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COMBATING CLIMATE CHANGE: Political economy of Green Paradoxes

Objetivo

Green Paradoxes are defined as the phenomenon that climate change policies can have counterproductive effects. For example, a subsidy on clean energy from renewable resources (solar, wind) will decrease the price at which this energy is supplied. But if the price still exceeds the cost of fossil fuel extraction and given that available stocks will be depleted, the price decrease will speed up the extraction from non-renewable resources, such as oil, that cause CO2 emissions. Hence, instead of delaying extraction the policy enhances initial extraction and emissions. In the design of environmental policy this effect is insufficiently taken into account, because the supply side of the market for fossil fuels is largely neglected.
The principal aim of this research proposal is to critically investigate Green Paradoxes and to come up with sound policy recommendations, taking into account the demand as well as the supply dimension of fossil fuels. Particular attention is paid to a broad and dynamic welfare analysis, allowing for concerns regarding sustainability. Especially relevant for tackling the research question is to provide a closer examination of imperfect competition on the oil market and to distinguish between dirty and clean alternatives for fossil fuel. In addition the proposal is to study the political economy of climate change policy to come up with proposals that not only muster global support but also address the adverse distributional aspects of climate change itself on developing economies and on the poorest of advanced economies who get hardest hit by green taxes. This requires not only the tools of modern political economy, but also the realms of second-best economics and the latest developments in public finance.

Convocatoria de propuestas

ERC-2010-AdG_20100407
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Régimen de financiación

ERC-AG - ERC Advanced Grant

Institución de acogida

STICHTING VU
Aportación de la UE
€ 1 849 878,05
Dirección
DE BOELELAAN 1105
1081 HV Amsterdam
Países Bajos

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Región
West-Nederland Noord-Holland Groot-Amsterdam
Tipo de actividad
Higher or Secondary Education Establishments
Investigador principal
Cornelius Antonius Adrianus Maria Withagen (Prof.)
Contacto administrativo
Hadewijch Van Delft (Mrs.)
Enlaces
Coste total
Sin datos

Beneficiarios (3)