System view of risks in biotechnology applications at industrial levelFunded under: FP1-RADPROT 6C
About 15 years of experiments in genetic engineering did not give rise to significant laboratory accidents, whereas some concern remains for the external release of recombinant DNA organisms. On the other hand, the extension of recombinant DNA technology from laboratory to the large scale industrial production is not devoid of intrinsic and systematic risks and has not received specific attention. Intrinsic risks of genetic engineering at the industrial level depend upon the type of operation and are predicable from experience in the research laboratory and in pilot plants. The systematic industrial risks are due to the usual relaxation in the arrangements and practices that follows the expansion of physical barriers and human involvement in the large scale work of the factories. Important factors in moving from laboratory to industrial level are: the differential consequences of adverse contingencies, the increased probability of human errors, the susceptibility of violations by workers despite their training, the multidimension of harmful effects and the constitutions of emergency sanitation procedures.
Bibliographic Reference: Paper presented: Management and Risk from Genotoxic Substances in the Environment, Stockholm (SE), Oct. 3-8, 1988
Availability: Available from (1) as Paper EN 34226 ORA
Record Number: 198911100 / Last updated on: 1994-12-01
Original language: en
Available languages: en