Objetivo In many real-life object allocation problems, objects' priorities involve indifference classes. The common practice to deal with ties is to randomly break them to obtain strict priorities. From the ex-ante point of view, random tie breaking induces random priorities. In this setting, Dr. Afacan will introduce a fairness notion generalizing the usual stability of Gale and Shapley (1962) to the random priorities setting. Then, he will check whether the well-adopted agent-optimal stable mechanism satisfies that notion along with other desirable properties. Dr. Afacan will next contruct a mechanism mainly built on the Probabilistic Serial Mechanism of Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001). He will define that new rule in a way that it will dominate the agent-optimal stable mechanism on the efficiency and fairness grounds. Lastly, he will characterize the introduced new mechanism. Programa(s) FP7-PEOPLE - Specific programme "People" implementing the Seventh Framework Programme of the European Community for research, technological development and demonstration activities (2007 to 2013) Tema(s) FP7-PEOPLE-2013-CIG - Marie-Curie Action: "Career Integration Grants" Convocatoria de propuestas FP7-PEOPLE-2013-CIG Consulte otros proyectos de esta convocatoria Régimen de financiación MC-CIG - Support for training and career development of researcher (CIG) Coordinador SABANCI UNIVERSITESI Aportación de la UE € 100 000,00 Dirección ORTA MAHALLE UNIVERSITE CADDESI N 27 TUZLA 34956 Istanbul Turquía Ver en el mapa Región İstanbul İstanbul İstanbul Tipo de actividad Higher or Secondary Education Establishments Contacto administrativo Aslihan Eran (Mrs.) Enlaces Contactar con la organización Opens in new window Sitio web Opens in new window Coste total Sin datos
