Figure 1: Experimental paradigm



Sixteen pairs of healthy male volunteers (randomly assigned to a "player" or an “adviser” role) interacted in an economic game. The player had to predict the outcome of a binary lottery for which the odds were shown as a pie chart (cue). On the bottom of his screen, the player was presented with a progress bar, which increased with every correct prediction (and decreased with every incorrect/missed prediction). The player was rewarded according to the following schedule: if the player reached the silver goal, he received an extra 10 Francs, while if he reached gold, he received an extra 20 Francs. The adviser, however, received more information about the outcome (constant probability of 80%), and based on this information, advised the player on which option to choose. Critically, the pay-out for the adviser was structured such that his motivation to provide valid or misleading information varied across the game. In addition to the player’s progress bar, the adviser was shown response ranges, gold and silver, which the player did not see. If the player’s score landed within the silver range at the end of the game, the adviser received an extra 10 Francs, if the score landed in the golden range, he earned an extra 20 Francs. However, if the score landed outside those two ranges, the advisers received no extra money. Importantly, the player was informed that the adviser had his own incentives and could sometimes help or sometimes mislead him, i.e. that his intentions may change during the game.