This project examines the societal pressures that shape the changing pattern of contemporary constitutionalism. In particular, it examines the rise of a transnational judicial constitution: that is, of a legal order, overarching national boundaries, in which, at different levels, judicial actors assume unprecedented authority to shape and conduct legislation. It is designed to produce the first macro-sociological explanation of the changing constitutional form of contemporary democracy, and it develops a unique sociological methodology for examining the rise of transnational norms and transnational judicial power.

The project advances the distinctive thesis, first, that transnational judicial constitutionalism needs to be examined as a functional extension of classical constitutionalism. Further, it advances the thesis that the rise of the transnational judicial constitution is shaped – to a high degree – by forces within particular national societies, and it brings solutions for political-systemic problems embedded in these societies. Notably, the construction of a transnational legal domain performs vital state-building functions for particular societies, it acts to raise the autonomy of state institutions, and in many cases it forms the structural precondition of effective statehood. By examining the inner-societal origins of the convergence between national and transnational legal domains, the project elaborates a model of contemporary constitutionalism that calls into question widespread globalist preconceptions regarding the origins of transnational norms, and it proposes a sociological counter-thesis to common analyses of legal globalization.

The project accomplishes its objectives by examining the impact of transnational legal norms on the structure of political institutions in eleven specifically selected polities: Chile, China, Colombia, Egypt, Germany, Poland, Russia, Tunisia, USA, UK, and Venezuela.