGO. Despite a growing strength in local authorities, concerning waste management since this activity is their responsibility, in terms of policy-making the Ministry and the Waste Institute are in effect the most important actors.

### **Network density**

In terms of density, the research determined a value of 1.15, which represents a relatively high degree of density, although less density is found amongst local actors, whereas higher density levels are usually associated with national actors. This depicts a situation where central actors tend to work more closely and to collaborate more than actors of regional and local levels, where there is still a lack of ties between neighbouring municipalities, or between local businesses.

### **Structural equivalence**

Four distinct groups of actors were found, and two are very significant for the research. The first is composed by national actors whose activities are mainly related to contribute to the knowledge of environmental issues and to provide assessments and orientations. The second group is composed by regional actors with strong responsibilities for the operational management of waste.

The analysis carried out demonstrates the centrality of both the Ministry of Environment and the Waste Institute in terms of influence on policy-making procedures and structures. Local actors still tend to be placed in the periphery of the network, indicating weak inter-municipal connections and relationships. We should point out that nevertheless, in terms of waste management, these connections exist between some municipalities that have implemented shared management operators.

The institutional network is very formal and mainly influenced by operational imperatives. Relationships between actors are essentially institutional, revealing to some degree a lack of informality and spontaneous character. Nevertheless, some changes are noted. At the national level, Geota and mainly Quercus NGOs are assuming an influential position as public opinion makers.

### **3.3. Part II: Europeanisation processes (objectives and implementation)**

#### **3.3.1. Section 1: Adaptational pressures (types, components and mechanisms)**

With regard to this point we can identify either negative or positive pressures. Most of the pressures that embarrassed the implementation of an effective regional development policy are originated by the fact that, historically, Portugal is a centralised state. More precisely, till 1975 Portugal was a large empire whose dominant pole was centralised in Lisbon, the capital. These characteristics were emphasised by the industrial policy of *Estado Novo*, in particular during the period 1953-73, that led to the settlement of large plants concentrated all around Lisbon, including the south bank of river Tagus (Brandão de Brito, 1989). The results were a macro-cephalic economic structure, rulers' neglecting attitude concerning regional development and, subsequently, huge regional disparities. The unbalanced geographic distribution of resources and the policy options of leadership led to a development strategy based on sectorial activity, even after the 1974 April Revolution (Silva, 1986).

Consequently, when Portugal joined the European Community there was neither tradition nor experience for applying a regional development policy. A positive point to be emphasised was the creation of local power, i.e. elected local bodies that have legal competencies to rule Municipalities, by the 1976 Portuguese Fundamental law. The pressures of Municipalities on central government were and are highly important for the promotion of local development. However local interests are not always in accordance with regional development priorities defined by central government.

The influence of EU regional policy was the other more important positive pressure on the development of the Portuguese regional policy, namely the 1988 EU reforms that imposed the allocation of Structural Funds on a regional basis and, later on, the 1993 2nd Delors Package that obliged central Portuguese government to undertake regional development policies oriented for reducing regional disparities. It should be noted that the importance of such a positive influence is tightly correlated to the rules imposed for the accession to the EU funds (Pires, 1998).

As a matter of fact, in Portugal, the reform of structural Funds of 1988 led to a complex and wide-ranging planning process undertaken by the State Department of Planning and Regional Development that was under tutelage of the Ministry of Planning and Territorial Administration. The main output of this process was the elaboration of the Major Planning Options for 1989-93, which incorporated strategic guidelines for the Regional Development Plan.

Considering that one of the major critiques addressed to the implementation of Community Support Framework (CSF) I was the weakness of civic participation, including the entrepreneurial class, the elaboration of the Portuguese Regional Development Plan, for the period covered by the CSF II, was preceded by a consultative process. Business Associations, Trade Unions, Local Civil Associations and experts on political, economic and financial issues participated in the consultative process, which was directed by the Ministry of Planning. The EU guidelines established for the intervention of the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Funds for the period 1994-99 reinforced the Portuguese planning process dedicated to reduce internal regional unbalances. In particular, it was attributed responsibility to the Association of Municipal Authorities for managing investment considered to be relevant for regional development. However the civil participation regarding EU funds management continued to be merely consultative.

Concerning environmental policy, the accession to the European Community in 1986 acted as the major pressure force for adaptation, in terms of legislation and institutional building, considered as essential requirements for implementing EU environmental standards, in Portugal. However municipalities played also an important role, as pressure actors on the central government, aiming at the improvement of public sewerage and water supply systems. This municipal attitude is easily understood by the fact that the percentage of the Portuguese population supplied by public sewerage system in 1980 and 1994 was of 2.3 and 25.9, respectively.

The extreme lack of laws addressing environmental issues in Portugal, until the accession to EEC, led to a broad transposition of EU directives to national law. Really, it wasn't until 1987 that the first Environmental Law in principal was established. In 1995, the government approved the first National Plan for Environment, which inherited the concerns and issues from the EU directives and policies. Since then, several EU directives were transposed, mainly concerning waste management issues. Briefly, the whole legislative framework for Waste Management was developed due to EU convergence pressures.

In order to control and manage environmental issues, new institutions had to be created. The history of the institutional structures devoted to environmental issues in Portugal is closely related to EC accession and the previous negotiation phase. One year after accession, the first institutional structure in the field of environment was created, the National Institute for Environment, although having a consulting character. However, it was only in 1990 that the Ministry of Environment was established, aiming at the resolution of the raising needs in policy-making and adaptation required by the EU environmental framework.

As a matter of fact, the distance that set Portugal apart from EU environmental standards constituted by itself a pressure to improve new policy decision-making that implied a global survey in order to identify major problems, the inclusion of environment in the Portuguese planning guidelines, the articulation between the Ministries of Environment and Planning, as well as the promotion of partnerships between central and local public authorities, municipalities and private actors. EU financial contributions in general and CSF funds more specifically act as a decisive push to achieve these improvement, namely because the Ministry of Environment tried to take advantage of EU funds in order to reduce the Portuguese environmental gap.

However, it must be noted that the Portuguese environmental policy faced some negative pressures with regard to the implementation of waste management systems. This was mostly felt at the municipal level, due to the lack of information and the fear of population dissatisfaction by the local leaders. The same kind of resistance was felt in the private sector, where industrial companies and farming undertakings resisted (and still resist) to the improvement of environmental solutions, invoking the low levels of productivity and business performance. This behaviour finds safe ground in the lack of efficient inspection and laws on environmental responsibility.

### **3.3.2. Section 2: Resistance to change**

In Portugal, the resistance to change in the field of regional development policy is well illustrated by the failure of all the process related to the creation and the institutionalisation of Administrative Regions, in the mainland.

The 1976 Portuguese Fundamental Law established the creation of Administrative Regions and their attributions, namely with regard to public services management, co-ordination and support to Municipal activities. However the Fundamental Law left out to the parliament (Assembly of the Portuguese Republic) the resolution of the territorial division for the Administrative Regions as well as the establishment of their legal competencies. Both of them were established by a parliamentary law, in 1991. Nevertheless, according to the article 256 of the Fundamental Law, parliamentary laws concerning that kind of matter have to be submitted to a national referendum.

The referendum, which was hold in 1998, had two questions. The first question concerned the creation of regions, in general, and the second one inquired about peoples' agreement on the creation of a region in their particular dwelling area. The national abstention was about 52% and 60% of the expressed votes were against the creation the administrative regions for both questions (STAPE, 2001).



The referendum result was highly relevant because it was preceded by a vibrant national debate that concerned not only political parties and leader opinion makers but also civic movements just created and organised for this proposal. The influence of these civic movements is illustrated by the fact that their legalisation was subordinated to the presentation of 5.000 civilian signatures in conformity to the Portuguese law. During the electoral campaign 25 civic movements of that kind were able to intervene in the debate. However it must be said that many of these civic movements were organised by political parties aiming at increasing their intervention specially through TV and radio electoral programs (Freire and Baun, 2001).

The triumph of the «no» was due to the convergence of several interests, namely the government itself, political parties and municipalities for fearing to loose power at local level but also business lobbies whose field of action was linked to the regional Co-ordination Commissions' activity. As a matter of fact, according to the parliamentary law, the territorial division that was proposed for the administrative regions was not based on the intervention areas of the Regional Co-ordination Commissions. This resolution, which was due to political covenants among parties represented in the Parliament aiming at the preservation of local influences, produced a large disagreement even among adherents to the idea of regionalisation.

The public rejection of administrative regions can be also considered as a consequence of the priorities adopted to promote national development and which outcome was the reinforcement of the trends conducting to the concentration of economic resources and capacities in the most important regions and cities, namely in the Lisbon and Tagus Valley region, the only one that has reached the EU Gross Domestic Product per capita. Nevertheless the referendum results for this region were similar to those achieved at national level.

Actually, in terms of resources, and in spite of EU strategies for regional distribution of Funds, the present administrative configuration leads to a polarised vision of development strategies. The most important regions and cities tend to be benefited in detriment of remote, smaller and interior ones, and regional asymmetries are hardly counteracted.

In this context the high abstention rate to the Referendum is quite understandable though it can be considered also as an expressive indicator concerning people's indifference for regional policy issues. This indifference illustrates the general lack of civic participation concerning political engagement for the improvement of life quality, which is due to the lasting high hierarchical gap between the Portuguese elite and the common

people (Cabral, 1997). More precisely the traditional paternalist system continues to frame the relationship between citizens and the political power and this is a major determinative feature of the Portuguese resistance to change.

Moreover, in the case of the environmental policy the fact that it has just begun after Portugal adhesion to EU is an additional cause for justifying the resistance to change from decision-making institutions and actors as well as common people in order to introduce new concerns and issues into the traditional procedures and processes.

The most evident resistance is felt with the persistence of egoist behaviours at individual and corporative level, regarding environmental issues and concerns. This is true for citizens who do not participate in simple ecological tasks at home, but also for economic activities that resist to improve methods to avoid pollution, using the argumentation that such an improvement implies costly investments incompatible with the low levels of Portuguese productivity.

However, the most dramatic resistance to change, due to its impact on both regional and environmental policies, concerns municipal authorities whenever they resist to accept the responsibility of embracing environmental concerns and issues into hands. This situation is worsened by the financial pressures on municipalities, which often lead the local politicians to decisions that do not take the environmental concerns into account. The most visible example is the arbitrary and somewhat chaotic management of land use and urban development, since the licensing of lands is the most effective and quick solution to obtain financial resources to face increasing demands.

Moreover, in some cases, Municipal authorities have been engaged in active resistance against the implementation of environment issues decided by central government. The most mediatic example concerned the co-incineration process for industrial waste that the government intended and was not able to be established in three different municipalities, because of local resistance.

Despite this initial widespread feeling, and due to the transposition of responsibilities in the environmental field, municipalities are now more engaged in solving waste management and environmental problems, by creating new kinds of technical and management structures and solutions and by developing partnerships with public and private actors.

Finally, it must be noted that the continuing absence of administrative regions is by itself a hampering element for change, due to two major and interrelated consequences. First of all, the absence of administrative regions difficulties the implementation of policies

able to take into consideration both the territorial planning and the improvement of transversal/integrated issues (Figueiredo and al. 2003) and so the traditional sectoral approach is reinforced.

### **3.3.3. Section 3: Evolution of central state policy-making structures**

The evolution of central state policy-making structures was oriented in order to accomplish EU determinations concerning access to Structural Funds and to promote the effectiveness of their application for improving regional and environmental development.

Accordingly structural policy-making changes concerned the following five main vectors of action:

- 1) Adaptation of the central government organic structure to the requirements of regional development and environmental issues.
- 2) Creation of de-concentrated administrative bodies dedicated to promote regional development and environmental policy.
- 3) Implementation of specific bodies in charge of co-ordinating the access, the management and the control of EU funds, either at national or local levels.
- 4) Implementation of specific units, which include representatives of the private sector and of Municipalities for the management of EU programs.
- 5) Implementation of advisory bodies, which include experts and representatives of the civil society.

The Minister of Planning is the top leader for regional planning and development policy as well as for the overall co-ordination of the CSF. The resolution of these tasks influenced the organisational structure of the Ministry of Planning, which comprises specialised central departments and de-concentrated regional services, i.e., the five Regional Co-ordination Commissions. These ones are charged to accomplish regional planning and regional development policies established by central government. Regional Co-ordination Commissions play also a major role as mediators between Central Government and regional actors, including Municipalities (Pires, 1998).

Definition, planning and improvement of environmental policy is in charge of the Ministry of Environment. The institutional structure of this Ministry comprises also specialised bodies with responsibilities at national level. Some of these bodies are devoted to very specific issues, as it is the case for the Waste Institute and the Water and Waste Institute (Pássaro, 2002). The former is responsible for implementing the national policy and for

formulating sectorial plans regarding waste management, the latter has the charge of regulating and monitoring waste management systems. At regional level there are five de-concentrated Environmental Directorates which responsibility concerns regulation, planning, monitoring, inspecting, controlling and the promotion of R&D activities in the five plan regions corresponding to the five mainland Regional Co-ordination Commissions.

The sectorial emphasis of Portuguese development strategy caused some difficulties for the co-ordination of the overall process regarding EU funds. In order to overcome such difficulties the Portuguese central government set up a co-ordinating system for the access, the management and the control of EU funds. Three levels of governance compose this system (European Commission, 2002):

- 1) The top level belongs to the central government, which major decision-making procedures are described as follows.

The overall control of EU funds is in charge of the Ministry of Finance; the Ministry of Planning is politically responsible for the correct execution of EU funds and for the preparation and implementation of regional planning. Environmental planning is in charge of the Ministry of Environment. However the transversal character of environmental issues, in terms of policy-making, draws the Ministry of Environment to share or require co-operation with other government departments, like the Ministry of Planning (for managing protected areas), the Ministry of Agriculture (land-use issues) or the Ministry of Fishery and Sea (coastal protected areas). It must be emphasised that the Ministry of Planning, in co-operation with the Ministries of Environment and Agriculture, is responsible for the preparation and the approval of the Regional Physical Plans (PROTS) that define at regional level the criteria concerning the spatial organisation of activities and the use of land. The Regional Physical Plans establish the general framework and policy guidance for the preparation of the Municipal Director Plans that are the main spatial planning tools aiming at structuring the municipal territory for development control purposes. The preparation of these Municipal Plans is closely scrutinised by Central government that is also responsible for its final and formal approval.

- 2) The middle tier of governance is performed by the Comissões de Acompanhamento (accompanying commissions).

These Commissions aims at the co-ordination of management, monitoring, control and assess concerning structural community interventions, in Portugal.

Consequently the middle tier of governance is integrated by the national agencies responsible for EU funds, general inspectors of the ministries involved in funds' application, the regional governments of Azores and Madeira Islands (the only two autonomous Portuguese regions) as well as the Regional Co-ordination Commissions. This middle tier is chaired by the Director-General of Regional Department that is embodied into the State Department of Planning and Regional Development.

- 3) At the bottom level there are management units that are in charge of operational programs.

In the case of sectoral programs each management unit is presided over by the concerned ministerial department. This is the case for the environmental operational interventions whose management unit is presided by the Environmental Directorate. In the case of regional programs the management units are presided over by Regional Governments (Azores and Madeira) or by Regional Co-ordination Commissions. Municipal authorities are incorporated in management units concerning regional programs applied in their territory. Regional business associations are also included in the management units of regional programs. Follow-up units were also set up for each operational measure.

The complexity of the governmental structure, that was created in order to adjust the options for both regional and sectorial developments, contributed to the implementation of an advisory process that is especially important for the elaboration of Development Plans. The main unofficial participants of this process are renowned politicians and businessmen as well as experts. External consultants frequently play a major role in plan preparation.

Moreover, the contribution of national experts is assured through their interventions in the CSF observatory, designed as an independent think tank and critic unit related to both the definition of priorities and the follow-up of the EU application funds.

Concerning environmental issues the involvement of experts and of civil society was achieved with the creation of National Councils, namely the National Council for Water and the National Council for Environment and Sustainable Development, which integrated experts from several social partners and representatives of the broader community.

Besides, the Ministry of Environment works in close cooperation with municipalities in several fields, namely the Ministry of Environment and Municipalities share responsibility

regarding the management of protected areas. The Ministry of Environment is also involved (through the Regional Directorates) in the preparation of Local Development Plans, in close cooperation with the municipalities.

#### **3.3.4. Section 4: Non-state actors**

We can sum up the involvement of these groups of actors in regional and environmental policy-making by three statements:

- 1) Experts' involvement is mainly directed by and embodied into central-government policy-making.
- 2) NGO's involvement is very limited.
- 3) The involvement of Regional business associations have been increasing and developing.

The need to integrate the reforms of Structural Funds led the Portuguese central government to a complex and wide planning process from 1988 on (Vasconcelos e Seabra, 2000). Additionally, in accordance with the Fundamental law, plan preparation procedures require a public consultation. So, step-by-step an advisory process was extended to non-governmental actors.

The involvement of experts in the policy-making process is mainly assured by their participation in consulting councils which are formal structures used to provide political proposals on the planning process, including environmental issues. Moreover national specialists of acknowledge expertise in the main areas of the CSF sphere of action are integrated in the CSF Observatory. Independent experts are also engaged in the evaluation of Operational Programs.

At national level four institutions have to be put in relief with regard to the advisory process. They are the Economic and Social Council, the Employment and Vocational Training Observatory, the National Council for Environment and Sustainable Development and the National Council for Water.

The Economic and Social Council (CES) is an advisory body aiming at the promotion of social and economic actors participation in the governmental decision-making procedures related to development policy, in general, and regional policy, in particular. The CES is composed by 64 members representing the Parliament, seeing that the CES President is elected by the Parliamentary deputies, the government, trade-unions, business associations, the co-operative sector, the high councils of science and technology and

liberal professions, Autonomous Regions, the entrepreneurial public sector, non-governmental institutions dedicated to social solidarity, environmental and consumers' protection, equality of gender promotion, as well as family associations, agricultural and rural associations, representatives of financial, insurance and tourism sectors, Universities and national specialists of acknowledge expertise.

Employment and Vocational Training Observatory (OEFP) is also an advisory council dedicated to analyse problems and to propose solutions related to employment and training. This observatory is composed by governmental officials of the Ministries of education, employment and social security, representatives of private management confederations in the field of agriculture, trade and industry as well as representatives of trade unions. At regional level the activity of the observatory is co-ordinated by the regional delegations of the Institute for Employment and Vocational Training (IEFP), which is under tutelage of the Ministry of employment and social security.

Concerning environmental issues, the National Council for Environment and Sustainable Development is the most relevant in terms of *apport* to the policy-making process, and represents the main fora for dialogue and discussion involving several Ministries and Regional institutions, as well as NGOs' representatives, local communities, industry, trade and agriculture, socio-professional associations, trade unions and universities.

In the case of Municipal Development Plans and Urban Development Plans, it happens that they are ordered to external consultants or they are prepared by mix teams of external consultants and local officials. However planning officials carry out the final responsibility to analyse and produce recommendations for approving or refusing the proposals which have to be submitted to local authorities (European Commission, 2000).

Trade unions are represented in the most important national advisory institutions. However as their activity is sectoral based they are not concerned by either regional development or environmental policy.

Specific NGO oriented for regional development don't exist and it's why they are neither represented in the Economic and Social Council nor considered by the legislation that regulates Portuguese NGO for co-operation and development (Barroco, 2000). Nevertheless, a positive point to be noted concerns the springing up of several local development associations, all over the Portuguese rural areas, which were stimulated by the LEADER programme. These local development associations have strengthened their area-based approach by expanding the intervention to other areas through the diversification of programmes and so by integrating them in a more collective field of action.

Environmental NGO participation is more expressive with regard to the formal advisory process, although there is only one very active NGO for addressing environmental questions whenever a policy is designed. Actually most of the other environmental NGOs have a hazardous existence. The same situation occurs with professional associations devoted to environmental issues.

On the contrary, the role of Regional Business Associations has been increasing since they were incorporated into the management units for regional programs. The SNA demonstrated that the only significant non-governmental actors are these business associations. Nevertheless dialogue and negotiation among these actors and regional/local authorities are highly influenced by Central Government priorities and strategy for regional development.

In particular, the implementation of environmental policy developed entrepreneurial awareness for opportunities of business in that field, and consequently, new companies dedicated to waste management appear (Levy et al., 2002). Moreover, entrepreneurial associations based at national, regional or sub-regional areas improved their participation in environmental activities in order to take benefits from investments, mainly for the construction of environmental infra-structures. The activities of all these kind of firms are submitted to the control of the Ministry of Environment, through its appropriate organic structures.

Concerning waste management, private sector has had an increasingly important role, since the opening of that area to the private market and entrepreneurship. Its involvement is nonetheless more oriented towards the implementation of procedures than to policy-making. It's also in the waste management area that can be observed the emergence of new private companies, as well as public-private partnerships regarding the municipal field of action.

Really, municipalities are responsible for the implementation of urban solid waste management systems and structures, but the high investment costs to implement them led municipalities to undertake new forms of partnership that can include private companies.

Otherwise public authorities require private companies for providing specialised waste management service, such as recycling very specific waste or managing the whole life cycle of specific materials. Briefly, though still very new, the waste market in Portugal is growing which foresees an increasing involvement of the private sector.



### **3.3.5. Section 5: Civic culture**

The patterns of civic culture in modern democratic societies are mainly characterised by the levels of people's participation in specific NGO, people's concerning about environmental issues aiming at the promotion of a sustainable development, improvement of social capital and the awareness about the quality of life according to human rights principles. Such a pattern implies that people are able to perform citizenship rights and duties (Cruz, 2003) not only by voting but also by participating actively in civic and political associations.

Otherwise, modern democratic societies present also an increasing propensity to individualism and egoist behaviours due to the defamiliarisation (socialisation) of social services undertaken by the welfare state, the isolation way of life in the metropolis, the spread of fordist work relationships and the exacerbation of competitiveness. Nevertheless, the welfare state crises and the heavy consequences of egoist behaviours on citizens' quality of life are improving the understanding about the importance of a more participative civic culture (Laville, 2000).

The patterns and levels of this kind of citizens' participation depend on many factors, among which the most relevant are the following: historical background (Rocha, 1991); supply and equity with regard to material and cognitive resources; equality of gender. The two latter conditions affect the access to education and culture and, subsequently, also the degree of citizens' exposition to intelligence as well as the gap between them and the political power. As a matter of fact the more is negative the citizens' evaluation about social equity, the less is their propensity to join associations devoted to public participation (Cabral, 1997).

According to these concepts the analysis of the civic culture, in Portugal, points to a dual situation which is characterised by the coexistence of traditional civic cultural patterns with the emergence of more modern ones, including the spread of individualism. Such a situation is quite understandable if one takes into consideration the wide and rapid transformations endured by the Portuguese society during the last 30 years.

Really during this period of time Portugal has ceased to be a colonial dictatorship and has built up a democratic regime which Fundamental law institutionalised the rights of a wide citizenship (Marshall & Bottomore, 1992), including the right to enjoy quality of life and a sustainable environment, the welfare state and created the democratic local power. Moreover Portugal undertook a process of opening to the external world that led to the integration into the EU.

However the Portuguese political regime continues to be highly centralised, the Portuguese civic participation is still very limited and the civil society presents a low level of autonomy with regard to the State. In socio-economic terms this dualistic situation is characterised by indicators inherent to either developed or less developed countries, namely high standards of consumption and peripheral patterns of production with low productivity, an increasing propensity to electoral abstention, a high female working participation rate and a powerless equality of gender, a low fertility rate and an increasing rate of the elder population (Machado e Costa, 1998; Cabral 1997).

The structural dimensions of the Portuguese civic culture lay down in the historical past related to an authoritarian and paternalist regime. During Salazar's regime any civic kind of association has to be sanctioned by the political police. Consequently, at that time, the few civic or political associations were more or less clandestine (Cruz, 1982). Such a reality radicalised civic participation in political terms and increased the gap between the common people and the politicians. Additionally it must be emphasised the consequences of the low levels of education and training as well as the lack of social equity concerning the access to material and cognitive resources since that these factors influence the gap between citizens and political power.

In the seventies a comparative study on this kind of gap (Hofstede, 1994) aiming at the quantification of the *power distance*, i.e. the citizens' acceptance of an unequal distribution of political power, the corresponding Portuguese value was 63 against to 38 in Holland and 18 in Denmark while Guatemala got 94 and Mexico 81 (the extreme limits of indicator were zero and 100, the former when people's disagree absolutely with an unequal distribution of political power and the latter when they agree completely). A more recent study confirmed that the Portuguese indicator on *power distance* didn't change and identified the unequal level of accessing to educational resources as being the most relevant factor for the explanation of that situation (Cabral, 1997).

Actually and according to this study the Portuguese young people belonging to the most educated and wealthiest social strata present the highest cognitive mobilisation regarding the understanding of policy, the highest exposition to the mass media as well as the perspective concerning their ability of influencing the future of Portugal. The importance of the inequality of gender on those matters was another conclusion of the study, as Portuguese women are less aware on political and civic participation and presented a higher power distance than Portuguese man. For instance the breakdown by sex of people engaged in cultural and sportive associations is about 2/3 for men and 1/3 for women (INE, 1995).

The SNA both for regional development and environmental policy confirmed the main features of the Portuguese civic culture stated above. Although civil society and social capital in general are regarded as indispensable for social and economical development and effective policy implementation, in practical terms civic culture and participation as well as informal networks addressing community life issues and public matters are still very diminished in Portugal. In fact, the State remains as the main and more influential actor in contributing to general and sustainable development and the politician class tends to be regarded as having a top-down structure and being distant from the real concerns of the population.

Moreover, civic organizations are not a very common structure to be found in the policy-making arena. The most visible exception is found in cases related to environmental issues, though NGO participation tended to be more reactive than pro-active. Such an approach corresponds to the increasing people's concerns about environment (Correia, 1995).

### **3.4. Part III: Assessment of learning capacity**

#### **3.4.1. Section 1: Outcome**

The implementation of either Portuguese regional development or environmental policy is closely related to the EC accession and the following integration process. In the concrete, when Portugal joined the EC there was no experience on both these policies and the institutional administrative structure was not properly adapted to improve them.

Responsibilities deriving from EU structural funds rules induced changes in policy making processes. The evolution of central state policy-making was oriented in order to accomplish EU determinations for accessing to structural funds and to improve the effectiveness of their application.

For both policies institutional adaptation began by establishing specific ministries which organic structure includes de-concentrated bodies. However the lack of regional administrative regions and the sectorial emphasis of Portuguese development strategy caused some difficulties for the co-ordination of the overall process regarding EU funds.

In order to overcome such difficulties the Portuguese central government set up a three tier co-ordinating governance system for accessing, managing and controlling EU funds.

The top level of this system is in charge of central government and its major actor is the Ministry of Planning that is responsible for regional development planning. Therefore the improvement of planning activity was a major outcome of the adaptational process, in

particular regarding Regional Physical Plans as they establish criteria for territorial organisation, use of land and general policy guidance for Municipal planning.

The middle tier of governance is performed by accompanying commissions, which composition varies according to the specificity of EU structural interventions. At the bottom level there are management units in charge of operational programmes, which are integrated by municipalities and regional business associations.

Another important feature of the Portuguese governance improvement was the implementation of an advisory process that was extended to non-governmental actors, namely renowned politicians, businessmen and experts. The involvement of experts in the policy-making process is mainly assured by their participation in consulting councils aiming at providing political and technical proposals on the planning process, including environmental issues. Moreover the most important national civil organisations are represented in advisory boards dedicated to promote the participation of social, economic and environmental actors in the governmental decision-making procedures related to the implementation of a sustainable development policy.

At regional level, the role of Regional Co-ordination Commissions must be highlighted as they are charged to accomplish regional planning and policy established by central government. Besides they overhead management units for EU regional programmes and they play also a major role as mediators between central government and regional actors, including municipalities.

Municipalities are the major actors at local level. However as their territorial area is quite small and the resolution of main local problems implies solutions concerning several adjoining municipalities, the Portuguese law approves the constitution of Municipal Associations aiming at solving specific and common objectives, including the management of EU funds allocated to regional development. Moreover the resolution of municipal common problems led to the constitution of inter-municipal companies whose stakeholders are some times exclusively public and another times are also private.

This kind of partnership is more frequent in the environmental issues, namely for urban waste management due to legal competencies of municipalities in that field. However it must be pointed the major role of the Ministry of Environment with regard to the emergence of these partnerships. In fact, Governmental approval of the Strategic Sectorial Plan for the management of Solid Urban Waste (PERSU) and its implementation, since 1997, made clear the need of improving co-ordination and rationalisation of municipal waste management systems in order to increase their

effectiveness. This co-ordination was stimulated by the combined action of specific bodies of the Ministry of Environment and the National Association of Municipalities.

The case of environment is therefore one where the europeanization process demanded a huge effort in learning and adapting the policy-making structures and procedures and we can say that it was generally successful.

Two main reasons contributed to such a success, namely the transversal characteristic of environmental issues in terms of policy-making and the tenacity of the Minister of Environment and its closer staff in order to overcome resistance's to change. The first characteristic drew up the Ministry of Environment to share responsibilities and co-operation with other governmental departments such as the Ministry of Planning (for managing protected areas), the Ministry of Agriculture (land-use issues), the Ministry of Fishery and Sea (coastal protected areas). As for resistance's to change the Minister of Environment engaged a fora for dialogue with civil society and Municipalities.

In particular, dialogue and negotiation between the Ministry of Environment and Municipalities opened the possibility of co-operation regarding the management of protected areas and local development planning. Besides dialogue with civil society contributed to develop social capital for environmental issues. As a matter of fact and in spite of the general weakness of Portuguese civic participation, concerns about environmental issues are much more evident than to regional development policy. Consequently environmental NGO, though very few, play a role for the implementation of environmental polity.

On the contrary, such an outcome was not reached in the field of regional development policy, excepting the very specific case of local development associations dedicated to rural development issues, which were stimulated by the implementation of LEADER. Otherwise, within the scope of regional development the only non-state relevant actors are Regional Business Associations, which role has been increasing since they were incorporated into management units for regional programs. Moreover, entrepreneurial associations based at national, regional or sub-regional areas have been improving their participation in environmental activities in order to take profit from investments on environmental infra-structures and on waste management, more particularly.

As stated above, waste management policy, namely the implementation of PERSU, stimulated the emergence of new kind of private companies and public-private partnerships. However these new actors are much more oriented towards the implementation of procedures than to policy-making.

Finally and on behalf of environmental policy it must be pointed the building up of the Portuguese legal system, by transposing all the EU Directives, as an important outcome because its application will induce major changes in policy-making and in fora for dialogue.

#### **3.4.2. Section 2: Patterns of learning and adaptation**

In that field, Portuguese results are quite contradictory for both regional development and environmental policies. On the positive side of the adaptation process it must be emphasized changes concerning central state formal structures, the creation of new public institutions for the resolution of specific problems, the implementation of coordinating procedures for accessing, managing, monitoring and controlling the application of EU funds, the institutionalization of an advisory process that includes the main public and civil organizations as well as experts, the improvement of planning and statistics on economic, social and environmental issues and of evaluating proceedings. Moreover, all European Directives on environment have been transposed to Portuguese law, as legal adaptation in the environmental area was an imperative for Portugal's convergence to EU standards.

Changes concerning central state formal structures were oriented in order to implement regional development policy, in the first place, and environmental policy, in the second place. Consequently, the new structure of the two concerned ministries includes de-concentrated departments devoted to take in consideration regional issues. In terms of geographic de-concentration the Ministry of Planning policy is in charge of the five Regional Coordination Commissions, corresponding to NUT II. With regard to environmental de-concentration policy there is also five Regional Environmental Directorates, which field of geographical action is exactly the same for Regional Coordination Commissions. This pattern of adaptation, which was clearly influenced by EU structural funds requirements, highly influenced the emergence of a pattern of learning concerning co-ordination at multi-level in order to achieve a sustainable regional development policy.

Within this scope, the preparation and implementation of Regional and Municipal Development plans played a major role in all the learning process. As a matter of fact, a new cycle of planning has been emerging progressively as step-by-step the traditional regulatory approach was substituted by a more comprehensive and participative methodology.

Namely, at local level, formal and informal means of co-operation and association have been created, promoting more flexibility and openness in the field of Municipalities' action

and its interface with de-concentrated bodies of the Ministries of Planning and Environment as well as with business affairs. This approach highlighted the importance of social networks in order to develop mechanisms of consensus.

Another relevant improvement of the learning capacity is evaluation. The EU imposition of evaluating the impact of structural funds had significant effects on the national evaluation mechanisms. Moreover these effects were not limited to the development of suitable structures and procedures in order to satisfy EU demands as, in general, evaluation became a visible part of the public and administrative agenda at all levels. An evaluation culture started to be created although only in the very early stage.

However the effectiveness of new governance practices was prejudiced by the fact that Portuguese development strategy continued to be based on a sectorial approach and the implementation of good practices of multi-level governance are embarrassed by the lack of regional decentralized administrative structures. Consequently the centralized traditional political system continues to be predominant with regard to policy-making decisions and so it contributes to the maintenance of a top-down and centre-periphery approach to policy-making and relationships between actors.

Nevertheless it must be pointed that such a reality is also a result of two major deficits in the Portuguese society, namely low patterns of qualification concerning human resources and more particularly in the case of administrative local and regional bodies and the very weak civil participation for resolving community life issues and public affairs.

### **3.4.3. Section 3: Policy recommendations**

The following policy recommendations are based on opinions expressed by interviewed actors and on outcomes of Portuguese study case, including the analysis concerning patterns of adaptation and learning.

#### **National level**

As it was stressed before, the two major causes that embarrasses the adaptation and learning of an effective multi-level governance system are the weak civic empowerment and the maintenance of a top-down and centre – periphery approach to policy-making. Both of these characteristics, which are very interrelated, are expressed through other patterns of failure: resistance to change, diminished social capital, low human resources qualification, insufficient participation of experts in policy-making decisions, some problems concerning co-ordination of governmental policies. So the subsequent policy recommendations are structured according to the two major causes that are the source of failures in the adaptational and learning process.

## 1) Civic empowerment

The lack of civil empowerment has its roots in Portuguese civic culture, deficiencies in the access to education and culture, peoples' misinformation about decision-making policy and about the main political issues concerning namely regional development and environment. Accordingly it will be necessary to improve policies in the following areas:

- **Education and Human resources qualification:** The educational system should be more aware about sustainable development issues and about improvement of citizenship. Moreover education should be more oriented to the integration of terminal scholarship in labour market specially in scientific and technical areas dealing with regional and environmental problems.

Investments on Human resources qualification have to be evaluated in order to adapt them to the new requirements presented above, including those resulting from EU Portuguese integration.

- **Information to citizenship:** Programs oriented to the information of citizens have to be improved. These programs should elucidate about the meaning of sustained development process and its relationship with wealth and safe environment as well as about decision-making processes to implement them and the importance of citizens' participation to reach success. Moreover, public services dedicated to implement citizens' sites should be created in order to inform and to promote civil participation for defining, implementing and controlling sustained development policies.
- **Mobilization of scientific community:** Scientific community must be mobilized and supported, namely by the improvement of R&D activities oriented to the evaluation of regional and environmental policies and, more specifically, the impact of each policy on the other.

This mobilization should also include the improvement of data base statistics on indicators related to regional development as well as on different sorts of waste and other relevant information for the implementation of an integrated waste management strategy. The lack of quantitative information on these issues is still predominant and represents an enormous setback for the design and implementation of new approaches and models for addressing them correctly.

## 2) Multi-level decision-making

The lack of an effective multi-level decision-making is related to the centralization of political and institutional power, poor social capital even between municipalities,



insufficient capacity of municipalities and business for using properly EU funds. Consequently, concerning these features our recommendations are the following:

- **Creation of administrative institutions at regional level** (namely administrative regions at the NUTS II level) in order to plan and to implement sustainable development policies more integrated, more efficient and more efficacious. In particular these administrative regions should be concerned about territorial planning, transports, management of hydraulic resources, waste management and nature preservation.
- **Rethinking and rebuilding de-concentrated administrative structure at central level** in order to increase efficiency regarding the implementation of regional development policies, in general, and to improve a better co-ordination of sectorial or operational programs, in particular.

In this field it's important to think about the effectiveness of the advisory councils as the high number of memberships that integrate them raises difficulties to their performance.

- **Strengthening managerial partnerships** amongst Central Government, Administrative Regional Institutions, Municipalities and private actors (companies and ONGs); in this field of action must be given a particular attention to hydraulic and waste management issues where the private entrepreneurship can have a relevant added-value in terms of flexibility, processes, managing skills and financial resources.
- **Implementing new and innovative solutions** regarding co-operation between central, regional and local actors. Once again, in this case, policy for urban waste should be seen as a good example for promoting this co-operation by enforcing policies and management practices based on energetic, organic and recycling valorization. The investment in traditional forms of solutions (namely, landfilling sites) has proven to be overwhelmed by the growing production of waste, since their long-term life expectancy was shortened to almost half, and new sites have to be build to give a response to new waste generation.
- **Improvement of the polluter-payer principle** and enforcement of public institutions that have authority for inspecting, controlling and regulating waste management activities. This enforcement must be integrated in a wide policy concerning the empowerment of people and business class.

## EU policy-makers

Concerning EU policy and taking into consideration both its main objectives and difficulties observed in Portuguese society either to understand and to achieve them, it must be emphasised the relative backwardness of Portugal compared to most of the other EU countries and the insufficient acknowledge of Portuguese citizens about EU issues and more particularly about EU structural fund rules. Consequently EU policy makers have to give a special attention to the following subjects:

- **Reinforcement of regional institutions** through the application of the subsidiarity rule and according to the principle "Strong Regions, a Strong Europe". In this field it has to be considered networks of European cities and their organizations as preferential partners for the definition and the implementation of regional and environmental policies.
- **Improving technological support** to European countries and, in particular, reducing the delay to answer to specific questions about environmental problems.
- **Development of R&D activities** inside and amongst European countries related to sustained regional development, integrating environmental problems and social cohesion.
- **Implementation of actions dedicated to the re-qualification of human resources** in the useful areas for socio-economic development and environment.
- **Organization of campaigns of information** about EU policies and, in particular for the case of environment, against wastefulness and in favor of waste management in order to mobilize European citizens for the search of a sustained model of development.
- **Promote programs financed by European funds more focalized on social problems** in relation to environmental issues, such as exclusion, slums and urban degradation.

## 4. Chapter Five: Hungary

### 4.1. Introduction

Multi-level governance is a relatively new method of policy-making in Hungary, which has received a great impetus with the systemic change in 1989-1990, with the possibility of returning to the principles of democracy and market economy. The process of European integration has set into motion several Europeanization processes, characteristically one for each of the main policy areas, and horizontal processes as well. The emergence of multi-level governance is defined here as the gradual involvement of institutions of all administrative tiers and all sectors into policy-making, and the creation of the suitable framework for this involvement (*Bache, 1998*). In Hungary it can be regarded as a horizontal process, shaping the interactions and decision-making mechanisms of all main policy areas, evolving with special features in each of them. In particular regional policy and environmental policy have demonstrated many undisputable but policy-area-specific but signs of this development, and are suitable for demonstrating the advancement of solutions of multi-level governance.

The style of governance continues to be strongly influenced by inherited structures and traditions of political culture, the longevity of certain structures of existing institutional arrangement, the inherent inactivity of the civil society and the existing structural weaknesses of the economy. After 1990 a political pendulum between parties of the moderate left and of the moderate right has evolved in Hungary, and no incumbent government has managed to win two consecutive general elections. One of the explanations for the phenomenon of the so-called „punishing democracy” is that the significant socio-economic transitions produce on each occasion new losers, who simply put the blame on the government in power. The repeated changes of government are also produced, of course, by changes in party preferences, a high proportion of those who vote do so only on emotional grounds (*Ágh-Kurtán, 1995, Ágh-Ilonszki 1996*). For this reason the development of political culture and style has been motivated by growing competition, and in a time of harsh political climate, loaded with recurrent conflicts, the country was denied of longer periods of consequent and conscious institution-building.

This is the political background of the ongoing transformation of the model and practice of territorial power, the appearance of the regions, the shaping of the territorial decision-making networks, and also of the evolution of contemporary environment protection policies and environmental management. Both investigated policy areas are heavily affected by the decentralisation and adaptation requirements, arising from the legal obligations and financial motivations related to the accession to the European Union.

## **4.2. Part I: National and regional context of policy-making prior to accession**

### **4.2.1. Section 1: National context of policy-making prior to accession/association**

The traditional Hungarian governmental model can be characterised by centralisation, a style of long-term institutional behaviour often rationalised by the moderate size of the country and reinforced by decades of Soviet style socialism. The legal, institutional and financial pillars of centralisation have been shaken by the systemic change of 1989-1990, with the restoration of parliamentarism and local democracy. However, the political and geographical centres have soon regained their weight in numerous aspects of policy-making and decision making; this applies not so much to the government as a collective decision-making organ, but rather to its line ministries, which have gradually re-centralised for themselves various tools of governmental power such as strong influences on the processes of regulation, resource distribution, and institution maintenance.

However, the re-centralisation processes had to come to terms with those significant changes, which have been introduced right after the systemic change in the Hungarian public administration system on the territorial level, which have occurred in political, structural and functional terms as well.

The model of self-governance endowed the local policy with an extremely wide autonomy. However, the administrative autonomy is not at all accompanied by an economic independence. The number of municipal local governmental legal entities has been increased in the spirit of democracy and autonomy, and the number of local decision-making units was doubled: more than 3.000 local governments replaced the former 1.600 local councils.

From the very beginning the government - respectively the line ministries - have aimed at establishing their own „bridge-head“ positions parallel with the local governments in order to capture the most possible from the public tasks and resources. In order to fulfil this tendency, some 40 different types of de-concentrated organs were established on the county- and regional tiers in various policy areas, e.g. in the administration of labour, construction, education, environment protection, consumer protection and agriculture. This development has often contradicted to the principle of local governmental dominance aimed at by the political transition.

Another very important change was the decreasing importance *of the county* as the medium level of the territorial public administration. (Hungary consists of 19 counties

plus the capital Budapest.) Since 1990 the "county-debate" has been going on: which should be the territorial tiers of Hungarian public administration, shall the counties be replaced with the micro-regions or with regions bigger than counties? (*Horváth, Gy, 1995*) These debates were based upon no professional but rather political basis. The county debate has created instability and did not produce any future concept, thus it has hindered the concentration of power at the meso-tier. The shaping of the regional institutional system and an analysis of the actions of the participants also highlight the fact that, without regional cohesion or regional tradition, the identity-building of regions is a difficult process full of contradictions in which the participants' involvement in co-operation can be secured only with the help of artificial means (*Pálné Kovács, 2000*). Various governments have announced several times the reform of the territorial administration, the strengthening of the medium level, the decrease of the number of de-concentrated administrative units and decentralisation, but without much success. (*Report on the Regions 2001*). The ambitious administrative reform announced by the newly elected government in 2002 is still in its preparatory phase.

To sum it up, the development of the Hungarian state is spectacular, as regards its constitutional foundations and democratic rules, but the tradition of centralisation is still alive, mostly because of the uncertain positions of the medium level. The model of local governance proved to be successful, yet it is incomplete regarding the distribution of resources and the lack of viable long-term concept about the governance on the medium level.

The legal regulation of regional policy in 1996 brought about significant changes in the territorial decision-making structure. The objectives of the Act on regional development and physical planning in 1996 involved the necessity of the decentralisation of public administration and a more flexible management of regional policy, establishing partnership with the actors of the social and private sectors. Although the legislator realised the advantages of decentralisation, it remained reluctant to share its competencies in regional policy with the county self-governments. Therefore the legislator introduced a special institution parallel with the public administration: the four-level system of development councils.

The composition of the development councils show tripartite or corporate character, it is varying in the different tiers (national, regional, county and micro-regional).

- At micro-regional level the municipalities have a right to create associations for development issues, and these associations can participate in the county councils.

- County development councils consist of: a representative of the county assembly, of the cities with county rank, representatives of micro-regional associations, representatives of employers (chambers) and the employees (trade unions), and finally the representative of the ministry responsible for regional policy. The development councils are equipped with far more power and competencies than the directly elected county assemblies that decide upon the development concept of the county and are entitled to distribute state subsidies within an application system.
- Regions. The National Regional Development Concept of Hungary, passed by the Parliament at the spring of 1998, defined the number and borders of the NUTS 2 regions. The act on regional development and physical planning made it obligatory to establish regional development councils from 1999.
- At national level the National Regional Development Council was established with representatives of regional councils, ministries, the capital city, the national associations of local governments, the economic chambers and the employees. The council had no decision-making competence; it was only an advisory organ for the minister responsible for regional policy.

The newly enacted institutional system of regional development councils has had a significant effect on the whole political and interest representation system in Hungary by aiming to harmonize the hierarchical tiers of administration with the civil sector and the economy (*Pálné, Kovács Ilona 2001, a*). The paradox in Hungarian regional development policy lies in the centralisation of resource allocation. The proportion of funds serving regional development goals and provided by the state is extremely small when compared to the funds handled by individual line ministries. Only an insignificant percentage (8-10%) of all national development funds was decentralised, also, the ratio of state funding aimed specifically at regional equalisation is extremely low (5-6%). This limits to a large extent the possibilities of the regional decision-making organs.

*Environment protection.* Immediately before the systemic change and ever since the institutions of environment protection has undergone a deep reorganisation. The Hungarian environment- and nature protection policy belongs to a ministerial level direction only since April 1988. It was with that date, that an Environment Protection and Water Management Ministry was established by unifying the earlier National Office for Environment- and Nature Protection, and the National Water Office. The following 15 years has produced a veritable migration of the environmental issues among various line ministries, whereby the protection of the environment was coupled respectively with transport and communication issues, construction, regional development, national

monument issues and water management issues. However, the de-concentrated organs of the Ministry, the 12 regional Environmental Protection Agencies have been continuously developed.

With the proceeding of the EU integration process demands on sub-national structures have been intensified. While the formulation of strategy and regulations has remained the responsibility of the centre, various tasks and responsibilities - such as implementation, consultation, legitimisation and co-financing - have been shifted to sub-national level, to local governments, moreover to regional and local state administrations. The capacity of these administrations is limited, both in terms of their resources and expertise.

Similarly to other policy fields, in environment protection also various fora have been created where local, county and regional communities, central agencies, moreover representatives of economic agents and NGOs are able to participate in the decision-making and interest reconciliation process. Thus, the National Council for Environment Protection is an advisory body to the Government, bringing together several authorities on environment, to promote and enhance environmental policy and trying to achieve integration of environment in other policies. Economic interest groups and civil organisations intensively participate in the rule making process, whereby EU integration serves as the framework for argumentation but is often taken as a pretext to enforce vested interests and to deviate investments from their optimal schedule and efficient allocation.

Environmental policies and regulations were continuously and in detail harmonised with EU legislation during the last decade. An "Act on the General Rules of Environment Protection" was accepted in 1995. A National Environmental Protection Program was elaborated and legislated by the Parliament in 1997 (*NEPP 1997*). The Environmental Protection chapter of the National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis Communautaire (NPAA, 2001) has determined the relevant targets; deadlines concerning legal harmonisation, institution building and implementation needs, and addressed costs and financial resources. By 2002 the country has adopted most of the EU's environmental regulations and norms. Environmental policies are largely based on the use of regulatory and economic instruments, and have been accompanied by sizeable environmental investments, co-financed by the EU in its PHARE and ISPA programs. Inadequate enforcement of environmental regulations and slow development of the institutional system of environment protection is a major concern in Hungary. Implementation problems arise due to lack of resources, lack of information and weak civic consciousness.

#### **4.2.2. Section 2: Regional context**

For both of the investigated policy areas a case study region was selected in order to investigate and to demonstrate the evolution of multi-level governance and its consequences in terms of network building among stakeholder organizations. The Region Southern Transdanubia was selected for illustrating the respective developments in regional policies, and the Region Central Hungary for demonstrating the evolution of networks in environmental policies.

##### **Regional policy**

*Southern Transdanubia* is considered a region of medium size, representing 15.2% of the total territory of the country. 975 000 people live in this region; this gives the lowest population density of the entire country. The region has numerous small villages, which is a dominant and characteristic feature of this part of the country. The population can be characterised by the low number of live births (9.7‰), high mortality rate (13.9‰) and relatively advanced ageing. The number of population is decreasing. Unemployment rates do not differ significantly from the national data. A dramatic decline in the number of jobs took place in mining, which had very severe negative impacts. The region is rich in natural resources and geographic assets. There are considerable mineral resources and also thermal and medicinal waters. Despite all this, the economic performance of the region is below the national average. Various sectors of technical infrastructure are at different levels of development; in particular transport infrastructure in Southern Transdanubia is amongst the worst of all regions, which can basically be explained by the lack of motorways.

Although Southern Transdanubia is one of the less developed regions in Hungary, it has a relatively rich experience in the development of regional policy. It was the first region in Hungary to create voluntarily the institutions of co-operation at regional level in 1992, and has been in close relation with European regional policy as a pilot region supported by Phare. The experience and connections acquired by the experts participating in regional development thus seemed suitable for the successful implementation of the survey. The evolution of the regional institutional system and the analysis of the actions of the interviewed stakeholders have revealed that, without regional cohesion or tradition, the identity building of regions is a difficult process.



## SWOT analysis of the Region Southern Transdanubia

Strengths	Weaknesses
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Openness to the south, "southern gateway" role</li> <li>- Developed regional centre, diversified regional connections; Pécs is an institutional centre for research activity</li> <li>- Varied, rich landscape, sub-Mediterranean climate</li> <li>- Variety of nationalities; foreign language skills; lively cross-border relations</li> <li>- Developed higher education infrastructure</li> <li>- Strong cultural and historical heritage</li> <li>- 40% of national electricity generation takes place in the region</li> <li>- Basic conditions exist for competitive agriculture</li> <li>- Viniculture, national role in quality grape production</li> <li>- High ratio of forested lands</li> <li>- Thermal and medicinal springs, rapidly developing tourism industry, with a wide variety of tourism products</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Relatively large distance from the main European development axes, peripheral location within the country and weak transport situation, bordered by rivers and other waters</li> <li>- Declining population</li> <li>- Extremely large percentage of inactive income earners (pensioners) and a large number of small villages</li> <li>- Depressed micro- regions</li> <li>- A low percentage of students participating in technical and IT higher education</li> <li>- Reclamation of mining areas not yet completed</li> <li>- Foreign investment has not been attracted into the region, in proportion to its qualities</li> <li>- Environmental problems in certain parts of the region</li> </ul>
Opportunities	Threats
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Ability to participate more intensively in European economic and social processes</li> <li>- Development of the agricultural structure</li> <li>- Extension of services relying on higher education</li> <li>- Development of complex tourism services and products</li> <li>- Large companies and economic development form the basis for an industrial development strategy</li> <li>- Potential for co-operation with Slovenia and Croatia</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Unless transport improves, the region will not be able to participate in the international division of labour</li> <li>- Polarisation of agriculture will result in loss of international competitiveness</li> <li>- Small villages will be deserted</li> <li>- Lack of funding for the elimination of environmental damage</li> <li>- Renewal of the Yugoslav conflict</li> </ul>

### Environmental policy

*The Region Central Hungary* is the smallest among the seven Hungarian regions, but it has the biggest population among the regions. It consists of the capital city Budapest and the surrounding Pest County. The situation of the region is determined by its central position, the relatively highly developed infrastructure, and by the dominance of the capital and its agglomeration. The region contributes two-fifth to the Hungarian GDP,

concentrating 40% of all active economic organisations in the country. The importance of financial services and real estate development are constantly growing, enhancing the dominance of service sector within economic structure of the region. The region is one of Central Europe's focal points in terms of attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI). There are considerable differences inside the region: while in Budapest the per capita GDP produced is double of national, and 89% of EU GDP, in the surrounding Pest County per capita GDP is only 78% of the national average. Budapest concentrates branches of production with high added value, like electronics, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, confection, food, and printing industry. Pest County is the site of traditional types of industry such as oil refinement, production of electronic machines and tools, food procession, and textile industry.

Since the 1960s Budapest as the economic and administrative centre of the country has deeply influenced the migration flows of Hungary. The working places created in the capital have attracted many people formerly working in the agrarian sectors of the countryside. The agglomeration of the capital is characterized by the spontaneous creation of several "sleeping settlements", whose population commutes daily into the working places of the capital. In the region the number of the unemployed has been decreasing for years, and unemployment rate is less than the country's average. There has been a shift in employment in the last decade from the production sector to service sector.

The case study region suffers from various environmental problems (*ERM, 2001*). Three-quarter of the waste water of Budapest flows without filtering and cleaning into the Danube, the green surface of the capital is quickly diminishing, existing communal landfills do not correspond to the requirements of safe disposal. In the capital Budapest the quantity of the municipal solid waste collected in the framework of public service is approximately 4 million cubic metres (*Environmental Management Inst. 2000*). During the 90's the population of the capital has decreased by ten percent and this has diminished the quantity of municipal waste. Organised waste collection covers almost hundred percent of the capital. The single waste incineration work of Hungary operates here, and processes 60% of all collected municipal solid waste of the city. At the beginning at the 90s there were still 4 landfills on the territory of the capital, all of which have been filled up and closed. For the disposal of the rest of the municipal waste of Budapest the landfills of the surrounding Pest County are used. On the other hand, the surrounding Pest County produces yearly 1.7 million cubic metres of municipal solid waste, which has increased during the 90s. Organised waste collection has been dynamically developing in the County. The region is characterised by a continuous

practice of uncontrolled dumping of wastes into illegal landfills (*Belconsulting et al. 2001*).

### SWOT Analysis of the Region Central Hungary

Strengths	Weaknesses
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Low level of unemployment (Budapest and its Agglomeration)</li> <li>- High economic activity (Budapest and its Agglomeration)</li> <li>- Qualified, skilled labour force (Budapest)</li> <li>- High concentration of FDI (Budapest and its Agglomeration)</li> <li>- Concentration of headquarters of multinational companies (Budapest)</li> <li>- Concentration of business service activities (Budapest)</li> <li>- Continuous outmigration of industrial sector (Pest County)</li> <li>- Ample supply of industrial parks and real estates (Pest County)</li> <li>- Infrastructure of quality tourism (Budapest)</li> <li>- Concentration of cultural economy (Budapest and its Agglomeration)</li> <li>- Infrastructure of education and training is given (Budapest)</li> <li>- High concentration of research institutions and universities (Budapest)</li> <li>- Scientific park (Budapest)</li> <li>- Concentration of healthcare institutions (Budapest)</li> <li>- Concentration of cultural institutions (Budapest)</li> <li>- Developed communication infrastructure (Budapest and its Agglomeration)</li> <li>- Attractive built environment (Budapest and its Agglomeration)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Spatial system is centralised, transversal connections of sub-centres are weak (Region)</li> <li>- Territorially uneven economic development (Region)</li> <li>- Dual economy (Region)</li> <li>- Out-of-date production factors in agriculture (Pest County)</li> <li>- Weak supply of tourism and cultural events in (Pest County); leisure facilities are underdeveloped (Pest County)</li> <li>- Weak regional marketing (Region)</li> <li>- Unclear distribution of competencies between the capital, its districts and the settlements of the Agglomeration (Budapest and its Agglomeration)</li> <li>- Uneven level of infrastructure provisions and services (Region)</li> <li>- Weak connections between the universities and industrial R&amp;D, as well as between education and the business sector (Region)</li> <li>- Increasing social and income difference (dual society) (Region)</li> <li>- Territorially concentrated social problems (Region)</li> <li>- Missing programs for the enhancement of living conditions of the Roma minority (Region)</li> <li>- Unsatisfactory level of social and healthcare infrastructure (Region)</li> <li>- Permanent lack of capacity in the primary road system (Agglomeration)</li> <li>- Low level of sewage and waste-water treatment (Region)</li> <li>- Complex and severe pollution, due the metropolitan position (Agglomeration)</li> <li>- Communal waste treatment unsolved (Region)</li> <li>- Decreasing green areas (Region)</li> <li>- Building stock is in bad conditions (Budapest)</li> <li>- Unregulated and wasteful land-use Agglomeration</li> </ul>

Opportunities	Threats
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Permanent and great internal market (Region)</li> <li>- Turntable role in transport (Region)</li> <li>- Transfer role between Western and South-Eastern-Europe (Budapest)</li> <li>- Favourable natural and territorial conditions (Region)</li> <li>- Unused alternative energy resources (Pest County)</li> <li>- Legal safeguards for regional actors for the protection of the environment (Region)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Economic needs of municipalities are stronger than environmental considerations (Region)</li> <li>- Low level of environmental awareness (Region)</li> <li>- The ability of agriculture to keep people in rural areas is decreasing (Pest County)</li> </ul>

*Source: Assessments of the authors based on Strategy Plan CHR (2001).*

#### **4.2.3. Section 3: SNA implementation**

In each of the two investigated policy areas, i.e. in the respective case study regions more than 30 structured interviews were made with public, private and non-governmental organizations in order to reveal the features of the networks of relationships relevant to regional policy, and respectively to environmental policy. Empirical results regarding the strength, duration and formal/informal characteristics of the ties developed between the investigated organizations were analysed quantitatively with the help of a standard software (Ucinet 6.0) of Social Network Analysis (SNA). The inputs of the computation were symmetrical matrices showing the existence and strength of ties among the stakeholders.<sup>21</sup>

*In the area of regional policy* (case study region: Southern Transdanubia) on the whole, the network has a strongly public character.

- The *density* of network is moderate: out of 100 possible connections only 40 are existent. Although NGOs and the private sector are part of the network, they are unable to play a central role. Actors within the same counties have stronger connections with each other than with those in other counties. Ties of middle tier (regional or county level) regional development organizations are dense with national and local institutional actors. Ties of local governments with neighbouring local governments are very dense.

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<sup>21</sup> The two lists of interviewed actors appear in the Appendix.

- The *centralization level* of the network of regional policy was 56% in case of the regional policy case study region County-level- and the regional level development agencies have obtained the most centralized position. The Southern Transdanubian Regional Development Council and the Southern Transdanubian Regional Development Agency have achieved by far the highest centrality. This can be interpreted by the nature of resource distribution, which is characterised by means of policy decisions, of regulation and of the tender system - all of them having a strongly centralised nature. Here the sphere of action of local actors is strictly limited.
- *Hierarchical clustering* procedures in regional policy have shown that actors at the national tier constitute a separate "clique", having a significantly different set of relations than any other interviewed actors. Partnership organisations and the elected local authority organs at regional and county level have strong integrating roles in regional policy. Actors within the same counties have stronger connections with each other than with those in other counties.

*In the domain of environment policy* (case study region: Central Hungary) many stakeholders were chosen from the public and also from the private sectors, and a certain number of NGOs were also interviewed. All of them are organizations actively participating in the physical, commercial and administrative processes of waste management of the case study region.

- The density of the resulting network was somewhat moderate: merely 30 of the possible 100 ties exist. Ties of environment protection authorities with all other actors are very dense.
- The centralization level in this network was 61%. Stakeholders with the highest indices of centrality are to be found among public sector institutions, publicly and joint public-privately owned utility firms and their trade association at national and regional level, and the group of the biggest private utility firms with many subsidiaries and co-operation ties.

*Hierarchical clustering* procedures in environmental policy/waste management have revealed a well-defined gap between public actors (demand and regulation of environmental services) and private actors (offer of environmental services). The system of ties of these "cliques" was characteristically different. On the other hand, publicly owned waste management firms and their owners (i.e. local governments of big settlements do not fit into any of the above clusters, and constitute a centrally placed, special cluster. The institutions of the capital and the institutions of the central

Government belong to the cluster with the densest set of relationships, while local organizations of the surrounding region belong to another cluster. This is surprising in view of the fact that the capital is strongly dependent on the surrounding territory regarding the physical processes of waste management.

#### **4.3. Part II: Europeanisation processes (objectives and implementation)**

##### **4.3.1. Section 1: Adaptational pressures (types, components and mechanisms)**

During the last decade the Hungarian policy-making structures have developed in continuous interactions with those of the EU. The harmonization of the legal system of Hungary with that of the EU has been successfully proceeding. During the accession negotiations the regional policy chapter did not raise any problems, while environment protection was quite problematic due to huge costs of the implementation of the EU regulations. The Europeanisation of both policy areas at institutional level lags behind that of the legal adjustments.

*Regional policy* requires a comprehensive co-operation between various sectors and tiers. This applies especially to its recently introduced model in Hungary, which is not any more based on the central state subsidies but rather on the involvement of local resources. Following the Act on Regional Development (1996) the vertically managed relationship system of both the sectoral departments (line ministries) and the sectoral de-concentrated organs took a new direction and became rather horizontal. Municipal egoism, which has formerly dominated the fragmented municipal system, was channelled into territorial frameworks in terms of development programming, resource distribution.

The Regional Development Act was based on recognition of the fact that the EU accession, and in particular the EU system of regional subsidies is advantageous for Hungary. The act aimed to follow the regional political principles of the EU. As a result, the regional planning process at all territorial levels has been reorganised according to EU principles. A range of professional organisations and enterprises dealing with planning has been developed. The regional plans themselves also follow the EU priorities.

During the training programmes (financed mostly by Phare) the relevant organs and persons acquired more and more professional knowledge about EU regional policy. As a result, a more professional management of regional planning has emerged, whereby the planning personnel has acquired the necessary theoretical basis and functional technology knowledge and has built an increasingly wide national and international

system of relationships. Non-professional and collective decision-making bodies have also developed similar skills.

Also in 1996 a decentralisation process of regional development resources has started. A tender system has been created under which there are possibilities to access decentralised resources at the county development councils. Applicant organizations have learnt the procedures needed for submitting applications, acquired subsidies if successfully applying, and have frequently formed local partnerships and alliances.

For the accession countries the most important pressure of European adaptation was the *negotiation phase* in the last year. During the negotiations with the European Commission, a decision was made that Hungary, as a wholly supported country should have a single Regional Operative Programme. After this decision the preparation process of the National Development Plan was conducted in a top-down style, and the local, regional actors had only little influence on the content of the Plan (*NDP 2003*). Another element in the negotiations was the designation of the managing authority of the Regional Operative Programme (ROP). Following the instructions of Brussels, the Hungarian government decided that the managing authority of the ROP would be a national agency. This also had a centralising effect by neglecting the regions, contrary to the tendencies of the previous decade, which was characterised by regionalism and decentralisation.

*Environment protection/waste management policy.* Hungary's European integration process has profoundly changed the incentive mechanisms of all types of stakeholders of environment protection, and in particular, of waste management. Adaptational pressures, i.e. the main impacts of the EU on the behaviour of organisations can be attributed:

- to harmonised rule-making;
- to its implementation and the compliance by the resulting regulations, to the EU-compatible development of the institutional arrangement;
- and to the emergence and co-operation consequences of new types of resources such as EU co-financed waste management projects.

Already in the early 90s, by virtue of the Europe Agreement, Hungary took the obligation to adjust the law and the ecological policy to the EU standards (*Bandi-Bencze-Elek, 1997*). An important milestone, the environmental chapter of the accession negotiations between the EU and Hungary has been closed in June 2001 (*EU Commission, 2001*). According to the agreement reached the EU monitors the amount, content and implementation quality of the harmonised environmental regulations and in case of non-

compliance the European Supreme Court is entitled to levy a fine on the Hungarian Government (*EU Commission 2002*). It is estimated that the harmonisation costs of only this chapter amount to 2500 billion HUF (cca. 10 billion Euro) (*Kerekes-Kiss, 1998; Kerekes-Kiss, 2000; Kovacs, 1998*). As of environment protection, Hungary has got derogations in case of only four EU regulations. Two of the environmental regulations of which the harmonisation will suffer a delay regards waste management: the EU requirements of directives regarding the incineration of wastes and that on recycling of packaging materials do not have to be fulfilled completely by the time of the integration.

The formulation, acceptance and implementation of a National Plan for Waste Management have been among the obligations of the Hungarian Government agreed on the accession negotiations. This Plan has been accepted by the Parliament in 2002 (*NPWM 2001*).

During the last decade Hungarian regulations for environment protection were continuously and in detail harmonised with EU legislation. The major regulations conformant with EU standards are *already in place*. By 2002 the country has adopted most of the EU's environmental regulations and norms. Environmental policies are largely based on the use of regulatory and economic instruments, and have been accompanied by sizeable environmental investments. The Community supports financially the process of assuming the obligations resulting from EU membership.

The most important projects of waste management are co-financed by the EU, the Hungarian Government and by the local communities. During the 90s the conditions for the effective and transparent utilisation of Community funding for environmental investments were created. In the first years after the systemic change the EU support has taken the administrative form of the PHARE Programme, which has supported many environmental projects. This programme is currently being phased out and replaced by the pre-accession instruments ISPA and SAPARD programmes. Approximately half of the resources of the ISPA Programme are devoted to environment protection.

Under the ISPA program in the years 2000-2003 the EU has made decisions on supporting the development of 12 integrated waste management systems throughout Hungary. In particular, in 2002 six integrated waste management projects were in course of being effectively managed in the country. Two from these subregional investments fall into the territory of the investigated case study region Central Hungary. Both programmes involve the building of a series of territorially dispersed waste management infrastructure (such as collecting, composting, selecting, forwarding facilities), with a



central waste landfill of a magnitude of 1.5 million cubic metres for each of the two projects.

Inadequate enforcement of environmental regulations is a major concern in Hungary. The upgrading of the institutional system of environment protection is a difficult task, which will take more time than the modernisation of the tools and the physical infrastructure of environmental protection. Implementation problems arise due to lack of resources, lack of information, problematic political decisions and problems in political culture and environmental awareness. Due to substantial lobbying force of local and sectoral interest groups environmental investments are often targeted to areas with lower priority or lower efficiency.

#### **4.3.2. Section 2: Resistance to change**

One of the side effects of multi-level governance is the enhanced possibility of subordinated actors to resist to necessary changes of Europeanization. However, delay or low performance in Europeanisation is as a rule not the result of the conscious resistance of certain actors to change, rather they can be explained by high compliance costs, long lived institutional traditions, vested interests and embeddedness into existing national political styles and solutions. Low participation rates in the referendum on EU accession in 2003 have shown that wide strata of people are not convinced about the advantages of joining or at least they have a lot of uncertainties, fuelled by the inconsistent messages of some political parties.

*Regional policy* is one of the public policies where the overwhelming majority of actors accept Europeanisation in the expectation of subsidies and additional funds to develop the regions lagging behind. The majority of the requirements (concentration, programming, partnership, additionality and efficiency) prevail also in Hungarian law (*DG Regional Policy and Cohesion, 1998*) However, on the other side, in Hungarian regional policy practice, many requirements are met only superficially; on the level of slogans rather than in actual decision-making. For example, the principles of *effectiveness, economic competitiveness and partnership* are difficult to implement in actual regional policy making.

Some groups are not entirely interested in the assertion of the principles of the regional policy of the European Union.

- *Territorial interest groups*: An interesting phenomenon was found in the SNA from the point of view of interest mediation. Actors living in the same county or city have often much closer contacts with each other than with other actors in other

counties. This means that the territorial neighbourhood is a very important factor in regional policy, which paradoxically can hinder the region-building process. Since the NUTS 2 regions are newly established artificial units, and regional consciousness is rather an exception than a rule, it is very hard to form common targets or programmes at regional level.

- *Counter-interests in the central government:* Another obstacle to change is that in the governmental sector, in particular the ministries that now dispose of considerable development resources, are not interested in all aspects of regional decentralisation. A temporary success of this group is indicated by the fact that the regions and their institutions will have a relatively smaller role in the acquisition and management of the structural funds after the accession, than planned before.
- *Conflicting interests of independent consultants and of the professional elite:* The practical know-how of applying for funds and of planning-managing regional development projects are monopolised by a narrow group of experts and civil servants mostly at central and regional level. This group of experts and clients originates from the public administration and business; they know very well that offering expertise at the application of regional policy can be a good business and that information and contacts can easily be converted into power. Conflicts between experts employed by the development agencies and the non-professional members of the council emerge very often. Professionals are not always interested in enabling decision-makers to understand the very complicated rules of applications etc.
- *Technocrats vs. local interests.* During the process of regional programming, technocrats have more opportunities to enforce their concepts than local society. However, on many occasions the lobby of mayors of settlements was stronger than the technocrat groupings interested in specific directions of economic development. In particular, due to the predominance of mayors within the county development councils the principle of equity enjoys higher priority than the principle of concentration. As a result, resources are distributed often in a fragmented way, rather serving the development of basic infrastructure of certain settlements. This phenomenon shifts regional policy towards settlement development.

*As of environmental policy,* Hungary still continues to be a laggard with regard to implementation of EU regulations, and this statement holds especially for waste management. There is a sizeable implementation gap between the national and European level legal requirements and Hungarian environmental performance. Hungary's EU-

harmonised waste management legislation is only three years old but it has already profoundly changed the strategies of all involved parties, including all tiers of government and the private sector. During the accession talks the negotiating partners have accepted these facts and have accepted a certain delay of legislation and implementation process of waste management regulations in Hungary.

This is partly caused by the costly adaptation process and partly by the slow development of institutional structures and behaviour. ISPA waste management projects often demonstrate the difficulties of managing public-public and public-private partnerships. The creation of regional waste management infrastructures is almost impossible where local governments are too deeply embedded into administrative hierarchies and in the same time fiercely autonomous. Frictions between Government and local authorities, co-operation incapacities between local authorities can often be attributed to conflicts between various political parties.

Hungarian NGO's and independent environment protection organisations often embrace issues, which in fact are countering EU-conform waste management principles. In particular, the reason for the failure of some planned ISPA projects has been that stakeholders have focussed rather on the local, than on general aspects. Single-issue organisations have often successfully campaigned against planned waste depositories with classical slogans of NIMBYism ('Not in My Back Yard'). For many local authorities the new waste legislation has been too difficult to comply by, and the Government has issued a decree allowing a delay in its implementation. Even so, most of the local governments are in clear breach of the Waste Management Law.

A fierce competition exists in the provision of waste management utility services, offered by firms of the private sector and partly by firms of public ownership. Various local authorities have been successful in slowing down the planned modernisation of waste management systems in neighbouring communities by blocking some ISPA projects in order to maximise the utilisation of their existing waste depositories (PIMBYism - 'Put in My Back Yard').

There is lack of consensus on the necessary number and capacity of landfills. Companies and local governments widely disagree on the optimal size and geographical pattern of waste management infrastructure to be developed by using joint private and public, Hungarian and EU sources.

### **4.3.3. Section 3: Evolution of central state policy-making structures**

The institutional arrangement of both investigated policy areas are rather centralised, although during the last decade recurring efforts have been made to decentralise some decision-making powers. Especially the decentralisation of finance has been difficult and slow, this feature opening the gates to eventual re-centralisation tendencies.

#### **Regional policy**

The place of control of regional policy within the governmental structure has been changing since we can speak about regional policy at all. Quite Recently the National Agency of Regional Development has been integrated into the Prime Minister's Office. The Commission year by year repeatedly has called for the strengthening of co-ordination among line ministries, for harmonising the development strategies of various branches with regional policy. However, the central administrative control of regional policy has not been strong enough to co-ordinate the implementation of other government policies on the regional level (*Fleischer-Futo-Pessl, 2001*). The development of regional policy still appears to be in its early phase, whereby the most important policy means are centrally provided legal regulations and resource allocation, and formal, institutionalised networks are initiated and directed primarily *from above* by applying the Regional Development Act (*Pálné, Kovács Ilona 2001b*).

Self-governments are financed partly by their own resources and partly by grants transferred from central government, whereas micro-regions, counties and regions do not have the right of levying taxes. Several counties and micro-regions have established organisations in order to assist the economic and social development of the regions. Informal, personal networks, local elites, key individuals have an important role in the distribution of power and of development resources.

#### **Environmental policy**

The main body responsible for environmental policy in Hungary is the Ministry of Environment Protection and Water Management. The Ministry organised the modernisation of the administrative and regulatory structure for environmental policy and the adaptation to developments in EU environmental policy. Its 12 regional agencies and local authorities are the major responsible parties for the implementation of environmental policy and in particular, of waste management. Within the Ministry of Environment Protection and Water Management a Waste Management Section was established with specific responsibility for this area.

Environmental actors agree that environmental policy remains centralised and that the relationships between Government agencies and local authorities are characterised with a special mix of co-operation and conflict. Formal structures such as the requirement for regional waste management plans have been put in place, which are suitable frameworks for organising waste management of localities, counties, regions and the whole of Hungary, but their implementation needs the continuous intervention of regulative and financing bodies.

#### **4.3.4. Section 4: Non-state actors**

During the last decade the involvement of non-state actors in Hungarian policy-making has increased, but still lags behind the European requirements. The criticism raised earlier in Western Europe is also formulated in Hungary, owing to the democratic deficit of partnership, corporative government (*Olsson, 1998, Pierre, 2000*). The weakness of private and NGO sectors is also reflected by the unsophisticated and uncontrolled nature of the mechanism for interest reconciliation, and by the dominance of the political parties in professional disputes (*Gombár et al., eds 1995*).

#### **Regional politics**

Private and NGO sectors still play an insignificant role in Hungarian regional politics. The institutional system itself does not motivate intensive involvement of these actors in decision-making and planning, also these sectors have a relatively low level of organisational and resource capacity regarding regional development. The weakness of NGOs in the regional decision-making process is also due to the fact that they are scarcely or not at all represented in the councils at the various tiers of administration and regional development. As for the social embeddedness of local authorities, the situation is slightly better, but empirical sociological research has shown that, especially in major municipalities, neither constituents nor civic organisations have close contacts and that the proportion of indifferent, uninformed citizens is typically significant (*Hajnal, 2001*). Analysis of the case study region Southern Transdanubia suggests that, although NGOs and the private sector are certainly part of the overall regional development network, they are unable to play a central role. The only exception is the university, which, also owing to its size, is a dominant actor in the region.

#### **Environmental policy**

During the last decade private stakeholders, experts and non-governmental actors have intensified their activities and widened the range of their contribution to Hungarian environmental policy. Public-Private Partnerships are widely implemented in environment

protection, but face many hardships due to lack of proper regulation and organizational know how. Private sector companies are deeply involved in various tasks of environment protection, in particular of waste management. A substantial number of environmental experts are working in various environment related lobby groups (*Chamber of Commerce 1999*). There are various professional associations of employers and of waste management companies that represent the interest of member companies on various government levels.

The Hungarian Green Movement started around the mid-1980s and as political changes neared, the number of groups increased significantly. After the 1989 political changes environmental activists re-oriented their critique to cover not only political decisions but also activities of profit-oriented companies. Groups have become increasingly institutionalized, arranged legal status, were registered by the state, sought financial support and became more professional, entering into activities such as research-and environmental education (*Klarer-McNicholas-Knaus 1998*). Environmental pressure groups have demanded attention from local and national authorities. Today insufficient funding, general legal problems, limited access to means of communication and a lack of volunteers seem to be their most pressing problems. There are numerous NGO/independent environmental organisations in existence that attempt to monitor the full implementation of European environmental law in order to promote positive solutions to environmental problems, but they are too fragmented to have a lasting impact.

#### **4.3.5. Section 5: Civic culture**

Governance in Hungary is heavily influenced by the fact that citizens show only a marginal involvement in international comparison, and that their awareness regarding their rights and obligations is rather limited. The investigation has corroborated the views on the general weakness of civil society and on the low level of civic participation. Public participation either in the planning and implementation processes of regional development, or in environmental programmes is rather scarce and formal, participation in voluntary environmental associations and organisations is very limited.

Hungarian political culture, civil society and the state can be characterised traditionally by a paternalistic attitude, which has retained its positions and exercises its impact even after the systemic change. One part of the economy and society is integrated by Western capital and culture, while a wide domain of the economy and society is characterised by traditional paternalistic attitudes. The resulting networks form a veritable dual economy and society. Critics of Hungary's Europeanization fear that this duality will be sharper after the accession of the country due to a possible stabilisation of the status and

advantages of the Western type elites. This duality is also easily demonstrated in environmental policies: while companies managed by foreign investors typically conform to high environmental standards, on the other side, small and medium sized companies of Hungarian owners find it difficult to comply by European-style environmental requirements.

The investigated stakeholders have exhibited a wide range of attitudes, including patterns and levels of civic engagement. In particular, the waste management behaviour of all stakeholders and also waste policies are influenced by such "soft" factors as environmental awareness, political culture and civic participation. Waste management behaviour is to a large extent a matter of collective consciousness. The presence, amount and visibility of illegally dumped waste is a reliable indicator of social capital in a region. The success or failure of infrastructural projects of waste management also depends largely on the trust between stakeholders, on their capabilities to communicate.

#### **4.4. Part III: Assessment of learning capacity**

##### **4.4.1. Section 1: Outcome**

In both policy areas the adaptation of the stakeholders to European standards can be properly modelled by the learning paradigm. The interviewed decision makers in both study regions have often referred to their strategies when confronted with consecutive new waves of European adaptational pressures - such as legal harmonisation, institutional development or the emergence EU-co-financed projects - as learning strategies.

##### **Regional policy**

The ongoing learning process regarding the regulation, institutionalisation of Hungarian regional policy has brought its impacts: these elements are more or less compatible with the European standards. In particular, Hungary has institutionalised partnership forums, NUTS II regions, planning and programming systems, monitoring etc., and all three territorial tiers are integrated into the regional political institution system. It is a challenge of the coming period to avoid fragmentation of the development resources, and for this purpose a clear division of labour has to be defined, avoiding unnecessary competition and conflicts among the tiers.

The regional decentralisation was fulfilled primarily in terms of the tasks and competencies but the bulk of resources continues to be distributed centrally. Adaptation pressure in form of administrative pressure from Brussels has accelerated the building and change of regional policy. New agencies have been or going to be established for

administering and handling the structural or pre-accession funds. Their main challenge is to absorb sufficient EU money without creating too extensive bureaucracy. The institutional system of regional planning and regional development is still centralised and in the same time uncoordinated, and it is not sufficiently based on professionalism. Networks among actors affected by regional policy still do not function properly.

### **Environmental policy**

Hungary's environmental policy is characterised by a continuous adapting and learning process. The country's European integration process has profoundly changed the incentive mechanisms of all types of stakeholders of waste management. The main impacts of the EU on the behaviour of organisations can be attributed (a) to harmonised rule-making, (b) to its implementation and the compliance by the resulting regulations, to the EU-compatible development of the institutional arrangement and (c) to the emergence and co-operation consequences of new types of resources such as EU co-financed waste management projects.

Change is most clearly visible in the administrative reform: quick and consequent in legal harmonization, but somewhat slower in its implementation due to conflicts and compromises. Roles and relationships between government regulators and regulated businesses have been profoundly re-defined due to deep identity changes on both sides. The enhancement of the role of civil society is also a result of Hungary's adaptation to democratic principles.

#### **4.4.2. Section 2: Patterns of learning and adaptation**

Most of the institutions affected by the investigated adaptational pressures have reacted in a pro-active way; a defensive attitude was only rarely to be observed. As a general rule, adaptation within individual organizations was more effective than the creation of joint projects, together with other institutions serving the aims of learning. Organizational learning was successfully embodied in renewed rules, re-organized institutions and investment projects serving EU-conform objectives, while on the other side, human learning occurring within planned frameworks of human resource development was not so typical than learning occurring as an unplanned by-product of institutional development.

### **Regional policy**

Adaptation to the requirements of regional policy has been in progress at all levels of decision-making since the enactment of the Regional Development Act. The majority of the requirements (concentration, programming, partnership, additionality and efficiency)



covered by the European Council's statute declaring the EU requirements of regional politics prevail also in Hungarian law and in regional policy practice. Information and knowledge about European affairs is better disseminated on central level, than on local levels of public administration or in other sectors of the institutional system.

Respondents in the case study region attributed positive changes to the EU programmes in respect of self-training, learning and especially the support of development initiatives. The investigated case study region shows an increasing degree of cohesion and networks. The adaptation was basically top-down directed using the methods of institution building and regulatory activity, with much less emphasis placed on human resource development policy.

Beneficiaries of the resources of regional policy were usually the local governments, which have acquired in this process a relatively substantial professional experience in the field of planning, tenders and project management. However, the number of organisations, politicians, persons and businesses that directly participated in EU projects is still rather small. The skills necessary for keeping in touch with European institutions are highly appreciated on the market, and the concerned range of experts and businessmen are not interested in the dissemination of this know how.

### **Environmental policy**

It is generally accepted that EU environmental policy is the main force behind recent development of environmental policy in Hungary. Legal harmonisation and its enforcement has generated a substantial amount of adaptation work for the central and decentralised government agencies of environment protection, albeit without a sufficient degree of institutional development. Public institutions of environmental protection play an important part in the implementation of the above regulations and policies, leading to conditions whereby markets of waste management services and wastes function smoothly as well.

However, the learning capacity of these institutions is seriously limited by resource problems. In particular, Environmental Protection Agencies have not enough capacities to fully exercise control activities. Resource shortages of institutional development and of infrastructure investment are alleviated by EU funds to a considerable extent. Moreover, various ISPA co-financed waste management projects of regional scope have been launched.

In environmental policies the following institutional solutions have been introduced as mechanisms of adaptation.

- *PPP*. Most of the waste management infrastructure established by these projects are (or will be) operated in the framework of public-private partnerships. PPP is a way of co-operation that is still underdeveloped, but the spreading of such partnerships is inevitable. In the case study region policy-making structures and policy implementing institutional structures at all levels have been heavily influenced by the Europeanization process.
- *Network building* is an adaptation strategy for most of the stakeholders. Local governments and waste management utility companies often team up in order to utilise economies of scale in integrated waste projects.

## **Planning**

Waste management planning has been also proving an efficient way of learning and adaptation, and has served as an effective forum of interest reconciliation among the many stakeholders of waste management. The preparation of these plans is still coordinated by the decentralised institutional network of Environment Protection Agencies, but it is hoped that at a later phase NGOs and private groups will be able to compile these influential documents.

### **4.4.3. Section 3: Policy recommendations**

Multi-level governance is first and foremost a method of governance whereby the stakeholders of various tiers and sectors act autonomously, but in the same time in a harmonized way, based on a wide range of information, using a strong portfolio of accumulated social capital. For this reason education and human resource development policies have to pay sufficient attention to the deep problem of the lack of civic consciousness. The schooling system should emphasis issues of regional, national and European consciousness and moreover the rights, duties and values connected with sustainable development. In particular, Government Programs have to be launched to inform the citizens about the above matters, in order to improve the general knowledge on decision-making processes and to reinforce citizens' participation. For these purposes the universities and the scientific communities have to be mobilized. R&D activities in regional and environmental policies have to be conducted and the impact of each policy on the other has to be assessed. Also, statistical efforts have to be conducted on the inputs and outputs of the respective policy areas.

## **Regional policy**

The role, inter-dependence, finances and legal framework of administrative regions has to be clearly and quickly designed. European experiences corroborate that the reinforcement of the administrative capacities of the existing regional institutions enjoys a high priority. It is a main inconsistency of the Hungarian regional policy structures that the means of the established institutions, especially regarding financial resources, are totally insufficient to accomplish the regional policy goals. Regional policy still follows a decentralisation trend only in respect of decision-making competencies, but unfortunately, regarding resource allocation the degree of centralisation is has not diminished.

More attention has to be paid to the concentration of the local allocation of resources. Considerations of efficiency, competitiveness and innovation are not prominent in decision-making in relation to regional development. Local actors have to be persuaded that only wide-ranging regional programmes are effective and will receive support after accession. Also, more attention has to be paid to the transparency, accountability, publicity and sound management of regional programmes.

As a parallel programme, the tasks of the sectoral networks of de-concentrated administrative structures have to be clearly defined.

Viable solutions have to be disseminated regarding co-operation between central, regional and local actors, locally optimal techniques and methods have to be developed to improve the culture of co-operation and partnership. In particular, the legal, institutional and procedural frameworks of PPPs have to be determined.

## **Environmental policy**

*Environmental policy* is still very centralized, despite continuous efforts to involve private and civil stakeholders. Involvement of local and environmental interest groups is on many occasions a formality; on other occasions it lacks professionalism and leads to sharp conflicts based on the NIMBY principle. In environmental protection, still many decisions regarding the distribution of resources are strongly influenced by political party allegiances, rather than by professional considerations.

For the above reasons, the Government should launch projects in order to create more effective fora for the interaction between conflicting environmental interests and interest groups.

Local governments are often not able or not willing to comply by important pieces of regulation due to lack of resources - consequently frictions and tensions arise between various sectors and tiers of the public administration. For the above reasons attention has to be paid to enhance co-ordination among central and local levels of the public administration.

Also an intensification of co-ordination is necessary among public and private stakeholders within strongly regulated and transparent frameworks. In particular, a uniform regulation of Public Private Partnership is needed.

The level of civic participation and awareness is rather low in international comparison. Therefore the Government should attach resources and enter into joint projects with the relevant NGOs with the aim of developing the consciousness of the public regarding environmental matters.

## 5. Chapter Six: Poland

### 5.1. Introduction

Poland is a unitary state with the population of 38mio people. Its current administrative structure was established in 1998, when the territory was divided into 16 voivodeships, 315 counties and 65 cities with county rights as well as 2489 communes.

In terms of polity, it is a presidential-parliamentary democracy. The state is headed by the President, with the legislative powers belonging to the bicameral Parliament and with executive functions at central level vested in the hands of the Council of Ministers.

With regard to economic system, Poland is a mixed capitalism. Due to privatisation process, the role of private sector has increased significantly. It accounts for 72% of industrial output and 74% of total employment<sup>22</sup>. The majority of prices are market-determined.  $\frac{3}{4}$  of Gross Domestic Product is generated in services, which employ some 50% of workforce. In spite of restructuring process, the structure of the economy remains obsolete. Poland still needs reforming some branches (coal mining, steel industry, defence industry, public services, agriculture and fisheries).

It is widely acknowledged that since the end of the Communist rule, Poland has transformed itself into a stable democracy with a multi-party political system (although the political scene is in the state of flux) and made one of the most successful transitions to a free market economy, although the costs of reforms are not negligible. The country envisages some economic problems (unemployment, regional disparities, deepening poverty as well as poor technical and economic infrastructure). These phenomena have been to be tackled by economic policy, which was integrated and framed in a comprehensive medium-term context by successive governments. However, policy became less supportive and contained recently, which threatens the macroeconomic stability.

The process of what is called "double transformation", i.e. transition of political and economic system, has been underpinned in international commitments. Since 1989 the top priority of all successive governments has been the integration with Western political and economic structures. In 1990, Poland joined the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. In 1991, Poland became a member of the Council of Europe and

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\* Authors: prof. Aleksandra Jewtuchowicz (Ph.D.), Malgorzata Czernielewska-Rutkowska (Ph.D.), European Institute, Lodz (Poland).

<sup>22</sup> Central Statistical Office, 2000 data.

signed an agreement on association, the so-called *Europe Agreement* with the European Union. In 1992, Poland concluded a trade agreement with EFTA countries. In 1993 Poland became associated with the Western European Union. A year later it applied for the EU membership. In 1995 Poland joined the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the World Trade Organisation. It embarked the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development in 1996.

## **5.2. Part I: National and regional context of policy-making prior to accession**

### **5.2.1. Section 1: National context of policy-making prior to accession/association**

At the brink of 1990s Poland was rather uniform in terms of socio-economic development, but the systemic reforms significantly increased regional disparities. By the mid-1990s regional policy was not considered to be a priority of economic policy in Poland, and was limited to measures supporting the structural changes, mainly attenuating the negative effects of growing unemployment. Regional actions, undertaken to counteract this phenomenon, tended to be occasional, inconsistent, poorly coordinated and with limited resources<sup>23</sup>. At national level, the interests of different sectors and industries prevailed over regional interests.

Another important aspect which impeded the development of regional policy was the country's territorial organisation with its 49 regions – voivodeships – too small for the government to run effective state regional policy. Also the lack of self-government at regional level was the main obstacle to the development of regional policy "bottom-up".

Interest in the regional aspects of Poland's social and economic development grew in response to changes in the priorities of macroeconomic policy (aiming at fast growth and the improvement of the competitiveness of Polish economy) and, what is more important, was the reaction to growing regional disparities. The differentiation of the regions at NUTS 2 level is 1:2 and the differences at lower level (NUTS 3) reach the 1:5 ratio<sup>24</sup>. Discrepancies in *per capita* income juxtapose with the level of economic activity, the role of private sector in the economy, the pace of privatisation, the level of foreign investors' attractiveness as well as endowment in infrastructure.

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<sup>23</sup> Kozak, M. (1998), "Polityka regionalna w Polsce – wybrane zagadnienia", in: *Polityka regionalna i fundusze strukturalne w Unii Europejskiej*, Instytut Europejski, Lodz, p. 174; Ministry of Economy (2002), National Development Plan 2004-2006, June, p. 32.

<sup>24</sup> *Costs and Benefits of Poland's Membership in the European Union* (2003), European Centre Natolin, Warsaw, p. 68-74.

At the beginning of 1990s discussion concerning the future model of Polish regional policy was centred on two issues. First of all, it had to be decided whether the main aim of the policy would be to reduce social and economic disparities between regions in Poland or rather to concentrate resources on fast economic development of the country as a whole. The second issue was the need for further decentralisation of the country. The discussion included some important aspects, such as the creation of self-government at regional level (but also at additional sub-regional level), different proposals of voivodeships' regrouping and granting them responsibilities for the implementation of regional policy<sup>25</sup>.

The entire discussion was influenced by the Poland's decision to apply for EU membership on 5 April 1994. Future regional policy became being perceived in the context of both the membership criteria in this particular area and the potential benefits of EU financial instruments, mainly the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund. The latter was especially important on account of limited own resources. At that time, EU assistance programmes already gained a considerable share in the overall regional development budget in Poland, especially Phare programme, being the key financial source of supporting regional actions in Poland in 1990s. By 1999 Poland received about 1.2bn EUR, including 0.4bn EUR of assistance concentrated on regional development objectives (of which 0.25bn on crossborder cooperation) and 0.1bn assisting structural action in the area of environment, transport and SME<sup>26</sup>. Among the programmes assisting broadly defined regional and local development there were: Phare Struder, Phare Crossborder, Phare-Rapid, Phare Inter-Regional Development.

By the beginning of 1990s environment policy was subjugated to economic and industrial policy. Despite the existence of some institutions responsible for ecological policy (especially at central level) as well as environment-related legal acts, the policy was entirely declaratory, which – accompanied by scarce investment outlays accounting for 1% of GDP – resulted in the disastrous state of the nature.

In 1990s Poland had to create ecological policy from the scratch and underpinned the process in international commitments. The first fundamental change was mental one – the shift from the perception of environment treated as a function of economic policy to the approach that perceives economic policy as a subject to environment policy.

The first strategic document, the *State Ecological Policy*, setting up the principles, aims and instruments of Polish environment policy was adopted in 1991. Among the enumerated principles there were sustainable development principle, the rule of law in

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<sup>25</sup> *Strategiczne wyzwania dla polityki rozwoju regionalnego w Polsce* (1996), Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, p. 16.

<sup>26</sup> Kozak, M., *op. cit.*, p. 32.

ecological policy, polluter pays principle, the elimination of pollution at source, social partnership rule, collaborative problem solving as well as the principle of staging of environmental measures. It is worth noticing that at that time the *State Ecological Policy* was quite a modern document. It is worth recalling that it was drafted a year before Rio de Janeiro Conference and the adoption of *Agenda 21*.

However, the legislative “revolution” took place only in the year 2001 with the acceleration of the accession process, when the major Parliamentary acts on environment were passed.

The implementation of law has always proceeded sluggishly. In spite of implementation deficit, the state of the environment ameliorated significantly, not only due to the evolution of the policy-making, but also on account of severe recession that afflicted the country at the beginning of 1990s and the restructuring of Polish economy. The generation of air-pollutants (SO<sub>2</sub> and NO<sub>x</sub> and particulates) dropped by 47%, 25% and 58% respectively. The positive trends in the domain of water management concerned the improvement of the quality of waters, a decrease in water consumption for both industrial and communal use, accompanied by the reduction of industrial waste generation by 14% and a decline in untreated waste waters by virtually 70%.

### 5.2.2. Section 2: Regional context

The Lodz Voivodeship – the selected case-study region – is situated in central Poland. It is a transit area and an important communication node. The area of the province is 18.219 km<sup>2</sup>, inhabited by 2.7 mio people (7% of the country’s population).

With regard to economic structure, the Lodz Voivodeship is considered to be a rural-non metropolitan region<sup>27</sup>, with agriculture accounting for 4% of Gross Value Added and 33% of employment<sup>28</sup>. Once the industrial monoculture (textile and clothing industry), nowadays the province has more diversified industrial structure, but the reliance on labour- and natural resources-intensive branches is high.

Transformation processes have not changed much the economic structure of the region<sup>29</sup>. Emerging SMEs, of which 93% are “micro” enterprises, operate in traditional industries, which results in their low profitability, innovation, modernity and wages. The region

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<sup>27</sup> Dutkowski, M. (2001), “Typologia polskich regionow”, in Szomburg, J. (ed.), *Polityka regionalna panstwa posrod uwiklan instytucjonalno-regulacyjnych*, Instytut Badan nad Gospodarka Rynkowa, Gdansk.

<sup>28</sup> Central Statistical Office data, 2001.

<sup>29</sup> Dziemianowicz, W. (1999), “Transformacja gospodarcza nowych wojewodztw”, *Polska regionow*, Instytut Badan nad Gospodarka Rynkowa, Warszawa, nr 8, p. 21.



attracts little interest from foreign investors. The level of economic activity of the community is low. The Lodz Special Economic Zone has not lived up to the expectations. As a result, unemployment at 18.1%<sup>30</sup> is the most serious problem of the region and the main concern for policy-makers.

With regard to political climate, on account of the dominance of industry in its economy and the class structure of the society, the Lodz Province has always been considered to support leftist parties, especially of the Social Democratic Alliance (SLD), being an alliance of more than 30 leftist groupings whose core is the Social-Democratic Party of the Polish Republic – renamed and reorganised former communist party. It must be stated out quite clearly that intelligentsia's parties (the Freedom Union and the Civic Platform) have never had an extensive electorate in the voivodeship. In subsequent parliamentary elections after 1989 the post-communists have enjoyed bigger political support than "on average" in Poland.

Nonetheless, all aspects of socio-political situation of the country and the voivodeship are assessed by the inhabitants of the Lodz Province more pessimistically than the country average. It concerns the assessment of the overall situation, political situation, economic situation, situation at workplace, the quality of life and financial standing. The main factor behind the gloomy perception of the reality are the effects of economic downturn and especially painful restructuring, which has entailed huge social costs.

In this context, it comes as no surprise that the evaluation of the activity of the authorities appears in a different light than elsewhere in Poland. The inhabitants of the Lodz Province are more critical of the economic policy of the government than an "average" Pole. There are also more "euro-sceptics" and people undecided on whether Poland should join the European Union than at national level. As a result, people are pre-occupied with here and now rather than long-term strategies and far-sighted visions<sup>31</sup>.

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<sup>30</sup> Central Statistical Office data, 2001.

<sup>31</sup> PARR (2001), *Nowe wojewodztwa. Fakty, opinie, nastroje*, Warszawa.

### 5.2.3. Section 3: SNA implementation

The density of networks in both policy areas is moderate. Out of 100 possible connections in the area of regional policy only 66 are existent, whereas in the domain of environment policy merely 42 in 100 ties exist<sup>32</sup>. When valued matrices are used, the density of networks amounts to 1.46 and 1.10 in the area of regional and environmental policy respectively<sup>33</sup>. The density is not evenly distributed among the clusters of the stakeholders<sup>34</sup>. More centralised are networks in ecological policy than in regional policy. The degree of network centralisation in the field of ecological policy amounts to 61.4%, whereas in the regional policy – to merely 13.3%.

In the field of ecological policy it is evident that the most central are the Voivodeship Office<sup>35</sup> and the Voivodeship Fund for Environmental Protection and Water Economy in Lodz as well as the Voivodeship Inspectorate for Environmental Protection, the representatives of central policymakers in the region. The same holds true, when the valued matrix is considered. The most centrally located stakeholders are “arms” of the most prominent policy-makers of central level in the region and – what is more – disposing financial resources, which might indicate the presence of strong national gatekeepers.

In the domain of regional policy, surprisingly enough, the most central are “entrepreneurship promoters” at regional level, such as the Foundation for Enterprise Development, the Agency for Regional Development, Incubator Foundation in Lodz, although the Voivodeship Office and the Marshal Office – two main policy-makers in the region also occupy quite a central position. The similar picture emerges when the valued matrix is considered, although the centrality of the Voivodeship Office and the Marshal Office is much more evident. An interesting observation can be made with regard to the Lodz University, having a differentiated position depending on the matrix used. When one considered just the existence of interactions, the University occupies a central position. When the strength of ties is taken into account, the University shifts more towards the periphery. Such a divergence might stem from the nature of collaboration between the academic community and other stakeholders. Our survey reveals that the co-operation is

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<sup>32</sup> The invaluable methodological introduction to the quantitative network analysis can be found in: Knoke, D., Kuklinski, J. (1982), “Network Analysis”, *Sage University Papers Series: Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences*, no 07-028.

<sup>33</sup> For further details see: Jewtuchowicz, A., Czernielewska, M. (2002), *Social Network Analysis. Regional Policy. Poland – Lodz Province*, European Institute, Lodz, March; Czernielewska, M., Joachimiak, N. (2002), *Social Network Analysis. Environment Policy. Poland – Lodz Province*, European Institute, Lodz, March.

<sup>34</sup> For further quantitative results and their implications for the policy-making see the subsequent sections.

<sup>35</sup> The institutions and their roles are described in the appendix 1.

little structuralised and institutionalised, as it stems from the activity of researchers rather than the institution itself.

In the field of the policy of environment protection, common set of linkages have the public institutions at local and regional level and PPPs<sup>36</sup>. Also the national gatekeepers are structurally equivalent. Identical pattern of relations have public institutions of regional level. The fourth sub-group is composed of stakeholders implementing the policy at local and regional level. To be more specific, the first cluster consists mostly of public institutions of national and regional level (the Marshal Office, the Office of Spatial Planning of the Lodz Voivodeship, the two universities, the Ministry of Economy, the OBREM – Research and Development Centre for Urban Economy) as well as both NGOs: the Regional Centre for Ecological Education and the Eko-Lodz Association. The only case that is not expected to appear here is the Eko-region in Belchatow, as it is a regional PPP. The second cluster is quite heterogeneous, at first glance. However, it may be easily seen that it groups the actors of both local and regional levels that implement ecological policy, located at the periphery. It is amply demonstrated by the presence of the Pol-Dan-Eko or even the Commune Office in Belchatow. The third cluster comprises four institutions of public sector of national level: the Voivodeship Fund for Environment Protection and Water Economy, the Voivodeship Office and the Voivodeship Inspectorate for Environmental Protection. The only institutions whose presence here seems odd is the Ekoboruta in Zgierz – a company dealing with exploitation of medical waste. The fourth and the most numerous category is composed of institutions of regional and local level: both public (county offices, county funds for environmental protection and water economy) as well as public-private (the Ekoconsulting Ltd. in Lodz, Eko Wynik in Lodz, etc.). More consistent picture occurs when one considers the strengths of relations between the stakeholders. The first cluster is composed of two prominent sub-groups: public institutions of regional and local level: county offices, county funds for environmental protection and water economy and regional PPPs: the Eko-Boruta in Zgierz, the Ekoconsulting Ltd. in Lodz, the Eko Wynik Ltd. in Lodz or the Ekopomoc Plc. The second category consists of “national gatekeepers”: the Voivodeship Office, the Voivodeship Fund for Environmental Protection and Water Economy and the Voivodeship Inspectorate for Environmental Protection. The third cluster comprises mainly public institutions of regional level: the University of Lodz, the Technical University of Lodz, the Office of Spatial Planning of the Lodz Voivodeship, the two universities, the Ministry of Economy and the OBREM – Research and Development Centre for Urban Economy). The fourth one groups the actors of both local and regional levels that implement ecological

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<sup>36</sup> For the qualitative characteristics of the clusters of networks (their intensity, type and frequency) see the subsequent sections.

policy, located at the periphery. It is amply demonstrated by the presence of the Pol-Dan-Eko, the ECOGAL in Kutno or even the Commune Office in Belchatow.

Three striking features of the networks emerge, when one takes into account multi-dimensional scaling graph of the network<sup>37</sup>. Private sector institutions are alienated (see the position of Eko-Boruta in Zgierz, Eko-ABC Ltd. in Belchatow, Pol-Dan-Eko Ltd. in Belchatow or Ekoserwis – Research Institute in Lodz). Another dangerous phenomenon are the peripherality of NGOs: the Regional Centre for Ecological Education at regional level, as well as the Eko-Lodz Association at local level, both dealing with ecological education. The third evident feature is the the alienation of institutions that before 1999 used to be within administration boundaries of other provinces. The prime example of this might be the peripheral position of the County Fund for Environmental Protection and Water Economy in Kutno or in Piotrkow Trybunalski, the Ekoserwis Ltd. in Kutno or the ECOGAL in Kutno.

In the domain of regional policy there is a distinct division between two groups of cliques. The first one is the cluster grouping the most important public sector policy-makers. The remaining sub-groups are composed of institutions supporting development at regional and local level, although it must be admitted that the reasons behind such a partitioning of enterprise promoters are not straightforward. It is noteworthy that one obtains much more coherent and logical view, when one considers the valued matrix, i.e. when one takes into account the strength of links among stakeholders. In particular the first cluster includes the Voivodeship Office, the Marshal Office, the Office of Spatial Planning and the city offices of main towns: Ozorkow, Belchatow, and Kutno. The second cluster consists of entrepreneurship promoters, of both regional and local level such as: the Lodz Business Club, the Lodz Chamber of Industry and Trade, the Polish Chamber of Textile Industry and the Chamber of International Economic and Scientific Co-operation. The same holds true for the fourth group, including – among the others – the National System of Services, the Agri-incubator, the Foundation for Enterprise Development in Poddebice and the Foundation for Enterprise Development. The most heterogeneous and the biggest at the same time is the third cluster. The prevailing sub-group are the regional and local institutions whose task is to foster regional and local development and to provide services for SMEs, such as the Incubator Foundation in Poddebice and the

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<sup>37</sup> The computation of multi-dimensional scaling graph of the network is aimed at drafting the two-dimensional picture of the network. First of all, the location of each stakeholder is found. Then, the distance between a pair of actors reflecting the strength of the interactions between them is established. As a result, this algorithm is especially predestined to reveal central or peripheral position of each stakeholder in the network as well as the intensity of co-operation among the stakeholders.

"Initiative for Poddebice County" Foundation, although there are some institutions whose presence in this cluster seems strange (the Ministry of Economy).

The multi-dimensional scaling graph of the network provide further evidence of the clustering and strength of relations between key actors: the Voivodeship Office, the Marshal Office, the Agency for Regional Development and the Foundation for Enterprise Development. The Ministry of Economy is alienated regardless which matrix is considered, which might stem from the fact that the stakeholders circumvent the Lodz Office for Regional Development and address directly the "headquarter" in Warsaw.

The most distant actors are these coming from outside the Lodz Metropolitan Agglomeration: Belchatow (the Belchatow City Office, the Agency for Regional Development "ARREKS"), Poddebice (the "Initiative for Poddebice County" Foundation, the Incubator Foundation in Poddebice, the County Office in Poddebice), Kutno (the Kutno City Office, the Agency for Development of Kutno Region) or Piotrkow Trybunalski (the Euro-Centre in Piotrkow Trybunalski), which might herald the centre-periphery conflict and reinforce the disintegration tendencies. It is worth recalling that the same phenomenon emerged in the field of ecological policy. It is the quantitative proof of widespread belief that the dominance of the Lodz City over the rest of the region causes a number of conflicts, mostly over funding, as the majority of resources are allocated to the restructuring of the city. The factor behind it is the new administration division of the province, bringing about the internal differentiation of the region, which accompanied by the gravity of some peripheral areas towards "old" metropolises, might reinforce disintegration tendencies.

### **5.3. Part II: Europeanisation processes (objectives and implementation)**

#### **5.3.1. Section 1: Adaptational pressures (types, components and mechanisms)**

By applying for the European Union, Poland declared her readiness to assume the obligations resulting from the membership, i.e. to adopt *acquis communautaire*. The process of approximation of Polish law to EU requirements, which consists of the integration process (the approximation of institutional structures), the adaptation process (the adjustment of the present solutions to the requirements) and the harmonisation process (the creation of "new economic and legal deal"), can be labelled as the Europeanisation. The Europeanisation is a top-down process, as it creates the misfit of legal, institutional as well as governance structures.

The legal adjustments are well advanced. Already in 1991 by virtue of *Europe Agreement* Poland took the obligation to adjust the law to *acquis* and in 1998 adopted the *National Programme for the Preparation to Membership in the European Union*, updated on regular basis, establishing tasks aiming at achieving Poland's readiness to EU membership at the end of 2002. As a result, during the accession negotiations the *Regional Policy and Co-ordination of Structural Instruments* (chapter 21) did not raise any problems and none grace period was agreed. On the contrary, *Environment* (chapter 22) was quite problematic due to huge costs of the implementation of the EU regulations<sup>38</sup> and 9 transitional arrangements were provided. Hence, in the area of the ecological policy the legal misfit is going to disappear in the medium term perspective<sup>39</sup>.

The Europeanisation of both policies at institutional level has followed the legal adjustments. However, organisational-institutional changes are progressing slowly. Not only are they considered to be time-consuming and expensive, but their unsatisfactory tempo reflects widespread belief in Poland that it is sufficient to change the law to change the reality<sup>40</sup>. As a result, it comes as no surprise that it has been assessed that "Poland has made significant progress in the setting-up of the institutional structures, but further strengthening of institutional capacities is needed"<sup>41</sup>. However, it is recognised in Polish literature that there is an increasing internal incompatibility of the whole institutional system, although it is admitted that external compatibility (the approximation with EU requirements) is progressing. It is a worrying phenomenon, as Poland is not an institutional *tabula rasa*. The question therefore arises to what extent the imports of institutions via the adoption of the *acquis* permits to create institutions capable of fostering local and regional development. The imported solutions risk to be too complicated to introduce and to enforce, which is particularly frightening, if one takes into account the poor social capital endowments as well as limited financial resources<sup>42</sup>.

The process of the Europeanisation of cohesion policies is propped up by the Community. Out of all forms of assistance provided by EU part, the most important ones are financial means for the modernisation of the infrastructure, resources for the support of legal harmonisation and assistance for implementation of policy changes in the two fields. The

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<sup>38</sup> Orłowski, W., Mayhew, A. (2001), "The Impact of the EU Accession on Enterprise Adaptation and Institutional Development in the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe", *SEI Working Paper*, Sussex European Institute, no 44.

<sup>39</sup> Commission of the European Communities, (2002), *Enlargement of the European Union. Guide to the Negotiations, Chapter by Charter*.

<sup>40</sup> Marody, M., Wilkin, J. (2002), *Meandry instytucjonalizacji: Dostosowanie Polski do Unii Europejskiej*, EU monitoring, V1, Krakow.

<sup>41</sup> Commission of the European Communities (2002), *Progress Report*, SEC (2002) 1408; UKIE (2002), *Raport w stanie dostosowan instytucjonalnych w Polsce do wymogow czlonkostwa w Unii Europejskiej*, Warszawa.

<sup>42</sup> Marody, M., Wilkin, J., *op. cit.*

EU support has already been present in PHARE Programme and currently is accompanied by the pre-accession instruments (ISPA and SAPARD programmes). The important constituent of PHARE assistance is Special Preparatory Programme dedicated to institution-building, whose main aim is to build and develop institutional and administrative structures, as well as human resources at central and regional level, especially with a view to enhance their capacity for effective implementation of the structural assistance on accession. Only in 2002 were some 82mio EUR earmarked for this issue. In the years 2000-2002 32 projects accounting to 1.5bn EUR were or are to be co-financed by ISPA. There is already some evidence of policy adaptation: improved access to financial means, legal and institutional adjustments, more effective use of available resources, improvement of evaluation (including self-assessment), learning by doing, establishment of partnerships and networks as well as improvement of social participation.

### **5.3.2. Section 2: Resistance to change**

The decentralisation reform ceded the competence for planning and conducting the policy of local/regional development to lower tiers of government. At national level the relevant ministries are responsible for the co-ordination of all activities related to the policy-conduct. They formulate national strategies and all related strategic documents; secure the co-ordination of implemented measures with a view to ensuring their coherence with the national strategies and report on the impact of all undertaken actions.

At regional level, there is a division of tasks between government's representative in the region – Voivod heading the Voivodeship Office and the representative of self-government in the region – the Marshal Office. The Voivod is an intermediary between central government and regional self-government. It is in charge of the transfer of funds to region's budget and a supervisor over monitoring the utilisation of funds and progress of planned investments and all activities regarding regional development and environment actions performed by self-government. Self-government (the Marshal Office headed by Marshal) is responsible for the formulation and implementation of cohesion policies in the voivodeship (programming, monitoring, supervision of all pro-development and pro-ecological activities in the region). The Regional Assembly adopts general policy guidelines in the form of regional strategies. It is to be consulted by the steering committee, consisting of representatives of the Voivod, local partners (self-government, social and economic partners, academic and research institutions), etc.

At local level, it is local self-government that is in charge of a wide range of executive tasks, such as the selection of service providers, proper execution of planned activities

towards meeting the set goals, maintaining financial and other relevant documents. Local administrations are final beneficiaries of regional assistance.

It is a general opinion that the devolution of powers was performed with much success. Although, both policies operate in a decentralised matter, the phenomenon of the so-called overlapping competence still raise some controversies<sup>43</sup>. It is assessed that the ongoing detailed allocation of tasks has to be further developed<sup>44</sup>.

It is widely believed that the decentralisation of finance has lagged behind the decentralisation of powers, which reinforces re-centralisation tendencies. Self-governments are financed by the mixture of own resources and grants transferred from central government. At commune level, slightly more than a half of the income are communes' own revenues. Voivodeships are more dependent on funding from the central budget, as some 80% of their revenues take the form of general-purpose grants and specific grants. The worst situation is with the counties, whose 10% of revenues comes from own resources<sup>45</sup>.

As a result, the networks are still much centralised with central-level institutions that dispose financial resources, the so-called national gatekeepers, occupying core positions. Within both policy areas central position in the network is occupied by the Voivodeship Office, being the representative of the central government in the region and a financial intermediary between upper and lower level of government. What is more, the survey by Hausner, Kudlacz and Szlachta indicate that there is an agreement among the stakeholders that the Voivod with his offices should play a central role in the networks of co-operation, especially with regard to co-ordinating functions, because of his or her administrative skills and experience and the concentration of the powers<sup>46</sup>. The same holds true for the Voivodeship Fund for Environment Protection and Water Economy in the field of environment policy, which acts as a collector of fees for the economic use of environment and ecological fines on the one hand and as a donor of financial assistance dedicated to the pro-ecological investments, on the other hand.

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<sup>43</sup> Gilowska, Z. (2001), "Preferencje społeczne – preferencje władzy" in Szomburg, J. (ed.), *Polityka regionalna państwa posrod uwiklan instytucjonalno-regulacyjnych*, Instytut Badan nad Gospodarka Rynkowa, Gdansk.

<sup>44</sup> Commission of the European Communities (2002), *Progress Report*, SEC (2002) 1408, p. 105.

<sup>45</sup> Bury, P., Swianiewicz, P., (2002), *Grant Transfers in Financing Local Governments in Poland*, paper presented at NISPAcee Annual Conference in Krakow, April 24-27; Gilowska, Z., Misiag, W. (2000), *Dostosowanie dochodow jednostek samorządu terytorialnego do norm konstytucyjnych i standardow europejskich*, "Polska regionow", Instytut Badan nad Gospodarka Rynkowa, Warszawa, nr 17.

<sup>46</sup> Hausner, J., Kudlacz, T., Szlachta, J. (1997), *Instytucjonalne przeslanki regionalnego rozwoju Polski*, PAN Komitet Przestrzennego Zagospodarowania Kraju, Warszawa PWN, p. 60.



### 5.3.3. Section 3: Evolution of central state policy-making structures

There are numerous ad-hoc, little formalised and institutionalised points of resistance to change. At local level the policy-conduct encounters some NIMBY protests from the part of public opinion and some non-governmental organisations. The most controversial, "provocative" area is environmental protection, especially the problem of location of some ecological investments like waste disposals or composting plants, but the location of other infrastructural investments such as expressways also raises citizens' emotions. There have been also allegations that some NIMBY protests have had "ignoble motives". Some NGOs – facing scarce finance – accepted financial incentives from local authorities for withdrawing their "No" to the questioned developmental projects. However, although being a real nuisance for local politicians, protests are sometimes considered to be a positive contribution to social capital. It has been argued that crisis sparked off by the manifestation of public discontent or disapproval often leads to re-institutionalisation. New capacities, permitting to increase citizens' participation in decision-making process, to increase transparency in policy-making and to involve new networks, are built. Protests are seen as a catalyst of building consensus-oriented culture. It is pointed out that conflicts can ignite the regulation of these policy areas, which are particularly vulnerable to clashes over limited resources<sup>47</sup>.

Other factor impeding domestic change is the poor quality of self-government in Poland. The surveys indicate that the level of knowledge of Polish civil servants of sub-national level on EU policies is still unsatisfactory<sup>48</sup>. The outcome of these deficiencies is already visible when it comes to the implementation of the pre-accession funds<sup>49</sup>. EU membership is expected to exacerbate these problems. Another obstacle is low organisational culture of local and regional administration, low transparency and accountability and some civil servants' resistance towards increased social participation in the policy-making<sup>50</sup>.

The surveys reveal the low quality of local government in Poland and significant regional discrepancies in terms of the institutional performance understood as ability to respond to social demand, to agree goals, to make decisions and to implement agreed policies, of

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<sup>47</sup> Janicke, M. (1996), "Democracy as a Condition for Environmental Policy Success: the Importance of Non-institutional Factors", in W. Laffery, J. Meadowcroft (eds.) *Democracy and the Environment*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar; Ostrom, M. (1990), *Governing the Commons*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>48</sup> Mach, Z., Niedzwiedzinski, D. (eds.) (2001), *Polska lokalna wobec integracji europejskiej*, Krakow.

<sup>49</sup> Zelazo, A. (2002), „Członkostwo Polski w Unii Europejskiej – pierwsze problemy potencjalne kryzysy dla samorządu terytorialnego w Polsce”, in Kurczewska U. et al. (eds.), *Polska w Unii Europejskiej. Początkowe problemy i kryzysy*, Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, Warszawa, pp. 117-127.

<sup>50</sup> UKIE (2001), *Analiza skutków prawnych regulacji wprowadzonych przez ustawodawstwo dostosowawcze dla samorządów gminy, powiatu i województwa*, Warszawa.

local and regional authorities. In general, there is the division into Poland A (the western part) and Poland B (the eastern part) with the Lodz Voivodeship being an exception that proves the rule. With some oversimplification, the self-governments in the eastern voivodeships produce lower quality legislation, as measured by the average number of questioned (by the Voivod) resolutions per one municipal government. They introduce and implement less innovative solutions and legislation. They are more corrupt. They also provide the administration services of worse quality. Their policy is not perceived as stimulating local economic growth and social development. The self-governments in Poland B have also poorer rating – vis-à-vis other self-governmental entities – with regard to planning and managerial capabilities.

It is interesting to scrutinise the factors behind such a gloomy appraisal of the institutional performance of the self-government in Poland, being – by all means – the crucial stakeholder in the cohesion policy and the reasons for the regional disparities of its quality. The Putman's theory of modernisation says that institutional performance is dependent on economic and social development level. With some simplification, some public institutions perform better because they have more money to spend and people are more skilful than in other regions. It can be easily seen that local government in Poland B – with few exceptions – perform alongside the trajectory that could be predicted on the basis of "modernisation" index, proxied by some socio-economic indicators.

The second theory places special emphasis on civil traditions and on the development of civil society. It assumes that public institutions perform better in environment where there is more trust and mutual co-operation, where people are more willing to be involved in public issues and in societies which are more open and therefore more willing to learn. This theory fits the regional patterns.

Another dangerous phenomenon in local administration is its politicisation. The major stakeholder, as provided for in the relevant legislation and revealed in the Social Network Analysis conducted within ADAPT project, the Voivod, is nominated along a political criterion: he or she is appointed by the Prime Minister and usually is a member or a supporter of a party or parties that won elections. On the other hand, the other important actor – the Marshal heading the Voivodeship Managing Board is appointed by the Regional Assembly (the Sejmik), the only body at voivodeship level elected in a universal suffrage. Such a way of the appointment of the Marshal gives him or her more legitimacy and accountability, but it does not make him or her independent of political influences. This – in turn – leads to frequent clashes between these two actors having a political rather than substantive background. The current division of powers between these two stakeholders is a factor igniting the potential conflicts.

All subsequent local elections were becoming less and less local, i.e. they were more and more dominated by political parties represented at national level. There is a significant lack of continuity of power<sup>51</sup>. It is quantitatively demonstrated by the outcome of survey by Swaniewicz et al., which reveals that the full political stability, understood as one mayor throughout the period 1993-1999 is merely 19% of all cases<sup>52</sup>.

Another worrying aspect of the present system is low level of professionalisation of self-governmental public administration, which might result – among the others – from the fact that the regime of the *Statute on civil service* of 18 December 1998 is not applicable to the self-governmental public administration at commune, county and voivodeship level, as it is excluded from the scope of the civil service.

#### **5.3.4. Section 4: Non-state actors**

The cohesion policies of the European Union are, undoubtedly, the policies that involve the greatest numbers of players. These are institutions at all levels (Community, national, regional and local) and actors from a very diverge range of milieux in the private sector (industry, agriculture, transport companies, etc.). It is a common knowledge that the regional development and environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned stakeholders: experts, professionals, NGOs, businesses and citizens. Therefore, the degree of the involvement of the different actors in the policy-making is of outstanding importance. The European Commission assesses that the social participation in policy-conduct has increased significantly, but still lags behind the European standards<sup>53</sup>. On one hand, the most important policy documents are consulted with public opinion. It is best exemplified by the wide public consultations of regional development strategies and the national strategy, which was one of the experiences of such a kind, definitely sparked off by the adaptation of the European patterns of the policy-making.

In this context, it comes as no surprise that Public-Private Partnerships are considered to be one of the most attractive tools to address the issue of regional development. The aforementioned statement is based on the recognition that pooling the resources of both the public and private sectors permits to obtain:

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<sup>51</sup> Marody, M., Wilkin, J., *op. cit.*

<sup>52</sup> Swianiewicz et al. (2000), „Sprawnosc instytucjonalna administracji samorzadowej w Polsce: zroznicowanie regionalne”, *Polska regionow*, Instytut Badan nad Gospodarka Rynkowa, Gdansk, nr 16.

<sup>53</sup> Commission of the European Communities (2002), *Progress Report*, SEC (2002) 1408.

- greater scope for innovation;
- improved quality of services offered traditionally by local authorities;
- risk sharing.

In Poland one can add another important reason why to develop PPP that is faster delivery of infrastructural projects via fund raising, which permits to narrow civilisation gap between different regions of Poland as well as Poland and the European Union.

As one size does not fit all, out of different forms of PPPs some are highly recommended in Polish reality, as they permit to maximise the output/input relation. They are public-private partnership, including: supply and civil works contracts, management contracts, leasing, build-own-operate contracts, concessions), public-private public-private partnership (the so called jointed ventures), public-private private partnership (a private contractor takes current operational decisions), private-public partnership (a public entity leases facilities from the private sector).

However, efforts to implement these partnerships face many challenges. For local and regional authorities, the challenge is to find ways to fulfil their responsibility for ensuring that all citizens have access to basic services, while meeting the needs of private investors. This implies a new and often difficult transition for many self-governments, from a provider and a manager of basic services, to an enabler and a regulator. For private firms, the challenge is to be convinced that investing in any particular project offers more attractive returns than other available investment opportunities. Drawing that conclusion depends on the firm's comparison of the potential returns against the potential risks, including both country risk (reflecting the general frameworks established by governments for any private investment in the country) and project risk (reflecting the specific characteristics of the investment opportunity offered by governments).

Overcoming these challenges is further complicated by a range of gaps in the capacity of both public and private actors, including:

- the reciprocal mistrust and lack of understanding of each other's interests and needs across the public and private sectors;
- the absence of locally available information on and experience with arranging sustainable partnerships;
- and the underlying legal, political, and institutional obstacles to forming effective public-private relationships.

As a result, there are scarce examples of successful PPPs in Poland. The most prospective areas, i.e. the domains where PPPs are going to develop best, are municipal services, such as gas, water, heat supply and waste management<sup>54</sup>.

The experts' and professionals' involvement in the policy-conduct is little structuralised and institutionalised and it is often *ad hoc*. The higher level of governance, the higher professionalism, understood as the decision-makers' willingness to employ and entrust experts. The lower, the more anti-intellectual disregard for the "world of eggheads", represented by some politicians and civil servants<sup>55</sup>, which is especially acute at local level<sup>56</sup>. The fact that Polish social dialog in the domain of cohesion policies and elsewhere lacks the intellectual-expert resource base is "responsible" for the weaknesses of social dialog in Poland that is "soft", non binding, putting an emphasis on providing information and consultation. Institutionalised forms of dialog, which have a systemic significance, are kept to minimum. Social dialog in Poland is – to much extent – publicised both in terms of the subject and form of debate. Its main subject of disputes on different issues attracting social attention is establishing who is to blame for the emergence of the problem. The question of responsibility is often shift to dimension of morality, which changes an initial conflict of interests into a conflict of values, and confrontation with a problem into a struggle for the right to exist on political scene. In this context, it comes as no surprise that the conditions and the possibilities of solving a problem ceased to matter. What is more, the diagnoses and proposals formulated in the course of discourse do not go beyond the bounds of common sense notions, which results from the superficial knowledge of the parties to the dialog, their determination not to disturb the interest of major actors and the will to manipulate the counterparts.

The involvement of NGOs in the policy-making is meagre, which might stem from the numerous deficiencies of the third sector in Poland<sup>57</sup>. First of all, merely 58-90% of NGOs are active ones. The majority of them, i.e. 41% operate locally, at commune and county level. ¼ acts at regional level, whereas every four operate nation-wide. Environmental protection and regional/local development as NGO's domains occupy distant positions

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<sup>54</sup> Moszoro M. (ed.) (2000), *Partnerstwo Publiczno-Prywatne w dziedzinie usług komunalnych*, Municipium, Warszawa, s. 10.

<sup>55</sup> Hausner, J. Marody, M. (2001), *The Polish Talk Show: Social Dialogue and European Integration*, EU-monitoring V, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Malopolska School of Public Administration of Cracow University of Economics, Krakow.

<sup>56</sup> This phenomenon demonstrated itself – at the early stage of our empirical research – with the different number of ties received and initiated by the University of Lodz – one of the interviewees. Such a divergence in the perception of the co-operation by its two parties: the academics and the other stakeholders stems from the experts' inner imperative to participate in the socio-economic life of the region, which is not noticed or appreciated by other actors.

<sup>57</sup> Marody, M., Wilkin, J. (2002), *op.cit.*

with education and leisure being the main area of their activity. Another stumbling blocks for the development of the third sector in Poland is the under funding: associations and foundations are heavily reliant on their own resources derived from members' contributions. The second most important source of financial means are public subsidies and donations from businesses and natural persons. Legal and regulatory environment is also perceived as detrimental to the development of the third sector in Poland. The obstacles are the lack of stability of state regulation towards the third sector, tax regulations (few tax exemptions for charitable activities) as well as extensive public administration sphere that leaves little room for NGOs' activities. Instead of shrinking, public sphere tends to grow, as measured by employment in public administration, which accounts for 3,4% of workforce and is higher by 33% than in the mid-1990s. There are not established modes of co-operation between the third sector and the public sector, namely the self-governments, which is – after the decentralisation – the main partner to NGOs. Existing procedures are inconsistent. In certain areas, the co-operation is based on informal agreements or arbitrary decisions. It often takes a shape of clientelism. It is widely acknowledged that it is imperative to elaborate the institutionalised modes of co-operation between the two sectors of which contractual system is "the best value for money", as it is based on public-private partnership, which permits to develop civic engagement and to improve the quality of life (the better quality of services provided by NGOs). The sad and pessimistic diagnosis finds its justification in our empirical research, where the alienation of the NGOs from the networks is evident in both policy areas and manifests themselves with the peripheral positions of non-governmental organisations.

The pessimistic diagnosis finds its justification in our empirical research, where the alienation of the NGOs from the networks is evident in both policy areas and manifests themselves with the peripheral positions of non-governmental organisations. The outcome of ADAPT research resonates well with the study by Hausner, Kudlacz and Szlachta that reveals the marginalisation of non-governmental organisations in the policy-making. The interviewed actors indicated the participation deficit of NGOs, although the interviewees pointed out that their role is significant and shall increase in the nearest future. The assessment of NGOs' participation in the policy-conduct may be mirrored by the fact that the activity of the third sector bears fruits in the longer perspective, i.e. "the effects of today measures are visible tomorrow"<sup>58</sup>.

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<sup>58</sup> Hausner, J., Kudlacz, T., Szlachta, J., *op. cit.*

### 5.3.5. Section 5: Civic culture

The success of many cohesion measures and in particular their implementation depends to a large extent on behavioural changes by citizens and/or stakeholders. The degree of support, acceptance, comprehension, co-operation and feedback from citizens, national, regional and local authorities and business is therefore paramount. Political culture, mutual trust, consensus-oriented and co-operative decision-making strongly influence the way in which domestic actors respond to Europeanisation pressures.

Civic culture in Poland is characterised by the high level of distrust<sup>59</sup>. The only reliance is on family. The importance the individual attach to family and friends can indicate the high level of informal social capital, but – on the other hand – it does not necessarily mean the high level of extended trust. It is pointed out that in Poland, as in other transition economies; there is no positive correlation between networks among friends and general moral attitudes.

There is also distrust in public institutions. Apart from the charities, the church, the army and some international organisations (UN, NATO), other institutions do not enjoy social trust. The majority of Poles do not trust local authorities. 1/3 puts no confidence in civil service. The worst ratings have political parties and politicians.

Although consensus is a highly valued concept and is understood correctly, not as giving up one's interests, but rather looking for solutions satisfactory to some extent to all parties, the Aristotle's rule of "golden mean" is hardly used in political life, since there is a widespread belief that the most important decisions are not taken by consensus. On the other hand, the society show the similar diagnosis of the socio-economic situation of the country and of the region, as the catalogue of basic development problems is not very extensive.

Civil engagement is low. It is measured by the active membership in civic organisations, including the church, sports club, environmental organisations and charities as well as different groups that represent economic and political interests such as trade unions or political parties. Although the variety of the organisations Poles are members of is considerable, the percentage of Poles stating that they are actively involved in any of 30 different organisations does not exceed 5.5%<sup>60</sup>. The worse socio-economic situation, the bigger passiveness. Low civic engagement is a particularly worrying phenomenon,

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<sup>59</sup> Rose, R. (1995), "Russia as a Hour Glass Society: a Constitution without Citizens, *European Constitutional Review*, 4(3), pp. 34-42.

<sup>60</sup> CBOS (2002), *Kondycja polskiego społeczeństwa obywatelskiego*, komunikat nr 265.

considering the fact that social participation is positively correlated with trust. The outcome of our survey resonates well with the results obtained in other research and reveals a serious disjuncture between social participation and moral attitudes of individuals. On the one hand, the overwhelming majority of Poles state that people should participate actively in socio-economic life that one should be sensitive towards the needs of others" or "one should help the others". The majority also believe in the efficacy of collective action and co-operation in solving important socio-economic problems. On the other hand, summary index of civic engagement, measuring all forms of citizens' activity towards the community amounts to 33%<sup>61</sup>. One can be tempted to conclude that actions speak louder than words and that the civic participation is simply better representation of social capital than declaratory attitudes, described above, but it is believed that the hitherto discrepancy may demonstrate huge potential of social participation and stand-by readiness for collective actions.

Different factors are blamed for this situation. The crucial one is the elitist style of local politics and policy-making. On one hand, local and regional authorities declare that being informed about citizens' preferences is one of their most important duties. They also state that each civil servant at local and regional level should talk to citizens and that the active involvement of residents between elections is important in order to make local democracy work. What is more, they find it imperative to encourage residents to be active in public affairs. There is a wide number of ways in which self-government can learn the views of residents, of which the most important ones are organised meetings as well as "personal contacts". On the other hand, local and regional authorities do not translate the knowledge of citizens' perception into local decision making process. The illuminating survey Swanievicz et al. reveals that politicians' attitude towards social participation in the policy-conduct is dominated by "politics is too complicated" stance.

In this context, it goes without saying that the society feels that politicians and the authorities do not represent their interests. A considerable part of Polish public opinion claim that local and regional authorities mainly take care of their own interests or they are steered by local and regional lobbying groups. A majority state that they have little impact on local politics, although one has to admit that the feeling of being able to influence local socio-economic and political life is much more widespread than the feeling of influence on regional or national polices. Such persuasions are merely a tip of the iceberg, revealing the syndrome of the destitute society. One may be tempted to blame political elites for this, however some researchers argue that it is rather the underdevelopment of civil society that is "responsible" for this phenomenon.

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<sup>61</sup> CBOS (2000), *Spoleczenstwo obywatelskie. Miedzy aktywnoscia spoleczna a biernoscia*, komunikat nr 2278.



The factor breeding distrust is corruption. Although situation in Poland is not so bad in comparison with different CEECs countries<sup>62</sup>, Poland still has the Corruption Perception Index at the level of 4, where 10 means "highly clean", whereas 0 - "highly corrupt"<sup>63</sup>. 70% of Poles are of the opinion that corruption is one of the most serious problems in Poland. It is very dangerous for local development that many people find local government more corrupted than other layers of administration. In 1995 CBOS public opinion suggested that corruption is more frequent at central level than at local level (24% vis-à-vis 10%), but similar 2000 survey shows the percentages of 17% at central level and 14% at local level<sup>64</sup>. According to the survey conducted by Swaniewicz et al. 15% of citizens know personally someone who at least once bribed local bureaucrats and councillors. Opinions of local entrepreneurs are more pessimistic. As many as 38% of them know another businessman who offered bribe. Every tenth citizen and entrepreneur find offering bribe almost inevitable to solve a problem. Virtually as crucial as actual corruption is attitude accepting bribes. The survey by demonstrate that 10% of mayors is of the persuasion that it would be right to accept something in return for some extra work and 7% in return for solving the problem faster than normal. The Lodz Province occupies the 12<sup>th</sup> rank as far as corruption in local government is concerned (the lower rank, the less corrupt the self-government in a given region)<sup>65</sup>. A World Bank report on corruption in Poland indicates the following areas in which self-governments are especially vulnerable to corruption: granting zoning decisions, licenses and permits as well as contracts for public works (World Bank, 1999). In this context, it goes without saying that waste management is particularly sensitive area. Corruption afflicts not only administration, but also private sector. It is amply demonstrated by notorious bribery scandal in the Lodz ambulance service in February 2002. It was alleged the doctors of the ambulance service not only took payment from the owners of funeral parlours for information about the death of patient, but they also actually killed patients for profit<sup>66</sup>.

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<sup>62</sup> According to EBRD report analysing situation in 20 post-communist countries, Poland occupies the second rank as far as „bribe tax” (measured as a percentage of the revenues spent on bribes) and 12th place with regard to bribe frequency. See also: Rose, R. (2002), “Advancing into Europe?” in *Nations in Transition* 2001, New York: Freedom House.

<sup>63</sup> Transparency International (2003), *Global Corruption Report*, p. 265.

<sup>64</sup> CBOS 2001, “Korupcja i afery korupcyjne w Polsce”, komunikat nr 2554.

<sup>65</sup> Swianiewicz et al. (2000), „Sprawność instytucjonalna administracji samorządowej w Polsce: zroźnicowanie regionalne”, *Polska regionów*, Instytut Badan nad Gospodarka Rynkowa, Gdansk, nr 16; CBOS (2000), *Poczucie reprezentacji interesów i wpływu na sprawy publiczne*, komunikat nr 2265.

<sup>66</sup> Transparency International, *op.cit.*

## 5.4. Part III: Assessment of learning capacity

### 5.4.1. Section 1: Outcome

It is assessed that Poland has made an important progress in the setting up of institutional structures. The bodies, which are responsible for the policy making in both areas have been designated, although steps must be taken to strengthen the overall co-ordination. The institutions were allotted the competence, but equipped with limited financial resources to carry out the tasks assigned.

The role of private sector in the policy-making has increased significantly. In the domain of regional policy, the development of private sector or PPP institutions supporting local and regional development should be regarded as success. The established organisations have collected potential necessary for undertaking activities supporting newly created businesses, entrepreneurship and local as well as regional development<sup>67</sup>. The increase of role of private sector manifests itself in our research. In this context it is worth recalling that the "enterprise promoters" such as the Foundation for Enterprise Development, the Agency for Regional Development and the Incubator Foundation in Lodz occupy central positions in the policy-networks<sup>68</sup>. In the field of environment policy, the private sector is more alienated from the networks of co-operation<sup>69</sup>, although its role is significant with regard to the provision of environment-related services.

The networks have been developing fast, especially among public-sector stakeholders (with formal, regular and institutionalised ties). Out of vertical connections, the densest are the networks grouping self-governmental units, which stems from the necessity to co-operate imposed by the relevant legislation. Relatively strong ties bind the public sector with PPPs and NGOs, but they are often *ad hoc* (i.e. pragmatic, to achieve some objectives), less formal and non-institutionalised. The interactions between the public sector and other stakeholders have often one-way character with private actors acting as petitioners or customers rather than partners and treated in paternalist manner.

What is worse, some unfavourable phenomena with regard to the properties of the networks persist over time and there is little evidence of improvements. In their illuminating study conducted in the mid-1990s Hausner, Kudlacz and Szlachta identified

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<sup>67</sup> Matusiak, K., Zasiadly, K. (2001), „Stan, zasoby i kierunki rozwoju osrodkow innowacji i przedsiebiorczosci na poczatkach 2001”, in: *Osrodki innowacji i przedsiebiorczosci w Polsce*, SOIIPP-Report 2001, KEUL, Lodz-Poznan, p. 11-17; Nawrot, A.. (1999), *Bilans instytucji promocji rozwoju regionalnego i otoczenia biznesu w nowym ukladzie terytorialnym*, „Polska regionow”, Instytut Badan nad Gospodarka Rynkowa, Warszawa, nr 1.

<sup>68</sup> Jewtuchowicz, A., Czernielewska, M., *op. cit.*

<sup>69</sup> Czernielewska, M., Joachimiak, N., *op. cit.*

some “weaknesses” of the institutional ties binding stakeholders in the process of the policy-making in the field of regional policy<sup>70</sup>. They pointed out to the informal nature of connections and the lack of “substantive” co-operation. The exchange of personnel, financial dependency (shares in capital, funding), ties: founder founded institution, “social” relations have been the most frequent institutional ties.

To sum up according to Campos<sup>71</sup> governance can be characterised by 5 institutional pillars:

- Government;
- Public administration;
- Rule of law;
- Policy-making;
- Civil society.

The assessment of institutional dimension of governance is also at the core of survey conducted by Kaufmann et al<sup>72</sup>. The researchers “measure” the quality of governance. It comes out that it deteriorates in Poland, which is surprising taking into account the progressing approximation of Polish law with *acquis communautaire*.

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<sup>70</sup> Hausner, J., Kudlacz, T., Szlachta, J., *op. cit.*

<sup>71</sup> For the bibliographic reference see: Marody, Wilkin, *op. cit.*

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*

### The quality of governance in Poland

	The years 1997-1998	The years 2000/2001	The trend
Democratic control	1,12	1,21	
Political stability	0,84	0,69	
Efficiency of the state	0,67	0,27	
The quality of law	0,56	0,41	
The rule of law	0,54	0,55	
The anti-fraud activity	0,49	0,43	

*The estimates range from (-2,5) bad quality to (2,5) good quality.*

*Developed after: Marody, Wilkin, op. cit., p. 133.*

#### 5.4.2. Section 2: Patterns of learning and adaptation

The important process of interactive learning takes place within the networks identified. In our research the stakeholders stress the constructive benefits of their involvement in developmental and environmental interventions co-financed with the pre-accession funds such as more effective use of available resources, the learning of evaluation techniques, the methods of self-assessment, realising the role of co-operation and networking as well as social participation in the policy-making. However, due to the nature of the networks<sup>73</sup>, the learning process is little structuralised, institutionalised and *ad hoc*. Very rarely it has permanent character and it is frequently disrupted, as the institutions, being important animators of networks and the learning, are liquidated due to the exhaustion of outside support funds and the lack of local-authorities' interest in backing them<sup>74</sup>.

The nature of networks as revealed by our survey permits to conclude that they are unlikely to develop into "change agents" or "norm entrepreneurs" that would persuade actors to redefine their interests and identities engaging them in processes of social learning, leading to successful policy adaptation. The networks that exist are not bound

<sup>73</sup> See section on the outcome.

<sup>74</sup> Jewtuchowicz. A., Szlachta. J., *Regional Policy in Poland – European Integration Strategies and Development of Partnership Systems*, forthcoming.

together by shared beliefs and values strong enough to persuade other actors to reconsider their goals and strategies, either. Nor they are epistemic communities *sensu stricto*, having authoritarian claim to knowledge and a normative agenda<sup>75</sup>.

Institutional learning, especially at local level, tends to be sporadic. The unsatisfactory level of knowledge of Polish civil servants of sub-national level on EU policies has been already addressed in the report, but it should be stressed that the failure of self-governments to face the intellectual challenge of the EU integration might lead to the petrification of the centralisation of both policies<sup>76</sup>.

Intensive learning has been taking place within institutions supporting local/regional development. Their activities can be grouped into five categories:

- Elaborating regional development plans, programmes and strategies;
- Investing;
- Training and consultancy;
- Information and promotion;
- Execution of conferred administrative decisions.

The process of professionalisation and specialisation of their activities have been going on hand in hand with the increasing competition for the European funds, which led some agencies to taking up commercial activity, trying to survive with scarce financial resources or even going bankrupt. But this process of Schumpeterian destruction resulted in some local and regional agencies to redefine their mission, tasks and objectives. Another reorientation has been taking place after 1999. With the emergence of the voivodship and county self-government, some initiatives, which were previously granted the competences of self-government, found themselves in entirely new situation with the imperative to define new *raison d'être* in local and regional communities.

However, the process of learning is impeded by some externalities (inadequate organisational-legal frames, changing legal environment, the lack of good practices, experience and traditions as well as the shortage of examples to emulate) and internal

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<sup>75</sup> Börzel, T., Risse, T. (2000), "When Europe Hits Home: Europeanisation and Domestic Change", *EioP*, vol. 4, no 15.

<sup>76</sup> Szlachta, J. (2001), *Znaczenie funduszy europejskich dla rozwoju regionalnego Polski* <http://www.rcie.zgora.pl/tematy/opracowania.html>, p. 21.

factors: mentality (the spirit of hostility instead of co-operation) and poor capital endowment<sup>77</sup>.

#### 5.4.3. Section 3: Policy recommendations

It is imperative to strengthen the administrative capacities. With the devolution of powers, with the progressing engagement of social partners in the policy-making, with the withdrawing of the state from direct intervention to indirect animation, the public administration cannot be weak. On the contrary! Therefore it is assessed that additional staff resources should be allocated, especially at sub-national level and further training of regional and local civil servants is of outstanding significance<sup>78</sup>.

The institutions should be shaped according to the World Bank model: listening, piloting and mainstreaming, which would permit to counteract the growing internal incompatibility of the institutional system in Poland<sup>79</sup>. It is of utmost importance to reinforce the overall co-ordination of all measures taken in both policy areas.

It is crucial to monitor regularly the extent of the achievement of the assumed goals and tasks in both policy domains as well as of the objectives of the control system of environment and regional policies. It is advisable to increase the role of evaluation of the effects of institutional performance. Three groups of indicators should play a vital role in this evaluation process:

- indicators of efficiency;
- indicators of economic effectiveness;
- indicators of social engagement and participation<sup>80</sup>.

Evaluation of effects produced by the control system of both policies shall be a source of relevant information used for further improvements of the system. Gathered information on the effects of environment and regional policies should be made public. Successful results will promote further improvements taken by all social partners as well as the authorities.

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<sup>77</sup> Hausner, J., Kudlacz, T., Szlachta, J., *op. cit.*

<sup>78</sup> Commission of the European Communities (2002), *Progress Report*, SEC (2002) 1408, p. 108; UKIE (2002), *Raport w stanie dostosowan instytucjonalnych w Polsce do wymogow czlonkostwa w Unii Europejskiej*, Warszawa.

<sup>79</sup> OECD (1996), *Networking of Enterprises and Local Development*, Paris, OECD, p. 118

<sup>80</sup> Poskrobko, B., Ejdyś, J. (2003), *Model of Waste Management Control System at Regional Level*, European Institute, Lodz, p. 46.

Further actions should be taken to increase social participation and to develop different kind of partnerships, both horizontal ones (EU Commission – central government – regional authorities – local self-government) and vertical ones (among authorities, academic milieu, NGOs, business environment institutions, etc.)<sup>81</sup>. It is important to develop public-private partnerships (supply civil works, contracts, management contracts, leasing, build-own-operate contracts, concessions), the private public-private partnership (the so called joint ventures), public-private private partnership (a private contractor takes current operational decisions) and private-public partnership (a public entity leases facilities from the private sector)<sup>82</sup>. It is crucial to elaborate the institutionalised modes of co-operation between public sector and NGOs, of which contractual system is “the best value for money”, as it is based on public-private partnership, which permits to develop civil engagement and to improve the quality of life (the better quality of services provided by NGOs)<sup>83</sup>. To increase social participation, the authorities should encourage trust and to ensure a right balance between conflict (to prevent paternalism) and participation<sup>84</sup>.

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<sup>81</sup> Szlachta, J. (2003), *Regional Policies In Central European Candidate Countries. Lessons From Cohesion Countries*, European Institute, Lodz.

<sup>82</sup> Guislain, P., Kerf, M. (1995), “Concessions – the Way to Privatised Infrastructure Sector Monopolies”, World Bank, *Viewpoint*, October.

<sup>83</sup> Marody, Wilkin, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

<sup>84</sup> OECD (1996), *op.cit.*, p. 118.

## **C. PART C: THE EUROPEANISATION OF REGIONAL AND ENVIRONMENT POLICIES, INSTITUTIONAL LEARNING CAPACITY AND DOMESTIC ADAPTATION: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES**

### **1. Chapter Seven: The Europeanization of Regional Policy Making and Domestic Governance Structures: Cohesions and CEE Countries**

#### **1.1. Introduction**

In this chapter we look comparatively at the Europeanisation of regional development in the cohesion and CEEC states, focusing on the domestic governance structures and adaptation. The chapter analyses and compares the adaptational pressures and reactions in the cohesion states (Greece, Ireland and Portugal) and the CEECs (Hungary and Poland). We consider the degree to which the pre-existing domestic governance structures in the cohesion states enabled adaptation to EU policy, and whether the domestic structures fitted with EU policy, or created policy misfits. It is often assumed that EU policy is a major catalyst for policy adaptation and institutional change, and that the reform of the EU's structural funds in 1988, created pressures for change. The new regional policy requirements were likely to challenge pre-existing national approaches to regional policy as the states were required to adopt new National Development Plans/CSFs in congruence with EU regulations. This required an increase and broadening of the consultation process in drawing up the plans, thereby ensuring that both public and private actors at the regional and local levels were involved in the process. Similar challenges faced the CEE states in preparing for accession and responding to the pre-accession instruments.

#### **1.2. Part I: Europeanisation of policy-making and domestic levels of governance**

##### **1.2.1. Section 1: Evolution of Policy Misfits and Adaptational Pressures**

#### **Cohesion Countries**

##### **1) Greece**

In Greece the combination of a centralised state structure, government control of the civil service and a weak civil society has constituted a major impediment to the adaptation and Europeanisation processes (Paraskevopoulos & Rees 2002). On joining the EC in 1981 there was an incompatibility between EC procedural, administrative and normative requirements and Greece's centralised



state and weak civil society, all of which led to major adaptational pressures. These major adaptational pressures have set in motion a set of incomplete adaptation procedures leading to a 'half-way Europeanisation'. Over time Greece's national regional policy has had to adapt to the requirements of EC regional policy. Nevertheless, the introduction of the principles of 'subsidiarity' and 'partnership' and the promotion of the integrated approach to planning has not easily fitted with the centralised and interventionist administrative tradition, the predominance of the state and the limited participation of social and private actors.

## 2) **Ireland**

In Ireland the machinery of government proved to be sufficiently malleable to change and adapted on a piecemeal basis in order to cope with the day-to-day management of the EC structural funds (Rees, Quinn and Connaughton, 2002). The centralised and sectoral approaches, which typified Ireland's system of government, were modified in response to the adaptational pressures of EC membership. Ireland's ability to adapt its structures in response to EU pressures reflected pragmatism on the part of the political elite, a strong civil service tradition, as well as a broader public consensus in favour of EU membership. It is also important to note that the Irish state, from the late 1980s onwards, utilised national partnership agreements with the employer organisations and the trade unions as part of a strategy of national economic growth. The importance of EU financial interventions strongly influenced Ireland's policies, especially following the reform of structural funds in 1988. Brussels' continuing insistence on the creation of effective sub-national structures for implementation of EU regional policy led to structural and institutional change.

## 3) **Portugal**

In Portugal the centralised nature of the state structure made the implementation of an effective regional development policy difficult. When Portugal joined the EC there was no national regional policy tradition and macro economic concerns were considered more important than large regional disparities. Prior to membership, the 1974 revolution had already led to new democratic structures and the growth of elected local bodies, such as municipalities. However, local interests were not always in agreement with the regional development priorities defined by the central government. The EU's regional policy, particularly the 1988 reforms and the 1993 Delors II package,

increased pressure on Portugal to adapt its approach to regional development and to focus on reducing regional disparities. It also prompted a limited degree of administrative reorganisation at the national level and some deconcentration, utilising the RCCs as regional coordinating bodies, but otherwise EC regional policy led to little institutional change at the regional level.

## CEECs

### 1) Hungary

Regional policy constitutes an area of high adaptational pressures for the CEECs, given that the issues of centre-periphery relations, decentralisation and regional development - along perhaps with the emergence of "privileged"/Europeanised elites on the level of core executive - lie at the core of the impact of conditionality (Goetz, Kl. and Wollmann H., 2001). This has to be viewed within the framework of the adaptational pressures facing these countries in all fields of public policy, at the same time as the transition from authoritarianism and modernisation. In this respect, although Hungary faced the pressure of these challenges, and the challenge of transforming a highly centralised system of governance to a decentralised one since 1989, this intensified after the signing of the Association Agreement (1991). However, the stage at which pressures for adaptation became more evident is the negotiation phase, and in particular over Chapter 21. Within this framework, both the 1998 and 1999 Commission's Regular Reports pointed to the weaknesses of the institutional infrastructure, especially with regard to administrative capacity and the inefficiencies in terms of inter-ministerial coordination. In the 2001 Regular Report, however, the Commission noted some progress in the application of the EU principles guiding the European regional policy.

Overall, it is widely accepted that the EU demands for a strong institutional capacity at the regional level have been used in the case of Hungary for justification of a statist conception of regional administration, especially in the preparation of the National Development Plan and the Regional Operational Programmes (ROPs), at the expense of the partnership model (Palne-Kovacs, I., et. al., ADAPT National Report, 2003;). Additionally, another challenge has been the number of the communes (3092) that negatively affects the coherence of regional programming. In sum, coordination and partnership problems at both the national and sub-national levels of government may be viewed as the key areas of adaptational pressure in regional policy.

## 2) Poland

Poland has faced similar adaptational pressures to Hungary. The processes of administrative restructuring, decentralisation and transformation of a highly centralised system of governance, though put forward as necessary steps for complying with EU conditionality criteria and facing the challenges of Europeanisation, have coincided with the transition from authoritarianism and modernisation. In Poland these pressures are arguably intensified by the size of the country. This has become evident from the coordination problems that arose with regard to the management of pre-accession aid, given the quite problematic territorial administrative structures, involving 49 territorial units (voivodships) and almost 2300 municipalities. Nonetheless, in the negotiation of Chapter 21 Poland did not face severe difficulties, given that the necessary adjustments of the legal framework was already well advanced, especially through the reforms adopted in 2000-01 (Czernielewska, M. et. al., 2003). The Polish case is similar to other CEECs, in that it demonstrates the discrepancies between legal adjustments and institutional adaptation.

Legal adaptation should be viewed as a necessary but not sufficient condition for institutional adaptation. In the case of Poland, it has been widely recognised that while the necessary legal framework of the administrative reform has been promptly advanced, the institutional and/or organisational change, that is, an important factor in adaptation, is a slow process (Czernielewska, M. et. al., 2003). In other words, the "institutionalisation" of the legal adjustments/adaptation is raised as the most significant adaptational pressure facing Poland. There is some evidence to suggest, that, while Poland generally demonstrates similar patterns of adaptation at the level of central administration with the other CEECs, it stands out for the adoption of the so called "Southern European paradigm", involving certain degrees of political clientelism and corruption, during the transitional period (Goetz, K., 2001).

While Poland shares the same areas of adaptational pressure as Hungary, namely coordination and partnership problems, the issues related to the "institutionalisation" of the reforms and subsequently to the institutional capacity at both the national and sub-national levels of government are viewed as imposing more intense adaptational pressures than in the Hungarian case.

### **Comparative Conclusions**

With the exception of Ireland, the transformation of the systems of governance primarily through administrative restructuring, devolution and decentralisation in the other participating cohesion (Greece, Portugal) and CEE (Hungary, Poland) countries - put forward as necessary steps towards meeting the EU conditionality criteria and facing the challenges of Europeanisation - have coincided with the transition from authoritarianism. Thus Europeanisation is associated with democratisation and modernisation, and should be viewed as a primarily independent variable, affecting the institution building and learning processes at both the national and sub-national levels of government. Consequently, in regional policy, Europeanisation has led to substantial administrative restructuring, involving devolution, network creation and institution building at the national and more importantly at the sub-national level of government in all these countries, albeit in varied degrees. In Ireland, on the other hand, Europeanisation is viewed as significantly affecting the governance structures that are traditionally based on the so-called Westminster model of government. Therefore, in sum, the degree of adaptational pressures facing all the participating countries should be considered as generally high, though a crucial diversification variable might be the duration of authoritarianism. Nonetheless, other domestic variables, such as culture and institutional infrastructure, may be more important in accounting for variation in the degree of adaptational pressures than merely the duration of authoritarianism.

### **1.3. Part II: Goodness of fit of domestic governance structures**

#### **1.3.1. Section 1: Evolution of formal institutional and policy-making structures**

##### **Cohesion Countries**

###### **1) Greece**

##### **Policy-making processes**

In the pre-accession period Greek regional policy was focussed on national economic development rather than on measures aimed at promoting regional development. In the post-accession period, this emphasis was initially retained, although state controls and regulations were slowly abandoned and de-regulation and privatisation gradually gained momentum. A number of local development policies were initiated and there was a series of decentralisation reforms and a new system of 'democratic planning'. In 1989 the first CSF was used as an instrument of planning, eventually replacing all other forms of development plans.

The types of problems that have arisen include a lack of cohesion between the ROPs and those parts of the national sectoral programmes which are implemented in the regions. There is also a broader lack of complementarity between the different EU programmes. The lack of incentives for public private partnership formation and networking. Whenever such partnerships and networks emerge, they are formed on an ad-hoc basis and outside a well-defined legal framework. Decision-making and implementation processes in Greece are vertically fragmented, both nationally and regionally, thus hindering horizontal co-ordination for a coherent strategy. Moreover, the lack of formal participation mechanisms and the binding of political parties by party clientelism leave very limited room for effective political co-operation (Getimis & Economou, 1996). The CSFs have required a constant building of new institutions, the redefinition of older ones and the formation of extensive networks and partnerships. These create significant adaptation difficulties and pressures in a state which has had only limited experience in partnership formation and networking.

### **Administrative structures**

The Greek administrative system is characterised as being:

- Highly centralised with major decision-making taken at the national level and administered through a system of regions. Basic competences and financial resources have not been transferred to the regional and local institutions. With the preservation of the key role of central government, the clientelistic mechanisms of privileged interest groups continuing to operate (Getimis and Economou, 1996).
- The local tier comprises the prefectural councils (established in 1984), with directly elected prefects, along with municipalities and communities.
- A new regional tier was created, with the introduction of administrative regions in 1987 (headed by a government appointed representative assisted by regional councils) and its role upgraded in 1997.

The functional role of the region is limited to that of strategic regional planning, which places it at the margins of the local system of governance (Paraskevopoulos, 2001). Starting in the 1980s, and especially from 1994 onwards, a change in centre-periphery relations increased the influence of the local government.

### **Institutional actors**

EU regional policy has had a significant impact on the Greek institutional system. It has impacted on the administrative structure of the Greek state and fostered

decentralisation, notably the establishment of 13 administrative regions in 1986. The impact has increased with the CSFs and the introduction of the principles of 'programming' and 'partnership'. In order to cope with these changes there was an increasing level of decentralisation from 1993 onwards. There was an opening up of procedures of democratic planning at each spatial level but with continuation of the hierarchical, 'top-down' structure, within which coherence and complementarity of plans should be achieved (Paraskevopoulos, 2001). What the decentralisation and democratic planning reforms implicitly brought about has been the identification of specific projects at each level of government, subject to the expenditure constraints of the higher tier (ibid.). It also led to extensive institution building, broadening of actors and redefinition of roles. The regional councils and the monitoring committees bring together a large number of partners from different economic sectors and levels of government. Moreover, the arena has been transferred from the local level to the regional level broadening the scope of activity of the concerned actors and demanding extensive learning to ensure efficiency in the new ways of networking, lobbying and partnership formation.

## 2) Ireland

### **Policy-making processes**

On accession Ireland was centralised with decision-making taking place at the national level. On joining the EC, Ireland was treated as one NUTS II region and accorded objective one status from 1989 until 2000. The focus was on national economic development over regional and local initiatives, with membership tending to initially reinforce rather than challenge this viewpoint. The changed emphasis within the EU since the late 1980s have combined with changed attitudes and circumstances in order to create a climate conducive to a more regionalised focus in policies and provision. The local dimension has also grown in significance with the emergence of a cadre of non-governmental actors who facilitated the process of 'bottom-up' development. The reforms of the structural funds accelerated the change in practices and procedure, and acted as a catalyst to broaden the range of actors involved in the planning and implementation of interventions and to change some administrative practices.

### **Administrative structures**

Ireland's public administration comprises:

- A strong central administration of government departments and state sponsored agencies and a relatively weak system of local government.

- The Irish system of policy-making and implementation is preponderantly sectoral. It is only in recent years (largely in response to EU structural and cohesion policies) that a more integrated approach to policy making and implementation has been adopted. EU business has been successfully grafted on the normal business of the various government departments.
- The system of local government is currently undergoing change aimed at making it more responsive, efficient and effective.

Since 1994 eight regional authorities co-ordinate some local authority activities and play a monitoring role in relation to the use of EU structural funds. In 1999 two regional assemblies were created and promote co-ordination of the provision of public services in their areas, manage new regional operational programmes in the CSF 2000-2006 and monitor the impact of EU regional programmes.

### **Institutional actors**

In Ireland the machinery of government has had to change and adapt in order to cope with the day-to-day management of the EC structural funds. There has been some institutional change at the national level, with the administrative adaptation of government departments and increased Oireachtas scrutiny of EU business, but there have been relatively few new national level institutions created. Developments at the local and regional levels suggest that there is the possibility for innovation and partnership. There is also an increasing willingness at this level to learn from regional actors in other states, as well as to share experiences and ideas. The most obvious structural changes have been brought about by the emergence of the new regional structures and the growth of local partnerships.

## **3) Portugal**

### **Policy-making processes**

In Portugal policy-making was largely centralised and regional policy was not a priority prior to accession in 1986. The Fundamental Law established three tiers of local government: parishes, municipalities and administrative regions. In 1984 the government for the first time established regional policy as an objective and in 1988 the structural fund reforms led to the adoption of a complex and wide-ranging planning process. The Regional Development Plan, 1989-1993, was drawn up after a consultation process at the regional level, but the decision to prepare and submit a single RDP was still taken by the national government. Similarly, for the period 1994-99, the government strategy was to maintain EU funding while simplifying the procedures required under the

1988 reform, work on the RDP involved participation by the different ministries, Regional Coordination Commissions, the autonomous regions, local authorities, figures from political, business and financial life and MEPs. In 1999 a similar process of consultation was undertaken for the NDP for 2000-2006.

### **Administrative structures**

- The Portuguese system of administration is highly centralised, although the constitution does provide for administrative deconcentration and decentralization. In 1979 the Regional Coordination Commissions were established in order to coordinate deconcentration.
- In 1983 the Directorate-General of Regional Development was set up, as a part of the Ministry of Internal Administration, in order to coordinate the intervention of the European Regional Development Fund (until recently under the Ministry of Planning and Territorial Administration).
- The institutional model for access to ERDF was based on a three-tier system: the top tier of overall coordination and direct dialogue and negotiation with the EC Directorate-General for Regional Policy, a middle tier, comprising the research and planning offices of the different ministries involved, the regional governments of the Azores and Madeira, as well as the Regional Coordination Commissions, and the third tier, consisting of those responsible for implementation.

### **Institutional actors**

Following EC membership, a number of institutional structures were created at the national level and incrementally adapted in response to European requirements. The use of CSFs led to the creation of a new structure to manage, monitor, control and assess EC interventions. This was an innovative model for the administrative sector, with the creation of "parallel" bodies specifically designed to manage EC funds. The solution made it possible to decentralise the management of funds within the central administrative authorities and even for the local authorities, and to abide by the principle of partnership established in EC regulations. The institutional structure for implementation of the structural funds during the CSF for 1994-99 broadly adopted the previous model for management, monitoring, assessment and control. Under CSF III a new model for management of EC funds was developed wherein each regional operational intervention covers and includes the interventions of all ministries in the region, giving the deconcentrated regional departments significantly greater responsibilities.



## **CEECs**

### **1) Hungary**

#### **Policy-making processes**

The dominant issues facing Hungary in relation to its adaptation to the EU regional policy-making structures refer to the coordination of the actions financed by EU interventions funds (mainly Phare/CBC, ISPA and SAPARD) and the gradual adoption of the principles of concentration, programming, partnership and additionality. Thus, since 1990 a series of reforms decentralising the state administration, re-establishing the autonomy of local governments and delegating to them broad responsibilities in delivering local public services were introduced. They also put forward a legal and regulatory framework to enable private participation in local infrastructure and services and tightened budget constraints. The reforms of the early 1990s, and in particular the reform of local government, were characterised by the strengthening of the role of locality (municipalities, local communities) at the expense of counties, which is the traditional unit of the system of local governance.

The formal policy-making structures for regional policy, however, were established in the period 1996-1999 by the Act on Regional Development and Physical Planning 1996 and its amendment (1999). The main policy-making relevant feature introduced by the Act is the creation of a three-tier system of Regional Development Councils at the county, regional and national levels of government, in parallel with the public administration structures, and with the right of local municipal associations to participate in the county councils. The primary objective of this policy-making framework has been to facilitate consultation, dialogue and eventually participation in policy formulation of all interest groups and stakeholders, especially at the meso-level (county and region) of government. However, the predominant role of central state actors (ministries) in the councils, especially after the 1999 amendment of the Act, and the weakness of the local institutional infrastructure in general have resulted in an ever increasing role of political parties in the policy process with the possibility for raising party-dominated clientelism as the main characteristic of regional policy-making process (Palne-Kovacs, I., et. al., 2003).

#### **Administrative structures**

Hungary is widely considered as a "frontrunner" in administrative adaptation at both the national and sub-national levels of government (Goetz, Kl, and H. Wollmann, 2001). In part this can be explained by its refusal to adopt the so-called "Latin", (namely the

Southern European) paradigm in the transition from authoritarianism. Its success is also attributed to the fact that the reform of public administration originates in institutional reforms begun in the late 1970s with the "professionalisation" of public administration. The main administrative innovation in terms of regional policy has been the establishment, in 1999, of the seven administrative regions/Regional Development Councils (NUTS 2), as the main locus for coordination of the activities of de-concentrated government departments. The regions, which are overseen by Commissioners, have constituted the second meso-level of governance – the first being the 19 Councils at the county level (NUTS 3). However, while regions are mostly artificial entities facilitating the reconciliation between local interests and central state tasks, the articulation of local interests takes place at the county level, County Development Councils. Overall, both the regional and county Councils are loci for co-coordinating regional development policy, where central government is represented by branch officials, responsible for implementing sectoral policies.

Decentralisation and reform of the regional governance system, however, has gone hand in hand with increasing concerns about the strengthening central administrative capacity. Therefore, central state, and in particular the Ministry of Agriculture and Regional Development (MARD), remains the key actor in the policy-making process. This is mostly evident in the allocation of financial resources, whereby the share of all the decentralized levels of government amounts to only 8-10% of development funds (Palne, I., et. al. 2003).

### **Institutional actors**

The county remains the main locus for the articulation of local interests and the formulation of policy-making. Thus, the directly elected county assembly used to be the main forum of interest representation and intermediation at the sub-national level of government. The county development councils, brought about by the latest administrative reforms, are supposed to be the new – and empowered - loci of interest representation and policy formulation at the county and sub-county (local) level of government. In this respect, the actors' constellation at the county councils level includes municipal associations, private and civil society as well as professional association actors. The establishment of the regions in 1999 was supposed to create another forum for interest intermediation and policy formulation close to the central state. However, the limited role of both local public actors and pressure groups, such as chambers, NGOs etc., in the regional development councils after the 1999 amendment of the Regional Policy Act has substantially decreased the role of the region/regional council. Therefore,

the identification of the main actors in terms of interest representation is to be carried out primarily at the county and secondarily at the regional level.

## 2) Poland

### **Policy-making processes**

In terms of the adaptation to the EU regional policy-making structures, Poland faces similar challenges to Hungary, primarily related to the coordination of EU funds (Phare, ISPA and SAPARD) and the gradual adoption of the principles of concentration, programming, partnership and additionality. With regard to policy-making structures, Phare, SAPARD and ISPA programmes functioned as initiators of the democratic programming approach to development, the preliminary steps to which have been the formulation of the National Development Plan and the National Development Programme (2000-2006). They have also contributed to the processes of learning and institution building within the policy-making structures. This is achieved mainly through the provisions for the implementation of the partnership principle in the preparation of the operational and regional (voivodship) programmes under the Phare assistance, which involves consultation in the policy-making process, institutionalised in the form of steering and monitoring committees. These committees constitute fora for dialogue and communication among all actors involved in the policy process.

### **Administrative structures**

Poland is considered as following Hungary in the process of administrative reform at the central state level, demonstrating similar patterns of "enclaves" of professional and expertise excellence, mainly confined in the sectors dealing with the EU (Goetz Kl. and H. Wollmann, 2001). There is also strong evidence of adoption of the Southern European paradigm, involving clientelist practices and corruption (Goetz, K., 2001). The objective of the reforms of the administrative system of the state after 1989 has been to re-establish the self-government structures and gradually decentralise the policy-making process.

The reform of 1999 introduced three tiers of local and regional government territorial units, that is 16 voivodships (NUTS 2), over 300 poviats (NUTS 3) and the local level (communes-gminas). The elected regional councils (Sejmiks) and the management boards directed by the Marshal represent the self-government structures. The representative of the central government in each region (Voivod) monitors the activities of the Sejmiks. The new tiers of government and especially at the regional level have been granted broad competencies for regional and physical planning, land management

and environmental protection. However, lack of sufficient financial resources and over-dependence on the central government prevent regional self-governments from fulfilling their statutory roles and they are constrained to drafting regional development plans (Gilowska 2001:145). Overall, the lack of co-ordination between the national and sub-national actors and levels of government as a result of unclear allocation of competences constitutes a serious problem for the planning and implementation of the EU structural policy.

### **Institutional actors**

There are formal provisions for social dialogue, interest representation and consultation in the policy-making process at both the national and sub-national levels of government. At the central state level, the 'National Strategy for Regional Development' provides for social dialogue and interest groups, private sector and NGO actors' participation in the policy process, on a consultative basis, through the Council for Regional Policy. At the regional level, the Marshall Office is obliged to consult the strategy and its realisation with the Voivod, local actors (self-governments, social and economic partners, research institutions), but also with other voivodships and regions. In accordance with the partnership principle, a regional steering committee appointed by the Marshal consults a regional strategy and a voivodship operational programme, which are adopted by the Regional Assembly. However, the weakness of the institutional infrastructure, especially at the sub-national level, triggers the decisive role of the central state in the policy process, accompanied by a substantial amount of party-dominated clientelism (Czernielewska, M. et. al., 2002).

### **Comparative Conclusions**

The cohesion states have adapted their national administrations and regional structures in response to the requirements of an evolving EU regional policy. The change in structural funding has induced a certain amount of social learning and adaptation of domestic institutional structures, especially at the sub-national levels. In the cohesion states, significant administrative change has occurred, with administrative reorganisation and changes in the responsibilities and roles of central government departments evident. New sub-national regional actors have been created in two of the three states; perhaps strongest in Greece, still relatively weak in Ireland and virtually non-existent in Portugal. This is an interesting finding, given that the adaptation pressures have been high in Portugal and yet change has largely been confined to administrative reorganisation rather than formal institution creation.

Both Hungary and Poland have followed the 'South European' - primarily the Greek and secondarily the Portuguese - paradigm of administrative adjustment to the Europeanisation of the policy process, involving devolution and decentralization. This is particularly evident in the establishment of regional governance units at the NUTS II level. Given, however, the inherent weaknesses of the institutional infrastructure, especially at the sub-national level, they followed suit the trend of recentralisation – encouraged by the EU Commission- since the mid-1990s. Ireland stands out for its rather reluctant and more pragmatic approach to decentralisation of the policy process, given the effectiveness of its national institutional machinery.

The following table summarises some of the key policy fits/misfits in the regional policy arena.

**Table 4.** Institutional and Policy Fit and Misfit

State	Policy Fit	Policy Misfit
<b>Greece</b>	Centralised administrative system	Centralised policy-making Poor administrative tradition Institution building Lack of consensus
<b>Ireland</b>	Administrative pragmatism Strong civil service tradition Moderate degree of institution building Consensual policy-making Strong civil society	Centralised policy-making Weak local government
<b>Portugal</b>	Centralised administrative tradition Deconcentration	Centralised policy-making Absence of institution building Absence of regional policy tradition Lack of consensus
<b>Hungary</b>	Adoption of EU acquis Growing civil service expertise on EU matters	State-led policy-making National coordination poor Administrative capacity Weak sub-national institutions
<b>Poland</b>	Adoption of EU acquis Growing civil service expertise on EU matters	State led policy-making Poor coordination between ministries Poor institutional adaptation Institutional capacity

**Table 5.** Cases of misfits, adaptational results and mediating factors

Country	Policy Misfit	Adaptational Result	Mediating factors
<b>Greece</b>	Centralised policy-making Poor administrative tradition Institution building Lack of consensus	Slow change Slow change Resistance Slow change	Central structure/clientilism Centralised institutions Static system Weak civil society
<b>Ireland</b>	Centralised policy-making Weak local government	Slow change Slow change	Central structure Central structure/political climate/civil society
<b>Portugal</b>	Centralised policy-making Absence of institution building Absence of regional policy tradition Lack of consensus	Slow change Resistance Slow change Some change	Central structure Central structure/society Central structure Weak civil society
<b>Hungary</b>	State-led policy-making National coordination poor Administrative capacity Weak sub-national institutions	Some change Improving Improving Slow change	Centralised structure/civil society/clientilism Government Civil Service Centralised state/funds/
<b>Poland</b>	State-led policy-making Poor coordination between ministries Institutional Building Institutional capacity	Some change Improving Slow change Slow change	Centralised structure/civil society/clientilism Government Central structure/funds Multiple veto points

The patterns of change described above are evident in the types of central actors identified in the Social Network Analysis as involved in regional policy in the five regions in the following table. It is notable that in Portugal and Poland these actors are largely deconcentrated national representatives, whereas in Ireland and Hungary the key actors are institutions representative of the region and locality.

**Table 6.** The most central actors in regional policy in the five regions

	<b>Notio Aigaio, Greece</b>	<b>Mid-West Region, Ireland</b>	<b>Lisbon and Tagus Valley, Portugal</b>	<b>South Transdanubian Region, Hungary</b>	<b>Lodz Region, Poland</b>
<b>1</b>	ROP Managing Authority	Shannon Development	Ministry of Planning	South Transdanubian Regional Development Council	Voivodeship Office in Lodz
<b>2</b>	Regional Secretariat	Mid West Regional Authority	Regional Development Directorate General	South Transdanubian Regional Development Agency	Marshal Office, Department of Economy
<b>3</b>	Cycladese Development Agency	Limerick County Council	Lisbon and Tagus Valley Coordination Commission	Assembly of Somogy Council	Marshal Office, Department of Development Regional Policy
<b>4</b>	Cycladese Prefecture	Ballyhoura Partnership	Lisbon Metropolitan Area	Assembly of Baranya Council	Foundation for Enterprise Development
<b>5</b>	Dodecanese Prefecture	Department of Environment and Local Government	Abrantes Municipality	University of Pécs	Incubator Foundation in Lodz

### 1.3.2. Section 2: Non-state actors

#### Cohesion Countries

##### 1) Greece

#### **Existence of fora for dialogue and negotiation**

In Greece there are limited fora for dialogue in which non-state actors have an opportunity to participate in the policy-making process, with regional policy still predominantly a public sector activity under the control of the Ministry of National Economy. In Notio Aigaio, the key actors identified in the Social Network Analysis were the Cycladese and Dodecanese Development Agencies, along with some of the newer private-public actors, such as the Local Association of Municipalities and Communes. The main state actors, however, remain the regional secretariat and ROP managing authority. The principal local regional fora in which non-state actors play a part are the regional councils and the ROP monitoring committees.

### **Role of experts**

Policy experts, such as research centres and individual experts, play little or no role in Greece, with very limited evidence of any involvement at this level found in the Notio Aigaio region. In the regional policy domain most of the evidence points to the importance of state actors, both at the national and regional levels, with only some minor involvement from actors in the university sector and private associations.

### **Role of the private sector**

Private interest actors do not play a direct role in policy-making and implementation. Most interviewees considered private actors, such as trade union and associations, to be poorly informed. The exceptions are the chambers of commerce. For example, the Dodecanese Chamber plays a significant role in the prefecture being a significant actor *"in the development process and the initiator of almost all fora for information, dialogue and communication in the prefecture"* (Paraskevopoulos, 2001: 111). Many of these actors are members of the Notio Aigaio Regional Council and the ROP monitoring committee, and thus participate in voting on regional operational programme.

### **Participation of NGOs**

There is limited NGO participation, outside of the two chambers of commerce, which are considered private actors. The local university is identified as an actor in our analysis, and as a part of the network, but is not a central player. The finding is not surprising, given the weakness of civil society in Greece, and the predominant role of state actors.

## **2) Ireland**

### **Existence of fora for dialogue and negotiation**

Over the three programme periods there has been increase in the level of formal consultation and involvement of non-state actors. At the national level, non-state actors, such as the social partners, have played a growing formal role in the formulation and implementation of regional policy arising out of three National Development Plans. At the regional level, in the Mid-West the preparation of the second (and also the third) NDPs involved an extensive consultation process (Quinn, 1999). The Social Network Analysis highlights the key role played by the Mid-West regional authority, as a fora for such dialogue. Interviewees attributed more significance to the Mid-West regional authority than to the Southern and Eastern regional assembly. Shannon Development, the local development agency, is perceived by interviewees as being an important forum for interaction. Clear structures for management and monitoring of measures have also been



established, which have included a monitoring committee for each OP and an overall CSF monitoring committee.

### **Role of experts**

The role of experts remains limited but has grown reflecting an increasing use of independent experts for policy analysis and assessment. Government departments also avail of the advice and expertise of the private sector, either through consultancy or through specialist recruitment. Such expertise is also reflected in the part played by national level bodies and the use of expertise at the local level. At the regional level, the local third level educational institutions are involved on the fringes of the issue networks. For example, Shannon Development as a part of the National Spatial Strategy, has utilised a mix of private consultants and university expertise, to help it shape its regional development strategy.

### **Role of the private sector**

Individual private actors and private organisations are generally not involved in policy-making, but are involved through associations and chambers of commerce on the Mid-West's EU operational committee, although not on the regional authority's management or operational committee. In Ireland chambers of commerce are private associations with members drawn from a wide array of local business actors. In Limerick and Ennis the chambers of commerce are important local actors. There are strong links between membership of such chambers and local authority actors. In most instances industry and voluntary groups are more likely to be in receipt of loans and grants from bodies such as Shannon Development, or participants in particular EU projects. In the regional policy arena those actors interviewed were largely from the public sector and made little reference to private actors.

### **Participation of NGOs**

In Ireland there are many local and regional organisations, as would be expected given a strong civil society, but many of these actors are not directly involved in regional policy. There are other private associations, such as the Irish Hotel Federation, Irish Business and Employers Confederation, ICTU and Irish Farmers Association that have regional and local offices in the Mid-West region, but are not directly involved in the formation of policy. One notable exception is the LEADER groups, or local community associations or companies, which are specifically geared to local development needs. These actors are particularly well informed and featured prominently as key actors in our Social Network

Analysis. Such actors are well networked and are highly interactive with the local authorities and state agencies, although their outlook and influence is highly localised.

### **3) Portugal**

#### **Existence of fora for dialogue and negotiation**

In Portugal there has been an incremental and growing involvement of non-state actors in the planning process, reflecting a slightly stronger civil society than in Greece. At the national level, the public sector, the private sector and NGOs are all represented on the Economic and Social Council, which seeks to promote the participation of economic and social agents in the government's decision-making process. The central actors remain the Ministry of Planning and the Regional Development Directorate General. At the regional level, the Lisbon and Tagus Valley Coordinating Commission, provide the main fora for dialogue. Non-state actors have also been involved on the monitoring committees offering a further forum in which to discuss policy. Other than these fora, however, there are limited opportunities for non-state actors to play a role in regional development.

#### **Role of experts**

In Portugal experts are largely integrated into the existing central government policy-making frameworks. For example, experts are involved on consultative councils and as part of the CSF Observatory. Government departments also use independent experts as part of the evaluation process and external experts are used in the formation of municipal development plans and urban development plans.

#### **Role of the private sector**

In the private sector there is a wide range of profit and non-profit organizations but with relatively little involvement in national or regional fora. The interviews with actors suggested that there has been an increase in the number of entrepreneurial associations at local level. The major objective of these associations is to develop lobbying power with regard to national decision makers, namely ministries, in order to obtain financial support.

#### **Participation of NGOs**

Civil society in Portugal is relatively weak, with NGOs not normally involved in the development of regional policy. The exceptions would appear to be regional business associations (e.g. Leiria Regional Business Association), which do play a role in the regional process. Similarly, there is some limited trade union activity, although this tends

to be confined to representation on national level bodies. Lastly, Agricultural Development Associations have developed strong links with other NGOs, municipalities and municipal associations. There have been attempts to involve non-state actors in the policy process, arising out of criticism of the first CSF where there was limited civil participation, thus the second CSF was preceded by a consultative process which involved business associations, trade unions, local civil associations and experts.

## **CEECs**

### **1) Hungary**

#### **Existence of fora for dialogue and negotiation**

The Regional Development Councils brought about by the latest administrative reforms of the period 1996-99 constitute the main fora for dialogue. At the central state level, the National Regional Development Council is viewed as the most important forum for dialogue, despite its consultative role in policy formulation. At the regional and county levels the crucial role of the respective Development Councils, as fora for interest intermediation, dialogue and policy consultation is revealed by their central position within the regional policy network (see Palne, I., et. al., 2003). Additionally, other EU Structural Funds-specific institutions at the regional and county levels, such the European Information Point and the European Development Office may be viewed as EU-specific consultation bodies. However, all these institutions cannot be accounted for as part of the pre-existing institutional infrastructure, but rather as institutional innovations brought about by the Europeanisation of the policy process.

#### **Role of experts**

There has not been identified significant presence of expertise - in the form of think tanks - in the formulation of policy. The involvement of experts is on the basis of professional advice provision and/or participation in projects. For example, experts from the University of Pécs contribute to the drafting of development programmes for the region, as well as managing the regional marketing strategy. There is some evidence, however, of issue-specific networks. Thus, at the regional level, the development council is assisted by a non-profit regional development agency, operating as a public utility company and participating in the management of the Phare pilot programme. At the county level, the European Information and Development Public Utility Company, jointly founded by the Baranya County Assembly, the county's Chamber of Commerce and the local government of the city of Pécs, are responsible for EU tenders, preparation of EU-funded projects and international contracts. The Company has prepared the EU

integration strategy for the region and participates in several micro-regional tenders (Palne, I., et. al., 2003).

### **Role of the private sector**

The level of private sector and PPPs participation in the policy process is generally low. The only significant actors are associational actors, namely Chambers of Commerce, but with limited representation at the Development Councils. Beyond the Chambers, at the national level, a planning institute (TIR) operating as a limited company but owned by the Ministry of Regional Development (MARD) plays a key role in spatial planning and project evaluation. At the regional level the only important actor is the Hungarian Development Bank, which is in exclusive public ownership, and participates in financing regional development programmes. Nevertheless, its role cannot be deemed significant. Finally, the Pecs Industrial Park, founded with the support from a Phare programme, is the only important private actor at the local level (see Palne, I., et. al., 2003).

### **Participation of NGOs**

The presence and role of NGOs in the policy-making process is limited and this is an indication of the weakness of civil society in Hungary. This weakness, which is partly attributed to the lack of motivation for intensive participation, is accompanied by the rather predominant role of political parties and clientelism in the policy process. As the Social Network Analysis suggests, although NGOs are part of the policy network, they are unable to play a central role (see Palne, I., et. al., 2003). There is some evidence at the local level of civic foundations focused on addressing unemployment and rural development problems being active participants in the organisation of the public works programmes and training.

## **2) Poland**

### **Existence of fora for dialogue and negotiation**

The existing fora for dialogue at both the national and sub-national levels of government are mostly related to institutional innovations brought about, either directly or indirectly, by the Europeanisation of policy-making. Thus, as the fieldwork suggests (Czernielewska, M. et. al., 2003), the main fora for dialogue at the national level, such as the Agency of Enterprise Development, the Agency for Regional Development, the Agency for Agriculture Market and the Committee for European Integration, mostly deal with either the administration or distribution of pre-accession funds. Additionally, the National Strategy for Regional Development constitutes a policy consultation forum which is indirectly linked with the reforms put forward by Europeanisation. At the regional level,

on the other hand, the main forum for dialogue and policy consultation is the Marshall's Office.

### **Role of experts**

There is no evidence of expertise involvement in the policy-making process in the form of think tanks in Poland. Experts' involvement is usually constrained to professional and advice consultancy on the drafting of legislation while the implementation stages are characterised by the predominance of the central government administration. This is revealed by the position of the University of Lodz within the network (see Czernielewska, M. et. al., 2003). There is, however, some presence of issue-networks primarily at the regional level, such as the Lodz Agency for Regional Development and the Incubator Foundation.

### **Role of the private sector**

Although the main form of private sector and PPPs participation is that of associations and primarily chambers at the regional (i.e. Polish Chamber of Textile Industry, Lodz Chamber of Industry and Trade) and local (i.e. Lodz Business Club, Chamber of International Economic Cooperation) levels, there is some presence of public-private agencies (i.e. Agency for Regional Development), which are almost exclusively related to EU programmes. In general, there are serious doubts about the success of PPPs in Poland, given the unfavourable cultural environment, in terms of lack of trust and cooperative culture (Czernielewska, M. et. al., 2003).

### **Participation of NGOs**

The presence and role of NGOs in the policy process is limited in Poland. Although there are numerous NGOs (around 41,500) the majority are weak and do not play significant role in the policy-making (Klon-Jawor, 2002). The legal and regulatory environment is perceived as detrimental to the development of the NGOs. The main obstacles include the lack of stability of state regulation towards the third sector, tax regulations and extensive public administration sphere that leaves little room for NGOs' activities (Marody, Wilkin, 2002:137). Additionally, there are no established and institutionalised modes of co-operation between the NGOs and the public sector, (Marody, Wilkin, 2002: 89). This is indicative of the weakness of civil society in Poland and coincides with the dominant role of political parties and clientelism.

## **Comparative Conclusions**

In the case of Portugal and Greece the evidence suggests a low level of participation by non-state actors, experts and private actors with limited fora in which participation might take place, whereas there is greater levels of organised non-state actor activity in Ireland that is aided by the existence of a range of fora at the national, regional and local levels. Both Hungary and Poland demonstrate low level of performance in all the indicators of participation and cooperative culture (fora for dialogue, expertise, PPPs and NGOs), which may be attributable to authoritarianism. These conditions may be similar to experience of Greece and Portugal. This of course does not necessarily mean that the performance of the latter has been dramatically improved.

### **1.3.3. Section 3: Resistance to change**

## **Cohesion Countries**

### **1) Greece**

#### **Institutionalized veto points**

The centralised character of the Greek state has militated against successful adaptation to EU regional policy. In the Greek case strong central government departments and a weak civic culture have provided an impediment to change, resulting in incremental adaptation. In the case study, the regional secretariat and CSF managing authority were perceived as the most central actors and the main veto players. While the current system allows for an increased degree of participation by regional and local public actors and consultation of non-state actors it is far from being an example of change having led to a devolution of power and authority to sub-national levels of government. Nevertheless, while national structures may have provided some institutional veto points, there has been greater participation of sub-national actors in European programmes.

#### **Cultural aspects**

In the Greek case, long-term consolidation of societal corporatist arrangements capable of negotiating social pacts has not emerged. Trade unions and employer organisations are fragmented and have played a limited role in the policy formation process. The process of adapting to European programmes has been slow and organised interests seem to lack the capacity to play a part in the policy formation process. State actors, both at the national and regional levels, have tended to enjoy a monopoly of influence

with non-state actors having limited involvement at the policy formation stage but becoming more important at the implementation phase.

## 2) Ireland

### **Institutionalized veto points**

Ireland has had a positive outlook on Europeanisation, although in practice there has also been some resistance to change at both the national and local levels. In relation to regional policy, national government departments resisted attempts at devolution, preferring to adapt existing procedures and practices, and only finally accepting limited regional structures when EU funding appeared under threat. Local actors were also resistant to change and to the development of regional structures and questioned their necessity in a small state. However, while national actors, such as the Department of the Environment and Local Government, offered some resistance, and were usually the main veto points, this was tempered by a desire to access EU funding.

### **Cultural aspects**

In Ireland the majority of the public and the political elite have been pragmatic in seeing the EU from an opportunistic perspective, while seeking to preserve as much state autonomy as possible in decision-making. The adoption of the partnership model in the 1980s and the overall corporatist nature of the Irish state has made it easier to adapt to EC funding requirements. Irish state and non-state actors have been used to working in consultative fora and forming a partnership approach to problems of governance.

## 3) Portugal

### **Institutionalized veto points**

In contrast to the Irish and Greek cases, there has been considerable resistance to change in Portugal. Notably, the referendum in 1998 at which the public were consulted as to whether regions should be created or not, led to a no vote. This reflected opposition to creating new structures that might threaten the authority of national and local structures. Moreover, there would appear to have been support for prioritising national development and concentrating resources on the most important regions and cities. The central government, and in particular the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Planning, are the main central players that are most likely to be veto points.

## **Cultural aspects**

Public support for the existing distribution of powers and institutions seem to militate against the development of regional structures and provides a source of further resistance to change. The Portuguese state remains highly centralised with limited civic participation. The involvement of NGOs in policy-making structures is limited and the public show little interest in playing a role in regional development.

## **CEECs**

### **1) Hungary**

#### **Institutionalized veto points**

Although Europeanisation of public policy in general and of regional policy in particular is popular in Hungary, resistance to the changes in the policy styles that it entails does occur. This can be explained either by high compliance costs, vested interests or long lived institutional traditions. Despite the fact that it is difficult to clearly identify institutionalised veto points, there are certain areas of actor constellations that have some strong motivation to resist change. These may include: central government actors/interests; territorial interest groups; and other vested interests (elite professionals, technocrats etc.) (see Palne, I., et. al., 2003). Notably on the basis of the Hungarian regulation the representative of the Ministry for Regional Policy has to a certain degree a veto right in some case within the Development Councils. Nonetheless, it might be difficult to argue that the main pockets of resistance are formally institutionalised in Hungary. Conversely, informal norms and cultural aspects may be more important in this respect.

#### **Cultural aspects**

There is evidence to suggest that the lack of crucial institutional infrastructure elements, such as cooperative culture, at the domestic level of governance may have serious consequences for the learning and adaptation process, in the sense that it may result in the absence of crucial mechanisms that facilitate the learning process (i.e. for a dialogue and experts for the diffusion of new norms etc.). In this respect, Hungary arguably demonstrates some at least of these deficiencies (i.e. low level of cooperation, weak civil society, political clientelism) from the legacy of authoritarianism.



## 2) Poland

### **Institutionalized veto points**

Resistance to formal changes is weak in Poland. Since the Polish government declared its compliance with all regulations related to EU cohesion policy, all requested legal and institutional changes are implemented. However, the genuine change of the policy-making system in regional policy, power devolution to the regions and application of the EU principles has encountered difficulties. Although the new regional structures (NUTS 2) have been implemented and accepted by the European Commission, those structures do not yet function as the politico-economic entities (Kulesza 2001). The process of formation of regional identities has just commenced and taking into account the fact that new regions function only since 1999, their principally administrative role is hardly surprising. Policy-making remains centralised. Paradoxically, accession to the EU might work counter to the processes of power devolution in Poland. Therefore, against the background of underdeveloped regional identities, weakness of the new institutional structures and their financial dependence on the centre lead to strengthening the 'gate-keeper' role of the central administration in the regional policy-making and public funds redistribution.

### **Cultural aspects**

Cultural aspects of the domestic institutional infrastructure may be the key explanatory variable for the problematic learning and adaptation processes in Poland. In particular, the problems related to the lack of cooperative culture and the other relevant mechanisms for facilitating the learning process (i.e. fora for dialogue and experts for the diffusion of new norms etc.) are more acute in Poland than in Hungary (see Czernielewska, M. et. al., 2003). Subsequently, low levels of cooperation, extremely weak civil society and political clientelism seem to be intrinsic elements of the domestic institutional structure and may constitute the main impediments to the learning and adaptation processes.

### **Comparative Conclusions**

In all three cohesion states there have been varying degrees of resistance and evidence of veto players. The evidence suggests, however, that there has been higher levels of resistance among national level actors to EU regional policy in Greece and Portugal, than in Ireland, where such resistance has been offset by pragmatic considerations. Hungary and Poland, while considered as frontrunners terms of learning, adaptation and Europeanisation among the CEECs, face problems of resistance to change in their

domestic institutional and policy-making structures. The points of resistance are identified with both veto players/points related to specific constellations of actors/interests and crucial cultural aspects of the domestic institutional infrastructure. In this respect, they are similar primarily to Greece and secondarily to Portugal and Ireland.

#### **1.3.4. Section 4: Civic culture**

##### **Cohesion Countries**

###### **1) Greece**

Greece has a weak civil society, with low citizen involvement and limited awareness by the public of their rights and obligations. The strongly centralised and clientelist nature of the state with limited intermediary institutions and fora for dialogue works against citizen involvement. The lack of social capital, such as trust, norms and networks, is a further feature of the system. Previous research in the Notio Aigaio had demonstrated the existence of a civic policy-making environment and this is still evident and plays a significant role in facilitating relations based on trust and reciprocity. The attitude of the majority of government officials and of people involved in the process of designing and implementing European regional policy is one in which a bottom-up approach is preferred. The majority of the respondents believe that the political system is still characterised by a high degree of centralisation and the operation of a strong clientelistic system. While most actors interviewed in the case study saw a strong civil society as important, it was generally considered to be weak. There was a clear mismatch between European policy expectations and the nature of civil society in Greece, with the underpinning civil society considered necessary to the success of European programmes lacking.

###### **2) Ireland**

Ireland has a strong civil society and one in which NGOs have become formally involved in the policy-making process. While the Irish political system is characterised as clientelistic, it has been underpinned by a strong civil society, in which trade unions and employers' organisations have since the 1980s been involved in partnership with government. There has also been a long history of community involvement that has provided the basis for a strong local development process. Ireland's civil society tradition is important in understanding regional and local involvement in EU programmes. There is a strong trust in political institutions and the civil service, although lower levels of trust in politicians, with a strong believe in the value of social capital. In the Mid-West region the levels of satisfaction with citizen participation vary, with the NGO sector expressing most

dissatisfaction while many state actors were satisfied with the degree of citizen participation. There was universal dissatisfaction with the level of citizen involvement in the planning and implementation of regional development programmes. It was also notable that a majority of respondents in the Mid West region believed that the social structure of the region had changed in recent years and some commented that such change was evident throughout Irish society.

### **3) Portugal**

The Portuguese case is very similar to that of Greece in that the state has been highly centralised with limited citizen participation and involvement in policy matters. In interviews participants did identify the importance of a strong civil society and social capital as a part of the policy process, but nonetheless, saw this as absent with the public distant from and uninterested in the policy process. The political class, at both the national and local level, is regarded as relatively trustworthy. For the Lisbon and Tagus Valley Region, politics are in general evaluated mostly as democratic and somewhat participative but also as having a top-down and hierarchical structure. The groups that can be considered as more important and influential in politics in the region are municipalities and government ministers. The less influential groups are considered to be the trade unions, NGOs, and second tier local authorities (Juntas de Freguesia). Civic organisations were either non-existent or weak, with the state playing the predominant role in the policy process.

## **CEECs**

### **1) Hungary**

The main features of social capital and civic culture in the CEE countries are: relatively high level of interpersonal trust; low level of trust in public institutions; increased levels of corruption and political clientelism. These features are closely linked to the long duration of authoritarianism and have important implications for the strength of the civil society and cooperative culture in these countries (see Mishler, W. and R. Rose, 1995, 2001; Rose, 2002; Annexes). Although Hungary demonstrates these characteristics, it is considered to be in a better position than most of the other CEECs, especially corruption (Rose, 2002; Annexes). This is partly attributed to the less oppressive character of its authoritarian past. Nevertheless, these characteristics crucially affect the capability of the domestic institutions and policy-making structures of the country.

## 2) Poland

Poland exhibits a weaker position than Hungary on all the social capital/civil society indicators mentioned above, and especially on corruption and the extent of political clientelism (e.g. Mishler, W. and R. Rose, 1995, 2001; Rose, 2002; Annexes), with serious consequences for the capability of the institutional structures.

### Comparative Conclusions

In both Greece and Portugal civil society and social capital are quite weak, although stronger in Ireland. It is noteworthy that while there seem to be fora for dialogue and communication, public, private and NGO participation remains quite low in most of the states under examination. Such a finding is important in terms of the goodness of fit between EU policy and domestic governance structures. In Poland and Hungary the data suggest a relatively low level of social capital and weak civil society. The situation is worse in Poland than in Hungary, especially in the level of corruption and the extent of clientelism. This has severe implications for the capability of the institutional and policy-making structures, especially during the period of transition and facing the challenges of Europeanization.

#### **1.4. Part III: Conclusions - Assessment of learning capacity**

##### **1.4.1. Section 1: Evaluating the learning capacity of the domestic institutional**

### 1) Greece

The Greek political system has been resistant to change, with a slow and limited capacity to adapt its governmental and administrative structures to meet European policy requirements. There was considerable national-level resistance to change and adaptation is more formal than substantive. The top down administrative structure reinforces these tendencies and militates against greater involvement of non-state actors. This has been somewhat offset in the 1990s by the restructuring of sub-national administration. Central actors, such as the National Ministry of Economy, have been reluctant to cede authority to other sub-national actors, other than through decentralisation, and has retained control over EU funding whenever possible. Involvement in European programmes and the consequential restructuring of regional administration has afforded non-state actors a greater opportunity to play a role in the regional-level policy-making process. The evidence suggests that sub-national state actors are networked and cooperate with each other in the planning and implementation of regional policy. Greece still has a weak civic

culture and a lack of social capital, as highlighted in recent Eurobarometer surveys (2001). It may, however, be that Greece is in a transitory stage. As such the lack of a cooperative society may inhibit the learning process.

In Greece there is limited participation of regional and local actors in fora for dialogue and negotiation. At the regional level, the most important fora for dialogue and negotiation are the regional council and the ROP monitoring committee, both by-products of the EU structural funds, while at the local level the prefecture provides a further forum. The evaluation of the second Greek CSF highlights the limited participation of the private sector and restricted public-private partnership formation. There is a common perceptions among the major regional and local actors involved in regional development regarding the main problems and objectives of regional development policies in Notio Aigaiio. This common understanding of the major problems provides a good basis for synergistic relations among the actors.

Greece is undergoing an incremental Europeanisation of its institutional and structural edifice. The adaptation of sub-national systems to the EU structural policy has been highly dependent on the learning capacity of the local institutions. There was significant institutional change in the 1990s, with regions taking on greater involvement in their own regional development process. However, the learning capacity of these institutions has been dependent on the presence of vertical and horizontal networks and social capital endowments, which the SNA analysis suggests has been weak.

## **2) Ireland**

In the Irish case while the state has been a major beneficiary of EU funding it has remained reluctant to devolve powers to regional level bodies. National actors are generally supportive of EU policies and have adapted existing practices and created new coordinating mechanisms in order to incorporate EU business into national policy. There has been an incremental restructuring of intergovernmental relations and the establishment of regional authorities and regional assemblies. The Irish system of public administration remains centralised, with resources concentrated at the national level. The main central state actors have adapted to the changing rules of the game by retaining a central role in the policy process, but have incorporated sub-national actors into the policy process. There are a significant number of non-state actors at the local and regional levels, although many of these are not directly involved in regional development. In the Mid-West region the actors involved in the process have become highly networked, as the SNA analysis suggests, with formal and informal horizontal and vertical networks, with high degrees of centrality and density.

In Ireland the actors interviewed attributed a high value to civil society and social capital with all of them considering them as either necessary or indispensable. There was an underlying welcome for the expanded range of actors and networks and the facilitative norms, which have become a part of involvement in the EU regional policy process. Interviews carried out with regional actors indicate that formal institutions, such as the regional authorities and the regional assemblies, serve as significant fora for dialogue/negotiation thereby facilitating learning. There is no evidence of formal public/private partnerships for the 1994-1999 period; although there are significant planned levels of activity in the current National Development Plan (2000-2006). Many of the interviewees welcomed the prospect of further collaboration and the formation of networks between private and public sectors.

The regional and local actors interviewed showed a common understanding of major issues, albeit with different emphases and nuances. Interviewees also identified obstacles to exploitation of the opportunities offered by the EU's regional policy as being bureaucracy and rigidity; lack of infrastructure; policy dimensions; difficulty in obtaining 'matching funding' and the lack of capacity as well as the lack of entrepreneurial approach within the region. EU regional policy did lead to changes in behaviour and attitudes of central actors in relation to regional and local development, with the creation of new regional structures and institutions and a greater emphasis being placed on involving sub-national actors, drawing them into the process, and making them responsible for achieving EU programme objectives.

### **3) Portugal**

In the Portuguese case there was limited enthusiasm for adaptation to European structures and some resistance by national and local state actors, as well as the public, to adoption of new institutions. As in the case of Greece, a certain degree of institutional change was required to ensure Portugal benefited from EU programmes, largely through de-concentration. Portugal has met formal EU requirements, if largely within the context of pre-existing administrative and institutional structures, with limited capacity to change further. The main central actor has been the Ministry of Planning, as regards the formulation and the implementation of regional policy, whereas at the regional level, the main actor has been the Regional Co-ordination Commission (RCC). The relationship between the different levels of governance is highly structured and vertically orientated, although it has brought about greater coordination among the different actors and focussed their attention on regional development policy. The traditional regulatory approach that typified past approaches has been replaced by a more comprehensive and participatory planning approach. Arising out of this both public and non-state actors at

the regional and local level have been engaged in a process of learning to cooperate and network formation.

There are few other NGOs involved in regional development, as civil participation is very limited, and is often sporadic and related to very specific problems. The increasing role of municipal associations and the mobilisation of civil and entrepreneurial actors, undertaken by the Ministry of Planning and its bodies, has promoted the emergence of a new governance approach to policy making. This approach emphasises the importance of social networks, civic participation and the creation of mechanisms to obtain consensus. New formal and informal mechanisms to mediate interests have been created with more flexibility and openness, especially in the field of municipalities' activities and their interface with business affairs. In Portugal although civil society and social capital in general are regarded as indispensable for social and economic development and effective policy implementation, in practical terms, levels of civil participation, informal networks and citizen participation and involvement in public matters are still very low. Lacking a strong civil society and facilitative environment Portugal found it difficult to adjust to EU regional policy.

In Portugal dialogue and negotiation among regional/local actors are highly influenced by central government priorities and its strategy for regional development. Certainly, in the LTV region, the Municipality of Lisbon and subsequently the Lisbon Metropolitan Authority act as major political actors within the framework of dialogue between central government and its regional bodies, as well as vis-à-vis regional business associations. The creation of municipality associations has promoted dialogue between the concerned municipalities, but regional priorities are still defined by central government, limiting dialogue and negotiation at a local level (see Valadares Tavares 2000). In Portugal there is limited evidence of formal public-private partnerships. Some municipalities have created integrated technological centres and infrastructures for industrial areas to be used by private companies. The central government created a specific institution (Empresa Geral do Fomento) to support private investments. The public sector has promoted the role of the private sector, including helping companies to access EU financing, and has also created several private companies with public funds to undertake specific objectives. There is a relatively common understanding of development problems in the LTV region. Local actors tend to devote less attention to regional or national problems, whereas private actors usually attribute more importance to issues that influence productivity and business performance.

EC membership did not lead to a fundamental change in the existing political system, but did lead to significant changes in the relationship between the state and the economy,

and led to changes in the role of central and local authorities. New institutional attitudes and forms of behaviour have emerged in response to requirements at various levels: intra and inter-sectoral adjustments and cooperation, public-private partnerships, public involvement and participation. At local level, formal and informal means of association and cooperation have been created, alongside the emergence and consolidation of development associations.

#### **4) Hungary**

Hungary has followed the 'Southern European' paradigm of administrative adjustment to the Europeanisation of the policy process, involving devolution and decentralisation. Given, however, the inherent weaknesses of the institutional infrastructure it followed the trend of re-centralization – encouraged by the EU Commission – since the mid-1990s. Centralisation and extensive clientelism, the main features of the domestic governance structures, are not conducive to learning. The level of non-state actors' (experts, NGOs, private sector) involvement in the policy process in Hungary is generally low and this may be a crucial factor that negatively affects learning capacity. The veto players/points level of resistance to change is not particularly strong in Hungary. The more serious problem for the learning process may be the cultural aspect. Hungary demonstrates relatively low level of social capital and weak civil society. This affects negatively the building of a cooperative culture and thus inhibits the learning process. There are some fora for dialogue, created directly or indirectly as a result of the Europeanisation of the policy process. Such fora, however, do not reflect the dynamism of the pre-existing structures. The presence of PPPs in the policy process is very poor which does not facilitate the learning process. There is a relatively encouraging level of common understanding of the major problems, which is a positive sign for learning. There has been significant institution building, because of the collapse of the pre-existing institutional infrastructure.

#### **5) Poland**

Poland has also followed the 'Southern European' paradigm of administrative adjustment, involving devolution and decentralization and the trend of re-centralization – encouraged by the EU Commission – since the mid-1990s. The case of Poland is worse than Hungary with centralisation, corruption and extensive clientelism, the main features of the domestic governance structures, which are not conducive to learning capacity. There is very limited participation of non-state actors in the policy process, which does not facilitate learning. There is some resistance to change mainly related to cultural aspects. Low levels of social capital and extremely weak civil society have not facilitated learning.



Europeanization-related fora do not reflect the pre-existing dynamism of institutional infrastructure. There is some evidence of PPPs, but actors have doubts about their likely success. There is a good amount of common understanding; which may encourage for learning. There is extensive institution building reflecting the collapse of the pre-existing structures.

### **Comparative Conclusions**

In assessing the learning capacity of the cohesion and CEE countries it would appear important to consider the pre-existing domestic structures and societal norms in assessing the capacity of the systems to adapt to Europeanisation. There are clear similarities between the Greek/Portuguese and Hungarian/Polish cases, with the former exhibiting slow learning tendencies and having a limited capacity for adaptation, which seems to be mirrored in the Polish case, and to a lesser extent Hungary. Ireland is the exception, given its pre-existing democratic structures, relatively effective system of governance and strong civil society. Nevertheless, there are similarities between Ireland and the other two cohesion states, with intergovernmental relations still in a state of change and flux. In all of the cases, the regional level of identity remains weak, with a poor policy fit with EU regional policy characterising all but the Irish cases.

On the basis of the indicators discussed above the following table summarises the strengths and weaknesses of the learning capacity in each of the five regions.

**Table 7.** Key indicators of learning capacity in the five regions

<b>Country/indicator</b>	<b>Greece</b>	<b>Ireland</b>	<b>Portugal</b>	<b>Hungary</b>	<b>Poland</b>
<b>Resistance to change</b>	Strong	Medium/Weak	Strong	Medium	Medium/Strong
<b>Decentralisation trends</b>	Weak/Medium	Medium	Medium	Weak	Medium
<b>Participation of non-state actors in regional policy making</b>	Weak	Medium	Medium	Weak	Weak
<b>Civil society</b>	Weak	Strong	Weak/Medium	Weak	Weak
<b>Co-operation climate</b>	Weak	Strong	Medium	Medium	Medium
<b>Fora for dialogue</b>	Weak/Medium	Strong/Medium	Weak/Medium	Medium	Medium
<b>Development of PPP's</b>	Weak	Weak/Medium	Weak/Medium	Weak	Weak/Medium
<b>Common understandings</b>	Strong	Strong	Strong	Strong	Strong
<b>Institution building</b>	Weak	Medium/Strong	Weak	Medium	Medium

In summary:

- There is resistance to change in all of the states, with it being strongest in Greece, Portugal and Poland, in comparison to Hungary and Ireland. Resistance is likely to limit change and in turn learning.
- There is limited decentralisation in all of the states, although deconcentration has occurred in Portugal and Poland, and there has been moderate decentralisation in Ireland and Greece. In those instances in which there has been decentralisation, such as in Ireland, there have been greater opportunities for non-state and peripheral actors to participate in regional policy-making and implementation. In such cases there is also likely to have been a greater exchange of knowledge and more innovation leading to an improved regional (and national) learning capacity.
- The participation of non-state actors is limited in all the case studies, except for Ireland and Portugal, where there appears to be a moderate level of NGO and expert participation.
- All of the cases, except for Ireland, exhibit weak civil societies and are characterised by low citizen participation. In the case of Ireland, the strength of the civil society provides an important underpinning that enhances its learning capacity. This would appear to be supported in the Social Network Analysis wherein Ireland has a high level of network centralisation and density. This suggests there is a greater degree of communication among the actors in the Mid West region with a more dense flow of information, knowledge and ideas, which increases the learning capacity of the actors involved in the policy network.
- The existence of a climate of cooperation and consensus appears strongest in Ireland, and to a less extent in Portugal, Hungary and Poland, while being weak in Greece.
- In all of the cases examined a variety of formal fora exist at the national, regional and local levels, wherein state and non-state actors interact, although the impact of such fora on the policy process is less clear and in some instances appears largely designed to satisfy EU requirements for consultation.
- The growing importance attached to developing PPPs is not yet reflected in the practical growth of such arrangements on the ground and while some states such as Ireland, Portugal and Poland favour such arrangements, implementation still seems problematic.

- There seemed to be a common understanding of development problems in all of the case studies, although with actors perceiving such problems in different ways and offering different solutions and approaches to dealing with regional problems.
- New institutions and structures have been developed in all the states to facilitate the development and delivery of regional policy. The practice on the ground, however, reflects the difficulties that most of the states face in changing their governance structures to accommodate EU regional policy requirements. It is particularly worth noting that Greece and Portugal have made limited process in this area and that changes in Ireland have not led to broader political institutions at the regional level. The evidence in relation to Poland and Hungary suggests that there will be similar problems in both of these states, as the realisation of regional structures remains problematic in such centralised, unitary political systems.

These findings are in the main supported in the results of the Social Network Analysis undertaken in the five case study regions, which are summarised on the basis of two indicators in the following table.

**Table 8.** Structure of the networks in the five case study regions

<b>Region/Network characteristics</b>	<b>Centralisation degree</b>	<b>Density</b>
<b>Noitio Aigaio, Greece</b>	61,58	1,143
<b>Mid-West Region, Ireland</b>	137,09	1,76
<b>Lisbon and Tagus Valley, Portugal</b>	105,56	1,24
<b>South Transdanubian, Hungary</b>	56,1	0,406
<b>Lodz Region, Poland</b>	106,40	1,46

In general, there are low degrees of centralisation in Greece and Hungary, with lower levels of density, whereas in Poland, Portugal and especially Ireland, the findings suggest higher degrees of centralisation, with higher levels of density. In the former cases, this may lead us to suggest that the networks are more likely to facilitate the flow of information and exchange of knowledge thereby enhancing learning. Nevertheless, in all of the cases central state actors still dominate the networks in the cohesion and CEEC states. These findings, however, need to be qualified by noting that the sample of actors surveyed in the Greek and Portuguese cases were small, while in the Irish case a larger population of actors were identified, but not all actors were willing to be interviewed. In using Social Network Analysis we need to be aware of the limits of the data and it is

should be used in conjunction with the qualitative findings in drawing reasoned conclusions.

Further conclusions can also be drawn in relation to learning by looking at the networks' structural equivalence in the five regions. In examining the structural equivalence of the matrices that were used in the analysis of the relations between the actors it is possible to look at what sub-groups of actors emerged as being strongly related to each other. In all of the cases four sub-groups of actors were identified (i.e. those that were strongly or negatively related). In the case of the cohesion states (e.g. Notio Aigaio Region, the Mid West Region in Ireland, and Lisbon and Tagus Valley) the central state and regional actors tend to fall into the first and second groupings, although there are some variations, arising from the response rate to the questionnaire that need to be considered. The third and fourth groups tend to include the more peripheral and less connected actors. Similar findings are apparent with regard to the CEECs (i.e. Lodz Region, Poland and the South Transdanubian Region, Hungary) where central state actors dominate in the first sub-group. Again, when we look at the other sub-groups it becomes harder to generalise, although the data largely supports the qualitative findings about the growing importance of regional authorities and the limited (but growing) role of non-state actors and private interests.

In summary, as in EU environmental policy, the process of Europeanisation in the regional policy arena has had an important impact on the domestic governance structures and administrative and policy practices in the five states leading to significant learning. The nature and pace of learning has been affected by the differing political and administrative cultures and structures, the degree of institutionalisation and the system of institutional interactions, the range of actors involved and their respective roles, the types of network that exist and the levels of social capital and civic engagement. It would seem important to bolster and underpin the development of dense networks in order to facilitate the flow of information and co-operation at all levels of governance and to build a strong and effective institutional infrastructure.

## **2. Chapter Eight: The Europeanization of Environmental Policy Making and Domestic Governance Structures: Cohesions and CEE Countries**

### **2.1. Introduction**

The aim of this report is to analyse and compare the adaptational pressures and reactions which have come about in three of the Cohesion states (Greece, Ireland, Portugal) and two of candidate countries (Hungary and Poland), in the field of environmental policy (waste management). We consider the degree to which the pre-existing domestic governance structures in the five countries under consideration were in a position to adapt to the EU environmental policy, and the extent to which these domestic structures fitted with EU policy, or alternatively created policy misfits. It tends to be assumed that EU policy is a major catalyst for policy adaptation and institutional change in the field of the environment. We have also tried to incorporate the added value of the Social Network Analysis by linking the results to the issue of learning capacity. In sum, this report examines from a comparative perspective, the impact of the EU's policies and programmes in the environmental (waste management) policy area in the three Cohesion countries and the two accession states in terms of policy fits and misfits and learning capacity.

The report is organized around three core Parts. Part A looks at both the Cohesion and the CEEC countries and the evolution of policy misfits and adaptational pressures in the area of environmental policy. Part B examines the five countries under consideration and the goodness of fit of their domestic governance structures, by analyzing in each country a) the evolution of central state policy-making, b) the resistance to change, c) the participation level of the non-state actors in the environmental policy making and d) the civic culture. Finally, in Part C the assessment of the learning capacity in the five countries under consideration attempted through the evaluation of the learning capacity of the domestic institutional structures of the environmental policy.

## **2.2. Part I: Europeanization of Policy-Making and Domestic Levels of Governance**

### **2.2.1. Section 1: Evolution of policy misfits and adaptational pressures**

#### **Cohesion Countries**

##### **1) Greece**

Greece belongs to the group of countries called “policy takers”, who face important policy misfits in the sector of environmental policy. In the pre-accession period Greece didn't have the appropriate political, cultural and institutional structures capable to ensure the implementation of an effective environmental policy. Also, there was a rather regulatory attitude of the environmental issues. Because of these policy misfits the europeanization process creates pressures for harmonization.

In the sector of environmental legislation Greece has made important steps to adapt the national environmental laws with the EU directives, but there are still many delays in the implementation. So, the need for a full adaptation of the EU environmental legislation keeps putting pressures on the Greek state. The first important step came with the Single European Act, which applied pressure to Greece with the introduction of new initiatives and integrated pollution control.

Furthermore, some basic characteristics of the Greek environmental policy-making, even now, are the weak civil society, the strong bureaucracy, the centralized structure of the central state and the absence of consensus building and institution building capacity. Also, some more misfits concern the environmental policy (tools, mechanisms, targets), the structure of policy (institutions, networks) and the style (norms and values). The above policy weaknesses preclude the europeanization policy and are in contrary with the EU policy, which demands new cooperation mechanisms and networks in national and European level and a more pro-active and a less state-led policy making style.

##### **2) Ireland**

Ireland also belongs to the group of countries called “policy takers”, who face important policy misfits in the sector of environmental policy. The main policy misfits are focused on the sector of environmental legislation where there are still some delays in the implementation of laws. In the field of environmental policy only a few governmental activities took place until 90's under a low public awareness on environmental issues. Moreover, the Irish environmental policy is characterized by pragmatic and ad hoc

reactions, while it should have a pro-active policy making and radical change. In the field of waste management, a major misfit is the absence of regional designation as in the case of Ireland, Waste management "regions" are artificial entities which do not conform to other regional public service provision or the Midwest regional configuration in respect to regional policy. This has a knock on effect for cooperation in dealing with the issues and resources. Nevertheless, the europeanization process has brought important legal changes, administrative changes, institution building and policy innovation.

Particularly, in the field of waste management there is a need from all the levels of governance to harmonize the performance of the existing institutional structures and procedures with the demands of the European policy. There is also a need for legal compliance. The so far adoption of EU legislation and policy tools has led to the creation of the EPA (Environmental Protection Agency) in 1992. Moreover, there has to be enforced the cooperation of the local authorities in regional level in order to achieve compliance with the EU directives. Within this framework there have already been steps forward to the enforcement of the pre-existing developed cooperation climate (partnerships) after the involvement in the EU.

### **3) Portugal**

Portugal like Greece and Ireland belongs to the group of "policy takers". Portugal's accession into the EU (1986) constituted the main adaptational pressure in terms of legislation and institutional building in order to comply with the European standards. Furthermore, the municipalities had put important pressure aiming at the improvement of public sewerage and water supply networks. Nevertheless, the most important deficits were noticed, and still exist in a lower degree, in the national environmental legislative framework, in spite of having transposed all EU directives to national legislation.

The accession in the EU has contributed to the creation of new institutions for the control and the management of environmental issues as also to the emergence of a new policy making. In that direction important the CSF funds have played an important role by their financial contribution.

## **CEEC's**

### **1) Hungary**

Since early 90's Hungary has made a great effort to adapt its environmental policy making structures to those of the EU. It was then, when by the virtue of the Europe Agreement, Hungary took the obligation to adjust the national law and the environmental policy to the EU standards. In these years the majority of EU's environmental legislation



has been adopted, but there are still implementation delays due to the high implementation costs, the absence of the necessary financial resources, the lack of information and awareness and the problematic political decisions. The main adaptational pressures in the field of environmental policy concern the harmonization of rule-making, the implementation and the adaptation of the regulations to the EU-compatible development of the institutional arrangement, as well as the emergence of new types of financial resources.

At the moment the Hungarian environmental policy is based on the use of regulatory and economic instruments and on the development of large environmental investments. The main policy misfits in the environmental sector are:

- the inadequate enforcement of environmental regulations;
- the upgrading of the environmental protection institutional system;
- the implementation problems;
- the inefficient target areas of the local and sectoral interest groups.

## 2) Poland

The harmonization of the Polish environmental laws with the EU's legislative framework has been taking place since 1991 and until 2001 the most important directives had been adopted. While, the legal harmonization degree is quite satisfactory there are still existing important implementation delays and problems due to the huge implementation costs. Also, in the field of the institutional building there has been a limited progress, which combining with the weak Polish civil society puts pressures on the Polish environmental policy in order to comply with the EU's demands for wide cooperation networks and less-state policy making.

### **Comparative Conclusions**

The five countries under consideration have faced important challenges during the europeanization process of their national environmental policy. In all of the cases there was an acute pressure put on, in order to harmonize their national environmental policy with the European standards. The majority of the policy misfits in each case study have been mainly related to the non-compliance with the EU's legislative framework. Though, all of the above countries have made explicit efforts to harmonize their national laws with those of the EU. Within this framework the Cohesion countries have managed earlier than the CEECs to comply "on the ground" with the European standards. Nevertheless, in

all five countries the most important policy misfit, in the field of environmental policy, is the delay in the implementing European laws.

Ireland and Portugal compared to the other three countries seem to face less policy misfits in the field of environmental policy. Within this framework, both countries have developed, to a satisfactory degree, institutions and co operational networks capable of embodying the standards of the European environmental policy. In addition, Ireland has also made important steps in the field of administrative changes. In contrast, in Greece, Poland and Hungary there has been limited institutional building. The absence of the necessary institutions in the field of environmental policy strengthens the existence of policy misfits. Furthermore, the Greek and Polish environmental policies are characterized by state-led policy making processes, which is contrary to the pro-active type of policy provided by the EU. Greece, compared to the other two Cohesion countries, has not adopted the appropriate environmental policy tools, mechanisms, networks and styles to enable it to comply with the EU requirements.

In relation to the CEE countries, only Hungary has sought to adopt new environmental policy instruments. Also, in Hungary and Poland the main reason for the policy misfits in the environmental area is the absence of the adequate financial support.

Comparatively, the evolution of policy misfits in the five studied countries is presented in the following two tables.

**Table 9.** Goodness of fit by country

Country	Fit	Misfit
<b>Greece</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Legal harmonization</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Regulatory policies</li> <li>- Implementation</li> <li>- State-led policy-making</li> <li>- Absence of co-operation climate</li> <li>- Institution building</li> </ul>
<b>Ireland</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Legal harmonization</li> <li>- Policy innovation</li> <li>- Consensus climate</li> <li>- Institution building</li> <li>- Local authority funding</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Implementation</li> <li>- Ad hoc reactions</li> <li>- Regional designation for waste management</li> </ul>
<b>Portugal</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Legal harmonization</li> <li>- Improved policy-making</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- institution building</li> <li>- implementation</li> <li>- regulatory policies</li> </ul>
<b>Hungary</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Legal harmonization</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Implementation</li> <li>- Rule-making</li> <li>- Political decisions</li> <li>- Regulatory policies</li> <li>- Institution building</li> <li>- State-led policy-making</li> </ul>
<b>Poland</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Legal harmonisation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Implementation</li> <li>- State-led policy-making</li> <li>- Institution building</li> </ul>

**Table 10.** Cases of misfits, adaptational results and mediating factors

<b>Country</b>	<b>Misfit</b>	<b>Adaptational result</b>	<b>Mediating factors</b>
<b>Greece</b>	Regulatory policies	Slow change	Centralized structure
	Implementation	Resistance	Multiple veto points
	State-led policy-making	Resistance	Centralized structure, static system
	Absence of co-operation climate	Slow change	Personalistic attitude, weak civil society
	Institution building	Slow change	Static system
<b>Ireland</b>	Implementation	Slow change	Centralized structure
	Ad hoc reactions	Partial Change	Learning capacity
	Regional designation for waste management	Slow change	Centralized structure
<b>Portugal</b>	Institution building	Slow change	Centralized structure
<b>Hungary</b>	Implementation	Slow change	Insufficient funds
	Rule-making	Partial change	Centralized structure
	Political decisions	Resistance	Politisation, Static system
	Regulatory policies	Slow change	Centralized structure, Multiple veto points
	Institution building	Slow change	Insufficient funds
<b>Poland</b>	State-led policy-making	Resistance	Centralized structure
	Implementation	Slow change	Insufficient funds
	Institution building	Slow change	Insufficient funds, Multiple veto points

## **2.3. Part II : Goodness of Fit of Domestic Governance Structures**

### **2.3.1. Section 1: Evolution of formal institutional and policy-making structures**

#### **Cohesion Countries**

##### **1) Greece**

#### **Policy-making processes**

During the pre-accession period, environmental policy in Greece was considered a branch of spatial and urban planning, but after the country's accession it was formulated as a distinct and coherent policy. It happened under the EU pressure and it was driven by the EU environmental legislation. The first modernization step of the Greek environmental policy making came with the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty where the term of sustainable development was introduced as the main environmental policy principle of the EU. The modernization of the environmental policy-making was further strengthened by the 5<sup>th</sup> Environmental Action Programme. The terms "environmental protection" and "ecology" entered the Greek political debates in the 90's, when the funds for environmental protection increased and public awareness, as well as the role of NGO's, were reinforced.

The main existing problem of the Greek environmental policy is the slow legislation alignment because there are not taken in mind the special needs, the conditions and the reality of the country. This is the main reason that there are noticed important implementation problems and delays. The waste management policy during the last two decades has followed the Greek environmental policy in general terms. Some basic particular policy deficits that are noticed in the field of waste management policy are:

- The lack of an integrated management/coordination strategy that would link the national, regional and local levels and the intense conflict among social and institutional actors that creates conditions for a misregulated policy-making environment at the local level.
- The lack of co-ordination and the intense conflict between local authorities leading to short-term political decisions and ineffective types of governance.

## **Administrative structures**

At administrative level, the Greek environmental policy-making process is shared among the Ministry of Environment (it is the main responsible actor) and other sector ministries like the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of National Economy. On the other side the role of regional and local authorities is limited as they play only a consultative or secondary executive role since they are deprived of necessary financial, technical and scientific resources for effective monitoring and control.

## **Institutional actors**

The role of the institutional actors (NGO's, Chambers, civil organizations etc) is limited in the environmental policy making process. That problematic institutional infrastructure is a result of the centralized nature of the Greek state, the considerable lack of decentralization measures and the complete absence of independent bodies.

## **2) Ireland**

### **Policy-making processes**

The environmental policy-making processes have been drastically affected by the europeanization process. Within this framework the coordination has been increased, the policy making mechanisms have been improved and new issues like National Development Plan have been introduced. The type of administrative restructuring that has come about included adaptation in the role of sectoral departments, increased co-ordination and improvements in policy mechanisms.

### **Administrative structures**

Regarding the administrative structure, the majority of the responsibilities for the formation of the environmental policy have passed to the Government Departments and their regional bodies. Within this framework, the Department of Environment has the leading role, while the sectoral Departments have been enforced. Moreover, important responsibilities have been assigned to local authorities under the Waste Management Act (1996). Under this act they certainly are not powerless but rather lack the resources to implement measures. On the contrary, the Regional Assemblies have limited role, while no power has been transferred to the local authorities, because of the centralized character of the central state.

## **Institutional actors**

In the field of the central state's institutional structure, important progress has been noticed. This is mainly expressed by the establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency (1992), the establishment of the Regional Authorities (1994), the establishment of the National Sustainable Development Partnership (1999), while the Office for Environmental Protection is under establishment. The above institutions, as a whole, are in charge of a big part of the Irish environmental policy-making process. Also, within the process of bottom-up development the non-governmental bodies play an important role in the process of environmental policy making. Moreover, institutions like private actors, NGO's and local development bodies have empowered their role because of their participation in the implementation of the National Development Plan.

### **3) Portugal**

#### **Policy-making processes**

In the field of environmental policy-making process Portugal has made important progress by adopting integrated practices and cooperation climate. Environmental policy making was re-oriented to accomplish EU requirements concerning access to Structural Funds and to promote the effectiveness of their applications for improving environmental development.

#### **Administrative structures**

After the accession of Portugal in the EU the central state administrative structure provided a wider deconcentration and some decentralization by attributing competences to local power. Nevertheless, the main body responsible for the formation of the environmental policy is the Ministry of Environment (created in 1994) and its specialized bodies with responsibilities at national level (Waste Institute, Water & Waste Insitute). The deconcentration progress has been reinforced by the creation of administrative bodies dedicated to facilitate environmental policy. Within this framework, the role of the Regional authorities and the Municipalities has empowered by the implementation of specific bodies in charge of coordinating the management of the EU funds and Programmes, either in national or local levels, which include include representatives from the Regional and Local authorities.

## **Institutional actors**

In the field of central state's institutional structure, institutions like civil organizations have taken more power in the environmental policy making process by their participation in the implemented advisory bodies. The participation of the actors from the civil society has empowered by the establishment of the National Council for Water and the National Council for Environment and Sustainable Development, which integrated social representatives and groups of the broader community.

### **CEEC's**

#### **1) Hungary**

##### **Policy-making processes**

The Hungarian environmental policy-making structure is appeared to be rather centralized, being controlled in a high degree by the central state actors. Moreover, the political climate between the central state authorities and the regional/local actors is characterized by conflicts and cooperation.

##### **Administrative structures**

The main body responsible for the environmental policy in Hungary is the Ministry of Environment Protection and Water Management, which defines the administrative structure of environmental policy as well as for waste management policy. Furthermore, its 12 regional and local agencies are responsible in an important degree for the implementation of the environmental policy.

## **Institutional actors**

Within the general centralization climate of environmental policy around the central state authorities, institutional actors like civil organizations have limited responsibilities for the planning of environmental policy and in particular of waste management policy.

#### **2) Poland**

##### **Policy-making processes**

The Polish environmental policy-making processes are characterized by an extended decentralization reform and by the generated controversies between the responsible bodies because of overlapping competencies. Nevertheless, this decentralization trend is weakened by the lack of funds at regional/local level.



### **Administrative structures**

The responsible authorities for the planning and implementation of environmental policy, as well as for waste management policy, are mainly the central state authorities (Ministry of Environment) and the regional/local authorities in an important degree.

### **Institutional actors**

Except the state institutions no initiatives have been developed for the transfer of responsibilities to institutions like civil organizations or other non-state organizations and companies.

### **Comparative Conclusions**

Looking at the evolution of central state policy making in the five countries under consideration, it must be stressed that in all cases there has been important progress. The policy making process in the field of environment has been significantly affected in all cases by Europeanization with the Irish and the Portuguese central state environmental policy making most affected when compared to the other three countries. More specifically, in both cases the coordination/consensus climate has been increased and new mechanisms and integrated practices have been adopted. Moreover, in Ireland policy innovation was introduced (e.g. establishment of EPA) and in Portugal the environmental policy was improved. In Greece, the central state's environmental policy making process was not empowered by Europeanization in comparison to the other two Cohesion countries. The least progress has been evident in Hungary and Poland.

In examining the administrative processes in Greece, Ireland and Hungary there has been limited progress, as the environmental policy making process remains state-led. Within this framework, in these three cases, the Ministries of Environment, their national bodies as well as other Sectoral Ministries are in charge of the environmental policy formation. In comparison, in Portugal and Poland there has been a more decentralized administrative environmental policy making structure. In these two cases with the exception of the Ministries, the regional and local authorities have been actively involved in the environmental policy making process.

In terms of importance of the institutional actors in the process of environmental policy making, it is clear that the role of NGOs and other civil organizations is very limited in the cases of Greece, Hungary and Poland. In Ireland, NGO involvement tends to be fragmented but nonetheless does exist. The most progress is emerged in Portugal where a series of institutional changes has lead to a greater participation of NGOs in the environmental policy making process.

The dominance of the central state actors concerning the environmental policy making in all five countries is depicted by the SNA conducted in the five case-study regions (Attica Region, Mid-West Region of Ireland, Lisbon Metropolitan Area, Region Central Hungary, Lodz Region). In the following table the most central actors in the field of waste management in the five case study regions are identified.

**Table 11.** The most central actors in the field of waste management concerning the five case study regions

	<b>Attica Region - Greece</b>	<b>Mid-West Region of Ireland</b>	<b>Lisbon Metropolitan Area - Portugal</b>	<b>Central Region of Hungary</b>	<b>Lodz Region - Poland</b>
<b>1</b>	Ministry of Environment, Urban Planning and Public Works	Limerick City Council	Ministry of Environment	Environmental Protection Chief Directorate of the Middle Danube Valley Region	Voivodeship Office in Lodz, Department of Environment
<b>2</b>	Region of Attica	Environmental Protection Agency	Waste Institute	Ministry for Environment Protection and Water Management	Voivodeship Inspectorate for Environment Protection in Lodz
<b>3</b>	Union of Municipalities and Communities of the Prefecture of Attica	Department of Environment	Quercus NGO	Municipal Public Space Management Shareholder Company (public utility firm)	Voivodeship Fund for Environment Protection and Water Economy
<b>4</b>	Ministry of the Interior, Public Administration and Decentralization	Clare County Council	GEOTA NGO	Association of Public Owned Waste Management Service Providers (civil trade association)	Eko-Boruta in Zgier (private company)
<b>5</b>	Managing Authority of the Operational Programme "Environment"	Limerick County Council	AMTRES	Office of County Pest	Marshall Office, Department of Agriculture and Environmental Protection

The data depicted in the above table confirms the dominance of the central state actors in the process of policy making in the field of waste management, as only in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area there is a broad participation of institutionalized actors (NGOs). Also,

in Poland, under the wide liberalization progress, the participation of the private sector is also emerging.

### **2.3.2. Section 2: Non-state actors**

#### **Cohesion Countries**

##### 1) Greece

#### **Existence of fora for dialogue and negotiation**

In the field of environmental policy and particularly in the field of waste management there is a lack of systematic dialogue between government officials, regional and local authorities and representatives from the civil society. The Monitoring Committees of the Operational Programme "Environment" and the Regional Operational Programme of Attica are two of the main formal fora, introduced by the EU for discussing the effectiveness and implementation of the respective programmes. Nevertheless, it should be taken into consideration that their role has been considerably limited with the introduction of the institution of the Managing Authorities. At the regional and local level, the Regional, Prefectural and Municipal Councils are the formal fora for dialogue and negotiation. Among them, the Regional Council is the most important one as it consists of a great variety of actors who participate in the process of planning and approving the regional waste management plan. Moreover, ESDKNA, HERRA and HSWMA constitute strong fora for dialogue in the Region of Attica.

#### **Role of experts**

The role of the experts is very limited as Greece still lacks those mechanisms capable to ensure their participation in the environmental policy, concerning planning and implementation. Even in the cases where such mechanisms have been created, there has been a gradual reduction of participation processes in the institutional planning framework in order to increase effectiveness and transparency and limit any time-consuming processes.

#### **Role of the private sector**

The private sector's role in waste management remains limited, as the main bodies responsible for the implementation of projects come from the public sector. Although it is widely accepted that co-operation facilitates the development of relations based on trust and on the sharing of responsibilities and economic risks, the creation of partnerships between actors from all sectors, in the field of waste management, has been marginal.

More often, the municipalities have provided waste and wastewater management services directly, without co-operating with private specialized companies. Nevertheless, in some cases, local actors have entered inter-municipal co-operation schemes to organize the collection, processing and disposal of wastes in order to benefit from economies of scale.

The private sector has been involved in waste management in several ways. Private sector's main role has been to undertake projects included in EU's action programmes. Also, some companies have been involved in manufacturing and trading waste collection equipment, also offering, in some cases, services for waste collection. Moreover, specialised offices have undertaken waste management studies and associations/chambers with special divisions have dealt with environmental issues. However, it seems that several actors are seriously considering the possibility of extending the private sector's involvement, e.g. through the adoption of voluntary agreements in order to enhance the flexibility of specific organizational choices. Finally, the intention of the Ministry of National Economy to formally encourage public-private cooperation and to finance companies related to the waste management sector should be mentioned.

### **Participation of NGO's**

The role of the NGO's is diminished, as there they do not participate in the environmental policy-making process. NGO's are acting out of the policy making field acting mainly at local level. Their role is mainly activist trying to increase the public awareness on local environmental problems.

#### 2) Ireland

### **Existence of fora for dialogue and negotiation**

The existence of fora for dialogue and negotiation in the field of environmental policy-making is limited. Within this framework, it's only the Department of Environment and the Environmental Protection Agency, which principally have regular and formal contact with the local authorities as opposed to other sub-national actors. City/County Development Boards are identified as significant actors in the context of future strategy but have a marginal role at the moment.

### **Role of experts**

The role of the experts is very limited as there have not been established those mechanisms capable to ensure their participation in the environmental policy, concerning

planning and implementation. Within this framework, the formal involvement of the experts in the environmental policy-making formation is limited although it increases at the implementation stage. Nevertheless the role of experts is increasing by their participation in new mechanisms (e.g. City/County Development Boards) and by the publication of expert reports and recommendations into the waste management problem.

### **Role of the private sector**

At local and regional level there are several large private waste contractors who have obtained an EPA licence in the Mid-West Region of Ireland. Smaller operators are increasingly entering the market and though local authority collections remain the only service in rural areas in particular, it is apparent that their share of 'the market' has decreased in urban areas. In the area of waste management, some of the most significant initiatives have come from the private sector although capital funding and support from central government is minimal and inadequate. In regard to the maintenance and operation of environmental services there is clearly more scope for contracting out which is a relatively new concept in the context of domestic municipal waste. In regard to the network analysis undertaken in this study, private sector actors have a moderate degree of centrality within the network, reflecting the greater role they are undertaking in the provision of services. On the contrary, Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) are still very limited in the field of environment and particularly in the field of waste management. PPP initiatives remain, however, in infancy with details of approval available only for Dublin waste management facilities. In Ireland no PPP's currently exist in relation to recycling facilities but the private sector is increasingly becoming involved in the collection of waste and recycling. In this case the collection of municipal domestic waste as a service provided by local authorities is declining and a number of private contractors have come on the scene in the past three years. The questionnaire did not yield any information on PPPs in the Midwest region with IBEC indicating that they are not in existence as no facilities have been built.

### **Participation of NGO's**

The participation level of NGO's in the policy-making process since recently has been limited as they were usually critical observers of the process acting only at national level. Nevertheless, the last years some of them have become partners in the policy formation process. For example, NGO's, such as IBEC, since recently have usually been critical observers of the process and lobbyists on behalf of their members, but now they consist partners in the environmental policy making process. In conclusion NGO involvement is certainly weak but not absent.

### 3) Portugal

#### **Existence of fora for dialogue and negotiation**

Dialogue was mainly supported by the Ministry of Environment, which maintained relationships with all kinds of actors in order to overcome the initial indifference in public opinion regarding environmental problems. Nevertheless, the existence of fora for dialogue and negotiation remains limited. Concerning waste management in LMA the Waste Institute has the responsibility to cooperate for the licensing and the supervision of all waste management systems. This responsibility implies a permanent dialogue and negotiation with all the actors concerned by environmental problems. We should stress that even environmental NGOs' initiatives were unfeasible without some financial support of the Ministry of Environment.

#### **Role of experts**

The role of experts is relatively increased, as they are embodied into central-government policy making actors. They are involved in the policy making process by participating in consulting formal councils, which are established in order to provide political proposals on the planning process of environmental issues. Moreover, there is an increased participation of experts in the implementation and evaluation of the Operational Programs and the CSF's.

#### **Role of the private sector**

In order to accomplish the Urban Solid Waste Plan (PERSU), some municipalities of LMA implemented multimunicipal waste management systems that are run by private companies, although most assets are public. Moreover, the responsible authority (municipality or association of municipalities) can give the concession to design, build and operate these systems to private actors. In other cases, municipalities contract all-private companies to assume these tasks or other specific activities, like road cleaning, waste collection, separation, treatment or recycling. In other situations, private sector takes the lead due to legal imperatives. This is the case in packaging waste, where companies that produce or import packaging materials are both owners and clients of Sociedade Ponto Verde, which runs the whole life-cycle of these materials. Besides the increasing perception that environmental issues create opportunities for businesses conducted to the emergence of other private actors involved in the environmental area. Nevertheless the role of the private sector has to be further empowered.

## **Participation of NGO's**

The participation level of the NGO's is increased as they are involved into the formal advisory process. Nevertheless, there is only one very active NGO for addressing environmental issues whenever a policy is planned, while the most of them have a rather hazardous existence.

## **CEEC's**

### 1) Hungary

## **Existence of fora for dialogue and negotiation**

Concerning the existence of fora for dialogue and negotiation, many weaknesses can be discerned in Hungary. The main formal fora are developed and controlled within the operation framework of state actors and European Programs. In waste management issues, particularly, there has been developed a satisfied level of formal fora for dialogue and negotiation. Referring to the most important actors consisting fora for dialogue, in Region Central Hungary these are mainly Government Agencies (eg. Environmental Protection Agency), Regional Development Council, County Councils and Municipal Councils. Also, in the Region Central Hungary, Regional & Subregional Committees distributing regional development funds and integrated EU Programmes constitute important fora for dialogue. In addition, waste market mechanisms constitute crucial fora for dialogue enforcing the role of private sector in the process of negotiation. Furthermore, in the Region Central Hungary there is the weak participation of citizens in the process of dialogue, in the field of waste management.

## **Role of experts**

The role of the experts has increased the last years in the field of environmental policy formation. As a consequence, a substantial number of experts are working in various environmental lobbying groups. Nevertheless, their role tends to be still limited.

## **Role of the private sector**

Many steps have been taken in the process of the liberalization of the Hungarian waste management market. Within this framework various schemes of public-private partnerships have been developed. The establishment of extensive public-private partnerships has been pursued to support financial waste management infrastructure projects. The empowerment of the PPP's model leads Hungary towards to the europeanisation of their waste management practices. Within that framework,

local/county authorities in both regions have developed public-private partnerships with private companies in order to implement regional or EU Programmes. With reference to the role of the private sector in the Region Central Hungary, private companies, related to waste management, contract with local authorities in order to undertake specific parts of waste management. These are usually large companies. Also, foreign private companies are also involved in the sector of waste management.

### **Participation of NGO's**

The participation of NGO's has also increased the last years. They are mainly attempt to participate in the monitoring process of the European legislation's implementation, in order to facilitate solutions to environmental issues. Nevertheless, they are fragmented because of the insufficient funding, the general legal problems, the limited access in information and the lack of volunteers.

#### 2) Poland

### **Existence of fora for dialogue and negotiation**

In Poland, the main formal fora are also developed and controlled within the operation framework of state actors and European Programs. Within this framework there has developed a satisfied level of formal fora for dialogue and negotiation, in waste management issues. Nevertheless, an important degree of dialogue takes place in informal forums, in the case of the Lodz Region. The most important formal fora for dialogue and negotiation in Lodz Region are public state actors. These actors are: the Voivodeship Office in Lodz and the Marshal Office. Also, actors, as the Bank for Environmental Protection Plc and the National Fund for Environment Protection and Water Economy, who are responsible for the distribution of funds in investment waste management projects, constitute crucial forums for dialogue. In addition, many actors of the region participate in organized seminars and conferences. These seminars and conferences can be accounted as important formal fora for dialogue.

### **Role of experts**

The role of experts in the environmental policy formation process is diminished and not institutionalised. Within this framework there are only some experts participating in the higher levels of governance.



### **Role of the private sector**

Within the framework of waste management market's liberalization, various schemes of public-private partnerships have been developed in both regions. The establishment of extensive public-private partnerships has been pursued to support financial waste management infrastructure projects. Also, PPP's, have been established in the sector of waste management collection and treatment. Also, local/county authorities have developed public-private partnerships with private companies in order to implement regional or EU Programmes. Though, the role of the private sector in Poland is increased as many small private companies are activated in the field of environment, and particularly in the field of waste management.

### **Participation of NGO's**

The participation level of NGO's is very limited as there have not been established those mechanisms capable to ensure their participation in the environmental policy, concerning planning and implementation.

### **Comparative Conclusions**

Referring to the existence of fora for dialogue, many weaknesses can be discerned in the three Cohesion countries. The principal fora are developed and controlled by the state. Among the three Cohesion countries, Ireland appears to have the most formal fora for dialogue, while in Greece and Portugal there is a significant absence of dialogue concerning environmental issues. In addition, especially in the Greek case study, dialogue takes place on the basis of personal relations. In the case of the CEEC countries there are also many weaknesses that can be discerned concerning the existence of fora for dialogue. Nevertheless, they have developed a more satisfactory level of formal fora for dialogue in comparison with the three Cohesion countries. In both countries, the main formal fora are developed and controlled within the operational framework of state actors and European programs. What is common between the three Cohesion countries and the two CEE countries is the absence of citizens' and NGOs' participation from the environmental policy making process.

Regarding the role of the private sector in the sector of environmental policy in the three Cohesion countries not many steps have been taken to enable its empowerment, despite the overall agreement on the necessity of the development of co-operation between the public and the private sector. On the contrary, in all three countries, the public-private partnership model remains weak and rather marginal. Only in the Portuguese case study did some municipalities develop public-private partnerships with the participating private

companies being responsible for the implementation of the multi-municipal waste management systems or for the design, building and operation of those systems. In the Greek and Irish case studies no public-private partnerships have emerged because municipalities provide the necessary waste management services directly to the citizens without co-operating with private companies. In Ireland no PPP's currently exist in relation to recycling facilities but the private sector is increasingly becoming involved in the collection of waste and recycling. In this case the collection of municipal domestic waste as a service provided by local authorities is declining and a number of private contractors have come on the scene in the past three years. With reference to the role of the private sector in the field of waste management in the three Cohesion countries, the following basic similarity has been discerned: private companies, related to waste management, contract with municipalities in order to undertake specific parts of waste management, like manufacturing and trading of waste collection equipment, waste collection, recycling, separation and road cleaning.

In comparison, many steps have been taken in the process of liberalization of environmental policy and waste management market in Hungary and Poland. Within this framework various schemes of public-private partnerships have been developed in both countries. Extending public-private partnerships are established in order to support financial waste management infrastructure projects. Within that framework, local/county authorities in both regions have developed public-private partnerships with private companies in order to implement regional or EU Programmes. With reference to the role of the private sector in the two CEE countries, the following basic similarity has been discerned: private companies, related to waste management, contract with local authorities in order to undertake specific parts of waste management, like landfilling, waste collection and recycling. These companies are smaller operators (Poland) or larger companies/multinationals (Hungary). In the case of Hungary foreign private companies are also involved in the sector of waste management.

The role of the experts in the environmental policy making structures in the five studied countries remains limited. It is only in Portugal, that mechanisms capable of ensuring the participation of the experts in the environmental policy making structure have been developed. In Ireland the role of experts is weak but is increasing. Also, in Hungary, in comparison with Greece and Poland, the experts have a small participation degree in the policy-making, but even in this case their role remains limited.

The role of the NGOs also remains limited in the majority of the Cohesion and CEE countries under consideration. The only case, where NGOs have a satisfactory participation degree in the environmental policy making structure, is Ireland. This

happens because of the country's traditional strong civil society and cooperative and consensus climate. In Portugal and Hungary there is only a limited participation of NGOs in the environmental policy making structure, while in Greece and Poland their role remains even more limited.

### **2.3.3. Section 3: Resistance to change**

#### **Cohesion Countries**

##### 1) Greece

#### **Institutionalised veto points**

The most powerful resistance to change in the field of waste management policy comes from the local authorities, including municipal and prefectural actors. The local authorities often act as an obstacle to the elaboration of the waste management policy either because they haven't adopted a stable strategy to address the main waste management problems (allocation of sanitary landfills), or because their policy depends on the narrow party considerations that dominate in each case, or because some of them tolerate the current situation in order to gain future benefits. Another factor, responsible for the existence of long-term problems in the field of waste management (illegal dumping) is the NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) syndrome applied by the local authorities.

#### **Cultural aspects**

The main cultural aspects that hinder changes in the field of environmental policy and particularly in the waste management policy are the following:

- The dominance of a clientelistic climate, which reinforces citizens' passiveness and hinders the development of cooperation, which could facilitate a consensual solution to the waste management problems.
- The absence of integrative and consensual arrangements between state and society, as well as among society actors, which creates a climate of distrust and insecurity not favourable to partnership building, networking and cooperation.
- The involvement of public authorities, which has been nominally strong in the environmental policy resulting in a politicised economy and an extensive public sector.
- The interest politics, which have been fragmented and have included examples of sectoral corporatism.

- The process of policy formation and implementation, which have been ineffective and centralised.

## 2) Ireland

### **Institutionalised veto points**

The Irish environmental policy and particularly the waste management policy, still lacks behind the European standards as there are many delays in the implementation process. In the Irish case-study local authorities are not responsible for the NIMBY syndrome, rather that county boundaries are significant in relation to allocation of resources (and indeed allocation of dumps or incinerators). Locally elected representatives have vetoed waste management plans that have contained proposals for waste solutions that are deemed unpalatable for and unpopular with their constituents. As a result, the lack of progress in putting waste plans in place was resolved by central administration through the passing of legislation to facilitate making the adoption of waste management plans the function of the County Manager as opposed to a function of the elected representatives. This approach has been much criticised as an attack on local democracy.

### **Cultural aspects**

The cultural aspects that impede the adaptation of the waste management policy are the emergence of a clientelistic/personalist political system. Also, the composition of this waste region (Limerick, Clare and Kerry) denotes problems in cooperation that may not arise to the same extent if the region was aligned to the Mid-West region for regional policy. These two cultural aspects traditionally contribute the main factors of resistance to change.

## 3) Portugal

### **Institutionalised veto points**

The main institutionalised actors of resistance to change, concerning environmental policy, in Portugal, are the municipal authorities, which resist accepting the responsibility of embracing environmental issues into hands. Moreover, the local authorities under financial pressures make decisions that do not take environmental issues into account. Also, in many cases municipalities resist actively against the implementation of governmental environmental policies. Another factor of resistance to change is the absence of institutionalized administrative regions hindering the implementation of the appropriate integrated environmental policies. All the above, in addition with the strongly centralised state, act against the europeanization of the Portuguese environmental policy.

## **Cultural aspects**

Traditionally, the Portuguese environmental political climate is characterised by the dominance of egoist behaviours at individual and corporative level. Also, the citizens many times avoid implementing simple environmental-friendly solutions at home considering their economic costs. This shows that there is a lack of ecological consciousness. Nevertheless, the most important cultural issue facilitating resistance to change is the individualistic attitude, which hinders cooperation and social action in order to address environmental problems.

### **CEEC's**

1) Hungary

## **Institutionalised veto points**

The most important institutionalised veto players per type of actors are the following:

- **Government:** Government acts as an obstacle to the europeanization of Hungarian environmental policy because it hasn't made to develop those institutions capable to facilitate the implementation of the European standards. Moreover, government allows the delays in the implementation of waste laws by the local authorities. Those delays are mainly owed to the high implementation costs, which cannot be covered by the local authorities.
- **Local Authorities:** Local Authorities are often deeply embedded into administrative hierarchies and in the same time autonomous hindering the adoption of the European practices in the field of environmental policy. Also, some of them are responsible for the appearance of the PIMBY (Put In My Back Yard) syndrome in order to ensure the more funds.
- **Civil Organisations:** In many cases civil organisations react to the allocation of waste management infrastructure emerging the NIMBY syndrome.

## **Cultural aspects**

The main cultural aspects that lead to considerable resistance to change are the following:

- The dominance of the political parties in the political climate and the conflicts between them, which create confrontations between the state and regional/local authorities.

- The lack of environmental awareness on environmental issues.
- The traditional paternalistic attitude characterising a big part of the society, which hinders the implementation of the appropriate policy practices.
- The lack of co-operation and of consensus climate between the stakeholders.

## 2) Poland

### **Institutionalised veto points**

The most important institutionalized veto players in the field of environmental policy are detected at the local level. Within this framework there are some non-governmental organisations and a part of the public opinion, which act controversy to the government's environmental policy. These protests are facilitated with the form of the NIMBY syndrome and usually concern waste disposals or composting plants. Furthermore, at the local level another obstacle to the europeanization of the environmental policy is the local authorities. Within this framework, local authorities act as veto players because the knowledge level of their civil servants is still unsatisfactory.

### **Cultural aspects**

The cultural aspects that lead to resistance to change of the Polish environmental policy-making are the following:

- The low organisational culture of the local and regional administrative structures.
- The low transparency and accountability.
- The resistance of some civil servants against the increased of the social participation in the environmental policy-making area.
- The politicisation of the local political climate, which brings the controversies between the national political parties into the local level.

### **Comparative Conclusions**

In all the five countries under consideration there are important institutionalised veto players who are opposed to the Europeanization process in environmental policy. The most important institutionalised veto players in all the five case studies are the local authorities. Particularly, in Greece and Portugal local authorities are the only veto players, who are also responsible for the existence of the NIMBY syndrome. In Ireland the main veto players are the locally elected representatives. In Poland and Hungary,

except from local authorities, the NGO's and civil organisations are acting as veto players causing the NIMBY syndrome.

Regarding the cultural aspects that adversely affect the Europeanization process in the environmental field, it must be stressed that in all five countries there is resistance to change. Nevertheless, these aspects are differing in each country. Within this framework, the aspect of clientelism characterises the Greek and Irish environmental policy. The personalism and the egoist attitude are highly developed in Ireland and Portugal. The politisation of the general political climate as well as the local/regional political climate exist in Greece, Hungary and Poland. The lack of a consensual and cooperational climate characterises the Greek, the Portuguese and the Hungarian environmental policy-making, while the lack of ecological awareness characterises Hungary and Portugal. Finally, the aspects of low organisational culture, transparency and accountability are typical in Poland.

#### **2.3.4. Section 4: Civic culture**

##### **Cohesion Countries**

###### 1) Greece

Traditionally, the presence of civil society in Greece has always been poor. That has to do with the limited citizens' participation in the civil organizations and the low levels of awareness on environmental issues. Furthermore, citizens' involvement in the environmental policy making process is very limited because of the centralized structure of the Greek state. The absence of a strong civil society is related to the lack of information and intermediary institutions, capable to promote dialogue and participation of different social groups in the planning procedures. In addition, citizens' participation is weakened because of the general climate of distrust. This high degree of distrust is owed to the lack of more integrative and consensual arrangements between state and social actors.

More specific, the case-study of Attica region is a characteristic example of the Greek reality, where the social capital endowments are very limited. The citizens' participation in the planning and implementation procedure of environmental problems and in voluntary organizations is very weak although most of the citizens consider that the presence of a strong civil society is necessary. Furthermore, there is an extended distrust degree on the part of the citizens and private actors to the governmental decisions taken to address the environmental issues.

## 2) Ireland

In the case of Ireland, the strong social capital endowments are traditionally established as an institution emerged both for partnership with the government and for the addressing of governmental failures on environmental issues. Within, this framework there is a high degree of citizens' participation in voluntary associations and civil organizations. The power of citizens participation has been empowered in the process of policy-making planning by institutionalized the participation of civil organizations in the County Development Boards. Moreover, the europeanisation process has given more opportunities to the Irish civil society by offering financial support and ensured legitimacy for local groups. Also, a substantial amount of energy on behalf of citizens (in relation to the waste management issue) tends to be also channeled into protests.

The case study of the Mid-West Region of Ireland depicts the general status of the Irish civil society. In this case, most of the actors agree that the emergence of a strong civil society is necessary. However, most of the interviewed actors consider that the citizens' participation is not that satisfactory and that it has to be further empowered. In addition, it is positive that within that region there is not an issue of distrust.

## 3) Portugal

The emergence of social capital endowments in Portugal is limited, as well as the power of civil organizations is diminished not able to affect the policy-making planning and implementation. This is mainly owed to the centralized structure of the Portuguese state. Nevertheless, it is only the area of environment where there are voluntary organizations emerged in the policy making structure acting with a reactive way to address environmental issues. The status of the Portuguese civil society is depicted in the case study of the Lisbon Metropolitan Area where, although the issue of a strong social capital is considered indispensable for economic and social development, low levels of citizens' participation are facilitated.

### **CEEC's**

#### 1) Hungary

The social capital endowments in Hungary as also the civil society are very weak in all the sectors of policy-making, including environmental policy. This can be deprived by the facts that citizens' participation in voluntary/civil organizations is very limited, by the citizens' limited awareness concerning their rights and obligations and by their low level involvement in the planning and implementation process of environmental policy. That



weak civil society comes as a sequence from the centralized state structure and the paternalistic attitude of the civil society.

The survey in the case study of Central Hungary Region confirmed the emergence of a weak civil society, as there is a low citizens' participation in civil organizations and a low degree of environmental awareness. That weak civil society justifies the several problems emerged in the field of waste management policy (illegal dumping), which could be addressed better through a facilitating collective consciousness.

## 2) Poland

In the case of Poland, the civil society appears to be rather weak. This comes as a result from the general climate of distrust to the central state authorities and by the absence of consensus climate. Although, a high degree of citizens participate in civil organizations, only a small percentage of them are actively involved. Moreover, there is a low awareness degree on environmental issues and a very limited involvement of civil organizations in the process of environmental planning and implementation. Nevertheless, the majority of citizens support that the necessity of a strong civil society, which could address actively in cooperation with the governmental authorities the environmental problems, and particularly, the waste management problems.

### **Comparative Conclusions**

The role of the social capital endowments as well as of the civil society is considered indispensable for the Europeanization of the environmental policy. Nevertheless, in Greece, Portugal, Hungary and Poland there is a weak civil society. In those four countries the existence of a weak civil society is expressed by the absence of awareness on environmental issues. Furthermore, in Greece, Portugal and Hungary there is a limited citizens' participation in civil organizations, in comparison to Poland where, although there is a high level of citizens' participation in civil organization, only a small percentage of them are actively involved. Also, in Greece and Poland there is an increased general climate of distrust, which negatively impacts upon the social capital endowments. In the above-mentioned countries the existence of a weak civil society comes as a result of the absence of a consensus climate and the lack of intermediary institutions and information.

In contrast, Ireland has a traditionally strong civil society, which is characterized by the high degree of citizens' participation in civil organizations, by the existence of empowered civil organizations and by the development of a strong co-operative climate. What is positive for the future development of the civil society in the five countries is the common understanding of the development problems by almost all the actors. This fact

can lead to a higher degree of citizens' participation and to a higher degree of awareness on environmental issues.

## **2.4. Part III: Conclusions - Assessment of Learning Capacity**

### **2.4.1. Section 1: Evaluating the learning capacity of the domestic institutional structures**

#### 1) Greece

The europeanisation process of the Greek environmental policy is hindered by the existence of veto players and by those cultural aspects characterizing the environmental policy. The existence of this strong resistance to change depicts the weakness of the involved actors' learning capacity. In the field of environmental policy the central state assumed new responsibilities following accession. Despite recent reforms, the centralized nature of the Greek state has not been eliminated. The strongly centralized nature of the Greek state in the field of environmental policy hinders the flow of information and thus the learning capacity. In the same way, the role of the non-central state actors (Professionals, experts, NGO's) in the environmental policy-making process remains limited. In most cases, no effective mechanisms have been established to ensure their participation in policy planning, implementation and co-ordination. Thus, the limited participation of non-state actors in the environmental policy-making is an obstacle to the exchange of knowledge and ideas and to the flow of information.

Moreover, in Greece civil society is weak and social capital endowments are limited in the field of waste management. The existence of a weak civic culture hinders communication, the sharing of new ideas and knowledge and hence also deters collective action and the learning process. The existence of formal fora for dialogue increases the exchange of information, the communication between actors, the exchange of ideas and knowledge and hence the learning capacity of the actors. Nevertheless, it has to be stressed that in Greece, overall, there is a lack of systematic dialogue, on issues related to environment and particularly to waste management, between government officials, regional and local authorities and representatives from the civil society. Also, in Greece the role of the private sector is marginal in the field of waste management. Particularly, the formation of partnerships between the public sector and private companies remains, also, marginal. The marginal development of PPP's depicts that the exchange of knowledge and new ideas hasn't been encouraged and as a consequence the same applies to the learning capacity of the institutional actors.

Nevertheless, in Greece there seems to be a common understanding on environmental issues. The fact that environmental problems are taken into account by almost all the regional actors, even by the public actors, who plan and implement the environmental policy in the Region, is no doubt a possible factor. The common understanding of development problems contributes a precondition for dialogue between the actors, which results in the increase of learning capacity. Finally, the institution building capacity in Greece with reference to environmental issues remains very weak. The creation of co-operative networks in the Region of Attica is minimal and limited to the point that EU programmes (e.g. Operational Programme of "Environment") or national legislation (e.g. with regard to the synthesis of the Regional Council, which is nonetheless imposed by the EU) have established them. Most of the contacts between the actors involved in the field are informal and based on personal relations and interest in the specific policy area. In this framework, the capacity of the existing institutional infrastructure in terms of learning and adaptation is rather weak. The above facts show that few changes have taken place in the existing institutional infrastructure, which is a result of the weak learning capacity of the actors.

## 2) Ireland

The europeanisation process of the Irish environmental policy is also hindered by the existence of veto players and by those cultural aspects characterizing the environmental policy. Referring to the role of the Irish central state actors involved in the environmental policy, it has been enhanced after the country's accession. Nevertheless the centralized nature of the Irish state has not been eliminated. As a result, the centralized nature of the Irish state in the field of environmental policy hinders the flow of information and thus the learning capacity. Also, the role of the non-central state actors in the environmental policy-making process in general remains limited. Thus, the limited participation of non-state actors in the environmental policy-making, even if some NGO's have increased responsibilities, constitutes an obstacle to the exchange of knowledge and ideas and to the flow of information.

In regard to the civil society, it has traditionally been perceived as strong in Ireland but with problems as regards individual choices and practices coupled with a relatively low level of environmental awareness. Overall, the Irish civil society has empowered through the europeanization level, as the communication between actors and the flow of information and knowledge increase has incremented and as a consequence the learning capacity has been improved. Moreover, the existence of fora for dialogue and negotiation on environmental issues remains limited in Ireland. The limited fora for dialogue on environmental issues, depicts the absence of communication among actors and the

limited flow of information, ideas and knowledge. Furthermore, the PPP's in Ireland remain limited in the field of waste management. This limited development of public private partnerships depicts the non-encouragement of knowledge and information exchange, which cannot lead to a more extensive learning capacity.

On the contrary, there is a common understanding on development problems in Ireland. In the Mid-West Region of Ireland the regional and local actors interviewed illustrated a common understanding of major issues but were inclined to comment on problems specific to their county as opposed to on a regional basis. The existence of common understanding on development issues is the precondition for dialogue among the actors and as a consequence increases the learning capacity of the actors. Finally, in the field of institution building, in the sector of environment, there have been many important steps through the europeanization process. This is depicted by the support for creation of new institutions, the establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency, the establishment of City/County Development Boards, Strategic Policy Committees, Regional Authorities and Regional Assemblies, which have a less or more important role in environmental policy. Moreover, networking and co-operation provided a widening range of actors involved in environmental policy and local groups are becoming more active. As a result, in Ireland, knowledge and learning in the field of environmental policy have been reinforced as a result of the country's participation in the EU.

### 3) Portugal

In Portugal there are also veto players and cultural aspects characterizing the environmental policy which act as resistance to change. The emergence of such a resistance to change depicts the weakness of the involved actors' learning capacity. Also, the structure of the Portuguese central state structure concerning environmental policy-making has changed drastically following accession. Within this framework decentralization trends are developing and many of the responsibilities for the policy formation have passed to the regional and local authorities. These decentralization trends have increased the flow of information and knowledge, leading to an enhanced learning capacity. Complementary, the role of the non-state actors following the demands of the EU has been increased in the field of environmental policy-making. This increased role of the non-state actors has led to the increment of the exchange of information and knowledge as well as to some empowerment of communication and dialogue.

Moreover, although civil society and social capital in general are regarded as indispensable for social and economical development and effective policy implementations, in practical terms, levels of civil participation, informal networks and

citizen's participation, public awareness on environmental issues and involvement in public matters are still very low in Portugal. As regards to the fora for dialogue it is considered crucial as it is a prerequisite for communication, sharing of knowledge and ideas, and exchange of information. Nevertheless in Portugal fora for Dialogue remain limited in the field of environmental policy. Concerning the Public Private Partnership model, it is partly developed in Portugal, with regards to environmental policy. The partly developed PPP model depicts that the exchange of new knowledge and information has been encouraged.

Furthermore, in general terms, there is a relative common understanding on development problems in Portugal, since some specific issues gather enormous consensus. The most consensual problems in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area are land-use management, social exclusion and transports. This common understanding on development is a precondition for dialogue between actors and can potentially facilitate the increase of learning capacity. Also, in the field of institution building an important progress has been noticed after the accession in the EU. This institutional adaptation is due to the requirements of EU environmental policy. However, the major motive force of environmental policy and institution building was the Ministry of Environment.

#### 4) Hungary

The europeanization process of the Hungarian environmental policy is hindered by the existence of veto players and by those cultural aspects characterizing the environmental policy. The emergence of such a strong resistance to change depicts the weakness of the involved actors' learning capacity. Despite the EU demands there is also a dominance of the central state actors in the process of policy making. Though, the strongly centralized nature of the Hungarian state in the field of environmental policy hinders the flow of information, and thus the learning capacity. Concerning the role of the non-central state actors in the environmental policy-making process, it must be stressed that some important steps have been made. Nevertheless their role remains fragmented due to the legal inefficiencies and the lack of funding. Thus, the limited participation of non-state actors in the environmental policy-making is an obstacle to the exchange of knowledge and ideas and to the flow of information.

Furthermore, in general terms the Hungarian civil society remains limited. The limited social capital endowments on environmental issues hinder the communication among actors, the exchange of knowledge and ideas and the learning process within the institutional networks. Additionally, through the europeanization process different fora for dialogue have emerged, concerning environmental problems. The establishment of fora

for dialogue is a positive sign for the improvement of the learning capacity, as is it considered a prerequisite for the exchange of information, ideas and knowledge. Moreover, public private partnership is widely practised in waste management, but its legal framework is not sufficiently regulated in Hungary. Nonetheless, the existence of an empowered PPP scheme in Hungary facilitates the communication between actors and the flow of information and knowledge.

Moreover, in Hungary and more specifically in the Region of Central Hungary all interviewed actors seem to have a more or less common understanding of the development problems of the Region. These are mainly environmental problems, related to spatial and urban planning and transport infrastructure deficiencies. This existence of a common understanding on development problems is considered crucial for the enhancement of the dialogue, acting positively on the improvement of learning capacity. Also, the process of institution building has been strengthened to serve the europeanization of domestic institutions. New institutions have been established in Hungary and particularly in the Region of Central Hungary. Cooperation has increased and various networks have emerged among several related actors. Inadequate enforcement of environmental regulations is a major concern in Hungary. The upgrading of the institutional system of environment protection is a difficult task, which will take more time than the modernisation of the tools and physical infrastructure of environmental protection. Within this framework, it seems that the existing institutions are facing difficulties to improve the Hungarian institutional infrastructure, showing the weaknesses of the learning capacity process.

#### 5) Poland

Similarly to Hungary, the europeanization process of the Polish environmental policy is hindered by the existence of veto players and by those cultural aspects characterizing the environmental policy. Also, the accession process has motivated the role of the Polish central state actors involved in the environmental policy. Within this framework, decentralization trends are taking place, which have as a result the transfer of responsibilities to the local and regional authorities and the enhancement of information flow. As regards to the role of the non-central state actors, in the environmental policy-making process in general, it remains diminished and not institutionalized. Thus, the limited participation of non-state actors in environmental policy-making constitutes an obstacle to the exchange of knowledge and ideas and to the flow of information. In the same way, the Polish civil society remains limited although the social capital endowments are considered indispensable for the europeanization of the environmental policy. The

weak civil society depicts the low communication between actors and the limited flow of information and knowledge.

Moreover, only a few steps have been done for the establishment of formal fora for dialogue, capable to address the main environmental issues. This weakness expresses the absence of information and knowledge exchange. Additionally, although the role of the private sector is enforced, not many steps have been taken to forward the development of the Public Private Partnership model. The absence of PPP's depicts the weaknesses for information and knowledge exchange, which hinder the learning capacity of the institutional actors.

On the contrary, in Poland, there is a common understanding on development problems. The existence of a common understanding facilitates a precondition for dialogue leading to the empowerment of learning capacity. Finally, the process of institution building has been strengthened to serve the europeanisation of domestic institutions. New institutions have been established, cooperation has increased and various networks have emerged among several related actors, but even in this field many steps have to be taken forward. The progress detected in the process of institution building depicts that the learning capacity of the actors has increased.

### **Comparative conclusions**

In general, the Cohesion Countries have succeeded a more extensive europeanization of their domestic institutional infrastructure than the CEECs, because the last two decades they had a better compliance of their national legal framework with EU's directives and regulations. Moreover, the participation of the Cohesion Countries in the CSF's and Programmes financed by the Structural Funds offered them more opportunities to transform their domestic institutional infrastructure. On the other side the absence of adequate funds in the Accession Countries deficits their opportunities to harmonize their domestic institutional infrastructure. This is why in the Accession Countries more delays emerge in the implementation of environmental projects, and problems regarding environmental infrastructure. In addition, the cohesion countries have developed environmental management practices to a great extent, but in some cases there are still problems related to the allocation of new sanitary landfills and to the existence of uncontrolled dumping sites.

In the following table the comparative results of the parameters indicating/affecting the learning capacity in the five studied countries are presented.

**Table 12.** Parameters defining learning capacity in the five studied countries

Country/Parameter	Greece	Ireland	Portugal	Hungary	Poland
<b>Resistance to change</b>	Strong	Medium	Medium	Strong	Medium/Strong
<b>Decentralisation trends</b>	Weak	Weak	Medium/Strong	Weak	Medium
<b>Participation of non-state actors into the environmental policy-making process</b>	Weak	Weak/Medium	Weak/Medium	Weak	Weak
<b>Civil society</b>	Weak	Medium/Strong	Weak/Medium	Weak	Weak
<b>Co-operation climate</b>	Weak	Strong	Medium	Medium	Medium
<b>Fora for dialogue</b>	Weak/Medium	Medium	Weak/Medium	Medium	Medium
<b>Development of PPP's</b>	Weak	Weak	Medium	Strong	Weak/Medium
<b>Common understanding</b>	Strong	Strong	Strong	Strong	Strong
<b>Institution building</b>	Weak	Medium/Strong	Medium	Medium	Medium

From the above table the following comparative conclusions can be extracted:

- In all countries there is resistance to change, which is more intense in Greece, and Hungary, compared to Ireland, Poland and Portugal. The higher resistance to change means less communication and exchange of knowledge, which in turn reduces the learning capacity.
- In Portugal and Poland there is more decentralization in comparison to the other three countries. That means that in these two countries there are more opportunities for non-state and peripheral actors to participate in the environmental policy making process, increasing the exchange of knowledge and innovation among actors.
- The participation of non-state actors is limited in all the five countries, except in Portugal where a more extended participation degree of NGOs and experts into the environmental policy-making is recorded.



- Regarding social capital endowments, in all countries there is a weak civil society and limited participation of citizens and civil organizations, with the exception for Ireland, which has a traditionally strong civil society. The existence of a strong civil society in Ireland means a wider communication between actors and a more dense flow of information, knowledge and ideas, which increase the learning capacity of the institutional actors in environmental policy.
- The existence of a consensus and cooperation climate is stronger in Ireland, Hungary, Portugal and Poland, respectively, in comparison to Greece where a cooperation climate is absent.
- In regard to the existence of fora for dialogue, in all countries under the EU initiatives informal fora have been established and controlled by the state. Nevertheless, in the most cases they have many weaknesses in how this has operated.
- In all five countries there is a common understanding of development problems.
- The development of PPP's is stronger in Hungary and Portugal, respectively, in comparison to the other three countries, where this model has not yet been developed.
- New institutions have emerged at national and regional/local level (regional/local authorities) in order to facilitate environmental policies and implementation. Nevertheless, In relation to institution building there are more deficiencies in Greece in comparison to the other four countries, where a wider range of institutions have been established.

We can also draw further conclusions for the learning capacity from the results of the Social Network Analysis that was undertaken in the five regions of the studied countries. Regarding basic characteristics of identified policy networks in all regions one should study comparatively the centralization degree<sup>85</sup> and the density degree<sup>86</sup> of these networks. The less centralized networks are more horizontal, facilitating the distribution

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<sup>85</sup> Centralization degree refers to the extent to which this cohesion is organized around specific actors: those with the greatest number of linkages. Centrality measurement reveals actors' involvement in network relations and demonstrates the structure -horizontal or vertical- of the networks and also constitutes an indicator of the distribution of power among the actors.

<sup>86</sup> Density measurement refers to the degree of connectedness of the entire network whereby zero indicates no connections between any actor and one means that all actors are linked to one another. Because density demonstrates the strength of ties, it can be used as a partial measurement for thickness. However, thickness has qualitative features, which will be explored during the interviews.

of funds and power in more levels of governance, as also the more dense networks facilitate cooperation, formation of partnerships and consequently the flow of information. The centrality degree and the density of the five studied networks are presented in the following table.

**Table 13.** Structure of the networks in the five case study Regions

<b>Region/Network characteristics</b>	<b>Centralization degree</b>	<b>Density</b>
<b>Attica Region - Greece</b>	99,26	0,7
<b>Mid-West Region of Ireland</b>	121,43	1,65
<b>Lisbon Metropolitan Area - Portugal</b>	81,90	1,15
<b>Central Region of Hungary</b>	110,54	0,45
<b>Lodz Region - Poland</b>	195,86	1,1

Within this framework the Cohesion regions, in general, have less centralized networks compared to the CEEC regions and more dense networks. This means that, in the three Cohesion countries there is a wider flow of information and exchange of knowledge and ideas in comparison to CEEC countries, where these networks display more weaknesses. Nevertheless, what is common in all Cohesion and CEEC case studies is that central state actors dominate the networks.

More conclusions concerning the learning capacity can be derived from looking at the networks' structural equivalence in the five studied Regions. Analyzing the structural equivalence of valued matrices it's crucial to study how central actors are apportioned in the sub-groups. In all five regions' networks four sub-groups emerge. In the cases of the Attica Region, the West Region of Ireland, the Lodz Region and the Region of Central Hungary there is a dominance of the central state actors in the most subgroups, while the other groups, where there are no central state actors, have less power. On the contrary, in the Lisbon Metropolitan Region the central state actors along with the most important NGO's dominate the formed sub-groups. This fact shows that in Portugal there is an increased participation of the non-state actors, which increases the exchange of knowledge and ideas and as a consequence enforces the learning capacity.

Overall, the process of Europeanisation has impacted significantly on administrative and policy practices in the five countries leading to widespread learning. The nature and pace of learning has been affected by the political and administrative cultures and structures, the institutionalisation level of those structures, the system of institutional interactions, the procedures determining information and communication flows, the range of actors

involved and their respective roles, the types of network which exist and the levels of social capital and civic engagement.

In conclusion, in both CEECs and Accession (especially in the CEECs) regions, further steps must be taken towards the europeanization of the domestic institutional infrastructure. Within this framework, it is necessary for all case study regions to adopt the required stable rules in order to reduce uncertainty among actors, to support the emergence of dense networks, to facilitate the flow of information and co-operation at all levels of governance and of course to proceed with the building of the necessary institution infrastructural basis. This will lead to the emergence of stable intra-regional networks with a good learning capacity capable to adapt to the dynamically changing environment.

## **D. PART D: COPING WITH MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE: POLICY IMPLICATIONS**

### **1. Chapter Nine: assessing policy outcomes and implementation - patterns of learning and adaptation in the Cohesion and the CEE countries**

#### **1.1. Introduction**

The main goal of this chapter is the overall evaluation of the fieldwork research and the identification of the existing patterns of the learning process in both policy areas in all the participating countries. To do so, we draw on the existing evidence on the outcomes of policy implementation, taking into account the limitations in terms of data availability. In that respect, it should be stressed that there has been limited availability of data from ex post evaluation of the impact of Community interventions, especially at the regional (NUTS II) and subregional (NUTS III) levels.

#### **1.2. Greece**

Despite the fact that institution building/institutional creation is considered as the main outcome of the learning process -crucially affected by the Europeanization of policy-making given the generally poor level of the pre-existing institutional infrastructure- the strengthening and the stability of institutions still remains a key challenge for Greece's public policy arena within the EU MLG structure. Indeed, institution building was significantly absent from the democratization/Europeanization agenda during both the first post-authoritarianism (1974-81) and, most importantly, the first post-accession (1981-1990s) period. Additionally, in the first period after the emergence of modernization on the domestic public policy agenda in the early 1990s, institution building was substantially misconceived as almost synonymous to "marketization". Thus, arguably, the serious process of institution building, albeit mostly reluctant and not always successful, started in the mid-1990s.

##### **1.2.1. Regional policy**

#### **Policy implementation**

The picture of Greece's institutional "goodness of fit"/capacity, drawn from the case study and comparative reports, is reflected in and vindicated by the evidence from policy implementation, as it emerges from the ex post evaluation on the implementation of the ROP (CSF II, 1994-99) of the Southern Aegean Islands, which is supposed to be a relatively converging region and success story in policy implementation. In particular, despite the significant improvements in aspects of the planning process (i.e. consistency

between general/main development goals and specific policy objectives), the report concentrates on important and crucial weaknesses related to the implementation phase of the programme. First is the lack of long-term framework for development with sectoral and intraregional priorities, which would be conducive to the elimination of development disparities within the region. Subsequently, second, the significant gap in institutional and administrative capabilities among islands within the region, i.e. between big and smaller islands, which has serious consequences for their capacity to draw and prepare project proposals, thus deteriorating the intra-regional disparities. Third, the lack of congruence and/or coordination between the –primarily sectoral- allocation of resources by the central state, on the one hand, and the regional priorities/objectives, as they are defined in the ROP, on the other, is considered an additional factor contributing to the intraregional disparities.

These deficiencies seem to be related to the level of efficiency in the implementation process and, subsequently, to the accomplishment of the strategic objectives of the ROP. This becomes particularly evident from the level of accomplishment with regard to the three strategic goals of the ROP, namely: the concentration of resources in the form of Specific Integrated Programmes; the expansion of private sector involvement in financing the ROP; and the support of problematic sectors in the region. In particular, the two Specific Integrated Programmes, that is on “tourist exploitation of sea and culture” (Sub-prog. 1) and the “specific integrated programme for Leros isl.” (Sub-prog. 6) are characterized by low level of both economic and physical completion (see indic. absorption data in Table 14. below), as well as, by serious institutional and administrative deficiencies. With regard to the goal of expanding the private sector involvement in the ROP, which actually is closely linked to the financing of the two specific integrated programmes mentioned above, the level of its accomplishment has been very poor up to 1999, thus indirectly affecting the progress of the integrated programmes (sub-progs 1&6). Finally, there is evidence of serious deficiencies in the accomplishment of the third strategic goal of supporting the problematic sectors in the region. In particular, almost all of ROP’s actions focused on the problematic sectors (namely, water management, protection of physical and built environment, intra-regional communication, power sufficiency and efficiency of public administration) demonstrate a generally poor level of accomplishment (Ministry of National Economy, 1999).

**Table 14.** CSF II (Southern Aegean ROP 1994-99) Absorption per Sub-programme

Sub-programmes	Overall Absorption (1999) (%)
1. Tourist Exploitation of Sea and Cultural Resources	38.1
2. Support of Productive Sectors	46.2
3. Improving Human Resources	38.9
4. Environment – Quality of Life	69.7
5. Support of Local Government	54.0
6. Specific Integrated Programme for Leros Isl.	28.6
7. Completion of CSF I Actions	99.6
8. Technical Assistance	34.3
9. Total ROP	50.3

*Source: Ministry of National Economy [ENVIPLAN - G. Tsekouras & Co], (1999), Evaluation Report, ROP Southern Aegean, 1994-99.*

In sum, the evidence from the evaluation of policy implementation in relation to the major problems facing the region suggests the ROP's contribution to tackling the most serious of these problems, and particularly containment of mass tourism concentration, support of agriculture and sustainability, is generally poor, while the only relatively "success stories", in terms of ROP's contribution to tackling the development problems of the region, are mostly evident in the areas of improving transport infrastructure and lifting the isolation of the region (islands). In the light of these findings, it should be stressed that the persistence of intraregional disparities in the period of the CSF II as a major development issue in the region, despite the continuing EU interventions -which actually re-vindicates findings of previous research (Paraskevopoulos, C., 1998, 2001)- underlines the importance/predominance of the national contextual factors, in terms of weaknesses in institutional capacity, vis-à-vis local specificities. This is because there is evidence of a relatively better quality of local institutional infrastructure in the Southern Aegean region, when compared with other Greek regions (Paraskevopoulos, C., 1998, 2001).

### **Patterns of learning**

The entry into the EC/EU and the gradual Europeanization of regional policy, particularly after the 1988 reform of the Structural Funds, have constituted an external shock for the structure of the state and the system of public administration that crucially affected the process of institutional and policy change at the domestic policy arena. The learning

process is linked to both the institutional and policy change. In that respect, first, the centralized planning system was challenged by the requirements of the partnership and subsidiarity principles for active participation of subnational governments in the planning and monitoring procedures. Under these pressures, substantial reforms of the intergovernmental relations took place in the 1980s and 1990s, involving the creation of the 13 administrative regions, the elected second tier of subnational government at the prefectural level, as well as, the creation of new municipalities through the compulsory merger of the communes (the so called "Kapodistrias Plan") in 1997. These reforms were accompanied by the restructuring of the planning system, the main feature of which was its attempt 'to combine "top-down" control with "bottom-up" definition of priorities' (Andrikopoulou, 1992:198).

Second, the upgraded role of the Regional Secretariat in drawing up the ROPs and the establishment of direct links between supranational and subnational levels of government through their joint involvement in the Monitoring Committees are seen as the main improvements in the implementation of the first CSF (1989-93), which have been further strengthened in the second funding period (1994-99). However, the unfavourable politico-economic circumstances during the initial phase, the administrative weaknesses and the maintenance of the hierarchical structure of the planning procedures functioned as counter forces causing internal and external inconsistencies, significant delays and inefficiencies (CEC, 1995). With regard, in particular, to the ROPs, on the one hand the control of the ministry of National Economy upon the financial resources of the CSF and the Community Initiatives funds and the low, in general, quality of the local institutional infrastructure in terms of learning and adaptation (absence of intra-regional networks) on the other, played an important role in inhibiting the formulation of integrated development strategies.

Third, this weakness of the subnational institutional infrastructure, marked by the role of local clientelism in the policy-making process, led to a shift in the policy priorities of the III CSF, from democratic participation towards efficiency in the management of the funds, and subsequently to further reinforcement of the decisive role of central state and the relevant administrative/political institutions (Central administration of the Ministry of National Economy, Central Payment Authority, General Secretary, Minister). This trend, however, may be gradually leading towards an increasing involvement of technocrats (independent consultants, experts) in policy-making both at the national and subnational levels of government.

Overall, undoubtedly Europeanization has constituted an external shock for the domestic governance and policy-making structures in Greece, closely linked to the modernization

process, and therefore it should be viewed as a crucial variable affecting domestic policy and institutional change. However, its impact is crucially dependent on the learning capacity of the pre-existing institutional infrastructure and, in that respect, Greece's poor institutional capacity has fundamentally influenced the pace of domestic change. Nonetheless, given the variation, both sectoral and territorial, in institutional performance, there is evidence of sectoral and territorial variation in the pace of institutional and policy change as well. Additionally, there is also evidence that the incremental logic of Europeanization results in the improvement of the institutional infrastructure, even if the pre-existing institutional capacity in terms of learning and institution-building was poor (Paraskevopoulos, C., 1998, 2001). It is within this framework that institutional change and/or adaptation/innovation is considered as the main outcome/pattern of the learning process in regional policy in Greece.

### **1.2.2. Environmental policy**

#### **Policy implementation**

Environmental policy in general and waste management in particular is the policy area which better reflects the institutional and policy-making weaknesses of the domestic governance structures in Greece. Even the formulation of environmental policy as a coherent and distinct policy area in the second half of the 1980s was strongly influenced by the need for harmonisation of national legislation with EU rules. Policy implementation in environmental policy and particularly in waste management involves the transposition and enforcement of EU legislation (directives), implementation of environment/waste management-related EU interventions (Sectoral and Regional Operational Programmes, Cohesion Fund etc.) and the actual accomplishment of policy objectives in the field.

Thus, the EU directives are enforced by insufficient trans-ministerial decisions and the law on "the protection of the environment", which has a rather declarative character, resulting in a lack of effectiveness in the policy-making. Although Greece has a good record of adopting EU legislation (in fact all the relevant Council Directives -75/442, 91/156, 94/62- have been transposed) there are serious delays in the process (4-6 years) and without thorough examination of the conditions and needs at the national level (e.g. through research and production of reports). It is indicative that there was a significant delay (7 years) for the incorporation of the Packaging Waste Directive (94/62) into the Greek legislation and there are still several steps that need to be taken for its enforcement (e.g. set up of an organisation for alternative waste management schemes). Additionally, at the regional and local levels, the lack of co-ordination and the intense conflict between local authorities -an outcome of few formal arrangements for policy co-



ordination other than collective work teams and monitoring committees dealing with EU legislation and funding programmes- especially in the greater Athens area and Thessaloniki, lead to short-term political decisions and subsequently to ineffective types of governance (Getimis et. al., National Report, 2002).

With regard to the implementation of environment/waste management-related EU programmes and initiatives, the evidence from the implementation of the -CSF II- ROP 1994-99 of the Attica region is indicative. In particular, the Sub-programme 1, corresponding to the strategic objective of "improving the environment and quality of life" consistently demonstrates the lowest level of both absorption rate and level of physical completion among all the sub-programmes/strategic objectives of the ROP -it should be stressed that the general picture emerging from the evaluation regarding the implementation of the other sub-programmes of the ROP is positive- (see indic. absorption data in Table 15.). This almost consistent underperformance in the implementation of the environment-related actions and measures of the CSF/ROP is generally attributed to weaknesses of the institutional infrastructure and/or to the lack of institutional modernization. Additionally, and most importantly, the evaluation provides evidence about the significant underperformance/low level of accomplishment of the specific measure (M.1.2) related to the waste management tasks of the ROP, which is attributed to the so called "social reactions" factor, namely to the reactionary attitudes towards the location of landfills (the well-known NIMBY syndrome) (Ministry of National Economy, (1999), *Evaluation Report, ROP Attica, 1994-99*).

**Table 15.** CSF II (Attica ROP 1994-99) Absorption & Phys. Compl. Per Sub-programme

<b>Sub-programmes &amp; Strategic Objectives</b>	<b>Absorption (%) (1999)</b>	<b>Physical Completion (%) (1999)</b>
1. Environment and Quality of Life	37.50	45.7
2. Development of Productive Sectors & Transport Improvement	66.90	63.7
3. Social Cohesion	52.00	54.5
4. Local Government Autonomous Interventions	87.00	98.4

*Source: Ministry of National Economy [LOGO-TECH], (1999), Evaluation Report, ROP Attica, 1994-99.*

As for the actual accomplishment of policy objectives, the main waste management-related problem of Attica region is twofold: on the one hand, while the bulk (95%) of the estimated 3,500 tonnes of solid waste is disposed of to the sanitary landfill located in the Municipality of Ano Liosia, this landfill has already been saturated; and on the other

hand, the remainder is disposed at several small and uncontrolled landfills and dumpsites<sup>87</sup> (Andreadakis et. al., 2000, p. 181). Therefore, the creation of –a network- of other sanitary landfill(s) has been raised as the major waste management-related issue in the region.

As far as recycling is concerned, almost 150,000 inhabitants are served through a network of 2,500 recycling bins and more than 300 tonnes of recyclables are recovered each month within the framework of a recycling programme carried out by HERRA, a recycling association, and five municipalities, focusing on recovering packaging (aluminium and steel cans, plastic bottles, glass bottles, paper and board) and paper (newsprint and magazines, office paper etc.) waste (Andreadakis et. al., 2000, pp. 195-196). Furthermore ESDKNA, the municipal association, is responsible for the operation and financing of a collection programme for the recycling of paper, which serves about 2 million people in 53 municipalities, with a network of 3,000 bins. The current recovery is 470 tonnes per month and the collected paper is sold directly to private companies dealing with separation and sale of used paper (Andreadakis et. al., 2000, p. 196).

Overall, however, recovery, recycling and reuse programmes do not constitute well-developed policy instruments of waste management in Greece. Only an estimated 8% of the total municipal solid waste is directed into material recycling (Andreadakis et. al., 2000, p. 171). Moreover, the method of incineration is not practiced due to a widespread fear for potential emissions of harmful air pollutants and the increased costs (Andreadakis et. al., 2000, pp. 178, 199). For, a series of projects, to be financed by the Cohesion Fund, refer to the creation of infrastructure for recycling, the construction of two new sanitary landfills, as well as the collection and transport of waste in the Attica region, with a goal of increasing the amount of recycled waste to 25% of the total produced by the end of 2006 (Region of Attica, 2001, pp. 52, 68).

### **Patterns of learning**

Extensive institutional creation accompanied by unclear, half-baked and often contradictory policy choices, an outcome of the lack of any previous experience of policy-making (environmental policy constitutes a relatively new policy area even at the EU level in any respect) and problematic governance structures, has been the main outcome of the learning process in environmental policy in Greece. Thus, the main institutional framework/innovation in the area of waste management is the “National Waste

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<sup>87</sup> The uncontrolled dumping sites in the region of Attica are 32 (YPEHODE, 2001, *Uncontrolled Dumping Sites in Greece*, Directorate General for the Environment, Department of Environmental Planning, Office for Solid Waste Management).

Management Plan”, established in 1997, which has put forward the national guidelines for the management of solid waste (Andreadakis et. al., 2000, p. 179). It’s main principles are: prevention/reduction of the production of wastes at source; reuse, recycling or recovery of useful material or energy from waste; environmental sound disposal of waste residuals; “the polluter pays” principle; proximity of the locations for the processing of waste to the source of their production; environmental restoration of polluted sites; and usage of management technologies which are economically and technically sustainable as well as effective with regard to the protection of the environment (YPEHODE, 2001, p. 31).

In terms of policy, however, the need for immediate action due to environmental and legislative pressures led to the adoption of an approach which is not based on a holistic consideration of the problem but rather on the replacement of uncontrolled dumpsites by sanitary landfills. Hence, besides the fact that there is a serious delay in the implementation of the National Waste Management Plan, about 15 sanitary landfills are in operation or under construction, while 30 regional plans proposing suitable disposal sites have been approved by YPEHODE, to be financed to a large extent by EU funds. Nonetheless, they contradict current EU policy’s orientation regarding solid waste management, and especially with the scope of the Directive 1999/31 on landfilling (Andreadakis et. al., 2000).

Additionally, at the administrative level, there are few formal arrangements for policy co-ordination. Thus, the large number of governmental agencies dealing with the environment and the lack of formal co-ordination mechanisms accompanied by the hierarchical nature of Greek public administration inhibit the formulation and implementation of an integrated environmental policy (OECD, 2000, p. 126).

Finally, it should be noted that apart from the general encouragement of the co-operation between private enterprises and municipalities for the implementation of waste management policy, the national legislation as a whole does not provide for the involvement of the private sector in solid waste management.

### **1.3. Ireland**

The learning process in Ireland has significantly affected the centralized Westminster-like institutional and policy-making structure. However, its primary impact has been the transformation, rather than the expansion of the existing institutional structure. Thus, institutional innovation has taken place especially at the central state level and the building of new institutions has been rather limited. Overall, the top-down administrative

hierarchy corresponds to Ireland's pragmatic, ad hoc and reactionary stance towards the Europeanization of policy-making.

### **1.3.1. Regional policy**

#### **Policy implementation**

Regional policy implementation in Ireland points to the direction and vindicates the findings of the analysis of the Irish case made in the national and comparative reports, in the sense of the fundamental role played by the pre-existing domestic institutional structures in the learning and adaptation processes. In particular, the emergence of the Celtic Tiger should not be attributed merely to the Structural Funds interventions, but rather emphasis should also be placed on the crucial role of the "domestic institutional underpinnings", that is: first and above all the broad social consensus achieved in 1986/87 that allowed the Government to instigate a period of budgetary control; this social consensus, a strong evidence of presence of cooperative culture, covers not only wage agreements but also the direction of public policy and the mechanisms for its implementation; second, the large influx of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 'creating' a new sector of industry around high value-added operations (such as technological and pharmaceutical companies) which were attracted by low corporate tax rates (10%), and a well-trained and English-speaking work force; third, exchange rate stability in international markets facilitated at the EU level by the introduction of the Single European Market (Rees et. al., National Report 2002). Ireland's economic success was also influenced by effective national education policies that resulted in a well-educated workforce. Moreover, it might be worth noting that the main feature of the Irish CSFs has been the emphasis on human resource development with a higher proportion of funding being designated for this purpose than was the case in the other peripheral countries. Over 40 % (Bradley et al: 1995:59) of total CSF spending was in this area thus, realising a core element of Ireland's economic strategy. Therefore, Structural Fund transfers should be considered alongside these factors. Further, this seems to have been a key finding of the ex post evaluation of the CSF II for Ireland, given its emphasis on the role of institutions "the strength of member state institutions is an important factor" (Fitzpatrick Associates Economic Consultants, *Ex Post Evaluation of Objective 1, 1994-1999, National Report – Ireland, 2003*).

The evidence from the region selected for fieldwork research (Mid West - Objective 1 in transition) reinforces the above analysis. It is currently considered a relatively developed region and it has, relative to other areas in Ireland, been perceived as an area of growth and one of the principal areas of development outside Dublin (see data in Table 16.)

(Rees et. al., National report, 2002). Despite its peripherality, the EU structural interventions have facilitated the process of catching up by providing necessary resources for exploitation of the natural resources and for improving the educational and skill levels of the region. What has been fundamental in this process, however, is the strong local institutional structure based on a local network incorporating the Shannon Development agency, the University of Limerick and the Shannon Airport. This institutional infrastructure has been crucial for creating and sustaining a relatively strong foreign industry base around the technological park. The role of this institutional structure in the catching up of the Mid-West region has been recognized by the ex post evaluation of CSF II as well (Fitzpatrick Associates Economic Consultants (2003) *Ex Post Evaluation of Objective 1, 1994-1999, National Report – Ireland*, pp. 117-18).

**Table 16.** Per Capita GVA relative to EU Average (1994-1996)

Region	Average 1994 –1996 EU = 100
Dublin	122.4
South-West	102.1
Mid-West	88.2
South-East	86.8
Mid-East	78.9
Border	76.5
West	71.3
Midlands	66.4
State	95.0

*Source: CSO, November, 1998.*

**Patterns of learning**

Adaptation of the pre-existing institutional structure rather than extensive institution building is the pattern/outcome of the learning process in regional policy in Ireland. This may be because Ireland has not had experienced authoritarianism and in this respect should be considered as an institutionally developed country. Its system of public administration has been traditionally based on the British “Westminster” model, predicated on a strong central executive with subordinate local authorities answerable to and financially dependent on the centre. It was only in 1999 that a referendum led to the inclusion of a constitutional provision for local government in *Bunreacht na hEireann*, the Irish constitution.

Thus, Ireland's approach to the newly founded European Regional Development Fund was predicated on a desire to maximise Irish financial returns and was seen as important in contributing to national economic development. Initially this position was reinforced by the manner in which the regional fund operated, with the use of national quotas and the funding of large-scale infrastructure projects. Irish officials were quick to respond to Community guidelines and ensured that Ireland gained what was viewed as its "fair share" of the available funds. The state also gained a strong reputation for utilising funds allocated to projects, unlike some states where funds were allocated but not fully used. There was, then, during the period 1975-1988 little incentive to change Ireland's approach to regional policy, as the existing system of funding rewarded Ireland handsomely.

The reform of the Structural Funds in 1988 and the adoption of a new European approach to regional policy necessitated the Irish government to change its approach to funding, lest it lose structural funding, which had become increasingly seen as a key source of revenue and a significant contributor to GDP. The Irish government, like its counterparts in the other cohesion states, had to develop a National Development Plan, and in so doing it was expected to involve, and consult, a range of sub-national actors. Arising out of this changing climate, the Irish government in forming its national development plan, engaged in a process of local and regional consultation, forming regional committees for the purposes of consultation, and later formalising them as Regional Authorities (1994). The process was, however, more symbolic than real at this stage, with the plan already largely formed before the consultation process was completed.

Pressures from local community groups and associations mirrored the pressure for change from Brussels, with Ireland experiencing sustained, if still limited, local-led economic development. The second national development plan (1994-99) provided a spur to further change, eight Regional Authorities were formally established<sup>88</sup>, but with relatively few powers beyond broad coordination and consultation of local and regional actors involved in the day-to-day management of EU operational programmes. While the position of central government remained critical to understanding what was happening, local and regional actors were becoming far more involved and integrated as part of the implementation process, if still in a hierarchical relationship to national government. Many of the more progressive local authorities during this period appointed European liaison officers and became increasingly involved in a range of EU programmes (e.g. community initiatives), although the level of interregional cooperation remained low and largely concerned with the exchange of personnel and experience (Rees 1997).

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<sup>88</sup> The Regional Authorities were composed of elected members nominated by the local authorities.

The most recent national development plan (2000-06) provides further evidence of change and adaptation in response to the EU's reformed structural funds. Ireland, in order to maintain its objective one status, designated the state as two regions for funding purposes. These two regions, the Border, Midlands and West (Objective One) and Southern and Eastern region (Objective One in Transition), have been given responsibility for managing regional operational programmes, as well as coordinating services and monitoring the impact of EU programmes, marking a new and significant departure in a regionalised tier of administration in Ireland. In practice, the two Regional Assemblies (1999) remain highly artificial constructions and there is little or no public identification with these bodies. Nevertheless, as this brief analysis suggests much has been changing in Ireland with a broad array of national, regional and local actors now involved in the development and implementation of regional policy. This means that more is being demanded of local and regional actors, placing an increasing strain on financial resources and staff, and they are involved in more dense hierarchical and horizontal networks, participating in their own right, and in some instances at odds with national government. It should, however, be remembered that Ireland is a small state and many of those involved in this policy sector know each other and relations are highly personalised, with officials able to operate both through formal and informal channels.

### **1.3.2. Environmental policy**

#### **Policy implementation**

The implementation of environmental policy in general and waste management in particular demonstrates that Ireland shares some characteristics of other less-developed Member States (Rees, et. al., National Report, 2002). Although most of EU legislation (directives) has been transposed by the establishment of the Waste Management Act (1996), unprecedented volumes of wastes of various kinds are currently being produced as a result of the 'Celtic Tiger' economy and the recent surge in consumer spending. Moreover, in 1998, over 90% of the municipal waste stream was consigned to landfill, which points to one-dimensional approach that is clearly unsustainable and contrary to European policy and practice. On the other hand though, there have been significant increases in the number of waste recovery facilities over the last few years. In 1998, 837 bring banks were reported throughout the country, compared with 426 in 1995. Recycling rates in Ireland for household and commercial packaging wastes show that between 1993 and 1995 the overall recycling rate rose from 10.3 per cent to 15.6 per cent (Rees, et. al., 2002).

The implementation of EU policy in the Mid-West region which consists of the Limerick, Clare and Kerry counties can be characterized as piecemeal and primarily reactionary. The counties of the region share similar general problems in relation to waste management. These are the closure of landfill sites, illegal dumping, lack of infrastructure, recycling and waste minimization and public opposition to new landfill dumps and thermal treatment facilities, while there is a lack of recycling and waste minimisation initiatives. There is a mix of public and private arrangements whereby both local authorities and private collectors in the region operate the domestic waste collection service. For example, Limerick City Council privatised its waste collection service in 2000, while in County Kerry the local authority predominantly operates the municipal waste collection, covering 62% of the county. Another 13% of the households avail of private collection. In County Limerick, the provision of the local authority waste collection is under scrutiny due to rising costs and competition from private operators (Rees, et. al., 2002).

### **Patterns of learning**

Significant institution building/innovation, especially when compared with the regional policy, is the main feature of the learning process in environmental policy in Ireland. Waste management has gained national prominence in Ireland in recent years. The issue is highly emotive and politically charged, with national bodies, local authorities and pressure groups at loggerheads over the issue and unable to agree acceptable solutions. Ireland's long established claim to be an environmentally friendly state seems increasingly challenged by economic growth and subject to legal challenge in Europe for failing to implement EU directives in this area. In response to European pressures, Ireland adopted a Waste Management Act (1996; amended 2001) and has developed a number of policy documents in this area, as well as seeking to address the problem at a practical level through the Operational Programme for Environmental Services (1994-99).

The main body responsible for environmental policy has been the Department of the Environment and Local Government, with local authorities responsible for implementation of policy (e.g. environmental protection, physical planning, water supplies and sewerage). Within the Department of the Environment a Waste Management Section was established in 1994 with specific responsibility for this area. It is the case, however, that environmental policy remains centralised with a largely hierarchical relationship existing with local authority officers. Beyond this level of government there was little attempt to seriously implement EU environmental policy in Ireland, with the state belonging to the category of "laggards" and "latecomers", but without the excuse of being a new member state. The creation of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1992, with the



increasing regulation of waste sites, provided a marked improvement in an area lacking in administrative control. This development, linked with the requirement under the 1996 Act to develop regional waste management plans in nine areas, suggests that central government control remained a key feature even in the late 1990s (Rees, et. al., 2002).

Public consultation in the formation of waste management plans is required under the Local Government Planning and Development Acts (1992, 1996), but such consultation appears low in many cases, despite protests over proposals for incineration and further landfill sites. In general, the administrative framework remains underdeveloped and implementation of waste management policy on a regionalised basis is very much in its infancy. A number of local authorities failed to adopt waste management plans, leading in 2001 to an amended Waste Management Act whereby powers were transferred to the County Manager. As such the regional approach to waste management in Ireland may not realistically reflect the situation on the ground, which may lend itself predominantly to a local authority level response.

In the Irish case, adaptation to the EU's environmental regime has been pragmatic and piecemeal with the central government incorporating EU policy into the Department of the Environment and Local Government, as well as requiring local authorities to comply with these new directives. Pressures from the EU have certainly provided a critical impetus to Ireland in adapting existing and, in some cases, for example such as the EPA, creating new structures; Ireland has however remained slow to implement EU policy in this area. There are, however, examples of developments at local level where new community initiatives and networks involving individuals, commercial enterprises, and NGOs which seem to be working. Such projects may be synergistic and provide impetus to further local development, as well as guides to best practice solutions elsewhere. Overall, the Irish highly centralized system of public administration and its "traditionally" pragmatic, ad hoc and reactionary -as opposed to proactive and strategic- stance towards the Europeanization of public policy is vindicated in the field of environmental policy/waste management. However, current trends point to: an enhanced role of expertise in the policy process; the challenge to build PPPs in the area of waste management; and, some progress in implementing recycling programmes; albeit as a "top-down" driven strategy (Rees, et. al., 2002).

## **1.4. Portugal**

In a similar vein to Greece, the learning process in Portugal has resulted in significant and rather extensive institution building at the central state and regional levels since the early 1990s. It is debatable to what extent this process should be exclusively attributed to the influence of the EU.

### **1.4.1. Regional policy**

#### **Policy implementation**

Regional policy implementation in Portugal reflects its institutional picture, emerged in the national and comparative reports and painted by Loughlin as a semi-presidential centralized republic similar to that of the Fifth French Republic, which, however, provides for some forms of direct or participatory democracy and local government has been noted for its innovative approaches to public participation (2001: 256). The implementation of the CSF II ROP for Lisbon and Tagus Valley region, arguably the strongest Portuguese region in both demographic and economic terms, vindicates the above features. Indeed, the centralized but relatively efficient institutional infrastructure as it emerged from the institutional analysis seems to have played an important role in the relatively better "catching up" performance of the region (see indic. data in Tables 16. and 17.). This has also been recognized by the evaluation of the CSF II (see CIDEC - Centro Interdisciplinar de Estudos Económicos January (2003), *Ex-post evaluation of Objective 1, 1994-1999, National Report-Portugal*).

**Table 17.** Gross Value Added evolution - 1990 to 1999 (10<sup>6</sup> EUR)

Regions	GVAp		GVAbp				
	1990	1991	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Portugal	45.670	52.543	69.822	74.705	80.421	87.090	92.592
North	13.802	15.922	21.069	22.461	23.982	25.538	27.060
Centre	6.380	7.183	9.712	10.305	10.949	11.677	12.390
<b>LTV</b>	<b>19.857</b>	<b>23.179</b>	<b>30.756</b>	<b>33.160</b>	<b>36.048</b>	<b>39.639</b>	<b>42.193</b>
Alentejo	2.294	2.389	3.073	3.242	3.492	3.536	3.771
Algarve	1.646	1.910	2.289	2.419	2.604	2.958	3.167
Azores	798	908	1.187	1.247	1.327	1.476	1.581
Madeira	813	978	1.591	1.716	1.836	2.065	2.205
<i>ExtraRegio</i>	<i>80</i>	<i>75</i>	<i>145</i>	<i>155</i>	<i>185</i>	<i>200</i>	<i>224</i>

*Source: INE, Regional Accounts 1990-1994 (edited in 1998); 1995-1999 (edited in 2001).*

It should be taken into account however, that the LTV region was in a better position regarding infrastructures as well as economic and educational capacities anyway and thus it was better placed for attracting a greater part of investments either public or private, when compared with the other regions. Additionally, it has been one of the principal beneficiaries of EU funds (Rato, H., et. al., National Report, 2002).

**Table 18.** GVAbp per capita and disparity index (1995 - 1998)

Regions	1995	1996		1997		1998	
	10 <sup>3</sup> PTE	10 <sup>3</sup> PTE	disparity index	10 <sup>3</sup> PTE	disparity index	10 <sup>3</sup> PTE	disparity index
Portugal	1.486	1.586	100,0	1.709	100,0	1.845	100,0
North	1.262	1.338	84,4	1.426	83,4	1.511	81,9
Centre	1.197	1.269	80,0	1.353	79,2	1.442	78,2
<b>LTV</b>	<b>1.962</b>	<b>2.109</b>	<b>133,0</b>	<b>2.297</b>	<b>134,4</b>	<b>2.519</b>	<b>136,5</b>
Alentejo	1.232	1.309	82,5	1.426	83,4	1.456	78,9
Algarve	1.400	1.475	93,0	1.585	92,7	1.794	97,2
Azores	1.041	1.086	68,5	1.152	67,4	1.274	69,1
Madeira	1.306	1.405	88,6	1.501	87,8	1.679	91,0

*Source: INE, Regional Accounts 1995-1999 (edited in 2001).*

## Patterns of learning

The learning process in regional policy in Portugal has been conducive to rather extensive institutional creation, primarily at the central state and secondarily at the subnational levels, despite the resistance to change expressed through the referendum. Thus, at the time of membership in 1986, Portugal lacked a regional policy or instruments, although regional state administration did exist and was based on districts, of which there were 18, and also the Commissions of Regional Coordination, while products of central government, existed in five areas. At the local level there are two tiers of authority: municipalities (305) and parishes (4,005) in which executive and deliberative functions are vested. There also exist the metropolitan areas of Lisbon and Porto, which have their own administrative governments, elected by representatives of the municipalities that make up the metropolitan areas. A further regional tier was provided for by the constitution, and the Basic Law on Administrative Regions passed parliament in 1991, but was rejected by the people in a referendum held in 1998. In Portugal the debate over regionalisation was at its most prominent in the 1980s, reflecting the states bid to join the EC and the concerns over the need for a regional policy.

Portugal, like Ireland lacked any regional tier of government, and it was only in response to the reformed structural funds in 1988 that a regional approach was adopted to planning under the direction of the Ministry of Planning and Territorial Administration (later broken up and regional functions assigned to the Ministry of Planning, 1999). These reforms led the government to engage in consultations that involved the Commissions of Regional Coordination (Comissões de Coordenação Regional)<sup>89</sup> and representatives of civil sectors. Indeed, the CCRs originally established in the 1960s and 1970s grew in prominence during the 1980s, as more demands were made on Portugal by the EC. In 2002 the Ministry of Planning was replaced by a new ministry, the Ministry for Cities, Territorial Planning and the Environment which took on some of its functions (Rato, H., 2002).

Community membership challenged Portugal to define its regional development policy. It also led to the establishment of the Directorate-General of Regional Development (1983), as part of the Ministry of Internal Administration. This new body was to coordinate the EU regional fund intervention. In June 1986 this was integrated into the new Ministry of Planning and Territorial Administration, bringing together all the players under one

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<sup>89</sup> The CCRs are based on five areas: North, Centre, Lisbon and Tagus Valley, Alentejo and Algarve. They are on one level part of the national government, but are also important in defining the identities of these areas. Functions include urban and rural planning and coordinate with municipalities in relation to EC structural funds.

member of the government. Portugal, like Ireland, submitted a single Regional Development Plan for the entire country (1986-90), thereby ensuring the whole state was eligible for funding.

As in Ireland and Greece, the initial management of the structural funds was undertaken in a very hierarchical manner, with the Council of Ministers selecting applications on the recommendations of the Directorate-General of Regional Development. This changed in response to the reform of structural funds and the adoption of a new Community Support Framework. The Ministry of Planning and Territorial Administration was directly responsible to the Commission for the administration of the funds, with national and operational monitoring committees established to oversee each programme. The national and community bodies were charged with implementation, whereas the social partners' role was merely advisory. This system of management has continued for CSF II, but was revamped for CSF III, whereby each operational programme includes all ministries in the region, providing such departments with more significant responsibilities. In sum, the Portuguese process, despite a degree of Europeanisation, remains highly centralised, with a lack of regional government and administration making it difficult to coordinate regional activities.

#### **1.4.2. Environmental policy**

##### **Policy implementation**

The main insight offered by the implementation of environmental and particularly waste management policy in Portugal is that it refutes the principle of "one size fits all" in comparative public policy, demonstrating that there may be variation in policy-making between one policy area to another even within the same country and/or contextual framework. Indeed, waste management in Portugal may be considered as a relatively success story, incorporating significant institutional innovation in the form of PPPs and/or expertise involvement in policy-making, as well as, important presence of civil society organizations (NGOs), especially at the national level. The policy environment is characterised by appropriate regulation since all the relevant EU legislation (directives) have been transposed. Further, in terms of accomplishing the policy tasks, in 2001, the recycling of packaging waste reached 174.000 tons, of which 110.000 were from citizens (22% increase) and 63.000 from industry and distribution (425% increase), while glass package recovery reached 68.000 tons, paper and cardboard 72.000, steel 19.000 and plastic 11.000 with the Lisbon (24.000 tons), Oporto (16.000) and Madeira (8.000) regions having the higher levels of recycling material collecting. Additionally, according to recent data, no uncontrolled dumping sites (341 in 1996) are operating anymore, while

35 new landfilling facilities, 2 incinerating systems and 5 composting facilities have been built (Rato, H., et. al., National Report, 2002).

With regard to the evidence from the fieldwork region, the Lisbon Metropolitan Area (LMA), composed of 19 municipalities and established by the joining of two NUT III Regions ("Greater Lisbon" and "Setúbal Peninsula") and Mafra and Azambuja Municipalities, is the most populated area with 2.682.676 inhabitants and the political, economic and administrative centre of the country. It is also strongly representative in environmental terms, due to its geographical location around the biggest Estuary of the European Continent, the Tagus Estuary. In terms of waste production, LMA accounts for the 20% of the country's total (1.335.000 tons in 2001) with a per capita waste production of 1.400g/inhabitant/day in 2001. LMA is considered a pioneer region in implementing Integrated Waste Management systems (in technical, institutional, socio-economic and environmental terms), as well as in separated collection (paper/card, package, plastic, ferrous and non ferrous materials, aluminium, wood and glass) and valorisation systems (multi-materials, energetic, organic matter and composting).

### **Patterns of learning**

Successful institution building, based on a relatively good quality of institutional infrastructure, is the main outcome of the learning process in Portugal, given that the country has traditionally been considered as belonging to the "laggards" group. In terms of institutional creation, in 1987 the Portuguese Assembly adopted an environmental law that led to the creation of the National Institute for the Environment, while in 1990 the Ministry for the Environment and Land Use Management was created with specific responsibility for environmental policy. In 1995 the government adopted a National Plan for Environmental Policy. This was followed by the Waste Management Act (1997) and led to the establishment of a National Waste Institute (1998); which has been an autonomous part of the Ministry of the Environment. This system of governance is reinforced by regional directorates that ensure the coordination of policy in conjunction with the environmental ministry. There is, however, limited coordination at a national level between ministries, and at a regional level between municipalities, given the lack of a regional tier of administrative governance.

In practice, waste management is the preserve of the municipalities, but their small size and limited ability to cope with waste management problems have prompted them to rely instead on public-private partnerships (PPPs) to manage the waste problem. In this sense, Portugal's approach is different to Greece and also to Ireland, where PPPs are only slowly becoming a feature of Irish administration.

The Portuguese approach to Waste Management illustrates both the problems of the centralised state and its slowness to act to address environmental problems, and yet, at the same time, there is considerable innovation in some municipalities. For example, while waste has grown as a problem in the Lisbon area, the municipal authorities that constitute the Lisbon Metropolitan Area (LMA) have responded by implementing an Integrated Waste Management System. In LMA technological solutions have been used to address the problems of waste management, with a multi-method approach being adopted to provide innovative solutions. As in Ireland there is considerable NGO pressure for change, with similar levels of protest, and there is also significant interaction with the business community, who clearly see some commercial opportunities to make money from rubbish! The Portuguese case highlights in a number of ways the innovative methods of local government in this state with a range of solutions being offered to the problem. This includes direct management by municipalities, delegated management by associations of municipalities to PPPs, and delegation and concessions to private companies (Rato, et. al., 2002).

### **1.5. Hungary**

There is comparatively limited evidence on the outcomes of the learning process in Hungary. There is some evidence though of significant but not very extensive institution building at the central state level, given in particular the collapse of the pre-existing institutional infrastructure. There has been, however, extensive institutional restructuring at the regional and local levels. Overall, there is strong evidence that Hungary's forerunner status among the CEECs and relatively good level of institutional infrastructure should be attributed to the prompt/early starting up of the reform process under the previous regime (the so called "Kantar-ism"). Nonetheless, institution building remains the crucial challenge ahead with regard to the content of the learning process.

#### **1.5.1. Regional policy**

##### **Policy implementation**

Regional policy implementation in Hungary is characterized by the trend towards adapting to EU Structural policy *Aquis* by using as a vehicle the pre-accession instruments (Phare, ISPA and SAPARD) and by trying to adopt a Western-like policy-making style in regional development through engagement with what's happening in regions of Western European countries. Some assessment studies on Phare sub-programmes point to management and coordination problems often resulting in serious delays in project implementation, as well as, in inflexible contracting procedures. Additionally, emphasis is placed on the lack of preparatory studies and master plans,

which are symptoms of problematic project management. With regard to Phare-financed transport projects, the evaluation studies identify a strong bias towards investment in physical infrastructure to the detriment of institution building and training, as well as, lack of coordination between Phare and other financial international institutions. On the other hand, though, Phare-supported projects focusing on institution building are viewed as having little impact on policy formulation, while, by contrast, they play a key role in policy implementation. Finally, in relation to Phare CBC projects, the evaluation emphasises institutional weaknesses, management shortcomings and low absorption rates, all contributing to major delays in the implementation. The recommendations concentrate on decentralized management, enhancement of partnerships and improvements in the governance structures in general (Palne, I. et. al. National Report, 2002).

There is little evidence from evaluation on policy implementation in Southern Transdanubia, the region selected for fieldwork research, which is considered as a less developed region, hit by serious demographic, economic and environmental problems.

### **Patterns of learning**

Relatively reluctant institutional creation and/or innovation are the main features of the learning process in Hungary. Thus, since 1990 a series of reforms decentralizing the state administration, re-establishing the autonomy of local governments and delegating to them broad responsibilities in delivering local public services were introduced. They also implemented a legal and regulatory framework to enable private participation in local infrastructure and services and tightened budget constraints. Additionally, the intermediary level of government has been reinforced by establishing Regional Development Councils and by attempts to promote municipal associations.

One of the main achievements of the reforms of the administrative system was the establishment of eight administrative macro-regions overseen by a Commissioner. Commissioners hold the rank of the state secretary and report to the Minister of Interior. Their tasks are to co-ordinate the activities of de-concentrated government departments within their region. Despite their main obligation of legal monitoring, they also play a considerable role as co-coordinators of economic development activities within their regions. Deconcentrated units of government ministries in counties or administrative regions exist in order to implement sectoral policies. These branches fall under the direct administrative control of the Ministry concerned and do not possess any autonomy. They have influence on the empowering of local actors and might act as an interface between the central government, local authorities and non-governmental organizations. They can



also lend credible representation of the local and regional activities in Budapest. The task of co-coordinating regional development policy has now been transferred to Councils of Regional Development, where the government is represented by the branch officials (Horvath, et. al., 2002).

Decentralization and reform of the regional governance system, however, goes hand in hand with increasing concerns about the strengthening of the central administration capacity, which constitutes a high priority for the EU Commission, given that there are signs of another Southern European pattern, namely the emergence of "enclaves" of professionalism and technocratic excellence (the so called Europeanizers) confined in sectors of public administration which are mostly involved in dealing with the EU (Goetz, K., 2001).

The number of communes (3092), however, affects negatively the coherence of the wider area as an economic unit. Each individual municipality has its own physical and economic plan and this perpetuates inequalities in terms of housing and business locations. Meeting the requirements of EU accession and EU standards in infrastructure, environment and other areas will require large investments and therefore, the task is to provide municipalities with an intergovernmental framework that supports local government efforts to access capital markets in order to finance investment needs.

### **1.5.2. Environmental policy**

#### **Policy implementation**

Hungary, along with most of the Cohesion countries, belongs to the "latecomers" – "laggards" group of countries, for which environment policy has been formulated by the EU standards. Varying transitional periods for the implementation of the environmental *aquis* and some institutional innovation are the main features of waste management policy implementation in Hungary, in a policy environment characterized, for obvious reasons, by decrease in hazardous and agricultural waste and, simultaneously, significant increase in solid waste.

This trend is particularly evident in the fieldwork region of Central Hungary, which consists of Budapest and the surrounding Pest County. The Region is a densely populated area -28% of Hungary's population, approximately 2,8 million people, of which 1,84 million in Budapest- and one of Central Europe's focal points in attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Budapest produces large quantities of waste -appr. 4 million cubic metres- but there is lack of available space due to highly competitive uses of land. Organised waste collection covers almost 100% of the capital. However, the waste

incineration system processes only 60% of all collected municipal solid waste of the city. At the beginning at the 1990s there were 4 landfills in the territory of the capital, all of which were filled up and closed. For the disposal of the rest of the municipal waste the landfills of the surrounding Pest County are used. On the other hand, the surrounding Pest County produces yearly 1.7 million cubic metres of municipal solid waste, which has increased during the 90s. With regard to the hazardous and industrial waste, although the production of hazardous waste has been significantly decreased both in Budapest - from 600.000 tons/year to 200.000 tons/year- and in the Pest County -from 400.000 tons/year to 75.000 tons/year- between 1993 and 1997, non-hazardous industrial waste is estimated to around 1 660 000 t/y in Budapest and to 780 000 t/y in Pest county. Finally, the region is characterized by uncontrolled dumping of wastes into illegal landfills (Palne et. al., 2002).

### **Patterns of learning**

Institutional innovation and relatively significant presence of new forms of governance are the main characteristics of the learning process in environmental policy/waste management. The National Programme for the Adoption of the *Acquis Communautaire* (NPAA) is the main framework for the adoption of the EU environment policy rules and regulations. It determines targets, deadlines concerning legal harmonisation, institution building and implementation needs, addresses costing with reference to the financial resources to be ensured by the central budget, the private sector and the municipalities. Its main task, however, is the problems, primarily coordination, related to the use of EU financial resources, such as PHARE and ISPA. By the end of 2002 Hungary is expected to have adopted most of the EU environmental regulations and norms. Although the Ministry of the Environment is the main policy-making actor, demands on sub-national structures have intensified as a result of the Europeanization process, in particular with the implementation of the Environmental *Acquis*. Various tasks and responsibilities, which were previously carried out by the national government, have been transferred to the sub-national level of government, although its administrative capacity is limited, both in terms of resources and expertise.

The National Council for Environment Protection is the forum, where local, county and regional communities, as well as economic agents and NGOs participate in the interest reconciliation process. This is an advisory body to the Government, bringing together public authorities and civil society actors and trying to achieve integration of environment with other policies.

Waste management constitutes the most crucial environmental policy issue for Hungary. Hazardous waste, in particular, has often been the area of intense social conflicts related to environmental problems, given the large amounts of industrial hazardous waste that have been accumulated over the last decades, and the limited capacity for disposal (Dingsdale, A. et. al., 2002). Although the transposition of the EU Waste Framework Directive (75/442) marked Hungary's compliance with the EU environment policy, the National Plan for Waste Management was elaborated by the Ministry of the Environment only in 2001. The main task of the plan is to decentralize the policy process, especially the implementation phase, by specifying and allocating responsibilities to the subnational (regional and local) level of government. Although decentralization has not always led to institutional performance in the implementation of the policy, mainly because of serious coordination problems and lack of sufficient resources, there is evidence of a particularly active role of civil society actors in the policy process. Civic organizations, ranging from nation-wide environment protection alliances to local single issue groups, play an important role, performing both regulatory and implementation functions.

Despite the significant institutional innovation that has taken place and the EU interventions through mainly the PHARE, ISPA and LIFE programmes, however, Environment has been proved to be an expensive policy area and therefore the amounts of investment needed are estimated to be very high.

## **1.6. Poland**

As in the case of Hungary, there is limited evidence on the outcomes of the learning process. There has been however, some institution building at the both the national and subnational levels with particular emphasis on the administrative and territorial restructuring at the regional and local levels of government. Institutional reforms are linked to the collapse of the pre-existing structures and the extensive administrative restructuring is strongly influenced by considerations/expediencies related to the need for compliance with the EU. As in the case of Hungary, institution building remains the crucial challenge ahead with regard to the content of the learning process.

### **1.6.1. Regional policy**

#### **Policy implementation**

In a similar vein to Hungary, regional policy implementation in Poland is strongly affected by the need for compliance and adaptation to the EU Structural policy *Aquis* by using as a vehicle the pre-accession instruments (Phare, ISPA and SAPARD). Part of the adjustment measures necessary to meet the conditions of EU regional policy have been already

implemented, however it should be stressed that regional policy is still a policy *in statu nascendi* – and its full development will require a lot of time and effort. This can be achieved only through the *learning by doing* process apart from the legal adjustments introduced by national legislation. The proper development of regional policy depends strongly on practical “regionalisation” that is maturing of new regions according to their own developmental priorities, alongside the growth of experience of regional administrations. In that respect, the problem of *absorption capacity* emerges, with stronger provinces being more apt to utilise the new support instruments both from national and EU assistance sources. Therefore, apart from creation of legal bases and financial conditions (establishment of coherent support system) regional development requires also technical support for regional administrations (such programmes, including the ones addressed specifically to underdeveloped regions of the eastern regions, are being implemented) (Czernielewska, et. al., National Report, 2002).

There is little evidence from evaluation on EU regional policy programmes implementation in Lodz Voivodship, the region selected for fieldwork research, which is considered as a purely representative, in terms of strengths and weaknesses, medium region of Poland.

### **Patterns of learning**

The learning process in Poland has taken the form of regionalization and institutional creation at both the national and subnational levels, arguably demonstrating some similarities, albeit in a rather convoluted way, with decentralization attempts in Cohesion countries (i.e. Greece) during the first post-authoritarian period (i.e. artificial regionalization).

In particular, the objective of the first reforms of the administrative system after 1989 has been to re-establish the self-government structures and gradually decentralise the policy-making process. Thus, while since 1975 the administrative structure of the country involved two tiers of territorial division, including 49 voivodships and over 2300 municipalities, the –latest- reform of 1999 introduced three tiers of local and regional government territorial units, that is 16 voivodships (i.e. regional level-NUTS II), over 300 poviats (i.e. sub-national level with strong historic tradition) and the local level (communes-gminas). The new tiers of government and especially at the regional level have been granted broad competencies for regional and physical planning, land management and environmental protection. The anticipation of the future membership of the EU provided the context for this systemic transformation process (PNR, 2002).

The EU structural interventions through mainly the PHARE, SAPARD and ISPA programmes functioned as initiators of the democratic programming approach to development, the preliminary steps to which have been the formulation of the Preliminary National Development Plan and the National Development Programme (NPR) for the period 2000-2006. Beyond the obvious benefits of the programming approach, namely the effective utilisation of the pre-accession aid and facilitating the management of Structural Funds after accession, it initiated the processes of learning and institution building within the policy-making structures. This is achieved mainly through the provisions for the implementation of the partnership principle in the preparation of the operational and regional (voivodship) programmes under the PHARE assistance, which involves consultation in the policy-making process, institutionalised in the form of Steering and Monitoring committees as well as other counselling bodies. These committees constitute fora for dialogue and communication among all actors (public, private, societal) involved in the policy process. This function of the pre-accession EU structural interventions of course may be seen as similar in many respects to the role of previous EU structural policy actions, such as the IMPs in Southern Europe.

However, the lack of co-ordination between the national and subnational actors and levels of government as a result of unclear allocation of competences constitutes a serious problem for the planning and implementation of the EU structural policy in Poland, while, on the other hand, the strengthening of the central administration capacity remains a primary concern for the EU Commission.

### **1.6.2. Environmental policy**

#### **Policy implementation**

Generally long transitional periods for the implementation of the environmental *aquis* and rather extensive institutional creation are the main features of waste management policy in Poland. There is also evidence of improvement in the state of environment, although it may be attributable to changes in the development process rather than to specific policy measures. In any case, Poland is considered as "laggard" country in terms of environmental protection.

Lodz Province, the region selected for fieldwork research, is one of the most densely populated Polish provinces (146 persons per 1 square kilometre, vis-à-vis country average of 124), while 1/3 of the region's population (2.6 million inhabitants in 1999) and 1/2 of the urban population is concentrated in the capital-Lodz, the second largest city in Poland. Until 1999 the Lodz Voivodeship was the smallest and the only Polish city-industrial voivodeship, while it was also included in the list of "ecologically endangered"

areas. This is because, beyond the municipal waste, the region faces serious problems with industrial and hazardous waste. The main sources of industrial waste are: metallurgy, electric power generation (Belchatow power plant) and brown coal mining (Belchatow), chemicals production. There are 15 landfills accepting industrial waste in the region, all exclusive property of the waste producing companies. In addition, hazardous waste mostly involves waste oils, post-galvanisation waste, solvents, paints, lacquers and waste containing asbestos. Waste oils are collected by part of CPN (Polish Petroleum Concern) garages and the companies working as intermediaries in collection of waste from businesses (the intermediary companies need to have the legally required permits for collection and transport of hazardous waste).

The problem of waste constitutes the main priority of all programmes regarding the environmental protection on regional and local levels. Some of the problems remain unresolved largely due to limited resources and still need to be tackled. The City Council of Lodz has adopted the *Municipal waste management programme 2010*, constituting a multi-annual strategy leading to establishment of a stable and efficient system of waste management in the Lodz commune, based on European standards. Within the activities undertaken within the programme the following actions are provided for:

- building of the municipal landfill ("temporary" with 3 year's time span of utilisation and the proper one (30 years' exploitation);
- building of the sorting plant, providing for proper selection of waste before disposal – the priority included into ISPA Large Scale Infrastructure Facility programme;
- extension of waste composting plant;
- development of selective collection of waste (to cover 90% of the city) and introduction of the so-called two-container segregation at households (wet and dry solid waste).

### **Patterns of learning**

Extensive institutional creation, albeit with serious concerns about effectiveness and efficiency, has been the dominant feature of learning in the environmental/waste management policy in Poland. The Second State Environmental Policy constitutes the main visionary framework for environment policy, defining the objectives and standards that need to be met in order to comply with the *acquis communautaire*. The document deals with the main issues of environment policy and sustainable development and focuses on the redistribution of the role of the actors-participants in the policy-making process, by the strengthening of the functions of local governments and the private

sector and by improving the level of public access to information on the state of environment for NGOs. In addition, greater emphasis is placed on the role of education, science and transfer of environmentally friendly technologies and rules for management of the environment. Thus, although the main policy-making actor is the Ministry of the Environment, at the territorial level the relevant province, county and commune authorities may draw up respective environmental protection programmes, taking the necessary requirements into account. These programmes are adopted respectively by the assemblies of a province, a county and commune councils. Every two years the executive authorities of a province, a county or a commune submit reports on the implementation of programmes to: the provincial assembly, a county council or a commune council. The self-governments – especially on NUTS 4 and 5 levels - are involved directly in provision of basic services to the community, including waste management, granting permits and provision of necessary technical infrastructure.

As for Waste Management, although it is the most crucial environment policy area for Poland, the current state of the art is the elaboration of the National Waste Management Plan. The plan is expected to cover all the basic categories of wastes generated, in particular municipal and hazardous waste (Carter, F. W. and E. Kantowicz, 2002). The main tasks of the Plan should comply with the sustainable development strategy and implement the principles of the II State Ecological Policy. The carrying out of the Plan involves a wide range of actors/agents, such as the Waste Economy Institute, the Institute of Industrial Areas Ecology and the State Geological Institute, while consultative bodies (chambers, professional associations) will take part as well. This “integration gap” in the state of the environment policy between Poland and EU has led to requests for transition periods in almost all policy areas of waste management (hazardous, packaging, urban etc.).

There is, however, some evidence about a relatively active role of civil society in the policy process. In particular, a number of educational activities are observed in the field of ecological education organised by NGOs. The number of NGOs in environmental sector was growing and a number of www sites were opened each year in 1990s, promoting the pro-environmental style of life or supporting actively the protection of species and providing information to activists. Unfortunately, many of these initiatives are less active nowadays and their influence on policy formulation is rather limited (probably due to lack of funds and weak interaction with relevant authorities) (PNR, 2002). On the other hand, with regard the social participation in decision-making and implementation of environment policy some preliminary observations point to the influence of factors, such as the distrust in political institutions and weak co-operation and co-ordination links

between various levels and types of authorities (local-regional, additionally hierarchical in nature influencing negatively functional co-operation).

### 1.6.3. Instead of Conclusions

	<b>"Goodness of fit" of Domestic Institutional Structure</b>	<b>Patterns of Learning</b>
<b>GREECE</b>	Very poor; some positive albeit sporadic evidence since mid-1990s	Institution building as institutional creation in both policy areas
<b>IRELAND</b>	Medium; Stands out vis-à-vis the other countries, but not ideal	Transformation/adaptation of the pre-existing institutional structures
<b>PORTUGAL</b>	Medium to poor; Central state capacity but at a cost	Extensive institution building
<b>HUNGARY</b>	Poor to medium; "Western- style" core executive	Institution building as a challenge; danger of limited -"formal"- compliance
<b>POLAND</b>	Poor; "Southern-style" central administration	Institution building as a challenge; danger of limited -"formal"- compliance



## **2. Chapter Ten: coping with multi-level governance in public policy-making: Hungary, Poland and the 'other' CEECs**

### **2.1. Institutional Reforms and Regional Policy: a Tentative Assessment**

#### **2.1.1. Hungary<sup>90</sup>**

The regional policy is one of the public policy which has had a big influence on the structure and functioning methods of Hungarian public administration. The main reason of this phenomenon is the lack of strong intermediate level of governance and the uncertainty of the geographical scale of meso-level government. Due to these facts the institutional system of regional policy was built parallel or outside the ordinarily public administration.

According to the law on regional policy of 1996 the so called development councils were set up to decide on territorial plans and resource allocation. These councils have been already working since 7 years and their activity provides some evidence of the Europeanisation process, but there are still some problems encountered:

1. The partnership type of composition ensured the co-operation among public, private and civil sectors, but not without negative consequences. The civil and private actors have not enough influence comparing with the public actors especially with the centrally delegated stakeholders.
2. The delegated membership of the councils provides insufficiently strong legitimacy and public controlled contacts to the local society and stakeholders.
3. The councils have no appropriate administrative background in the form of development agencies because of their uncertain legal status and scarce finance.
4. There are too many institutionalised levels of the system (micro-regional/county/macro-levels). Therefore the administrative capacities (staffing and resources) are fragmented without real effects to spatial processes.
5. The whole system of decentralised institutions and public resources cannot reach the scale and weight of central level in the regional policy since the main

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<sup>90</sup> The Authors are greatly indebted to Dr Ilona Pálné Kovács for her contribution to the assessment of institutional reform in Hungary.

aim of the legislation was to decentralise and to regionalise the control of regional policy.

Summarising one can be tempted to conclude that the Hungarian regional development institutional system is not enough decentralised and has not sufficiently strong legitimisation although it is dominated by the public sector.

Just before the accession an official programme was announced to modernise the institutional system of regional policy within the framework of the reform of the whole territorial public administration. However, the future of the reform purposes concerning the directly elected regional governments can be questioned because of the lack of comprehensive preparation since the draft of the amendment of law on regional policy has been already laid before the parliament:

1. Among the three level of development councils the regional one will be strengthened by the provision of resources and the assignment of competencies.
2. The partnership elements will be more dominant involving more private and civil actors with different rights of participation in the development councils.
3. The professional, administrative capacity will be expanded by providing more state subsidies for agencies for regional development.

These changes can be evaluated as right steps towards the modernisation of regional policy management but they can not substitute the structural reform of the whole public administration. The structural changes will not prove satisfactory if it weren't for human capital: a more flexible, more professional and more integrated style of working.

One has to emphasise that the public administration needs modernisation not only because of the requirements of regional policy. After the systemic change when the local governmental model was introduced, the Hungarian legislator committed some wrongdoings concerning the territorial structure and legal framework for the local governments. The number of the municipalities was doubled; the meso-level governments and the co-ordination means and institutions between administrative branches were virtually eliminated, to give just a few examples. The regional policy and its needs for a more comprehensive and integrative approaches have influenced very positively adaptation pressures, but it could not solve all problems facing the Hungarian public administration.

### 2.1.2. Poland<sup>91</sup>

The *Europe Agreement* directly imposed on Poland the duty of developing subjects of regional policy. The process of decentralization of authority began in Poland in 1990 with the administration reform creating self-government communes and ended in 1999 with establishing counties and voivodeships. As a consequence, 2489 communes, 315 counties and 65 cities with counties rights as well as 16 voivodeships constituting regions were formed.

It is a general opinion that the decentralization of tasks and powers was performed successfully, although the division of power and the phenomenon of the so-called overlapping powers still raise some controversies<sup>92</sup>. However, the decentralization of finance lagged behind the decentralization of from the central government<sup>93</sup>. At commune level, slightly more than a half of the income is communes' own revenues. Voivodeships are more dependent on funding from the central budget, as some 80% of their revenues take the form of general-purpose grants and specific grants. The worst situation is with the counties, whose 10% of revenues comes from own resources<sup>94</sup>. It is imperative to design and implement profound decentralisation of public finance.

The newly created 16 Polish voivodeships are still lacking the traditions and procedures of good regional co-operation. The model of play and co-operation of institutions in accordance with well-ordered procedures must be created anew.

Polish regions-voivodeships were created under the Self-Government Act of May 7, 1998. It imposes new tasks concerning regional development on local authorities. The self-government of a voivodeship determines the voivodeship development strategy which is implemented through voivodeship programmes, having, in view, among others, the following objectives: raising the level of competitiveness and innovation of a voivodeship's economy, preserving the values of the cultural and natural environment with a view to the needs of future generations and maintaining the spatial order.

The act of May 7, 1998 on government administration in voivodeship defines the role of voivod as a representative of the government administration in the voivodeship and

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<sup>91</sup> Elaborated upon: A. Jewtuchowicz, J. Szlachta, *Regional Policy in Poland – European Integration Strategies and Development of Partnership Systems*, forthcoming.

<sup>92</sup> Z. Gilowska, "Preferencje społeczne – preferencje władzy" in Szomburg, J. (ed.), *Polityka regionalna państwa poprzez uwikłanie instytucjonalno-regulacyjnych*, Gdansk: Instytut Badan nad Gospodarka Rynkowa, 2001.

<sup>93</sup> P. Bury, P. Swaniewicz, *Grant Transfers in Financing Local Governments in Poland*, paper presented at NISPAcee Annual Conference in Krakow, 24-27 April 2002.

<sup>94</sup> P. Bury, P. Swaniewicz, *Grant Transfers in Financing Local Governments in Poland*, paper presented at NISPAcee Annual Conference in Krakow, 24-27 April 2002.

imposes on the voivod the responsibility, among others, for implementing the government's policy in the area of the voivodeship with respect to adjustment of specific objectives of the government's policy to local conditions, particularly as concerns the state regional policy carried out in the area of the voivodeship, and co-operation in foreign affairs.

The principal legal framework of Polish regional policy is created by the act of May 12, 2000 on the principles of supporting regional development (Jour. of Law no 48, item 550)<sup>95</sup>. The act specifies the principles and forms of supporting regional development and the principles of co-operation of the Council of Ministers in this field as well as of agencies of government administration with the territorial self-government, and, in particular it indicates:

- 1) the institutions supporting regional development;
- 2) the mode of performing activities supporting regional development;
- 3) the principles of concluding and carrying out the voivodeship contract.

The primary instrument of implementing Polish regional policy is the National Regional Development Strategy (NRDS). The minister competent in the matters of regional development is responsible for the preparation of the draft and it is adopted for six years in an act of the Council of Ministers. The Joint Commission of the Government and the Territorial Self-Government, voivodeship administrations and representatives of social and economic partners must give their opinions on the draft. The government's information on the implementation of the strategy is to be considered by the Parliament (the Sejm) every three years.

The strategic objective of the National Regional Development Strategy is to create conditions for an increase of the competitiveness of regions and counteracting the marginalization of some areas in such a way as to foster the country's long-term economic development, its economic, social and territorial cohesion and integration with the European Union.

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<sup>95</sup> There is a proposal of the Statute on the National Development Plan (NDP). It sets up the principles and the instruments of the elaboration and the realisation of NDP, with a special emphasis on the principle of co-ordination and partnership among different governmental and self-governmental units, social and economic partners as well as international organisations. It also provides the legal framework for the institutional arrangements, financing (including separated resources from central budget, separated resources from the budgets of self-governmental units, the structural funds, the Cohesion Fund and other resources from international organisations such as the European Investment Bank) as well as the system of programming, monitoring, reporting, evaluating and controlling. The draft aims at the facilitating of the absorption of the structural funds and the Cohesion Fund at the accession.

The mechanism of the policy of supporting regional development in Poland is being formed with essential internal and external conditionings taken into consideration. These conditionings refer, among others, to:

- 1) decentralization of administrative structures as well as spatial differentiation and territorial concentration of problem issues and development chances, which in effect forces a gradual shift from sectorally implemented policy to region-oriented activities and requires fuller regard to the role of newly created self-government structures and remodelling the relation between the central government and local authorities;
- 2) limited amount of financial means, forcing the concentration of state intervention (support) instruments in the area of selected priorities and regions;
- 3) necessity of developing an institutional-legal and programme system capable of receiving and managing pre-accession assistance and then of effective implementation of the EU structural and regional policy programmes.

The modern approach to the strategy of regional development is based on search for safe and sustainable bases for development within regions, taking wide advantage of the commitment of local communities. Local and regional economic programmes oriented towards supporting entrepreneurship, transfer of technologies and commercialisation, improvement of competitiveness, require a professional institutional setting. In practice, this means a necessity to create institutions of local development specializing in conducting actions for economic development<sup>96</sup>.

The main prerequisites for the institutionalisation of regional development were created together with the system reforms after 1989. Although the first conceptions were developed in the second half of 1980s, the first innovation and entrepreneurship centres were created independently of one another in 1990. These initiatives were as a rule undertaken by "enthusiasts" who had had a chance of becoming familiar with western experiences and had to convince potential interested parties what purpose such centres would serve. The implementation of aid schemes of different types, visits of experts and consultants as well as foreign visits of economic activists and representative of the administration greatly influenced increasing interest in the field. At the same time, the tasks related to the support of entrepreneurship, transfer of technologies, promotion and

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<sup>96</sup> On the basis of K. B. Matusiak, "Otoczenie instytucjonalne przedsiębiorstw regionu łódzkiego", in: A. Jewtuchowicz, A. Suliborski (eds.), *Strategiczne problemy rozwoju regionów w procesie integracji europejskiej* Lodz University Press, Institute of Regional Economics and Environment Protection, Lodz, 2001.

publicising information were adjusted in business organisations of different types (commercial chambers, trade organisations, employers' associations and unions and other representation organisations of entrepreneurs) in the form of dedicated business centres. There appeared organisationally separate and conceptually coherent ideas for training and advisory centres, loan and guarantee funds, centres for transfer of technologies, business incubators and technology stocks. In the beginning, all such ideas were treated with reserve. Organisational initiatives were often undertaken with a view to facilitate access to aid resources. An increase of interest in innovation and enterprise centres took place only in the mid-1990s. Many ideas undertaken in the first years were not completed as planned because of financial and organisational limitations. However, this period was of enormous significance for collecting domestic experience and building teams which in the years to follow did not make the mistakes of the pioneering time. There were many attempts to consolidate the environment and create lobbying structures, such as: the Associations of the Organizers of Innovation and Entrepreneurship Centres in Poland; the Associations of Regional Development Agencies and Foundations; the Associations "Free Entrepreneurship"; the National Association of Guarantee Funds. A relevant role on a national level is played by the "National Services System" created by the Polish Foundation for Promotion and Development of SMEs. There was some time necessary for self-government activists, politicians and officers of the local and central administrations to understand the new idea<sup>97</sup>.

Evaluating the situation and at the same time allowing for the conditionings and conditions in Poland, the development of institutions supporting economic development should be regarded as success. The undertaken attempt to adapt a conceptually advanced institutional form under difficult conditions of entirely rebuilding the economic system was successful. In this respect, Poland outpaced the remaining post-socialist countries, and some of the centres do not depart from European or American standards. The established institutions collected resources and potential necessary for undertaking activities supporting newly created businesses, entrepreneurship and local and regional development. Thanks to their activity more than 300 thousand people (mainly unemployed) have been trained and gained new qualifications on different types of courses, training, seminars and consultations. Loan funds and guarantee funds have offered a chance of access to financial means to about 4500 new companies without

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<sup>97</sup> K. Matusiak, K. Zasiadły, "Stan, zasoby i kierunki rozwoju ośrodków innowacji i przedsiębiorczości na początku 2001 r.", in: *Ośrodki innowacji i przedsiębiorczości w Polsce*, SOOIPP-Report 2001, KEUŁ, Łódź/Poznań, 2001, p. 11-17.

credit history. Over 1600 new subjects have started their business activity at incubators and technological centres with a bankruptcy rate of several percent<sup>98</sup>.

The present system of the policy-making in regional policy shows some inadequacies. One of the most important ones is its vulnerability to the process of politicisation. The major stakeholder, as provided for in the relevant legislation and revealed in the Social Network Analysis conducted within ADAPT project, the Voivod, is nominated along a political criterion: he or she is appointed by the Prime Minister and usually is a member or a supporter of a party or parties that won elections. On the other hand, the other important actor – the Marshal heading the Voivodeship Managing Board is appointed by the Regional Assembly (the Sejmik), the only body at voivodeship level elected in a universal suffrage. Such a way of the appointment of the Marshal gives him or her more legitimacy and accountability, but it does not make him or her independent of political influences. This – in turn – often leads to the clashes between these two actors having a political rather than substantive background. It must be borne in mind that with regard to the regional policy, the Voivod is an intermediary for transfer of funds to region's budget and a supervisor monitoring the utilisation of funds and progress of planned investments and all activities regarding regional development actions performed by self-government. He or she is also an overall financial controller over the entirety of the Voivodeship Contract on the side of central government. The Marshal is responsible for the formulation and implementation of regional policy in the voivodeship (programming, monitoring, and supervision of all pro-development activities in the region).

Another worrying aspect of the present system is low level of professionalisation of self-governmental public administration, which might result – among the others – from the fact that the regime of the *Statute on civil service* of 18 December 1998 is not applicable to the self-governmental public administration at commune, county and voivodeship level, as it is excluded from the scope of the civil service<sup>99</sup>.

Another dangerous phenomenon is corruption. Poland still has the Corruption Perception Index at the level of 4, where 10 means "highly clean", whereas 0 - "highly corrupt"<sup>100</sup>. 70% of Poles are of the opinion that corruption is one of the most serious problems in Poland<sup>101</sup>. It is very dangerous for local development that many people find local government more corrupted than other parts of administration. In 1995 CBOS public

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<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 18-19.

<sup>99</sup> The issue of the deficiencies in the sector of public administration at sub-national level is approached more thoroughly in the chapter dedicated to the assessment of the institutional reform in the domain of environmental policy, where this problem also exists.

<sup>100</sup> Transparency International, *Global Corruption Report* 2003, p. 265.

<sup>101</sup> CBOS, "Korupcja i afery korupcyjne w Polsce", komunikat nr 2554, 2001.

opinion suggested that corruption is more frequent at central level than at local level (24% vis-à-vis 10%), but similar 2000 survey shows the percentages of 17% at central level and 14% at local level)<sup>102</sup>. According to the survey conducted by Swaniewicz et al. 15% of citizens know personally someone who at least once bribed local bureaucrats and councillors<sup>103</sup>. Opinions of local entrepreneurs are more pessimistic. As many as 38% of them know another businessman who offered bribe. Every tenth citizen and entrepreneur find offering bribe almost inevitable to solve a problem. Virtually as crucial as actual corruption is the attitude of accepting bribes. The surveys demonstrate that 10% of mayors is of the persuasion that it would be right to accept something in return for some extra work and 7% would like an incentive in return for solving the problem faster than normal<sup>104</sup>.

## **2.2. Institutional Reforms and Environmental Policy: a Tentative Assessment**

### **2.2.1. Hungary<sup>105</sup>**

During the last fifteen years Hungarian environmental policy has been profoundly reformed and Europeanisation was one of the main forces behind these changes. However, this adjustment process has not evenly prevailed in all aspects of environment protection.

Most tools and means of this policy – especially the legal measures – have been deeply adjusted to EU patterns. In particular, legal harmonisation in environment protection has gone a long and successful way. On the other hand, the objectives of this policy field have been harmonised to the aims of the respective European objectives often only in verbal terms. It means that in its actions the government was led more strongly by infrastructural and financial abilities and governance traditions than by its own declared targets.

Moreover, during this period the institutions of environment protection have developed along a pathway, which was most probably almost identical with the evolution that these institutions would have performed without the process of EU integration of the country. Still, in the same time also new European behavioural patterns of multi-level governance

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<sup>102</sup> CBOS, *Poczucie reprezentacji interesow i wplywu na sprawy publiczne*, komunikat nr 2265, 2000.

<sup>103</sup> Swianiewicz et. al., „Sprawnosc instytucjonalna administracji samorzadowej w Polsce: zroznicowanie regionalne”, *Polska regionow*, Instytut Badan nad Gospodarka Rynkowa, Gdansk, nr 16, 2001.

<sup>104</sup> Swianiewicz et al., *op.cit.*

<sup>105</sup> The Authors are greatly indebted to Dr Thamas Fleischer and Dr Peter Futo for their contribution to the assessment of institutional reform in Hungary.



have appeared. A wide range of efforts has evolved aiming at the harmonisation and reconciliation of interests between various levels of government, branches of economy and the civil society. Such institutional behavioural patterns were mostly born as a response to transposed EU regulation and financial conditions.

These efforts were not satisfactory in order to upgrade the style of the young Hungarian environment policy to the spectacular pace of development of the tools and means. The environmental performance of the Government has been uneven, and this is partly due to deficiencies in style of governance. In particular, the adaptation to EU patterns has often been shallow, not going beyond schematic imitation; measures of centralisation have often been chosen in a way that stifled local initiatives; co-ordination among ministries has been lacuary; political influence in professional issues was too strong and the relation to the civil organisations has developed in an unbalanced way.

It is without doubt that fundamental reforms have substantially changed Hungarian waste management policies in recent years and these changes can be owed to a large extent to the pressure of adjustment in the integration process. The main impetus of changes has been the reform of the legal system, of financial conditions and the adjustment of waste management planning activity to EU patterns. As a result of these adaptation mechanisms and owing to the opening up of the waste management market, European behavioural patterns have spread across the network of waste management actors.

But the positive impacts of development turned up only in a limited degree in the achievements of the environment protection policy of the country. The level of Hungarian waste management is deeply below the average of EU member countries. The main obstacles and drawbacks are to be found in the expensiveness of the operation and the costliness of the modernisation of present out-of-date waste management infrastructure, in the legal difficulties of creation of new type networks, in the low capacities of the institutions, in the erroneous interpretation of autonomy of local governments, in the presumed or real distortions of competition on the waste management markets and in the lack of social capital.

The Hungarian waste management policy is centralised, but it cannot be simply regarded as an activity governed top-down, since it also involves the patterns of transfer and representation of the interests of micro-level participants. The multi-level concept, which can be regarded as an EU standard penetrates the style of waste management policy, but at the same time the old and deeply entrenched centralisation patterns of Hungarian governance are reorganised.

The style of governance can be said to be open, since enterprises, economic interest groups and partly civil organisations are routinely involved in the processes.

The Law on Waste Management accepted in 2000 put the responsibility of regulation on the government for all types of wastes. Regional offices of environment protection work on the basis of strong central expectations. But these fundamentally important institutions would need more organisational development and much more financial resources for the liquidation of environmental deficit and to grow up to the application of law made consequent in the law harmonisation process.

The task of local governments is the keeping and implementation of rules and regulations. But at the same time the insufficiently financed local governments themselves often just execute or postpone the waste management decisions. In the planning process the government closely co-operates with the local governments, the enterprises and local groups.

The Europeanisation of public policies has fundamentally changed the motivation mechanism and frames of activity of all participants of waste management. The well-known NIMBY ("not into my backyard") motivation is often demonstrated at public polls, political and legal conflicts. But at other places the "PIMBY" (Put In My Backyard) motivation is also widely spread. This pattern is explained by the fact that during the investigated period the collection and deposition of waste has been a profitable activity for public and private companies alike involved in this business. Such considerations often influence the decisions of subregional associations of local governments organised to build contemporary waste management infrastructure with EU co-financing.

Public, private and civil stakeholders of waste management have created a network, which has been aggregated from many regional and professional sub-networks of co-operation. The distribution of strength of relationships among stakeholders does not correspond to actual physical processes of waste management, but are rather formed by historically biased institutional and geographical centre-periphery relations.

### **2.2.2. Poland**

The Europeanisation of Polish policy of environmental protection at institutional level has followed the legal adjustments, although some authors are of the opinion that EU membership does not stipulate institutional domestic changes, as the EU law leaves the freedom to choose the way the ecological directives are transposed into national legal

order to Member States<sup>106</sup>. As at the beginning of the Europeanisation process Poland was not an institutional *tabula rasa*, the Polish legislator took a wise decision to take advantage of the existing institutional infrastructure for the purpose of the "European policy-making". It is best exemplified by two important stakeholders: the Inspectorate of Environment Protection and the Fund for Environment Protection and Water Economy. Both institutions were established before 1989, but with the progress of the Europeanisation process of Polish ecological policy they were allotted additional competences. The Commission of the European Communities assesses, that the ongoing detailed allocation of tasks has to be further developed<sup>107</sup>.

Along the decentralisation trends, the responsibilities within environmental protection were transferred to regional and local self-government. However, formal decentralisation was not accompanied by the transfer of financial means. As a result, self-government is heavily dependent on subsidies from central budget, which impairs the effective execution of tasks, assigned by legislation. Since each subvention usually has a specific purpose, the autonomy of self-government is much hampered. In this context, self-governance seems to be illusory.

There are also still some interpretation problems with the division of tasks and responsibilities among different layer of the government. Although the obligations are explicitly defined in relevant legislation, they sometimes overlap, which brings about some conflicts between different levels of governance and hampers successful adaptation of EU patterns. The competence-related clashes manifest themselves in the survey. It seems that time will resolve the aforementioned problem, as it has been only three years, since the self-government in its present form was established and the introduction of effectively functioning system requires a considerable time span to get fully operationalised.

Special challenges are faced by the self-government. The adoption of EU policy imposes numerous duties and tasks on local and regional administration. It is widely argued that for the time being the tasks assigned exceed the administration capacities of Polish self-government. The surveys indicate that the level of knowledge of Polish civil servants of sub-national level on EU polices is still unsatisfactory<sup>108</sup>. The outcome of these deficiencies is already visible when it comes to the implementation of the pre-accession

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<sup>106</sup> T. Zylicz, T., „Ekologiczno-ekonomiczne aspekty integracji z Unia Europejska”, in U. Kurczewska et al. (eds.), *Polska w Unii Europejskiej. Początkowe problemy i kryzysy*, Warszawa: Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, 2002, p. 334.

<sup>107</sup> Commission of the European Communities, *Progress Report*, SEC (2002) 1408, p. 105.

<sup>108</sup> Z. Mach, D. Niedzwiedzinski (eds.), *Polska lokalna wobec integracji europejskiej*, Krakow 2001.

funds<sup>109</sup>. There are difficulties – among the others – in the preparation of public procurement documentation, in the conclusion of voivodeship contracts and in the selection of suppliers. The preparation of technical documentation, economic-financial analyses, feasibility studies, environment impact analyses is also problematic. To overcome these shortcomings, self-governmental units outsource many services provided they have sufficient financial resources, which is costly. EU membership will exacerbate these problems. Other effect of the Europeanisation of policy-making on self-government will be the improvement of the culture of organisation of local and regional administration. It will adopt high European standards with regard to transparency, accountability and enhanced social participation, which – apart from calling for considerable investment outlays for “communication” infrastructure – might constitute a civilisation shock and a mental problem for some civil servants. Another dangerous phenomenon in local administration is its politicisation<sup>110</sup>. All subsequent local elections were becoming less and less local, i.e. they were more and more dominated by political parties represented at national level. There is a lack of continuity of power. It is quantitatively demonstrated by the outcome of survey by Swaniewicz et al., which reveals that the full political stability, understood as one mayor throughout the period 1993-1999 is merely 19% of all cases<sup>111</sup>. The failure of self-governments to face the aforementioned deficiencies might lead to the petrification of the “provisional” centralisation of environmental policy.

There is a common agreement that the administrative capacities to implement the EU environmental law should be strengthened. Additional staff resources should be allocated, especially at sub-national level, i.e. in counties and voivodeships<sup>112</sup>. Further training of staff at regional and local level is also necessary if Poland is to be ready to implement EU environmental policy at accession.

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<sup>109</sup> A. Zelazo, „Członkostwo Polski w Unii Europejskiej – pierwsze problemy potencjalne kryzysy dla samorządu terytorialnego w Polsce”, in U. Kurczewska et al. (eds.), *Polska w Unii Europejskiej. Początkowe problemy i kryzysy*, Warszawa: Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, 2002.

<sup>110</sup> UKIE, “Analiza skutków prawnych regulacji wprowadzonych przez ustawodawstwo dostosowawcze dla samorządów gminy, powiatu i województwa”, Warszawa, 2001.

<sup>111</sup> Swianiewicz et al., „Sprawność instytucjonalna administracji samorządowej w Polsce: zróznicowanie regionalne, *Polska regionów*, nr 16, Gdansk: Instytut Badan nad Gospodarką Rynkową, 2000.

<sup>112</sup> Commission of the European Communities, op. cit., 108 and UKIE, Raport w sprawie dostosowania instytucjonalnych w Polsce do wymogów członkostwa w Unii Europejskiej, Warszawa 2002, p. 22.1-35.

### 2.3. Institutional Reform and “European” Policy-Making: Generalised assessment for CEECs

By applying for the European Union Poland, Hungary and other Central and Eastern Europe countries (CEECs) declared their readiness to assume the obligations resulting from the membership, i.e. the legal and institutional framework, known as the *acquis*, by means of which the Union implements its objectives. It calls for the existence of modern administration. The process of the integration with the European Union (from the first contacts established at the turn of 1990s. via the association by virtue of the *Europe Agreements*, accession negotiations to anticipated membership) has always been a driving force (once a stick, once a carrot) behind institutional change in CEECs, although it is widely argued in the literature that adaptation pressures have been exerted by the adherence to other international organisations such as NATO, OECD, WTO, the Council of Europe as well as different regional initiatives. Although it is impossible to abstract in both qualitative and quantitative terms a “pure EU effect” from multilateral policy-making CEECs takes part in, the EU membership is special, as Lippert et al.<sup>113</sup> point out, for the specifics of the EU management model, whose prominent features are: multilevel governance, hard and soft policy co-ordination as well as transgovernmentalism.

Out of three modes of the Europeanisation (exerting coercive and constraining pressures by prescribing institutional models, to which domestic structures have to be adjusted, altering domestic opportunity structures, whose essence is to modify the context rather than imposing distinctive institutional forms and exerting ideational influence and a social constructivist account of change), in regional and environmental policies the coercive character of the adaptational pressures is dominant<sup>114</sup>. As a result, the Europeanisation of both policy domains has not been a process of policy transfer, but rather the output of contractual relations among still unbalanced parties<sup>115</sup>.

The mechanisms of the Europeanisation processes differ among CEES. They include:

- EU’ s gate keeping role in determining the pace of the candidates’ integration process with the Union.

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<sup>113</sup> B. Lippert et. al., “Europeanisation of CEE Executives: EU Membership Negotiations as a Shaping Power”, *Journal of European Public Policy* 8: 6 December 2001, p. 983.

<sup>114</sup> A. Gwiazda, *Europeanisation in Candidate Countries from Central and Eastern Europe*, paper presented for EPIC workshop in Florence, EUI, 19-22 September 2002, pp. 9-10.

<sup>115</sup> J. Milanese, *Europeanisation Effects in Central and Eastern Europe: a Multi-Level Explanation Approach. Between Domestic and External Pressures towards Policy Change*, paper prepared for presentation at the Fifth Biennial Conference: “Bigger and Better? The European Union, Enlargement and Reform”, European Community Studies Association, Toronto, 31 May-1 June 2002.

- Benchmarking and monitoring whose main tool are progress reports.
- Provision of models: provision of legislative and institutional templates.
- Provision of aid and technical assistance whose major instrument is PHARE Special Preparatory Programme, as well as ISPA and SAPARD.
- Consultancy and twinning.

Due to the above-mentioned conditionality of the Europeanisation process the candidates have been under extremely high adaptation pressure, which has reduced the room for domestic responses to external pressures and fostered mutual co-operation among officials dealing with the Union.

There are some common features as well as problems and dilemmas encountered in the process of the Europeanisation. The lowest common denominator – as evaluated by the European Commission in its regular *Progress Reports* – is the assessment that there is a significant degree of compliance with the *acquis* in terms of the transposition rate of the EU legal acts and considerable implementation deficit.

There are still some tensions between centralising and decentralising tendencies<sup>116</sup>. Although a majority of EU policies operate in a decentralised matter and there are strong arguments for the decentralisation<sup>117</sup>, so far the competences for EU affairs have been concentrated at the highest political and governmental level. What is more, some sectoral strategic policy decisions have been contradictory to the announced trend towards decentralisation<sup>118</sup> (e.g. single operational programmes in the domain of regional policy). The deficiencies of public administration at sub-national level (especially financial dependency of self-governmental units<sup>119</sup> and the shortage of human resources) have been expected to reinforce the centralisation of the management of EU policies.

It should be pointed out quite clearly that there has been not a uniform pattern of the institutional change in CEES countries and political elites in post-communist countries have been interested in the third way. The applicants have tried to streamline and strengthen their own institutional arrangements. Such an approach to the building of

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<sup>116</sup> H. Grabbe, „How does Europeanisation affect CEE governance? Conditionally, Diffusion and Diversity”, *Journal of European Public Policy* 8: 6 December 2001, p. 1018.

<sup>117</sup> See: A. Jewtuchowicz, M. Czernielewska, *Social Network Analysis. Regional Policy. Lodz Voivodeship*, European Institute, Lodz 2003, mimeo ADAPT document.

<sup>118</sup> See: J. Szlachta, *Regional Policies in Central European Candidate Countries. Lessons from Cohesion Countries*, European Institute, Lodz 2003, mimeo ADAPT document.

<sup>119</sup> See: Bury, Swianiewicz, *op.cit.*

administrative capacity might result from the fact that there is no uniform “European” model to be adapted and the extent to which the EU prescribes specific institutional solutions is limited, due to the lack of EU institutional templates<sup>120</sup>. What is more, in many policy areas, there is a shift towards deregulation and liberalisation. Nonetheless, it seems that due to the 5 mechanism of the Europeanisation, there has been a considerable degree of emulation of the administrative structures existing in the EU Member States. The important limitation of the process of imitation and the constraint to the EU’s influence, is the diversity and the complexity of actor constellations involved in the process. CEE officials deal with the Commission, national experts from the Council, the per-accession advisors from national public administrations, civil servants and politicians from individual member states. As a result, it is argued that “the present configuration of executive arrangements is still a fluid amalgam of inherited, imported and domestically developed institutional arrangements”<sup>121</sup>.

The imitation of the European patterns has its advantages<sup>122</sup>. It is a useful and expedient way of reforming the administrative system in the context of: significant time pressure of transformations, the duality of systemic transition (to market economy and to democratic regime) and the weakness of civil society. However, it should be pointed out quite clearly that it might lead to the deepening of internal incompatibility of the whole institutional system, though external compatibility (the approximation with EU requirements) is progressing<sup>123</sup>.

A worrying phenomenon in public administrative sphere in CEECs is still its politicization, being the legacy of the communist system. As political scenes in the applicant countries are still in the state of flux, with political parties alternating in popularity, with deep ideological cleavages, it results in the lack of the continuity of powers. The extent to which the institutional systems are “politically driven” differs among the prospective Members, but even in Hungary, said to be a front-runner of civil service reform, it is still a problem, as subsequent governments have always taken the opportunity to change personnel in administrative offices. Other legacies of the previous regime still in evidence

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<sup>120</sup> The same holds true for the assessment of the administrative capacity.

<sup>121</sup> K. Goetz, H. Wollmann, “Governmentalising Central Executives in Post-Communist Europe: a Four-Country Comparison”, *Journal of European Public Policy* 8: 6 December 2001, p. 822.

<sup>122</sup> W. Jacoby, “Tutors and Pupils: International Organisations, Central European Elites and Western Models”, *Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration*, Vol. 14, no 2, April 2001.

<sup>123</sup> Hausner, J. Marody, M., *The Quality of Governance: Poland Closer to the European Union*, EU-monitoring IV, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Krakow: Malopolska School of Public Administration of Cracow University of Economics, 2000.

are corruption, nepotism, favouritism, patronage, state capture, various forms of maladministration and public distrust of executive politicians and officials<sup>124</sup>.

Empirical surveys indicate that another dangerous phenomenon in the administrative systems in CEECs is the deepening dualism of public administration. There is clear evidence of professionalisation and depoliticisation of civil service dealing with the European affairs<sup>125</sup>, especially in the policy domains where the EU imposes some institutional solutions such as cohesion policies. It has resulted from the fact that the logics of the accession process has given the pivotal role to the national government and within the executive, these have been the officials rather than politicians that have had the longest and the most consistent role in EU preparations, which has led to the technocratisation of this stratus of the public administration, complemented by their relative longevity as well as the high level of expertise. It must be borne in mind – however – that the side effect of this positive phenomenon – in a longer perspective – might be the “democratic deficit” of the system<sup>126</sup>.

At the same time the quality of the institutional performance of non-EU related administration lags behind. There is debate in academic milieu if the existence of such “islands of excellence” is a factor mediating or prohibiting domestic institutional change and whereas it serves the whole administrative system well. On the one hand, they might serve as trend setters for the public administration as a whole<sup>127</sup>, but on the other hand the misgivings are that if only the top layer of the public administration becomes Europeanised, while the lower strata and the public are excluded from the process, the pan-European demos are less likely to emerge<sup>128</sup>.

#### **2.4. Implications for the Reform Process in Public Policy: between the “Legacies of the Past” and the Challenge(s) of the Future**

CEECs are inevitably faced with the same decisions that earlier had to be made in Member States of the European Union. Particularly valuable may be experiences of cohesion states that were and still are the major beneficiaries of the EU cohesion policies and the hitherto assessment of the institutional reform in Hungary, Poland and other CEES.

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<sup>124</sup> K. Goetz, H. Wollmann, *op.cit.*, p 883.

<sup>125</sup> K. Goetz, “Making sense of post-communist central administration: modernization, Europeanisation or Latinization”, *Journal of European Public Policy* 8: 6 December 2001, p. 1036.

<sup>126</sup> H. Grabbe, *op. cit.*, p. 1017.

<sup>127</sup> K. Goetz, H. Wollmann, *op. cit.*, p. 881.

<sup>128</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1029.



#### **2.4.1. Building of potential in the sphere of strategic development programming**

The European Union allocates very large funds to development measures in the poorest Member States, the annual amount of which may be equal to 4% of Gross Domestic Product. Activation of such funds requires from beneficiaries to prepare a sequence of programming documents such as National Development Plan, Community Support Framework, and Programme Complements in the domain of regional policy whereas in the field of waste management it is imperative to elaborate waste management programmes at all levels of governance, being one of the environment related policy documents. Measures financed from the EU budget should bring a significant macroeconomic effect, mainly growth of GDP and decrease of the unemployment rate. The range of allowed financing from the Structural Funds and Cohesion Funds is very wide, which means that a beneficiary country should propose the most advantageous pattern of actions in the context of three directions: infrastructure, human capital, and the production sector. A relevant analysis is possible by means of macroeconomic models of HERMIN type. The mentioned cohesion countries have built a necessary potential within the government administration and co-operating research institutions, which allows making proper decisions concerning allocation of European funds. Measures taken under European funds should be consistent with those taken under the regional policy on the basis of domestic funds. Other state policies should also promote achievement of objectives of the regional policy. The same holds true for the environmental policy. It is particularly crucial to make use of relevant experiences of the cohesion countries because the CEES are characterized, in the opinion of the European Commission, by significant deficit of strategic thinking.

#### **2.4.2. Definition of the relationship between the cohesion within the European Union and cohesion within the country**

At present, CEECs face the same option as it was earlier the case with cohesion countries: whether the priority should be to reduce the development gap towards other parts of the European Union, or to prevent excessive differentiation within the country. The answer to that question is a requisite of choosing a set of measures to be supported from European funds.

#### **2.4.3. Systematic decentralization of the public administration system**

Cohesion countries were characterized by a very high level of centralization of their administration systems. It manifested itself e.g. in taking majority of decisions (not only the most important ones) on the national level, in the lack of self-government

administration on the regional level and lack of the public administration on the level of NUTS-II regionalization, and in the centralized system of public finances. All that made it difficult to conduct an active intraregional policy. Due to various own experiences and the experience in establishing European centers, the said countries are gradually building their regional level, generally by de-concentrating various functions from their capital cities to regions. Poland and Hungary are big and internally differentiated countries so that it is not possible for them to effectively carry out a development policy without an efficient regional level. An important experience of cohesion countries is their decentralized administration of regional operational programmes. However, it is necessary to avoid a situation of having two parallel administration systems – a general system and one applied to European funds.

#### **2.4.4. Building partnerships of various institutions in the sphere of regional development policies**

The regional policy as well as ecological policy (including waste management) followed in the Member States of the European Union is highly socialized. The European Commission believes that social participation is a prerequisite for efficiency of the policy because it guarantees involvement of most important social partners in the implementation of regional strategies. The participation is considered in two aspects: horizontal – consisting of the co-operation of four levels of the public administration (European Commission, the country's government, regional authorities and local self-government), and vertical – consisting of the co-operation of public administrations with the sector of non-government organizations, academic institutions, business environment institutions, economic entities, banking sector, etc. Cohesion countries have established effective mechanisms of social participation in the process of preparing most important programming documents and in implementing measures financed from Structural Funds (monitoring committees). It is especially important in post-communist countries where it seems a key element of actions directed at building a civil society. It is important to make use of experiences of cohesion countries as regards forms of voluntary co-operation of self-government bodies.

#### **2.4.5. Provision of necessary co-financing for European funds**

The European Union requires a proper financial set-up of enterprises financed from European funds with funds from the beneficiary's own resources. In case of Objective 1 areas, the required level is 25%, which means that every three Euros paid from Structural Funds have to be supplemented with one Euro paid by the beneficiary country. To guarantee the necessary co-financing of European funds, it was necessary to rebuild

the public finance system in the cohesion countries in order to free the required co-financing resources. It was equally important for those countries to start to prepare many years' plans of budget expenses assigned for development activities. Accession to the European Union requires all CEECs to make fundamental changes in their public finance systems. A way of rationalizing the development expenses is to make use of experiences of the Member States in the sphere of public-private partnerships.

#### **2.4.6. Preparation of necessary investment projects**

Activation of structural funds and Cohesion Fund in CEECs means fundamental changes in the regional policies of those countries. The number of necessary investment projects financed from European funds will be more than four times greater than it the respective number under the three pre-accession programmes just before the accession. Expenses related to preparation of the projects are not qualified costs, and besides, they should be incurred in advance. It is also necessary to create an institutional potential to support identification and preparation of the investment projects in a proper format.

#### **2.4.7. Exchange of best practices**

The regional policy in CEECs was carried out within the paradigm of a centrally planned economy, and it had a definitely compensative character, whereas the ecological policy was subjugated to the economic policy. New aspects of the policy including, e.e. building of a competitive capability of the regions and public-private partnerships, call for obtaining the know-how from the Member States, while the relevant experiences of cohesion countries are sometimes much more adequate than those of the most developed European Union countries. Also, experiences of cohesion countries in the monitoring and evaluation of enterprises undertaken within European funds may be relatively easy to be adopted in the new Member States. Experiences in creating administration structures of the regional policy and the policy of environmental protection at national and regional levels, and in the methods and techniques of coordinating activity of various institutions are very important. An efficient transfer of best practices is a prerequisite for the effective use of European funds in Poland and Hungary as well as in other CEECs.

### 3. Chapter Eleven: Policy Recommendations

This project enabled an in-depth study of the impact of Europeanisation on the regional and environmental policy spheres in Cohesion and Accession countries. The qualitative dimension of the study underscored many positive effects of the Europeanisation of policy processes such as improved policies and practices, increased effectiveness of interventions, new networks and know-how, capacity building, strengthening of the territorial dimension and greater mobilisation of civil society. However, many lessons are to be extrapolated from the Europeanisation process. The results of the ADAPT project allow us to draw the following broader comparative conclusions regarding the Europeanisation of regional and environmental policy-making and the extent of adaptation in the Cohesion (Greece, Ireland, Portugal) and CEE (Hungary and Poland) countries under consideration:

- 1) The Europeanisation of regional and environmental policy-making has considerably impacted upon the policy-making processes, administrative structures and institutions in all the countries under consideration and has subsequently led to widespread learning and adaptation. Learning and adaptation have been more extensive in Ireland regarding regional policy-making with Greece, Portugal, Poland and Hungary all demonstrating slow learning tendencies and limited adaptation capacity. In the field of environmental policy-making, the three Cohesion countries are much better off though learning and adaptation are on-going processes with still a long way to go.
- 2) The pace of learning, institutional restructuring and subsequently of adaptation has been very much affected by a number of factors, such as the pre-existing political culture, the administrative structures and the level of institutional embeddedness, the economic situation, state-society relations, the policy-making processes and the range of actors involved in them, the types of networks that exist and the levels of social capital and civic engagement.
- 3) The pace of learning, institutional restructuring and subsequently of adaptation has also been affected by the extent of adaptational pressures exerted by the EU. With the exception of Ireland, all countries have faced medium to high adaptational pressures. To a certain extent this could be explained by the fact that Ireland has been the only country in which adaptation did not coincide with democratization and modernization. This means it was realized within a less demanding environment.

- 4) In the field of regional policy-making, in all countries under consideration, Europeanisation led to considerable administrative restructuring, institution-building and broadening of the policy-making processes to a number of previously excluded social actors. With the exception of Ireland, one could argue that the countries under consideration are being characterized by 'half-way adaptation'.
- 5) In the field of environmental policy-making all countries can be characterized as 'laggards' facing high policy misfits. Europeanisation has led to significant legal harmonization but the necessary institution-building and establishment/functioning of the required implementation/enforcement mechanisms has yet to be completed.
- 6) In both fields and in all the countries under consideration Europeanisation has led to the emergence of networks, new forms of public-private partnerships and a greater involvement of the private sector and civil society thus creating a good basis for learning and more rapid and efficient adaptation. Still the impact of all these new factors on the policy-making processes seems to be rather weak; these often reflect a procedural need to satisfy EU requirements for consultation rather than indigenously driven developments.
- 7) Despite serious attempts at decentralization of public administration and policy-making processes, the central state continues to play the key role in policy-making, to dominate networks and partnerships and to control the majority of power and financial resources setting considerable impediments for learning and adaptation. Unfortunately, the bureaucratic requirements of the Commission (especially in the field of regional policy-making) seem to be re-enforcing that trend. The European focus, of its nature, requires common financing and common rules.

From the above and following a three-level approach to regional and environmental policy-making, the ensuing policy recommendations can be drawn.

### **3.1. European level**

- 1) **Cohesiveness of EU Policies:** It is worth reminding that local, regional and national institutions emerge and operate within the broader European context. It is important to stress that Europeanisation itself is not a cohesive process but has rather been characterized by vertical and horizontal fragmentation indicating a lack of a cohesive single policy network at the Community level.

There is a pressing need for more horizontal policy integration which means that the Community should create the necessary cohesive mechanisms and tools that will achieve cohesion and synergy among the different policies and their outcome providing crucial support for implementation while eliminating emerging contradictions (for example one could mention the environmental impact of the structural policies in the Cohesion countries or the contradiction between diminishing internal regional disparities and simultaneously covering the gap with the West in the CEECs).

- 2) **Vertical integration:** The Community should also promote more vertical policy integration through better interconnection, within the framework of multi-level governance, between the Community institutions and the member-state governments, as well as between the national and sub-national governmental bodies in the policy-making processes.
- 3) **Efficiency and legitimacy concerns:** A balance should be pursued between ensuring legitimacy, which demands more extensive participation and involvement of a greater number of local and regional authorities and social actors, and ensuring efficiency towards problem-solving and effective monitoring and evaluation. The current trend in several member-states for more centralized methods presents a potential threat, leading towards domination by the central state institutions and structures and demands an urgent re-orientation towards a greater balance between central state and regional governance institutions.
- 4) **State-society relations:** In this respect, although the Community's priority for strengthening the central state administrative capacity (especially in the CEECs) may be right, this is difficult to achieve without taking into account the state-society relations and their interaction within the domestic level of governance. Thus, in policy design, the processes of institution building, social capital creation, civil society strengthening through enhancing networking, NGOs consultation etc. should be prominent among the Community's key priorities.
- 5) **Trans-national networking:** The Commission should promote direct links with sub-national actors and institutions, as well as promote networking among sub-national actors in different member states, thus facilitating the exchange of knowledge and information, maximising learning and increasing the negotiating power of these actors. This would necessitate the allocation of special funds and incentives for creating communication channels above the national barriers (e.g. creation of databases with potential partners across Europe).

- 6) **Good practice code in policy-making:** The Community should consider creating repositories of knowledge with good practice cases and should insist on the member-states using them for consultation at all stages of policy-making and implementation.
- 7) **Enhancing expertise involvement at the national level:** The Community should focus on encouraging the creation and enhancement of the role of expertise (preferably in the form of independent think-tanks) in policy-making at the domestic/national level of governance, given the crucial importance of experts' involvement for the learning process. This should constitute a priority in policy design and could take the form of incentive provision etc.
- 8) **Human capital investment for regional/local community capacity building:** The Community should also consider the allocation of special funds for the development of local/regional community capacity building to increase understanding and commitment at all levels of governance. The EU has to deliberately promote human capital investment to facilitate and accelerate adaptation.

### 3.2. National level

- 1) **Decentralisation towards better competence allocation:** Institutional and political traditions do matter and should be taken into consideration. It should always be kept in mind that it is fairly difficult to substantially decentralize a centralized state structure. Instead of trying to put aside central state institutions and governmental bodies, it would be more useful to clarify competencies and responsibilities among different levels of governance, allowing the central state to have the overall strategic, coordinative, regulatory and re-distributive role.
- 2) **Duplication and fragmentation reduction:** It is important to avoid duplication of powers and responsibilities among national, regional and local actors. Similarly, it is necessary to avoid over-institutionalization in order to reduce the fragmentation of policy-making and the overlapping of competencies.
- 3) **Towards elected regional authorities:** Special care should be taken not to replace old demons with new ones. More specifically, the institutionalization of the intermediate, regional level of governance should be promoted in a way that enhances the active involvement of sub-regional authorities and facilitates networking and partnership building at regional level. This means it should have

a clear legitimacy basis and enjoy relative financial autonomy rather than simply functioning as a deconcentrated bureaucratic state agent. Recent re-centralization trends seem to be hindering the functioning and effectiveness of the newly formed regional governance structures.

- 4) **NGO involvement:** It is important to involve NGOs and private actors at the earliest stages of policy making and implementation. Only by having a say in the drawing up of plans (which reflect their needs and demands) will they have a greater likelihood of involvement in implementation. Regarding the private sector, it is necessary to decrease bureaucracy and uncertainty in order to increase private investment. Especially third level social actors, chambers etc. should be actively involved in the preliminary policy-making and implementation stages.
- 5) **Partnership building:** It is necessary to institutionalize partnership formation and networking and to promote the exchange of knowledge, information and know-how through proper mechanisms that are accessible at all levels of governance and by all the relevant actors.
- 6) **Expertise creation and involvement in policy-making:** The role of expertise (preferably in the form of independent think-tanks) in policy-making at the national level of governance is of crucial importance for the learning process and subsequently for the more rapid and efficient adaptation. Thus, the creation of expert groups and the support and enhancement of their role in policy-making should constitute a priority in the policy-making agenda.
- 7) **Social capital/civil society/co-operative culture building:** For political stability, for government effectiveness, and even for economic progress social capital may be even more important than physical and human capital (Putnam 1993). Norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement create horizontal civic links, bound to lead to higher levels of economic and institutional performance. Where such norms and networks are absent, the outlook for collective action seems pessimistic. Thus, special attempts at opening up and facilitating participation should be made in order to build social capital, no matter how long the temporal perspective required.



### 3.3. Regional level

- 1) **Regions as the most crucial Europeanisation fields:** The regional level of governance constitutes the most important 'field' of adaptation/Europeanisation. The institutionalization of the regional level of governance should be promoted in a way that ensures legitimacy and relative financial autonomy while complementing active decentralised state-units. Each region, once institutionalised, should be seen as a unique entity with special characteristics and qualities, a specific environment for policy-making and implementation and distinctive learning and adaptation capacity. This means that different mechanisms should be used in different cases to promote adaptation and enhance rapprochement with the Community requirements.
- 2) **EU-oriented vocational training:** Special attempts should be made to 'educate' and train social actors and regional and local authorities on the EU requirements, networking, lobbying at a higher level and partnership building in order to create the necessary knowledge base.
- 3) **Creation of incentive schemes for private participation:** Stronger partnerships should be created intra-regionally with greater private and civic participation to ensure duration and viability upon completion of a given action. Policy incentive schemes to encourage private sector participation should be implemented. Joint involvement of public and private sector in planning, funding and implementation of projects should be facilitated.
- 4) **Civic engagement and consultation:** Mechanisms should be created to allow consultation between the regional authorities and the civil society on various local concerns. Moreover, the public should have better access to information (via info campaigns, special events, etc.) and the scientific community should be consulted more often. Groups of experts and NGOs should play a greater consultative role in local affairs.
- 5) **Human capital investment in training and education:** It is important to improve the quality (education level, know-how) of the human resources at both the regional and the local levels through the establishment of an adequate and sustained programme of recruitment based on merit and fitness and the elaboration of training programmes.
- 6) **Increase participation at early stages of planning:** All actors should be included at the early stages of planning. Focus should be placed on very specific

needs and problems of the region, especially in case of small budgets. This is particularly important for the CEECs where the funds are limited and often insufficient for the implementation of all the foreseen actions.

- 7) **Create social capital endowments:** For political stability, economic progress and government effectiveness social capital may play a crucial role since norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement encourage horizontal civic links, which are bound to lead to higher levels of economic and institutional performance. However, building social capital from outside is not easy as existing political, economic and social structures often constitute a considerable barrier to such efforts. Thus, special attempts should be made to create the conditions that, in the long term, might lead to durable social capital endowments.

Overall, special attention should be paid to building and supporting institutions of regional governance. The Community should provide special support *for* the establishment and effective function of new institutions at that governance level. Within the context of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Cohesion Report under preparation by the Commission, the European Convention and the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe and in accordance with the discussion about revision of the Structural Funds operation, the concepts of Territorial Cohesion and poly-centrism emerge as the focal points for all future EU policies. Both concepts are vitally linked to the notion of meso level (NUTS II) and functional urban areas/metropolitan regions as the most appropriate governance units. This means that the Community should focus on, and directly promote the regional/metropolitan level of governance, through the elaboration of the necessary tools and mechanisms, the facilitation of institution-building and legitimacy strategies as well as the support of learning and innovation. This is particularly important in a context where re-centralisation trends can be detected in the majority of the member-states and the CEECs.

### **3.4. Lessons for the CEECs**

The expansion of the list of the conditionality/compliance criteria for the CEECs' negotiation for entry to include institution building, fighting corruption etc. may be viewed as a major innovation on the part of the EU Commission, with regard to the impact of Europeanization on domestic institutional structures. Indeed, focus on such "soft or low level", but simultaneously crucial aspects of governance initiates a break with the past. Previous waves of enlargement were primarily dominated by the relevant case-sensitive economic and/or policy issues and secondarily by general considerations

(qualitative criteria) regarding the domestic socio-political system, namely functioning democracy, human rights and so on.

This focus on fundamental principles/issues should underpin public policy-making in general and the selected policy areas in particular in these countries. Therefore, institution building should be raised as the main priority at both the supranational and domestic levels of governance. Relevant policy tools at the supranational and/or national levels of government might include: a) conditionality/compliance criteria regarding institution building considerations at each phase of public policy-making (policy design, planning, implementation etc.) and b) motivation (incentives) related to institution building functions, such as network creation, fighting corruption and so on. Overall, institution building must have absolute priority on the modernization agenda in these countries. Getting the institutional and framework right will be a key factor in ensuring successful adaptation.

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## IV. ANNEXES

### 1. Chapter Two Annexes

#### 1.1. SNA Tables

**Table 19.** Centrality measures of regional development

**Policy network in Notio Aigaio**

Actors	Centrality degree
ROPMA	34.000
RS	34.000
CDA	33.000
CPR	30.000
DPR	29.000
MNE	28.000
DTEDK	26.000
MA	25.000
CTEDK	24.000
RCC	23.000
CC	22.000
CPC	21.000
DDA	21.000
MC	19.000
ECC	19.000
CTUC	18.000
DPC	18.000
DTUC	16.000
DC	16.000
UA	14.000
MOU	10.000

**Table 20.** Centrality measures of regional development

**Policy network in the Dodecanese**

<b>Actors</b>	<b>Centrality degree</b>
ROPMA	15.000
RS	15.000
DPR	18.000
DTEDK	18.000
RCC	16.000
DDA	15.000
DPC	13.000
DTUC	11.000
DC	11.000
UA	6.000

**Table 21.** Centrality measures of regional development

**Policy network in Cyclades**

<b>Actors</b>	<b>Centrality degree</b>
ROPMA	15.000
RS	15.000
CDA	21.000
CPR	18.000
CTEDK	18.000
CC	13.000
CPC	15.000
ECC	14.000
CTUC	14.000
UA	9.000

**Table 22.** Centrality measures of waste management

**Policy network in Attica region**

<b>Actors</b>	<b>Centrality Degree</b>
YPEHODE	27.000
ATREG	23.000
ESDKNA	20.000
YPESDDA	19.000
MAOPE	15.000
TEDKNA	14.000
KER	13.000
EASTAT	12.000
ERA	11.000
ANLIOS	11.000
HSWMA	11.000
EPEM	9.000
EBEA	9.000
HERRA	6.000
HWMCA	6.000
TEE	5.000
PARGEO	4.000
GSEE	1.000

Figure 2. Policy network in Notio Aigaio (MDS)




Figure 3. Structural equivalence in Notio Aigaio

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	6	4	3	9	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2
		M	M	M	M	R	R	U	C	C	C	C	C	E	C	R	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D
1	MNE		3	3	2	2	2	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	1
2	MA	3		3	2	2	2		2	1	1	1	1	2											
3	MC	3	3		2	2	2		2	1	1	1													
4	MOU	2	2	2		2	2																		
5	RS	2	2	2	2		3	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	1
6	ROPMA	2	2	2	2	3		1	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	2	2
7	UA	1				1	1		1	1	1	1	1	2		1	1	1		1	1			1	1
8	CPC					2	1		3	1	2	2	1	3		1	2		2	1					
9	CPR	2	2	2		2	2	1	3	2	2	2	1	3		1	2		2	1					
20	CTUC	1	1			1	2		1	1	2	2	2	2	1										2
16	CTEDK	1	1	1		2	2		1	2	2	2	1	3	3									2	1
14	CC	1	1	1		1			1	2	2	2	1	1	3		2		2		1		1		1
13	ECC	2	1	1		2	1		1	1	1	2	3	1	2		1								
19	CDA	1	2			2	2		2	3	3	1	3	3	2		1	1	2	1	1		2	1	1
12	RCC	1				2	1		1	1	1		2	1	1		2	2	2	3		2	2	1	1
11	DPR	2	2	2		2	2		1	2	2					1	2	2	3	2		3	1		1
15	DC	1				1	1					2	2			2	2	2		1		2	2		
10	DPC					2	1		2	2						1	2	3		2		2	1		
17	DTEK	1	1			2	2		1	1	1	2	1	1	1	3	2	1	2			3	2		
18	DDA	1	1			1	2				1	1	2			2	3	2	2	3					
21	DTUC	1	1			1	2		1	2						1	1	1	2	1	2				



Figure 4. Policy network in Dodecanese (MDS)




Figure 5. Structural equivalence in Dodecanese

		1											
		1 9 0			3	2 7 4			6 8 5				
		R	D	D	U	R	D	D	R	D	D		
1	RS	1	1		1	3	1	2	2	2	2		
9	DDA	1				2	2	2	2	3	3		
10	DTUC	1			1	2	2	1	1	2	1		
3	UA	1	1			1			1	1	1		
2	ROPMA	3	2	2	1		1	1	1	2	2		
7	DC	1	2	2			1			2	1		
4	DPC	2	2	1			1			2	2		
6	RCC	2	2	1	1	1	2	2		3	2		
8	DTEDK	2	3	2	1	2	1	2		3	2		
5	DPR	2	3	1	1	2	2	3		2	2		

Figure 6. Policy network in Cyclades (MDS)




Figure 7. Structural Equivalence in Cyclades

		1	2	3	6	8	5	7	4	9	10
		R	R	U	E	C	C	C	C	C	C
1	RS		3	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	1
2	ROPMA	3		1	1	2	2	1	1	2	2
3	UA	1	1		1	1	1	1		2	1
6	ECC	2	1	1		3	1	1	1	2	2
8	CTEDK	2	2	1	3		2	1	2	3	2
5	CPR	2	2	1	1	2		2	3	3	2
7	CC		1	1	1	1	2		2	3	2
4	CPC	2	1		1	2	3	2		3	1
9	CDA	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	3		1
10	CTUC	1	2	1	2	2	2	2	1	1	

Figure 8. Policy network in Attica region (MDS)





Figure 9. Structural equivalence in Attica region

		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1										
		1	3	3	5	6	8	2	0	7	9	1	4	6	5	8	2	7	4
		Y	P	M	T	E	K	Y	E	A	A	T	G	H	E	H	E	H	E
1	YPEHODE	1	3	1	2	2		3	2	2	3	1		2	1		2	2	
13	PARGEO	1					1	1											
3	MAOPE	3			1	1	2		1	2	1			1	1			1	1
5	TEE	1	1		1							1							1
16	EASTAT	2	1	1	1		2		2			3							
18	KER	2	1	2		2		2	1		2	1							
2	YPESDDA	3				2	2		3	3	3	3							
10	ESDKNA	2	1	1			1	3		1	3	3		2			1	1	1
17	ANLIOS	2	2					3	1		2	1							
9	ATREG	3	1	1	3	2		3	3	2		3							2
11	TEDKNA	1					1	3	3	1	3		1	1					
4	GSEE											1							
6	HERRA											1		2	3				
15	ERA	2	1					2						2	2		1	1	
8	HSWMA	1	1											3	2		2	1	1
12	EPEM	2						1						1	2		1	2	
7	HWMCA	2	1					1						1			1		
14	EBEA			1	1			1	2					1	1		2		

## 1.2. Map



## 2. Chapter Three Annexes

### SNA Tables


#### 2.1. Regional Policy

**Table 23.** Freeman's Degree of Centrality Measures

No	Actor	Degree	NrmDegree
1	Shanndev	74.000	200.000
3	Mwra	73.000	197.297
13	limcoco	61.000	164.865
2	Ballyh	52.000	140.541
33	Doe	47.000	127.027
34	Dof	43.000	116.216
20	Cenb	41.000	110.811
14	Tnthco	41.000	110.811
25	Ncn	41.000	110.811
10	teagasc	38.000	102.703
19	Tenb	38.000	102.703
35	otherds	37.000	100.000
4	Fas	33.000	89.189
26	tleader	30.000	81.081
21	Paulp	29.000	78.378
17	limebcy	27.000	72.973
16	Clcoco	25.000	67.568
5	Ida	23.000	62.162
23	Rrltd	22.000	59.459
36	Ibec	21.000	56.757
2	Serega	19.000	51.351
15	limcico	19.000	51.351
24	wlimr	17.000	45.946
32	jcnea	16.000	43.243
18	limebc	15.000	40.541

6	forfas	15.000	40.541
11	ifa	14.000	37.838
12	ictu	13.000	35.135
9	beireann	10.000	27.027
27	lcc	9.000	24.324
7	fisheries	8.000	21.622
8	aerrianta	8.000	21.622
29	ihfed	7.000	18.919
30	travela	6.000	16.216
28	ecc	6.000	16.216
38	ersi	5.000	13.514
37	erm	2.000	5.405
31	ccone	1.000	2.703
Network Centralization = 137.09% Homogeneity = 3.99%			

Figure 10.



**Figure 11. Structural Equivalence, Mid West Region**

```

2 1 2 2 1 3 1 3 2 1 3 3 2 1 1 3 2 3 1 3 2 3 2 2 1 1 2 1 3
1 2 1 7 5 5 6 9 4 4 7 3 3 3 2 3 2 2 1 5 4 6 0 4 1 7 8 0 6 0 9 8 9 5 6 7 8 8
s s p l i n t t d t e r l m j d b i i o w i t f c f a c f t b e i l c l l e
-----
1 shanddev | 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 | 2 3 3 1 2 3 | 2 1 2 1 2 | 1 3 3 2 2 2 3 3 2 3 2 |
2 serega | 3 2 3 1 1 2 3 | 2 2 | | |
21 paulp | 3 2 1 1 | 1 2 1 3 | 2 2 3 2 2 | 2 2 |
17 limebcy | 3 2 2 1 2 2 2 | 2 1 2 | 2 1 2 | 1 2 |
5 ida | 3 1 3 1 2 2 3 | 2 2 1 2 | | 1 |
25 ncn | 3 3 1 2 3 3 3 3 | 1 1 3 1 | 3 1 3 1 3 | 3 |
26 tleader | 3 1 1 1 3 3 2 3 | 2 1 1 3 | 1 1 1 1 | 1 1 |
19 tenb | 3 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 | 2 1 | 2 2 3 1 1 2 | 1 1 2 |
34 dof | 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 | 1 2 3 3 2 | 2 2 | 2 2 2 2 2 2 |
14 tnthco | 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 | 3 3 3 2 | 3 3 | 1 1 1 |
-----
37 erm | 1 | 1 | | |
23 rrltd | 2 1 2 | 1 1 2 | 2 3 3 | 2 3 |
13 limcoco | 3 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 3 | 1 3 3 3 | 1 1 3 2 2 3 2 | 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 1 2 |
3 mwra | 3 2 1 2 3 1 1 3 3 | 3 2 2 | 3 2 3 1 3 3 | 2 2 3 2 3 3 2 3 3 3 2 1 3 |
32 jcone | 1 3 | 3 | 1 1 3 1 1 | 1 1 |
33 doe | 2 2 1 1 2 3 | 1 1 3 2 3 2 | 3 3 3 2 1 2 | 3 1 3 3 |
22 ballyh | 3 3 2 2 1 3 2 | 2 3 2 2 | 2 3 3 3 2 | 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 |
-----
12 ictu | 2 2 | 1 3 1 3 | | 1 |
11 ifa | 1 2 | 1 2 1 3 2 | 2 | |
35 otherds | 2 2 2 3 3 2 3 | 3 3 3 3 3 | 2 | 3 |
24 wlimr | 1 3 1 1 1 | 2 2 3 | 3 | |
36 ibec | 2 2 1 3 2 | 2 1 1 2 | 2 | 3 |
10 teagasc | 1 1 1 1 | 3 3 3 1 3 | 2 2 3 2 3 | 3 3 3 |
4 fas | 2 2 2 3 1 2 3 | 3 2 3 2 2 | 3 | 3 |
31 ccone | | 1 | | |
-----
7 fisheries | 1 | 1 2 1 | 3 | |
8 aerrianta | 3 1 | 1 2 | | 1 |
20 cenb | 3 1 1 1 2 | 2 2 3 3 2 | 1 3 3 3 3 | 1 1 1 1 3 1 |
6 forfas | 2 3 1 2 | 1 2 1 2 | | 1 |
30 travela | 1 | 1 3 1 | | |
9 beireann | 2 | 1 3 1 2 | | 1 |
28 ecc | 2 | 1 2 | | 1 |
29 ihfed | 2 | 1 3 1 | | |
15 limcico | 3 2 2 1 | 3 3 3 2 | | |
16 clcoco | 3 2 2 1 | 3 3 3 3 2 | | 3 |
27 lcc | 2 2 2 | 1 2 | | |
18 limebc | 3 1 2 | 2 1 2 | 3 | 1 |
38 ersi | 2 | 3 | | |
-----

```



## 2.2. Waste Management

Table 24. Freeman's Centrality Degree Measures

No	Actors	Degree	NrmDegree
6	limcico	56.000	193.103
21	epa	50.000	172.414
19	doe	48.000	165.517
7	clcoco	41.000	141.379
5	limcoco	38.000	131.034
8	kcoco	36.000	124.138
13	lcc	34.000	117.241
22	univ	32.000	110.345
4	wbs	31.000	106.897
25	erm	28.000	96.552
9	limcdev	28.000	96.552
24	ibec	27.000	93.103
20	dof	26.000	89.655
15	tcc	23.000	79.310
10	limcdev	21.000	72.414
18	comhar	20.000	68.966
29	taisce	19.000	65.517
12	clcodev	17.000	58.621
3	mrbm	15.000	51.724
14	ecc	14.000	48.276
11	kcodev	13.000	44.828

16	kwd	12.000	41.379
17	jcenv	11.000	37.931
30	earth	11.000	37.931
1	voice	11.000	37.931
23	repak	10.000	34.483
26	sullivan	9.000	31.034
27	timoney	6.000	20.690
2	regauth	4.000	13.793
28	regass	3.000	10.345
	DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS		
1	Mean	23.133	79.770
2	Std Dev	13.880	47.861
3	Sum	694.000	2.393.104
4	Variance	192.649	2.290.712
5	SSQ	21.834.000	259.619.500
6	MCSSQ	5.779.467	68.721.367
7	Euc Norm	147.763	509.529
8	Minimum	3.000	10.345
9	Maximum	56.000	193.103
Network Centralization = 121.43% NOTE: For valued data, both the normalized centrality and the centralization index may be larger than 100%.			

Figure 12. MDS Diagram




Figure 13. Structural Equivalence Block Diagram


		1	1	1		2	1	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	1	2	1	2	2	2	3	
		1	2	0	4	3	4	9		5	3	6	1	2	6	5		7	3	7	5	2	9	1
		r	r	l	w	l	e	l		l	r	l	k	c	s	t		c	m	t	e	u	d	e
1	regass																						3	
2	regauth						3																	1
10	limcdev			3	3	3					3							1		2	3	1	1	
4	wbs		3	1	3	3			3	3			3				3	1		3	1			1
13	lcc		3	1	3	3			3	3	1	3		3			1	2			1	1	1	1
14	ecc			3	3					1				3			1				1	1		1
9	limcdev		3	3	3	3			3	3	1	1					1				1	1	1	1
5	limcoco			3	3	3				2	3			1			3	3		1	1	3	2	
23	repak									2	3													3
6	limcico		3	3	3	1	3		3	3	3	3	2	1			3	1	2	2	1	3	2	1
11	kcodev			1	1					3								2		1	1			3
12	clcodev			3	1					3							3		2	3	1	1		
26	sullivan								1	2							2				1			3
15	tcc			3	3	3					1	1										1	1	3
7	clcoco		1	3	1	1	1		3	3	3	2					3	3	2	3	3	2		1
3	mrbr			1	2				3	1							3				1	1	2	1
27	timoney									2							3					1		
25	erm		2			1			1	2	2	2					2				1	1	3	3
22	univ		3	3	1		1		1	1	3						3	1		1	1	3		1
19	doe		1	1	1	1	1		3	3	1	1		1			3	1		1	1	3		1
21	epa		1		1	1	1		2	2	1	1	1	1			2	2	1	3	3	3		1
16	kwd									1											1	1		3
17	jcenv			1						3												3	3	1
24	ibec			1	1	1				1	1			1			1	1	3	1	3	3		1
18	comhar			1	1				1	1							3				3	3	3	3
8	kcoco			1	1				3	3	3	3		3	3		3			2	1	3	2	3
20	dof		3	1	1	3	1		1	2	2	2								3	3	3		1
28	voice								1	1												1	1	3
29	taisce								1	1												1	3	3
30	earth																							
31			1								1	1	3	3				1						1

3. Chapter Four Annexes


3.1. SNA Tables

3.1.1. MDS Diagrams

Regional policy



## Environmental Policy



### 3.1.2. Freeman's degree of centrality tables

#### Regional Policy

2		1
NrmDegree		Degree
-		-----
1	MINPLAN	19.00
211.11		
2	DGRD	16.00
177.78		
3	LTVRCC	15.00
166.67		
4	LTMA	12.00
133.33		
5	AML	8.00
88.89		
6	LRBA	7.00
77.78		
7	PRBA	8.00
88.89		
8	ABRANT	12.00
133.33		
9	OEIRAS	7.00
77.78		
10	OUREM	10.00
111.11		
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS		
		1
2		Degree
NrmDegree		-----
--		
1	Mean	11.40
126.67		
2	Std Dev	3.95
43.94		
3	Sum	114.00
1266.67		
4	Variance	15.64
1930.86		
5	Euc Norm	38.16
423.97		
6	Minimum	7.00
77.78		
7	Maximum	19.00
211.11		
Network Centralization = 105.56%		

**Environmental Policy**

2		1
NrmDegree		Degree
-----		
-		
1	ME	27.00
180.00		
2	WI	28.00
186.67		
3	WWRI	11.00
73.33		
4	NESBA	19.00
126.67		
5	QUERCUS	24.00
160.00		
6	GEOTA	22.00
146.67		
7	EEC	9.00
60.00		
8	EEA	16.00
106.67		
9	AML	13.00
86.67		
10	AMTRES	22.00
146.67		
11	AMARSUL	21.00
140.00		
12	ALMADA	13.00
86.67		
13	LISBON	13.00
86.67		
14	OEIRAS	16.00
106.67		
15	IPODEC	16.00
106.67		
16	TRIU	6.00
40.00		
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS		
		1
2		Degree
NrmDegree		-----
--		
1	Mean	17.25
115.00		
2	Std Dev	6.18
41.20		
3	Sum	276.00
1840.00		
4	Variance	38.19
1697.22		
5	Euc Norm	73.29
488.63		
6	Minimum	6.00
40.00		
7	Maximum	28.00
186.67		
Network Centralization = 81.90%		



### 3.1.3. Structural equivalence blocked matrices

#### Regional Policy


		1							
		1 2 3	4 0 8	7 5 9	6				
		M D L	L O A	P A O	L				
1	MINPLAN	3 2	2 2 2	3 2 2	1				
2	DGRD	3 2	2 2 2	1 1 2	1				
3	LTVRCC	2 2	2 2 2	1 1 2	1				
4	LTMA	2 2 2	1 3	1 1					
10	OUREM	2 2 2	1 2		1				
8	ABRANT	2 2 2	3 2		1				
7	PRBA	3 1 1	1	1	1				
5	AML	2 1 1	1	1 1	1				
9	OEIRAS	2 2 2		1					
6	LRBA	1 1 1	1 1	1 1					

**Environmental policy**

		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1								
		1	6	7	4	8	3	9	0	4	3	1	2	2	5	5	6
		M	G	E	N	E	L	A	A	O	W	A	A	W	Q	I	T
1	ME	3	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	3	2	1	
6	GEOTA	3		1	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	3	1	1
7	EEC	2	1		1	2	1		1					1			
4	NESBA	2	2	1		1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1
8	EEA	2	2	2	1		1		2			1	1	2		2	
13	LISBON	1	1	1	1	1	2		1		1		2		1	1	
9	AML	2	1		1		2		3		1	1	1		1		
10	AMTRES	2	1	1	2	2			3		1	2		2	3	2	1
14	OEIRAS	2	1		1		1	3	3					2		2	1
3	WWRI	2	1		1			1			2	1	2		1		
11	AMARSUL	2	1		1	1	1	1	2		2		3	2	2	2	1
12	ALMADA	1	1		1	1	1				1	3		2	1	1	
2	WI	3	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2		2	2	1
5	QUERCUS	2	3		1	2	1	1	3	2	1	2	1	2		3	
15	IPODEC	1	1		1		1		2	1	2		2	1	3		1
16	TRIU	1		1				1			1		1		1		

### 3.2. Map

For the Regional Policy case-study, the Lisbon and Tagus Valley Region was selected. For the Environmental Policy case-study, the Lisbon Metropolitan Area, which belongs to the Lisbon and Tagus Valley Region, was selected.



#### 4. Chapter Five Annexes

##### 4.1. SNA Tables


##### 4.1.1. Policy Area: Regional Policy. Case Study Region: Southern Transdanubia

##### Interviewed actors/stakeholders in the Region Southern Transdanubia

Serial No of Stakeholder	Administrative tier or geographical range of activity	Sector or ownership	Name of Stakeholder	Abbreviation
1	National Level	Public	Ministry of Agriculture and Regional Development, Division of Regional and Rural Development.	MAR
2		Public	Ministry of Agriculture and Regional Development, Division of Sapard Programme Management	Sapard
3		Public	Ministry of Agriculture and Regional Development, Division of National Development Centre	MNDC
4		Public	Ministry of Phare Affairs, Secretariat	Phare
5		Public	Prime Minister's Office, State Secretariat of Regional Policy	PMO
6		Publicly owned	Hungarian Institute of Town and Regional Planning, Division of Territorial Information System	TIR
7		Public	National Development Council	NDC
8	Regional	Public	Assembly of Baranya County	ABC
9		Public	Assembly of Somogy County	ASC
10		Public	Regional Centre of Labour Force Training and Education	Lab
11		Publicly owned	Hungarian Development Bank, Regional Unit for Southern Transdanubia	Bank
12		Public	Southern Transdanubian Regional Development Council	RDC
13		Public	Baranya County Development Council	Bcoun
14		Public	Somogy County Development Council	Scoun
15		Public	Tolna County Development Council	Tcoun

16	and County Level	Public	Southern Transdanubian Regional Tourism Committee	Tour
17		NGO	Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Baranya County	Bcham
18		NGO	Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Somogy County	Scham
19		NGO	Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Tolna County	Tcham
20		Publicly owned	University of Pécs	Univ
21		Publicly owned	European Information and Development Ltd., Pécs	Euinf
22		Publicly owned	South-Transdanubian Regional Development Agency	Agency
23	Local and Micro-Regional Level	Public	Self-Government of the Town of Pécs	Pecs
24		Public	Self-Government of the Town of Kaposvár	Kapos
25		Public	Self-Government of the Town of Szekszárd	Szeksz
26		Public	Micro-Regional Associations of Baranya County	Bmic
27		Public	Micro-Regional Associations of Somogy County	Smic
28		Public	Micro-Regional Associations of Tolna County	Tmic
29		Publicly owned	Industrial Park Pécs	Indpark
30		NGO	Resource Centre Foundation	Found

## Multidimensional scaling diagram of the stakeholders in the Region Southern Transdanubia



**Freeman's degrees of centrality of the stakeholders in the Region Southern Transdanubia**

<b>Serial No.</b>	<b>Abbreviation</b>	<b>Stakeholder</b>	<b>Degree of centrality</b>
12	RDC	South Transdanubian Regional Development Council	78,2
22	Agency	South Transdanubian Regional Development Agency	69,0
14	Scoun	Somogy County Development Council	57,5
8	ABC	Assembly of Baranya County	56,3
20	Univ	University of Pécs	56,3
9	ASC	Assembly of Somogy County	51,7
13	Bcoun	Baranya County Development Council	51,7
15	Tcoun	Tolna County Development Council	49,4
17	Bcham	Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Baranya County	48,3
23	Pecs	Selfgovernment of the Town of Pécs with county rank	48,3
25	Szeksz	Selfgovernment of the Town of Szekszárd with county rank	47,1
24	Kapos	Selfgovernment of the Town of Kaposvár with county rank	43,7
16	Tour	South Transdanubian Regional Tourism Committee	41,4
26	Bmic	Micro-Regional Associations of Baranya County	41,4
3	MNDC	National Development Centre	40,2
7	NDC	National Development Council	40,2
10	Lab	Regional Centre of Labour Force Training and Education	40,2
1	MAR	MARD regional and rural development divisions	37,9
5	PMO	Prime Minister's Office, State Secretariat of Regional Policy	35,6
11	Bank	Hungarian Development Bank – regional unit	31,0
18	Scham	Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Somogy County	31,0
19	Tcham	Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Tolna	31,0

		County	
21	Euinf	European Information and Development Ltd.	29,9
27	Smic	Micro-Regional Associations of Somogy County	26,4
30	Found	Resource Centre Foundation	26,4
29	Indpark	Industrial Park of Pécs	25,3
2	Sapard	MARD Sapard programme management	21,8
6	TIR	VÁTI - Territorial information system	21,8
28	Tmic	Micro-Regional Associations of Tolna County	20,7
4	Phare	Ministry of Phare Affairs, Secretariat	18,4
		Mean	40,6
		Std. Deviation	14,3



**Structural equivalence matrix of the network in the Region Southern  
Transdanubia**

	MAR	Sapard	MNDC	Phare	PMO	TIR	NDC	Tcoun	Tmic	ASC	Scham	RDC	Kapos	Scoun	Tcham	Smic	ABC	Bmic	Pecs	Bcham	Euinf	Indpark	Found	Univ	Bcoun	Bank	Lab	Szeksz	Agency	Tour	
1 MAR	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1		1	1	1					1	2			1	2		
2 Sapard	2	1		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1						1	1		1		1		
3 MNDC	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	3	1	2		3	1	3		1	1	2		1				1	2	1	1	1	2	1	
4 Phare	2	1		1	1	2				1	2	1		1				1				1		1					2		
5 PMO	2	1	1	1		1	2	2	1	2		2	2	2		1	2	1	1					1	1	2	1	1	2		
6 TIR	2		2	1		2	1		1		2	1	1			2				1					1			1	1		
7 NDC	2	1	2	2	2	2		2	1	2		2	2	2		1	2	1	1	1				1	3			1	2		
15 Tcoun	2	1	3		2	1	2		3	1	1	3		2	3		1	1			1		1	2	2	1	1	3	3	3	
28 Tmic	1		1	1	1	1	3					2		2						1			1				1	1	1	2	
9 ASC	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1			2	3	2	3	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	
18 Scham	1	1						1		2		2	2	2	2	2	1				2			2	1		3		2	1	
12 RDC	2	1	3	2	2	2	2	3	2	3	2		3	3	2	3	3	3	3	3	2	1	2	2	2	3	2	2	3	2	3
24 Kapos	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	2		2	2	3		3	1	2	1		1	1	1			1	1	2	2	2	2	2	
14 Scoun	2	1	3		2	1	2	2		3	2	3	3		1	3	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	1	2	3
19 Tcham	1	1		1				3	2	1	2	2	1	1			1			2				1			2	2	2	2	
27 Smic		1	1		1	1			2	2	3	2	3						1				1				1	1	1	2	1
8 ABC	1	1	1		2	2	2	1		2	1	3	1	2	1			3	3	2	3	2	2	3	3	1	2	3	2	2	
26 Bmic	1	1	2	1	1		1	1		1	3		1				3		2	2	2		2	2	3	1	2		2	2	
23 Pecs	1				1	1	1	1	1		3	1	1		1	3	2		3	3	3	1	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	3	
17 Bcham			1			1	1			1	2	2	1	1	2		2	2	3		2	3	2	2	3	2	3	2	2	2	
21 Euinf							1	1		1	1	1					3	2	3	2		1	1	3	1		1	2	1	1	
29 Indpark				1							2		1				2		3	3	1			3	1	1	1	1	2		
30 Found							1	1	1		2		1		1	2	2	1	2	1		2	1		2	1	2		3		
20 Univ	1	1	1	1	1		1	2		2	2	2	1	2	1		3	2	3	2	3	3	2		2	1	2	3	2	3	
13 Bcoun	2	1	2		1	1	3	2		2	1	3	1	2			3	3	3	3	3	1	1	1	2		1	1		2	3
11 Bank			1	2			1	1	1		2	2	2					1	3	2		1	1	1				3	2	1	
10 Lab		1					1	1	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	3	1	1	2	2	1			1	2		
25 Szeksz	1		1	1	1	1	3	1	2		3	2	1	2	1	2		2	2	2	1		3			3	1		3	2	
22 Agency	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	2	3	2	1	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	3	2	2
16 Tour			1				3	2	1	3	2	3	2	3	2	1	2	2		2	1		3	3	1		1	2	2		


**4.1.2. Policy Area: Environmental Policy/Waste Management. Case Study**  
**Region: Central Hungary**

**Interviewed actors/stakeholders in the Region Central Hungary**

<b>Serial No of Stakeholder</b>	<b>Administrative tier or geographical range of activity</b>	<b>Sector or ownership</b>	<b>Legal form of Stakeholder</b>	<b>Name and location of Stakeholder</b>	<b>Abbreviation</b>
1	National	Public	Central Government Institution	Ministry for Environment Protection and Water Management (Budapest)	GN_MinEn
2	Regional	Public	Decentralised Government Agency	Environmental Protection Chief Directorate of the Middle Danube Valley Region (Budapest)	GR_EPAge
3	Regional	Public	County Government	Office of County Pest (Budapest)	GR_PestC
4	Regional	Public	Regional Development Institution	"Pro Regio" Regional Development Agency of the Region Central Hungary (Budapest)	GR_ProRe
5	Municipal	Public	Local Government	Budapest	GM_Budap
6	Subregional	Public	Sub-regional Association of Local Governments	South Buda Vicinity Regional Development Association (Budakeszi)	GS_SBuda
7	Subregional	Public	Sub-regional Association of Local Governments	Zsambek Basin Regional Development Association of Local Governments (Biatorbagy)	GS_Zsamb
8	Local	Public	Local Government	Aszod	GL_Aszod
9	Local	Public	Local Government	Budakeszi	GL_Budak
10	Local	Public	Local Government	Csomor	GL_Csomo
11	Local	Public	Local Government	Godollo	GL_Godol
12	Local	Public	Local Government	Pusztazamor	GL_Puszt
13	Local	Public	Local Government	Solymar	GL_Solym

14	Local	Public	Local Government	Zsambek	GL_Zsamb
15	Local	Public	Utility Firm	Municipal Public Space Management Shareholder Company (Budapest)	FRPu_FKF
16	Local	Public	Utility Firm	Okoviz Ltd. (Cegled)	FRPu_Oko
17	Local	Public	Utility Firm	VUSZI Ltd. (Godollo)	FLPu_VUS
18	Local	Public	Utility Firm	Ceszolg Ltd. (Cegled)	FLPu_Ces
19	Regional	Private	Utility Firm	ASA Hungary Ltd. (Gyal)	FRPr_ASA
20	Regional	Private	Utility Firm	Biofilter Ltd. (Budaors)	FRPr_Bio
21	Regional	Private	Utility Firm	Doppstadt Ltd. (Zsambek)	FRPr_Dop
22	Regional	Private	Utility Firm	Ereco Co. (Budapest)	FRPr_Ere
23	Regional	Private	Utility Firm	Pyrus-Rumpold Ltd. (Budapest-Aszod)	FRPr_PyR
24	Regional	Mixed Public-Private	Utility Firm	Becker Ltd. (Erd)	FRM_Beck
25	Local	Private	Utility Firm	Mozes Ltd. (Cegled)	FLPr_Moz
26	Local	Private	Utility Firm	Selective Waste Recycling Ltd. (Tura)	FLM_SHTu
27	Regional	Mixed Public-Private	Utility Firm	Rumpold Bicske Ltd. (Bicske)	FRM_RuBi
28	National	Civil	Trade Association	Association of Privately Owned Waste Management Service Providers (Budapest)	TA_PrWMF
29	National	Civil	Trade Association	Association of Publicly Owned Waste Management Service Providers (Gardony)	TA_PuWMF
30	National	Civil	Trade Association	Association of Recyclers	TA_Recyc
31	National	Civil	Environment Protection Pressure Group	Humusz Environment Protection Association of Waste Management Issues (Budapest)	CN_Humus
32	Regional	Civil	Environment Protection Pressure Group	Zsambek Basin Environment Protection Association (Perbal)	CR_Zsamb

Multidimensional scaling diagram of the stakeholders in the Region Central Hungary



**Freeman's degrees of centrality of the stakeholders in the Region Central  
Hungary**

<b>Serial No.</b>	<b>Abbreviation</b>	<b>Name and location of Stakeholder</b>	<b>Degree of centrality</b>
2	GR_EPAge	Environmental Protection Chief Directorate of the Middle Danube Valley Region (Budapest)	46
1	GN_MinEn	Ministry for Environment Protection and Water Management (Budapest)	31
15	FRPu_FKF	Municipal Public Space Management Shareholder Company (Budapest)	28
29	TA_PuWMF	Association of Publicly Owned Waste Management Service Providers (Gardony)	26
3	GR_PestC	Office of County Pest (Budapest)	24
23	FRPr_PyR	Pyrus-Rumpold Ltd. (Budapest-Aszod)	20
27	FRM_RuBi	Rumpold Bicske Ltd. (Bicske)	18
5	GM_Budap	Budapest	17
7	GS_Zsamb	Zsambek Basin Regional Development Association of Local Governments (Biatorbagy)	15
30	TA_Recyc	Association of Recyclers	15
6	GS_SBuda	South Buda Vicinity Regional Development Association (Budakeszi)	13
8	GL_Aszod	Aszod	13
21	FRPr_Dop	Doppstadt Ltd.(Zsambek)	13
26	FLM_SHTu	Selective Waste Recycling Ltd. (Tura)	13
4	GR_ProRe	"Pro Regio" Regional Development Agency of the Region Central Hungary (Budapest)	12
24	FRM_Beck	Becker Ltd.(Erd)	12
12	GL_Puszt	Pusztazamor	11
19	FRPr_ASA	ASA Hungary Ltd. (Gyal)	11
28	TA_PrWMF	Association of Privately Owned Waste Management Service Providers (Budapest)	11
31	CN_Humus	Humusz Environment Protection Association of Waste Management Issues (Budapest)	11
11	GL_Godol	Godollo	10
17	FLPu_VUS	VUSZI Ltd. (Godollo)	10
22	FRPr_Ere	Ereco Co. (Budapest)	10

14	GL_Zsamb	Zsambek	8
16	FRPu_Oko	Okoviz Ltd. (Cegled)	8
20	FRPr_Bio	Biofilter Ltd. (Budaors)	8
13	GL_Solym	Solymar	7
10	GL_Csomo	Csomor	6
9	GL_Budak	Budakeszi	5
18	FLPu_Ces	Ceszolg Ltd. (Cegled)	4
25	FLPr_Moz	Mozes Ltd. (Cegled)	4
32	CR_Zsamb	Zsambek Basin Environment Protection Association (Perbal)	4



#### 4.2. Map

*The NUTS II division of the country based on the National Development Concept 1998*





## 5. Chapter Six Annexes

### SNA Tables

#### Policy of environment protection: stakeholders and their role

Level	Sector	Institution	Profile
National	Public	Voivodeship Office in Lodz (governmental representation in the region), Department of Environment	Supervision over the activities of self-government bodies with respect to their conformity with relevant legislation and implementation of environmental task defined at national level
		Voivodeship Inspectorate for Environmental Protection in Lodz	Environmental monitoring and data collection on quality of waters, land, air, waste generation (in particular hazardous), noise pollution, etc.
		Voivodship Fund for Environment Protection and Water Economy	Implementation of ecological policy of the state via financial support for ecological investment in protection of waters, land, air, forestry, conservation areas as well as support for research and educational initiatives and support of tasks of environmental monitoring
		Lodz Office for Regional Planning of the Ministry of Economy	Implementation of tasks within regional policy according to the state policy of regional and sustainable development policies realised by the Ministry of Economy
		OBREM – Research and Development Centre for Urban Ecology	Implementation of research & development tasks of central administration with regard to management of communal solid waste, maintenance of cleanness and order, management of green areas on the level of regions, association of communes, communes and towns and cities. Research e.g. into technologies of waste management, experts report, standardisation consulting, etc.
		Office of Spatial Planning of the Lodz Voivodeship	Implementation and supervision over the activities related to state spatial planning policy (as

			body representing central government) at regional level
Regional	Public	Marshal Office, Department of Agriculture and Environmental Protection	Implementation of tasks related to environmental protection according to relevant legislation – at regional level, drafting the environment protection programmes, data collection on the state of waste management
		University of Lodz	Research activities in the field of environmental protection, provision of expertise and consultancy
		Technical University of Lodz	Research activities in the field of environmental protection, provision of expertise and consultancy
	Private	Eko- Boruta in Zgierz	Waste management - exploitation of landfills collecting ashes from medical waste incineration plants
	PPP	Ekoconsulting Ltd. in Lodz	Consultancy services in environmental sector
		Eko Wynik Ltd. in Lodz	Company offering consultancy, supervision over pro-ecological investment and related services
		Ekopomoc Plc. – Ecological Leasing Company	Company offering leasing services in the field of environmental investment
		Eko-Region Ltd. in Belchatow	Waste management - collection of solid communal waste from individuals and legal persons, exploitation of landfills, organisation of selective collection, collection of industrial waste from producers
		Lodz Agency for Regional Development	Support for SMEs, consultancy, management of EU funds (PHARE, STRUDER, OFFICE, STRUCDER 2), training and consultancy for self-government bodies
	Citizens	Regional Centre for Ecological Education	NGO, educational activities, promotion of pro-ecological initiatives
Local	Public	County Office in Belchatow - Department of Environmental Protection	Implementation of statutory administrative tasks relating to environmental protection tasks

		County Office in Piotrkow Trybunalski – Department of Environmental Protection	(e.g. permit granting for waste management)
		County Fund for Environmental Protection and Water Economy in Belchatow	Implementation of ecological policy of the state via financial support system for ecological investment in protection of waters, land and air, forestry, conservation areas as well as support for research and educational initiatives and support of tasks of environmental monitoring at county level
		County Fund for Environmental Protection and Water Economy in Piotrkow	
		County Fund for Environmental Protection and Water Economy in Kutno	
		Commune Office in Belchatow	Implementation of statutory tasks related to environmental protection in particular waste management assigned to this level of public authorities
	PPP	Agency for Regional Development ARREKS in Kleszczow (Belchatow County)	Support for local development, consultancy for self-government and other bodies active in the field of management – activities similar to other regional development agencies
		Communal Services Company Ltd. in Piotrkow Trybunalski	Waste management
		SANIKOM Ltd. in Belchatow	Waste management - collection, transport, utilisation and incineration of wastes (including hazardous)
		Ekoserwis Ltd. in Kutno	Waste management - collection and utilisation
	Private	Ekoserwis – Research Institute in Lodz	Research, consultancy and expertise services in environmental sector
		Pol-Dan-Eko Ltd in Belchatow	Industrial waste treatment
		Eko-ABC in Ltd. Belchatow	Hazardous waste treatment (especially medical waste)
		ECOGAL in Kutno	Industrial waste treatment
	Citizens	Eko-Lodz Association	NGO, promotion of pro-ecological initiatives and educational activities

## Regional policy: stakeholders and their role

Level	Sector	Institution	Profile
National	Public	Voivodeship Office in Lodz (governmental representation in the region), Department of Regional Development	Supervision over the activities of self-government bodies with respect to their conformity with relevant legislation and implementation of regional policy tasks defined at national level
		Ministry of Economy, Lodz Office for Regional Development	Implementation of tasks within regional policy according to the state policy, conducted by the Ministry of Economy
		Office of Spatial Planning of the Lodz Voivodeship	Implementation and supervision over the activities related to state spatial planning policy (as body representing central government at regional level)
Regional	Public	Marshal Office, Department of Regional Development Policy	Implementation of regional policy at voivodeship level
		Marshal Office, Department of Economy	
		University of Lodz, Faculty of Economics and Sociology	Research activity, provision of expertise and consultancy
	Private sector associations	Lodz Chamber of Industry and Trade	Consultancy, organisation of training seminars, provision of information
		Polish Chamber of Textile Industry	Consultancy, provision of information
		Polish Chamber of Fashion	Advisory services, promotion of enterprise of textile industry
	NGO	National System of Services	Provision of assistance for SMEs with a view to increasing the competitiveness of the sector on the EU Single Market; a group of 150 local business counselling centres
		International Women's Foundation	Provision of assistance in the field of job seeking, job intermediation
	Public-private	Agency for Regional Development Plc.	Provision of services for SMEs, services for regional institutions in the field of access to foreign assistance programmes, feasibility

			studies for infrastructure projects in the communes, financial aid for local institutions acting in the field of entrepreneurship development, training for local authorities in the field of regional development and promotion, management of EU programmes
		Foundation for Enterprise Development	Implementation of economic development programmes, especially in the areas of SMEs, exports, regional development, job creation, human resources and counteracting unemployment, as well as promotion of new technologies
Local	Public	Lodz City Office	Executive tasks, implementation of regional policy at local level
		Belchatow City Office	
		Ozorkow City Office	
		Kutno City Office	
		County Office in Poddebice	
	Private sector associations	Lodz Business Club	Association of businessmen; representation of businessmen's interests; promotion of entrepreneurship and self-governance
		Chamber of International Economic and Scientific Co-operation	Provision of services for SMEs
	NGOs	Incubator Foundation in Lodz	Provision of assistance for SMEs (incubator, microloans, training)
		Foundation for Development of Zelow Commune	Fostering local development by providing assistance in the field of water supply, telecommunication network, culture and sports activity and environmental protection, support for SMEs and agriculture
		Euro-Centre in Piotrkow Trybunalski	Dissemination of information on European affairs and pre-accession funds, provision of assistance for enterprises interested in trade and economic co-operation with EU countries
Incubator Foundation in Poddebice		Provision of assistance for local SMEs	

		Foundation for Enterprise Development in Poddebice	Provision of assistance for local SMEs
		Agri-incubator in Bratoszewice	Support for restructuring and modernisation of agriculture in Strykow Region, promotion of entrepreneurship, mainly SMEs, promotion of job creation, counteracting unemployment
		OPUS-SPLOT in Lodz	The Centre for Promotion and Development of Civil Initiatives "OPUS": support of all civil activities concerning dealing with socio-economic problems; Network of Information and Support Centres for Non-Government Organisations: support of integration of the third sector
		"Initiative for Poddebice County" Foundation	Local development
	Public-private	Agency for Regional Development ARREKS Plc.	Local development, a promotion of enterprise, provision of advisory and training services, addressed mainly to SMEs, economic promotion of the region credit activity, activity on behalf of the telecommunication
		Agency for Development of Kutno Region Plc.	Local development, promotion of local enterprise, promotion of foreign direct investment in the region

## 6. Overall Annexes

### 6.1. Environmental Policy

#### 6.1.1. Actors Interviewed

##### Attica Region – Greece

Level	Sector	Region of Attica
National	Public	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Ministry for the Environment, Spatial Planning and Public Works - Department of Solid Waste Management (YPEHODE)</li> <li>- Ministry of the Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation (YPESDDA)</li> </ul>
	Public-Private	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Managing Authority of the Operational Programme "Environment" (Ministry for the Environment) (MAOPE)</li> </ul>
	Private	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Greek General Confederation of Labour (GSEE)</li> <li>- Technical Chamber of Greece (TEE)</li> <li>- Hellenic Waste Management Companies Association (HWMCA)</li> </ul>
	NGOs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Hellenic Solid Waste Management Association (HSWMA)</li> <li>- Hellenic Recovery and Recycling Association (HERRA)</li> </ul>
Regional	Public	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Regional Council of Attica (RCA)</li> <li>- Region of Attica (ATREG)</li> <li>- Union of Municipalities and Communities of the Prefecture of Attica (ESDKNA)</li> <li>- Local Unions of Municipalities and Communities of the Prefecture of Attica (TEDKNA)</li> </ul>
	Public-Private	
	Private	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- EPEM (study bureau) (EPEM)</li> <li>- Paraskevopoulos – Georgiadis (study bureau) (PARGEO)</li> <li>- Commercial and Industrial Chamber of Athens (EBEA)</li> </ul>
	NGOs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Ecological Recycling Association (ERA)</li> </ul>
Local	Public	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Prefecture of East Attica (EASTAT)</li> <li>- Municipality of Ano Liosia (ANLIOS)</li> <li>- Municipality of Keratea (KER)</li> </ul>
	Public-Private	
	Private	
	NGOs	

### Mid-West Region of Ireland

Level	Status	Actors
European		
National	Public	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Joint Committee on Environment &amp; Local Government</li> <li>- Department of Environment &amp; Local Government</li> <li>- Department of Finance</li> <li>- Comhar – The National Sustainable Partnership</li> <li>- Environmental Protection Agency</li> <li>- Universities</li> </ul>
	Private	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- IBEC</li> <li>- Environmental Resource Management</li> <li>- Repak</li> <li>- MC O’Sullivan</li> <li>- Timoney Feeley</li> </ul>
	NGOs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- VOICE</li> <li>- An Taisce</li> <li>- Earthwatch</li> </ul>
Regional	Public	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Regional Assemblies</li> <li>- Regional Authorities</li> </ul>
	Private	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Mr. Binman Ltd.</li> <li>- Wheelie Bin Enterprises</li> </ul>
	NGOs	
Local	Public	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Limerick County Council</li> <li>- Limerick City Council</li> <li>- Clare County Council</li> <li>- Kerry County Council</li> <li>- Limerick County Development Board</li> <li>- Kerry County Development Board</li> <li>- Limerick City Development Board</li> <li>- Clare County Development Board</li> </ul>
	Private	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Killarney Waste Disposal</li> <li>- Limerick Chamber of Commerce</li> <li>- Ennis Chamber of Commerce</li> <li>- Tralee Chamber of Commerce</li> </ul>
	NGOs	



### Lisbon Metropolitan Area – Portugal

Regional Level	Institutional Sector	Actor	Interviewed personality
National	Public	Ministry of Environment	Eng José Sócrates (Minister)
		Waste Institute	Eng Dulce Pássaro (President)
		Water and Waste Regulation Institute	Eng António Teixeira Cardoso (President)
	Private	National Environmental Sector Business Association	Eng Marcos Levi Ramalho (President)
	NGOs	Quercus NGO	Eng Rui Berkmeier (Board of Directors)
		GEOTA	Eng Marlene Marques (Board of Directors; actual Director in Loures Municipal Department)
		Environmental Engineering College	Eng Arménio Figueiredo (Board of Directors)
		Environmental Engineers Association	Eng João Pedro Rodrigues (Board of Directors)
		National Council for Environment and Sustainable Development	Dr. Aristides Leitão (Executive Secretary)
		Lisbon Metropolitan Area	Dr. Rui Carreteiro (Presidency assistant)
		AMTRES	Dr. Herculano Pombo (President)
		AMARSUL	Eng Emídio Xavier (President; actual Barreiro Municipality President)
	Local	Public	Almada Municipality
Lisbon Municipality			Eng Ângelo Mesquita (Departmental Director)
Oeiras Municipality			Dr. José Eduardo Costa (Departmental Director)
IPODEC			Carlos Raimundo (Board of Directors)
TRIU			Eng Carlos Artur Rato Albino (Managing Partner)

### Central Region of Hungary

Serial No of Stakeholder	Administrative tier or geographical range of activity	Sector or ownership	Legal form of Stakeholder	Name and location of Stakeholder	Abbreviation
1	National	Public	Central Government Institution	Ministry for Environment Protection and Water Management (Budapest)	GN_MinEn
2	Regional	Public	Decentralised Government Agency	Environmental Protection Chief Directorate of the Middle Danube Valley Region (Budapest)	GR_EPAge
3	Regional	Public	County Government	Office of County Pest (Budapest)	GR_PestC
4	Regional	Public	Regional Development Institution	"Pro Regio" Regional Development Agency of the Region Central Hungary (Budapest)	GR_ProRe
5	Municipal	Public	Local Government	Budapest	GM_Budap
6	Subregional	Public	Sub-regional Association of Local Governments	South Buda Vicinity Regional Development Association (Budakeszi)	GS_SBuda
7	Subregional	Public	Sub-regional Association of Local Governments	Zsambek Basin Regional Development Association of Local Governments (Biatorbagy)	GS_Zsamb
8	Local	Public	Local Government	Aszod	GL_Aszod
9	Local	Public	Local Government	Budakeszi	GL_Budak
10	Local	Public	Local Government	Csomor	GL_Csomo
11	Local	Public	Local Government	Godollo	GL_Godol
12	Local	Public	Local Government	Pusztazamor	GL_Puszt
13	Local	Public	Local Government	Solymar	GL_Solym
14	Local	Public	Local Government	Zsambek	GL_Zsamb
15	Local	Public	Utility Firm	Municipal Public Space	FRPu_FKF

				Management Shareholder Company (Budapest)	
16	Local	Public	Utility Firm	Okoviz Ltd. (Cegled)	FRPu_Oko
17	Local	Public	Utility Firm	VUSZI Ltd. (Godollo)	FLPu_VUS
18	Local	Public	Utility Firm	Ceszolg Ltd. (Cegled)	FLPu_Ces
19	Regional	Private	Utility Firm	ASA Hungary Ltd. (Gyal)	FRPr_ASA
20	Regional	Private	Utility Firm	Biofilter Ltd. (Budaors)	FRPr_Bio
21	Regional	Private	Utility Firm	Doppstadt Ltd. (Zsambek)	FRPr_Dop
22	Regional	Private	Utility Firm	Ereco Co. (Budapest)	FRPr_Ere
23	Regional	Private	Utility Firm	Pyrus-Rumpold Ltd. (Budapest-Aszod)	FRPr_PyR
24	Regional	Mixed Public-Private	Utility Firm	Becker Ltd. (Erd)	FRM_Beck
25	Local	Private	Utility Firm	Mozes Ltd. (Cegled)	FLPr_Moz
26	Local	Private	Utility Firm	Selective Waste Recycling Ltd. (Tura)	FLM_SHTu
27	Regional	Mixed Public-Private	Utility Firm	Rumpold Bicske Ltd. (Bicske)	FRM_RuBi
28	National	Civil	Trade Association	Association of Privately Owned Waste Management Service Providers (Budapest)	TA_PrWMF
29	National	Civil	Trade Association	Association of Publicly Owned Waste Management Service Providers (Gardony)	TA_PuWMF
30	National	Civil	Trade Association	Association of Recyclers	TA_Recyc
31	National	Civil	Environment Protection Pressure Group	Humusz Environment Protection Association of Waste Management Issues (Budapest)	CN_Humus
32	Regional	Civil	Environment Protection Pressure Group	Zsambek Basin Environment Protection Association (Perbal)	CR_Zsamb

## Lodz Region – Poland

Institution	Label
Voivodeship Office in Lodz (governmental representation in the region), Department of Environment	VO
Voivodeship Inspectorate for Environmental Protection in Lodz	VI
Voivodeship Fund for Environment Protection and Water Economy	VFEP
Lodz Office for Regional Development of the Ministry of Economy	ME
OBREM – Research and Development Centre for Urban Ecology	OBREM
Office of Spatial Planning of the Lodz Voivodeship	SP
Marshal Office, Department of Agriculture and Environmental Protection	MO
University of Lodz	LO
Technical University of Lodz	TUL
Eko- Boruta in Zgierz	EB
Ekoconsulting Ltd. in Lodz	EC
Eko Wynik Ltd. in Lodz	EW
Ekopomoc Plc. – Ecological Leasing Company	EP
Eko-Region Ltd. in Belchatow	ER
Lodz Agency for Regional Development	LARD
Regional Centre for Ecological Education	RCEE
County Office in Belchatow - Department of Environmental Protection	COB
County Office in Piotrkow Trybunalski – Department of Environmental Protection	COP
County Fund for Environmental Protection and Water Economy in Belchatow	CFEPB
County Fund for Environmental Protection and Water Economy in Piotrkow Trybunalski	CFEPPT
County Fund for Environmental Protection and Water Economy in Kutno	CFEPK
Commune Office in Belchatow	COOB
Agency for Regional Development ARREKS in Kleszczow	AR

(Belchatow County)	
Communal Services Company Ltd. in Piotrkow Trybunalski	CSC
SANIKOM Ltd. in Belchatow	SAN
Ekoserwis Ltd. in Kutno	EKLTD
Ekoserwis – Research Institute in Lodz	EKRES
Pol-Dan-Eko Ltd in Belchatow	POLDANECO
Eko-ABC in Ltd. Belchatow	EKOABC
ECOGAL in Kutno	EKOGAL
Eko-Lodz Association	EKL

### 6.1.2. Freeman's Degree Centrality Measures (valued analysis)

#### Attica Region – Greece

	Actors	Degree	NrmDegree
1	YPEHODE	27.000	158.824
2	YPESDDA	19.000	111.765
3	MAOPE	15.000	88.235
4	GSEE	1.000	5.882
5	TEE	5.000	29.412
6	HERRA	6.000	35.294
7	HWMCA	6.000	35.294
8	HSWMA	11.000	64.706
9	ATREG	23.000	135.294
10	ESDKNA	20.000	117.647
11	TEDKNA	14.000	82.353
12	EPEM	9.000	52.941
13	PARGEO	4.000	23.529
14	EBEA	9.000	52.941
15	ERA	11.000	64.706
16	EASTAT	12.000	70.588

17	ANLIOS	11.000	64.706
18	KER	13.000	76.471
<b>DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS</b>			
1	Mean	12.000	70.588
2	Std Dev	6.667	39.216
3	Sum	216.000	1.270.588
4	Variance	27.000	1.537.870
5	SSQ	3.392.000	117.370.242
6	MCSSQ	800.000	27.681.660
7	Euc Norm	58.241	342.593
8	Minimum	1.000	5.882
9	Maximum	27.000	158.824
Network Centralization = <b>99.26%</b> NOTE: For valued data, both the normalized centrality and the centralization index may be larger than 100%			

#### Mid-West Region of Ireland

	Actors	Degree	NrmDegree
6	limcico	56.000	193.103
21	epa	50.000	172.414
19	doe	48.000	165.517
7	clcoco	41.000	141.379
5	limcoco	38.000	131.034
8	kcoco	36.000	124.138
13	lcc	34.000	117.241
22	univ	32.000	110.345
4	wbs	31.000	106.897
25	erm	28.000	96.552
9	limcdev	28.000	96.552
24	ibec	27.000	93.103
20	dof	26.000	89.655
15	tcc	23.000	79.310

10	limcidev	21.000	72.414
18	comhar	20.000	68.966
29	taisce	19.000	65.517
12	clcodev	17.000	58.621
3	mrbm	15.000	51.724
14	ecc	14.000	48.276
11	kcodev	13.000	44.828
16	kwd	12.000	41.379
17	jcenv	11.000	37.931
30	earth	11.000	37.931
1	voice	11.000	37.931
23	repak	10.000	34.483
26	sullivan	9.000	31.034
27	timoney	6.000	20.690
2	regauth	4.000	13.793
28	regass	3.000	10.345
<b>DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS</b>			
1	Mean	23.133	79.770
2	Std Dev	13.880	47.861
3	Sum	694.000	2.393.104
4	Variance	192.649	2.290.712
5	SSQ	21.834.000	259.619.500
6	MCSSQ	5.779.467	68.721.367
7	Euc Norm	147.763	509.529
8	Minimum	3.000	10.345
9	Maximum	56.000	193.103
<p>Network Centralization = <b>121.43%</b>  NOTE: For valued data, both the normalized centrality and the centralization index may be larger than 100%</p>			

### Lisbon Metropolitan Area – Portugal

	Actors	Degree	NrmDegree
1	ME	27.000	180.000
2	WI	28.000	186.667
3	WMWRI	11.000	73.333
4	NESBA	19.000	126.667
5	QUERCUS	24.000	160.000
6	GEOTA	22.000	146.667
7	EEC	9.000	60.000
8	EEA	16.000	106.667
9	AML	13.000	86.667
10	AMTRES	22.000	146.667
11	AMARSUL	21.000	140.000
12	ALMADA	13.000	86.667
13	TRIU	6.000	86.667
14	OEIRAS	16.000	40.000
15	IPODEC	16.000	106.667
16	LISBON	13.000	106.667
<b>DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS</b>			
1	Mean	17.250	115.000
2	Std Dev	6.180	41.197
3	Sum	276.000	1.840.000
4	Variance	38.188	1.697.222
5	SSQ	5.372.000	238.755.563
6	MCSSQ	611.000	186.667
7	Euc Norm	28.000	488.626
8	Minimum	6.000	40.000
9	Maximum	73.294	27.155.557
Network Centralization = <b>81,90%</b> NOTE: For valued data, both the normalized centrality and the centralization index may be larger than 100%			



## Central Region of Hungary

	Actors	Degree	NrmDegree
1	GN_MinEn	31.000	100.000
2	GR_EPAge	46.000	148.387
3	GR_PestC	24.000	77.419
4	GR_ProRe	12.000	38.710
5	GM_Budap	17.000	54.839
6	GS_SBuda	13.000	41.935
7	GS_Zsamb	15.000	48.387
8	GL_Aszod	13.000	41.935
9	GL_Budak	5.000	16.129
10	GL_Csomo	6.000	19.355
11	GL_Godol	10.000	32.258
12	GL_Puszt	11.000	35.484
13	GL_Solym	7.000	22.581
14	GL_Zsamb	8.000	25.806
15	FRPu_FKF	28.000	90.323
16	FRPu_Oko	8.000	25.806
17	FLPu_VUS	10.000	32.258
18	FLPu_Ces	4.000	12.903
19	FRPr_ASA	11.000	35.484
20	FRPr_Bio	8.000	25.806
21	FRPr_Dop	13.000	41.935
22	FRPr_Ere	4.000	32.258
23	CR_Zsamb	20.000	64.516
24	FRM_Beck	12.000	12.903
25	FLPr_Moz	4.000	12.903
26	FLM_SHTu	13.000	41.935
32	FRM_RuBi	18.000	58.065
28	TA_PrWMF	11.000	35.484
29	TA_PuWMF	26.000	83.871
30	TA_Recyc	15.000	48.387

<b>31</b>	CN_Humus	11.000	35.484
<b>32</b>	FRPr_PyR	10.000	38.710
<b>DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS</b>			
<b>1</b>	Mean	13.875	44.758
<b>2</b>	Std Dev	8.863	28.589
<b>3</b>	Sum	46.000	1.432.258
<b>4</b>	Variance	78.547	817.345
<b>5</b>	SSQ	8.674.000	90.260.148
<b>6</b>	MCSSQ	2.513.500	148.387
<b>7</b>	Euc Norm	93.134	300.433
<b>8</b>	Minimum	4.000	12.903
<b>9</b>	Maximum	444.000	26.155.047
<p>Network Centralization = <b>110.54%</b>  NOTE: For valued data, both the normalized centrality and the centralization index may be larger than 100%</p>			


**Lodz Region – Poland**

	<b>Actors</b>	<b>Degree</b>	<b>NrmDegree</b>
<b>2</b>	VO	88.000	293.333
<b>3</b>	VI	87.000	290.000
<b>4</b>	VFEP	84.000	280.000
<b>10</b>	EB	58.000	193.333
<b>1</b>	MO	53.000	176.667
<b>11</b>	EC	51.000	170.000
<b>13</b>	EP	45.000	150.000
<b>12</b>	EW	41.000	136.667
<b>19</b>	CFEPB	38.000	126.667
<b>17</b>	COB	38.000	126.667
<b>21</b>	CFEPK	33.000	110.000
<b>18</b>	COP	33.000	110.000
<b>7</b>	LU	32.000	106.667
<b>8</b>	TUL	28.000	93.333
<b>20</b>	CFEPPT	27.000	90.000
<b>25</b>	SAN	27.000	90.000
<b>24</b>	CSC	24.000	80.000
<b>29</b>	EKOABC	23.000	76.667
<b>27</b>	EKRES	23.000	76.667
<b>6</b>	OBREM	21.000	70.000
<b>23</b>	AR	21.000	70.000
<b>30</b>	ECOGAL	20.000	66.667
<b>16</b>	RCEE	19.000	63.333
<b>14</b>	ER	19.000	63.333


26	EKLTD	18.000	60.000
22	COOB	16.000	53.333
15	LARD	14.000	46.667
9	SP	13.000	43.333
28	POLDANECO	13.000	43.333
5	ME	13.000	43.333
31	EKL	4.000	13.333
<b>DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS</b>			
1	Mean	33.032	110.108
2	Std Dev	21.472	71.575
3	Sum	1.024.000	3.413.333
4	Variance	461.063	5.122.928
5	SSQ	48.118.000	534.644.438
6	MCSSQ	14.292.968	158.810.750
7	Euc Norm	219.358	731.194
8	Minimum	4.000	13.333
9	Maximum	88.000	293.333
<p>Network Centralization = 81,90%</p> <p>NOTE: For valued data, both the normalized centrality and the centralization index may be larger than 100%</p>			

### 6.1.3. MDS Diagram – Policy network structure


#### Attica Region – Greece




#### Mid-West Region of Ireland




## Lisbon Metropolitan Area – Portugal



## Central Region of Hungary



## Lodz Region – Poland



### 6.1.4. Structural Equivalence

#### Attica Region – Greece

	1	1 1	1 1	1	1	1	1
	1 3 3 5 6 8	2 0 7 9 1 4	6 5 8	2 7 4			
	Y P M T E K	Y E A A T G	H E H	E H E			
1 YPEHODE	1 3 1 2 2	3 2 2 3 1	2 1	2 2			
13 PARGEO	1	1 1	1				
3 MAOPE	3	1 1 2	1 2 1	1 1	1 1		
5 TEE	1 1 1		1				1
16 EASTAT	2 1 1 1 2	2	3				
18 KER	2 1 2 2	2 1 2 1					
2 YPESDDA	3	2 2	3 3 3 3				
10 ESDKNA	2 1 1	1	3 1 3 3	2	1 1 1		
17 ANLIOS	2 2		3 1 2 1				
9 ATREG	3 1 1 3 2	3 3 2 3					2
11 TEDKNA	1	1	3 3 1 3	1	1		
4 GSEE			1				
6 HERRA			1	2 3			
15 ERA	2 1	2		2 2	1 1		
8 HSWMA	1 1			3 2	2 1 1		
12 EPEM	2	1		1 2	1 2		
7 HWMCA	2 1	1		1	1		
14 EBEA	1 1	1 2		1 1	2		

## Mid-West Region of Ireland

	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	3															
	1	2	0	4	3	4	9	5	3	6	1	2	6	5	7	3	7	5	2	9	1	6	7	4	8	8	0	8	9	0			
	r	r	l	w	l	e	e	l	r	l	k	c	s	t	c	m	t	e	u	e	d	e	k	j	i	c	k	d	v	t	e		
1 regass																																3	
2 regauth					3																											1	
10 limcidev			3	3				3							1		2	3	1	1											1		
4 wbs			3	1	3	3		3		3			3		3	1			3	1						1					3		
13 lcc			3	1	3	3		3		3	1	3		3	1	2			1	1	1				1	1	1	1			1		
14 ecc				3	3						1				3		1			1	1					1					1		
9 limcdev			3	3	3	3		3		3	1	1			1			1	1	1	1				1	1	1				1		
5 limcoco			3	3	3				2	3		1			3	3		1	1	3	2				1	1	3	2	1	1	1	1	
23 repak									2	3																						3	
6 limcico			3	3	3	1	3		3	3		3	3	2	1			3	1	2	2	1	3	2	1	3	1	1	3	2	1	1	1
11 kcodev				1	1				3						1				2	1	1											3	
12 clcdev				3	1					3						3		2	3	1	1											3	
26 sullivan									1	2						2				1												3	
15 tcc			3	3	3					1	1								1	1			3	1		3						3	
7 clcoco			1	3	1	1	1		3	3	3	2				3	3	2	3	3	2				1	3	3					3	
3 mrbm				1	2				3	1						3			1	1	2				1							1	
27 timoney										2						3					1											1	
25 erm			2			1	1		1	2	2	2				2			1	1	3				3	2	3	1	1	1	1	1	
22 univ			3	3	1	1	1		1	3						3	1	1	1	3					1	3	1	1	3	1	1	1	
19 doe			1	1	1	1	1		3	3	1	1		1	3	1	1	1	3					1	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	
21 epa			1	1	1	1	1		2	2	1	1	1	1		2	2	1	3	3	3				1	3	3	3	2	3	3	3	
16 kwd										1		3							1	1												3	
17 jcnv				1						3									3	3					1							1	
24 ibec				1	1	1			1	1		1		1	1		3	1	3	3				1	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
18 comhar				1	1	1	1		1							3			3	3	3				3		1					1	
8 kcoco				1	1	1	3	3	3	3	3				3				2	1	3	2	3	1	1						1		
20 dof			3	1	1	3	1	1		2	2	2							3	3	3					1						1	
28 voice										1	1									1	1	3	3			1						1	
29 taisce										1	1									1	3	3	3		3	1						1	
30 earth																																	
31			1		1						1	1	3	3		1																	

## Lisbon Metropolitan Area – Portugal

		1	6	7	4	8	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1						
		1	6	7	4	8	3	9	0	4	3	1	2	2	5						
		M	G	E	N	E	L	A	A	O	W	A	A	W	Q						
1 ME		3	2	2	2		1	2	2	2		2	2	1	3	2	1				
6 GEOTA		3		1	2	2		1	1	1	1		1	1	1	2	3	1	1		
7 EEC		2	1		1	2		1	1					1							
4 NESBA		2	2	1		1		1	1	2	1		1	1	1	2	1	1	1		
8 EEA		2	2	2	1			1	2				1	1	2		2				
13 LISBON		1	1	1	1	1		2	1			1	2			1	1				
9 AML		2	1		1			2		3		1	1	1		1					
10 AMTRES		2	1	1	2	2				3		1	2		2	3	2	1			
14 OEIRAS		2	1		1			1	3	3				2		2	1				
3 WWRI		2	1		1					1		2	1	2		1					
11 AMARSUL		2	1		1	1		1	1	2		2	3	2		2	2	1			
12 ALMADA		1	1		1	1		1				1	3	2		1	1				
2 WI		3	2	1	2	2		2	1	2	2		2	2	2		2	2	1		
5 QUERCUS		2	3		1	2		1	1	3	2		1	2	1	2		3			
15 IPODEC		1	1		1			1	2	1			2	1	2		3	1			
16 TRIU			1		1				1				1	1			1				





## 6.2. Regional Policy

### 6.2.1. Actors Interviewed

#### Notio Aigaio Region – Greece

Governance level/Status	Public	Public/Private	Associations/Private	NGOs/Civil Society
<b>National</b>	Ministry of National Economy (MNE)	CSF Monitoring Committee (MC)	CSF Managing Organization Unit (MOU)	
	CSF Managing Authority (MA)			
<b>Regional</b>	Regional Secretariat (RS)	ROP Monitoring Committee (ROP MC)		University of the Aegean (UA)
	ROP Managing Authority (ROPMA)			Aegean Network of Ecological Associations (ENEA)
	Regional Council (RC)			
<b>Local</b>	Cyclades Prefectural Council (CPC)		Cyclades Chamber (CC)	
	Cyclades Prefecture (CPR)		Dodecanese Chamber (DC)	
	Dodecanese Prefectural Council (DPC)		Cyclades TEDK (CTEDK)	
	Dodecanese Prefecture (DPR)		Dodecanese TEDK (DTEDK)	
	Rhodes City Council (RCC)		Cyclades Development Agency (CDA)	
	Ermoupolis City Council (ECC)		Dodecanese Development Agency (DDA)	
			Cyclades Trade Union Centre (CTUC)	
			Dodecanese Trade Union Centre (DTUC)	

## Mid-West Region of Ireland

Level	Sector	Actor
<b>National</b>	<b>Public</b>	Cabinet Committee on Europe
		Joint Committee on European Affairs
		Department of Environment & Local Government
		Department of Finance
	Other Departments	
	<b>Private</b>	IBEC
		Environmental Resource Management
<b>NGOS</b>	ESRI	
<b>Regional</b>		Shannon Development
		SE Regional Assembly
		Midwest Regional Authority
		FÁS
		IDA
		Forfás
		Fisheries Board
		Aer Rianta
		Bus Éireann
		Teagasc
	<b>Private</b>	IFA Regional Office
		ICTU Regional Office
	<b>NGOs</b>	
	<b>Local</b>	
Tipperary NR Co. Co		
Limerick City Council		
Clare County Council		
Limerick Enterprise Board (City)		
Limerick Enterprise Board (County)		
Tipperary Enterprise Board		
Clare Enterprise Boards		

		Paul Partnership
		Ballyhoura Development
		Rural Resources Ltd.
		West Limerick Resources
		Nenagh Community Network
		Tipperary Leader Group
	<b>Private</b>	Limerick Chamber of Commerce
		Ennis Chamber of Commerce
	<b>NGOs</b>	Irish Hotel Fed
		Travel Agents

#### Lisbon and Tagus Valley region – Portugal

<b>Administrative Level</b>	<b>Institutional Sector</b>	<b>Actors</b>
<b>National</b>	<b>Public</b>	Ministry of Planning
		Regional Development Directorate-General
<b>Regional</b>	<b>Public</b>	Regional Coordination Commission – Lisbon and Tagus Valley
		Lezíria do Tejo Municipality Association
		Lisbon Metropolitan Area (authority)
	<b>Private</b>	Leiria Region Business Association
		Portalegre Region Business Association
<b>Local</b>	<b>Public</b>	Oeiras municipality
		Ourém municipality
		Abrantes municipality

### South-Transdanubia region – Hungary

Level	Sector		Actor	
<b>National</b> <b>NUTS 1</b>	<b>Public</b>	1	MARD (Ministry of Agriculture and Regional Development) regional and rural development divisions	MAR
		2	MARD Sapard programme management	Sapard
		3	MARD National Development Centre	MNDC
		4	Ministry of Phare Affairs, Secretariat	Phare
		5	Prime Minister's Office, State Secretariat of Regional Policy	PMO
	<b>Private</b>	6	Hungarian Institute of Town and Regional Planning Stock Company – territorial information system	TIR
	<b>Public &amp; Private</b>	7	National Development Council	NDC
<b>Regional</b> <b>NUTS 2 - 3</b>  (Region, county)	<b>Public</b>	8	Assembly of Baranya County, /C	ABC
		9	Assembly of Somogy County, /C	ASC
		10	Regional Centre of Labour Force Training and Education, /R	Lab
	<b>Private</b>	11	Hungarian Development Bank – regional unit, /R	Bank
	<b>Public &amp; Private</b>	12	South-Transdanubian Regional Development Council, /R	RDC
		13	Baranya County Development Council, /C	Bcoun
		14	Somogy County Development Council, /C	Scoun
		15	Tolna County Development Council, /C	Tcoun
		16	South-Transdanubian Regional Tourism Committee, /R	Tour
	<b>NGOs</b>	17	Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Baranya County, /C	Bcham
		18	Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Somogy County, /C	Scham
		19	Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Tolna County, /C	Tcham
		20	University of Pécs, /R	Univ
		21	European Information and Development Ltd., /C	Euinf
		22	South-Transdanubian Regional Development Agency, /R	Agency

<b>Local</b> <b>NUTS 4-5</b> Municipium, Micro-region	<b>Public</b>	<b>23</b>	Self-Government of the Town of Pécs,/L	Pecs
		<b>24</b>	Self-Government of the Town of Kaposvár,/L	Kapos
		<b>25</b>	Self-Government of the Town of Szekszárd,/L	Szeksz
		<b>26</b>	Micro-Regional Associations of Baranya County,/M	Bmic
		<b>27</b>	Micro-Regional Associations of Somogy County,/M	Smic
		<b>28</b>	Micro-Regional Associations of Tolna County,/M	Tmic
	<b>Private</b>	<b>29</b>	Industrial Park Pécs,/L	Indpark
	<b>NGOs</b>	<b>30</b>	Resource Centre Foundation,/L	Found

## Lodz Region – Poland

Level	Sector	Institution
<b>National</b>	<b>Public</b>	Voivodeship Office in Lodz (governmental representation in the region), Department of Regional Development
		Ministry of Economy, Lodz Office for Regional Development
		Office of Spatial Planning of the Lodz Voivodeship
<b>Regional</b>	<b>Public sector</b>	Marshal Office, Department of Regional Development Policy
		Marshal Office, Department of Economy
		University of Lodz, Faculty of Economics and Sociology
	<b>Private sector associations</b>	Lodz Chamber of Industry and Trade
		Polish Chamber of Textile Industry
		Polish Chamber of Fashion
	<b>NGOs</b>	National System of Services
		International Women’s Foundation
	<b>Public-private</b>	Agency for Regional Development Plc.
		Foundation for Enterprise Development
<b>Local</b>	<b>Public</b>	Lodz City Office
		Belchatow City Office
		Ozorkow City Office
		Kutno City Office
		County Office in Poddebice
	<b>Private sector associations</b>	Lodz Business Club
		Chamber of International Economic and Scientific Co-operation
	<b>NGOs</b>	Incubator Foundation in Lodz
		Foundation for Development of Zelow Commune
		Euro-Centre in Piotrkow Trybunalski
		Incubator Foundation in Poddebice
		Foundation for Enterprise Development in Poddebice
		Agri-incubator in Bratoszewice
		OPUS-SPLOT in Lodz

		"Initiative for Poddebice County" Foundation
	<b>Public-private</b>	Agency for Regional Development ARREKS Plc.
		Agency for Development of Kutno Region Plc.

### 6.2.2. Freeman's Degree Centrality Measures (valued analysis)

#### Notio Aigaio Region – Greece

Actors	Centrality degree
ROPMA	34.000
RS	34.000
CDA	33.000
CPR	30.000
DPR	29.000
MNE	28.000
DTEDK	26.000
MA	25.000
CTEDK	24.000
RCC	23.000
CC	22.000
CPC	21.000
DDA	21.000
MC	19.000
ECC	19.000
CTUC	18.000
DPC	18.000
DTUC	16.000
DC	16.000
UA	14.000
MOU	10.000



## Mid-West Region of Ireland

No	Actor	Degree	NrmDegree
1	Shanndev	74.000	200.000
3	Mwra	73.000	197.297
13	limcoco	61.000	164.865
2	Ballyh	52.000	140.541
33	Doe	47.000	127.027
34	Dof	43.000	116.216
20	Cenb	41.000	110.811
14	Tnthco	41.000	110.811
25	Ncn	41.000	110.811
10	teagasc	38.000	102.703
19	Tenb	38.000	102.703
35	otherds	37.000	100.000
4	Fas	33.000	89.189
26	tleader	30.000	81.081
21	Paulp	29.000	78.378
17	limebcy	27.000	72.973
16	Clcoco	25.000	67.568
5	Ida	23.000	62.162
23	Rrltd	22.000	59.459
36	Ibec	21.000	56.757
2	Serega	19.000	51.351
15	limcico	19.000	51.351
24	wlimr	17.000	45.946
32	jconea	16.000	43.243
18	limebc	15.000	40.541
6	forfas	15.000	40.541
11	ifa	14.000	37.838
12	ictu	13.000	35.135
9	beireann	10.000	27.027
27	lcc	9.000	24.324

7	fisheries	8.000	21.622
8	aerrianta	8.000	21.622
29	ihfed	7.000	18.919
30	travela	6.000	16.216
28	ecc	6.000	16.216
38	ersi	5.000	13.514
37	erm	2.000	5.405
31	ccone	1.000	2.703
Network Centralization = 137.09% Homogeneity = 3.99%			

### Lisbon and Tagus Valley region – Portugal

no	Actor	Degree	NrmDegree
1	MINPLAN	19.00	211.11
2	DGRD	16.00	177.78
3	LTVRCC	15.00	166.67
4	LTMA	12.00	133.33
5	AML	8.00	88.89
6	LRBA	7.00	77.78
7	PRBA	8.00	88.89
8	ABRANT	12.00	133.33
9	OEIRAS	7.00	77.78
10	OUREM	10.00	111.11
Network Centralization = 105.56%			

### South-Transdanubia region – Hungary

Serial No.	Abbreviation	Stakeholder	Degree of centrality
12	RDC	South Transdanubian Regional Development Council	78,2
22	Agency	South Transdanubian Regional Development Agency	69,0
14	Scoun	Somogy County Development Council	57,5
8	ABC	Assembly of Baranya County	56,3
20	Univ	University of Pécs	56,3
9	ASC	Assembly of Somogy County	51,7
13	Bcoun	Baranya County Development Council	51,7
15	Tcoun	Tolna County Development Council	49,4
17	Bcham	Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Baranya County	48,3
23	Pecs	Selfgovernment of the Town of Pécs with county rank	48,3
25	Szeksz	Selfgovernment of the Town of Szekszárd with county rank	47,1
24	Kapos	Selfgovernment of the Town of Kaposvár with county rank	43,7
16	Tour	South Transdanubian Regional Tourism Committee	41,4
26	Bmic	Micro-Regional Associations of Baranya County	41,4
3	MNDC	National Development Centre	40,2
7	NDC	National Development Council	40,2
10	Lab	Regional Centre of Labour Force Training and Education	40,2
1	MAR	MARD regional and rural development divisions	37,9
5	PMO	Prime Minister's Office, State Secretariat of Regional Policy	35,6
11	Bank	Hungarian Development Bank – regional unit	31,0
18	Scham	Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Somogy County	31,0
19	Tcham	Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Tolna County	31,0
21	Euinf	European Information and Development Ltd.	29,9
27	Smic	Micro-Regional Associations of Somogy County	26,4

30	Found	Resource Centre Foundation	26,4
29	Indpark	Industrial Park of Pécs	25,3
2	Sapard	MARD Sapard programme management	21,8
6	TIR	VÁTI - Territorial information system	21,8
28	Tmic	Micro-Regional Associations of Tolna County	20,7
4	Phare	Ministry of Phare Affairs, Secretariat	18,4
		Mean	40,6
		Std. Deviation	14,3

### Lodz Region – Poland


No	Actor	Degree	NrmDegree	Share
21	IFL	71.000	244.828	0.056
13	FED	69.000	237.931	0.055
2	MOE	64.000	220.690	0.051
1	MORP	63.000	217.241	0.050
3	VO	63.000	217.241	0.050
12	ARD	61.000	210.345	0.048
10	NSS	59.000	203.448	0.047
14	LCO	58.000	200.000	0.046
22	FDZC	55.000	189.655	0.043
18	COP	55.000	189.655	0.043
7	LCIT	45.000	155.172	0.036
6	ECSOC	43.000	148.276	0.034
17	KCO	43.000	148.276	0.034
28	IPC	42.000	144.828	0.033
19	LBC	41.000	141.379	0.032
25	FEDP	37.000	127.586	0.029
30	ADK	36.000	124.138	0.028
24	IFP	35.000	120.690	0.028
15	BCO	35.000	120.690	0.028
4	ME	34.000	117.241	0.027

27	OPUS	33.000	113.793	0.026
5	SP	32.000	110.345	0.025
20	CIESC	28.000	96.552	0.022
29	AR	28.000	96.552	0.022
26	AGR	28.000	96.552	0.022
16	OCO	27.000	93.103	0.021
23	ECPT	23.000	79.310	0.018
11	IWF	21.000	72.414	0.017
8	PCIT	19.000	65.517	0.015
9	PCF	18.000	62.069	0.014

Network Centralization = 106.40%; Homogeneity = 3.79%


### 6.2.3. MDS Diagram – Policy network structure

#### Notio Aigaio Region – Greece




## Mid-West Region of Ireland

Multidimensional Scaling For Valued Regional Matrix




Lisbon and Tagus Valley region – Portugal






South-Transdanubia region – Hungary



## Lodz Region – Poland



### 6.2.4. Structural Equivalence

## Notio Aigaio Region – Greece

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	6	4	3	9	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2
		M	M	M	M	R	R	U	C	C	C	C	C	C	E	C	R	D	D	D	D	D	D
1	MNE		3	3	2	2	2	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	1
2	MA	3		3	2	2	2		2	1	1	1	1	2			2			1			1
3	MC	3	3		2	2	2		2		1	1	1				2						
4	MOU	2	2	2		2	2																
5	RS	2	2	2	2		3	1	2	2	1	2		2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2		1
6	ROPMA	2	2	2	2	3		1	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	2	1	2	2
7	UA	1				1	1		1	1	1	1	1	2			1	1		1			1
8	CPC					2	1		3	1	2	2	1	3			1	2		2	1		
9	CPR	2	2	2		2	2	1	3		2	2	2	1	3		1	2		2	1		
20	CTUC	1	1			1	2		1	1	2		2	2	2	1							2
16	CTEDK	1	1	1		2	2		1	2	2	2		1	3	3					2		1
14	CC	1	1	1		1			1	2	2	2	1		1	3	2	2		1			1
13	ECC	2	1	1		2	1		1	1	1	2	3	1		2		1					
19	CDA	1	2			2	2		2	3	3	1	3	3	2			1	1	2	1	1	2
12	RCC	1				2	1		1	1	1		2	1	1			2	2	2	3		2
11	DPR	2	2	2		2	2		1	2	2					1		2	2	3	2		3
15	DC	1				1	1					2		2	2	2		2		2			2
10	DPC					2	1		2	2					1		1	2	3		2		2
17	DTEDK	1	1			2	2		1	1	1	2	1	1		1		3	2	1	2		3
18	DDA	1	1			1	2					1	1		2			2	3	2	2	3	
21	DTUC	1	1			1	2		1	2					1			1	1	2	1	2	

## Mid-West Region of Ireland

```

2 1 2 2 1 3 1 3 2 1 3 3 2 1 1 3 2 3 1 3 2 3 2 2 1 1 2 1 3
1 2 1 7 5 5 6 9 4 4 7 3 3 3 2 3 2 2 1 5 4 6 0 4 1 7 8 0 6 0 9 8 9 5 6 7 8 8
s s p l i n t t d t e r l m j d b i i o w i t f c f a c f t b e i l c l l e
-----
1 shanndev | 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 | 2 3 3 1 2 3 | 2 1 2 1 2 | 1 3 3 2 2 2 3 3 2 3 2 |
2 serega | 3 2 3 1 1 2 3 | 2 2 | | |
21 paulp | 3 2 1 1 | 1 2 1 3 | 2 2 3 2 2 | 2 2 |
17 limebcy | 3 2 2 1 2 2 2 | 2 1 2 | 2 1 2 | 1 2 |
5 ida | 3 1 3 1 2 2 3 | 2 2 1 2 | | 1 |
25 ncn | 3 3 1 2 3 3 3 3 | 1 1 3 1 | 3 1 3 1 3 | 3 |
26 tleader | 3 1 1 1 3 3 2 3 | 2 1 1 3 | 1 1 1 1 | 1 1 |
19 tenb | 3 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 | 2 1 | 2 2 3 1 1 2 | 1 1 2 |
34 dof | 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 | 1 2 3 3 2 | 2 2 | 2 2 2 2 2 |
14 tnthco | 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 | 3 3 3 2 | 3 3 | 1 1 1 |
-----
37 erm | 1 | 1 | | |
23 rrltd | 2 1 2 | 1 1 2 | 2 3 3 | 2 3 |
13 limcoco | 3 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 3 | 1 3 3 3 | 1 1 3 2 2 3 2 | 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 1 2 |
3 mwra | 3 2 1 2 3 1 1 3 3 | 3 2 2 | 3 2 3 1 3 3 | 2 2 3 2 3 3 2 3 3 2 1 3 |
32 jcnea | 1 3 | 3 | 1 1 3 1 1 | 1 1 |
33 doe | 2 2 1 1 2 3 | 1 1 3 2 3 2 | 3 3 3 2 1 2 | 3 1 3 3 |
22 ballyh | 3 3 2 2 1 3 2 | 2 3 2 2 | 2 3 3 3 2 | 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 |
-----
12 ictu | 2 2 | 1 3 1 3 | | 1 |
11 ifa | 1 2 | 1 2 1 3 2 | 2 | |
35 otherds | 2 2 2 3 3 2 3 | 3 3 3 3 3 | 2 | 3 |
24 wlimr | 1 3 1 1 1 | 2 2 3 | 3 | |
36 ibec | 2 2 1 3 2 | 2 1 1 2 | 2 | 3 |
10 teagasc | 1 1 1 1 | 3 3 3 1 3 | 2 2 3 2 3 | 3 3 3 |
4 fas | 2 2 2 3 1 2 3 | 3 2 3 2 2 | 3 | 3 |
31 ccone | | 1 | | |
-----
7 fisheries | 1 | 1 2 1 | 3 | |
8 aerrianta | 3 1 | 1 2 | | 1 |
20 cenb | 3 1 1 1 2 | 2 2 3 3 2 | 1 3 3 3 3 | 1 1 1 1 3 1 |
6 forfas | 2 3 1 2 | 1 2 1 2 | | 1 |
30 travela | 1 | 1 3 1 | | |
9 beireann | 2 | 1 3 1 2 | | 1 |
28 ecc | 2 | 1 2 | | 1 |
29 ihfed | 2 | 1 3 1 | | |
15 limcico | 3 2 2 1 | 3 3 3 2 | | |
16 clcoco | 3 2 2 1 | 3 3 3 3 2 | | 3 |
27 lcc | 2 2 2 | 1 2 | | |
18 limebc | 3 1 2 | 2 1 2 | 3 | 1 |
38 ersi | 2 | 3 | | |
-----

```

Lisbon and Tagus Valley region – Portugal

		1						
		1 2 3	4 0 8	7 5 9	6			
		M D L	L O A	P A O	L			
1	MINPLAN	3 2	2 2 2	3 2 2	1			
2	DGRD	3 2	2 2 2	1 1 2	1			
3	LTVRCC	2 2	2 2 2	1 1 2	1			
4	LTMA	2 2 2	1 3	1 1				
10	OUREM	2 2 2	1 2		1			
8	ABRANT	2 2 2	3 2		1			
7	PRBA	3 1 1	1	1	1			
5	AML	2 1 1	1	1 1	1			
9	OEIRAS	2 2 2		1				
6	LRBA	1 1 1	1 1	1 1				

### South-Transdanubia region – Hungary

	MAR	Sapard	MNDC	Phare	PMO	TIR	NDC	Tcoun	Tmic	ASC	Scham	RDC	Kapos	Scoun	Tcham	Smic	ABC	Bmic	Pecs	Bcham	Euinf	Indpark	Found	Univ	Bcoun	Bank	Lab	Szeksz	Agency	Tour	
1 MAR	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	1						1	2			1	2		
2 Sapard	2		1		1		1	1		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1						1	1		1		1		
3 MNDC	2	1		1	1	2	2	3	1	2		3	1	3		1	1	2		1				1	2	1	1	1	2	1	
4 Phare	2		1		1		2			1	2	1		1				1				1		1					2		
5 PMO	2	1	1	1		1	2	2	1	2		2	2	2		1	2	1	1					1	1	2		1	2		
6 TIR	2		2		1		2	1		1	2	1	1				2			1					1				1		
7 NDC	2	1	2	2	2	2		2	1	2		2	2	2		1	2	1	1	1				1	3				1	2	
15 Tcoun	2	1	3		2	1	2		3	1	1	3		2	3		1	1			1		1	2	2	1	1	3	3	3	
28 Tmic	1		1		1		1	3				2			2					1				1		1	1	1	1	2	
9 ASC	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1			2	3	2	3	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	1		1	2	2	1	2	2	2	
18 Scham	1	1						1		2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1			2				2	1		3		2	1	
12 RDC	2	1	3	2	2	2	2	3	2	3	2		3	3	2	3	3	3	3	3	2	1	2	2	2	3	2	2	3	3	
24 Kapos	1	1	1	1	2	1	2			2	2	3		3	1	2	1			1	1	1			1	1	2	2	2	2	
14 Scoun	2	1	3		2	1	2	2		3	2	3	3		1	3	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	1	2	3
19 Tcham	1	1		1				3	2	1	2	2	1	1				1			2				1			2	2	2	2
27 Smic		1	1		1		1			2	2	3	2	3						1				1			1	1	2	1	
8 ABC	1	1	1		2	2	2	1		2	1	3	1	2	1				3	3	2	3	2	2	3	3		1	2	3	2
26 Bmic	1	1	2	1	1		1	1		1		3		1			3		2	2	2		2	2	3	1	2		2	2	
23 Pecs	1				1		1		1	1		3	1	1		1	3	2		3	3	3	1	3	3	3	3	2	2	3	
17 Bcham				1			1	1		1	2	2	1	1	2		2	2	3		2	3	2	2	3	2	3	2	2	2	
21 Euinf								1		1		1	1	1			3	2	3	2		1	1	3	1		1	2	1	1	
29 Indpark					1							2		1			2		3	3	1			3	1		1	1	1	2	
30 Found								1	1	1		2		1		1	2	2	1	2	1			2	1		2			3	
20 Univ	1	1	1	1	1		1	2		2	2	2	1	2	1		3	2	3	2	3	3	2		2	1	2	3	2	3	
13 Bcoun	2	1	2		1	1	3	2		2	1	3	1	2			3	3	3	3	3	1	1	1	2		1	1		2	3
11 Bank			1		2			1	1	1		2	2	2					1	3	2		1	1	1				3	2	1
10 Lab		1						1	1	2	3	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	3	1	1	2	2	1				1	2	
25 Szeksz	1		1		1	1	1	3	1	2		3	2	1	2	1	2		2	2	2	1		3		3	1		3	2	
22 Agency	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	2	3	2	1	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	2
16 Tour			1					3		2	1	3	2	3	2	1	2	2		2	1			3	3	1			2	2	

### Lodz Region – Poland

		2	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	2	1														
		1	2	3	9	5	6	7	5	7	9	7	0	9	8	4	8	4	2	1	8	0	4	3	2	1	5	6	3	6	0			
		M	M	V	A	S	O	K	B	O	L	L	C	P	P	L	C	I	A	I	I	A	M	E	F	I	F	E	F	A	M			
1	MORP		3	3	2	3	3	3	3	3		2	2	2	2	2		3	2	3	2	2	3	3	2	2		1	2	3	2			
2	MOE		3	3	2	3	3	3	3	1		2	2	1	1	3		3	3	3	3	2	2	3	2	3		3	2	3	2			
3	VO		3	3	2	3	3	3	3	3		3	3	1	2	3		3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3		1	1	3	2			
29	AR		2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2		1	1	1	3		1	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2		1	3	2	2				
5	SP		3	3	2	2	3	2	2	2		1	2	1	2		3	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2		1	1	2	2				
16	OCO		3	3	3	2	2	2	2	1		1	1	1	1	2		2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2		1	1	2	2				
17	KCO		3	3	3	3	2	3	1	1		1	3	1	3		3	3	2	3	3	3	3	3	3		1	1	3	1				
15	BCO		3	3	3	2	2	2	3	3		1	1	1	2		2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2		1	3	1	2				
27	OPUS		3	1	1	1	1	3	1	1		1	1	1	3		1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2		2	1	2	3	3			
19	LBC		2	2	3	1	1	1	1	1		2	2	2	2	2		3	2	2	1	1	1	1	1		1	2	3	3	1			
7	LCIT		2	2	3	1	2	1	3	1		2	1	1	1	2		3	2	2	3	2	2	2	2		1	1	1	3	1	3		
20	CIESC		2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		2	1	1	1	2		1	3	3	1	1	1	1	1		1	2	1	2	1			
9	PCF		2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2		2	1	1	3		2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2		2	2	2	2	2			
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18	COP		3	3	3	3	3	1	3	3		3	3	3	3		3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3		3	3	3	3	3			
24	IFP		2	3	3	1	1	1	2	2		2	2	2	2		2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2		2	2	1	3	1	3		
12	ARD		3	3	3	2	1	2	3	2		2	2	1	2	1	2		3	2	3	2	2	2	2		2	2	2	2	3			
21	IFL		2	3	3	1	2	2	2	2	2		2	2	3	2	2	3		3	2	3	3	3	2	2	3		2	3	3	3	3	
28	IPC		2	2	3	2	2	2	2	2		3	3	3	3		3	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3		2	2	3	2	3			
30	ADK		3	2	3	1	1	1	3	3		3	2	3	3		3	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3		3	1	3	3	3			
4	ME		3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3		1	2	1	2		3	2	3	2	3	2	2	2		1	1	2	2	2				
23	ECPT		2	2	3	2	2	2	2	2		1	1	1	1		3	1	2	2	2	2	2	2		2	1	1	1	1	1			
22	FDZC		2	3	3	2	1	1	2	2		2	1	1	1	1		3	2	2	3	3	3	2	2		1	2	2	3	3	3		
11	IOF		1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1		1	1	1	2		2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2		1	2	1	1	1	1			
25	FEDP		3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		1	1	1	1		3	2	2	3	2	3	1	2		2	3	3	1	3				
6	EC30C		2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2		2	1	1	1	2		3	1	2	3	2	1	1	1	2		1	3	2	2		
13	FED		3	3	3	3	1	3	3	3		3	3	2	2	2	3		3	3	2	3	3	3	3		3	1	3	2	3	3		
26	AGR		3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3		3	1	2	2	2		3	1	2	3	2	3	3	3		1	3	1	1	1			
10	MSS		2	2	2	2	2	1	1	3		1	3	1	2	1	2		3	3	3	3	3	2	1	3		1	3	2	3	1		

### 6.3. Questionnaire

**Title:**

*EU Enlargement and Multi-level Governance in European Regional and Environmental Policies: Patterns of Institutional Learning, Adaptation and Europeanization among Cohesion Countries (Greece, Ireland and Portugal) and Lessons for New Members (Hungary and Poland)*

**Objectives of programme:**

This research project focuses on facilitating the adaptation process of the prospective new member states of the EU to the multi-level system of governance in the regional and environmental policy areas, by conceptualising learning, institutional and policy adaptation in the selected policy areas within the EU system of governance, and by drawing lessons from the experience of previous enlargement waves' – Cohesion – countries. Hence, the main goal of the project is twofold: first, to evaluate, on a comparative basis, the impact of Europeanization of public policy on the governance structures of the three traditionally unitary nation states of the EU and their response, in terms of learning and adaptation, to the European environment in the regional and environmental policies; and, second, to utilize this research outcome in identifying the appropriate reforms that the new member states should undertake in order to facilitate the adaptation and adjustment of their public policy structures to the new European environment in the selected policy areas.

**Objective of questionnaire:**

With this questionnaire, we are interested in studying the role partnerships play in the formulation of regional development strategies in general, and in the process by which European Regional Policy is planned and implemented. Your institution has been identified as a significant actor in this process. We would like to talk with you about local development initiatives and the role your institution has taken in the implementation of European regional policy. We will follow an interview schedule to guarantee we cover all topics in a quick and efficient manner.

[SAMPLE – REGIONAL]

Interview No. \_\_\_\_\_

**PART I: GOALS, PURPOSES, AND INTERESTS**

We would like to start by asking you a few general questions about your institution.

**[Common questions: I1-I6]**

**I1.** How would you describe the main activities and functions of your institution?

---

**I2.** When was your institution established what is its legal status?

---

**I3.** How many people does your institution employ?



---

**I4.** Taking into account all the economic development initiatives your institution pursues, approximately how much of its activity is devoted to the EU programmes and initiatives (large percentage, small percentage)?

---

**I5.** What goals does your institution seek to achieve by exploiting the opportunities European regional policy provides (in terms of effectiveness and learning)?

**I5.1.** Legal adaptation (compliance with legislation)

**I5.2.** Institutional adaptation (administrative/structural reforms)

**I5.3.** Increase of public participation

**I5.4.** Partnership formation/networking

**I5.5.** Self-learning and evaluation

**I5.6.** Undertaking of development initiatives/exploiting endogenous resources

**I5.7.** Gaining access to financial resources

**I5.8.** Other (describe)


**I6.** What is the composition of your institution (name the actors, who are public, private, etc.)?

---

**[Only for public authorities: I7-I8]**

**\* We hand out a checklist of the actors we have already identified and that will be included in the SNA**

**I7.** With which of the actors included in the list do you share common goals?

---

**I8.** From which of the actors included in the list do you face opposition in relation to the above goals?

---

## **PART II: MAJOR REGIONAL PROBLEMS**

**[Common questions: II1-II2]**

**II.1.** What is your assessment of the Region's main economic and social problems?

**II.1.1.** Demographic problems (e.g. low birth rates, population losses, etc.)

---

**II.1.2.** Socio-economic and development problems (e.g. unemployment, production, etc.)

---

**II.1.3.** Infrastructures (e.g. accessibility, balanced development, etc.)

---

**II.1.4.** Environmental/spatial problems (e.g. natural and cultural resources, land uses, etc.)

---

**II.1.5.** Other problems

---

**II.2.** Do you think there are major conflicts within the Region and, if yes, among which actors?

<b>II.2.1.</b> Interest conflicts (economic, social, etc.)	
<b>II.2.2.</b> Adaptation conflicts (pressure, resistance to change, etc.)	
<b>II.2.3.</b> Political conflicts (party politics, overlapping of responsibilities, etc.)	
<b>II.2.3.</b> Cultural – attitudinal conflicts (resistance to learning, innovation, etc.)	
<b>II.2.4.</b> Resources conflicts (allocation of financial, human resources, use of resources, etc.)	
<b>II.2.5.</b> Other (name)	

### **PART III: REGIONAL NETWORKS (local and intra-regional)**

#### **[Common questions: III1-III4]**

**III.1.** We are going to give you a table of all institutions that have been involved in the planning and/or implementation process of regional development projects. Could you tell us which institutions have you contact with, consulted or co-operated with, what type of co-operation did you have and within which framework?

**\* Please use for Table 1A:**

<b>2: regular contacts</b>  (weekly – monthly)	<b>A: institutionalized contacts</b>	<b>I: European policies</b>  <b>programmes – projects</b>
<b>1: irregular contacts</b>  (every few months)	<b>B: common actions in</b>  <b>programmes/projects</b>	<b>II: national policies,</b>  <b>programmes – projects</b>
<b>0: no contacts</b>	<b>C: informal contacts</b> (informal  meetings, invitations, etc.)	<b>III: regional policies,</b>  <b>programmes - projects</b>  <b>IV: local policies</b>  <b>programmes - projects</b>

**III.2.** We are going to give you a table of all institutions that have been involved in the planning and/or implementation process of regional development projects. Could you tell us if you or any one in your institution is a member or on the Board of Directors/Advisory Committee of any of those institutions? Could you tell us if there are any members of these institutions who participate in your institutions? Which of these institutions do you feel your institution influences? Which of those do you feel stand out as especially influential in your situation?

**\*Please use for Table 1B:**

**0: no membership**

**1: you are a member and influential**

**2: you are a member but not particularly influential**

**3: the other is a member and influential**

**4: the other is a member but not particularly influential**

**You might use more than one option, e.g. 1 and 4.**

**III.3.** In which co-operation does your institution play a leading role?

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**III.4.** Which of the above institutions do you feel stand out as especially influential in the formulation and implementation of development strategies in your region?

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**PART IV: SUPRA-REGIONAL NETWORKS (inter-regional, national, and European)**

**[Common questions: IV1-IV4]**

**IV.1.** Does your institution have co-operation with relevant institutions of other regions (in the country, cross-border, etc.)? Could you identify these institutions and the type of co-operation that your institution has?

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**IV.2.** Is this co-operation influenced by policy priorities decided at the national level?

---

**IV.3.** We are going to give you a table of national and European actors involved in the making, implementation and management of regional development policy. Could you tell us with which of these actors does your institution have contact with, what type of contact and within which framework?

**\*Please use for Table 2:**

<b>2: regular contacts</b>  (weekly – monthly)	<b>A: institutionalized contacts</b>	<b>I: European policies,</b>  <b>programmes – projects</b>
<b>1: irregular contacts</b>  (every few months)	<b>B: common actions in</b>  <b>programmes/projects</b>	<b>II: national policies,</b>  <b>programmes – projects</b>
<b>0: no contacts</b>	<b>C: informal contacts</b> (informal  meetings, invitations, etc.)	<b>III: regional policies,</b>  <b>programmes - projects</b>  <b>IV: local policies,</b>  <b>programmes - projects</b>

**[Question for actors at national level: IV4]**

**IV.4.** What kind of guidelines does your institution give to regional institutions? How do you perceive the influence of your institution at the regional level?

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**PART V: EUROPEAN REGIONAL POLICY (1994-2000)**

**[Common questions: V1-V6]**

**V.1.** Could you please tell us which EU programmes, initiatives, etc. has your institution participated in or received financial support from? For each one could you tell us the name of the programme/initiative, etc., the leading actor, the partners involved, its budget and its duration?

Name	Leader	Partners	Budget	Duration - Time

**V.2.** Could you please tell us problems/difficulties that your institution encountered in the implementation of EU programmes/initiatives?

**V.2.1.** Lack of necessary institutions

**V.2.2.** Lack of know-how, personnel

**V.2.3.** Limited or delayed funds

**V.2.4.** Limited participation, networking

**V.2.5.** Conflicting interests

**V.2.5.** Other (name)


**V.3.** Has your institution participated in relevant committees involved in the planning or evaluation of EU programmes? If yes, at which level (European, national, regional)? Could you please name these committees? How

substantial has been your institution's participation in each committee and in which field (policy-making or evaluation)? Who did convene each committee?

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**V.4.** What type of changes do you think the implementation of European programmes has brought in the categories listed below?

**V.4.1.** Legal adaptation (compliance with legislation)

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**V.4.2.** Institutional adaptation (administrative/structural reforms)

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**V.4.3.** Increase of public participation

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**V.4.4.** Partnership formation/networking

---

**V.4.5.** Self-learning and evaluation

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**V.4.6.** Undertaking of development initiatives/exploiting endogenous resources

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**V.4.7.** Gaining access to financial resources

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**V.4.8.** Other (describe)

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**V.5.** Is your institution an active participant in any European organisation or network in the field of regional development? Could you please name them and describe their key responsibilities?

**V.5.1.** Committee of the Regions

**V.5.2.** Thematic network of inter-regional co-operation


V.5.3. Office in Brussels


V.5.4. Other (name)

V.6. How important are the European links? What advantage do they bring? Are they becoming more important?

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## PART VI: SOCIAL CAPITAL

**\*By social capital we mean the existence of trust, norms and networks that facilitate common action and co-operation among people in a given region.**

### VI.1. State and civil society

**VI.1.1.** In general, how do you assess the impact of social capital (trust, networks, norm of reciprocity) on the level of local institutional capacity and the way in which local development strategies are planned and implemented?

a) Indispensable

b) Necessary

c) Not so important


**VI.1.2.** How important is the role of the state in regions' capacity to adapt to the changing global environment and gain access to more EU funds?

a) Indispensable

b) Necessary

c) Not so important


**VI.1.3.** In comparison with the role of the state, how important do you assess the presence of a strong civil society and dense networks of civic engagement at the local level for the achievement of the above mentioned goals?

a) Indispensable

b) Necessary

c) Not so important


### VI.2. Citizens' participation

**VI.2.1.** Based on your experience in this region, what is your evaluation of the degree to which citizens are active participants in voluntary associations and organizations?

a) Satisfactory

b) More or less satisfactory

c) Non satisfactory


**VI.2.2.** Based on your experience in this region, what is your estimation of the degree to which citizens are involved in the planning and implementation processes of regional development programmes?

a) Satisfactory

b) More or less satisfactory

c) Non satisfactory


**VI.3. Trust**

**VI.3.1.** Based on your experience in this region, what is your estimation of the degree to which one can trust the elected politicians?

a) One can certainly trust

b) One may trust, but there are some exceptions

c) One cannot trust even if there are some exceptions

d) Of course, one cannot trust


**VI.3.2.** Based on your experience, what is your estimation of the degree to which one can trust the elected local and regional authorities in your region?

a) One can certainly trust

b) One may trust, but there are some exceptions

c) One cannot trust even if there are some exceptions

d) Of course, one cannot trust


**VI.3.3.** In comparison with other regions, which of the following words, in your opinion, would better describe politics in this region (choose 3)?



- a) Honest
- b) Democratic
- c) Participatory
- d) Bottom-up
- e) Top-down
- f) Hierarchical
- g) Command and control
- h) Political clientelism
- i) Corrupted


**VI.3.4.** What is your estimation of the amount of power wielded by each of the following groups in the political life of this region?

**VI.3.4.i.** National Party Leaders

- a) Great influence
- b) Considerable influence
- c) Little influence
- d) No influence


**VI.3.4.ii.** Local Party Leaders

- a) Great influence
- b) Considerable influence
- c) Little influence
- d) No influence


**VI.3.4.iii.** Local elected bodies (2<sup>nd</sup> tier)

- a) Great influence
- b) Considerable influence


- c) Little influence
- d) No influence

**VI.3.4.iv. Press/Media**

- a) Great influence
- b) Considerable influence
- c) Little influence
- d) No influence

**VI.3.4.v. Government ministers**

- a) Great influence
- b) Considerable influence
- c) Little influence
- d) No influence

**VI.3.4.vi. Local elected bodies (1<sup>st</sup> tier)**

- a) Great influence
- b) Considerable influence
- c) Little influence
- d) No influence

**VI.3.4.vii. Local private actors (chambers, associations, etc.)**

- a) Great influence
- b) Considerable influence
- c) Little influence
- d) No influence

**VI.3.4.viii. Trade unions**

- a) Great influence
- b) Considerable influence
- c) Little influence
- d) No influence

**VI.3.4.ix. NGOs**

- a) Great influence
- b) Considerable influence
- c) Little influence
- d) No influence

**VI.3.5.** Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements

**VI.3.5.i.** In this region, people, generally obey the laws (traffic code, urban planning regulations) only if they are not contradict their individual interests

- a) Agree completely
- b) More or less agree
- c) More or less disagree
- d) Disagree completely

**VI.3.5.ii.** In social and economic affairs today technical considerations have greater weight than political ones

- a) Agree completely
- b) More or less agree
- c) More or less disagree
- d) Disagree completely

**VI.3.5.iii.** Normally in politics one can trust others

- a) Agree completely

- b) More or less agree
- c) More or less disagree
- d) Disagree completely


**VI.3.5.iv.** Generally in political controversies one should avoid extreme positions because the proper solution usually lies in the middle

- a) Agree completely
- b) More or less agree
- c) More or less disagree
- d) Disagree completely


**VI.3.5.v.** In spite of the development of recent years the social structure of this region has remained unchanged

- a) Agree completely
- b) More or less agree
- c) More or less disagree
- d) Disagree completely


**VI.3.5.vi.** The compromise between political opponents is dangerous because that normally leads to the betrayal of one's own side

- a) Agree completely
- b) More or less agree
- c) More or less disagree
- d) Disagree completely


**VI.3.5.vii.** Basically in this region no one is much concerned with what happens to his neighbour

- a) Agree completely
- b) More or less agree
- c) More or less disagree


d) Disagree completely

**VI.3.5.viii.** At the regional level there are no great differences of opinion on the principal problems

a) Agree completely

b) More or less agree

c) More or less disagree

d) Disagree completely

**VI.3.5.ix.** All citizens should participate actively in the collective life of his/her community

a) Agree completely

b) More or less agree

c) More or less disagree

d) Disagree completely

**VI.3.5.x.** He, who asserts that he is motivated by the public good rather than by his private interest is a liar or a fool

a) Agree completely

b) More or less agree

c) More or less disagree

d) Disagree completely

**VI.3.5.xi.** One's primary responsibility is towards one's own family or towards oneself, not towards the whole community

a) Agree completely

b) More or less agree

c) More or less disagree

d) Disagree completely

**VI.3.5.xii.** From your experience, how often crucial issues for your region are settled by compromise between different approaches

- a) Very often
- b) Often
- c) Not so often
- d) Seldom


**VI.3.6.** With regard to each of the following aspects of the operation of Regional Government in this region, are you: very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, not much satisfied, or not at all satisfied?

**VI.3.6.i.** Planning capacity

- a) Very satisfied
- b) Somewhat satisfied
- c) Somewhat dissatisfied
- d) Very dissatisfied


**VI.3.6.ii.** Utilization of EU funds

- a) Very satisfied
- b) Somewhat satisfied
- c) Somewhat dissatisfied
- d) Very dissatisfied


**VI.3.6.iii.** Time taken to implement decisions

- a) Very satisfied
- b) Somewhat satisfied
- c) Somewhat dissatisfied
- d) Very dissatisfied


**VI.3.6.iv.** Co-operation with local authorities

- a) Very satisfied
- b) Somewhat satisfied


- c) Somewhat dissatisfied
- d) Very dissatisfied

**VI.3.6.v. Utilization of University/research capacity of the region**

- a) Very satisfied
- b) Somewhat satisfied
- c) Somewhat dissatisfied
- d) Very dissatisfied

**VI.3.6.vi. Co-operation with central government**

- a) Very satisfied
- b) Somewhat satisfied
- c) Somewhat dissatisfied
- d) Very dissatisfied

**VI.3.6.vii. Citizens' participation in the decision-making**

- a) Very satisfied
- b) Somewhat satisfied
- c) Somewhat dissatisfied
- d) Very dissatisfied

**PART VII: CONCLUDING REMARKS**

**VII.1.** What have been the overall effects of European regional policy in relation to the development prospects of your region? To what degree do they meet the local needs?

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**VII.2.** What are the major obstacles for the exploitation of the opportunities European regional policy presents for the development of your region?

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