A systematic approach for closing the gap between expectations and reality in arms control
Multilateral arms control treaties enunciate desirable broad objectives to limit or eliminate specific categories of weapons. In this paper, we use the NPT, CFE, CWC and CTBT, as examples, to examine treaty goals, verification objectives and monitoring regimes. We conclude that, for those goals to be quantifiable, a quantitative index of verifiability can be defined for measuring compliance and a monitoring system can be constructed. For the non-quantifiable goals, the concept of verifiability might be inappropriate. Instead, concepts such as confidence-building measures instead of verification might be the best one could do in a given treaty.
Bibliographic Reference: Paper presented: Strengthening of Safeguards Integrating the Old and the New, Dresden (DE) 8-11 May 2000
Availability: Available from European Commission, Joint Research Centre, Ispra (IT)
Record Number: 200012263 / Last updated on: 2000-08-10
Original language: en
Available languages: en