Frontiers in Mechanism Design: Methodology and Applications

Projektinformationen

Frontiers in Design

ID Finanzhilfevereinbarung: 682417

DOI 10.3030/682417

Das Projekt endete am 15 April 2022

EK-Unterschriftsdatum 27 April 2016

Startdatum 1 September 2016

Enddatum 31 August 2022

Finanziert unter

• EXCELLENT SCIENCE - European Research Council (ERC)

Gesamtkosten € 1 644 774,00

EU-Beitrag € 1 644 774,00

Koordiniert durch

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON
United Kingdom

Ziel

Mechanism design is the engineering side of economics. Research findings in this field have helped governments and practitioners worldwide design better institutions: auctions that are more profitable or efficient; labour markets that improve the match between employees and employers; and better ways to assign students to public schools. The cornerstone of mechanism design is the revelation principle, which provides a canonical class of mechanisms and turns the mechanism-selection problem (which a priori may appear unmanageable) to a constrained optimization problem. The standard mechanism design paradigm relies on three fundamental assumptions: 1. The designer of the institution—the principal—does not have any privileged information. 2. The principal chooses the mechanism and commits to it once and for all. 3. There is no interrelationship of the mechanism with outside markets. In addition, almost the entire mechanism design literature assumes that private information is unverifiable (soft). These assumptions often fail in today’s “big data” world: Firms (online retailers, insurance companies, banks) do have privileged—and often certifiable—information that may affect contractual terms they propose. Also, they interact repeatedly with the same agents and, as they learn about them, they attempt to change the terms by making personalized offers. Finally, often a mechanism—e.g. a government insurance program—interacts with private insurance markets. The proposed research aims at providing methods and foundations to design optimal mechanisms at precisely those highly relevant situations: 1. mechanism-design by an informed principal, 2. design of mechanisms and their transparency when the principal lacks commitment, 3. mechanism-design when an intervention interacts with markets. The latter part of the project aims to employ these cutting-edge tools to revisit the design of insurance markets.

Wissenschaftliches Gebiet

• natural sciences › computer and information sciences › data science › big data
• social sciences › economics and business › economics › production economics
• social sciences › economics and business › business and management › commerce

Schlüsselbegriffe

• Mechanism Design
• Limited Commitment
• Informed Principal
• Certifiable Information

Programm/Programme

• H2020-EU.1.1. - EXCELLENT SCIENCE - European Research Council (ERC) Main Programme

Thema/Themen

• ERC-CoG-2015 - ERC Consolidator Grant

Aufforderung zur Vorschlagseinreichung

ERC-2015-CoG

Finanzierungsplan

ERC-COG - Consolidator Grant

Gastgebende Einrichtung

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON

• Netto-EU-Beitrag: € 1 644 774,00
• Adresse: GOWER STREET ; WC1E 6BT London ; Vereinigtes Königreich
• Region: London › Inner London — West › Camden and City of London
• Aktivitätstyp: Higher or Secondary Education Establishments
• Gesamtkosten: € 1 644 774,00

Begünstigte (1)

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON

Vereinigtes Königreich

• Netto-EU-Beitrag: € 1 644 774,00
• Adresse: GOWER STREET ; WC1E 6BT London
• Region: London › Inner London — West › Camden and City of London
• Aktivitätstyp: Higher or Secondary Education Establishments
• Gesamtkosten: € 1 644 774,00