Community Research and Development Information Service - CORDIS

Abstract

The nuclear non-proliferation regime rests on several elements that complement and reinforce each other. The political commitment of States against possession of nuclear weapons is reinforced by institutional measures, the most important being IAEA safeguards, which provide a high level of assurance of compliance with obligations through international verification. The institutional barriers against proliferation, such as treaty regimes and associated verification arrangements, can be effectively reinforced by technological barriers. This paper discusses basic approaches that could be taken to enhance the proliferation resistance of the nuclear fuel cycle. This general discussion is followed by illustrative examples of some topical concepts of proliferation-resistant nuclear fuel cycles that are being promoted by various experts and countries.

Additional information

Authors: BRAGIN V, Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, Barton (AU);CARLSON J, Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, Barton (AU);LESLIE R, Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, Barton (AU);SCHENKEL R, JRC, Institute for Transuranium Elements, Karlsruhe (DE);MAGILL J, JRC, Institute for Transuranium Elements, Karlsruhe (DE);MAYER K, JRC, Institute for Transuranium Elements, Karlsruhe (DE)
Bibliographic Reference: An oral report given at: The IAEA Symposium on International Safeguards - Verification and Nuclear Material Security. Held in: Vienna (AT), 29 October - 1 November 2001
Record Number: 200114165 / Last updated on: 2001-12-21
Category: PUBLICATION
Original language: en
Available languages: en