Obiettivo "Economists' modern understanding of the functioning of markets is based on the behavioral assumption of individual rationality. Market agents are assumed to hold well-defined preferences and have perfect ability to draw Bayesian inferences in accordance with correct knowledge of the market model and market equilibrium. This research proposal is based on the premise that bounded rationality on the part of consumers is potentially a major source of market friction. My objective is to develop general theoretical tools to investigate this intuition, and to examine whether these tools can be insightfully applied to realistic market settings. So far, the literature on the subject has progressed as a sequence of specific models that capture one aspect of consumer psychology at a time. The challenge is to synthesize and generalize these models into flexible theoretical frameworks for modelling market interaction between profit-maximizing firms and boundedly rational consumers. Hopefully, various aspects of consumer psychology can be embedded into these frameworks, so that analytic results can be stated in terms of general, abstract properties of consumer behavior, rather than in terms of specific psychological effects. In turn, this general analysis is expected to lead to novel applications. Here are some of the general questions that I hope to address. Can we view certain aspects of firms' pricing and marketing strategies as responses to consumers' bounded rationality? To what extent are boundedly rational consumers vulnerable to exploitation by firms? Does competition protect them from exploitation? Does interaction between firms and boundedly rational consumers give rise to inefficiencies, and how are these affected by competition? What is the impact of various regulatory interventions in this context? Do market forces lead firms to ""educate"" or ""debias"" boundedly rational consumers? Does greater consumer rationality imply more competitive industry profits?" Campo scientifico natural sciencesmathematicsapplied mathematicsstatistics and probabilitybayesian statisticssocial scienceseconomics and businesseconomicsmicroeconomicssocial sciencespsychology Parole chiave Bounded Rationlity Competition Exploitative Contracts Industrial Organization Marketing Multi-Attribute Products Naive Inferences Obfuscation Programma(i) FP7-IDEAS-ERC - Specific programme: "Ideas" implementing the Seventh Framework Programme of the European Community for research, technological development and demonstration activities (2007 to 2013) Argomento(i) ERC-AG-SH1 - ERC Advanced Grant - Individuals, institutions and markets Invito a presentare proposte ERC-2008-AdG Vedi altri progetti per questo bando Meccanismo di finanziamento ERC-AG - ERC Advanced Grant Istituzione ospitante UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON Contributo UE € 818 698,44 Indirizzo GOWER STREET WC1E 6BT LONDON Mostra sulla mappa Tipo di attività Higher or Secondary Education Establishments Ricercatore principale Ran Spiegler (Prof.) Contatto amministrativo Michael Browne (Mr.) Collegamenti Contatta l’organizzazione Opens in new window Sito web Opens in new window Costo totale Nessun dato Beneficiari (2) Classifica in ordine alfabetico Classifica per Contributo UE Espandi tutto Riduci tutto UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON Contributo UE € 818 698,44 Indirizzo GOWER STREET WC1E 6BT LONDON Mostra sulla mappa Tipo di attività Higher or Secondary Education Establishments Ricercatore principale Ran Spiegler (Prof.) Contatto amministrativo Michael Browne (Mr.) Collegamenti Contatta l’organizzazione Opens in new window Sito web Opens in new window Costo totale Nessun dato TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY Israele Contributo UE € 279 938,36 Indirizzo RAMAT AVIV 69978 Tel Aviv Mostra sulla mappa Tipo di attività Higher or Secondary Education Establishments Contatto amministrativo Lea Pais (Ms.) Collegamenti Contatta l’organizzazione Opens in new window Sito web Opens in new window Costo totale Nessun dato
