CORDIS Archive : Training and Mobility of Researchers / Contract Nr : FMBICT972445

THE VALUE OF INFORMATION IN ZERO-SUM GAMES

Host Laboratory	Scientific Supervisor
Université Catholique de Louvain Center for Operations Research & Econometrics VOIE DU ROMAN PAYS, 34 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve Belgium	PROFESSEUR Claude D'Aspremont Tel : 32/10474335 / Fax : 32/10474301 Email : corsec@core.ucl.ac.be
	Grant Holder
	Dr. Olivier Gabriel Adrien Gossner (French) Tel : 33/153792638 / Fax : 33/153792638 Email : gossner@core.ucl.ac.be
Abstract Research objectives and content The notion of ''Comparison of statistical experiments', due to Blacwkell, characterizes which information sources are better than others in single agent optimization problems. A Game-Theoretic extension would be to characterize when an information source is better than another for some agent. Unluckily, it is known that in many economic situations, getting more information can harm an agent i, mainly because of the different behavior it induces to other players Nonetheless, in a strategic game, which is a conflictual situation, it is always better for any agent to get more information about the state of nature. Comparing two information sources I and J, we say that I is better that J for player I (thus worse for player 2) when for every strategic game G, I guarantees a better payoff to I in G than J. My main research objective will be to obtain simple characterizations of this preorder relation in which the auxilliary game G does not appear. Training content (objective, benefit and expected impact) Jean-Francois Mertens, at CORE, is a specialist of strategic games and of Game-Theory in general. I expect to learn from him some of most useful techniques for this class of games. Links with industry / industrial relevance (22) Contract number : FMBICT972445 Duration : 09 Months from 01-01-98 -- Category 30 (B30)

Last updated :10:07:98

Do you have questions or comments about this site : tmr-grants@dg12.cec.be