CAN CONTAINMENT AND SURVEILLANCE PLAY A MORE IMPORTANT ROLE IN SAFEGUARDS?
After a long period of development of containment and surveillance (C/S) techniques, a good level of reliability and tamper resistance has been reached for a limited number of devices which appears acceptable for implementation in safeguards in combination with assay techniques. The evolution of the European Fuel Cycle will have an impact on the application of safeguards in the future. This evolution is characterized by increased flow and storage capacities of nuclear materials and a lower degree of accessibility. Furthermore, spent fuel storage (intermediate storage or final disposal) create new safeguards problems which must be faced. Consideration is given in this paper to enhanced C/S systems. This includes systems with a higher reliability of components, multi-level C/S systems and the integration of nuclear material monitoring systems. Several of these systems are now under development or are being implemented within the European Communities (EC). The cooperation of operators, in their role of designing and operating nuclear facilities, is fundamental for the successful application of C/S with an acceptable level of intrusiveness. This cooperation will be illustrated through practical examples. Several projects, developed in a joint effort with plant operators, have reached the stage of field test.
Bibliographic Reference: FACILITY OPERATIONS SAFEGUARDS INTERFACE, SAN DIEGO, CALIF., USA, NOV. 29, DEC. 4, 1987, AVAILABILITY: CEC-LUXEMBOURG, DG XIII/A2, BP 1907, MENTIONING PAPER ORA 33777 E
Availability: Can be ordered online
Record Number: 1989126079400 / Last updated on: 1989-05-01
Available languages: en