

Households, Work and Flexibility

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Abstract

The study compared flexibility and work-life balance in 8 countries (UK, the Netherlands, Sweden, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria) using a representative sample survey of those between 18 and 65 carried out in 2001 (N=10123) and a study of policy frameworks.

The study showed that there are many kinds of flexibility to be found in regular, secure jobs as well as in irregular or “atypical” ones. Therefore, we argue that discussion of flexibility should not be limited to labour market de-regulation and the number of “atypical jobs” as measured in part-time and temporary work. Taking this broad view, there was a great deal of flexibility inside European labour markets as seen from the employees’ perspective. However, we were able to identify “good flexibility” as well as “bad flexibility”. Good flexibility is where it was controlled by the person and was associated with high levels of job satisfaction. This was most often found among middle class professionals on higher salaries and was more common in the North Western EU countries than in Eastern and Central Europe. Bad flexibility was associated with lack of control over hours, place and conditions of work, with low job satisfaction and with manual workers on lower incomes and with younger workers. This kind was most often found in Central and Eastern European countries with large numbers in Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary. However, whilst in Western Europe the victims of bad flexibility were mostly women, in ECE countries they were often men.

The extent to which bad or good flexibility were ascendant depended to some extent on the regulation of flexibility. In Sweden and the Netherlands (and increasingly in the UK) flexibility was regulated so that flexible workers could also have job security and there was a shift from employer-lead flexibility to employee-lead flexibility with the individualisation of working hours and conditions as well as benefits. In the Accession countries of Slovenia, Hungary and Czech Republic, the scope for flexibility had been introduced but take up was variable. In particular, the take up of part time work options were not appealing in countries where even wages from full time wages were low and where both men and women expected to work full-time. However, in the Czech Republic the dynamic changes in the labour market over the last decade has allowed many people to change jobs and professions, often to improve their work. In Romania and Bulgaria the lack of legislation or ineffective legislation has meant that the sources of flexibility have been concentrated among particular groups of workers in a highly segmented labour market. Flexibility is often forced upon people with no alternative. The lack of regulation as well as the over-regulation of flexibility leads to a greater proportion of bad flexibility rather than good flexibility jobs and the growth of informal methods of flexibilisation (avoiding regulations) through casual and informal work as well as agricultural subsistence work.

Flexibility needs to be seen in the context of the dominant cultures of work and care in different European regions, which determine the way in which different flexibility options are taken up by men and women. In this respect we can distinguish between employer-lead flexibility, that has dominated until now in ECE countries and employee-lead flexibility that has become more prominent in North Western Europe since the mid 1990s. Employee-lead flexibility allows the development of flexibility schedules suited to the needs of individual employees.

Our results indicate that the discussion of flexibility is normally too limited. It is framed in terms of the extent of the removal of job protection and labour market regulation, whereas we have shown that it is precisely regulation that can lead to improved flexibility and wider acceptance of flexibility – to good rather than bad flexibility. The discussion of flexibility usually involves counting part-time, self-employed and contract workers. Our results show that not only are these not necessarily good measures of flexibility in a comparative context, but also that they were inadequate for understanding the many different kinds of flexibility that are in fact existing, often in the context of full time and regular jobs. There were many variations on time flexibility. Working part-time or on temporary contracts were only two possibilities. Many people had the possibility to change their working schedule within the context of having a full time and regular job, so time flexibility was not only limited to precarious jobs. Time flexibility could take place across the day, the week, the year or across the life course and this would seem to be one way of introducing flexibility without worsening employment conditions

A further factor to be discussed was the role of flexibility in assisting the work-family balance. Here the main finding was that paradoxically, whilst there was a much more even division of labour between men and women in North Western EU countries, it was in these countries where the work-family conflict was felt to be most acute. In countries of ECE where there was a highly unequal division of labour and with a tradition of women working full time as well as men, there was less role conflict. Men especially would like to reduce their hours in order to spend more time with their families and this was particularly the case for better educated men. Most men worked more than 40 hours per week, so there could be a good argument for reducing hours in order to enhance family life.

[LIST OF CONTENTS]

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	8
1.1 FLEXIBILITY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE	8
1.2 BALANCING FAMILY AND WORK.....	11
1.3 FAMILY AND FLEXIBILITY REGIMES.....	11
2. BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES OF THE PROJECT	13
3. SCIENTIFIC DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT RESULTS AND METHODOLOGY	16
3.1 STUDY METHODS	16
3.2 PROJECT RESULTS.....	17
3.3 RESULTS OF THE HWF SURVEY.....	27
3.4 FLEXIBILITY OF TIME	42
3.5 PLACE OF WORK	48
3.6 CONTRACT FLEXIBILITY.....	55
3.7 POTENTIAL FLEXIBILITY	57
3.8 THE EXTENT OF FLEXIBILITY IN EUROPE.....	59
3.9 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TIME, PLACE AND CONTRACT FLEXIBILITY.....	61
3.10 FAMILY- WORK INTEGRATION.....	78
4. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS	86
4.2 FUTURE RESEARCH.....	94
4.3 POLICY IMPLICATIONS	95
5. DISSEMINATION AND EXPLOITATION OF RESULTS (SUMMARY)	100

[LIST OF TABLES]

Table 1.	Basic data about the HWF Survey	16
Table 2.	Trends in Labour Market Policies.	19
Table 3.	Country work policies	23
Table 4.	Welfare, family and flexibility regimes	26
Table 5.	Work forms and flexibility measures (% of workers in each country)	59
Table 6.	All Income earners'. The rate of the different flexibility types by countries, including farmers and self- employed, part-time workers (%)	60
Table 7.	Flexibility patterns by countries, within full-time workers, excluding farmers, self- employed and part-time workers (%)	60
Table 8.	Pearson correlation between flexibilities	61
Table 9.	Pearson correlation between flexibility types by country	62
Table 10.	Types of flexibility by basic socio-demographic indicators (% , N=5316 and 4294 for income quartiles)	64
Table 11.	The odd ratios of combined-flexibility *	65
Table 12.	The odd ratios of time-flexibility by countries and predictors*	66
Table 13.	The odd ratios of place-flexibility by countries and predictors*	67
Table 14.	The odd ratios of contract-flexibility by countries and predictors*	68
Table 15.	Atypical workers' odds of being paid a low wage compared to regular full time workers (Odds ratio)	76
Table 16.	Atypical workers' odds of being paid a high wage compared to regular full time workers (Odds ratio)	77
Table 17.	Who is mainly responsible for... ..	78
Table 18.	Distribution of domestic works.	79

[LIST OF FIGURES]

Figure 1.	Type of working schedule at main income-earning activity: Shift work.....	28
Figure 2.	Shares of respondents employed full-time.....	29
Figure 3.	Shares of respondents employed part-time.	30
Figure 4.	Shares of self employed respondents.....	31
Figure 5.	Casual work: shares of respondents working on day-to-day agreements.	32
Figure 6.	Farmers: shares of respondents.....	33
Figure 7.	Variety of income sources of individuals, multiple choice, relative shares within a sum of choices per country.....	35
Figure 8.	Variety of most important income sources of households, multiple choice, relative shares within a sum of choices per country.....	37
Figure 9.	Number of income earning activities of respondents during the last year.	39
Figure 10.	Shares of respondents who stayed in the same job for more than five years. ...	40
Figure 11.	Hours of work on the main activity, mean values per gender, per country (radar chart).....	42
Figure 12.	Hours of work on the main activity, mean values per gender, per country (bar chart).	43
Figure 13.	Types of working schedule on the main activity.	44
Figure 14.	Reasons for wanting less hours on the main activity.	45
Figure 15.	Patterns of variations in hours on the main activities.	47
Figure 16.	Place of work on the main activity.....	48
Figure 17.	Reasons for working at home (main activity).	49
Figure 18.	Variations in places of work (main activity).....	50
Figure 19.	Control over main aspects of flexibility, HWF means (main activity)	51
Figure 20.	Control over the general working schedule (main activity).....	52
Figure 21.	Control over the overtime hours (main activity).	53
Figure 22.	Control over the over place of work (main activity).	54
Figure 23.	Type of contract (main activity)	56
Figure 24.	Readiness to accept specific conditions for a new job, per countries (yes+maybe)	58
Figure 25.	Four occupational groups (ISCO 1, 4, 5 and 9) and their distribution by type of work contract and by country	72
Figure 26.	Satisfaction towards the type of contract of the ISCO groups by country	73
Figure 28.	Problems with combining work and domestic obligations, percentages per country (always and often).....	82
Figure 27.	Problems with combining work and domestic obligations (HWF means), percentages.	83

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The HWF project took place between April 2000 and April 2003. It involved a carrying out representative sample survey of individuals between 18 and 65 (N=10123) in the following countries: the UK, Sweden the Netherlands, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. These countries were chosen because of their different flexibility policies. The project considered patterns of flexibility on the one hand and work-family combinations on the other along with the role that flexibility played in balancing work and family life. The actual patterns of flexibility were looked at in terms of the policies introduced in each country.

The objectives of the project were to understand the impact of work flexibility on households in different European contexts, in terms of time (part-time, short-term work), place (where the work takes place) and conditions (what sort of contractual arrangements pertain, formal and informal arrangements) by undertaking a sample survey. This was set in the context of a description and analysis of the kinds of regulations and policies governing flexible work in different countries, including the impact of EU and national policies in this respect.

A particular focus was to look at the variations in flexibility according to gender, generation, socio-economic status, along with the work cultures and values in order to understand if flexibility had positive or negative outcomes for social cohesion. Of special importance were the contrasts between the different EU countries with different strategies of flexibility on the one hand and the post-communist Central European Countries (ECE), which have since started the Accession process to the European Union.

An important factor in the quality of life in European countries is the balance between work and family and both the survey and policy analysis were used to build up an understanding of the contrasting cultures of care and social policies enabling or preventing the balance of family and work. The role of flexibility in achieving this was also considered.

1.1 FLEXIBILITY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

There is a great deal of flexibility in Europe. Taking all income earners together, 30% were time-flexible, 15% were place flexible, 29% were contract flexible, 11% had more than one source of income (income flexible) and nearly half (47%) combined one or other of these different kinds of flexibility. Over half were prepared to work more hours, move or accept worse working conditions, retrain or learn a new language and this rose to three quarters in some countries.

Flexibility means different things in different countries. In Sweden and the Netherlands there is an attempt to promote flexibility of hours without having precarious jobs. However, even between these two countries there were differences since in Sweden both men and women were more likely to work full time and flexibility was managed over a life-time as well as on a weekly timescale to encourage the balance of family and work. In the Netherlands, however, large numbers of women work part time and others are able to negotiate their hours as a different form of managed flexibility. In the UK men (especially fathers) work very long hours and women are more likely to work part-time but in the context of precarious or no contracts. In the Czech Republic, the buoyant labour market over the last 12 years has enabled a great deal of job mobility and encouraged a lot of self-employment as either a first or a second job. In Hungary, we find the highest number of people with an irregular working schedule and in Slovenia the highest number of people (half) combine different kinds of flexibility. In Bulgaria the disappearance of regular jobs has led to a

large layer of people with very precarious jobs, which we could term “forced flexibility” and in Romania the same has happened but in addition a large number of people returned to peasant-style subsistence farming as a result. We could say, therefore, that *there is no one road to flexibility*.

The results showed that there were two different kinds of flexibility. For managers and professionals with high paying jobs there was flexibility of time and the possibility to control their flexibility. We might term this “good flexibility”. On the whole they were happy with their jobs. At the other end of the social spectrum were manual workers with precarious jobs who could not control their flexibility and were generally unhappy with their jobs. We might term this “bad flexibility”. In North Western Europe we find more flexibility of the good type (as well as in Slovenia and the Czech Republic to a lesser extent) but in ECE generally we find more of the bad kind of flexibility with a labour market divided between secure and inflexible workers and insecure very flexible ones. Flexibilisation has had a rather negative impact on workers in transition countries, especially Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary.

Good or bad flexibility could be encouraged by regulation. Policies encouraging control of flexibility within regular jobs, such as in Sweden and the Netherlands, can help to encourage a more positive form of flexibility and promote flexibility with security. Where there is no policy to control flexibility, an unregulated flexibility emerges which creates a large disadvantaged group of excluded people on precarious jobs and a strong segregation between people on who are rigid and traditional and people who are forced to be flexible. Good flexibility can be encouraged through regulation by the state and social partners. Bad flexibility is more likely to emerge when there is no regulation, too much regulation or inadequate regulation. However, there are examples of bad flexibility in all countries.

Part time work is often seen as an indicator of flexibility, but seen across the whole of Europe, this was not necessarily a good indicator. The role of part-time work is very different in ECE countries and Western Europe. In Western Europe part-time work is mainly feminised and is the way in which women combine work and family caring responsibilities. In Western Europe, part-time work was common for women (around a quarter of women in the UK and Sweden worked part time). However, in ECE countries part-time work is much more marginal (1-4% of the workforce) and is as likely to be done by men as by women. It is usually only an individual strategy for people entering retirement or who are ill or disabled. Women with children in ECE countries are not any more likely to work part time than other groups, although they are quite likely to stay at home full time to look after children whilst the children are small. In general, people in ECE countries do not want to work part-time for the very low wages, which are paid, and employers have little incentive to introduce part-time work under existing legislation. Those who were part time work were often advantaged rather than disadvantaged groups in ECE countries since this includes teachers, translators and accountants. In general, both men and women in ECE countries prefer to have life-long, secure employment.

The public discourse on flexibility ranges from the positive embracing of flexibility as a way of modernizing the labour market and creating employment whilst enabling the integration of work and family, to downright hostility and resistance. The former was found in the North Western EU countries, whilst the latter attitude was found in the ECE countries where de-regulation was the economic ideology of the early 1990s, associated with job loss, privatisation, high inflation and a widening gap between incomes and prices. The modernising approach is more likely to lead to “regulated flexibility” whereby flexibility is developed in negotiation with social partners in order to create flexible jobs and home-work balance, as is the case in Sweden and the Netherlands. On the other hand, the UK has moved from “de-regulated flexibility” aimed at removing job protection towards a more “partially de-regulated flexibility”. Some ECE countries, such as the Czech Republic and Slovenia, introduced some flexibilisation measures but also encountered strong resistance, whilst other ECE countries such as Hungary embraced flexibilisation more willingly but in the context of inadequate labour market mechanisms for regulation. We could call this “partially regulated flexibility”. However, other countries, by introducing only de-regulatory measures and not controlling flexibilisation are left with a combination of “over regulated flexibility” and “unregulated flexibility”, leading to strong divisions between regular, secure (and inflexible) workers alongside a large excluded group of people in precarious, casualised jobs and irregular incomes who are forced to be flexible. Much of this flexibility takes place in the informal as well as the formal economy. This is more the case in Romania and Bulgaria.

We can distinguish between employer-lead flexibility, that has dominated until now in ECE countries and employee-lead flexibility that has become more prominent in North Western Europe since the mid 1990s. Employee-lead flexibility allows the development of flexibility schedules suited to the needs of individual employees.

Flexibility has been associated with job creation. There were strong differences in the number of employed people in our various countries. Whilst the North Western EU countries had very high levels of employment, in Romania and Bulgaria almost half of those between 18 and 65 were out of the labour force, either unemployed, retired (partly because the age of retirement was comparatively low in those countries), housekeepers or sick/disabled. Whilst in Sweden this was only 14%, in the Netherlands only 22%, in the UK 32%, Slovenia 31%, the Czech Republic 30% and 28% in Hungary. The employment rate has dropped very dramatically in the ECE countries since the transition. Clearly there is a problem of job creation to be addressed in ECE countries. Early retirement is no longer a solution to problems of unemployment and can even exacerbate them. This was partly related to the structure of employment as well, since in those countries with higher levels of good flexibility and employment generally, there was a much larger service sector. In ECE countries, the underdevelopment of this sector means that there is still much scope for modernisation in the labour market. On the other hand, the large agricultural sector (even growing in the case of Romania and Bulgaria) is the source of much of the flexibility to be found in those countries.

One of the findings of the study is that the way in which flexibility is taken up depends upon the culture of care in different countries. In the Netherlands and the UK, part-time work is a response to the expectation that women will look after families – care of families is seen as a private problem; in Sweden the state is seen to be important in the care of children; in the candidate countries the state and employers traditionally supported full time working women with children, but this has been eroded over the last decade, and the extended family or other forms of self-help are now the most common solution, although extensive state support continues in Slovenia due to the country's relative affluence. In Hungary and the Czech Republic there is also state subsidised child care provided by municipalities and most people use this facility after the children turn 3. Nevertheless, women in ECE countries still expect to work full-time.

The combination of flexibilisation (whether regulated, partially regulated or unregulated) along with the culture of care and patterns of labour force participation in different countries has led to different gender outcomes in different parts of Europe. In Sweden, where gender egalitarian policies have been an explicit goal, flexibility is more balanced between men and women. Nevertheless, there is a group of younger, less educated workers who seem to be excluded from this protection, perhaps because they are at the beginning of their working careers. In the Netherlands the most vulnerable group for having precarious jobs are the less educated and women and this is also the case in the UK. However, in the ECE countries such as Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovenia the most vulnerable and socially excluded group on precarious contracts are men, especially younger and older workers. In Romania and Bulgaria, this is a very large group. In Hungary and Romania, deprivation also has a rural dimension.

Our results indicate that the discussion of flexibility is normally too limited. It is framed in terms of the extent of the removal of job protection and labour market regulation, whereas we have shown that it is precisely regulation that can lead to improved flexibility and wider acceptance of flexibility – to good rather than bad flexibility. The discussion of flexibility usually involves counting part-time, self-employed and contract workers. Our results show that not only are these not necessarily good measures of flexibility in a comparative context, but also that they were inadequate for understanding the many different kinds of flexibility that are in fact existing, often in the context of full time and regular jobs. There were many variations on time flexibility. Working part-time or on temporary contracts were only two possibilities. Many people had the possibility to change their working schedule within the context of having a full time and regular job, so time flexibility was not only limited to precarious jobs. Time flexibility could take place across the day, the week, the year or across the life course and this would seem to be one way of introducing flexibility without worsening employment conditions.

Whilst time flexibility was rather well-developed, place flexibility was rather under-developed in most countries and affected mainly middle aged men with particular kinds of jobs.

This leads us to conclude that there is no one road to flexibility. Flexibility has different impact in different countries according to the gender and work culture, the culture of care for families and the regulation of flexibilisation (or the lack of it). Therefore policies that would work in some contexts would not work in others. For example, encouraging full time jobs with flexible options within them would work in ECE countries but not so well in the UK or the Netherlands. Encouraging part-time work, on the other hand, will work better in some contexts (the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden) but not so much in others, such as most of ECE countries. Furthermore, we need to bear in mind the role of good and bad flexibility as policy outcomes.

1.2 BALANCING FAMILY AND WORK

Many experience a conflict between work and family, associated with role strain as well as time strain. One third of workers would like to work less hours in order to spend more time with their families. Only in the poorer countries in ECE did people want to work more hours, and there it was in order to earn more money to make ends meet.

Surprisingly, it was mainly men who felt that their work prevented them from spending enough time with their families. Those with higher education and higher income were also more likely to express this opinion.

Furthermore, it was parents that were most affected by the family-work conflict more than non-parents. Fathers in the Netherlands, the UK, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Romania felt that their work interfered with their family life. This family-work conflict was most acute in Western EU countries more than in ECE Applicant countries.

The most traditional division of labour was found in Hungary and the Czech Republic, whilst families in Western Europe were most likely to share the domestic work and in Slovenia, father's took on a substantial share of childcare. One paradoxical conclusion was that whilst in the western countries, especially in Sweden there was the strongest egalitarian principles concerning gender, it was also in that country where there most family-work conflict was experienced. It seems that in those countries where there are no aspirations to gender equality, there is also less experience of conflict. Countries where there were the most egalitarian gender policies, such as Sweden and Slovenia were also ones where women were more likely to work full time and men do more of the household work, so although the division of labour was not equal between the sexes, there did seem to be some impact on behaviour in terms of the domestic division of labour.

Hence, although people in ECE countries worked the longest hours and many of them were found in an expanding casualised sector, they did not on the whole experience family-work conflict because they had no expectations of equality. On the other hand, in Sweden, where there was the greatest degree of sharing domestic labour and a long history of policies to help balance work and family, there was the most feeling of conflict.

Policy consideration should be given to how to enable fathers to spend more time with children in European countries, perhaps by enabling more flexibility for men as well a women.

1.3 FAMILY AND FLEXIBILITY REGIMES

In the analysis of labour market, social and family policies, we can see some evidence of the welfare-state regimes defined by Esping Andersen and other analysts. However, we also need to factor in the changing and diversifying regimes of the Accession countries in ECE and to bring together the policies on flexibilisation with those for families. Our countries fall into several groups. In North Western Europe, we find the three types of welfare regime typified by our three countries and in these countries there is a shift from employer-focused flexibilisation to employee focused flexibilisation as well as the development of policies designed to be family-friendly, but in the context of the dominant family model. Hence in the Netherlands this is based upon a conservative, modified breadwinner model, with one and a half earners per household, in Sweden upon a universalist egalitarian employment model where two full time wage earners are the norm, but with state support for care of children and in the UK a liberal regime with minimal state intervention and the family regarded as a private affair. In the case of Slovenia we have an example of a welfare state that is universal and family friendly as a development of the earlier version of socialist self-management. It does indeed resemble Sweden on the Adriatic, but flexibilisation policies are not well developed there with flexible workers often coming from outside through Temporary Work Agencies and short term contracts. In the Czech Republic we find rather good facilities for childcare linked with a conservative family tendency encouraging women to stay for four years as full time mothers (but paid for this) and Hungary is similar in this respect (3 years paid maternity leave). This long period of maternal leave helps to encourage a more conservative family model, but with an income for women. In Bulgaria and Romania we find de-institutionalising systems where the previous extensive family support has been replaced with private or incomplete coverage.

In the ECE countries, flexibilisation has been mainly employer-lead although we may detect some evidence of a shift towards employee-lead flexibilisation in the very recent legislation of the Czech Republic. We would expect more convergence with full integration into the EU and the adoption of EU Directives for

atypical workers. Protection of a-typical workers is increasingly directed from a European rather than a national level and national level trades unions are focused more upon traditional industrial workers.

We can put together the welfare regime type, the family model and flexibility measures. We find that the liberal regime type is associated with de-regulatory flexibilisation policies leading to a variety of family models which are “private” solutions to the integration of family and work. Thus, in the UK we can find modified breadwinners, dual carers as well as female breadwinners. In the Netherlands, there is a conservative family-centred welfare regime, where flexibility policies are built upon concept of a private, patriarchal nuclear family where the women have the main responsibility for caring. The progressive flexibilisation measures in fact reinforce this family model. In Sweden, we find a universal welfare regime linked to regulated flexibility and family friendly policies that allow women to participate most fully in the labour market with extensive state support. In Slovenia we find a similar system, but with little attempt to introduced family friendly flexibility polices. Nor is it the outcome of feminist campaigning, but rather the extension of the previous system to promote full employment. In the Czech Republic and in Hungary, we find partially regulated flexibility along with a re-institutionalising welfare state using an individually based social insurance model coupled with egalitarian gender regime with state support. In Bulgaria and Romania we have de-institutionalising regimes with unregulated flexibility, a division between inflexible and flexible workers and “private” solutions for childcare, including egalitarian systems based upon extended family rather than the state and dual carer systems by necessity.

Flexibilisation strategies therefore need to take into account the family-gender model and the prevailing culture of work.

2. BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES OF THE PROJECT

The objectives of the project were to understand the impact of work flexibility on households in different European contexts, in terms of time (working times, hours of work), place (where the work takes place) and conditions (what sort of contractual arrangements pertain, formal and informal arrangements) by undertaking a sample survey. This was set in the context of a description and analysis of the kinds of regulations and policies governing flexible work in different countries, including the impact of EU and national policies in this respect.

A particular focus was to look at the variations in flexibility according to gender, generation, socio-economic status, along with work cultures and values in order to understand if flexibility had positive or negative outcomes for social cohesion. Of special importance were the contrasts between the different EU countries with different strategies of flexibility on the one hand and the post-communist Central European Countries (ECE), which have since started the Accession process to the European Union. In fact three of our ECE countries will soon become full members of the EU: Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Hungary. The other two are negotiating a later round of admission: Romania and Bulgaria.

An important factor in the quality of life in European countries is the balance between work and family and both the survey and policy analysis were used to build up an understanding of the contrasting cultures of care and social policies enabling or preventing the balance of family and work. One of the objectives of the project was to understand the role of flexibility in achieving this.

Europe is often compared unfavourably to the USA in terms of flexibility: whilst the US labour market is flexible, Europe is alleged to suffer from „Eurosclerosis” (Ganßman 2000). The assumption is that all European countries suffer from the same kinds of inflexibility to a greater or lesser extent. However, whilst flexibility is much discussed, it can actually mean a range of things (Pollert 1991). Apart from the well documented distinction between functional and numerical flexibility (Pollert 1988), for some, flexibility means the removal of regulations and institutions protecting workers (Riboud, Silva-Jauregui et al. 2001). For others flexibility is defined rather narrowly in terms of the extent of part-time work, the extent of fixed term contracts and the extent of self-employment. However, in most cases, flexibility is assumed from external variables. That is, it is assumed that if there is less regulation, people will be more flexible.

The opening of capital flows and subjection of national economies to global competition in the 1980s and 1990s has forced European countries to introduce flexible labour markets in order to remain competitive. This was done rather successfully in the three North Western countries that we are considering, but using different strategies. In the UK there was a de-regulatory strategy, in the Netherlands an agreement on increasing the workforce with more part time and temporary work along with wage restraint and in Sweden, flexibilisation was introduced within the policies of solidarity and full labour force participation for both men and women. In all these countries levels of participation in the labour market are very high and there was growth and prosperity through the 1990s, reflected in the optimistic and positive attitudes of respondents in the HWF survey to economic conditions. In these North Western EU countries there has been a shift from employer-lead styles of flexibility to employee-lead styles of flexibility. That is, flexibility has become more individualised, reflecting employee needs.

In ECE countries, by contrast, the regimes of full employment which were in place until the end of the 1980s were characterised by state control of the labour market, with low wages compensated by price

subsidies and high levels of social protection (for example support for working women). From the end of the 1980s, they were torn apart by the introduction of market de-regulation in the 1990s. This took mainly the form of employer-lead flexibilisation and led to the deterioration in living standards and job loss for large parts of the population. It was mainly experienced by the populations of those countries as negative, although there was an increase in prosperity after the mid-1990s and the creation of new jobs and opportunities, especially for educated people. This is reflected in the fact that the vast majority of HWF respondents in Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary are dissatisfied with their economic situation and felt that it had deteriorated even in the last five years. In Slovenia and the Czech Republic where the impact of transition was less harsh, only just over half of respondents were satisfied with the economic condition of their household (Wallace, Chvorostov, Nagaev. 2003).

The debates on flexibility have focused upon whether what is good for the economy is also good for the individual workers in the economy: are they advantaged or disadvantaged by flexibility? Many studies have pointed to the implications of flexibility for creating a more precarious labour market for low paid employees (often women or young people) (Dex 1997; Perrons 1998; Burchell, Day et al. 1999; Beck 2000; Bradley, Erikson et al. 2000; Standing 1999), whilst others have argued for the potential for using flexibility to enhance personal development and the family-work balance (Handy 1994; Hörning, Gerhard et al. 1995; Bridges 1996; Hill, Hawkins et al. 2001; Auer 2002; Spoonley and Firkin 2002; Tietze and Musson 2002). In other words, are people able to take advantage of flexibility to enhance their lives or are they rather the victims of flexibility? Relevant here are the older generation of debates about the dual or segmented labour market which differentiates between „core” protected group of employees and more peripheral groups of workers that can be more easily dismissed following fluctuations in demand (Doeringer and Piore 1971). More recent debates have argued rather that the secondary labour market has become more common for larger groups of workers, including middle class, managerial and professional workers who were previously seen as „core” workers on regular (secure) contracts (Sennet 1998).

Whilst time flexibility has been rather well documented (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 2002) (Dex 1997; O'Reilly and Fagan 1998); the emphasis has been mostly on the increasingly important role of part-time work and a variety of flexible hours contracts (annualised hours, shift working, evening and weekend working, time sharing, term-time working etc.) which have enabled employees to meet the demands of longer opening hours, round the clock demand, just in time production and so on. However, whilst part-time work, for example, is often seen as evidence of flexibility, part-time workers can be rather „rigid” in the sense of working only fixed hours. Part-time work need not be precarious and it has been the policy goal in countries such as Sweden and the Netherlands to introduce security for part time workers with comparable conditions to full time workers (Boje and Strandh 2003; Jager 2003). Contract flexibility has also been rather well discussed in terms of jobs often with fixed term contract duration. However, flexibility of place has enjoyed much less discussion, except in the analysis of telework and other IT professionals (Huws 1996; Hochgerner 1998). Nevertheless, we can see this as another way in which the needs of the labour market and the availability of the workers come together in different ways. Inflexibility of place is seen as one of the main rigidities in some countries, standing in the way of meeting labour market needs and reducing joblessness (see the discussion for example in the Czech Republic (Vecernik and Stepankova 2002)). These are all sources of flexibility within a job. However, another source of flexibility which is seldom considered is the extent to which people might combine several jobs or several sources of income. This kind of additional flexibility can provide new opportunities for some (for example it can be way of venturing into self employment) or a source of hyper-exploitation as people undertake several jobs with declining wages to make ends meet (Nelson and Smith 1999). Additional job holding has been a common source of economic activity in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe in order to augment low or declining wages.

For this reason, we have looked at flexibility of *time*, including a range of different working arrangements, flexibility of *place*, or where a person lives and works and flexibility of *conditions*, or what sort of contractual arrangements are in place. In addition, we have looked at the extent to which people have more than one source of income – in one job they may be flexible, in another not. Finally, we look at the extent to which these different kinds of flexibility relate to one another. Is it the case that time flexible workers are also precariously employed? And do those with flexible hours take on additional activities?

Flexibility is normally discussed in terms of „atypical” or „non-standard” jobs, assuming that regular, full-time employment is standard or typical work (Keller and Seifert 1995; Zilian and Flecker 1998). Atypical employment implies the introduction of new work forms. In fact we could argue that these work forms are not really so new, but that they are untypical in the era of the post-war Keynesian full (male) employment settlement that prevailed in Europe for 40 years with the expansion of the hierarchy of workers, managers and public servants in private and state bureaucracies. Such jobs are most often protected also by trade

unions who also formed part of the post-war settlement. This is still in fact the normal working pattern for the majority of employed Europeans. This was certainly the typical pattern in Eastern and Central Europe for most of the post-war period under Communist regulation, although it has been changing rapidly since 1989. Hence, standard, typical employment is not regarded as flexible. We show however, that standard employment can also be flexible and that flexibility does not depend upon the destruction of such jobs; it depends upon the way they are regulated.

The countries drawn upon exhibit different forms of flexibility in terms of policies and national statistics (Wallace 2003). These might be termed „regimes of regulation” which affect flexibility through the combination of labour market developments, state and other regulation as well as social dialogue (Regini 2000). The UK has introduced more liberal, US style flexibility policies allowing people to be hired and fired under a variety of different conditions relatively easily with weak unions and decentralised collective bargaining. This has been mainly achieved by taking away regulations to protect workers. Even though this has been mitigated by the policies of the „New Labour” since 1997, we might still regard this as partially „de-regulated flexibility”(Cousins and Tang 2003). The Netherlands and Sweden on the other hand have introduced flexibility policies during the 1990s to counteract unemployment and they have been introduced in the context of strong regulations protecting the working conditions of flexible workers and with relatively powerful Trades Union and State intervention. We have termed this „regulated flexibility”. However, we should be aware that Sweden and the Netherlands have been regulated in very different ways. In Sweden flexibility has been introduced so that people can take time out to raise families or study whilst maintaining full time employment and gender equality has been an explicit policy goal(Boje and Strandh 2003). In the Netherlands, by contrast, regulation takes place in the context of introducing part time employment or creating various flexible time options within employment in order to draw women into the workforce and ensuring the equal social benefits of time flexible workers compared to full time workers(Jager 2003). Hungary has tried to introduce flexible working arrangements since the beginning of the 1990s and although the legislation did not appear to have much impact, flexibility was nevertheless embraced at an early stage(Medgyesi 2002). We might term this „partially regulated flexibility”. The Czech Republic and Slovenia have tried to resist flexibility, seeing it as a threat to conditions, but nevertheless have introduced a range of legislation opening the way for different kinds of contractual arrangement, so they are also „partially regulated” (Vecernik and Stepankova 2002; Kopasz 2003). Finally, Romania and Bulgaria have introduced some legislation allowing part time or self employed work, but have stifled it with over-regulation, so that employers and employees find ways around this through the black economy. In those countries there has not been any progressive legislation to encourage flexibility to any extent, but the populations have been forced to become flexible due to the severe economic problems faced by people in the labour market (Stanculescu and Berevoescu 2003). This kind of flexibility tends to bypass state regulation or even not to be regulated at all, and we might term this „unregulated flexibility” and forcing workers to become flexible, since most would prefer a regular job (Wallace 2002; Wallace 2003). We were therefore interested to consider what kinds of flexibility really occur under these different regulation regimes.

The types of labour market regulation-regime outlined above could be taken as predictors of flexibility. However, rather than assuming that labour market regulation or de-regulation leads to flexibility, we should look instead at the actual patterns of flexibility, which we can then map back onto the different regulatory regimes. It is often the case, for example, that regulations are introduced and are not implemented, or are introduced but have no effect, as is the case with some of the flexibility legislation in Hungary (Medgyesi 2002). Indeed, regulations can have entirely unintended consequences and since the transformation of the ECE countries has been a big „experiment” we might expect this to be the case.

3. SCIENTIFIC DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT RESULTS AND METHODOLOGY

3.1 STUDY METHODS

The first research strategy was to collect national statistics and contextual knowledge to describe and analyse the patterns of work and household behaviour in general in the target countries.

The second research strategy was to implement a standardized representative sample survey in each country (face-to-face and telephone), aiming at a representation of the working age population between 18 and 65 in each country. The survey was designed to examine the ways in which the activities of different household members combine, covering all forms of work, including domestic work, childcare, work in the informal economy, self-provisioning, additional casual and occasional jobs, and various kinds of regular employment, and to look at attitudes to flexibility as well as actual behaviour, the ways people arrange their work and their preparedness to be flexible (N=10123). More detailed results of the survey can be found in (Wallace 2003; Wallace 2003; Wallace, Chvorostov, Nagaev. 2003).

The third strategy was to document and compare flexibility and family policies in different national contexts which were then compared in a comparative report. This was done mainly by asking partners to provide accounts of labour market and family policies and by putting these accounts together in comparative tables. These can be found in the HWF reports (Wallace 2003; Wallace 2003).

Below is some information about the surveys. Further information can be found in the various HWF reports (Wallace 2003).

Table 1. Basic data about the HWF Survey

	General sample	Conventional sample (*)	Method of Interview	Response rate	Date of the survey
The United Kingdom	945	941	Personal face-to-face	48%	February 19 – May 8, 2001
The Netherlands	1,007	1,007	Telephone	22%	March 12 – April 9, 2001
Sweden	2,292	1,284	Postal method and telephone	69%	February 19 – May 8, 2001
Slovenia	1,008	839	Personal face-to-face	65%	April 20 – June 12, 2001
Czech Republic	1,556	1,556	Personal face-to-face	50%	January 03–10, 2001
Hungary	1,166	1,166	Personal face-to-face	65%	January 31 – February 07, 2001
Romania	1,864	1,524	Personal face-to-face	85%	February 1 – March 5, 2001
Bulgaria	1,806	1,806	Personal face-to-face	87%	February 20 – March 06, 2001
Total:	955,699	1788,343			

Note: (*) Conventional sample includes only persons aged between 18 and 65. For Sweden, the sample does not include IT workers.

Source: HWF Project, 2003

3.2 PROJECT RESULTS

The project results are set out in the following way. First we introduce the policies on flexibility and the family policies. Then we turn to the survey results, drawing upon papers and reports written for the project. Only some of the data and the calculations are presented. For the rest please refer to Wallace, Chvorostov and Nagaev 2003 and Wallace 2003, Thematic Papers.

3.2.1 FLEXIBILITY POLICIES

The Western EU countries in our HWF project have all embraced flexibilisation as a way of modernizing the labour market. However, they have used different strategies and these take place within the context of different prevailing regimes of regulation (Regini 2000). The regimes of regulation are based upon government policies and the different kinds of social dialogue traditions in different countries, which are analysed in this section of the report. They are also affected by the different traditions of family policy which integrate family and work in different ways, although this is usually ignored by regulation theorists (Lewis 1992). This aspect is covered in the final section of the report. However, regulation regimes are also affected by the culture of the work as well as the culture of care and these are analysed separately in the survey reports (Wallace, Chvorostov, Nagaev 2003).

The HWF countries can be grouped according to their labour market regulation regimes. In the UK the de-regulatory policies of the 1980s and early 1990s have been replaced with policies such as a minimum income and better conditions for part time workers. We might term this a move from de-regulatory towards “partially deregulated flexibilisation”. In Sweden, flexibilisation strategies were adopted to pull the country out of the recession of the 1990s and they took the form of making work more flexible within the context of a the norm of regular full time work for both men and women. In the Netherlands since the 1980s, a distinctive strategy was adopted of getting more women into the labour market by encouraging part time work. This was extended to a concern with managing the working timetable so that hours of work could be made flexible and individualized for all employees. However, this was in the context of job protection and offering job security, what has been dubbed “flexicurity”. Both Sweden and the Netherlands therefore practice what we might call “regulated flexibility”.

In the post-communist Accession countries, it was necessary to completely modernize the labour market according to new principles after the regime changes in 1988-1990. In these countries, the norm of a controlled labour market which gave a full-time life-long job to both men and women (and discouraged mobility between jobs) was replaced by a free labour market. However, because full employment was ensured by over-manning and there was a need to modernize the industries and collective agricultural enterprises where most people had been employed, the change to a market economy was accompanied by the massive shedding of jobs and initially a dramatic fall in production and output. Also, many services that had previously been provided by employers – for example, housing, heating, nursery care - were lost or reorganized. New policies had to be introduced into the labour market, including unemployment benefits, social insurance, pension reforms and a taxation system. With these very broad changes brought about in a short period of time through a whole raft of legislation, there were of course some mistakes and miscalculations so that legislation had to be continually updated. In general Western European models of labour market reform were introduced, but did not always function well in a different work culture. To begin with the sources of welfare support, in line with the former philosophy of universal coverage, were very generous. Under the advice of international agencies and strong fiscal pressure, these policies have become increasingly less generous and moved from a model of universal provision towards one of “workfare” - from passive and towards active labour market policies. This in fact reflects trends in labour market policies throughout Europe.

The Accession countries of ECE did not at first set themselves the goal of becoming “flexible” but nevertheless provisions for self-employment and part-time work as well as fixed term contracts were introduced in the early 1990s. Indeed at that time, the neo-liberal model of reform prevailed, which implied that it was better to get rid of all regulations and let the market free to take its own course. There was therefore an ideological consensus against regulation. The disastrous effects of this policy in terms of unemployment, impoverishment and the criminalisation of the economy lead to a backlash against market reform and the election of governments that instead put on the brakes. Once again there was no strategy for regulated flexibilisation. However, a great deal of spontaneous flexibilisation in fact took place as people moved jobs, moved professions, became self-employed or took on casual work. Informal methods of

flexibilising rather rigid rules also took place, for example with regard to official salaries on which social insurance was paid and top-up salaries which were provided unofficially. At least some of this was hidden by the grey economy as the legislation to control and incorporate economic activities often did not keep pace with the changes in economic behaviour. Where there have been progressive labour market and taxation policies, more and more activities have moved out of the grey economy and into the formal economy, as is the case in the Czech Republic and Hungary (Wallace and Haerfper 2002). We might call these “partially regulated flexibilisation” as a result, even if they did not embrace flexibility in the same way as the Northern European countries did. Slovenia, by contrast is a country that has been slow to introduce reforms, buoyed up by a prosperous economy and levels of GDP closer to the EU average. It could begin such reforms only after the independence in 1991 and not earlier as in the Czech Republic or Hungary (Sicherl, Stanovnik et al. 2003). In general the economies of all three of the more “prosperous” Accession countries – the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia – started to recover after the middle of the 1990s and have generally been improving since then. In the Czech Republic, an ideological battle between liberalization and social protection has raged around the concept of flexibility (Vecernik 2003). Nevertheless a range of legislation has been introduced which can aid flexibility and its implementation was assisted by the buoyant labour market with very low unemployment in the first part of the 1990s, enabling people to move between jobs with little risk of ending up unemployed. In Hungary, by contrast, there were rather progressive labour market reforms and attempts to introduced flexible measures, such as part-time work, from the beginning. However, these had rather limited success, since the take up was not impressive and many policies were subsequently abandoned or abolished (Kopasz 2003). High rates of unemployment make flexibility by employees into a personal risk.

In all Accession countries, transition lead to increasing polarization of income, differentiation within the workforce, job loss and rising poverty. Ethnic groups such as Roma were especially affected but so were young people and those in rural areas. Poverty was especially acute in the two least prosperous Accession countries, Romania and Bulgaria, whose economies did not pick up from the transition slump until the end of the 1990s (Kovacheva and Pancheva 2003; Stanculescu and Berevoescu 2003). This improvement affected the population in very patchy ways with a small number prospering and large numbers remaining poor or getting even poorer. Labour market and social security reforms were slow and often inappropriate or contradictory and could not match the impoverishment of the population, so that many people fell out of coverage altogether. The result was that more activities were pushed into the informal economy as people had to make ends meet without official incomes and inadequate or absent benefits (Wallace and Haerfper 2002). In Romania, this job loss accompanied by land restitution lead to large numbers (many of whom had been forcibly urbanized in the recent past) returning to the land and to subsistence production as a household strategy (Wallace 2002). In those latter two countries, therefore, there is a labour market divided between those still holding traditional (inflexible) jobs and a very flexible sector, where people live from casual work, self-employment, agriculture and could be said to be socially excluded. This flexibility takes place in spite of the lack of reform and so we might call this “unregulated flexibility”. However, it is also a product of the over-regulation and over taxation of some sectors such as self employment making it very difficult for people to legally become entrepreneurs.

The process of EU integration has introduced a new dynamic into this picture by including various labour market and social policy reforms as part of the Accession negotiations. In all countries it has been necessary to set up a National Employment Action Plan in response to the EU Employment Strategy. More detailed accounts of the different labour market policies in each country can be found in the HWF Report Number 2 (Wallace 2003). Here, we provide only a basic overview and summary of trends.

This can be summarized in the chart below. Here we contrast the past (1980s) with the present and the last decade when flexibilisation became a debate in many countries and there were attempts to respond to pressures to flexibilise. We concentrate only on a very general national level here. In the UK there was a movement from de-regulation by removing social protection and labour market controls, to one of partially regulated flexibility under “New Labour”. However, the legislation passed under New Labour (much of it arising from EU Directives) is regarded as the UK partners on the HWF project as minimal. In the Netherlands and Sweden we see the change in already strongly regulated labour markets to introduce flexibility within the context of continuing strong regulation and relatively strong involvement of the Trades Unions. In the Post-Communist countries we can see a movement of strong state control of the labour market and a deliberate (official) policy of anti-flexibility towards various degrees of regulated flexibility. In Hungary, there has been the most attempt to embrace such legislation, in the Czech Republic and in Slovenia more reluctant attempts. In Bulgaria and Romania the general economic crisis and lack of coherent policies have lead to a situation where flexibilisation is largely unregulated, even though some reform measures are in place.

Table 2. Trends in Labour Market Policies.

1980s	1990s and 2000s	
De-regulated flexibility	Partially de-regulated flexibility	UK
Regulated non-flexibility	Regulated flexibility	The Netherlands Sweden
Strongly regulated anti-flexibility	Partially regulated flexibility	Hungary Czech Republic Slovenia
Strongly regulated anti-flexibility	Mainly unregulated flexibility	Bulgaria Romania

Source: HWF Project, Claire Wallace, 2003

In all countries under consideration, some policies, which could be considered as leading towards flexibilisation, have been introduced. In the North Western EU countries, part time work and self-employment had already existed, but new legislation facilitating this along with temporary work was introduced from the 1980s and especially in the 1990s. In the ECE countries, such measures only became possible after 1989. However, the extent to which such policies have been introduced and the extent to which they have been effective is variable. Since 1997, many atypical jobs are regulated by EU Directives rather than on a national level in any case, so this is no longer an issue of national policies. EU directives have been concerned to protect the situation of precarious workers and women through directives on working time and parental leave. They have made the situation of flexible workers more secure. This coincides also with the Accession of ECE countries (excluding Bulgaria and Romania) to the EU.

In the UK, the de-regulatory policies of the 1980s and early 1990s were to some extent reversed after the election of the New Labour Government. Before that time, there was a progressive removal of job protection and wage protection. Conditions for part-time workers were reduced. Dismissal was made easier and the Trade Unions subdued – they no longer formed part of the national negotiations over labour market policies. In the UK it is also very easy to set up a small business. After 1998, protection for part time workers was introduced as well, but this was mainly in response to EU Directives on Working Time. In 1997 the Part Time Work Directive was introduced, coming into force in 2000, the 1999 Fixed Term Work Directive took force in 2002 and a new Directive on Temporary Work Agencies will also come into force this year (2003). Although the situation for non-standard workers has improved, they still do not enjoy the security and conditions that they have in the Netherlands and Sweden, which is why we have termed the UK “partly de-regulated”.

In the Sweden and the Netherlands a variety of measures were introduced in the 1990s to improve flexibility. Part time employment was encouraged in the Netherlands along with negotiated hours, which form part of the collective as well as individual labour negotiations. In both countries self-employment was encouraged and the situation of people on fixed term contracts improved so that after a certain time they must be offered full time jobs (this is also a response to EU Directives). However, there was also legislation to protect the position of part-time employees. Although this has been listed here as impeding flexibilisation, we could also see it as encouraging flexibility between and within firms by minimizing the risks when leaving a job.

It is evident that there was a general liberalization of labour markets in ECE countries through de-regulation throughout the 1990s and even from the 1980s in Hungary. However, the Trade Unions in both the Czech Republic and in Slovenia have tried to resist flexibilisation in industries that they control and during the tripartite negotiations. Legislation to encourage self-employment was considered especially important and as we have seen in the Czech Republic and Hungary, it had the result of encouraging a lot of self-employment, even if not all license holders started businesses.

Hungary embraced flexibilisation from the late 1980s, but Hungary also provides an example of how not all legislation that was introduced was successful (Medgyesi 2002). One programme introduced subsidies to encourage self-employment in 1991. By 1997 only 1-2% of the self-employed who were eligible had taken up such opportunities and this is the same story in many other ECE countries, such as Romania. It is doubtful if unemployed people make the best candidates for self-employment and they often live in depressed areas, where any kind of business initiative is difficult. A second scheme tried to encourage the

employers to employ the unemployed as casual workers. The employers were given a free “work book” and they received subsidies for their social security. The unemployed had an incentive to participate because they became eligible once more for unemployment benefit after a certain number of days work. However, the scheme was not a great success. An Act to encourage part-time work, introduced in 1991 through subsidising employers to make people part time rather than lay them off. This at first attracted 30 000 participants, but later the numbers fell off to just one sixth of the original numbers and in 1997 it was replaced with another similar scheme targeted at particular groups of employees, but this was also unpopular. However, new measures were introduced through the National Employment Fund. It is possible that such flexibility measures were introduced too soon, before either employers or employees were ready for them and that there will be more take up in future.

In Romania and Bulgaria many of the policies to encourage flexibilisation were even contradictory. For example, although it is possible to become self-employed, there are a dense forest of restrictions and permits to be negotiated. Legislation is mainly concerned with maintaining the working week rather than with reducing it.

The fact that policies aimed at encouraging flexibilisation are not many in number and are often contradictory or not well implemented or received in ECE does not mean that there is little flexibility. Both employees and employers have found a variety of ways to create flexibility of pay, conditions and hours on an informal basis, either by creating additional informal and casual jobs that evade the legislation or by creating additional conditions within the existing jobs, such as “top up” salaries. Furthermore the large numbers of casual and agricultural workers are forced to be flexible since they have no alternative employment. Many live from casual jobs from day-to-day. Some flexibility is even a continuation of the former second economy (Stanculescu and Berevoescu 2003)

We can say that there are flexibility policies that related first of all to a-typical jobs – that is, temporary, part-time and self-employment. In general the growth of these kinds of jobs in all countries has been accompanied by legislation, which first of all encourages such kinds of work and secondly, since the end of the 1990s, has attempted to make such work more secure. Such jobs have been the explicit target of EU Directives. However, we can also identify a whole range of flexibility policies within typical, regular employment. In the UK, Sweden, the Netherlands and the Czech Republic, work contracts and working hours have become more and more individualised. These measures can take a whole variety of forms from sabbaticals, care leave, negotiated hours, teleworking and so on.

This reflects perhaps a shift from flexibility which was intended to assist employers (Atkinson and Meager 1986) to flexibility from the point of view of the employee. Such individualisation of working contracts reflects the shifts in the welfare state as well as the nature of Social Dialogue. However, in most ECE countries, we still see a priority given to employer type flexibility policies or a division of the labour market between protected and unprotected workers, the former being inflexible and the latter highly flexible. This reflects the weakness or extreme defensiveness of the Trades Union organisation in those countries.

We could also make a distinction between the regulated forms of formal flexibility which we find in the North Western EU countries, especially Sweden and the Netherlands, and the informal forms of unregulated or partially regulated flexibility that we find in the ECE countries, especially Romania and Bulgaria.

3.2.2 FAMILY AND SOCIAL POLICIES

There have been a range of studies attempting to typologies welfare state regimes since the influential work of Esping-Andersen (Esping-Andersen 1990) in defining “Three worlds of welfare capitalism” building upon the earlier work of Richard Titmuss. Esping Andersen defined three welfare regime types: the liberal-minimal (characterized by the USA), the conservative-family centred (characterized by Germany) and the social-democratic (characterized by Sweden). Since then, others have added a “Southern European welfare regime” which is “sub-institutional” in nature (characterized by Greece, Spain and Portugal) (Gallie and Paugam 1999). Our three EU countries fit quite neatly into Esping-Andersen’s clusters, with the UK representing the liberal model, the Netherlands the conservative model and Sweden the democratic model. However, the welfare regimes of ECE represent a different set of models missing from these classifications until now. The ECE model of the communist period was a universal welfare system linked to employment: rights were earned through participation in the workforce. Rather than being based upon the breadwinner family and social insurance, rights were individually earned through the participation of all members of the society, including women. The ECE model of the communist period has given way to a more differentiated picture among CIS and Accession countries. They can be classified as “re-institutionalising” regimes of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia in which the communist-era welfare regimes are being remodeled,

often deriving from the Bismarckian social insurance model of the Central European conservative regimes, but based upon individual rather than family centred insurance. The South-Eastern countries of Bulgaria and Romania, by contrast, could be seen as “de-institutionalising regimes” where the universal coverage of the communist period has given way to more patchy coverage of the population and a division between secure, regularly employed workers and a casual, irregularly employed ones. These perhaps more resemble the southern European welfare model, or what Gallie and Paugham have called the “sub institutional model” although they are probably not based upon it (Gallie and Paugam 1999).

A number of studies have tried to produce typologies of the welfare state regimes with regard to family policies, following criticisms of the neglect of gender in Esping Andersen’s original work. Barbara Haas (Haas 2003) identifies studies using structural criteria such as that by Jane Lewis (Lewis 1992) and studies using cultural criteria such as those by Birgit Pfau-Effinger (Pfau-Effinger 1998; Pfau-Effinger 2003). Structural criteria include the provision of benefits and assistance to parents, cultural criteria include expectations of family life and the gendered division of labour. Haas has helpfully provided us with a synthesis of these two approaches, but applied only to small range of EU countries: Austria, the Netherlands and Sweden. Here we apply the scheme to all the HWF countries (Table 3.1).

We have divided the columns according to structural factors (social provision, eligibility) and cultural factors (expectations and norms). It is not necessarily the case the people’s family practices form themselves around social policies. As we have seen with the previous section on flexibilisation, it is sometimes the case that the policies are not implemented properly or are not taken up by the population. We have also made a division between countries as they were in the past and the models that they are moving towards at present, since this aspect of social life is not static, but changing according to path-dependent developments. Each country can fit into several categories, because we do not find 100% of families in any one category. Indeed, probably all models can be found to some extent in all countries. We have simply classified them according to the predominant models.

Beginning with the *traditional breadwinner model*, we could say that this is the traditional model in all countries, including the post-communist countries before the Second World War and in EU countries more recently. In this model, the man is the breadwinner, the woman takes over caring functions in a traditional male-female division of labour. This model was supported in most European welfare states through the social insurance system, the pension system, school hours, wage negotiations and so on. Culturally, it is based upon the assumption of a traditional division of labour between men and women in the home. The family is seen as a private sphere and members of the family should primarily have responsibility for caring for their members. This model has been challenged by the movement of women into the workforce, the increasing number of single parent and divorced families as well as by male unemployment. Nevertheless it is a model upon which the gender division of labour is still to a great extent based. This model was found in the Netherlands until recently and to a great extent in the UK as well. Although more women are now in the labour force and the gender division of labour is showing some signs of change, the traditional breadwinner model is still found in many families in the UK and the Netherlands. Some families in Eastern and Central Europe are also starting to follow this model where the “new rich” are able to earn enough money to support a dependent wife and children. In ECE countries it is also the norm during the long extended parental leave lasting sometimes several years.

The *modified breadwinner model* assumes still that the man is the main breadwinner. However, women are drawn into the workforce on a part-time basis as supplementary wage earners. The structures of the welfare state and the employment market still support the male breadwinner role, but women are expected to combine labour market participation with caring for children and family through part time work. The family is still seen as a private sphere which has responsibility for caring for its members and wife/mother of the family is the main carer in the home. State support for childcare is therefore minimal. This model was found predominantly in the UK in the past and in the Netherlands as well as the UK in the present. The Netherlands has moved from a “traditional breadwinner model” towards a “modified breadwinner model”. This model is not very common in ECE countries because part-time work for women is not established there.

The *egalitarian employment model* assumes that both men and women work full time in the labour market, even if women may take time off for parental leave, during which time they resort more to the traditional breadwinner model. In this model, the state, the municipality (or state employer) supports the participation of women in the workforce and takes over some care and responsibility for children. The expectation is that women and men will work full time and that someone else will take over the care of the children, even though women may still be mainly responsible for care. In the case of Sweden there is the provision of child care places and crèches from when the child is born up to 6 years which are accessible to

everybody. In the communist countries until 1989 it was mainly the state that took over this role, providing crèches from early in the morning until late at night at nominal fees or for free. In ECE countries the state was supplemented by the extended family, mostly in the form of grandparents (sometimes co-resident), who took care of children when the wife/mother was at work. This was basically the communist model of family-work integration, based mainly upon the principle of boosting population growth whilst maximising economic output. Paradoxically, the family remained nevertheless a private sphere, a retreat from the state, so that the division of labour continued to follow the traditional pattern from pre-communist times (Watson 1993). Now, as the state as well as employers have withdrawn from this responsibility, it is increasingly the extended family that takes over this role, or otherwise children are supervised “at a distance” by telephone. This is recognised in the right to take parental leave, which in Bulgaria, for example, can be taken by grandparents as well as parents. At the present time, Sweden continues to have this model, as does Slovenia, which has continued with the family policies of the previous era and even improved them. In other post-communist countries, this state and employer support has been cut, but women continue to work full time, so that the extended family becomes more important in this model. Whilst in the first two models it is believed that children are best cared for by their mothers, in the egalitarian employment model it is believed that collective childcare provision is actually a better form of care for children, enabling them to socialise with other children and to receive professional pedagogical supervision.

The ECE countries have tended to extend the period of maternal leave, in the Czech Republic up to 4 years, which means that whilst children are small, a more traditional breadwinner model is emerging, but this is with support from social insurance.

The *dual carer model* is more a product of modern labour market conditions and the increasing professional role of women in the labour market. In this model, both men and women work full time (as in the egalitarian employment model) but the family continues to be a private sphere (as in the traditional breadwinner model). Structurally, there is no state assistance, nor is there assistance from the extended family: the nuclear family is entirely responsible for childcare and seeks to find private solutions for the problem of childcare. It is a model found often in the US and Canada (Pratt and Hanson 1991; Hochschild 1997) and parents frequently believe that only they can adequately care for their children. The care of children is arranged around the husband/father and the wife/mother working in shifts in order to manage the care of the children, or in arranging their working life around school hours. It is expected that childcare and to some extent household work is shared, even if the woman may still be mainly responsible. Some couples may resort to this model for financial reasons, because in countries such as the UK and the USA buying unsubsidised private child care is very expensive, sometimes exceeding what women can earn. Therefore, whilst some couples may resort to this model for ideological reasons, others would do it for financial reasons. This dual carer model can be found in the UK and we can assume that it is increasingly common in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania where the state system has been withdrawn and the extended family system has broken down for one reason or another. This model is also supported by the increasing individualisation of the welfare system.

Finally, we find the *female breadwinner model*, and this would include the small but growing number of cases where women are the main breadwinners in the household as well as the large number of cases where women might be single parents. Nevertheless, it is increasingly common in the UK that women are the main breadwinners and it is not unknown in other countries. In the HWF survey, 49% of women in Britain claimed to be the main breadwinners in their households (see HWF Report no. 4). We might assume that under these circumstances, men may take over some of child care and domestic tasks (although probably not to the extent of the women in the traditional breadwinner model). As we have seen, women take up an increasing proportion of places in Higher Education so that at least some of these women may become breadwinners. In working class communities where men have lost their jobs, it is also often the case that they are forced to take over the female role in the household (Wheelock 1990). In this model, the family is once more a private sphere and responsible for its own members. The increasing individualisation of the welfare system which is no longer based so much upon gender, but rather upon individual entitlements supports this system (Lewis 2002). The latter two models are perhaps emergent ones. However, changes in the welfare state support such developments as the social insurance system that assumed a male breadwinner supporting his family is increasingly replaced by individualised benefits and insurances.

Table 3. Country work policies

	Structural criteria	Cultural Criteria	Countries in the 1980s and before	Countries now
Traditional breadwinner model	Support of male breadwinner with female dependent. Social insurance via male breadwinner	Expectation that man will be main wage earner and woman will do most of the household work and child care	UK, The Netherlands	UK The Netherlands
Modified breadwinner model	Support for male breadwinner and encouragement of part time work for women	Expectation that man is main breadwinner but that women will work part time and continue to do most of the housework and childcare Parental care of children seen as best	UK	The Netherlands UK
Egalitarian Employment model	Encourages both men and women to work in the labour market full time. State support for children	Expectation for women and men to work full time. Childcare taken over by the state or extended family (although women might be still mainly responsible) Collective care of children seen as best.	Sweden Slovenia Czech Republic Hungary Bulgaria Romania	Sweden Slovenia Czech Republic Hungary Bulgaria Romania
Dual carer model	Expectation of men and women as full time workers. Individualisation of benefits and insurance	Expectation of sharing of both employment and household work Parental care of for children seen as best		The UK
Female breadwinner model	Woman as main breadwinner. Individualisation of benefits and insurance	Woman in the labour market, man possibly in the home Parental care of for children seen as best or supported by extended family		All countries

Source: HWF Project, Claire Wallace, 2003

The flexibilisation of work is not only a labour market policy. The ability of men, but especially women with children to participate in paid employment depends to a great extent upon the childcare policies, parental and maternity leave in each country. This could also be said to be part of the European Social Model. However, these are highly variable and often follow the welfare state regimes and family models described earlier. Family and social policy is usually discussed separately and seldom explicitly part of a flexibilisation strategy, except perhaps in the case of Sweden where parents can work part-time until their child is 8 years old. Increasingly in other countries, the right to change hours to suit caring arrangements is being recognised (in the UK as well as in the Netherlands). However, these kind of family friendly policies have not affected ECE countries with the exception of Slovenia. In ECE countries, part time work is more a labour market strategy to avoid unemployment.

In analysing these different models, we should be aware of different principles of support for families and children. The first is with regard to the source of support for families with children. For example, in the UK, where the family is regarded as a private sphere and childcare a private problem, child support is provided mainly through tax credits to families and individuals, the idea being that families should buy in the support that they need in this way. This mechanism is not well developed in other contexts and in post-communist countries, the tax system can even work in a negative way, against the support of families which are

supported from other areas of the state budget (Kovacheva and Pancheva 2003). In the Netherlands, the tax system is used to support employers who provide childcare facilities, whilst in Sweden childcare is provided directly through the state and the municipalities, as in Slovenia where it is also substantially publicly subsidised. In other countries, such as the Czech Republic and Hungary, it is the social insurance system which is used to pay for maternity leave and benefits to families should cover child care. Municipalities, private and non-governmental organisations have increasingly taken over public care of children but this is subsidised. We can see therefore different combinations of indirect (taxation) as well as social insurance and direct support for families with children.

Secondly, there is the extent of public or private care for children. Whilst in all countries, both systems exist, the emphasis varies. In Sweden there is public child care support for children aged 0-6 which is provided at a nominal charge. In Slovenia, the public child care facilities for all pre-school children is supplemented by private facilities, but these are also subsidised. In the UK public facilities are only available for children at risk and not for other families, who must resort to private provisions, either in nurseries or with child minders. In the Czech Republic and in Hungary there are rather good childcare provisions with facilities for children up to three years (crèches) were reduced to a minimum after parental leave was extended up to four years (three years in the case of Hungary). In Bulgaria and Romania there is public child care provision, but the quality is poor and the infrastructure low. Private child care centres as well as private sector child minding arrangements are of good quality with good infrastructure, but too expensive for most people to use. The breakdown of the previous extensive childcare arrangements have not been replaced with alternatives in these “de-institutionalising” models.

We should also distinguish between formal childcare arrangements and informal ones. In all countries, private informal arrangements are the norm, but in Bulgaria and Romania such informal arrangements have taken over as other public facilities have declined. This may even take the form of no supervision of children at all as they simply come home from school and wait for their parents, or remote supervision through telephone calls.

We should also consider developments in the system of family and social policies, since these are evolving systems. In the UK, the system of family support has received considerable impetus in recent years, with increasing credits given to families with children as well as nursery and child care places being provided. Some thought has been given to the integration of family and working life and ways of getting more women to participate in the labour force, so we could say that the UK has become more family friendly in recent years whilst maintaining the principle of private responsibility of care and individualised provisions. In Sweden there has been a slight contraction of support for mothers in favour of support for fathers who have been encouraged to take leave to care for children. However, the system remains generous in supporting parents with children to integrate work and care whilst maintaining the principle of public, collectivised provision. In the Netherlands there is little public provision of childcare, although this has been under consideration as part of the attempts to manage the integration of work and care. In all these EU countries, therefore, family support has generally been expanding or is at high levels already.

In the post-communist countries, the previous system of support for working women through public child care provision was mainly a way of attempting to boost the population whilst maximising economic productivity. Therefore these provisions were never introduced on account of feminist pressure or in order to be family friendly. Nevertheless in outcome they were family friendly policies, implemented mainly in the latter two decades of the communist system. Since the 1990s these systems have undergone extensive reforms. Social insurance has been introduced, which in the Czech Republic and Hungary is used as a form of family support. A private sector has been introduced, offering alternative child care facilities. On the other hand, employers no longer offer child care facilities for their employees as they may have done in the past and responsibility for this has been mainly devolved to the municipalities, who are suffering from lack of funding. Social policies have become more targeted rather than universal, aiming to reach families with particular needs, such as those with disabled children or with parents unemployed, or single parents. Benefits have become more and more means tested rather than universal. The introduction of an NGO sector has meant that some caring and assistance functions have been taken over by such organisations, so that provision for families is far more fragmented and differentiated. However, in countries such as Romania and Bulgaria where the deterioration of the previous public services has not been matched by affordable alternatives, the informal care of children by relatives or by parental self-help became more important.

In the post-communist countries, there has been generally a cut-back and diminution of support for families, as the communist era policies have been reformed and facilities are constantly cut back or allowed to go into decline. Even now, there is little consideration of family friendly policies or initiatives to support

women and families in care and in work. This debate is not part of the policy agenda at all. The exception is Slovenia, where the high GDP and buoyant economy have enabled a continuation and even improvement in family friendly policies, making it more similar to Sweden than the other countries under consideration here.

In many countries, there is an increasing attempt to involve fathers and not just mothers in the parental leave and the provision of care for children. In Sweden, where such recognition already existed, the possibility of the paternal role involvement has been extended. In Slovenia and Bulgaria this even extends to the extended family where grandparents can take parental leave if necessary. This reflects perhaps the decline of the traditional breadwinner model in favour of the dual carer model in social policies.

We should also be aware of the implementation and take up of such policies instead of just considering what exists on paper. For example, in the Netherlands people use childcare nurseries only for a couple of days per week and not the whole week and parents prefer to take care of their children at least part of the time themselves. Furthermore, there has traditionally not been sufficient facilities and the quality was lower than in other countries such as Sweden. However, this is changing in recent government initiatives to encourage municipalities to provide more places for the children of working mothers. In the post-communist countries the provision of private facilities as an alternative to public facilities has been accompanied by a decline in the use of this kind of child care because it is not affordable for most parents, except in Slovenia where this kind of care is subsidised. The post-communist economic realities create numerous difficulties for working parents. For example, in Bulgaria, there are often problems with paying insurance for pregnancy in small private companies. Employers in private companies do not allow fathers or grandparents to take the leave for child rearing by exerting informal pressure and threatening dismissal. Furthermore, since increasing numbers of people work informally, casually or without a work contract, they are not covered by social insurance and not entitled to maternity or parental leave, which makes this group particularly vulnerable to receive no protection in risks of pregnancy and motherhood. Furthermore, although mothers and even fathers are entitled to take extended leave, in fact very few are able to afford to do this in the current climate and sometimes they are threatened with dismissal if they try.

3.2.3 LABOUR MARKET, FAMILY AND GENDER REGIMES

In the analysis of labour market, social and family policies, we can see some evidence of the welfare-state regimes defined by Esping Andersen and other analysts. However, we also need to factor in the changing and diversifying regimes of the Accession countries in ECE and to bring together the policies on flexibilisation with those for families. Our countries fall into several groups. In North Western Europe, we find the three types of welfare regime typified by our three countries and in these countries there is a shift from employer-focused flexibilisation to employee focused flexibilisation as well as the development of policies designed to be family-friendly, but in the context of the dominant family model. Hence in the Netherlands this is based upon a conservative, modified breadwinner model, in Sweden upon a universalist egalitarian employment model and in the UK a liberal regime with minimal state intervention and the family regarded as a private affair. In the case of In Slovenia we have an example of a welfare state that is universal and family friendly as a development of the earlier version of socialist self-management. It does indeed resemble Sweden on the Adriatic, but flexibilisation policies are not well developed there. In the Czech Republic we find rather good facilities for childcare linked with a conservative family tendency encouraging women to stay for four years as full time mothers (but paid for this) and this is similar in Hungary. In Bulgaria and Romania we find de-institutionalising systems where the previous extensive family support has been replaced with private or incomplete coverage. In the ECE countries, flexibilisation has been mainly employer-lead although we may detect some evidence of a shift towards employee lead flexibilisation in the very recent legislation of the Czech Republic. We would expect more convergence with full integration into the EU.

Protection of atypical workers is increasingly directed from a European rather than a national level and national level trades unions are focused more upon traditional industrial workers.

Turning to Table 4 below, we put together the welfare regime type, the family model and flexibility measures. We find that the liberal regime type is associated with de-regulatory flexibilisation policies leading to a variety of family models which are “private” solutions to the integration of family and work. In the UK we can find modified breadwinners, dual carers as well as role reversal. In the Netherlands, there is a conservative family-centred welfare regime, where flexibility policies are built upon concept of a private, patriarchal nuclear family where the women have the main responsibility for caring. The progressive flexibilisation measures, in fact reinforce this family model. In Sweden, we find a universal welfare regime linked to regulated flexibility and family friendly policies that allow women to participate most fully in the

labour market with extensive state support. In Slovenia we find a similar system, but with little attempt to introduced family friendly flexibility policies, but rather an extension of the former socialist self-management system. In the Czech Republic and in Hungary, we find partially regulated flexibility along with a re-institutionalising welfare state using an individually based social insurance model coupled with egalitarian gender regime with state support. In Bulgaria and Romania we have de-institutionalising regimes with unregulated flexibility, a division between inflexible and flexible workers and “private” solutions for childcare, including egalitarian systems based upon extended family rather than the state and dual carer systems by necessity.

Table 4. Welfare, family and flexibility regimes

	Welfare regime type	Flexibility regime type	Family-gender regime type
UK	Liberal	De-regulatory/partially de-regulated	Modified breadwinner Dual carer Female breadwinner
The Netherlands	Conservative	Regulated	Modified breadwinner
Sweden	Universal	Regulated	Egalitarian
Slovenia	Universal	Partially regulated	Egalitarian
Czech Republic	Re-institutionalising	Partially regulated	Egalitarian
Hungary	Re-institutionalising	Partially regulated	Egalitarian
Bulgaria	De-institutionalising	Unregulated	Egalitarian Dual carer
Romania	De-institutionalising	Unregulated	Egalitarian Dual carer

3.3 RESULTS OF THE HWF SURVEY

In the survey we looked at a range of different kinds of flexibility and a range of sources of tension or compatibility between home and work. In one report we have included the multivariate analysis according to different themes (Wallace 2003) and in another report we have considered mainly the bivariate analysis according to break such as gender, age, income, urban-rural dimensions (Wallace, Chvorostov, Nagaev, 2003).


Here we provide a synthesis of these results. First we consider flexibility and secondly we consider family-work balance.

3.3.1 FLEXIBILITY.

We considered a range of sources of flexibility. As well as the numbers in self-employment, part-time work and contract work, we considered different sources of income of individuals and households, the ways in which different income sources were combined and the extent of job changing. We divided flexibility according to that of time, place and contract and we looked at how much flexibility there was within regular jobs as well as a-typical employment. Finally we looked at potential flexibility – to what extent were people prepared to be flexible?

Let us begin with the conventional definitions of flexibility – part-time and temporary work, sometimes called “a-typical” employment (Figures 1-8). Starting with part-time work in Figure 3 we can see that it is most often carried out in the North Western EU countries and in those countries it is mainly women who do this work. In ECE countries, part-time work is marginal and is as likely to be done by men as by women. Shift work is found more often in the ECE countries, reflecting the dominance of industry in the structure of employment Figure 1. However, shift work is also quite often carried out in the UK. Shift work is most often done by men in the West and women in the East. Self-employment was rather common in the Western European countries and in the Czech Republic Figure 4. However, it was represented a small but significant share of the workforce in all countries. In all countries, men are more likely to be self-employed than are women. Farmers are very unevenly distributed Figure 6. In EU countries they represent only a very small number of the employed but in Romania, 20% of the workforce were farmers, reflecting the re-ruralisation of the population which is further discussed in this report. Casual workers, like farmers, are most common in Romania where they represent another aspect of forced flexibilisation Figure 5. We can see from these charts, that especially part-time work, shift work and farming show very large variations between countries. However, many different forces are hidden behind these trends. In the West part time work fits with the “modified breadwinner model” of the family, this is not the case in the East. Whilst in most countries farming employs a declining number of people, in Romania their numbers are increasing. Shift work reflects the structure of employment in different countries, whilst the number of fixed term contracts is often a response to a labour market with high job protection rather than vice versa. By looking only at such data, we are not really comparing like with like in terms of flexibility across different countries. This is why we decided to broaden the picture of flexibility in our research.

Figure 1. Type of working schedule at main income-earning activity: Shift work




Note: HWF Questionnaire, Q1.12: The main income-earning activity. "Is your working schedule REGULAR / SHIFT WORK / FLEXTIME / OTHER REGULAR // IRREGULAR?"

Source: HWF Survey 2001 – Unified international data collection.

Around half of the total sample of working aged population between 18 and 65 is employed full time. (see Figure 2) The highest number of full time employees is in Sweden, where 58% of respondents are thus employed and this was followed by Slovenia with 50%, the Czech Republic with 49%, Hungary with 46%, Bulgaria with 41%, the United Kingdom with 41% and Romania with only 35%.

In the old EU countries, it was clear that most of the full time workers were often men and this was the case in Slovenia and the Czech Republic too, although in other ECE countries full time work was more evenly spread between men and women. The percentage of female full time workers (compared to all full time workers) was highest in the new European countries, especially Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary. The share of female full time employees was lowest in the UK with only 31% of all workers because they are more likely to work part time. Older people are the least likely to be employed full time and full time employment is concentrated mainly among the prime aged groups (30-59). Full time employment was also found more often in the better-educated groups and among the higher income groups. Those in urban and semi-urban areas were most likely to be full time employed.

Figure 2. Shares of respondents employed full-time.




Notes: (1) HWF Questionnaire, Q1.06; value option "Employed full-time".
 (2) (*) for the Netherlands, data refer to the respondents with "Regular working hours (traditional working week of 5 days, Monday to Friday)".

Sources: (1) HWF Survey 2001 – Unified international data collection
 (2) Annet Jager, Country Survey Report // HWF Series of Project Research reports. Research Report #3 "HWF Survey: Country Survey Reports". Ed. C.Wallace. Vienna, 2003 P. 86

Part time employment (Figure 3) is found most frequently in the Netherlands (26 %), UK and Sweden with 16% of people working part time. Part time employment in the new European countries was rather negligible with 4% or less of workers in the CEE countries working part time. Part time employment is found mainly among women, but the extent to which this is the case varies considerably. In the UK women part-timers outnumber men by 9:1. In Sweden and the Czech Republic, the ratio is 4:1. In Slovenia this drops to 3:1 and in Hungary to 2:1. In Romania and Bulgaria there is little difference between the numbers of male and female part timers, with men being even more likely to be in this kind of work than women. Part time work is found among all educational levels in the UK, whilst in Sweden it is mainly concentrated among the lower educated. The higher educated, however, are more likely to be part time in ECE countries. Part time workers are found among those with low income in the UK and Sweden, although in the ECE Countries this is not necessarily the case and in Romania and Bulgaria they are found among the high-income earners. In those countries, this may be because part-time workers are more likely to work in the under-developed private sector or in the under-developed personal services where they can ask higher salaries than those in the state sector. Many part time workers are for example, language teachers, translators, those working the legal, computing or accounting services can ask for high fees. In Romania they are likely to be found among the health and teaching professions and their short working hours are related to their annualised teaching contracts. However, they may also supplement this with additional private tutoring.

Figure 3. Shares of respondents employed part-time.




Notes: (1) HWF Questionnaire, Q1.06; value option "Employed part-time".
 (2) (*) In the Netherlands there is the most part time work, done mainly by women, but in the HWF questionnaire this question was asked in a different form in the NL (see Jager 2003).

Sources: (1) HWF Survey 2001 – Unified international data collection
 (2) Annet Jager, Country Survey Report // HWF Series of Project Research reports. Research Report #3 "HWF Survey: Country Survey Reports". Ed. C.Wallace. Vienna, 2003 P. 86

Around 7% of respondents in the sample were self-employed and the highest numbers could be found in the Czech Republic with 9% followed by the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Sweden, all with 8% (Figure 4). Hungary is also rather high with 7% and in Bulgaria there is likewise 7%. However, there is generally less self-employment in the ECE countries (with the exception of the Czech Republic). Slovenia had 5% self-employed and finally Romania, 4%. We should note that 13% of Czech Respondents said that their main source of income was from self-employment, so it may rather be the case that 4% of them earned more from their second or additional self-employed job than from their main job.

In all countries, men are more likely to be self-employed than are women and older people (especially prime aged) more than younger. The likelihood of being self-employed rises with education and is highest amongst those with tertiary education in all countries. In most countries the self-employed are clearly in the highest income group. However, in some countries, such as Romania and Bulgaria, much self-employment was really marginal activities such as selling things on the street and little different to casual work.

Figure 4. Shares of self employed respondents.




Note: HWF Questionnaire, Q1.06, value option "Self employed".

Source: HWF Survey 2001 – Unified international data collection

Casual workers represent about 3% of the sample and there are strong variations between countries (Figure 5). The highest number of casual workers is to be found in Romania at 7% followed by Slovenia with 4%. Next comes Sweden with 3% and all the other countries have less than 2% of casual workers. Casual workers are most often female in the UK, but are more often male in the New European Countries. In the UK, Slovenia and Sweden, casual workers are most often young people and this is the case in most of the New European Countries too, apart from Bulgaria. Casual workers are not necessarily found among the lower educated, as we might expect, except in Hungary, Bulgaria and Slovenia. In other countries, higher numbers are found also among the better educated. In ECE countries, casual work takes place often in the informal sector of the economy where people do not pay taxes or social security. It might involve “dealing” or a “business” of some kind. However, many casual workers are also very poor and may have declared themselves as “unemployed” in the HWF survey. In Romania, people working on computers or as accountants might also do this as casual work. Therefore, casual work covers a variety of different kinds of flexibility.

Figure 5. Casual work: shares of respondents working on day-to-day agreements.




Note: HWF Questionnaire, Q1.06, value option "Casual worker (working on a day-to-day agreements)".

Source: HWF Survey 2001 – Unified international data collection

In most countries the number of farmers was rather negligible (Figure 6). However, in Romania, 20% of the sample described themselves as farmers, whereas the mean for the whole survey was only 3%. In other countries the numbers of farmers was very small (Slovenia 2%, Hungary 1%, Bulgaria 1%, the Netherlands, Czech Republic and Sweden all below 1%). In Romania, farmers are likely to be older people, to have low education and low incomes. This is because farming represents a survival strategy for many Romanians who may have no other significant income sources or may use it to supplement their incomes.

Unpaid workers in family businesses represent less than 1% of the sample as a whole but their numbers are largest in Romania, where they are mainly lower educated females from rural areas, probably working on farms and agricultural related businesses.

Figure 6. Farmers: shares of respondents.



Notes: (1) HWF Questionnaire, Q1.06, value option "Casual worker (working on a day-to-day agreements".
 (2) Zero-values for the UK

Source: HWF Survey 2001 – Unified international data collection

3.3.2 OUT OF THE WORKFORCE

The unemployed represent 10% of the sample and the highest numbers are found in Bulgaria (27%) and Slovenia (13%). In addition Romania has 11% unemployed and the Czech Republic 8%, Hungary 7%, the Netherlands 6%, the United Kingdom 5% and Sweden 5%. The Accession countries have much higher unemployment than do the EU countries on account of the labour market restructuring there. In the Netherlands, Slovenia and Sweden, women are more likely to be unemployed than are men. There are very large gender differences especially in the Netherlands and in Slovenia. However, in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria women are less likely to be unemployed than are men. We should remember, however, that many unemployed women are registered as having some other status such as “housewife”. Unemployment is much more common among the less educated and of course they have low incomes. Whilst in the UK and the Netherlands, unemployment is most often an urban problem, in other countries the unemployed are more likely to be found in rural areas. In Romania, 5% of the population is described as “unregistered unemployed” although in other countries these were negligible or the question was not asked (see Wallace, Chvorostov and Nagaev, 2003 for tables).

In ECE countries, there was also a very high numbers who were retired from paid work, 22% in Romania, 15% in Slovenia, 14% in the Czech Republic, 14% in Hungary, 9% in Bulgaria. By contrast, in the UK there were 11%, but in Sweden and the Netherlands only 5% and 4% respectively. Early retirement is often used as an alternative to unemployment, but in ECE there was a tradition of early retirement for women with families and some categories of workers. However, some retired people were also working, as is the case for 7% of the retirees in Romania.

In Romania, the numbers of “housekeepers” was also high (12%). This was followed by the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, countries where women have traditionally stayed at home (10% and 8% respectively). In the new European countries, the numbers of housekeepers is generally low because there was not a tradition for women to take on this role and these countries had only 4% of respondents or less in such a role. However, the country with the lowest number of housekeepers (1%) is Sweden, due to the legislation which enables people to take leave from employment to raise children rather than quitting their jobs altogether.

Another way of being out of the workforce is to be sick or disabled. The UK had the highest number of such people at 7% followed by the Czech Republic with 4%. The Netherlands and Sweden had 4% and 3% respectively whilst most of the ECE countries had only between 1% and 3%. This can also be a form of unemployment and the numbers of people registering as sick or disabled probably reflects as much the type of legislation available as the number of sick people.

3.3.3 SOURCES OF INCOME


To begin with, we looked at different sources of income that the individual might have had in the last month; assuming that they might have many sources of income, we asked people to identify as many sources as necessary, without any restriction. Looking at income from a wage or salary (summarized in Figure 7) we can see that this was most important in the Western countries as a source of income. In particular, in Sweden 71.1 per cent of people gave this as their source and this was followed by the Netherlands (69.6 per cent) the UK (59.8 per cent). In ECE countries a wage or salary was not that important as an income source: in Slovenia this was given by 59.6 per cent of respondents, in the Czech Republic 53.5 per cent, in Hungary 49.2 per cent. In the more economically disadvantaged countries of Bulgaria and Romania, a wage or salary constituted less frequent income source with only 46 per cent of respondents in Romania and 37.5 per cent in Bulgaria. In half of the countries (the Netherlands, Sweden, Slovenia and the Czech Republic) the wage or salary was a more frequent income source for men. In the other half (UK, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria) it was a more frequent choice of female respondents. In each country, the wage or salary was the more important for people in the younger and middle ages than among older or younger age cohorts and it was also much more important for the people with higher levels of education. Generally speaking, salary from an income was more important for those with higher levels of education and higher incomes. A wage or salary was a more frequent choice in the urban areas in most countries but in the UK and the Netherlands, this was the case in more rural settlements, reflecting different patterns of settlement in those countries, with more affluent people moving to the countryside.

Social support (including formal and informal sources here) was most important in the Czech Republic (52.4%), Hungary (43.5%) and Slovenia (39.2%). In these countries, many women are subsidised to stay at home for long periods of time to raise children.

Self employment and additional jobs were much more important to individuals in the Czech Republic than it was anywhere else at 26.2 per cent, followed by Slovenia (20.1 per cent) and Bulgaria (17 per cent). However, self-employment need not be a lucrative option, it can also be a form of under-employment as is often the case in ECE countries. Self-employment was generally about twice as high among males as among females, and it was most common in the middle-aged groups. It was more common among those with better education, especially tertiary education. In most countries, self-employment makes a big difference to income: the self-employed had much higher incomes in general and this was especially the case in ECE countries.

Profits from business or investments seemed to feature mainly in the UK (9.4%) and the Czech Republic (8.9%).

Figure 7. Variety of income sources of individuals, multiple choice, relative shares within a sum of choices per country.



- Notes:
- (1) HWF Questionnaire, Q 1.05: "Please tell me all the different sources of income that you had in the last month".
 - (2) The chart summarizes data from the HWF Survey Ranking tables (see Wallace, Chvorostov and Nagaev, 2003).
 - (3) The vertical bars represent sums of all choices made by the respondents of an individual country. Due to the possibility of multiple choices, the sums of series in the bars may exceed 100%; therefore, the indicated values should be interpreted as relative shares within the sum of choices per country.
 - (4) The legend keys refer to the following original options of individual income sources: (A) Wage or salary; (B) Self employed earnings; (C) Income from additional jobs; (D) Income from own farming or agricultural production; (E) Pension; (F) Unemployment benefit; (G) Grant or scholarship for education and training, including loans; (H) Other social transfers (e.g. child allowance, parental leave); (I) Income from investments, savings or rents from properties; (J) Profit from a business; (K) Private transfers (e.g. alimony, or payment from others such as parents); (M) Other income sources; (N) None, the respondent had no income last month.

Source: HWF Survey 2001 – Unified international data collection

Unemployment benefits were most important as a source of income for households in Bulgaria and Romania where unemployment was also very high, but this was followed by the Czech Republic and the UK. However, the percentage receiving unemployment benefits in some countries (8 per cent in Bulgaria, 6 per cent in Romania) was lower than the percentage describing themselves as unemployed. Hence we find in these countries that the unregistered unemployed in Romania amounted to 11 per cent and the unregistered unemployed in Bulgaria amounted to 27 per cent (see Wallace, Chvorostov and Nagaev 2003). However, we should note that many of the registered as well as the unregistered unemployed were in fact working in different activities. For example, in Romania, 5 per cent were self-declared unregistered unemployed, but 1 per cent is also declaring work in agriculture or casual work, so of these 4 per cent satisfy the definition of unemployed. Of the registered unemployed, there were 6 per cent, but 2 per cent are also stated that they were working in agriculture or casual work, so only 4 per cent fully satisfy the definition of unemployed. Thus, according to the Romanian calculations, there are actually 8 per cent unemployed who are seeking jobs and do not work.

In Sweden, there were the highest share of people living from grants or loans (9 per cent) and this was followed by Slovenia (4 per cent). In other countries, the numbers having this income sources was negligible. In western EU countries, people were more likely to receive state support whilst in ECE countries support was more likely to come from within the family, reflecting the lack of state support on the one hand and traditions of inter-generational solidarity on the other.

Other social transfers as an income source went mostly to women because in most countries they included child allowances (although this is not the case in Romania where child benefit is paid to the family as a whole). In the United Kingdom, 25 per cent of people received such allowances and they were very important for low-income groups and this was the case also the Netherlands, where 19 per cent of people received such allowances. In Sweden, such allowances were concentrated more among the middle and upper income groups and 19 per cent of the sample received such allowances. The Czech Republic was also above the average with about one quarter of the sample receiving such allowances, but they were most spread around the population, with all income groups receiving such allowances. In Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary, where far fewer people received such allowances (only 5 per cent in Bulgaria and 2 per cent in Romania) there was a tendency for this to be important for lower income groups. In those three countries such allowances were more important in rural areas¹. This effect of social transfers seem to reflect the social policy regimes of the countries in question (see Wallace 2003)².

Private transfers such as alimony and payments from parents were important in the Czech Republic (6 per cent), Romania (5 per cent) and Slovenia (3 per cent). They were received mainly by the younger age group, implying that these were transfers from parents to children. They were most important among the lower income groups, confirming this assumption. They were also more common in urban areas.

The final category in Figure 7 is interesting because it shows that 18.8 per cent of respondents in Romania and 18.4 per cent in Bulgaria had no income at all. This represents about one fifth of the working age respondents in those countries. The numbers are below 10 per cent in all the other countries. In ECE countries it is mostly younger people who are in this position. However, in the Netherlands, where 5.9 per cent of people were without income, this was mostly older females who we can guess are family dependents. In Bulgaria and Romania, these people are more often female, more often younger and more often found in rural areas, reflecting the chronic under-employment of the post-communist populations in these countries and the disadvantages of some young people in this transition (see Report by Kovatcheva and Pancheva 2003)³. By contrast, almost no one in Sweden was without any income.

Respondents were also asked what was overall the most important source of income for their household in the last 12 months (summarized in the Figure 8). In all countries, the most important source of income was from a wage or salary and this was far more important for households than for individuals. In the Netherlands, 79.9% per cent of households lived mainly from this source, in the Sweden 78.4 per cent and Slovenia 69 per cent. In the Czech Republic, Hungary and the UK the numbers were between 61 per cent


¹ Other social transfers refers to other than pensions and unemployment benefit. This is a very mixed category, which at least in Romania do not refer to children allowance. There is a distinct variable s2_0_4, which shows that almost all households with children do also get children allowances. However, child allowance is not recorded as mother' or as father's income.

² Wallace, C. "Comparative Contextual Report" HWF Research Report no. 5.

³ Kovatcheva, S. and Pancheva, T. (2003) Bulgaria in HWF Report no. 3 Survey Report by Countries.

and 62 per cent living from this source, but in Romania and Bulgaria it falls to 55 per cent and 58 per cent, reflecting once more the chronic underemployment of those regions.

Figure 8. Variety of most important income sources of households, multiple choice, relative shares within a sum of choices per country.



- Notes:
- (1) HWF Questionnaire, Q 5.07: "Considering the overall situation of your household, including all its members, which is the most important source of income of your household in the last 12 months?"
 - (2) The chart summarizes data from the HWF Survey Ranking tables.
 - (3) The vertical bars represent sums of all choices made by the respondents of an individual country. Due to the possibility of multiple choices, the sums of series in the bars may exceed 100%; therefore, the indicated values should be interpreted as relative shares within the sum of choices per country.
 - (4) The legend keys refer to the following original options of individual income sources: (A) Wage or salary; (B) Self employed earnings; (C) Income from additional jobs; (D) Income from own farming or agricultural production; (E) Pension; (F) Unemployment benefit; (G) Grant or scholarship for education and training, including loans; (H) Other social transfers (e.g. child allowance, parental leave); (I) Income from investments, savings or rents from properties; (J) Profit from a business; (K) Private transfers (e.g. alimony, or payment from others such as parents); (L) Other income sources.

Source: HWF Survey 2001 – Unified international data collection

Household incomes from farming and agricultural production were also most important in Romania (4 per cent of households) and Bulgaria (3 per cent of households) and to some extent Slovenia (2 per cent of households). This was part of a survival strategy for poorer households in rural areas and is encouraged by the policies of land restitution in the early 1990s. Grants and scholarships were important in Sweden (4 per cent of households) and the United Kingdom (2 per cent of households). Everywhere else they were less than 1 per cent. Other social transfers supported almost 12 per cent of households in the UK, but were much less important elsewhere with only 3 per cent or less benefiting from this.

Very few households depended upon income from rents and savings, although this did account for 2 per cent of households in the UK. Elsewhere it was more negligible. Likewise, very few households depended

upon profit from a business, but surprisingly, Romania, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic were at the top of the league in this respect. Only a very few households were dependent upon private or other transfers.

We also asked a question about who earned the most important income in the household. In all cases it was the male respondent. However, there were interesting variations from country to country. The male respondent was most important in the Netherlands, with a 51-percentage point difference between male and female respondents. This was followed by the Czech Republic with 41 per cent and Sweden with 35 per cent, Romania with 27 per cent, Bulgaria with 15 per cent, Hungary with 14 per cent and finally the UK with only a 9-percentage point difference between the male and female respondents. In almost half of UK households, women claimed to be the breadwinner.


3.3.4 ACCUMULATION OF INCOMES

An aspect of flexibility that particularly interested us was how different activities could be combined together. For this reason we asked about the number of income earning activities in the last 12 months rather than jobs in order to leave the possibilities open. People in the Netherlands, Slovenia and Sweden are most likely to be dependent upon just one income source and those in Sweden the least likely. (Figure 9). Swedes are also most likely to have two sources of income (one in five of them said so), followed by those from the Czech Republic and Romania, whilst three or more sources were most common again in Sweden.

We might expect the ECE countries; especially the poorer ones to have citizens with multiple income sources because incomes from any one source are generally low. In the case of Bulgaria, this may be due to under-reporting, since most of such activities are in the informal economy. However, in fact, it is in Sweden where wages are among the highest, that multiple income sourcing is most common. Men generally fall into this multiple income earning category more than women and younger or middle-aged people more than older people. Better educated people and those with higher incomes are also more likely to have more than one income source. In Sweden, by contrast, double incomes were more evenly divided between men and women and educational groups.

Those having three or more income are also more likely to be men than women (except in Sweden), more likely to be younger than older and more likely to be better educated and have higher incomes than others. However, unlike the other categories, we find this pattern of behaviour slightly more associated with urban areas than with rural ones. In Sweden we once more find the multiple income earners distributed across all income categories and they are more likely to be women than men. One reason for the high number of multiple income sources in Sweden could be that many people who are part time employed also have an additional job. This is quite frequent in the public sector and among youngsters. In the middle aged group, an additional explanation might be that the Swedish rules for receiving parental leave benefits, sickness and unemployment benefits as well as a pension can be taken part time. Finally, an increasing number of older workers leave the labour market through doing a combination of part time work and taking pensions. These constructions allow for a great deal of flexibility among Swedish workers.

Figure 9. Number of income earning activities of respondents during the last year.




Note: HWF Questionnaire, Q1.07: "Could you tell me how many economic income-earning activities you have had in the last 12 months?"

Source: HWF Survey 2001 – Unified international data collection

3.3.5 JOB STABILITY

Another way of looking at flexibility is in terms of job turnover Figure 10. Comparing countries in terms of those who had held jobs for more than 5 years, we find Slovenia in the first position with 62%, followed by Romania with 61%, then Sweden (60%) and the Netherlands with 57%. After that Hungary (54%), the Czech Republic (53%) and Bulgaria with 49%. The least longevity of jobs was found in the UK with just 47% of people having held jobs for longer than 5 years. Whilst many more men had more stable jobs than women in the UK and the Netherlands, in Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Sweden, this was reversed.

Figure 10. Shares of respondents who stayed in the same job for more than five years.



Note: HWF Questionnaire, Q1.10: The main income-earning activity. "How long have you been doing this activity?" // Option: "More than 5 years".

Source: HWF Survey 2001 – Unified international data collection.

There was no obvious East-West dimension in job stability. The least job stability was in the UK, but Hungary and the Czech Republic have had very dynamic labour markets in the last ten years, so that there was a lot of movement in those countries. This is not necessarily a sign of instability. In Bulgaria, it represents more the massive shedding of jobs after transition. Slovenia and Romania represent more the "old" pattern of the former regimes whereby people expected to stay in a job for most of their lives, although in Romania there is strong bifurcation of the labour market with others being excluded from this security. Sweden and the Netherlands have labour market policies, which deliberately foster job stability, and we can see the contrast between those countries and the UK.

3.3.6 NEW WAYS TO LOOK AT FLEXIBILITY


Traditionally, numerical flexibility is seen in terms of the removal of job protection and Trades Union influence as well as ease of dismissal or the number of part time, self employed and temporary workers. As we have shown, the first definition is unsatisfactory because it assumes that flexible behaviour will follow from these measures. By contrast, we show that the regulation of flexibility by social partners can lead to more flexibility overall and to more sustainable flexibility in particular (meaning socially acceptable and leading to quality jobs in the long term). We also show that the definitions of part time work and self employed activity are so varied across East and West Europe, that it is not really helpful to look at these indicators alone. Furthermore, the reasons for pursuing one or the other are highly variable and may have nothing to do with flexibility. Finally, the number of temporary workers is likely to be a response to the lack of flexibility in labour market regulations rather than their existence. For these reasons, we do not regard these conventional indicators as being very good measures of flexibility in comparative perspective.

For this reason, we have developed some new ways of looking at flexibility. We consider flexibility to mean the way in which people will vary their place or time of work. Seen in this way, we can measure flexibility as something related to typical rather than a-typical employment. In other words we can measure the degree of flexibility within regular, full time jobs or part time jobs. This is a broader notion of flexibility and more close to the variety of working patterns that do in fact exist. In addition we take into account the extent that people can control their hours of work and their reasons for doing flexible work. Finally, we look at their potential for flexibility. Below we explain in more detail some of these measures.

3.4 FLEXIBILITY OF TIME

To begin with, we considered the number of hours worked per week in terms of mean and the median. Since “part time” means something different in every country, this is perhaps a better way to look at the length of the working week. On average, the people in the Accession countries work the longest hours, but that is because there is no tradition of part time work in those countries. In the old EU countries, we see clear differences between men and women, reflecting this tradition of the part time option for women. Thus, in the UK, the average working week for men is 43 hours, whilst for women it is 29 hours. In the Netherlands the difference is 40 and 26 and Sweden the gap narrows to between 42 and 37. In the Czech Republic and Slovenia the gap between men’s and women’s working hours is also 5 hours but both men and women work longer hours. This is also the case in Romania where the longest hours are worked on average (although the median is not so different to other countries): 48 for men and 41 for women. In Bulgaria the difference is very small with 39 for women and 41 for men. Thus, only in the Netherlands is the 40-hour week the average for men: everywhere else, men work longer than 40 hours on average. The longest hours are worked by people in the middle (prime) aged groups, who we can assume are often those with family responsibilities. Those with better education are generally working longer hours, although in Romania it is the reverse, reflecting the fact that many of those with long hours would be working on the land. Also reflecting this fact was the finding that longer hours were usually associated with higher income, except in Romania.


Figure 11. Hours of work on the main activity, mean values per gender, per country (radar chart).



Note: HWF Questionnaire, Q1.11: The main income-earning activity. “How many hours do you usually work per week on this activity?”

Source: HWF Survey 2001 – Unified international data collection.

Figure 12. Hours of work on the main activity, mean values per gender, per country (bar chart).



Note: HWF Questionnaire, Q1.11: The main income-earning activity. "How many hours do you usually work per week on this activity?"

Source: HWF Survey 2001 – Unified international data collection.

In order to capture all forms of flexibility, we asked firstly about the regular working schedule, Monday to Friday and then about deviations from that schedule (assuming that the precise peculiarities of the schedule would differ from country to country). According to this question, the respondents in Sweden were most likely to have a regular working schedule, with almost two thirds (63.2%) responding positively to this question. Bulgaria came next with 58.9% and the Netherlands, 54.2%. In the UK 51.9% of people had a regular working schedule and in Hungary (49.4%) and the Czech Republic 49.2%. The regular Monday to Friday schedule was most often found among those with better educational levels and better incomes. We can assume that having a regular schedule was a privileged situation in most countries, although less so in the UK and the Czech Republic.


The next question was about regular shift work. Slovenia and Bulgaria have the most shift workers with about one fifth of the population doing this kind of work, followed by Romania (15.8%) and the Czech Republic (14.9%) and the United Kingdom (13.1%). Hungary and Sweden all had below 10% and the Netherlands less than 4%. We could say that shift work perhaps reflects the predominance of traditional industrial enterprises as much as a new, flexible labour market in some of these countries. Shift work is most often done by women in the new EU countries and by men in the old EU countries, by younger people and by those with lower levels of education.

Flexitime schedules were most often found in the Czech Republic (14.1%) and Slovenia (10.7%) followed by Bulgaria and the UK (9.3%). Hungary had the least number of flexitime people with only 1.7%. In the Czech Republic it was most often men and those with high incomes who had this kind of freedom, whilst in Slovenia there was not much difference between the sexes, but often those with high income who had flexitime schedules. In Bulgaria it was men and in the UK, women who were likely to have such schedules. In most places flexitime was associated with higher incomes so we could say that it was a privileged kind of working schedule.

Around 8.7% had an “other regular working schedule”. However, in the Netherlands this went up to 14.5%, in Sweden 11.6%, in the United Kingdom, 11%. This probably reflects the prevalence of part time work in those countries as well as negotiated flexibility. The ECE countries had generally less “other” schedules. Slovenia, Bulgaria and Hungary had the least number of people with these kinds of schedules.

A large number of people had an irregular working schedule (around one fifth). The highest numbers were found in the Hungary (36.7%) and Romania (29.5%) with substantially above the HWF mean. The lowest numbers with irregular working schedules were found in Bulgaria (7.7%). The Netherlands, the UK and Sweden were around the same with between 14% and 19%. The Czech Republic had 12.4% and Slovenia 15.8%. In the Accession countries it was mainly men who had irregular schedules, in the old EU countries, mainly women. In many countries it was the lower educated group who had such irregular schedules. It seems to be mainly men in the prime aged group who have this kind of schedule, most often low income earners. In some countries (the Netherlands, Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria) these were noticeably in the highest income group, whilst in other countries (Romania, Slovenia, the UK) they were in the lowest income group. It seems therefore, that an irregular working schedule can be either the work of a privileged (perhaps professional) person or a lower income, less privileged member of the workforce.

Figure 13. Types of working schedule on the main activity.



Note: HWF Questionnaire, Q1.12: The main income-earning activity. “Is your working schedule REGULAR / SHIFT WORK / FLEXITIME / OTHER REGULAR // IRREGULAR ?” “Flexitime” means that you work regular hours but can arrive a little earlier/later or leave a little earlier/late. Usually this is not more than one hour flexibility in the day.

Source: HWF Survey 2001 – Unified international data collection.

Although many people had varying schedule, the variations according to annualised hours, four day week, four day week, three day week, term time working and job sharing were not very common. Although not all kinds of contracts were found in all countries, there was no obvious East-West distinction. Clearly a variety of contractual hours are available in the new European countries just as in the older ones.


3.4.1 DESIRED WORKING TIME

Many people would like to work less hours, altogether 28% of the sample. This was most often found in Czech Republic 39% and in Sweden 36% followed by the Netherlands (30%). In Hungary there were 29% and in the United Kingdom around one quarter wanted to work less hours. In Bulgaria only 12% of respondents wanted to work less hours and only 22% in Romania (Tables can be found in Wallace, Chvorostov and Nagaev 2003).

Even more people wanted to work the same hours: 73% in Bulgaria, 69% in the UK, 60% in the Netherlands, 57% in Sweden, 66% in Slovenia, 59% in Hungary and the Czech Republic and 54% in Romania. Those wanting to work more hours were 10% altogether: 25% in Romania, 15% in Bulgaria and 12% in Hungary.

The people who want to work less hours are most often men, and most often those with higher income except in Bulgaria and Romania. The overwhelming reason for wanting to work less hours is to spend more time with the family and this is followed by “other reasons” and then not wanting to work long hours.

Figure 14. Reasons for wanting less hours on the main activity.



Note: HWF Questionnaire, Q1.15: The main income-earning activity "Would you like to work on this activity the same number of hours, more hours, or less hours?"

Source: HWF Survey 2001 – Unified international data collection.

If we look in more detail at the issue of working less hours in order to spend more time with the family, we find that this is most often the case in Sweden (52% of respondents), followed by the United Kingdom (49% of respondents) and the Czech Republic (49% of respondents). In Bulgaria only an astonishing 4% give this reason, whilst in the Netherlands it is 28% and in Romania 31%. Other data also suggests that in Sweden, the conflict between work and care is felt most acutely (Strandh and Nordenmark 2003, Cousins and Tang 2003a, 2003b), whilst in the Netherlands, perhaps the prevalence of part time work is a solution to this conflict. The majority of part timers in the UK also want to work the same hours to fulfil domestic commitments, so conflict is not so high for part-timers.

Usually the work-family conflict is seen as a problem for women. Yet in the UK, the Netherlands, and Sweden it is more often mentioned by men. In ECE countries, where women have traditionally worked full time, it is definitely a women's problem, although even in those countries between 30% and 40% of men

mention this issue. The problem of work-family conflict in this respect is seen as an issue amongst mainly high-income groups.

The main reasons for wanting to work the same hours, is once more to spend more time at home with domestic commitments (41% Romania and Hungary, 37% the UK, 35% Czech Republic, 32% Slovenia, 25% Sweden, 22% Bulgaria and 13% the Netherlands), because they do not like working longer hours (25%) and because they are earning enough already, followed by “other” reasons. It is overwhelmingly women who say that they work these hours in order to spend time with their families and it is the same in every country. In the UK and the Netherlands it is low-income people who say this (presumably part timers), whilst in most other countries it is a value expressed by higher income respondents.

Not so many people wanted to work more hours (10% overall) but there were wide differences between countries. The countries where most people wanted to work more hours were Romania (25%), Bulgaria (15%) and Hungary (12%). 10% of respondents in the Netherlands also wanted to work more hours (mainly women). Very few people wanted to work more hours in the Czech Republic, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Slovenia. The most important reason for wanting to work more hours was because respondents needed more money. This was most often the case in Hungary and Romania (86% and 85% of workers) followed by Bulgaria (82%) the United Kingdom (72%) and Czech Republic (68%). Those in the Netherlands, Slovenia and Sweden were least likely to report this, and the percentage in the Netherlands was especially low at 22%. There is a clear East-West divide in response to this question: in the UK, the Netherlands and Sweden, (and also Slovenia to some extent) it is women who would like to work more hours for money, whilst in the rest of the ECE countries it is men.

In the Netherlands, the UK and Slovenia it is clearly the lower income groups who wanted to work more hours for more money, although in other countries this was more likely to be found among all income groups and in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania it was even the higher income groups, reflecting the fact that wages are low and prices are relatively high in those countries.


We also looked at how work consumes different parts of people’s time. Respondents were asked how often they carry out these activities in the evening, at weekends, or at nights. 51% of HWF respondents never do any work in the evening and this was highest in Romania (68%), Slovenia (61%) and Bulgaria (55%). In Hungary and in Sweden people were most likely to do their work in the evenings since only 34% and 35% said that they never worked in the evening. Men were more likely to work in the evenings than women.

In all countries about one quarter of respondents worked sometimes at nights. Men were more likely to work at nights than women in all countries. Just under half of respondents worked at weekends. Working at the weekends was most often found in Hungary and Bulgaria, and the Czech Republic (58% in each country). Those least likely to work at weekends are in Romania, although differences between countries were small. Men are also more likely to work at the weekends than women.

3.4.2 VARIATIONS IN WORKING HOURS

Respondents were asked if their working hours varied at all. This was another way of asking about flexibility. For the largest share of people, their hours never vary, but in all countries apart from Hungary and Bulgaria, more than half of people who answered this question had varying hours. Most common were hours that varied by the week or even by the day. Most flexible in this respect were Slovenia the UK and Sweden.

Figure 15. Patterns of variations in hours on the main activities.




Notes: (1) HWF Questionnaire, Q1.22: The main income-earning activity "Do you work varying hours?"
 (2) No compatible data for the Netherlands

Source: HWF Survey 2001 – Unified international data collection.

3.5 PLACE OF WORK

Many people work within the locality where they live (see Figure 16). However, commuting is rather common in the Netherlands (50.3% of people), Slovenia (44.8%) the Czech Republic (40.8%) and the UK (37.7%). A small number of people worked at only or partially at home (8.9%). This was most common in Bulgaria (17.3%), Slovenia (9.7%) and Hungary (9.5%). In Bulgaria and Slovenia this is likely to be people who are working in subsistence agriculture since they are most likely to be found in rural areas, although this was not the case in the Czech Republic or Hungary. Therefore, working in the same locality or commuting to a different locality were the most common patterns, covering 85% of all respondents.


Figure 16. Place of work on the main activity



Note: HWF Questionnaire, Q1.20: Place of the main income-earning activity

Source: HWF Survey 2001 – Unified international data collection.

Figure 17. Reasons for working at home (main activity).




Note: HWF Questionnaire, Q1.21: The main income-earning activity (if worked at home): "What is the reason for doing this activity at home?"

Source: HWF Survey 2001 – Unified international data collection.

Not being able to find any other job was most often cited as the reason to work at home in the Accession countries, especially Romania and Bulgaria. Working at home in order to be able to spend more time with the family was most common in the old European countries as well as the Czech Republic and domestic commitments played a role in the UK, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Romania and Bulgaria. In most countries, it was women who wanted to spend more time with their families, although in Sweden it was men who answered this and in Slovenia the sexes were 50/50. We could say therefore that in some countries (North Western Europe and the Czech Republic), working at home represents a form of chosen flexibility and in other countries it is more a form of forced flexibility.

Working in varying places was less common (Figure 18). Around 68.1% of people answered that their place of work never varies, and this was most common in Romania and Hungary and least common in Sweden and Bulgaria. Variations by the week and the day were most common. The men's place of work was much more likely to vary than the women's.

Figure 18. Variations in places of work (main activity).



Notes: (1) HWF Questionnaire, Q1.23: The main income-earning activity: "Do you work varying hours?"
 (2) No compatible data for the Netherlands


Source: HWF Survey 2001 – Unified international data collection.

3.5.1 CONTROL OVER FLEXIBILITY

A very important factor to emerge from the literature reviews is the extent to which people have control over the flexibility that they experience. Respondents were given the options “I decide” “employer decides” “employer and I decide together” “it is outside of our control”. We asked about the control of the working schedule, the control of the hours of work, control over overtime hours and control over the place of work. In Figure 19 we can see the general extent of control over the working schedule, overtime and place of work. Workers controlled the overtime most of all, but the general working schedule was negotiated in almost half of cases and the place of work in about one third of cases.

It was the employer who mainly controlled the hours of work in the Accession countries as well as the UK– this was the case for half or more than half of respondents in each country. In Sweden and the Netherlands people were more likely to state that they control the hours of work or that they decide together with their employer. This was especially the case in the Netherlands, where 42.3% of people claimed to be able to control their hours of work themselves. This is perhaps an outcome of the employee-lead flexibilisation policies in the Netherlands. In Romania a rather high number of people controlled their hours of work, but we can assume that this is because of the large agricultural sector rather than on account of flexibilisation policies.

Figure 19. Control over main aspects of flexibility, HWF means (main activity)




Note: HWF Questionnaire, Q1.24: The main income-earning activity: “Regarding this activity, do you decide or someone else decide on: WORKING SCHEDULE // OVERTIME HOURS // PLACE OF WORK ?”

Source: HWF Survey 2001 – Unified international data collection.

Men are more likely to be able to decide on their hours than women, and older workers more than younger workers. Those with better education controlled their hours more than those with lower education. In all countries, the higher income groups controlled their hours the most. There seemed to be more control over the hours of work for employees in the Netherlands and Sweden, but less so in the UK. In ECE countries, lack of control of the hours of work reflects a more traditional pattern.

Control of the working schedule followed a similar pattern as did control over overtime hours (not shown here). The employer was most often in control in the ECE countries along with the UK and employees had the most influence in the Netherlands and Sweden. In ECE countries, there was far less employee controlled flexibility, apart from Romania and this is on account of the numbers working in agriculture. As in the case of the hours worked, the men had more control than the women and older workers more than younger workers.


Figure 20. Control over the general working schedule (main activity).



Note: HWF Questionnaire, Q1.24: The main income-earning activity: "Regarding this activity, do you decide or someone else decide on: WORKING SCHEDULE?"

Source: HWF Survey 2001 – Unified international data collection.

Figure 21. Control over the overtime hours (main activity).



Note: HWF Questionnaire, Q1.24: The main income-earning activity: "Regarding this activity, do you decide or someone else decide on: OVERTIME HOURS?"

Source: HWF Survey 2001 – Unified international data collection.


3.5.2 CONTROL OVER PLACE OF WORK

Just over one fifth of respondents controlled their place of work themselves, and these were most likely to be found in Romania (33.2%), Sweden (25.5%) and the Netherlands (25.6%). Employers decided for 57.7% of respondents and these were most often found in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Romania and the United Kingdom. The place of work was negotiated with the employer in around 10% of cases, most often in the Netherlands (17.7%), Sweden (14.7%), the Czech Republic (11.4%) and Hungary (10.1%). In 9.4% of cases it was outside of everybody's control. Sweden and the Netherlands therefore, do seem to have negotiated flexibility where the employee has a good deal of control. In Romania the employee also has control, but for different reasons.

Those with higher income and higher education control their place of work the most and men control their place of work more than women.

The ability to control flexibility is important since it helps to distinguish good flexibility from bad flexibility. One quarter of respondents could control their hours of work, their working schedule, overtime and place of work. Generally speaking these were better-educated people, older people and people with higher incomes. Men had more control over their flexibility than women. Those in Western countries, especially Sweden and the Netherlands had the most control (although Romania was included in those countries with the most control, this is because the high number of farmers – Romanians were also in the category of people with the least control).

Figure 22. Control over the over place of work (main activity).



Note: HWF Questionnaire, Q1.24: The main income-earning activity: "Regarding this activity, do you decide or someone else decide on: PLACE OF WORK?"

Source: HWF Survey 2001 – Unified international data collection.

3.6 CONTRACT FLEXIBILITY


It can be seen in Figure 23 below. We can see that a permanent contract is the most common kind, followed by self-employment and then fixed term contracts and then no contracts. All the other kinds of contract affected less than 10% of the population and they included “on call”-contracts, with a temporary work agency, on a fee only basis, subject to performance, zero hours, other. An even smaller number were on work experience programmes. In the Netherlands, fixed term contracts were divided between 2% of respondents with a fixed term contract with no prospect of a permanent contract and 8% fixed term contracts with a perspective on a permanent contract.

Most people had permanent contracts. However, a significant minority had no contracts and these were most common in the UK and to a lesser extent, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. We could see this perhaps as an indication of the lack of regulation of flexibility and certainly in many countries could be an indication of the informal economy. Fixed term contracts were rather common in Bulgaria and Slovenia. Those with permanent contracts were a privileged group with higher education and higher income. Those without permanent contracts were more often people at the start or at the end of their working careers and they frequently did not want permanent contracts.

Permanent contracts were more common among the middle aged and older groups than among younger workers and among the better educated than among the less well educated. They were also more common among those with higher incomes groups in most countries (except in Romania and Bulgaria) (see Wallace, Chvorostov and Nagaev, 2003).

Respondents were asked what was the reason for doing contract work? There was a small proportion (9%) that did not want a permanent contract and these were mainly from Western European countries as well as Slovenia. The main reason for doing contract work was because the work was only available as contract work (37%) and 18% could not find a permanent job. In most countries it was women who did not want permanent jobs and the older and younger age cohorts. Lower educated people were more likely to say this than higher educated and those in rural areas more than those in urban areas as well as those with lower incomes.

Figure 23. Type of contract (main activity)



Note: HWF Questionnaire, Q1.25: The main income-earning activity: "What sort of contract do you have with you employer?"

Source: HWF Survey 2001 – Unified international data collection.

Hence, contract flexibility was also rather variable between countries, but contracts were most secure in those countries with regulated flexibility – the Netherlands and Sweden. Countries with the least regulation or where much work escapes regulation (the UK, Romania, Bulgaria) also had the highest proportion of irregular contracts

3.7 POTENTIAL FLEXIBILITY

Respondents were asked about how flexible they would be under certain conditions – if they had not job or if they could earn twice their current salary – in other words, both negative and positive incentives. Generally speaking, the positive incentive (earning more money) was more effective than the negative incentive (unemployment).

Three quarters of respondents were prepared to work more than 40 hours per week for more money and 70% were prepared to do so if threatened with unemployment. Generally speaking, people in ECE countries were more prepared to work longer hours than those in the Netherlands, although in the UK, with its long hours culture, this was also acceptable. In Bulgaria people were most prepared to work longer hours.


Fewer were prepared to migrate for work, only half of respondents over all. This was most common in the UK and least acceptable in the Czech Republic and Hungary. Once more, the Netherlands had rather low potential flexibility on this indicator. The potential to migrate may be associated with the nature of the housing market in different countries, which makes it more or less easy to move.

Around half again were prepared to accept worse conditions of work and once again the Netherlands is strikingly less potentially flexible on this indicator, whilst retraining was the most desirable option for flexibility, accepted by slightly more than three quarters of respondents. Here the positive and the negative incentives did not play such a role. Once more those in the Netherlands were the least potentially flexible on this indicator, whilst the Czech Republic and the UK were much more flexible.

Learning a new language was interesting for two thirds of respondents for potential flexibility. Highest scores were in the Slovenia, the UK, the Netherlands and the Czech Republic.

Hence, the rate of potential flexibility was rather high in the countries where the question was asked and retraining, learning a new language or working longer hours were also seen as sources of potential flexibility by at least two thirds of respondents. Potential flexibility was lower in the Netherlands than elsewhere on many indicators, except for learning a new language, so the regulation of flexibility perhaps leads to people being more discriminating in their views of work.

Figure 24. Readiness to accept specific conditions for a new job, per countries (yes+maybe)



Note: HWF Questionnaire, optional questions: Q 4.1 "Imagine that you had no job and get new a new one only under certain conditions. Would you be willing to...?" and Q 4.2 "Imagine that you were offered a new job position with twice the salary you have now. Would you be willing to...?"

Source: HWF Survey 2001 – Unified international data collection.

3.8 THE EXTENT OF FLEXIBILITY IN EUROPE

Using these more innovative measures of flexibility, and combining them in various ways into composite indices, we can arrive at a much higher measurement of flexibility than is usually supposed. Below in Table 5 we look at two measures. All those not in full time permanent jobs (a-typical workers) and the same group but also excluding the self-employed (a-typical employees).⁴ Here we find that in the UK and Bulgaria, nearly half the workers are flexible, and this is followed closely by the Netherlands and Romania. By this measure, Sweden has the lowest number of flexible workers (26,3%) although this is not necessarily a measure of the lack of flexibility, since in Sweden the flexibility was found within the context of regular, full-time jobs. In Sweden, more than any other country, people are most likely to hold more than one job, so flexibility takes a different form.

If we consider the number of flexible employees (by excluding the self-employed), we find that the Netherlands, the UK and Bulgaria have the highest numbers whilst Sweden and Romania have the lowest. (16,6% and 18,6%). Thus here we find that the regulation of flexibility in Sweden reduces the number of flexible employees, whilst in the Netherlands they are increased. The de-regulation of the labour market does seem to produce more flexible workers (see the UK) on this indicator. Moreover, whilst there is considerable similarity between the re-institutionalising and partially regulated accession countries (Slovenia, Hungary and the Czech Republic), there are wide differences between Romania and Bulgaria, especially once we exclude the self-employed.

Table 5. Work forms and flexibility measures (% of workers in each country)

	UK	NL	SE	SI	CZ	HU	RO	BG
atypical workers (all those not in permanent full time jobs)	46,4	45,2	26,3	35,6	33,5	33,5	40,6	47,8
atypical employees (those not in permanent full time jobs excluding self-employed)	37,2	38,7	16,6	28,0	21,6	24,0	18,6	36,1

Source: HWF Survey 2001 – Unified international data collection.

Taking another measure of flexibility we can look at the numbers who have time, place, and contract flexibility, to which we can add income flexibility for those with multiple income sources. *Time flexibility* is defined as people on a non-regular or irregular working schedule.. *Place flexibility* is defined as people working at home either the whole time or part of the time, abroad or having an irregular place of work (commuters were excluded). *Contract flexibility* was defined as people having anything but a permanent regular contract (i.e. no contract, fixed term contract, on call, with a temporary work agency, on a fee only basis, subject to performance or on a work experience project). *Income flexibility* includes all those with more than one income source. As to the more complex flexibility measures, while *combined flexibility* covers those with time and/or place- and/or contract-flexibility, *cumulative flexibility* covers those characterised by all three forms of flexibility simultaneously (for further analysis of these indicators see Sik and Wallace 2003).

Using this measure of flexibility, we find large numbers are income flexible in the United Kingdom and in the Czech Republic, time flexibility was most common in the UK and the Netherlands, place flexibility most common in Romania, whilst contract flexibility was most common in the the ECE countries. Because much of this variation is on account of the large number of farmers in Romania and the large number of part-time workers in the Western EU countries, we can exclude these groups from the analysis to see how much flexibility there is among normal full time jobs. Even if we exclude part time workers, farmers and the self-employed, which are highly variable from country to country, we still find a large number who are time and contract flexible (less so place flexibility) and one in three who combine different kinds of flexibility. However, there are now far fewer differences between countries, which start to look rather similar to each other within each flexibility category. Large differences emerge between Bulgaria and Romania once more, implying that these countries have very different kinds of flexibility. Whilst in Bulgaria contract flexibility was very common as well as combined flexibility, in Romania it seems that much of the flexibility was accounted for rather by the farmers and the self-employed – once these groups are removed flexibility in full time regular jobs turns out to be quite low in Romania.

⁴ See Stepankova (2003) for more full analysis.

Table 6. All Income earners'. The rate of the different flexibility types by countries, **including** farmers and self- employed, part-time workers (%)

	Income-flexibility	Time-flexibility	Place-flexibility	Contract-flexibility	Combined flexibility	Cumulative flexibility	N
United Kingdom	14	41	17	33	58	7	682
The Netherlands	10	40	11	28	55	4	785
Sweden	10	20	10	20	35	2	1185
Slovenia	7	30	19	34	51	7	584
Czech Republic	24	32	16	32	50	8	1072
Hungary	6	36	14	30	49	7	745
Romania	7	39	23	36	47	18	851
Bulgaria	9	21	9	42	45	5	1012
Total	11	31	15	32	47	7	6916

Source: HWF Survey 2001 – Unified international data collection.

Table 7. Flexibility patterns by countries, within full-time workers, **excluding** farmers, self- employed and part-time workers (%)

	Income-flexibility	Time-flexibility (part-time excluded)	Place-flexibility	Contract-flexibility	Combined flexibility	Cumulative flexibility	N
United Kingdom	4	18	13	15	34	2	404
The Netherlands	5	16	8	11	29	1	416
Sweden	6	14	9	10	27	0	732
Slovenia	3	19	11	6	30	0	385
Czech Republic	10	20	7	13	34	1	762
Hungary	2	28	7	13	37	1	537
Romania	4	17	4	4	21	0	524
Bulgaria	1	12	2	26	35	0	679
Total	5	18	7	13	31	1	4438

Source: HWF Survey 2001 – Unified international data collection.

3.9 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TIME, PLACE AND CONTRACT FLEXIBILITY

Using the narrower definition of flexibility (excluding farmers, self-employed and part time workers) we can use correlation coefficients to see how time, place and contract flexibility are associated. The overall association among the four forms of flexibility is a low level of positive correlation (Table 8.). This means that the different kinds of flexibility tend to be associated with one another and this is the general “European” model of multiple flexibility. However, contract flexibility and time flexibility are the most strongly correlated and this is followed by place flexibility and time flexibility. So there are two dimensions to the way in which different kinds of flexibility are associated together. On the one hand we have time and contract flexible workers and on the other hand we have time and place flexible workers. Let us now consider this by different countries.

Table 8. Pearson correlation between flexibilities

	Income flexible	Time flexible	Place flexible	Contract flexible
Income-flexible	1	0,088	0,079	0,080
Time-flexible		1	0,196	0,243
Place-flexible			1	0,150

* All correlation is significant at the $p=0.01$ level.

Source: HWF Survey 2001 – Unified international data collection.

From the Table 9, we can see that although there is generally a positive correlation between the different kinds of flexibility in different countries, there are also important differences between countries. In the UK, there are generally strong correlations between the contract flexibility and all other kinds of flexibility. This implies a rather dualised labour market driven by contract flexibility.

In the Netherlands, there are mostly weak or non-significant correlations with the exception of time and contract flexibility, which are rather strongly associated. Income flexibility is also somewhat associated with contract flexibility. Hence, it would seem that in that country flexibility is concentrated in a particular population group who are excluded from the protection extended to other workers. In Sweden, flexibility is more spread around the population. Only contract flexibility and time flexibility are associated – all other correlations are non-significant. As in the Netherlands, there is a group excluded from the protective legislation who are contract-dependent.

In the Accession countries we see a different pattern. In all of these countries, time and contract flexibility are rather strongly correlated as is time and place flexibility: temporary jobs are associated with irregular working hours and irregular working hours are also associated with irregular working places. However, they differ also from one another. Slovenia has strong time-place and time-contract flexibility in a dualised labour market. The Czech Republic more resembles the UK with all the kinds of flexibility being associated with one another, especially time flexibility with place flexibility. In Hungary, time-flexibility is strongly associated with place and contract flexibility.

Romania is rather an exceptional place in this analysis. Here the correlations are strongest of all and they are especially strong in relating precarious contracts with time and place flexibility. Time flexibility is also rather strongly related to place flexibility. This suggests a very dualised labour market in Romania. However, this is not the case in Bulgaria, where contract flexibility is more weakly associated with place and time, but place flexibility is strongly associated with time flexibility.

Table 9. Pearson correlation between flexibility types by country

		Time flexibility	Place flexibility	Contract flexibility
UK	Income flexibility	0,136	0,057*	0,153
	Time flexibility	1	0,076*	0,260
	Place flexibility		1	0,255
NL	Income flexibility	0,025*	0,086*	0,138
	Time flexibility	1	0,100*	0,260
	Place flexibility		1	0,054*
Sweden	Income flexibility	0,008*	0,017*	0,024*
	Time flexibility	1	0,028*	0,268
	Place flexibility		1	0,027*
Slovenia	Income flexibility	0,006*	0,059*	0,018*
	Time flexibility	1	0,236	0,291
	Place flexibility		1	0,108*
Czech Republic	Income flexibility	0,138	0,148	0,133
	Time flexibility	1	0,217	0,182
	Place flexibility		1	0,199
Hungary	Income flexibility	0,080*	0,080*	0,001*
	Time flexibility	1	0,264	0,244
	Place flexibility		1	0,123
Romania	Income flexibility	0,119	0,061*	0,144
	Time flexibility	1	0,381	0,403
	Place flexibility		1	0,408
Bulgaria	Income flexibility	0,010*	0,050*	0,101*
	Time flexibility	1	0,241	0,159
	Place flexibility		1	0,172

* Correlation is not significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Source: HWF Survey 2001 – Unified international data collection.

In general, contract and time flexibility are strongly associated in all countries. However, in ECE countries, time is also associated with place flexibility to a greater extent than in the EU countries, whilst in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, place and contract flexibility are also associated. In other words in the ECE countries as well as the UK there is a wide range of flexibilities, whilst in the Netherlands and Sweden there is a narrow range of flexibility relating mainly to time and contract. Flexibility is concentrated in these most regulated labour markets, but more dispersed in the UK and the ECE countries. It would seem that regulation helps to concentrate flexibility among a very specific group of workers in the most regulated countries; in less regulated countries it is more spread out. Let us now look at the characteristics of these workers in different countries.

3.9.1 HOW FLEXIBILITY RELATES TO LIFE SITUATION

In order to understand how flexibility is associated with people's life situation, we can look at the relationship with age, sex, education, income, and the urban-rural dimension. Below we begin with a simple cross tabulation (once more using our definition of flexibility which is homogenised across countries – that is excluding farmers, self-employed and part time workers who tend to be concentrated only in particular countries. Here we are looking at the flexibility only in regular full time jobs.

Income is only really significant in the case of contract flexibility, where contract flexible workers were concentrated in the lowest income category.

All forms of flexibility affect older and younger people the most. Young people are especially strongly affected by contract flexibility, as are older people to a lesser extent. In case of time-flexibility to be young significantly increases the probability of being flexible while to be in the older middle age group decreases its' probability. The latter is true for place-flexibility as well. As to contract-flexibility it is more likely both among the young and the old, i.e. in the two age groups most vulnerable on a traditional labour market.

Males are much more likely to be affected by all forms of flexibility - except time flexibility - than are females. Being male increases the possibilities of being place flexible and slightly decreases the chance to become contract- flexible.

Education has a strong impact on flexibility. The lowest educated are the most flexible on all dimensions, whilst the higher educated are negatively associated with flexibility, except in the case of time flexibility. The role of higher education, therefore increases the chances of time flexibility but decreases the probability of flexibility of contract and place and in consequence the contradictory influence has no significant influence on combined-flexibility.

Living in a rural area strongly increases the chances of all forms of flexibility and living in an urban area decreases the chances of place as well as combined flexibility probably because of the nature of agricultural related work and because of the need to commute from rural areas.

Thus there are different characteristics associated with different forms of flexibility, especially between time and contract flexibility on the one hand and place flexibility on the other. Thus, we could tentatively suggest that there are two divergent types of flexibility: *good flexibility* of better educated people which is associated more with having flexibility of time and *bad flexibility* which is associated with lower education, being male, being younger or older and living in a rural area. It is associated with contract, place and time flexibility as well as with the combination of all of these.

Table 10. Types of flexibility by basic socio-demographic indicators (%; N=5316 and 4294 for income quartiles)

	Income-flexy	Time-flexy	Place-flexy	Contract-flexy	Combined-flexy	Cumulative-flexy	N
Total	4	22	9	22	37	2	5316
18-29 years old	3	25	10	34	46	3	1578
30-59 years old	4	20	9	16	33	2	2746
60+ years old	6	23	10	20	34	3	992
Chi-square	0,001	0,000	0,519	0,000	0,000	0,024	
Male	5	23	12	21	38	3	2867
Female	3	21	6	23	35	2	2449
Chi-square	0,000	0,062	0,000	0,038	0,009	0,120	
Primary Education	2	27	13	31	44	4	461
Secondary Education	4	20	10	23	36	3	3648
Tertiary Education	5	24	7	14	36	1	1191
Chi-square	0,047	0,000	0,003	0,000	0,004	0,005	
Urbanized area	4	22	8	20	35	2	1697
Intermediate area	4	21	9	20	36	2	2250
Rural Area	4	23	12	27	41	4	1357
Chi-square	0,689	0,276	0,001	0,000	0,001	0,000	
Total	4	22	9	22	37	2	4294
Low income	5	20	10	30	37	4	996
Mid-low income	5	21	9	21	36	2	954
Mid-high income	3	20	9	19	35	2	1084
High income	3	22	8	16	35	2	1260
Chi-square	0,097	0,878	0,544	0,000	0,700	0,006	

Source: HWF Survey 2001 – Unified international data collection.

In the next section we compare the role of the same basic social determinants on the various forms of flexibility country by country. The question we want to answer by these models: Are there country specific differences in explaining the same forms of flexibility? We start the analysis with combined flexibility – that is with the generalised picture of flexibility and continue the analysis by looking at the three subtypes of flexibility according to the different social characteristics with which they are associated. For this analysis we have used odds-ratios as the more accurate way of looking at these differences. Odds ratios are interpreted by looking at how far above or below 1 they are. Approximately 1.6 and above can be seen as having a strong positive, 0.7 and below a strong negative impact (in relation to the reference group stated in the table) on the dependent variable.

Starting with combined flexibility, we find that in most countries, being young increases the chances of having some kind of combined flexibility, especially in the ECE countries, but not so much in the UK and Sweden. In Slovenia it is especially the case that young people are undertaking more than one kind of flexibility.

In the U.K. and the Netherlands it is women who are most likely to have this kind of flexibility, whilst in the Czech Republic, Hungary and especially in Romania the males have significantly higher probability of combining more than one type of flexibility, confirming the pattern that we noticed from the bivariate and univariate tables.

Low education increases the probability of becoming flexible – but not in all countries in the same way. While in the U.K. and Slovenia low education actually decreases the possibility of combined flexibility, having low education strongly increases the chances of becoming flexible in the Netherlands, Bulgaria and Romania. Having a higher level of education increases the possibility of combined flexibility in Sweden, and in Romania but decreases it in the Netherlands and in the UK. In Romania, as we already observed, it is often privileged groups who have atypical contracts as accounts, translators and so on or teachers undertaking additional tutoring.

Living in an urban area decreases the chances of combined flexibility in the Netherlands and in Romania. Once more it is the Romanian rural areas which are distinctive.

However, as we saw before contradictory influences can overshadow the real processes determining the sociogenesis of combined flexibility. Therefore in the following three tables we analyse the mechanisms one by one and country by country.

Table 11. The odd ratios of combined-flexibility *

	U.K.	Netherlands	Sweden	Slovenia	The Czech Republic	Hungary	Romania	Bulgaria
Age(reference group 3=37-45 years old)								
18-28 years old (1)	1,396	1,947	1,168	4,390	1,893	1,743	1,726	1,435
29-36 years old (2)	0,811	1,442	0,747	1,079	1,223	1,043	0,689	0,951
46-54 years old (4)	0,625	0,963	0,647	0,861	0,825	0,920	0,818	1,084
55-65years old (5)	1,354	1,495	0,488	1,160	1,292	1,077	1,141	1,192
Gender								
1=male, 0=female	0,759	0,783	1,118	0,968	1,453	1,556	1,751	0,976
Education (reference group: 2=secondary education)								
Primary (1)	0,597	9,944	1,373	0,934	1,904	1,735	3,565	6,335
Tertiary (3)	0,793	0,746	1,786	1,106	1,045	1,056	1,871	1,063
Place of residence (reference group: 2=intermediate area)								
Urbanized area (1)	1,053	0,613	0,864	1,151	1,177	1,267	0,517	1,147
Rural area (3)	1,180	0,762	1,302	1,258	0,823	1,216	1,480	1,111

* The detailed models are in Appendix 1

Source: HWF Survey 2001 – Unified international data collection.

Table 12. The odd ratios of time-flexibility by countries and predictors*

	U.K.	Netherlands	Sweden	Slovenia	Czechia	Hungary	Romania	Bulgaria
Age(reference group 3=37-45 years old)								
18-28 years old (1)	1,146	1,178	0,841	1,901	1,266	1,479	1,186	0,909
29-36 years old (2)	0,795	1,253	0,481	0,879	0,924	0,913	0,489	1,334
46-54 years old (4)	0,892	0,789	0,487	0,632	0,761	1,106	0,738	1,086
55-65years old (5)	1,745	1,455	0,477	1,382	1,229	1,132	1,430	1,147
Gender								
1=male, 0=female	0,668	0,554	0,908	0,746	1,440	1,977	1,761	1,341
Education (reference group: 2=secondary education)								
Primary (1)	0,734	2,528	1,090	1,456	1,688	1,509	3,406	2,361
Tertiary (3)	0,787	0,861	1,744	1,905	1,359	1,294	2,552	1,881
Place of residence (reference group: 2=intermediate area)								
Urbanized area (1)	1,220	0,684	0,739	1,185	1,374	1,391	0,549	1,438
Rural area (3)	1,015	0,516	1,084	1,317	0,869	1,322	1,702	1,444

The detailed models are found in Sik and Wallace 2003.

Source: HWF Survey 2001 – Unified international data collection.

As far as time-flexibility is concerned (Table 12) we see differences according to gender. In the three western countries (especially in the Netherlands) females are the most likely to become time-flexible, and this is also the case in Slovenia. However, in the remaining four ECE countries being male increases the chances of being time-flexible. Except for Slovenia, there is a clear East-West cluster in this case – gender and time. In all countries, except Bulgaria, being young increases the chances of time flexibility. However, being older also increases the chances of being time flexible, everywhere apart from Sweden. In most countries, apart from the UK, time flexibility is associated with having low education and this is especially the case in Romania, Bulgaria and the Netherlands. However, in Sweden, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria (and to a lesser extent Hungary and the Czech Republic) it is also increased by having higher education. Therefore, we see the polarisation between good flexibility and bad flexibility in the dimension of time as it relates to education. In Bulgaria while age and gender do not influence the probability of time-flexibility both education and residence have bifurcated influence in it, i.e. the extreme categories are the most likely to be time-flexible, the in-betweens the least. Time flexibility is a rural phenomenon in Romania and in Bulgaria, although in the Netherlands rurality decreases time flexibility.

Therefore, we can see that there are important differences between European countries in terms of time flexibility. There is a general tendency for the lower educated to be time-flexible, but we can identify a favourable flexibility for the higher educated as well as an unfavourable flexibility for the lower educated in terms of time.

Table 13. The odd ratios of place-flexibility by countries and predictors*

	U.K.	Netherlands	Sweden	Slovenia	Czech Republic	Hungary	Romania	Bulgaria
Age(reference group 3=37-45 years old)								
18-28 years old (1)	0,792	1,349	0,851	1,115	1,556	0,639	2,778	0,643
29-36 years old (2)	0,945	0,940	0,777	0,801	0,940	0,881	0,830	1,343
46-54 years old (4)	0,434	0,326	1,161	0,935	0,740	0,981	1,153	0,874
55-65years old (5)	1,924	0,721	0,681	1,207	1,526	1,037	1,295	1,531
Gender								
1=male, 0=female	1,111	6,175	2,259	2,485	1,850	1,845	3,919	1,422
Education (reference group: 2=secondary education)								
Primary (1)	0,349	4,233	2,833	0,782	1,274	0,775	4,953	1,327
Tertiary (3)	0,752	0,820	1,296	0,593	0,399	1,480	0,371	0,757
Place of residence (reference group: 2=intermediate area)								
Urbanized area (1)	0,715	0,405	1,163	1,025	0,932	1,210	0,850	1,373
Rural area (3)	1,204	0,791	0,705	0,846	0,902	2,197	3,312	1,429

* The detailed models are in Appendix Table ???

Source: HWF Survey 2001 – Unified international data collection.

Turning now to place flexibility, we can see that being young increases the chances of place flexibility in Romania but decreases it in Hungary and Bulgaria, whilst in the UK place flexibility is increased for the older age group and this is also the case to some extent in Bulgaria. Being male strongly increases the chances of being place flexible in all eight countries. Having a low education increases place flexibility in Romania, Sweden, and the Netherlands, but decreases it in the UK, Slovenia and Hungary. Being in a rural area increases the chances of place flexibility in Romania and Hungary.

Place flexibility is more homogenous across the different countries than is time flexibility. It most often affects men, so this is another all-European pattern.

Table 14. The odd ratios of contract-flexibility by countries and predictors*

	U.K.	Netherlands	Sweden	Slovenia	Czech Republic	Hungary	Romania	Bulgaria
Age(reference group 3=37-45 years old)								
18-28 years old (1)	2,921	3,274	9,977	13,451	3,013	4,893	2,816	1,659
29-36 years old (2)	0,828	1,029	3,992	1,914	1,400	1,791	1,018	0,778
46-54 years old (4)	1,109	0,959	0,432	1,237	1,119	1,283	0,929	0,934
55-65years old (5)	2,092	1,209	2,240	5,712	2,109	1,932	2,342	1,162
Gender								
1=male, 0=female	0,657	0,665	0,475	0,474	0,841	1,135	1,705	0,965
Education (reference group: 2=secondary education)								
Primary (1)	0,770	3,288	1,427	1,626	2,851	2,041	9,924	23,644
Tertiary (3)	0,633	0,552	1,006	0,768	0,666	0,583	0,294	0,504
Place of residence (reference group: 2=intermediate area)								
Urbanized area (1)	1,459	0,937	1,042	1,230	0,865	0,937	0,487	1,042
Rural area (3)	1,261	1,264	2,647	0,997	0,714	2,112	1,249	1,133

* The detailed models are in Sik and Wallace 2003.

Source: HWF Survey 2001 – Unified international data collection.

As to contract flexibility, we see that it is overwhelmingly found in the youngest and oldest age cohorts in each country. This is especially the case in Slovenia and in Sweden. In almost all countries, it is being female which increases the chances of contract flexibility, although in Hungary and Romania it is being male. Having a low education strongly increases the chances of contract flexibility in all countries except for the UK and this tendency is especially strong in Bulgaria, Romania and the Netherlands. In most countries, having higher education decreases the chances of contract flexibility. In Sweden and in Hungary, the changes of having contract flexibility are much stronger in rural areas.

In the UK none of the socio-demographic dimensions proper have significant influence on the probability of contract flexibility. In the Netherlands, the uneducated youth and in Sweden the youth in general are the most likely people to experience contract-flexibility. We could assume that it is the entrance to the labour market involves more contract flexibility in these countries. Whether it is a new phenomenon (a cohort effect) or only the usual form of job search patterns for the youngest (having several, less committing jobs in the beginning of their labour market career) or that of a dual labour market, we do not know, but the Dutch association between low education and youth in the case of contract flexibility is closer to a dual labour market than the Swedish version.

In Slovenia, age has a particularly strong influence on contract flexibility with both older and younger workers being found in this kind of flexibility. It is the uneducated who have significantly less chance of getting a contract in all countries

In Hungary the social basis of contract-flexibility is again entirely different. Age has a strongly but bifurcated role, i.e. those with the weakest labour market positions (the youngest and the oldest) are the most likely to be contract-flexy. In Romania all aspects of being a rural poor farmer are there to create a contract-flexible situation, i.e. being rural, uneducated, old and male. In Bulgaria it is the uneducated who has an extremely high chance of being (and very likely remaining for the rest of their life) contract-flexy.

Thus contract flexibility displays one homogenous feature across the different countries: it most affects younger people and older people. It is also associated with the less well educated. However, in other respects it differs from country to country.

In all of these odds ratios tables, it is education which stands out as having the most impact on flexibility. Those with lower education were likely to be most flexible, especially with respect to contract (except the UK). However, in the case of time flexibility, it was also often the higher educated as well as the lower

educated who were likely to be more flexible. The country by country analysis also confirms the cross tabulations: that it is younger workers and to some extent older workers who are most likely to be flexible.

Looking at this now country by country, we find that in the UK combined flexibility is not strongly associated with anything except that it is negatively associated with low education. Time flexibility in the UK is strongly found among the older age cohort and more among females than males. It is mostly associated with the middle educational group. Place flexibility is also found among the older cohorts and is negatively associated with being low educated. The strongest associations are found among contract flexibility where being young or being old are important as well as being female and having middle levels of education. The profile of the different kinds of flexibility in the UK is therefore that time flexibility is associated with older females of all educational types and place flexibility with older people. We can assume that these are women with families who need to combine work in the labour market with family care. Contract flexibility shows the strongest associations but it is young and old people, females and middle educational groups. Women are therefore most flexible on all dimensions in the UK. We could say that flexibility is feminized in the UK, but on other dimensions it appears to be spread more around the population.

Turning to the Netherlands, we find strong associations with combined flexibility: it is found mainly among the young and the lower educated and females. Time flexibility is strongly associated with being female, with being lower educated and with living in a semi-urban area. Place flexibility is also more associated with younger people, with being male and having lower levels of education as well as not living in a rural area. Contract flexibility in the Netherlands is associated with younger people, with being female with low education. The profile in the Netherlands is that for most types of flexibility it is young, lower educated and women who are most flexible, except in the case of place, where it is the young, lower educated males who are flexible. In the Netherlands, flexibility is therefore concentrated very clearly at the lower educated and younger ends of the labour market and some aspects of flexibility are strongly feminized. Thus, whilst the Dutch legislation aims to protect workers from precarious employment whilst maintaining flexibility of time (see Jager 2003), in fact there seems to a group of young people with lower educated that are excluded and unprotected. It is possible that they prefer precarious jobs if they are just entering the labour market or studying. Their lower education, however, perhaps suggests that they are excluded.

Looking at Sweden, we find that combined flexibility is negatively associated with being in the older age group and unlike in other countries, is associated with higher as well as lower levels of education. Time flexibility is negatively associated with almost all age groups except those between 37 and 45 and there is not much difference between males and females. Those with tertiary education are more likely to be time flexible. Time flexibility is therefore spread around the population and is even associated with more privileged groups rather than less privileged groups like in other countries. The strongly gender egalitarian regulatory regime in Sweden, means that this is the only country where gender plays no strong role. Place flexibility in Sweden is not much associated with age but strongly associated with gender – being male. It is associated with lower education. Contract flexibility in Sweden is strongly associated with people in younger age groups (up to 36) and with older people over 55. It is associated with being female and with living in a rural area. In Sweden therefore, flexibility is spread around the population with no groups being strongly affected. Unlike in other countries, time flexibility is not concentrated in any demographic group. In fact in Sweden, unlike other countries, higher educated people are often most flexible. Only in contract flexibility do we find young and old people most affected and that it is feminized. So, as in the Netherlands we find a protected sector of the labour market and an unprotected sector characterised by contract work. However, the division is not so stark as in the Netherlands.

In Slovenia, combined flexibility is strongly concentrated among the youngest cohort, between 18 and 28, but otherwise has no particularly strong socio-demographic characteristics. Time flexibility in Slovenia is associated most with the youngest and the best educated group, although place flexibility is strongly male in character and negatively associated with higher education. Contract flexibility is very strongly concentrated in the younger groups (especially 18-28) as well as older people over 55. It is more associated with women than with men. The profile of flexibility in Slovenia then is that neither combined nor time nor place flexibility are strongly concentrated, although flexibility affects more younger and older groups of workers. Furthermore, unlike in most other countries, it is the better educated who are likely to be time flexible, as in Sweden. Place flexibility is again different as it affects less educated males.

In the Czech Republic younger people with lower education and most likely to experience combined flexibility in their work. Time flexibility has a slight tendency to be associated with those with lower education and with being male, but not with any other characteristics. Place flexibility is strongly associated with males and negatively associated with having higher education, so it is males in the middle educational group who are most likely to have this kind of flexibility. Contract flexibility is strongly associated with older and younger

groups and those with lower education. It is weakly feminised. The profile of the flexible full time worker in the Czech Republic is therefore someone who is low educated and young and male in the case of combined or time flexibility, but in the case of contract flexibility younger or older and with a slight tendency towards being more likely to be female. Place flexibility is for middle level educated males.

In Hungary, combined flexible workers are younger people (below 28), male and less well educated. Time flexible workers are also male and more often lower educated (although higher education is also positively associated). Place flexible full-time workers are males in rural areas, mostly older age groups. Contract flexible workers are very often in the youngest group, but also in the oldest are low educated (higher education is negatively associated with contract flexibility) and from rural areas. The profile of flexibility in Hungary therefore is that there is an age, education and rural dimension. Combined as well as time flexibility being associated with younger people male and lower educated, whilst contract flexibility is associated with younger and older workers, the lower educated and rural areas. Place flexibility is different again being something for older male workers in rural areas.

In Romania, all forms of flexibility are heavily concentrated in particular population groups, much more strongly than in other countries. Here we find a strongly horizontally and vertically segmented labour market: between farmers and non-farmers on the one hand and between precarious flexible workers and non-flexible traditional workers on the other. Combined flexibility is found most among the youngest group, males and the lowest educated, although higher education is also strongly positively associated with combined flexibility. Time flexibility is not strongly associated with any age group except that it is negatively associated with the 29-36 year old group. Lower and higher education is strongly associated with time flexibility and time flexibility is positively associated with rural areas and negatively associated with urban areas. Place flexibility is strongly associated with younger groups, males and lower educated (and negatively associated with higher education). It is strongly found in rural areas. Finally, contract flexibility is found among the youngest and the oldest groups most positively, it is very strongly associated with lower education and negatively with higher education and it is negatively associated with urban areas. Hence we find two groups of people affected in Romania according to the type of flexibility. For combined and for time flexibility, we find a group of higher educated people and a group of lower educated people. Otherwise it is young people, males and those in rural areas who are most flexible, although contract flexibility can also be found among older workers. In the rural areas, this fits with a “return to the land” for the socially excluded workers, although unlike in the case of farmers, these are younger people in rural areas who find themselves to be “forced” into flexibility. Time flexibility can also be found among higher educated people, probably teachers and professionals (Stanculescu and Berevoescu 2003).

In Bulgaria, combined flexibility is found most strongly amongst the low educated, but it has no particular gender dimension, although there is a slight tendency for younger workers to be more combined flexible. For time flexibility, there are no particularly strong associations to be found except that it is associated both with the lower educated and with the higher educated and is more likely to be male, suggesting a similar structure to Romania. There is no urban-rural dimension to the same extent in Bulgaria as there is in Romania. Place flexibility is negatively associated with young people and positively associated with those over 55 and is also male, being more strongly associated with the lower educated. Place flexibility is found both in rural and in urban areas. Contract flexibility is much more strongly associated with young people, has no particular gender dimension but is very strongly associated with the lower educated. As in place flexibility, there is no particular urban or rural dimension. In Bulgaria, the gender and the rural-urban dimensions were not as strong as in other countries, such as Romania, although education was a fairly consistently strong variable. For combined flexibility and contract flexibility we find younger workers with lower education are most likely to be affected, whilst for place it was older male workers with lower education. Time flexibility showed a dual structure with both higher and lower educated males likely to be affected by this kind of flexibility. We could assume that like in Romania, this represented the flexibility of various professional groups such as teachers. Although there are large numbers of flexible workers in Bulgaria, they do not seem to be as concentrated among different population segments as in Romania. Rather, flexibility is a risk facing almost everyone.

Hence, the socio-demographic composition of flexibility showed a variegated picture. It was not necessarily the most vulnerable in the labour market that were affected in each country and it was not necessarily a feminised phenomenon, as the Western literature generally suggests. Place flexibility always had a different profile to the other forms of flexibility. Therefore, when we concentrate upon time and contract flexibility (which we know are strongly associated with one another- see Table.9) we find that whilst in all western EU countries plus Slovenia, flexibility is a feminised phenomenon, albeit more weakly so in Sweden and in Slovenia. In all the remaining ECE countries flexibility is more masculinised. If we count the least educated as a marginalised group, then we could say that they are most likely to experience flexibility

of time and contract in all countries apart from the UK. However, time flexibility was also associated with the better educated in Sweden, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria and in these countries flexibility could have favourable as well as unfavourable dimensions as there was both a marginal and a privileged group who were affected. Age was generally an important dimension. It was always young people who were most likely to experience flexibility (except the UK) and contract flexibility also affected older workers in many countries. Only in the UK did the young seem less affected by time flexibility than in other countries. The urban-rural dimension was important in Hungary and Romania, where rural workers were most flexible.

3.9.2 SOCIAL CLASS AND FLEXIBILITY

If we consider social class, we find a polarisation between different kinds of flexibility. On the one hand there is the flexibility of the managers and professionals (ISCO 1) who have time flexibility but are also satisfied with their jobs and are able to control their flexibility themselves (Stanculescu and Berevoescu 2003). However, this group work long hours and their work also invades their home life, since they frequently have to take work home with them. They are the most likely to suffer from a conflict between family and work and one way of resolving this is to work some of the time at home in order to spend more time with their families.


At the other extreme of the social scale we find a lot of flexibility among two groups: unskilled manual workers (ISCO 9) and farmers (ISCO 6). These groups are also very flexible, but they do not control their flexibility, they tend to be unsatisfied with their work and they work at home because they cannot find any other job.

The regulated forms of flexibility that we find in Western EU countries helps to spread flexibility more around the different occupational groups and leads on the whole to more satisfaction with work and more control of flexibility. On the other hand in Eastern and Central European countries (ECE) and especially in Romania and Bulgaria, we find much more a polarised labour market with secure workers on the one hand and flexible workers on the other. This more resembles the “Brazilianisation” of work described by Ulrich Beck (Beck 2000). In these countries people work already the longest hours in Europe, but they would like to work more in order to earn more money. For them there is no family-work conflict, which seems to be more a problem for advanced industrial society.

Among other ISCO groups such as 2 and 3 (professionals, technicians and associated professions) their hours are more likely to be decided by their employers even though they are also more likely to work in shifts. Finally, for ISCO group 5 (service workers) there are shorter working hours in the Netherlands and Sweden, mostly part-time in nature but not in ECE countries, where part time work is underdeveloped.

With very few exceptions, the permanent work contract is specific to professionals, technicians and associate professionals and to clerical workers (ISCO 2, 3, and 4 groups) in all the countries studied. Manual workers' (ISCO 7 and 8) situation varies from one country to another but this group predominantly holds a permanent work contract. The most flexible forms of work contract are to be found among those in managerial occupations (ISCO 1), agricultural and fishery workers (ISCO 6), unskilled workers (ISCO 9) and service workers (ISCO 5) to a lesser extent.

Figure 25 Four occupational groups (ISCO 1, 4, 5 and 9) and their distribution by type of work contract and by country



Note: Differences between occupational groups are statistical significant ($p=0.000$) in all seven countries. Distribution of the ISCO 4 (clerks group) is almost similar with those of ISCO 2 and ISCO 3 groups in all countries.

Source: HWF Survey 2001 – Unified international data collection.

Below the forms of contract and the type of employment for each occupational group are described.


Three occupational groups, namely ISCO 2, 3 and 4, are rather non-flexible on the dimension of the institutional conditions of work. The majority hold standard forms of work contract. However, out of these three occupational groups, flexible forms of work contract (on fixed term, temporary or on call) are held only by clerks (a quarter) from the Netherlands and professionals in Romania and Slovenia (8 percent, 21 percent respectively) to a greater extent than other professional groups in this category. On the other hand, when the situation of the same group across the seven countries is compared one finds that professionals (ISCO 2) hold flexible forms of work contract to a significantly larger extent in Slovenia (one in five professionals has a fixed term, temporary or on-call contract) while in the other countries about one in ten professionals is in this situation (12 percent in Czech and Bulgaria, 10 percent in Sweden, 8 percent in Hungary and Romania, and 7 percent in the Netherlands). Self-employment among professionals is rather rare in all countries, the largest share being recorded in the Czech Republic (14 percent of ISCO 2 is self-employed). Regarding the ISCO 3 group, self-employment is very low (less than 5 percent in each country) and flexible forms of work contract are more numerous only in Bulgaria (18 percent of ISCO 3 group) and in the Netherlands (13 percent). The situation of clerks is somewhat similar to the former group. Self-employment is even scarcer and flexible forms of work contract are available to a significantly larger extent only in the Netherlands (one in four clerks has a work contract which is fixed term, temporary or on-call) and

in Slovenia (one in five clerks) while the corresponding share diminishes to 12 percent in Sweden, 10 percent in the Czech Republic and Bulgaria, 8 percent in Hungary and only 5 percent in Romania.

These three occupational groups are overwhelmingly employed full-time: more than 70 percent of each group in Sweden and Slovenia, more than 75 in Czech Republic and Hungary, and more than 83 percent in Romania and Bulgaria. In the Netherlands the permanent work contract is combined with flexible forms of employment. Thus, regardless the type of work contract, only 69 percent of professionals (ISCO 2), 56 percent of ISCO 3 group and only 52 percent of ISCO 4 are full-time employed.

A standard work contract and full-time employment is associated in all countries with higher satisfaction. In the Central and South-East European countries where work regulations are not yet fully functional ISCO 2, 3 and 4 groups are significantly more satisfied with their type of contract compared to other occupational groups, particularly ISCO 6 and ISCO 9. In the two Western countries, where various work regulations are in place and are upheld by functioning institutions, there are no significant differences between the various occupational groups. Precisely because of the presence of a legal framework and the functioning institutions, satisfaction towards the type of work contract is significantly higher in the Western countries than in the Central and South-Eastern ones, irrespective of ISCO group.

Figure 26 Satisfaction towards the type of contract of the ISCO groups by country



Source: HWF Survey 2001 – Unified international data collection.

The significance of the difference between the occupational groups was tested with one-way analysis of variance, using Tukey's-b post hoc multiple comparisons test. In each country the differences are significant for $p=.000$ except in Czech Republic where $p=.001$ and in Slovenia where $p=.02$. For each occupational group the differences between countries were tested with one-way analysis of variance, which proved to be also significant for $p=.000$.

More than two thirds of the blue collar worker (ISCO 7 and 8 groups) have permanent work contracts in all seven countries. Flexible forms of work contract are more frequent only in Bulgaria (22 percent of ISCO 7 group and 27 percent of ISCO 8) and in the Netherlands (25 percent of ISCO 8 group). Self-employment represents shares larger than 7 percent only in the case of the craft and related trades workers (ISCO 7) in Slovenia (17 percent) and the Czech Republic (16 percent). In addition, the majority are full-time employed. Part-time employment is very low among the manual workers regardless of country. In case of all the three occupational groups presented above (professionals and white collars) ISCO 7 and 8 groups, standard work contracts and full-time employment result in satisfaction towards the institutional conditions of work.

Service workers (ISCO 5) have more flexible forms of work from the institutional perspective. In Hungary and Bulgaria, 13 percent of service workers work in the informal sector without a work contract. About one in every four service workers in Bulgaria, about one in five in Romania, and one in ten in Hungary perform the activity as self-employed. In the other four countries, flexible forms of work contract are more widespread among those in ISCO 5 groups: 28 percent in the Netherlands, 26 percent in Slovenia, 18 percent in Bulgaria, and 16 percent in the Czech Republic.

In contrast with the groups presented above, ISCO 1, ISCO 6, ISCO 9 groups are considerably more flexibilized on this dimension of analysis. Self-employment represents shares between 24 percent (in Hungary) and 49 percent (in Sweden) of ISCO 1 groups. In the case of agricultural and fishery workers (ISCO 6 groups) self-employment is combined with high levels of informal work. Thus, a fifth of the agricultural workers from Slovenia, a third of those from Hungary and Bulgaria and more than three quarters of those from Romania are self-employed. Informal work is performed by ISCO 6 groups by more than a half of those workers in Slovenia, more than a third in Hungary and Bulgaria, and 12 percent in Romania. In addition, 11 percent of the ISCO 6 group from Hungary and 20 percent in Bulgaria hold fixed term, temporary or on-call work contracts. Although both occupational groups (ISCO 1 and ISCO 6) are characterized by self-employment, significant differences are recorded in the satisfaction towards this situation. The institutional conditions of work represent a source of satisfaction for the ISCO 1 representatives, while for ISCO 6 groups, self-employment represents just a salvation niche, an alternative to unemployment, a fact that results in dissatisfaction (Figure 4). Consequently, if flexibilization is for ISCO 1 representatives a choice, those other groups rather retreat into agriculture or have been pushed into forced flexibilization.

Elementary occupations are highly regulated only in the two Western countries. In Sweden and the Netherlands the ISCO 9 groups have, from the type of work contract point of view, situations rather similar to other occupational groups such as service workers or white collar workers. The majority are employed on permanent work contracts while the rest have contracts on a fixed term (29 percent in the Netherlands and 14 percent in Sweden). However, significantly larger shares are part-time employed, a fact that shows that their situation is more precarious compared to the other occupational groups (except the service workers). In the transitional countries this occupational group seems the most affected by the economic transformations. In all accession countries, informal work and flexible forms of work contract are over-represented among the unskilled workers (ISCO 9). Ten percent of the unskilled workers work in the informal sector (without a work contract) in Slovenia and the Czech Republic, 15 percent in Bulgaria, 23 percent in Hungary, and 36 percent in Romania. Work contracts that are fixed term, temporary and on-call are held by 43 percent of ISCO 9 group from Bulgaria, 35 in Slovenia, 25 in the Czech Republic, 17 percent in Hungary and 7 percent in Romania (where these types of work contract are not yet fully regulated). Moreover, in these countries, ISCO 9 groups are significantly under-represented among those with a stable job (more than five years). Thus, ISCO 9 groups have the most insecure institutional conditions of work within each given country and have a more insecure situation in the transitional countries compared to the Western affluent ones. These gaps are reflected also in levels of satisfaction with work.

3.9.3 FLEXIBILITY AND AGE

It is often claimed that flexibility affects young people more than other age groups in the labour market (Wallace 2002). In the HWF project we focused upon flexibility and young people (Kovacheva, Tang et al. 2003). The question is whether flexible and precarious jobs act as a stepping stone into stable employment or lead to permanent exclusion from the regular labour market. On the one hand statistics at a European level are alarming: one half of young people between 17 and 20 are on temporary contracts or casual work and one third of those between 21 and 25. However, this also to some extent reflects the growth of further study and the incentives to undertake occasional jobs to subsidise studies. Different kinds of flexibility were recorded in the different halves of Europe: young people in Western Europe were more likely to be time flexible and those in Eastern Europe, contract flexible. The spread of work with reduced hours in Western countries has helped to stave off youth unemployment, something which is not available in ECE countries. In ECE and especially the Balkan countries, there is a strong polarisation of incomes with some young people benefiting from the changes and others being condemned to marginalisation, or even finding themselves with “no income” which was a relatively common situation for young people in ECE. Flexible contracts provide more work autonomy and satisfaction and young people prefer this to unemployment and dead end permanent jobs.

From Table.11 it is possible to see that even within the numbers in full time jobs, young people are more likely to be time flexible, place flexible and contract flexible. Furthermore they are more likely than other age groups to find themselves in combinations of flexible work. Some of these may be young people who pay for themselves whilst studying by doing casual jobs. However, the fact that many of the most precarious workers are young people with low education indicates that they are most likely involuntary victims of bad flexibility (see Sik and Wallace 2003).

3.9.4 FLEXIBILITY AND INCOME

To examine the quality of jobs the flexible workers have and also the quality of life they lead we examine personal monthly income provided by the HWF survey⁵. This variable includes first of all wage, salary or income from the main earning activities, but also other financial sources. The income has not been adjusted to the number of monthly working hours as we focus on the financial well-being of flexible workers rather than on hourly wages differentials. For this analysis we have applied the multinomial logit⁶ (used for example in Kalleberg et al, 1997), with monthly personal income as the dependent variable with three categories: low income (belonging to the first quartile), high income (in the highest quartile) and base category is income in the second or third quartiles. The explanatory variables include: sex and age dummies, educational and occupational dummies and five dummies for the flexible work forms. Table 15 shows the odds ratios for every country, where the odd ratio is a relative probability of a worker with given characteristic - for example on a fixed term contract - to have low (high) income as compared to the base category (which is regular full time employment). For example, the odds ratio 6 for fixed term workers in the Netherlands) say that they have six times bigger probabilities to be in a low income category (see Stepankova 2003). The model fits better the countries such as the Netherlands, Romania and UK. The explanatory power is weaker in transition countries, which can be associated with the lower number of flexible workers in the sample. We also have to mention that results have been calculated under the assumption that the data collected describe approximately the equilibrium state in economies. However, if the incomes of the flexible workers show more variability during economic cycle and wages of full-time workers are sufficiently rigid, then assessing the data in recession would mean the probability of receiving a low income would be overestimated and the probability of receiving a higher income would be overestimated. However, in 2001 when the data were collected, the countries under consideration had positive levels of economic growth⁷.

Table 16 provides the odds ratios for low income workers and help us to draw several conclusions. First, in the UK, Netherlands, Slovenia, Hungary and Bulgaria all flexible workers (even after controlling for differences in their education, sex, age and occupation) are more prone to belong to the low income category. The risk of segmentation on these markets is therefore bigger. Moreover, the biggest overall income differences seem to be found in the Hungary and the Netherlands. To illustrate this, the self-employed Hungarian worker has 16 times higher probability of having a low personal income than the Hungarian regular full time worker. In case of the Netherlands, they have a 3 times higher chance of being in an unfavourable situation. Moreover the flexible workers in “other” category, with many workers working subject to performance, have even a 26 times higher chance of finding themselves on a low income. This supports the conclusion by other researchers working with HWF data, that Hungarian market may be more precarious than other developed transition countries such as the Czech Republic (Keune, 2003). The differences between the flexible and regular workers are visible, although less pronounced, in the UK and are common especially among permanent part-timers, workers without contract (and employment protection) and in the category “other forms.” Among the more precarious arrangements in Bulgaria we find arrangements in the “other forms” category, part-timers and the self-employed. In Slovenia, we find significantly higher odds for being in the lowest income quartile among workers without contract and in the “other category” with a large share of workers employed via an agency.

In Romania, with a high share of flexible working arrangements, we find a significantly higher probabilities of being poor among the self-employed and in the “other category.” An interesting picture is provided by the low odds ratio in Sweden. Swedish self-employed workers have only a one third higher probability of low income than the full timers. Also in the UK, Czech Republic and Slovenia the relative probabilities of the self-employed being on a low income is quite low, which might indicate that in these countries, self-employment is a good opportunity for increasing the living standard.

⁵ In the following tables flexible workers are defined as those not in permanent full time jobs as seen in Table 5

⁶ For the methodology on the econometric modeling of multinomial logit see Green (2000) chapters 18, 19.

⁷ The growth rates for the first quarter of 2001 compared to the first quarter I previous year where the data have been collected are in percents 1,6 for the Netherlands, 2,7 for both Sweden and the UK, 4,4 for Hungary, 4,8 for Romania, 3,2 for Slovenia , 4,1 for the Czech Republic and 4,5 for Bulgaria. (source: Social situation in the European Union 2002).

With the exception of Sweden and the Czech Republic, in other countries the flexible workers are more prone to receive low personal incomes. Among the most precarious arrangements, according to the wage criteria, belong all the Hungarian flexible workers, part-timers and workers without a contract in the Netherlands, permanent part-timers and workers in the “other category” in Bulgaria and British and Slovenian workers without a contract and the self-employed in Romania.

Table 15 Atypical workers' odds of being paid a low wage compared to regular full time workers (Odds ratio)

	UK	Netherlands	Sweden	Slovenia	CR	Hungary	Romania	Bulgaria
women	3,937***	3,644**	0,422***	2,262*	1,443'	0,662	1,709*	0,605
primary	0,904	0,970	0,918	4,934'	1,331	1,230	1,399	1,709
tertiary	0,532'	0,281***	1,218	0,563	1,120	0,158'	2,985	0,525
18-29	1,401	2,062*	1,558*	0,951	0,872	0,680	1,502	0,524
60+	0,868	1,435	0,975	0,933	1,560'	0,434'	0,495'	1,525
legislators, senior managers and professionals	0,769	0,936	1,247	3,069'	0,763	0,979	1,288	0,391
service workers,craft and agriculture workers	3,571***	1,237	0,665'	1,641	0,924	0,503	2,077	0,880
plant and machine operators and elementary occupations	4,372***	1,633	0,973	1,560	1,147	1,191	5,167*	1,902
permanent part-time	4,057***	15,732***	0,696	2,832	2,143	22,755***	0,000	7,168**
fixed term	1,067	6,049***	1,092	2,131	0,989	11,769***	0,602	1,215
self-employment	1,919	3,316*	0,373*	1,597	1,340	16,202***	5,944***	4,412**
no contract	6,874***	12,868***	0,941	6,248**	0,741	6,319*	0,632	4,352'
other forms	2,707**	6,078**	1,865	6,634**	1,287	26,125***	4,230***	7,528***

Notes: *** $p < 0,001$ ** $0,001 < p < 0,01$ * $0,01 < p < 0,05$ ' $0,05 < p < 0,1$

Data for Hungary, Netherlands and UK weighted

Source: HWF Survey 2001 – Unified international data collection.

The fact that the flexible workers more often receive a lower income might be associated with the greater risk in the labour market. If the wages of flexible workers are more determined by market forces (for example they might be paid on a daily productivity basis) then this may disadvantage them when the market is low but it may be also advantage them when the market situation is good. Greater risk might mean that they have also lot to win. To examine this hypothesis we will test whether the flexible workers are also more likely to have a higher income as opposed to the regular employees. Table 17 provides the odds ratios for this case.

In general, the small odds ratios indicate that the relative probability of atypical workers being in the highest income group is usually smaller than for regular full-timers. The exception is those holding part-time jobs in the Czech Republic which might be accounted for by the multiple job holding of part-time workers and also by the fact that in transition countries the part-timers are working longer hours than in the East.

An interesting picture is presented by the Romanian results that show that certain flexible work forms, namely fixed term contracts and “other forms” do decrease the probability of having higher incomes. It is not so much that workers with these arrangements are prone to be poor as that their working arrangement do not allow them to become rich.

Table 16. Atypical workers' odds of being paid a high wage compared to regular full time workers (Odds ratio)

	UK	Netherlands	Sweden	Slovenia	CR	Hungary	Romania	Bulgaria
Women	0,265**	0,170***	0,286***	0,546*	0,837	0,718'	0,531**	0,316***
Primary	2,087	2,342	0,890	0,000	1,167	0,782	0,251*	0,191
Tertiary	2,010'	3,365***	1,231	2,451*	1,283	1,010	7,600***	1,790**
18-29	0,233*	0,268***	0,370***	0,657	0,984	0,754	0,537**	0,917
60+	0,510	1,081	0,684'	1,199	1,065	1,237	1,275	1,106
legislators, senior managers and professionals	1,511	1,479	3,379***	2,076	1,393	1,003	0,606	1,124
service workers,craft and agriculture workers	0,584	0,359**	0,535*	0,343***	0,634*	0,727	0,291***	0,538**
plant and machine operators and elementary occupations	0,000	0,649	0,439*	0,177***	0,382***	0,441*	0,388***	0,653'
permanent part-time	1,100	0,498'	0,475	1,859	2,573'	1,492	1,348	1,307
fixed term	4,637	0,782	0,000	0,445	0,536*	0,515	0,173***	0,590**
self-employment	1,127	0,782	0,390**	1,039	1,290	0,669	0,197***	0,872
no contract	1,317	0,761	1,082	0,657	0,723	0,192	0,352'	0,318'
other forms	0,678	0,349'	1,000	0,000	0,712	0,793	0,165***	0,436*

Source: HWF Survey 2001 – Unified international data collection.

3.9.5 GOOD AND BAD FLEXIBILITY

Throughout this report we have indicated that there is a distinction between good and bad flexibility (for the employee). One way to exemplify this is to ask: to what extent are flexible working arrangements a product of objective conditions or subjective preferences? Stepankova (2003) finds that in the ECE countries the underdevelopment of the service sector could explain the lack of flexible jobs. She finds that the flexible jobs are mostly bad, low paid ones and the biggest differences between flexible and normal workers can be found in the UK, the Netherlands and Hungary. In Bulgaria there is a specially strong likelihood that flexible workers will be poor ones. Those most affected by low income are: part-time workers in Hungary and Bulgaria, those on fixed term contracts in Hungary and the Netherlands, those who are self-employed in Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, those without a contract in Slovenia and Bulgaria and other working arrangements in Slovenia, Hungary and Bulgaria. In a parallel study of managers in the Czech Republic, the Czech team found that managers saw numerical flexibility as a way of maintaining firm competitiveness, but that the costs of functional flexibility were thought to be too high for transition countries.

In terms of satisfaction with their jobs, the Dutch and Swedes score the highest (Vecernik 2003) The stability of the job is a key factor in explaining job satisfaction and only in Hungary and Slovenia was the income rewards the most important factor. In CEE countries, education also explains a great deal of job satisfaction and in the Czech Republic and Sweden the self-employed are the most satisfied. The workers in Western Europe were more able to control their job autonomy than were the workers in ECE (one third vs one fifth) although Romania was an exception because of the large number of farmers. In two countries, the control over the job was associated with work satisfaction: Sweden and Hungary. In terms of potential flexibility – willingness to learn a language, retrain or work more hours or accept worse working conditions – we find that it was those in countries with the highest unemployment were most willing to be flexible. The substantial mobility in jobs in the last ten years in the post-communist labour markets is however, equalled by Great Britain. However, whereas in the UK there were frequent changes of job, in the Czech Republic the frequent changes of job were also associated with changes of profession. In the Czech Republic changing jobs was associated with having a high income, so we might assume that people did this in order to improve their labour market situation, whilst in the UK changing jobs was associated with having a low income. In Romania and Bulgaria they were associated with job loss and unemployment.

To summarise the information contained in many of the HWF reports, we find that bad flexibility is associated with low job satisfaction, with lack of control over employment by the employee, with low education and income. Good flexibility is mostly found among professional groups, is associated with higher income, education, satisfaction with work and control over work. There is more bad flexibility to be found in ECE countries than in Western EU countries. In Western EU countries bad flexibility is feminised, but it is more likely to be found among men in Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary.

3.10 FAMILY- WORK INTEGRATION

In another part of the questionnaire we looked family work balance. To begin with we looked at the division of labour by gender. Here we focused on particular common household tasks as well as childcare as indicators of the more general pattern of the household division of labour.

Table 17. Who is mainly responsible for...

	Male	Female	Shared	Other	Paid help
Routine maintenance and repair of the dwelling	64.0	12.2	7.7	7.6	8.5
Cooking	10.5	75.4	9.7	4.2	0.2
Cleaning the house	9.2	70.0	14.6	4.7	1.5
Washing the laundry	8.5	80.3	6.6	4.4	0.3
Daily shopping	19.4	58.5	17.5	4.5	0.1
Taking daily care of the child/children	7.4	64.1	17.9	10.3	0.3
Taking care of a sick child	6.5	69.0	14.0	10.3	0.2
Taking care of a sick friend or relative	11.0	57.9	19.7	11.1	0.4
Working on the agricultural plot or garden	37.2	27.6	26.1	8.1	0.9

In this table sons, grandsons, fathers, grand fathers, daughters, granddaughters, mothers, and grandmothers are considered as "Other".

Source: HWF Survey 2001 – Unified international data collection.

If we begin with the routine maintenance and repair of the dwelling, we can see this is mostly done by men in all countries. However, there are some important variations between countries, with women in the UK being most likely to undertake such tasks and least likely to in Hungary. Cooking was done most commonly in all countries by women, but there were big variations in how much men contributed to cooking. Sweden had the highest number of men contributing to cooking, with 22% and in the UK it was 19%, in the Netherlands, 8,9%. In the ECE countries the contribution of men to cooking was much lower with only 4,4% in Bulgaria, 5,8% in Romania, 5% in the Czech Republic, 9,5% in Hungary and 8% in Slovenia. There is a clear East-West division on the domestic division of labour with regard to cooking, with ECE countries have a much more "traditional" patriarchal model of the division of labour between the sexes. Furthermore, men and women were much more likely to share the cooking in North Western European countries than they were in ECE.

This emerges also in the division of labour in cleaning the house. Whilst this is most likely to be done by women in all countries, the ranking is similar to that of cooking: in Sweden 19,6% of men are responsible for cleaning, in the UK 14,1% and in the Netherlands 8.9%. Of the ECE countries, Slovenia has the highest number of helpful men with 7.9% and Bulgaria the lowest with 3,7%. Households in Western Europe and Slovenia are also much more likely to share this task than they are in ECE countries.

In washing laundry we find the same ranking between men and women and the same East-West pattern as for the other tasks that we have considered so far. However, with daily shopping there is a slightly different pattern. Men in ECE are much more likely to contribute to this domestic task – just as likely as their Western equivalents. However, whilst this was quite likely to be a shared task in the Netherlands (42,3%) and in Sweden (34,3%) in the ECE countries it is divided between the genders.

Turning to childcare, we find that this is overwhelmingly done by women. The biggest contribution by men is in Slovenia, where 13,4% of men are mainly responsible for this compared with 6,8% in the UK, 3,3% in the Netherlands, 5,4% in Sweden, 11,6% in the Czech Republic, 7,6% in Hungary, 5,7% in Romania and 7,8% in Bulgaria. Caring for a child when they are sick is also almost entirely done by women, but the biggest contribution by men is in Slovenia (12,3%) and Sweden (9,5%). Childcare is more likely to be shared between family members in the Netherlands and Sweden, whilst in ECE countries this was much less the case, reflecting perhaps the years of discussion about domestic work, the role of women and the daily timetable in those countries. A more gender egalitarian philosophy emerges in the household division of labour.

Responsibility for taking care of a sick friend or relative is also mainly a woman's job. However, higher contributions by men were found in Sweden (19,8%) and Slovenia (13,9%) and on this variable we also find

12% of men doing this work in Romania. Care of a sick friend or relative was likely to be shared in Sweden and the Netherlands as well as Slovenia.

Working in the agricultural plot or garden had a different profile. In general it was mostly done by men, but in fact the division of labour between the sexes was fairly even and men shared this kind of work. We should note that this was different kind of work in ECE countries where it was more likely to be a job of growing vegetables and fruit, whilst in Western EU countries it was more likely to be a job concerned with garden aesthetics.

There was a clear East-West division in the sexual division of household labour on many variables. Whilst all tasks were clearly gendered, (except work in the garden or plot) the contribution of men and women varied. In Western countries women were more likely to contribute to male tasks and men were more likely to contribute to female tasks. In the Netherlands and Sweden in particular, there was more sharing of tasks. In the ECE countries, the division of labour was much more clearly divided between men and women with little sharing and little contribution of the men except to shopping, which was more masculinised than in the west.

Paid domestic help was used frequently for routine maintenance and repair of the interior of the dwelling. Cleaning the house was more likely to be outsourced to paid domestic help in the UK and the Netherlands, but not so much in other countries. "Other" solutions were most often found in ECE countries and we might assume that this would include extended family and neighbours.

Table 18. Distribution of domestic works.

United Kingdom

	Male	Female	Shared	Other	Paid help
Routine maintenance and repair of the dwelling interior	51	25.7	10.1	7.5	5.7
Cooking	19.3	64.7	14.7	1.1	0.2
Cleaning the house	14.1	63	17.9	1.6	3.3
Washing the laundry	13.8	73.8	10.8	1.1	0.4
Daily shopping	18	60.4	19.9	1.4	0.2
Taking daily care of the child/children	6.8	66.9	22.1	3.5	0.8
Taking care of child when they are sick	6	74.3	17.5	2	0.2
Taking care of sick friend or relative	12	61.3	21.2	5.3	0.2
Working in garden or agricultural plot	38	33.1	20.1	5.5	3.2

Male and female household members are treated as "Other".

The Netherlands

	Male	Female	Shared	Other	Paid help
Routine maintenance and repair of the dwelling interior	55.7	10.3	23.8	3.9	6.4
Cooking	14.3	55.2	29.5	0.7	0.3
Cleaning the house	8.9	51.1	31.7	0.8	7.5
Washing the laundry	11.1	72.1	14.8	1	1.1
Daily shopping	16.3	40.8	42.3	0.3	0.2
Taking daily care of the child/children	3.3	47.6	47.6	1.5	
Taking care of child when they are sick	4.9	60.3	33.8	1	
Taking care of sick friend or relative	9.7	49.4	38.7	1.8	0.3
Working in garden or agricultural plot	30.2	30.1	37.2	0.8	1.7

Sweden

	Male	Female	Shared	Other	Paid help
Routine maintenance and repair of the dwelling interior	63.5	10.5	14.3	8.5	3.2
Cooking	22.4	53	23.2	1.3	0.2
Cleaning the house	19.6	47.5	30.2	1.7	1
Washing the laundry	19.1	62.7	16.6	1.5	0.1
Daily shopping	24.1	40.3	34.3	1.2	0.1
Taking daily care of the child/children	5.4	44.1	49.9	0.6	
Taking care of child when they are sick	9.5	47	41.3	2.3	
Taking care of sick friend or relative	19.8	39.3	37.5	3	0.3
Working in garden or agricultural plot	31	20.3	45.7	2.5	0.5

Slovenia

	Male	Female	Shared	Other	Paid help
Routine maintenance and repair of the dwelling interior	69.9	13.1	8.6	5.6	2.8
Cooking	8	83	6.3	2.6	0.1
Cleaning the house	7.9	66.4	20.6	4.5	0.5
Washing the laundry	5.3	87.3	4.7	2.8	
Daily shopping	19.6	62	15.6	2.8	
Taking daily care of the child/children	13.4	52.3	19.1	15.3	
Taking care of child when they are sick	12.3	63.8	16.5	7	0.4
Taking care of sick friend or relative	13.9	54.3	27.4	3.9	0.4
Working in garden or agricultural plot	29.1	35.1	32.5	3.1	0.2

Czech Republic

	Male	Female	Shared	Other	Paid help
Routine maintenance and repair of the dwelling interior	71.9	17.9	6.6	2.4	1.2
Cooking	5	90.4	4	0.6	
Cleaning the house	4.9	82.6	10.3	1.9	0.2
Washing the laundry	4	91.8	2.3	1.6	0.3
Daily shopping	14.5	72.2	11.3	2	
Taking daily care of the child/children	11.6	74.4	12.2	1.8	
Taking care of child when they are sick	4.2	87.2	7	1.6	
Taking care of sick friend or relative	8.9	72.1	17.2	1.7	0.2
Working in garden or agricultural plot	44.5	27	26.2	2	0.2

Hungary

	Male	Female	Shared	Other	Paid help
Routine maintenance and repair of the dwelling interior	43	2.9		6.3	47.7
Cooking	9.5	88.7	0.1	1.2	0.5
Cleaning the house	11.3	86.9	0.3	1	0.4
Washing the laundry	9.2	89.9	0.2	0.6	0.1
Daily shopping	22.8	76	0.5	0.7	
Taking daily care of the child/children	7.6	71.4	0.6	20.3	0.2
Taking care of child when they are sick	6.2	71.2	0.4	22.2	
Taking care of sick friend or relative	8.4	57.8	0.5	33.1	0.2
Working in garden or agricultural plot	53.8	25.1	0.4	20.5	0.2

Romania

	Male	Female	Shared	Other	Paid help
Routine maintenance and repair of the dwelling interior	64.2	11.5	0	20.3	4
Cooking	5.8	73.7	0	20.1	0.3
Cleaning the house	6.3	73.9	0	19.2	0.6
Washing the laundry	5.4	75.3	0	19.1	0.2
Daily shopping	22.8	57.4	0	19.5	0.4
Taking daily care of the child/children	5.7	64.9	0	28.4	1
Taking care of child when they are sick	5.2	65.7	0	28.1	1
Taking care of sick friend or relative	8.6	57.9	0	32.3	1.2
Working in garden or agricultural plot	43.1	22.7	0	33.1	1.2

Bulgaria


	Male	Female	Shared	Other	Paid help
Routine maintenance and repair of the dwelling interior	82.2	9	3.9	3.6	1.3
Cooking	4.4	88.8	5	1.7	
Cleaning the house	3.7	82.4	11.1	2.8	
Washing the laundry	3.2	88.8	5.3	2.7	
Daily shopping	17.4	62	16.9	3.7	
Taking daily care of the child/children	7.8	70.6	17.2	4.4	
Taking care of child when they are sick	7.2	71.7	16.3	4.8	
Taking care of sick friend or relative	12	59.8	25.3	2.8	0.1
Working in garden or agricultural plot	31.8	28.8	38	1.3	0.2

3.10.1 FAMILY-WORK CONFLICTS

A series of questions were asked to ascertain the extent to which there was tension between the demands of the family or household and work pressures in the last three months. The first question asked respondents “My work makes it difficult for me to do some of the household tasks that need to be done”. In the surrounding charts, different options on the scale have been combined and we see that more than half of respondents have felt some conflict at some time, even if only rarely, whilst 12.4% experienced it frequently. In the Western countries of Sweden, the UK and the Netherlands was this value expressed most often. In the UK and the Netherlands it is mainly men who say that they are likely to experience some conflict as it is in Hungary and Romania. But in Sweden, Slovenia and Bulgaria it is more likely women who experience some cross pressure between home and work on this question. In all countries young people are more likely to experience cross pressure than are older people and the better-educated more than the less educated. Higher income people experience more combination pressure on this question than lower educated people.

A similar question was asked “My work makes it difficult for me to fulfil my responsibilities to my family and other important persons in my life”. The results are set out below where we see that almost half of respondents have such difficulties. Here we see a similar pattern to the previous question but this time with those in Sweden experiencing the most conflict followed by Slovenia and the UK.. This time, the people in the Netherlands did not score very highly. Once again the gender results are rather surprising: in it is men who are most likely to experience this conflict in nearly all countries. Middle-aged people (most probably with children) are most likely to experience this conflict and those with better education and incomes. Income differentials did not make so much difference in ECE countries as they did in Western Europe

Figure 27. Problems with combining work and domestic obligations, percentages per country (always and often).




Note: HWF Questionnaire: Q 3.01 “How often have you experienced the following in the last three months?” (Five statements, scale of agreement, only the highest positive answers “always” and “often”).

Source: HWF Survey 2001 – Unified international data collection.


Figure 28. Problems with combining work and domestic obligations (HWF means), percentages.

My work makes it difficult for me to do some of the household tasks that need to be done




■ Never
 ■ Rarely+Sometimes
 ■ Often+Always


My work makes it difficult to fulfil my responsibilities towards my family and other important persons in my life




My responsibilities towards my family and other important persons in my life prevented me from doing my work adequately



I have to take work from my employment home to finish



I preferred to spend more time at work than to spend more time at home



Note: HWF Questionnaire: Q 3.01 "How often have you experienced the following in the last three months?" (Five statements, scale of agreement.)

Source: HWF Survey 2001 – Unified international data collection.

We also asked the question the other way round: “my responsibilities towards my family and other important persons in my life prevented me from doing my work adequately”. Here we see that family encroaches on work much less than the other way round – only 23% of people had ever had such a conflict. In the UK, Hungary and Romania it was men who were most likely to experience this kind of combination pressure. In Sweden it was women, whilst in other countries this pressure was rather equally divided between the sexes. Those in the middle and younger age groups are more likely to suffer combination pressure in this respect. In the UK it was clearly those with higher incomes who suffered this kind of pressure, although that was not necessarily the case in other countries.

Having to take work home to finish was also a way in which work encroaches into family life. This was the case for 22% of respondents. This was much more likely to occur in the Western European countries. In Sweden and the Netherlands there were the largest numbers taking work home, whereas this was much rather rare in Bulgaria. In most countries it was men who had to take work home and it was clearly the highest educated and highest paid who were in this position.

Very few wanted to spend more time at work than at home. Mostly they were found in Bulgaria, where the harsh economic situation means that people have to prioritise the possibilities of earning income.

An interesting East-West distinction emerged. Those in Western Europe are more likely to experience work-family conflicts than those in ECE countries and Sweden and the Netherlands emerged particularly in this respect followed by Slovenia and the UK. Younger and better-educated people are more likely to feel such conflicts and in the UK and the Netherlands it was men rather than women who expressed this. In the Netherlands and Sweden people are often likely to take work home to finish and in Bulgaria they are most likely to say that they prefer to spend time at work than with their families – probably in order to earn money. We can explain this difference by the fact that those in Western Europe probably had higher expectations of how to reconcile work and family, as have the young and better educated. In ECE countries there was no such expectation even though women there

3.10.2 WORK-FAMILY CONFLICT FOR PARENTS

The work-family conflict can be most acute for parents. Parents were then ones in all countries who felt most acutely the conflict between work and family. Flexibility is potentially a way of balancing the demands of work and family. In this respect it has been a policy strategy in Sweden, the Netherlands and more recently in the UK. However, in ECE countries, this aspect of work is missing from discussions. Whilst part time work is often seen as an option for women in Western countries (O'Reilly and Fagan 1998) it is not well developed in Eastern countries where the paper of Cousins and Tang (Cousins and Tang 2003) shows that having children has no impact on the reduction of hours for women. However, the ECE countries do offer very long periods of maternity leave for women, up to four years and subsidised (Wallace 2003). Thus we find 41% of mothers with children under 6 taking this option in Romania, 38% in the Czech Republic, 28% in Hungary and 20% in Bulgaria. However, in Bulgaria as well as other countries, the fact that many young women are casual workers or workers without contracts means that they are excluded from the two year parental leave scheme. In Slovenia, only 12% of mothers with young children are at home looking after them full time and this probably relates to the affordability of childcare in the generous welfare state where provision for working mothers has continued since the previous state socialist regime. For those mothers who do work in ECE, they tend to work much longer hours than in the West.

Fathers are most likely to share child rearing in Sweden and least likely in Hungary. In the UK, the Netherlands and Slovenia, about one quarter of parents share childcare equally and this rises to 40% in the UK for families with two full time earners. Hungary has the least equal division of labour when it comes to care of children. Child care in the Western countries is mainly the provenance of the nuclear family, whilst in ECE countries parents were much more likely to use the services of “other family members”. Sharing of other domestic tasks is also most prevalent in Sweden, with half of fathers undertaking cleaning, shopping and one third claiming to do the cooking. Responsibility for domestic tasks is almost entirely done by members of the household: paid domestic help is used only by a minority of households and only in Western Europe.

Parents with dependent children are most likely to experience family-work conflicts, but in the Netherlands, the UK, the Czech Republic, Romania and Hungary, it is fathers who state that work makes it difficult for them to fulfil their domestic responsibilities. Family work conflict is especially high in the UK suffering as it does a long hours culture. However, in Bulgaria where people work very long hours, there is no perceived conflict because this is necessary for survival. The strongest sense of family-work conflict

however, is expressed in Sweden. Those with tertiary education are most likely to experience family work conflict

Part time work is not even considered atypical in the Netherlands where it is the main alternative for mothers with children. Thus in the Netherlands part time work is a job creation strategy: 16% of Dutch mothers were at home full time compared with 34% of UK mothers, most of them being lone parents. In Sweden only 4% of mothers with young children were at home full time. Whilst part time work is associated with a low income in the UK and the Netherlands, this was not so much the case in Sweden. However, part time mothers were generally happy with the hours that they worked. Part time work was not an option for mothers in ECE countries who also did not appear to suffer from family-work conflict. The policies supporting working mothers in Sweden enables them to work 30-40 hours per week, much longer than in the Netherlands or the UK. Cousins and Tang suggest that the Netherlands and Sweden have an “institutionalised” approach to the distribution of time between family and work, whilst in the more deregulated UK system there is a “non-institutionalised” approach, or a lack of institutional support for combining work and family (Cousins and Tang 2003).

3.10.3 “COMBINATION PRESSURE” IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

We can look at family-work balance or conflict by drawing up indexes of conflict, putting together some of the questions described above to come to more analytical conclusions. For example, the paper by Jager, Kopps and van der Lippe concentrates upon working time, comparing the Netherlands, where there has been a great deal of debate and legislative innovations on working time, with other countries (Jager, Kops et al. 2003). They term the integration of work and family “combination pressure” and begin with the paradox that modernisation produces increased expectations and rising quality of life and that this also creates more time pressure and stress. They find that “combination pressure” as measured by the perceived conflict between family and work is highest in Slovenia and Sweden among couples. In the Netherlands there is the most flexibility of working times. Gender differences were strong only in Slovenia where Slovenian women experienced much more combination pressure than Slovenian men and in the UK where men had more pressure than women. They found that an important factor for not feeling combination pressure was to have agreement with the spouse and less conflict over a variety of household and work matters such as the family budget and the amount of time spent at work. Part time working hours are welcomed by Dutch and by British women as a way of integrating work and family. In Sweden, women opt for part time jobs with long hours (they have a right to work part time until the child is 8) and suffer the most combination pressure. Strandh and Nordenmark (2003) hypothesise that this is because of the gap between prevailing gender ideologies and the real distribution of labour. In Sweden there is more sharing of domestic work than in other countries, but a very strong gender ideology of equality. In reality women still do more work in the home than men and this causes discontent. In countries such as the Czech Republic and Hungary, men help far less in the home but this is in line with the prevailing gender ideology, so there is less role conflict.

The paper by Strandh and Nordenmark (Strandh and Nordenmark 2003) takes another look at social policies and combination pressure, especially comparing Sweden with other countries. They find that paradoxically, despite the social policies supporting family life and work, there is more experience of role conflict in Sweden than in other countries. On the other hand, in post-communist countries of Czech Republic and Hungary where there were also traditionally such policies, there is in fact no such experience of role conflict. They conclude that state policies are not necessarily reflected in population values. Supplementing the HWF data with questions on gender ideology from the ISSP survey of 1994, they find that whilst in Sweden there are generally egalitarian values expressed, in Hungary and the Czech Republic there is a very conservative and traditional view of gender roles. In the UK and the Netherlands, on the other hand, there is quite a strong gender role egalitarian ideology that is not in fact reflected in the social policies. They conclude that the explanation for such surprising results can be found in the gap between gender ideologies on the one hand and the actual division of labour in the household on the other. Where these are in harmony, as in the Czech Republic and Hungary, there will be less role conflict. Where the actual division of labour is unequal, but the gender role ideology tends towards equality, there will be role conflict. This suggests that the road towards gender equality lies not in the labour market or in social policies, but in the relations within the household.

4. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Flexibility is usually discussed in terms of de-regulation of the labour market by removing job protection, limiting the power of Trades Unions and allowing wages to fall. In this context it is often claimed that European labour markets are inflexible. The problem with this perspective is that flexibility is assumed to follow from these measures, but is not proven. An alternative method is to count the numbers of part-time workers, self-employed and temporary workers as being those in “atypical” jobs and to assume that this is a measure of flexibility. The problem with these measures is that the definition of such a-typical jobs in various countries is highly variable (for example with respect to part time work) and the numbers in these categories can be an indication of the lack of flexibility rather than the opposite. A further problem is that much flexibility is informal rather than formal in Eastern and Central Europe and thus not accessible to these kinds of statistics. We have criticised both of these perspectives from the point of view of the flexible worker. We assume that the flexible worker is one that can adjust working patterns to different employment needs.

In this study we were able to develop some new indicators of flexibility that enabled us to measure flexibility in a much broader sense because we asked about not only a variety of kinds of flexibility, but also about the extent to which people controlled their work and how satisfied they were with their jobs and with the flexibility within their jobs. Since we used a cross section of people between 18 and 65, we addressed the working age population in each country, but would also be able to locate those who were excluded from the labour market. We considered three dimensions of flexibility: working *time*, working *place* and working *conditions* (contractual).

Furthermore, we linked the study of flexibility with the study of work-family balance: how far can flexibility contribute to this? Whilst there are many studies of flexibility and an increasing interest in work-life balance, there are few studies that bring the two together. Through asking a series of questions about the relationship between family and work, we were able to supply this perspective. Below we consider the following topics: the regulation of flexibility, the different kinds of flexibility, good and bad flexibility, employee-lead flexibility, flexibility, work and care cultures, family-work balance, gender, social exclusion the issue of enlargement.

4.1.1 THE REGULATION OF FLEXIBILITY

The HWF project found that the way in which flexibility was regulated was very important for the kind of flexibility to emerge. For a long time flexibilisation was thought to be about the removal of regulations from the labour market. This, it was imagined, would force workers to take jobs and make it easier for employers to fire people. It would also enable the maximum wage elasticity to occur. This type of flexibilisation was tried out first of all in the UK in the 1980s and later in Eastern Europe where it was argued that the free market, unhindered by regulations, would be the way to transform those economies. This resulted in substantial loss of jobs, rising unemployment and a fiscal crisis of the state as more people were in need. Large parts of the population were plunged into poverty and one response was to turn to the land for subsistence production. Whilst some of the countries under consideration weathered this economic slump and came through it, others are still very much suffering under the effects of this form of market transition. It is still the case that these countries from having some of the highest levels of employment in Europe, now have some of the lowest levels. The effects are also visible in our survey where the majority of respondents in 72% of households in Bulgaria, 52% in Romania, 36% in Hungary, 43% in the Czech Republic and 14% in Slovenia are unsatisfied with their economic situation and the majority in Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary (69%, 58%, 51%) think that their economic situation deteriorated in the last five years compared with 25% in

the UK, 14% in the Netherlands, 19% in Sweden and 36% in the Czech Republic. In the Netherlands only 5% were dissatisfied with their economic situation and in Sweden it was only 12% and in the UK 19%. Those countries where there was less de-regulation have happier people in terms of the subjective prosperity.

Whilst Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovenia introduced some flexibilisation policies, they were not always taken up, so their implementation can be a problem. Or they were taken up in ways that were not predicted. For example, we can point to the high number of entrepreneurs in the Czech Republic, many of them not as part of their full time jobs and the low number of part time workers in all three countries. In these countries, as in other ECE countries radical de-regulation was resisted or produced a political backlash as citizens voted for parties that would protect them from flexibilisation.

In Bulgaria and Romania the economic crisis precipitated by transition and the lack of effective modernisation has resulted in a large amount of irregular flexibilisation which has brought misery, but perhaps also some work opportunities to those who lost their positions in the labour market. This was in effect a “de-regulatory” system with not enough policies to regulate or “tame” flexibilisation. However, some areas such as self-employment, was over-regulated, leading people to circumvent the regulations with the black economy.

It is now recognised that it is more important to build institutions for economic stability and prosperity than to destroy them and this task of institution building has been taking place in the ECE countries as they started Accession negotiations with the EU. It is also important that the population support the reform measures or they otherwise vote for backlash parties of various kinds (authoritarian nationalists or socialist parties).

Those countries who recognised a need for flexibilisation, but attempted to flexibilise the labour market within the context of strong regulation of the labour market seem to have fared the best out of all our countries. The Netherlands embraced flexibility by boosting the numbers in employment, giving part time workers the same conditions as full time workers. In Sweden, this was done in the context of full time jobs for both men and women with flexibility organised across the week, the day, the year or the life-course in the context of job security. Both of these countries however, have a group of people in the labour market who are excluded from fulltime regular employment and these are mostly lower educated and younger workers.

The UK began with a de-regulatory regime but with the entrance of the New Labour Government in 1997, coinciding with the introduction of EU Directives on working time and parental leave, they have moved more in the direction of regulated flexibility.

On the one hand over-regulation, such as the over-regulation of entrepreneurship in Romania where each entrepreneur has to obtain some 80 signatures in order to start a business (and pay unofficially for each favour) does not seem a good way to promote flexibility. It also leads employers as well as employees to circumvent such regulations by developing informal solutions and thus increasing the black economy. On the other hand, de-regulation alone can lead to the erosion of working conditions for large parts of the population and an electoral backlash as well as the threat of “social dumping” as firms seek the cheapest and easiest solutions in European labour markets. The lack of regulation, which is often the case for areas of employment in ECE countries, likewise leads to a rising black economy and rising inequality and exploitative practices. It seems to us therefore that regulation is indeed needed, but that it should be regulation built upon social consent and with a view to enabling flexibility rather than hindering it. In other words, we should welcome rather than resist flexibility and try to harness it to social goals.

In both Sweden and in the Netherlands flexibility was embraced as a way of modernising labour markets but within the context of high levels of social protection and security. In both of these countries, flexibility was seen as a method of combining work and care and not only as a labour market policy. Both of these countries enjoyed high levels of employment, low unemployment, the high participation of women in the labour force and rising prosperity through the 1990s. This is reflected also in the subjective attitudes of our respondents, who were very satisfied with their economic situation and enables these countries to easily meet the Lisbon employment goals. In the UK, de-regulatory policies lead to large numbers of socially excluded and precarious workers as well as a higher number outside of the labour force altogether. There was less subjective satisfaction with the economic circumstances.

Of our ECE countries, we find that in the Czech Republic the relatively buoyant labour market through most of the 1990s enabled people to change jobs and professions relatively easily, although in Hungary, there are much higher levels of inequality between flexible and regular workers, despite the fact that Hungary embraced change earliest and most comprehensively.

It would seem therefore, that in terms of social cohesion and in terms of the “European Social Model” regulated flexibility is preferable to unregulated flexibility and there are several models available as examples of “good practice”. The introduction of legislation however, has to fit with the work and family culture of the country. In some countries part time work for women may be an option, in others it may not.

Increasingly, atypical employment is regulated at a European level in any case. However, there are still substantial variations between countries. We should be aware of the fact that policies that are introduced are not always implemented and that they can be implemented in unforeseen ways. Even if they are implemented, they may not be taken up by people who either don't know about them or don't seem them as relevant to their needs. This is what has happened to much of the flexibility regulations introduced in ECE countries, but the issue is not limited to those countries. For example, legislation for the free movement of labour in the EU in the early 1990s also did not provoke the degree of mobility that had been hoped for, but did help to transform the nature of European football as players could move around Europe in search of higher salaries.

All of the countries we are considering felt the impact of the increasing globalisation of economic competition and recession during the 1990s and were forced to respond to these pressures. For this reason flexibilisation became an important issue and seemed at first to threaten the European Social Model based upon Social Dialogue, social protection and social security, but countries responded in different ways.

4.1.2 DIFFERENT ROADS TO FLEXIBILITY

One of our first conclusions is that there are different roads to flexibility. Whilst multiple job holding is a common form of flexibility in Sweden where flexibility takes place within the context of full time, mostly permanent jobs. In the de-regulated UK we find many precarious workers as well as a great deal of self-employment and substantial job turnover. In the Czech Republic we find the most job turnover and the highest amount of self-employment. Hungary had more insecure jobs than the Czech Republic as well as the most flexibility in the working schedule. In the Netherlands, where a policy of “flexicurity” was introduced enabling the introduction of part time work which was not precarious. In Slovenia flexibility was mainly displaced onto temporary contract workers. In Bulgaria flexibility was very widespread, but mostly associated with bad jobs and in Romania the large numbers of agricultural producers as well as other labour market groups were highly flexible, whilst traditional workers were not.

In ECE countries, shift work was more common, perhaps because of the traditional dependence on heavy industries, whilst part-time work was almost non-existence and as likely to be done by men as by women. Part time work on the other hand was very important for enabling flexibilisation in the North Western European countries, where it is mainly performed by women.

In other words, we find different kinds of flexibility in different countries. The extent that there is one or the other type depends upon:

The balance of employment between industry, agriculture and services. In Sweden and the Netherlands the service economy is very well developed, in ECE countries industry and agriculture are more important. Flexible employment in ECE is linked to structural changes in the economy, as the newest branches of trade, repair and services, also have the highest number of flexible workers

The culture of work. In ECE countries part-time work is simply not a favoured option, nor is it economically viable for most people apart from pensioners or those with no alternative. On the other hand full time work is the norm for both men and women and permanent jobs are preferred. In the UK and the Netherlands by contrast, part time work was a well established option, there is not a tradition for all women to work full time in the labour market. In Sweden, women also expect to work full time in the labour market but with chances to leave for child care or further study integrated into their work expectations.

The culture of care. This varies across the countries we are considering. Whilst in the UK and the Netherlands the family is a private sphere where mainly women are responsible for caring for children, in Sweden as well as Slovenia this is something that is much more commonly carried out by state services. In Hungary and the Czech Republic good state services are combined with a long period of leave (3 and 4 years) for mothers with young children, although it is still mainly women who are responsible for care. In Romania and Bulgaria where the state services are of poor quality and private services unaffordable it is more often the case that the extended family assists with care and men do very little.

The regulation of flexibility. As we have pointed out, there are different ways of regulating flexibility (or failing to regulate it) and we see many both good and bad examples in the countries that we are considering.

4.1.3 GOOD AND BAD FLEXIBILITY

Throughout this report we have indicated that there is a distinction between good and bad flexibility (for the employee). Good flexibility is associated with higher incomes, better educated workers and control over the time and place of work. Generally, it was professional workers who enjoyed this kind of flexibility. Bad flexibility was associated with low pay, low educated workers and lack of control over the time and place of work. Generally these were manual workers. Whilst bad flexibility is more widespread in ECE countries, especially Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary, there were also examples of good flexibility in these countries too. Good flexibility is associated with the degree and the nature of the regulation of flexibility, so that for example there was more good flexibility in Sweden and the Netherlands than in the UK.

Many flexible jobs are mostly bad, low paid ones and the biggest differences between flexible and normal workers can be found in the UK, the Netherlands and Hungary. In Bulgaria there is a specially strong likelihood that flexible workers will be poor ones. Those most affected by low income are: part-time workers in Hungary and Bulgaria, those on fixed term contracts in Hungary and the Netherlands, those who are self-employed in Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, those without a contract in Slovenia and Bulgaria and other working arrangements in Slovenia, Hungary and Bulgaria.

Work satisfaction is also associated with good flexibility. In terms of satisfaction with their jobs, the Dutch and Swedes score the highest (Vecernik 2003) The stability of the job is a key factor in explaining job satisfaction and only in Hungary and Slovenia was the income rewards the most important factor. In ECE countries, education also explains a great deal of job satisfaction and in the Czech Republic and Sweden the self-employed are the most satisfied. The workers in Western Europe were more able to control their job autonomy than were the workers in ECE (one third vs one fifth) although Romania was an exception because of the large number of farmers. In two countries, the control over the job was associated with work satisfaction: Sweden and Hungary. In terms of potential flexibility – willingness to learn a language, retrain or work more hours or accept worse working conditions. The substantial mobility in jobs in the last ten years in the post-communist labour markets is however, equalled by Great Britain. However, whereas in the UK there were frequent changes of job, in the Czech Republic the frequent changes of job were also associated with changes of profession. In Romania and Bulgaria they were associated with job loss and unemployment.

4.1.4 EMPLOYER-LEAD FLEXIBILITY AND EMPLOYEE-LEAD FLEXIBILITY

Initially, the discussions of flexibility were mainly *employer-lead*. They revolved around the idea of the “flexible firm” and the advantages of flexibilisation for responding rapidly to global pressures and change. The first responses were to reduce working conditions in order to make European labour markets more competitive. This was the discussion that dominated the first half of the 1990s and was part of the economic package that was introduced to “reform” Eastern and Central European countries as rapidly as possible. It is still an important discussion as the increasing erosion of the Fordist-style employment model of the post-war period is increasingly replaced by post-Fordist styles of production and an expanding service sector.

This model of flexibilisation started to be augmented by a different discussion from the second half of the 1990s, a discussion that revolved much more around *employee-lead* flexibility. Increasingly, flexibility was seen as bringing advantages and not only disadvantages to employees, enabling a better work-life balance and enabling a better combination of family and work. This problem became increasingly acute as more and more women entered the workforce, leading to different perspectives on work and will continue to be an issue if European countries are to meet the Lisbon employment targets of having more than 60% of women in the workforce by 2010.

This discussion can be found in the various commissions concerned with discussing the combination of work and care during the 1990s .in the Netherlands where for the first time the organisation of the daily timetable involving both work in the public as well as the private sphere came under policy discussion. In Sweden the integration of work and care has long been part of the underlying objectives of the flexibilisation of work and the integration with social security so that people can balance flexibility across a life-course in raising families. Increasingly, this is seen as a topic of public concern at a European level as exemplified in the activities of the European Network “New Ways to Work” starting in 1994. (http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/empl..nt_social/family-net). In the UK this was a topic of a research programme by the Joseph Rowntree Memorial Trust.

The outcome of such discussions has led to the increasing individualisation of flexibility, with employees being given the right to negotiate their own working arrangements *a la cart*. This does not necessarily mean a rise in “atypical jobs” but rather the adaptation of typical jobs to new conditions.

The domination of employer-lead flexibilisation and economic crisis in the ECE countries meant that the idea of employee-lead flexibilisation surfaced only much later. However, in the Czech Republic, for example, such rights to negotiate flexible contracts have been introduced and with the gradual Europeanisation of these countries through the Accession and harmonisation process, such rights will be extended. Even in Romania they have appeared on the legislation.

4.1.5 FLEXIBILITY, WORK AND CARE CULTURES

It is clear that flexibility is embedded in different cultures of work and care and that these differ across the European Union. Furthermore the two are linked (although not usually discussed together) and impact upon the way in which various flexibility options are pursued in different countries. For example, in Sweden, there is the expectation that women will work full time, that care of children will be shared between men and women and that flexibility is balanced across the life-course as well as the working week, with options for part time work until the child is 8 years old. In the Netherlands, there has been a move from a “breadwinner model” of a man at work and women at home caring for children towards a one and a half earner pattern with women working part time and caring for children part time. However, the family is seen as a private sphere and socialisation of children the responsibility of mothers, so there are not the same public child care facilities as in Sweden. In the UK, part time work is also common among women with children, but the care of children is a private rather than a state problem and so their care must be shared between the spouses or other private solutions need to be found. In the former Communist countries there was the expectation that the employers as well as the state generally would provide child care, enabling women to work full time. Women expected to work full time and there is no tradition of part time working for parents. This system continues and has even been improved in Slovenia where there are a variety of public facilities for caring for children as well some sharing of child care between spouses. In the Czech Republic and Hungary, the gendered division of labour is very patriarchal and women are paid to stay at home for the first 4 years in the Czech Republic and the first 3 years in Hungary. However, after that, they usually go to work full time again and put their children into publicly subsidised kindergartens. In Romania and Bulgaria women work very long hours and the public child care facilities have broken down, whilst private ones are unaffordable. Care of children falls more to the extended family. The domestic division of labour is also very patriarchal in those countries.

It seems therefore that women’s full time participation in the labour force across Europe does not necessarily lead to more of a tradition of sharing the domestic labour: in Eastern Europe it is quite the opposite. In those countries, where women are used to balancing the responsibilities for care with full time work, part-time options are not used to manage this balance. However, in other countries such as the Netherlands, it is less likely that women would want to put their children into a nursery all week. In the UK the lack of affordable nurseries means that women have to work part time. Altogether, Sweden seems to have the most flexible possibilities for balancing work and care across the life-course.

4.1.6 FAMILY-WORK BALANCE

Parents were then ones in all countries who felt most acutely the conflict between work and family. Flexibility is potentially a way of balancing the demands of work and family. In this respect it has been a policy strategy in Sweden, the Netherlands and more recently in the UK. However, in ECE countries, this aspect of work is missing from discussions. Whilst part time work is often seen as an option for women in Western countries (O’Reilly and Fagan 1998) it is not well developed in Eastern countries where the paper of Cousins and Tang (Cousins and Tang 2003) shows that having children has no impact on the reduction of hours for women. However, the ECE countries do offer very long periods of maternity leave for women, up to four years and subsidised (Wallace 2003). Thus we find 41% of mothers with children under 6 taking this option in Romania, 38% in the Czech Republic, 28% in Hungary and 20% in Bulgaria. However, in Bulgaria as well as other countries, the fact that many young women are casual workers or workers without contracts means that they are excluded from the two year parental leave scheme. In Slovenia, only 12% of mothers with young children are at home looking after them full time and this probably relates to the affordability of childcare in the generous welfare state where provision for working mothers has continued since the previous state socialist regime. For those mothers who do work in ECE, they tend to work much longer hours than in the West.

Fathers are most likely to share child rearing in Sweden and least likely in Hungary. In the UK, the Netherlands and Slovenia, about one quarter of parents share childcare equally and this rises to 40% in the UK for families with two full time earners. Hungary has the least equal division of labour when it comes to care of children. Child care in the Western countries is mainly the provenance of the nuclear family, whilst in ECE countries parents were much more likely to use the services of “other family members”. Sharing of other domestic tasks is also most prevalent in Sweden, with half of fathers undertaking cleaning, shopping and one third claiming to do the cooking. Responsibility for domestic tasks is almost entirely done by members of the household: paid domestic help is used only by a minority of households and only in Western Europe.

Parents with dependent children are most likely to experience family-work conflicts, but in the Netherlands, the UK, the Czech Republic, Romania and Hungary, it is fathers who state that work makes it difficult for them to fulfil their domestic responsibilities. Family work conflict is especially high in the UK suffering as it does a long hours culture. However, in Bulgaria where people work very long hours, there is no perceived conflict because this is necessary for survival. The strongest sense of family-work conflict however, is expressed in Sweden. Those with tertiary education are most likely to experience family work conflict

Part time work is not even considered atypical in the Netherlands where it is the main alternative for mothers with children. Thus in the Netherlands part time work is a job creation strategy: 16% of Dutch mothers were at home full time compared with 34% of UK mothers, most of them being lone parents. In Sweden only 4% of mothers with young children were at home full time. Whilst part time work is associated with a low income in the UK and the Netherlands, this was not so much the case in Sweden. However, part time mothers were generally happy with the hours that they worked. Part time work was not an option for mothers in ECE countries who also did not appear to suffer from family-work conflict. The policies supporting working mothers in Sweden enables them to work 30-40 hours per week, much longer than in the Netherlands or the UK.

The papers by Jager, Kops and van der Lippe (2003) consider what they term “combination pressure” as measured by the perceived conflict between family and work is highest in Slovenia and Sweden among couples. In the Netherlands there is the most flexibility of working times. Gender differences were strong only in Slovenia where Slovenian women experienced much more combination pressure than Slovenian men and in the UK where men had more pressure than women. They found that an important factor for not feeling combination pressure was to have agreement with the spouse and less conflict over a variety of household and work matters such as the family budget and the amount of time spent at work. Part time working hours are welcomed by Dutch and by British women as a way of integrating work and family. In Sweden, women opt for part time jobs with long hours (they have a right to work part time until the child is 8) and suffer the most combination pressure. In Sweden men do more domestic and child care work or share it, but a very strong gender ideology of equality. In reality women still do more work in the home than men and this causes discontent. In countries such as the Czech Republic and Hungary, men help far less in the home but this is in line with the prevailing gender ideology, so there is less role conflict.

At first sight, Sweden seems to have the most progressive policies for dealing with combination pressure. However, paradoxically, despite the social policies supporting family life and work, there is more experience of role conflict in Sweden than in other countries. On the other hand, in post-communist countries of Czech Republic and Hungary where there were also traditionally such policies, there is in fact no such experience of role conflict. They conclude that state policies are not necessarily reflected in population values. Whilst in Sweden there are generally egalitarian values expressed, in Hungary and the Czech Republic there is a very conservative and traditional view of gender roles. In the UK and the Netherlands, on the other hand, there is quite a strong gender role egalitarian ideology that is not in fact reflected in the social policies. Strand and Nordmark (2003) conclude that the explanation for such surprising results can be found in the gap between gender ideologies on the one hand and the actual division of labour in the household on the other. Where these are in harmony, as in the Czech Republic and Hungary, there will be less role conflict. Where the actual division of labour is unequal, but the gender role ideology tends towards equality, there will be role conflict. This suggests that the road towards gender equality lies not in the labour market or in social policies, but in the relations within the household.

4.1.7 GENDER AND FLEXIBILITY

In the Western European countries (the UK, the Netherlands and Sweden) it is clear that women are the ones who are most likely to be flexible in terms of time, although men are most likely to be flexible in terms of place. Women are also among the most disadvantaged in the labour market in terms of precarious employment, pay and conditions. This is partly due to preference: in most countries, women want to work the same number of hours (71.2% UK, 63.9% the Netherlands, 58.1% Sweden, 67.1% Slovenia, 57.3% Czech Republic, 61% Hungary, 57.8% Romania, 74% Bulgaria) and the main reason for this in all countries is to meet domestic commitments and spend more time with families. However, the amount of time that women actually spend at work in different countries is also highly variable and is much higher in Eastern and Central Europe than in Western Europe.

In Eastern and Central Europe, however, it is more likely to be men, rather than women who are in precarious and flexible employment. Therefore, the social basis of flexibility is variable across different countries in Europe, even once the obvious differences in the amount of part time work and self-employment and farming have been controlled for.

4.1.8 SOCIAL INEQUALITY, SOCIAL EXCLUSION AND FLEXIBILITY

In most countries there is a group at the bottom of the labour market who are condemned to “bad flexibility”. These are likely to be in short term jobs, to be younger workers (or older workers) and to be less educated. This group exists in all countries. It is larger in ECE countries, especially Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary and is a smaller group in Sweden and the Netherlands. In the UK and in Bulgaria precarious employment is spread more evenly around the whole population. Young people are also more likely to be unemployed, especially in ECE countries.

The risk of social exclusion based upon flexibility is particularly associated with having a low education in almost all countries, but also with being young and in Hungary and Romania it is associated with living in a rural area.

4.1.9 FLEXIBILITY AND ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Until now, good flexibility was concentrated mostly in North Western European countries as well as among some privileged groups in ECE. Bad flexibility was found most commonly in the ECE countries. In the ECE countries flexibility was employer-lead rather than employee-lead and tended to be associated with worsening work conditions and unemployment. We could say that these countries suffered more the catastrophic effects of flexibilisation and de-regulation whilst Western countries benefited in terms of growth, prosperity and sinking unemployment.

Many of the positive aspects of flexibility (individual work contracts, balancing family and work, social security for precarious workers, gender equality etc.) were not even considered in ECE. This is now changing thanks to the European Accession and harmonisation process. Now the European Employment Strategy applies equally to the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia as it does to the UK, the Netherlands and Sweden. Moreover, these countries are also subject to the EU directives on atypical work and to the development of mechanisms of Social Dialogue.

Romania and Bulgaria are furthest behind in terms of these kinds of reforms, but even in those countries more progressive employment legislation is being introduced and there is at least an awareness of what still needs to be done (see the documents Joint Assessment of Employment Priorities published for the European Commission in 2001 and 2002). In these documents skills flexibility, training and retraining are also seen as important priorities.

4.1.10 WELFARE, FAMILY AND FLEXIBILITY REGIMES

We combined the welfare regime type, the family model and flexibility measures (see page 11).. We find that the liberal regime type is associated with de-regulatory flexibilisation policies leading to a variety of family models which are “private” solutions to the integration of family and work. In the UK we can find modified breadwinners, dual carers as well as role reversal. In the Netherlands, there is a conservative family-centred welfare regime, where flexibility policies are built upon concept of a private, patriarchal nuclear family where the women have the main responsibility for caring. The progressive flexibilisation measures, in fact reinforce this family model. In Sweden, we find a universal welfare regime linked to

regulated flexibility and family friendly policies that allow women to participate most fully in the labour market with extensive state support. In Slovenia we find a similar system, but with little attempt to introduced family friendly flexibility polices and this is also not the outcome of feminist campaigning. In the Czech Republic and in Hungary, we find partially regulated flexibility along with a re-instiutionalising welfare state using an individually based social insurance model coupled with egalitarian gender regime with state support. In Bulgaria and Romania we have de-institutionalising regimes with unregulated flexibility, a division between inflexible and flexible workers and “private” solutions for childcare, including egalitarian systems based upon extended family rather than the state and dual carer systems by necessity.

4.2 FUTURE RESEARCH

Our research has indicated some new ideas about how flexibility can be viewed in a comparative perspective. However, our work was confined to a limited number of selected countries. It would seem to us to be important to extend such studies to a larger range of countries to find out the real patterns of flexibility across the European Union. In particular, it would be important to include some of the Southern European countries, in particular Spain which has the highest number of recorded flexible jobs. Other Southern European countries also have a high degree of flexible employment and so it would be important to see how far these conclusions could be applied there. Of the Western Central European countries (conservative, employment-based welfare states in Esping Andersen's typology) we have included only the Netherlands, which has a particularly progressive employment and flexibilisation policy. It would be very important to how far these conclusions apply to France and Germany in particular, given their economic importance in the European Union.

Our research concentrated mostly upon quantitative sources. It is clear that qualitative research can add a lot of additional information about the impact of flexibility, family-work combination and the needs of different groups of workers in the labour market. Future research should try to bring in this perspective too.

Finally, we are describing a rapidly moving picture. Even as we write this report new legislation is coming into force, especially in the Accession countries, so the situation could look very different in a few years time. It seems to us that it is important to monitor this situation in terms of broad definitions of flexibility and how they can be applied in different countries.

4.3 POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The policy implications follow from our main conclusions above

The regulation of flexibility . Flexibility should be regulated. The de-regulation of labour market protection can lead to an increase in bad forms of flexibility. However, the way in which it is regulated is important. Over-regulation can force flexible workers into the black economy and too little regulation leaves them vulnerable to exploitation and poverty. Therefore, flexibility should be regulated in such a way that it allows both the employer and the employee have maximum chance to manage their flexibility. It is clear that the opportunities to do so are maximised in the Netherlands where flexibility was used as a way of modernising the workforce and raising levels of employment. Sweden was also very successful in raising employment and offering work flexibility to employees, but using a different strategy to the Netherlands, more fitting to the culture of work and care in that country. It would seem that these examples of the regulation of flexibility could serve as examples of good practice.

Different kinds of flexibility. On account of the varying cultures of work and care across the European Union as well as the different structure of employment in each country, it would seem that there are different roads to flexibility. What might work in one country, will not work in another. Therefore, we should be beware of using too narrow a definition of flexibility (for example: deregulation or counting the numbers of part time, self-employed and temporary workers) and rather see flexibility in broader terms to include a variety of working arrangements both inside full time or secure jobs as well as outside of them.

Employee-lead flexibility: The HWF project has focused upon employees rather than employers. However, what we have shown is that there is considerable scope for flexibility in Europe and that this need not necessarily lead to bad jobs. An important dimension was the control of flexibility in leading to job satisfaction, and so it seems to us that the variety of options that can optimise and individualise flexibility can only be beneficial. This is well developed already in the Netherlands.

The informal economy and flexibility. The informal economy is often the way in which flexibilisation takes place, either due to lack of regulation, due to the lack of any alternative, or as a way of getting round regulations that are not suited to the cultures of work and care in the country in question. In Romania this has happened on a large scale with the growth of casual and agricultural subsistence production (to a lesser extent in other ECE countries too). These workers are the most poor and vulnerable, so exclusion from the regular labour market leads to exclusion on other dimensions too. They are not entitled to many welfare benefits either. Furthermore, those with no contracts were also among the most vulnerable groups in many countries. Therefore, finding ways to regularise the black economy can help to create jobs and revenue as well as protecting vulnerable groups by bringing areas of economic activity back into the formal economy. This has happened to a greater extent in the re-institutionalising countries of the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Hungary than in the de-institutionalising countries of Bulgaria and Romania. Care should be taken however, not to drive activities underground through over-regulation and over taxation.

Flexibility, work and care cultures. Introducing social and labour market policies might be seen as a relatively easy solution to counteract problems of flexibilisation. It is tempting to introduce measures that have already worked elsewhere. However, we should bear in mind that not all policies that have been introduced were taken up and that the way in which different opportunities are taken up depends upon the culture of work and care in different parts of Europe. Whilst part time work, for example is seen as a way of combining work and care for women in Western Europe (and perhaps to a lesser extent for men), this was not an appealing option for either women or men in ECE countries. In those countries full time work combined with supported periods outside of the labour market and the reintroduction of public care facilities might be preferable to private solutions. The cultures of care, or the way in which childcare and housework are carried out in relation to paid work should be taken into account in introducing policies to facilitate flexibility.

Vulnerable groups: Since the victims of flexibility are more likely to be the low educated and the young, and these are also the group most likely to be unemployed, measures should be taken to ensure that these groups are able to secure a more regular foothold in the labour market through training and professional assistance schemes. Otherwise there is a risk that they may be condemned to lifetimes of social exclusion. Such schemes are not well developed in ECE countries to the extent that they are in Western European countries under consideration. Such assistance should be extended to women in Western European

countries as well, although in ECE countries it was more likely to be men who might need this help to secure regular work places.

Family-work balance. Family work balance depends upon the perceptions of stress as well as the actual situation. Our results showed that many people would like to work less hours in order to spend more time with their families. Fathers in particular would like to spend more time with families, so increasing the flexibility options for men in this respect might be a way forward.

Flexibility and Enlargement. Flexibility has been approached in a very one-sided way in ECE countries – almost entirely as a way of introducing more employer-lead flexibility and in ways that threatened the situation of working people. In Western EU countries, by contrast there are more progressive models of flexibility, ones which can enhance employment at the same time as maintaining social protection. Policies should include the following elements:

Improving the acceptability of flexibility among the population, for whom it is often a dirty word associated with the erosion of jobs and work conditions

Introducing the idea of employee-lead as well as employer-lead flexibilisation

Encouraging the regulation of flexibility so that it takes place within the scope of the official economy and complies with employment regulations.

Encouraging the regulation of flexibility in such a way that it is not driven into the black economy (for example by reducing the number of permits and documentation needed to develop self-employment and liberalising working hours).

Introducing the possibility of work-life balance. Although this is not seen as a problem at present, it is likely to become more acute in the future.

Monitoring the take up and implementation of policies. Some policies may exist on paper but never really be implemented or taken up. This may be due to the fact that people don't know about them or that they are not suitable to people's needs.

Trying to avoid contradictory and confusing regulations in different fields of policy by emphasising "joined up policy".

Developing "good flexibility" strategies through helping to workers to restructure and control their working hours and working place.

Encouraging the development of flexibility within regular jobs as well as outside of them or instead of them.

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5. DISSEMINATION AND EXPLOITATION OF RESULTS (SUMMARY)

The results of the project have been disseminated to the wider public in the following ways

1. Internationally at meetings and policy workshops
2. Nationally at meetings, seminars and through newspaper and popular articles
3. Electronically through the use of the website, which has aroused substantial interest
4. In several countries, the project has contributed to national debates about flexibilisation
5. A number of working papers designed to contribute to policy debate have been written or commissioned at an international level through the Family and Welfare cluster workshops in Brussels and at a national level too.

The project has been represented at most major international conferences during the project duration and just afterwards. Since the results are available mainly at the end of the project, one should take the planned project output into consideration as well as publications and presentations to date, because most material will be produced after the end of the project.

In addition there has been academic dissemination through

1. Contributions to international conferences and publications, including keynote addresses. This has covered many of the major academic conferences during the duration of the project and just afterwards.
2. Contributions to seminars and conferences at a national level
3. Articles and books published in international journals and for an international audience
4. Articles and books at a national level in national languages.

**Full and detailed report
on exploitation and dissemination activities
of the HWF project is provided
in the Volume Two of the Final Project Report.**