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*Representations of Europe and the nation
in current and prospective member-states:
media, elites and civil society*

EURONAT

FINAL REPORT

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EU RESEARCH ON SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES

Representations of Europe and the nation in current and prospective member-states: media, elites and civil society

EURONAT

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PREFACE

Within the Fifth Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development (1998-2002), the Key Action "*Improving the socio-economic knowledge base*" carried broad and ambitious objectives, namely: to improve our understanding of the structural changes taking place in European society, to identify ways of managing these changes and to promote the active involvement of European citizens in shaping their own futures. A further important aim was to mobilise the research communities in the social sciences and humanities at the European level and to provide scientific support to policies at various levels, with particular attention to EU policy fields.

The Key Action Call "*Improving the socio-economic knowledge base*" had a total budget of 155 Million of Euros and was implemented through the launch of three Calls for proposals. As a result, 185 selected projects for funding have started their research between 1999 and 2002, involving more than 1600 research teams from 38 countries.

At least half of these projects are now finalised and results are systematically published in the form of a Final Report.

The Calls have addressed different but interrelated research themes which have contributed to the objectives outlined above. These themes can be grouped under a certain number of areas of policy relevance, each of which are addressed by a significant number of projects from a variety of perspectives.

These areas are the following:

- ***Societal trends and structural change***
16 projects, total investment of 14.6 Million Euro, 164 teams
- ***Quality of life of European Citizens***
5 projects, total investment of 6.4 Million Euro, 36 teams
- ***European socio-economic models and challenges***
9 projects, total investment of 9.3 Million Euro, 91 teams
- ***Social cohesion, migration and welfare***
30 projects, total investment of 28 Million Euro, 249 teams
- ***Employment and changes in work***
18 projects, total investment of 17.5 Million Euro, 149 teams
- ***Gender, participation and quality of life***
13 projects, total investment of 12.3 Million Euro, 97 teams
- ***Dynamics of knowledge, generation and use***
8 projects, total investment of 6.1 Million Euro, 77 teams
- ***Education, training and new forms of learning***
14 projects, total investment of 12.9 Million Euro, 105 teams
- ***Economic development and dynamics***
22 projects, total investment of 15.3 Million Euro, 134 teams
- ***Governance, democracy and citizenship***
28 projects; total investment of 25.5 Million Euro; 233 teams
- ***Challenges from European enlargement***
13 projects, total investment of 12.8 Million Euro, 116 teams
- ***Infrastructures to build the European Research Area***
9 projects, total investment of 15.4 Million Euro, 74 teams.

This publication contains the final report of the project "Representations of Europe and the nation in current and prospective member-states: media, elites and civil society", whose work has primarily contributed to the area "**Governance, democracy and citizenship**".

The report contains information about the main scientific findings of this project and their policy implications. The research was carried out by 8 teams over a period of 3 years, starting in September 2001.

This project has studied European and national identities and the connections between them in nine countries (Austria, Britain, the Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Spain), while adopting an interdisciplinary and comparative perspective. Research work has focused on the role of the media in the formation of meanings and representations of the nation and of Europe or of the EU in each country.

Results of the research undertaken show some interesting findings, for instance:

- The link between national and European identity exists but is currently under strain following the enlargement of the EU to the East.
- The analysis of the media discourse has pointed to an unexpected 'event effect', whereby broadcasting on important EU summit meetings, like the Nice Summit in 2000, promotes an image of conflict and disunity of the Union, while the coverage of events like the Euro launch have a celebratory character, emphasizing the historical importance and uniqueness of the European integration process.
- With regard to public opinion, the research has shown that views of the EU, Europe and the nation tend to be independent from factors such as gender, political orientation, place of residence and socio-economic status.
- Feelings of belonging to the region, nation, the EU and Europe as a larger geographical-cultural entity are generally comparable in all the countries analysed.

The abstract and executive summary presented in this edition offer to the reader the opportunity to have an overview of the scientific and policy conclusions, before going into the main body of the research provided in the other chapters of this report.

As the results of the projects financed under the *Key Action 'Improving the Socio-economic knowledge base'* become available to the scientific and policy communities, Priority 7 "*Citizens and Governance in a Knowledge Based Society*" of the Sixth Framework Programme of the European Union for Research and Technological Development (RTD) is building on the progress already made and aims at making a further contribution to the development of a European Research Area in the social sciences and the humanities.

I hope readers find the information in this publication both interesting and useful as well as clear evidence of the importance attached by the European Union to fostering research in the field of social sciences and the humanities.

T. LENNON,
Director

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1	THE PROJECT CONSORTIUM	9
2	ABSTRACT	13
3	EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	15
3.1	Objectives.....	15
3.2	Main Findings	15
3.2.1	Historical and State of the Art Review	16
	Southern Europe.....	16
	Greece	16
	Italy	16
	Spain	16
	Central Eastern Europe	17
	The Czech Republic	17
	Poland	17
	Hungary.....	18
	Central Western Europe	18
	Austria.....	18
	Britain	19
	Germany.....	19
3.2.2	Media and Party Discourses on Europe and the Nation.....	20
	Southern Europe.....	20
	Greece	20
	Italy	20
	Spain	21
	Central Eastern Europe	22
	The Czech Republic	22
	Hungary.....	23
	Poland	23
	Central Western Europe	24
	Austria.....	24
	Britain	25
	Germany.....	25
3.2.3	Public Opinion: Survey and Qualitative Interviews.....	26
	Southern Europe.....	26
	Greece	26
	Italy	27
	Spain	27
	Central Eastern Europe	27
	The Czech Republic	27
	Hungary.....	28
	Poland	29
	Central Western Europe	29
	Austria.....	29
	Britain	30
	Germany.....	30

3.2.4	General Assessment and Policy Implications	31
	Southern Europe.....	31
	Greece	31
	Italy	31
	Spain	32
	Central Eastern Europe	32
	The Czech Republic	32
	Hungary.....	33
	Poland	33
	Central Western Europe	34
	Austria.....	34
	Britain	34
	Germany.....	35
3.3	Comparative Remarks and Policy Suggestions.....	35
4	BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES OF THE PROJECT.....	38
5	SCIENTIFIC DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT RESULTS AND	
	METHODOLOGY	40
5.1	Southern Europe	40
5.1.1	Greece	40
	Data and Methods	40
	Comprehensive presentation of the findings on the Greek case	42
	Tackling the main objectives of the project	43
	National and European identities	45
	The ethnic-civic analytical continuum	48
	Lay people, political elite and the media	49
	Lay people discourse and their European orientation	50
	Conclusion	51
	References	52
5.1.2	Italy	53
	Data and Methods	53
	Achieving a better understanding of Italian reality and the links between party and media discourses	56
	National and European identities	60
	The ethnic-civic analytical continuum	61
	Do lay people reproduce the media and elite discourse or do they develop their own views and arguments?	63
	Lay people discourse and their European orientations.....	64
	Conclusion	66
5.1.3	Spain	67
	Data and Methods	67
	Findings.....	68
	National and European Identities: Inclusive or Exclusive?	68
	The ethnic-civic analytical continuum in the construction of National and European identities in Spain.....	69
	The ethnic-civic continuum as evaluated by citizens.....	72
	Public discourses on Europe and the European Union	73
	Comparison between citizens' and elites' discourses	76
	Conclusion	79

5.2	Central Western Europe	81
5.2.1	The Czech Republic	81
	The Czech national identity between ethnic and civic elements.....	81
	The easy way in: ‘Europe’ as a value.....	84
	EU citizenship? No, thanks.....	85
	<i>Euro-fatalism</i> and the Czech way to the West.....	85
	The gap between the public and lay discourses	86
5.2.2	Hungary.....	90
	General research questions in EURONAT and Hungarian specificities.....	91
	Some theoretical considerations	92
	Nation – Europe intertwined.....	92
	Relations between representations and identifications	92
	Key elements in representing the nation and Europe.....	93
	The representation of elites about the nation, Europe and the EU.....	94
	Media representation.....	94
	Political discourse	95
	Lay representations	96
	Survey results.....	97
	Interviews.....	98
	Lay people interpreting the media and political discourse.....	99
	Concluding remarks	99
5.2.3	Poland	100
	Data and Methodology.....	100
	The main research findings	106
	The understanding of the meanings of the nation, Europe, and the European Union in the media, political party, and the lay people discourses in Poland.....	106
	The national and European identities of Poles.....	110
	The Links between Party and Media Discourses	112
	Relations between lay people, media and elite discourses.....	113
	References.....	113
5.3	Central Western Europe	115
5.3.1	Austria.....	115
	Approach and methodologies.....	115
	Historical construction and reconstruction of Austrian collective identity.....	116
	National and European identities in the Austrian party system	118
	The representation of Europe and the nation in Austrian media.....	120
	The Austrian national and European identity profile.....	122
	Individual European and national attitudes in Austria.....	124
	Conclusion	126
	References.....	126
5.3.2	Britain	128
	Findings and methodologies	128
	Methodologies.....	128
	Achieving a better understanding of the British case: Britain and Europe	129
	Britain as a reluctant European and Europe as ‘elsewhere’	129
	The World War II and the special relationship with the US	130
	National and European identities	131
	The ethnic-civic analytical continuum.....	133
	The links between party and media discourses	135

	Do lay people reproduce the media and elite discourse or do they develop their own views and arguments?	136
	References	137
5.3.3	Germany	138
	Approach and methodologies	138
	Historical construction and reconstruction of German collective identity.....	139
	National and European identities in the German party system	141
	The representation of Europe and the nation in the German media.....	143
	National and European identity profiles in West and East Germany.....	145
	Individual European and national attitudes in West and East Germany.....	147
	Conclusion	149
	References	150
5.4	Comparative Remarks and Overall Policy Recommendations	151
6	POLICY IMPLICATIONS	160
6.1	Southern Europe	160
6.1.1	Greece	160
6.1.2	Italy	161
6.1.3	Spain	161
6.2	Central Eastern Europe	163
6.2.1	The Czech Republic	163
6.2.2	Hungary.....	164
6.2.3	Poland	165
6.3	Central Western Europe	165
6.3.1	Austria.....	165
6.3.2	Britain	166
6.3.3	Germany.....	167
7	DISSEMINATION AND EXPLOITATION OF RESULTS.....	169
7.1	Southern Europe	169
7.1.1	Greece	169
7.1.2	Italy	170
7.1.3	Spain	171
7.2	Central Eastern Europe	172
7.2.1	The Czech Republic	172
7.2.2	Hungary.....	172
7.2.3	Poland	174
7.3	Central Western Europe	174
7.3.1	Austria.....	174
7.3.2	Britain	175
7.3.3	Germany.....	175
8	ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	177
9	BIBLIOGRAPHY	179
10	ANNEXES	185
10.1	ANNEX I: A list of the agreed deliverables and their status	185
10.2	ANNEX II: A list of the publications and other output of the project	186

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2 ABSTRACT

This project studies European and national identities and the connections between them in nine countries (Austria, Britain, the Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Spain), adopting an interdisciplinary, comparative perspective. The project concentrates on the role of the media in the formation of meanings and representations of the nation and Europe or the EU in each country. This research should be considered against the backdrop of European integration studies and the recently emerging interest in the development of a European identity as a legitimacy basis for European integration.

The EURONAT project is organized around five interconnected phases of empirical work, theoretical analysis and user-oriented activities. The first phase concentrates on the historical background of nation and national identity formation in each of the countries under examination. We have also looked at the historical, policy and identity relationship between the country in question and the European Union. This first phase has enabled us to set the background against which our findings are analysed. Second, we have examined the media discourse on Europe and the European Union in the nine countries involved. We have analysed the daily press and television broadcasting with regard to two major EU events: the Nice summit in 2000 and the launch of the common currency in 2002. As a third step, we have looked at the discourse of political elites and their own understandings and representations of the nation, Europe, the EU and the relationship among them. The corpus of data analysed includes party electoral platforms and parliamentary debates on the Eastern Enlargement, on the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999 and on the Allied Forces' intervention in Afghanistan in 2001. The fourth stage of our research has concentrated on public opinion. Through the Eurobarometer survey, we have asked a representative stratified sample of citizens, in each of the countries under examination, to express their feelings of closeness or distance from citizens of their own country, other countries, Europe and selected non-European countries or specific ethnic minorities. We have also researched people's understandings of the nation and Europe both through the survey questionnaire and through a series of qualitative interviews conducted with citizens of different age, gender, socio-economic status, and rural-urban place of residence in each of the countries analysed. The qualitative interviews have provided us with lay people understandings of the nation, Europe and the EU in relation to their everyday lives as well as their concerns regarding more general social and political issues.

During the fifth and final phase of our work, we have analysed each country case as a whole and also each stage of the research comparatively. The project has concluded with a series of dissemination initiatives (organized locally/nationally and in Brussels), geared in particular towards media professionals. The dissemination activities have generally been hampered by the fact that media professionals have tight time schedules and are only interested in topical events and 'new' issues. Nonetheless, most national teams have managed to obtain interesting feedback concerning the construction of broadcasting on European affairs and journalists' understanding and necessarily mechanical use (mostly confined to numbers derived by occasional surveys run at a national or regional scale) of identity issues.

This final report summarises our findings at the national level as well as the comparative insights achieved through EURONAT that are relevant at a European level.

Regarding our research objectives, we have achieved a more advanced state of knowledge concerning national and European identity discourses, both public and private, in the nine countries studied. We have revised critically the notion of ethnic vs. civic national identity, emphasizing its limitations. We have shown that the link between national and European identity exists but is currently under strain following the enlargement of the EU to the East and its apparent disunity when international challenges are at stake. We have shown that Left and Right political orientations are relevant for party and media representations of Europe and the nation, however always in connection with the incumbent or opposition role of each party and of the media supporting it. The analysis of the media discourse has pointed to an unexpected 'event effect', whereby broadcasting on important EU summit meetings, like that of Nice in 2000, promotes an image of conflict and disunity of the Union while the coverage of events like the Euro launch have a celebratory character, emphasizing the historical importance and uniqueness of the European integration process. With regard to the public opinion, our research has shown that people's views of the EU, Europe and the nation tend to be independent from demographic factors such as gender, political orientation, place of residence and socio-economic status. Also, feelings of belonging to the region, nation, the EU and Europe as a larger geographical-cultural entity are generally compatible in all the countries analysed. Instrumental aspects prevail in people's feeling European (the right to free movement and the common currency). Citizens may have limited knowledge of the workings of the EU but they are aware of the complexity of the integration process and of the need to negotiate. The symbolic relevance of Europe/the EU in people's everyday lives varies in the different countries (least relevant in Britain). Citizens in the member states and in the associated countries (currently new member states) share their concerns regarding the defence of national interests within the context of the EU and the power balance between small/weak and large/powerful member states. Lay people have been shown to form creatively their own opinions and representations of Europe and the EU, relatively independent from the media even if they acknowledge that the media are their main source of information regarding European issues.

In conclusion, EURONAT has cast light on a general mistrust of citizens towards the national elites, especially as regards their handling of European affairs. Surprisingly our hypothesis of member state/associated country division along the East West or South North axis has not been confirmed. Rather the dividing line seems to run between small/weak and large/powerful member states.

3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

3.1 Objectives

This project lies at the crossroads between different research traditions, drawing at the theoretical and methodological levels from political science, sociology, social psychology, cultural studies, history and international relations, in an examination of nations and European integration. The project aimed to analyse and compare the intertwining of European and national identities and, in particular, the role of the Eastern enlargement in this, in nine countries in Western, Southern and Central Eastern Europe. In each case, the relationship between national and European identities is analysed through the images, representations, understandings and meanings of Europe in the various nations at the different levels of political elites, the media and civil society. In the empirical research, special emphasis is laid on the role of the media as the discursive universe within which national and European identities are formed.

The project had five main objectives:

- I. to enlarge and revise existing knowledge on representations and meanings of the nation, Europe and the European Union in different member states (Austria, Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain, U.K.) and associated countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland).
- II. to study the extent to which national loyalty and identification with Europe and/or the EU are mutually exclusive or compatible and intertwined with one another; to analyse the findings in each country in relation to the conceptual continuum from ethnic to civic models of nationalism, including the mode of incorporation of ethnic minorities.
- III. to highlight similarities and differences between the media, the elite and the lay people understandings and representations of Europe, the EU and the nation; to study the role of the media in setting the discursive context in which opinions on public issues are formed and debated; to explore the impact of the political parties and the media on public opinions and attitudes in society.
- IV. to compare the findings from the different countries concerning the first three objectives (I, II and III) and to assess whether the comparison between them is organized along the East-West and North-South axes, in relation to historical dimensions (trajectories of state formation and nation-building), or in accordance with geopolitical matrices (centre-periphery relations and the timing of inclusion in the European integration project).
- V. to inform media professionals with regard to prevalent representations of Europe and the nation in the countries under examination by means of organising workshops with media representatives at the local as well as European level; and to prepare policy memos for the project's dissemination and exploitation activities, generally aimed at non academic users.

3.2 Main Findings

The research findings generated by the EURONAT consortium are organised into the following sections (a) historical and state of the art review; (b) media and party discourse

analysis; (c) public opinion: survey and qualitative interviews analysis; and (d) assessment of hypotheses and policy implications. For comparative purposes, southern, central-eastern and central-western European countries are presented together.

3.2.1 Historical and State of the Art Review

Southern Europe

Greece

The Greek literature review gives an overall historical profile of Greek identity and nationalism, presenting at the same time a state of the art of relevant literature. The report makes explicit the cultural and historical factors which underpin the specificity and the ambiguous character of Greek identity. It highlights the fact that the historical interaction between Greece and Europe itself constitutes a central part of this tension and ambiguity. Yet, the report makes clear that, at the cultural level, Greek cultural and historical specificity is fully compatible with European identity. The tension largely derives from specific socio-economic and political power factors and from the fact that modern Greece has encountered substantial difficulties in harmonising its long, multifaceted historical heritage with a modern political identity. Its membership in the EU however seems now to present better prospects than ever for such harmonization to be achieved.

Italy

Our state of the art and historical report suggests that Italy as a nation and as an EU member state presents a number of particularities that are worth noting for comparative purposes. Nation formation has remained incomplete, unifying national symbols are even nowadays hard to find and the nation appears fragmented and even divided within. The revival of regionalism in the late 1980s and 1990s and the continuing dominance of an orientalisising discourse towards the South pose serious challenges to national unity. The EU, in this context, acts both as a resource for national identity, providing for the civic dimension that the former is lacking, and, by contrast, as a centrifugal force because it opens new levels of governance accessible to regions, independently from the nation state. Participation in the Common Market and later in the EU has brought many advantages to the Italian economy and industry. These have initially accentuated and even indirectly fostered larger regional disparities between the North and the South. Nonetheless, in the last two decades of the twentieth century Community funds have been used for the restructuring of the *Mezzogiorno*. Italy has played an important part in the institutional development of the structural and regional policies of the EU, paving the way for assistance to the more recent southern European member-states like Greece, Spain and Portugal. Earlier studies on the press discourse concerning the relationship between Italy and the EU reveal interesting combinations of national and European loyalties and the ways in which the two can be intertwined.

Spain

Our historical and state of the art report revised the existing literature on national and European identities in Spain today. The main finding is that Spain's trajectory represents a fascinating illustration of how national sentiments may become smoothly combined with the incorporation of a European identity. It is also a fundamental example of how the European integration process can contribute to strengthen national identities and nation-states themselves. It is precisely the notion of *una España europea* (a European Spain) which played a crucial symbolic role in the construction of a cohesive national identity in the

aftermath of the Franco dictatorship. This is the explanation for the high level of support for the EU in Spain.

Central Eastern Europe

The Czech Republic

The Czech state of the art and historical report shows that the view of the Czech Republic towards the EU countries, as in the case of other countries from the Soviet block, was determined by the global relationship between East and West. The major breakthrough in this respect was the break up of the Soviet block and the totalitarian systems in Central and Eastern Europe. The specific aspect of the Czech development was mainly the break up of Czechoslovakia, which as a consequence revived the debate about a Czech nationality and national identity. In connection with the domestic changes in the early 1990s and at the end of the twentieth century, the debates about Czechs belonging to Europe intensified. Election statements such as 'Back to Europe!' were supposed to mean clearly the end of the Communist past and eventually turned into a specific debate about joining Europe. There is no doubt in the public perception about the Czech Republic belonging to Europe; the question of EU membership is mostly connected with the benefits of such a step. The arguments in the discussions about the economic (dis)advantages of joining the EU predominate over any other integration aspects. Party disagreements about this have also influenced public attitudes on the matter, making citizens particularly cautious towards EU membership. Recently, this attitude has been exacerbated by the reluctance of the neighbouring EU countries to open their labour markets to new members. The above mentioned aspects have strengthened the view that the Czech Republic was not ready to join and the suspicion that Western European member states 'want to benefit from us'.

Poland

Our state of the art and historical report shows how Polish national identity developed over centuries with the colonization attempts made by the Partition powers (Russia, Prussia, and Austria) - known as the 'Germanization' and 'Russification' - as a decisive point. It also reveals that in the Polish history the two alternative views of a nation developed in relation to the two ways of the nation formation. One perceives a nation as a community based upon a common perception of history and culture, united (not unified) by the state in one political community; this political community embraces all ethnic groups living in the territory dominated by one of them, where all become citizens of one state while keeping their national distinctiveness. The other view perceives a nation as a separate ethnic group which has an indispensable right to organize itself into a political community, i.e. the state, within the territory inherited from the ancestors. The former interpretation drew upon the practice and tradition of the Commonwealth and its civic and territorial interpretation of the nation (also known as the Jagiellonian idea); the latter developed only in the nineteenth century when the Polish state did not exist due to the Partitions. Thus, in the Polish case the western style (the Commonwealth model) and the eastern style (the nationalist model) of the nation-building processes have developed and overlapped.

Our research also suggests the emergence of two main images of integrating Europe, namely that Europe constitutes an area of partnership and cooperation of civil societies, and that Europe is as sphere of rivalry between nation-states which are trying to dominate each other. Along with this we have identified two types of attitudes displayed by Poles towards European integration, the 'Euroenthusiatic' and the 'Euroseptic'. The positive image stems from a conviction that integration constitutes a unique opportunity and provides the additional

impetus to system transformation. The negative image is underpinned by the conviction that integration is leading to the negative outcomes for the national economy and would mean a total subjugation to Brussels. The analysis proves that, in Poland, it is the economy which dominates the discourse on the accession, and the expectation of economic development dynamizes a positive image of the EU. And although the current perception of the accession is sober, and the euphoria of 1989 has been replaced with rational calculation and pragmatism, still the majority of Poles views the integration as the most desirable scenario for the country.

Hungary

In this state of the art report, the Hungarian case was presented starting from the assumption that collective remembering and historiography have primary importance in and constitute the focus of Hungarian national identity. Throughout the report uses of national past were illustrated, and the main stages in the modern history of Hungarian national identity formation were shown. Based on these examples, we argued for a general conceptualization of national identity as formed in historic times. Adaptation to political and historic changes emerged as one of the most important concepts in understanding Hungarian national history. The future of a relatively small country overshadowed occasionally by empires of all sorts has been dependent upon its capacity to adapt to the changing international context. Throughout its history Hungary seemed to be always more or less open to European influences, and its national development was inspired by European examples. We understood nations as communities of collective remembering in which specialized elite groups have a fundamental role. The Hungarian elite interpreted the past not only as a luminous background for the present, but as a source of self-reflections and explanations for their time and for future goals. The counterselection of the elite was shown to lead to problems in this adaptation. In contemporary analyses of Hungarian national history, European integration itself seemed to provide an important outside point of reference in shaping national consciousness after the democratic changes.

Some key issues emerged in the process of accession for Hungary. The European Union has been represented as part of the West even though increasingly distinguished from the USA. For Hungarians, the loss of sovereignty has been seemingly counterbalanced by the increased possible influence of a small state through the EU. European integration has proved to be a facilitator in resolving conflicts with neighbouring nations. Common goals and interests in the process of accession turned elements of disagreement to co-operation with other East Central European countries. The minority issue has appeared as a challenge for the future of Hungarian national identity. European norms and values have provided a basis for resolving these problems in the long run. The future of nations is not interpreted as contradictory to further European integration. Rather the European Union may help European nations to overcome some dangerous components of nationalism (e.g. exclusivism and rejection of multiple identifications), while keeping national identity as an important form of social identification.

Central Western Europe

Austria

In the context and partial revision of the existing primarily Austrian, German and American literature, the development of an Austrian nation and national identity is analysed as a case of Empire-contracting nationalism. In particular, it is emphasized that Austria historically had

ascended to a double political centre of the German Roman Empire as well as the Habsburg Empire. On this background, the emerging modern Austrian nationalism in the 19th century oscillated between an Empire-oriented, an Austrian regional as well as a pan-German nationalism and national identity. With the collapse of the Habsburg Empire after WW I, the Habsburg identity became marginalized, but Austrian identity was then torn between a pan-German and Austrian regional orientation. The pan-German identification collapsed with WW II and in a gradual process Austrian identity crystallized as an autonomous national identity. At the core of this national identity there has been the sense of a small nation; a victim of Nazi Germany; a democracy in the framework of a small state and on the basis of an Austrian culture; and a neutral state mediating between East and West. On these foundations, the fall of communism and the opening of the Eastern European space have changed fundamentally the geopolitical coordinates of the Austrian nation. On the one hand, this geopolitical change went hand in hand with the integration of Austria into the European Union and transformed the meaning of neutrality. On the other, the opening of the East contributed to a sense of a threat resulting in a defensive-negative attitude towards the Eastern enlargement; meanwhile it revived also a Habsburg legacy in the form of a common Danubian Central European space resulting in a missionary-positive attitude towards the Eastern enlargement.

Britain

The literature review with regard to the British nation formation and Britain's relations to Europe has brought forth the following findings. First and foremost, it has been strongly suggested that Britain's territorial integrity which had not been seriously threatened until the First World War seems to have exercised a profound influence on the British state and nation formation. The idea of Britain being an island, a natural fortress, with its distinct institutions and way of life, is closely related to the widely held view that Europe as 'somewhere else'. These ideas have been shaped by the way Britain (or England for a long period of time) have interacted with the continental Europe.

At the same time, however, literature review has also indicated that Europe is a significant other for the contemporary British as it has been since the Middle Ages. Comparison with, or contrast to, the continental Europe is often made in the media and policy debate, and people of Britain do have a view of 'Europe' when asked. However, Europe is not *the* source of fear unlike during World War II, or inspiration.

Thirdly, Britain's relations to Europe is mediated through its relation to the USA. This reflects Britain's history as an imperial power. After losing Calais to the French in 1558, England did not make any further attempt to conquer the continent and concentrated on its maritime expansion. The English and later British self-understanding was therefore shaped and maintained mainly vis-à-vis the Empire, and later the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth was one of the major reasons why Britain did not join the European Economic Community in the first place, and the rise of the USA from a British colony to the only superpower in the postwar world has conditioned how the British sees themselves in the world.

Germany

In the context of the predominating view on the historical formation of German nationalism and national identity as determined by a mixture of primarily ethnic and cultural components, a more complex approach to the construction and reconstruction of German national identity

is pursued. First, it is argued that German collective identity from the German Empire to the Third Reich oscillated between an imperial and national scope. Only with the catastrophic defeat in WWII, and the division and the re-unification of Germany, did a German nation-state develop and consolidate. Second, the view is outlined that German collective identity entailed ethnic, cultural and political—authoritarian and civic—components and that the nature and weight of these components changed considerably during the 20th century. Third, precisely the catastrophe of Nazi dictatorship and warfare driven by a *völkisch*-racist totalitarianism have led to a reconstruction of German national identity based primarily on an ethnic *Heimat* patriotism, a democratic-constitutional identity as well as a cultural sense of the need to come to terms with the past. Fourth, the traumatization and stigmatization of German national identity by the catastrophe of the Third Reich resulted also in discrediting any new imperial reconstruction of post-WWII-Germany; on the contrary, West Germany identified strongly with Western Europe and the US; East Germany strongly with the Soviet Union. On this historical background, the reconstruction of German national identity in the context of Unified Germany is seen as characterized by a normalization of German national identity in the sense of a completed and consolidated nation-state, a weakening sense of traumatization and stigmatization, and growing self-esteem. As a result of the predominantly West German mode of national unification, however, this normalization goes hand in hand with a crystallization of West German and East German identities. As a corollary, the incorporation of Unified Germany into the European Union is accompanied by a crystallization of a stronger sense of special national interests within Europe and the formation of differing West and East German identifications with the European Union.

3.2.2 Media and Party Discourses on Europe and the Nation

Southern Europe

Greece

The media could play a substantial role in bringing closer the feeling of belonging to the Greek nation with the European identification of Greek citizens. The research has shown that their contribution is very significant. There is, however, a problem that mainly for commercial reasons and because of the strong competitive market, representations are presented, indeed constructed, in such a way that they do not inform the public adequately; the highly important area of the relationship of Europe and the nation is not handled with the seriousness it deserves. The research has also shown that all the major political parties are clearly committed to the European project and all, except the KKE (Communist Party of Greece), see that the future of Greece lies squarely within Europe. There are minor and insignificant variations as to how the major parties see the European road ahead. As expected, of course, the European issue is often handled by the parties through their immediate political and electoral interests. It seems also that no sufficient effort is made by the Government to present comprehensive policies on Europe, nor policies through which the public could be adequately informed.

Italy

Our study confirms the ideological and political links between specific parties and specific newspapers or TV channels. Moreover, we have found that the political-ideological orientation of each party and/or of the newspaper or TV channel related to it is a good predictor of the party or media representation of the nation, EU, Europe and their relationship. On the whole, we may conclude that ideology matters in shaping party representations of the

nation and Europe or the EU; however it matters in more complex ways than a simple Right-Left dichotomy would suggest. Our findings have to be read in the contemporary post-Cold War context, in which former Left-Right ideological distinctions have been shaken, national and regional minority movements have been revived, and notions of ‘Western values’ have been framed as universal, discrediting the possibility of alternatives coming from outside Western Europe or the United States.

Concerning the media discourse, in particular, we found that the nature of the events covered is reflected in the type of representations and discursive frames adopted by the media. Thus, even though the Nice summit might be seen as more decisive for the future of the EU, the Euro launch offered more opportunities for historical and symbolic framing emphasising not only a common past but a shared future. A parallel ‘event effect’ has been observed in the analysis of the party discourse. The party platforms analysis revealed how parties build a coherent worldview that frames and supports their policies; furthermore, it showed that European integration and the relationship between Italy and the EU are important political issues. However, the analysis of parliamentary debates, especially those on Kosovo and Afghanistan, revealed that parties shape their nation and EU representations in ways that respond best to the given political dilemma or challenge with which they have to deal. Thus, while ideological concerns shape the party positions as expressed in their electoral platforms, their positions on specific events are conditioned by a wider set of factors including intra-coalition and inter-coalition politics, electoral competition, international obligations and a pragmatic assessment of the options available under given circumstances.

On the whole, the study of the political elite discourses in Italy showed that the EU has come to play an important part in the definition of national identity and interest. Regardless of its pro- or anti-EU orientation, no political party could afford to ignore the question of Europe. At the same time, though, the political role of the nation-state in the EU, the protection of the national interests and the concession or preservation of national sovereignty in a number of policy areas remained contested issues. Thus, one might question the stability of the relationship between national and European orientations. Political parties may change their discourse and privilege again the national identity and interest if this proved to be a more rewarding electoral strategy. Such a shift appears relatively probable in conditions of national or international/European change such as the imminent enlargement of the EU to Central and Eastern Europe.

Spain

The main finding of the media and political elite discourse study is the coincidence in the kind of positive vision of Europe and the EU that both mass media and parties transmit to the public opinion and in the use of both terms as synonyms. None of the newspapers, TV channels or parties analysed is against the European integration. This is a characteristic particular of the Spanish system, while in the rest of countries there are parties for and against the process of European integration. The radical right in Germany, the British Conservative Party, the Czech communist party and ODS – on the right wing of the political spectrum the Greek communist party (KKE), the Italian CL, CR and LN and the Poland rightist LPR are all critical of the current project of EU. Mass media took on a reactive role, adopting partisan points of view that showed a correlation between the preferences of parties and the message they transmitted. Mass media also took a reactive position regarding the treatment of the different issues analysed (the Nice Summit and the Euro Launch), thus revealing that they do not have a pre-established strategy regarding how to deal with European issues.

Central Eastern Europe

The Czech Republic

In the Czech media and party discourse, 'Us' is displayed almost unanimously as an undifferentiated entity. In line with the findings of our state-of-art report, the contemporary Czech national identity makes no crucial distinction between the state, its inhabitants/citizens, and the ethnic nation. There was no alternative to the nation/state 'Us', as a convincing European identity is never articulated. Within the context of foreign policy, the Czech media and elites emphasise that Czechs constitute a small nation which has experienced the powers' arrogance in the past and still has to reflect on its limited influence. Europe as a label stays for the absent 'European' entry at the identity level. 'Europe' was mostly treated as a value that passed unquestioned throughout the materials analysed. The Czechs found the label deeply positive, expressing their long lasting identification with the civilization centre situated westwards. The EU figures mostly as a reality-based concept. That means the core reference is neither to the values, nor to emotional identification, but what is (or what seems to be at least) the factual experience: the norms, rules, political mechanisms and negotiations, and the concrete long-term goals. For this reason, 'Our' accession to the EU is mostly presented as an inevitable fact in the media, no matter how critical they are. Analogically, the political discourse focuses mostly on expressing 'Our' national interests in the pragmatic relationship to the EU and on the practical dimension of the believed-in EU concept.

We have analysed two dominant genres of the legitimization strategies: the media strategies and the political strategies.

The goal of the media is to promote themselves; accordingly, the European issues are exploited as an instrument to promote the media. The mainstream media paid attention to the European issues to attest their own 'serious' approach. The *Právo*, *Lidové noviny*, *Hospodářské noviny*, *Dnes* and *CT1* offered a facts-bound coverage on the EU, stressing the importance of the EU Enlargement – i.e. the importance of what the media themselves report. This corresponds to the general reality-based representation of the Union. The tabloids referred to European issues only seldom, as they aimed at provoking special effect. The main function of the EU issues at *Blesk* or *TV Nova* was to thrill the reader or spectator. The tabloids never attack the established structures of meaning, but they exploit the inner contradictions (e.g., they present positive value-based images of Europe vs. negative reality-based images of the EU Enlargement). In a way, this was also the strategy of many mainstream media, 'balancing' the contradictory commentaries (*Hospodářské noviny*, *Lidové noviny*, *Dnes*).

The goal of a political party is to promote itself through the program. The European issues are mostly connected to these programs, and the parties attempt to mobilize the structures of meaning, and even the dominant ways of thinking as established via the media strategies, to their support. The political strategies can be partly adopted by the media as well. In this respect, we identified two dominant political strategies. The critical attitude toward the EU could not cross the Czech discourse's boundary as set by the identification with 'Europe'. Therefore it had to play the vision of Europe against the EU (KSCM). Or, having accepted the matter-of-fact definition of the Accession, it later played against it the pragmatic objections, profiting from the strategy of tension management, as applied by the media (*ODS*, *Lidové noviny*). This, however, meant a grass-roots work that couldn't damage the EU idea in the

short term. The positive attitude mostly relied on the argument ‘EU is Europe’, that was partly supported by the media analysis (Coalition, V.Havel. Právo). The other solution was to stress the pragmatic aspect of Accession – the economic and political advantages, including favourable EU long-term program priorities (CSSD). The pro-Accession argument is stronger at the time being, but it contains a long-term catch: as mentioned above, the Czech discourse knows no explicit ‘European’ or even EU-identity. This holds an important challenge for the future.

Hungary

The media and political discourse reflected upon the key elements of national identity. In political debates, it has been repeatedly emphasized that the Euro-Atlantic integration of Hungary (NATO membership, possible EU membership) reinforces the nation’s belonging to the West, while in the discussions some distinctions showed the survival of the dilemmatic aspects of being between East and West. Many arguments acknowledged the fact that, as a small nation, Hungary may even gain more sovereignty with the Euro-Atlantic integration instead of losing much. Though there was a distinguished attention to the chances of small nations within the changing European institutions. European integration on the whole was seen as positive for the Hungarian minorities in the region. NATO and the EU were also distinguished from other great powers entering into the region by the important fact that this integration is not based on sheer geopolitical dominance but rather the nations’ free choice and interest. As the time of accession had been constantly postponed, a critical attitude has grown somewhat where elements of power politics have been attributed the EU.

The understanding of the international community also appeared as an important context for representations of the nation and Euro-Atlantic integration. From the Hungarian perspective, NATO membership was sufficient to join the standards of the western democratic powers and feel part of the international community. General human and democratic values were attached to different Euro-Atlantic organizations of NATO and the EU. A specific characteristic of Europe in this sense was gained by a greater cultural and national diversity that makes the main difference between the EU and the USA.

For both the media and the political discourse we should not forget an important internal context, that of the public opinion in Hungary. There is a high popular support for the Euro-Atlantic integration here, which is even higher than in most of the Central European countries. The referendum on joining NATO only reinforced the opinion poll results showing that the Hungarian public overwhelmingly supports joining NATO and the EU. However, this support does not mean that the public would be well informed about these institutions or about the short-term consequences of accession for Hungary.

Poland

The main findings of the Polish media and political discourse analysis may be summarized as follows: there was no coherent politics of presenting the EU, Europe and Poland in the media discourse. Still, while Europe was presented in historical, cultural, and geographical terms, the EU was portrayed as mostly economic and political edifice. In the media discourses the categories of nation, European or national identity were absent, as were any references to Polish history or tradition. The announcements concerned Poland as a state, and only rarely as a society. Secondly, the integration with the EU structures was a source of differentiation in the discourse of politics, while the construal of Europe, in contexts unrelated to the European Union, was made in a similar manner by all the parties. Spatially and culturally, Poland was

always conceived as being inseparably tied to Europe from the beginning of its existence as a state (since year 966). The European Union was the concept that differentiated Polish parties the most. In the analysed corpus of texts, two basic frameworks for construing this relationship were distinguished: the populist rhetoric of fear of the EU, and the pro-EU rhetoric of security. Thirdly, on the political scene three basic orientations towards the integration with the EU can be distinguished: the Eurosceptics - assuming the ability for independent development as well as distrust towards the integration with the EU; the Eurorationalists- supporting the integration, but pointing to the Polish interests; and the Euroenthusiasts- propagating the western pattern of development and being in favour of the integration.

Central Western Europe

Austria

The study of the Austrian media and political parties demonstrates that both have been discursive mediators and collective actors in the reconstruction of Austrian national identity and European orientations. Though both are independent of each other, they sometimes overlap and reinforce each other and sometimes diverge and materialize in different and contradictory directions. The media analysis, on the one hand, revealed a considerable spectrum of national and European identity layers. First, there is an elite layer of middle-class attitudes in educated papers with clearly pro-Austrian as well as pro-European attitudes; at the same time, they are divided in a more Christian-humanistic and a more secularist-humanistic camp—the former revitalizing a Habsburg Central European legacy, the latter favouring a Western European oriented social Europe. Second, there is a regional layer in harmony with national identity but with diverging European attitudes: pro-European attitudes based on cultural orientations, pro-European attitudes based on economic interests, and anti-European Union attitudes based on xenophobic-nationalist attitudes. Third, there is a popular lower middle class and working class layer in the tabloid mass papers with strongly Austrian-centred and ambivalent attitudes towards Europe and the European Union: nationalist stereotyping against East Europeans combines with economic interests in an enlarged Europe.

The political party analysis, on the other, reveals a political spectrum that goes mostly parallel, but also stands at odds with the media spectrum. First, the conservative main party, the ÖVP, overlaps with the Christian-humanistic educated middle-class and regional-cultural papers in its orientation to a cultural Europe and particularly a Habsburg-Danubian Central Europe, with the emphasis on the cultural integration of Europe and the economic opportunities of the eastern enlargement. Second, the social-democratic main party, the SPÖ, overlaps with the secularist-humanist educated middle-class and regional-economic papers, emphasizing the economic opportunities, but also the social challenges of an enlarged Europe; here a certain concern regarding the increasing economic competition for national industries and labour markets comes in. Third, the ecological orientations of the Green Party are resonated particularly in the educated secularist middle-class papers, with a clear concern about the negative ecological consequences of an integrating Europe but without the Habsburg components. And fourthly, the FPÖ with its leader Jörg Haider resonates particularly in his region and in the regional-xenophobic-nationalist paper; but the fear of alienation and national erosion was clearly also articulated in the educated as well as tabloid mass papers, in parallel with the entry of the FPÖ to the present conservative-liberal coalition government. At the same time, the mass paper in its predominant orientation oscillates between positive and negative assessments of the eastern enlargement in terms of economic

opportunities and risks and it includes less in terms of xenophobic stereotypes. This clearly indicates that the FPÖ was supported by Austrian voters primarily in the first phase of the evolving unknown enlargement, whereas in the second phase of the crystallizing known enlargement the FPÖ lost again this widespread national support.

Britain

Comparing the media and political elite discourses, one can draw following conclusions. Firstly, attitudes towards European integration were more polarised in the media discourse than the political elite discourse. While the three major parties were at least appreciative of the achievement of European integration so far, and all strived to lead the European Union, the right-wing papers were openly hostile to the European project itself, and some of them to the continuation of British membership. The left-leaning and centre-right papers on the whole avoided to express extreme views about the EU, which may reflect a political consensus that the EU had become part of the political reality. This discrepancies between the media and political elite discourses seem to cast a light on the position of the media in the British public discourse. Although both shared the same historical and geopolitical frameworks as seen in their reference to WWII and the role of the USA, the media showed a degree of detachment from the political discourse. The media in Britain, as far as the above analysis has revealed, seems to be doing what it is supposed to do: to mediate between the state – politics and the public which, according to the opinion polls remains sceptical about the EU. The Labour Party's legendary ability to manipulate the media has not been as far as the European issues are concerned.

Secondly, the both areas of discourse shared a clear Atlantic orientation, a similarity one might find in the Spanish public discourse given Spain's maritime imperial history. The EU in British public discourse could hardly be debated without reference to the USA or the Britain's supposed special relationship with the USA. In addition, the representations of Britain tended to emphasise that the Britain was not like continental countries. Being different from the rest of Europe was the major undertone of British self-understanding identified in this report. It follows, then, that the EU was often depicted as something that Britain did not really belong. The major political parties would deny this, but the media was on the whole pointing to this direction. The British case shows an interesting contrast to the Italian one in which the perceived closeness to the USA was taken up to reinforce its advantage in the European scene than to stress its difference from other European countries.

The examination of British public discourse has confirmed that Britain is still largely seen as not really European by the media and political elite. Although some awareness of being one of the big members of the EU which would mean more power in the European context was detected, identification with the EU in the public discourse remained low. Perhaps, if the referendum on the euro is announced, the level of involvement with the EU in British public discourse may increase, with a rigorous assessment of Britain's place in the world. If this happens, it may in turn result in a more Europeanised self-definition of Britain articulated in the public discourse.

Germany

The study of German media and political party discourses confirms the basic assumption that both are discursive mediators and collective actors in the German public sphere. Although they are mostly independent from each other (with the exception of two regional newspapers),

they in part overlap but also in part differ in their national and European orientations. The media analysis, on the one hand, revealed several important identity layers: First, there is an elite layer of educated middle-class attitudes with rather self-critical German and pro-European attitudes. However, this elite layer divides in a more Christian-humanist and a secularist-humanist wing—the latter interested primarily in a politically coherent, economically prosperous and socially evened-out Europe, the former more interested not only in a politically and economically, but also culturally integrated Europe. Second, there is a regional layer with strong differences in national and European attitudes and identifications depending on West German or East German location and respective cultural orientations. In the case of West German Bavaria, social-Catholic, pro-German and pro-European orientations predominated; in the case of Protestant-secularist Berlin-Brandenburg and Saxony, the national identification against the West German and West European model and ambivalent EU orientations, but focused instead of solidarity-minded social Eastern European orientations were characteristic. Third, there was a popular or populist lower middle and working-class tabloid mass paper with a clear nationalist and ambivalent European orientation, based however more on a welfare chauvinist discourse than on a xenophobic attitude towards other nations.

The political party analysis, on the other hand, also showed several identity layers, which were sometimes similar, sometimes different and in different combinations. The opinions expressed in the educated middle class papers as well as the tabloid mass paper largely overlap with the political centre of the Christian Democrats (CDU) and the Social-Democrats (SPD), and less so with the small parties of the Liberals (FDP) and the Greens. The CDU and partially the FDP represent predominantly the Christian-humanist orientations in the educated middle class papers. They are interested in a culturally, politically and economically integrated Europe. The SPD as well as the Greens and parts of the FDP overlap more with the secularist-humanist educated middle class papers. But both people's parties also articulate and respect the welfare nationalism of the lower middle and working class tabloid mass paper in contrast to the FDP and the Greens. In contrast, the regional papers analysed reflect either political partisan views—in the two cases considered due to political affiliation—or regional concerns—in the case analysing East German attitudes to the nation and Europe. They either correlate with political party orientations or criss-cross them. Of importance for the construction of German national and European identities, thus, were particularly two results in the German media and political party analysis: first, the lasting impact of the division of Germany and the particular Western-dominated form of reunification, and second, the impact of the distinction between educated middle-class and non-educated tabloid mass papers in shaping different orientations to the nation and Europe, but criss-crossing political party formations.

3.2.3 Public Opinion: Survey and Qualitative Interviews

Southern Europe

Greece

Lay people, though highly interested in Europe (as the research has clearly shown), are poorly informed about European issues and their significance for Greece and their every day lives. Both through the survey and the qualitative analysis of in-depth interviews, the research has shown that the Greek people are highly committed to their country; thus, all the symbolic cultural elements which underpin Greek identity scored very high. Lay people at the same time are clearly aware that there is great room and urgent need for improvements at the level

of civil society in order to reach western European standards. In this and the general context of the prospects of being citizens of an advanced, just, democratic European society, most respondents expressed themselves very enthusiastically.

Italy

The **survey** results suggest that in Italy feelings of closeness to the nation, region, city or village and to Europe or the EU are compatible. More specifically, the analysis has shown that local, regional and national identities are fully compatible. Regional and national identities are compatible with a feeling of closeness to the EU and may even, at least to a certain extent, reinforce such a feeling. Our results however also confirm the primacy of national identity over a sense of Europeanness. Italians feel European but only as a secondary attachment to their national identification.

These results are confirmed also by the **qualitative interview** analysis, where informants suggested that they felt both Italian and European, even if they had difficulties in clarifying what it means for them to be European. Hardly anyone questioned the fact that Italy should be part of the EU and/or that Italy was part of Europe. Rather, they debated the role of the country as an EU founder state, and judged its economic performance by 'European' standards or its legal and institutional system. They also elaborated on the different member state interests and the power differentials that structure their relations. Concerning the national culture and traditions, few informants considered that these were at risk because of the European integration process. Some even saw EU integration as an opportunity for testing the validity of the traditions and also for diffusing Italian culture and lifestyle to other countries.

Spain

Both the survey and the qualitative interviews phase showed the uneasiness of most Spanish citizens with 'nationalism' and the negative identification with their national symbols, due to their linkage with our authoritarian past. Place of birth and residence, language, and national character and common customs (perceived in a rather stereotypical way) were the most important elements in Spaniards' national identity. Most Spanish citizens feel Spanish and European at one and the same time. Any European identity is, nevertheless, secondary and weaker than their Spanish identity. Experience of living in other countries or of close contact with them serves to reinforce identities. This holds for national identity, in all three discussion groups, as well as for European identity, in the groups of Erasmus students and the executives of multinationals. All have come to feel more Spanish as a result of their contact with other Europeans, and in the case of students and executives, they also feel more European.

Central Eastern Europe

The Czech Republic

Survey results: The Czechs perceive the national as well as European identities in two dimensions: the *political/institutional* and the *symbolic/cultural*. In both cases, the cultural dimension prevails. Of course, the national identity is more substantial than the European one. On the other hand, the scores for proximity of the EU citizens or fellow-Europeans (question 25), as well as for the identification indexes (question 27) were rather high. There is a potential for the EU citizens to reach an in-group status. We shall also remark that only 8%

of the interviewees said they did not feel Europeans.¹ The survey interviewees displayed rather homogenous opinion on all the matters concerned. No significant divisions were found. So far, we can conclude that the Czech society has a very unified opinion concerning the meaning of feeling national and feeling European.

Our qualitative interviews findings however bring in a more subtle and differentiated look to the survey results and suggest the following fields for further investigation: First, we think that the issue of Germans' role in the lay discourse on national identity should be critically considered. Do the Germans really tend to be less important for the construction of the Czechs' identity? Would they be perceived as a nation as any other, in an essentially non-conflictual way? If yes, the consequences of such a shift would be considerable. Second, the issue of the Romany minority is extremely important. With respect to this, we would suggest a further analysis of the ways Romanies are excluded from the imagined community of the Czechs. If this implies that they also attract no sympathy or willingness to help, social scientists should also consider how to overcome such a deep isolation. Further, the mechanisms of the relationship between the lay discourse and the politics and media in the Czech Republic should be examined. Given the fact that there are many lay motives in the discussion of the EU that the media and politicians do not address, we wonder what the causes behind such a phenomenon are. And finally, we think it is time to reconsider whether the national identity of Czechs strongly levelled as our research suggests? And if so, what is the current trend in relating the social distinctions to the national identity?

Hungary

National and European identification were explored from various angles in this analysis. In its attitudinal aspects, Hungarians seem to identify with the nation very much (more than their region or locality). They regard EU citizens as a quasi in-group (a reference group) that is positively distinguished from any other social groups. Concerning out-groups, there were signs of a certain distinction between internal and external others. Minority groups were seen more positively than distant out-groups. A relational identity measure could be constructed out of the national and European attitude items, to show the closed (exclusive) vs. open (inclusive) forms of national identification patterns. There are systemic differences in the representation of nation and Europe between these groups of people. As far as the representational side of identity measures is concerned, we saw a threefold structure in the representation of the nation, where the emerging Symbolic factor questioned the simplistic bipolar models of ethnic/civic national identity. This independent factor reflects important concepts of social identity theory (Sovereignty, Borders, Symbols, and Pride). In the representation of Europe, the cultural aspects emerge more from all different kinds of answers.

Apart from commonalities, some social (group) differences were also detectable. A threefold system of background variables emerged in this analysis. Inclusive/exclusive identifications were used here too, age was recoded into a generation factor, and elite/non-elite positions were approximated by length of education. The results show that those with inclusive national/European identification tend to be more open to all out-groups. They represent the nation with more emphasis on both its Civic/institutional and Symbolic aspects while not denying cultural bonds. Those with open national identification have generally more positive evaluation of Europe in all aspects. There is a clear intergenerational dynamic of beliefs too.

¹ And only 2% stated they did not feel Czechs.

Elder people seemed to invest more in the symbolic and ethnic/cultural aspects of the nation. Thus a shifting emphasis from the cultural to the institutional/civic understanding is detectable between the elder and the youngest generations, which may predict the future change in national identity. Another interesting result is that while the younger generations reject direct measures of national identification, they rate high on more indirect measures. European identification carries elements of national identity among these young people. The main characteristic of elite positions is a mixture of scepticism toward specific policy outcomes (e.g. euro, free movement) of the European integration and openness to other people (out-groups) and change in general. The nation itself is also critically assessed by those in the elite. These results altogether show the need for further research on the background variables behind the attitudinal and representational aspects of national identity.

Poland

The major findings of the survey phase in Poland may be summed up as follows: the Polish respondents felt closest to fellow Poles, followed by the inhabitants of their locality. The second group in the ranking of perception of closeness comprises the Europeans, starting with the EU citizens; next come fellow Europeans perceived as being closer than Central and Eastern Europeans. The striking result of the Polish survey - different to the results of other Polish surveys - is the location of the Russians perceived as being slightly 'closer' to Poles than US citizens. This suggests that in our research 'being close' meant not a pure sympathy, but belonging to the same category. The top positions for national self-identification were comprised of: national symbols, language, ancestry, history and destiny. Respondents ranked as less important the items referring to the nation as a political entity based on a common state and economy. The identification with the European society is based on the instrumental values of common law, institutions, social security and economy. The European and national identities are inclusive, as being a Pole meant for the vast majority also being a European, but strong conviction of being European does not necessarily mean the same level of feeling of closeness to other European nations or the European Union.

These results are confirmed and broadened by the qualitative interviews, where informants identified stronger with the nation, fellow Poles, and the society (co-citizens) than with the state and its structures. Applying geographic and cultural criteria for being the European, the respondents identified themselves as such. Considering Poles' Europeanness in the terms of civilisation factors (meaning technological advancements, infrastructure, etc.) they felt less European than the Western European citizens. Describing their attitude towards citizens of other states or representatives of other nationalities, the respondents tended to regard themselves as open and tolerant. But some, especially the older and the inhabitants of the regions formerly belonging to Germany, expressed their fear of Germans.

Central Western Europe

Austria

The survey results confirmed the accepted knowledge that the spatial dimensions of Austrian identity (local, regional, national and European) are compatible with each other. Furthermore, the regional/local identity layer is the most important, the national one is second, and the European one is the least important. The survey results added important information about the Austrian national and European identity profiles. In comparative perspective, the Austrians combine a high identification with the nation in ethnic-cultural terms and a high identification with Europe in cultural-civilizational terms, whereas the intensity of political, economic and

symbolic identities is considerably lower on the national as well as on the European and EU level.

The qualitative interviews confirmed these survey results and gave an in-depth perspective on the individual level. The attachment to the local/regional level is most important, that to the nation is second in importance, and that to Europe third. Regarding the European dimension, particularly the EU and the eastern enlargement, it could be observed that it is contested among Austrians. The more educated, middle class, mobile and young, the more positive is also the identification with the political and economic dimensions of Europe, whereas the less educated, lower and working class, less mobile and old, the more negative is also the attitude towards the political and economic dimensions of an enlarging Europe.

Britain

The major findings of the survey phase in Britain may be summarized as follows: The British respondents feel closest to the inhabitants of their locality, followed by fellow Britons; the British respondents feel closer to people from the dominions and to the US citizens than to the EU citizens; those people who feel a higher level of closeness to the EU citizens tend to show a higher level of identification with all other groups analysed; the factor analysis on identification with various groups extracted two factors: identification with culturally similar groups and identification with non-British groups; language, common border and common culture are the three most important elements of British national identity; the factor analysis on the national identity question extracted two factors: a concept of an egalitarian nation and a concept of a homogeneous nation; 62 per cent of the respondents said they did not feel European; British and European identities are not mutually exclusive; the factor analysis on the European identity question extracted two factors: Europe as a state and Europe as a society; the factor analysis with two sets of concepts of British identity and Europe extracted two factors which suggests British identity and the idea of Europe are related to each other.

The main findings from the qualitative interview phase, on the other hand, suggest that: Respondents are by and large reluctant to talk about Europe either because they are not interested in politics or because they are ashamed of their ignorance of the EU matters; the majority of respondents support diversity at different levels; the most common representation of Britain is of Britain as an island; the representations of EU seem to be influenced by two opposing feelings: alienation and appreciation, depending on the respondents' social standing; many respondents are capable of separating the EU and Europe, and the most common representation of Europe is 'Europe as elsewhere'; the representations of the euro are made at three different levels: in the context of the nation and the EU, as a rational, economic issue, and in the context of their personal experience; although not many respondents claimed to have a strong European identity, many of them were happy to acknowledge that they were European.

Germany

The survey consisted of two separate parts: West Germany and East Germany. The results confirmed the accepted knowledge that the spatial dimensions of West German and East German collective identities (local/regional, national, European) are compatible with each other. In both cases the regional/local identity layer is the most important, the national one is second in importance, and the European level is third. However, the East Germans identify more with their region than with the German nation, which indicates the lasting ambivalence of East Germans towards the West German-dominated Unified German nation-state. In a

comparative perspective, the West Germans and the East Germans combine a low degree of national identification with a higher degree of European identification, though this so-called ‘compensatory’ relationship is more pronounced in West Germany than in East Germany and tends to decrease in the last years in both parts of Germany.

The qualitative interviews confirmed these survey results but gave an in-depth ethnographic picture of the national-European identity mix on an individual level. The general ranking from the local-regional to the national and European level was confirmed, and a more precise portrait of the East German ambiguities vis-à-vis the United German nation-state was given. In particular, it was found that the West Germans feel European though differing ways, whereas the East Germans display again a certain ambivalence vis-à-vis the EU as a close ally of the West Germans and at the same time a protection shield against the East. In addition, there could be observed a clear connection between social structure and the entanglements of national and European identity. The more educated, middle class, mobile and young people are clearly also more European oriented, whereas the lower and working class, the educated, less mobile and old tend to be more exclusive in their national orientation and to have a more sceptical European attitude, particularly vis-à-vis the East.

3.2.4 General Assessment and Policy Implications

Southern Europe

Greece

A general conclusion drawn from all sets of findings has been that the representations of Europe and the nation are open, dynamic and fluid. The concepts of national and European identity themselves are largely ambiguous but seem fully compatible, given the fact that the European project and the wider European identity are understood as being built on the basis of national and cultural difference and what could be called diverse democratic participation of the people of Europe.

Italy

The EURONAT project produced new knowledge concerning national and European identities in Italy, urging for caution in assuming that Italian elites and citizens are fully in favour of the European integration process. It has revealed the subtle twists of the public and private discourse that can cast light on the complex processes of identity formation and negotiation. From a policy perspective, our study has led to the following important results and recommendations. Our findings from the media phase suggest that EU information campaigns aiming at increasing citizen interest and active participation in the EU governance may be more effective if concentrated on celebrations and symbols rather than on the actual workings of the EU institutions and governance system. Our analysis of the party discourse urges for caution when taking at face value the party platforms and ideological positions, since these may be modified when parties are confronted with a political crisis or dilemma. Our study confirmed the hypothesis that ordinary citizens do not uncritically accept and/or reproduce the dominant media and elite discourses. They elaborated actively on stimuli and information received from the environment in their representations of the nation, the EU, Europe and the relationship between them. Having said this, we need also to acknowledge that lay people reproduced to a certain extent the main media and political debates in their talk. Last but not least, our overall findings suggest that the axes that are politically and symbolically – if not also economically – relevant today are the distinction between small and

large member states (Italy is striving to secure a position among the latter but constantly fears that it stands with the former) and the discrimination between current and new member states.

Spain

It is clear from this case study that Spanish historical legacies are fundamental to understand the high level of support for the European Union and the large percentage of people that hold dual identities (people who felt Spaniards and European at the same time). Among other factors, Spaniards' historically troubled relation with their national identity and the rejection of the legacies from the Francoist regime must be taken into account. History continues to leave a visible imprint on the configuration of Spanish national identities; this does not mean that any of the political actors consciously manipulates it.

Collective identities in Spain are rather inclusive. If this is less surprising regarding the compatibility of national and European identities given the particular historical trajectory of Spain, the compatibility of regional-nationalist and national-Spanish identities represents a more startling finding. Although nationalist parties in Catalonia and the Basque Country tend to instrumentalise their European identity to reject a national-Spanish identity, regional-nationalist, national-Spanish and European identities are inclusive and concentric among ordinary citizens in these regions. The attachment to national identity remains, however, stronger than the bonds to a European identity.

An unexpected finding has been the relative importance of ethnic elements for the national identity of ordinary citizens. In this regard, it seems that the complexes and prejudices of a Spanish nationalism associated with the previous Francoist regime are limited to the elites, who prefer to use civic references to ethno-cultural ones. Nevertheless, the identification with typical nationalist symbols, such as the flag and the anthem, continues to be difficult.

There exists a strong convergence in the discourse of Spanish elites and ordinary citizens regarding their pro-European attitudes. We have, nevertheless, pointed out some divergences too. Although all the Spanish parties are unequivocally pro-European, they have different ideas about how the EU should evolve and be in the future. Those ideas are linked to their political preferences, which they also try to promote through an instrumental use of the EU. Mass media, on the other hand, follow the ideological orientation of parties in their editorial lines. The unity of discourse at the elite level is mirrored by the congruencies at the ordinary citizen's level. Among the more remarkable convergences we found is the moral discourse used to justify European enlargement.

Central Eastern Europe

The Czech Republic

By way of conclusion, we would like to come back once more to the central issue of the relationship between the representations of Europe, the EU, and the nation in the Czech discourse(s). We present briefly the main findings, and we suggest the practical recommendations that seem to stem from these findings.

Europe and the nation are compatible. A European identity is currently compatible with the national identity of the Czechs. The normative-cultural representation of Europe is part of the complex normative claim of national identity. Apart from this, the Czechs' affiliation to the EU is firmly based on the popular perception of a West-East hierarchy, and on the aspiration to overcome it.

The EU citizenship is problematic. The problem that remains open is construction of a future European EU-citizenship, for which there is currently not much potential in the Czech discourse.

The Romany minority remain victims of the homogeneous representation of the Czech nation. The representation of the Czech nation or state is currently extremely homogeneous in all terms. This makes the majority population virtually unable to conceptualize incorporation of the minorities into the nation, or to feel some solidarity and responsibility for their problems.

Open up the European and national identities! Given all of the above, the next goal that the European integration brings in the realm of representations and identities in the Czech discourse seems to be tuning the European and national identities to be more open.

The uncertain status of the media and politics. Another issue arises, with the question of what means to use in order to achieve the necessary shifts in representations/identities. The influence of the representations used in both media and politics on the lay people representations is contestable, and indirect at best. Thus, even direct action concerning the design of public discourse might not bring about a quick shift in popular opinion. We have still a lot to learn in this respect.

Hungary

The referendum on EU membership sets the explicit context for the interviews. Although interviews reflected the general support that had been shown at the elections, people perceived the Hungarian media as not playing an informative role in the process of European integration. Respondents maintained that the media had depicted an uncritically positive picture of the EU and had failed to deal with practical issues of everyday life. Thus as was found before, Hungarians see the EU as being positive, although they are also prepared for (rather unspecified) obstacles in this process. They not only have limited knowledge about the Union and the possible changes in their lives, but blame the media and other social factors for not providing enough relevant information.

The general view of the European Union is a positive one, which, however, lacks detail. The EU is primarily seen by interviewees as an economic community based on exchange processes and a system of norms that regulate (public) behaviour. The positive and norm-forming sense attributed to the modifier 'European' also confirms this role of the EU. The overall picture is nevertheless split up by various group perspectives. These different perspectives have in principal developed through the identification of those gaining and those losing with accession. This division consequently resulted in distinctions such as rural–urban, old–young, wealthy–poor, educated–uneducated and having foreign language skills – lacking foreign language skills. Interviewees generally claim that the elite in political, economic and intellectual terms (those already living under better circumstances) will benefit more from EU membership.

Poland

Our findings from Poland have largely endorsed the hypotheses put forward by the EURONAT project. The project also produced new knowledge concerning the nation formation (due to the employment of an ethnic-civic analytical continuum), and the relation between the European and national identities. Still, it has revealed similarities and differences between the lay people and the elite (media and politics) discourses, which prove that ordinary people do not uncritically accept or reproduce the elite discourse. We can suggest that the Polish media work towards a coherent politic of presenting the European Union, and

Europe, and that the concept of the modern Polish nation should not be – as it is now - abandoned and handed over to the right-wing radicals (still marginal).

Our research worked out the implications for both the European Union member-states and for Poland. It suggests that in the EU as a whole, the media and party leaders need to co-operate actively by working towards the development of the EU citizens' common European identity, as this layer of the Europeans' identities still necessitates further development. With regard to Poland our research suggests that the media need to work out and carry out a coherent policy of informing about the European Union, and about the nation within this structure. Moreover, the media and the mainstream political parties should not hand over the issue of the modern Polish nation, its interpretation and relation to the other nations, to the right-wing radicals as they do currently. Finally, our research suggests that lay people need to be surveyed regarding their attitudes towards the fellow European Union member states and citizens; this would provide the elite with knowledge on popular moods and attitudes which, in turn, may be influenced by adjusting national policies and emphasising the common European good.

Central Western Europe

Austria

The general result of the combined stages of research on Austrian collective identity is a more precise and complex picture of the multiple dimensions of an emerging European identity in relation to the national, regional and local identity patterns. Important policy-relevant insights are: 1) for Austrians, Europe is primarily a cultural-civilizational concept, whereas the EU as an enlarging economic and political institutional framework is still vague; 2) the orientation to the EU is split into positive and sceptical, and even negative attitudes; 3) the direction of these European orientations is dependent primarily on education and social class. In order to generate a more political notion of the European, it would be particularly necessary to expand the knowledge of and interest in the European integration project on the various national levels from schools to the media and political parties. Although at the moment a considerable change from negative to positive attitudes to the eastern enlargement in the Austrian population can be observed, this change is related to the generally very positive impact of the eastern enlargement on the Austrian economy. But on the basis of the research results one should not under-estimate the continuing ambivalence vis-à-vis European integration that could be revitalized in a period of economic crisis and social conflict.

Britain

Our findings from Britain have largely endorsed the hypotheses put forward by the EURONAT project. An exception is probably the one on the timing of accession and its impact on pro-European attitudes. Although the UK has been a member of the EC/EU longer than Greece or Spain, it is clear that this has not made the British more pro-European than the Greek or Spaniards. What can be suggested from a comparative context is that it is not the length of time spent in the EC/EU that is most significant to the emergence of pro-European attitudes or a strong European identity; it is, rather boringly, history and geopolitics – what is described as the relational dimension – that shapes a nation's attitudes to Europe. In this regard, it would be interesting to conduct another comparative study of Britain, Denmark, Ireland and Sweden, those four countries which joined the EC in 1973, in order to pinpoint the exact factors that influence the growth of a European identity.

Germany

The general result of the combined research steps on German collective identity is a more precise and complex picture of the multiple dimensions of an emerging and developing European identity in relation to the national, regional and local identity levels. Important policy-relevant observations include: 1) the weakening compensatory relationship between the German nation and Europe in the direction towards a more self-conscious, less stigmatised, less compensatory, but generally positive relation to Europe and European integration; 2) the marked differences in the national-European identity mix between West and East Germany; and 3) the impact of social structure, class and education, on the national-European identity mix. In order to promote a deeper sense of a European identity, a particular target should be the less educated lower social strata as well as the East German region. In comparison to Austria, there is a well-informed pluralistic middle-class European orientation particularly in West Germany, but this European identity does not translate to the less educated, lower and working class people. So particular attention should be paid in the schools, the media and the political parties to this marked European identity gap. Regarding the Euro and the eastern enlargement, there is a considerable insecurity and scepticism and, even though they are expressed at the moment only marginally in anti-European orientations, any continuing negative consequences of an enlarging Europe could strengthen and politicise anti-European sentiments.

3.3 Comparative Remarks and Policy Suggestions

Our findings above confirm the compatibility between EU and national identity. They also confirm that national identity is a 'first order' identity to which most EU citizens feel closer, while a sense of belonging to Europe and the EU comes as a 'second order' feeling of loyalty and attachment. Both identities contain a blend of ethnic, civic and instrumental features. This blend varies among the countries studied but it cannot be said that national identity is mainly an ethno-cultural attachment, while the EU represents a more civic, territorial or indeed instrumental type of community. All these elements are intertwined in both identities and in some countries (the 2004 enlargement ones), ethno-cultural understandings of Europe prevailed.

The notions of Europe and of the EU are often conflated in the media, party and even in private discourses. In member states that joined before 2004, there is a tendency to appropriate the notion of Europe: Europeans are those who belong to the EU. By contrast, in the 2004 enlargement member states (which were still accession countries when the research was conducted), media, parties and lay people too distinguish between Europe – they themselves feel they belong to Europe historically and politically – and the EU, which they often represent as a closed club that Central Eastern European countries have to join in order to ensure the material welfare of future generations.

The picture we can draw from the analysis of party electoral platforms and parliamentary debates is more optimistic. Ideology is important when parties evaluate the European integration process. However, parties feel they are stakeholders in this process and can shape its development and outcomes. Overall, political ideology (left or right wing) is less important than expected. Media coverage and party debates are shaped by ideology only to a certain extent and even so, in conjunction with their overall positioning in the national political context, their office incumbency or opposition, and their understanding of their own

nation-state and its place within Europe. EU politics are organized in more complex ways than a simple right-left-wing continuum.

History is an important factor shaping discourses, permeating media representations and private understandings of what Europe and the nation are or should be. Historical national contexts act as interpretation lenses through which Europe, the EU and their relationship with the nation is understood and discussed. However, we found that in media and party discourses, current power relations, the relative weight of larger or smaller countries and of stronger or weaker economies, are important factors shaping the representation of the EU, Europe and the nation. Also lay people's representation of the EU is shaped by the power (im)balances between countries. Lay people are also aware that EU integration requires negotiation and realistic compromise.

One of the aims of the EURONAT project was to produce some general policy recommendations regarding best communication practices to be used by state agencies and the media to get the message across as regards EU integration. In other words, we had promised to provide some devices that would facilitate and strengthen information campaigns on the EU, increasing people's awareness of the EU's relevance in their daily lives as well as their will to participate in EU politics.

Our findings suggest that EU communication policies aiming to encourage political participation and to bring the citizens closer to the EU should first of all acknowledge the importance of national contexts and history. There can never be a single perspective, adopted EU-wide. There are rather national perspectives through which EU policies and realities are interpreted. Hence, any successful communication strategy should take into account such national and cultural specificities.

Parties do play an important role as mediators between national politics and European institutions and politics. Parties, perceiving themselves as actors involved in the making of the EU, can become important vectors of political participation and citizen involvement in EU matters. They can diffuse EU information, 'translate' it into the local political context and jargon, get citizens actively involved and transmit back to the EU level the citizens' opinions, preferences and interests. This is probably a mirror reflection of the EU multi level governance idea at the realm of public communication.

A European identity does not seem to be a necessary component of European integration. Or rather it does not seem to be a component that should be directly sought after. It rather will come up as an epiphenomenon of actual deeper European integration and as part of the experience of living together within a common supranational polity. In this respect, the role of the Euro and of the right to free movement cannot be exaggerated. Hence EU communication strategies should focus on specific issues that are of interest to EU citizens rather than promote activities that are directly concerned with issues of European identity, European history or European culture. These European formulations will be formed gradually through cultural exchange, dialogue and interaction within common programmes of action (e.g. programmes of cultural activities, educational exchanges, youth programmes, gender programmes etc.)

Also EU political leaders should openly discuss disagreements and negotiations rather than giving the impression that negotiations take place behind closed doors. Citizens are aware of

the inevitability of compromise and trade offs for the EU to function; hence, talking about such compromises in a realistic manner and on a case-by-case basis will help make the citizens feel closer to the EU. Meetings behind closed doors only raise mistrust between the EU and its citizens, without hiding successfully the sources of disagreement. Thus, the EU institutions should develop their own communication channels more in national and regional media, explaining the issues debated, the decisions to be taken, the necessity for such decisions, and distinguishing between the EU and the national or regional aspects of such issues.

Political issues may often seem too complex and too specialized to be explained to citizens. However, a special effort should be made to explain the main points in a simple language so that citizens have an opportunity to know, understand and express their opinions (opposed or supportive) if they wish. Actually another important finding of our qualitative study is that most people start talking about EU and European integration by stating that they do not know much about the issue.

4 BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES OF THE PROJECT

In European integration studies, attention has been traditionally paid more to the social, economic, and institutional aspects of the process of creating ‘an ever closer Union’ than to citizens’ support of and identification with Europe. The treaties that brought the EU into existence and the related legal, political and policy aspects of European unification have become the favourite subject of study for scholars in the disciplines of law, international relations, political science and public administration. Different models for analysing the process of European integration have been put forward and issues of institutional change and political or economic planning have been addressed in relation not only to current member states (EU 15) but also with regard to the prospective integration of Central and Eastern European countries. Despite their importance, however, attitudes towards the EU, the (debatable) emergence of a European identity and/or culture and the links between these and national loyalties or ethnic identifications have been less studied than policies. As a matter of fact, until the 1980s these were rather marginal themes and related studies were indeed very few (Handley 1981, Hewstone 1986, Inglehart 1979). More recently, however, interest in the topic has dramatically increased and we may distinguish between at least three perspectives from which to look at the relationship between European and national identities.

One strand of research has concentrated on the study of attitudes towards European integration. These studies have paid attention to general trends as well as selected factors that determine attitudes (Eichenberg, Russell 1993; Janssen 1991; Niedermayer 1991; Worcester 1990), but work in this field is often limited to one or two countries (Allington and Jones 1994; Baker *et al.* 1995; Dimitras 1992; Fells and Niznik 1992; Reif and Inglehart 1992). Nonetheless, the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty by individual member states has spurred a further wave of research on attitudes towards the Union (Eichenberg, Russell *ibid.*; Franklin *et al.* 1994; Gabel and Palmer 1995; Worcester and Mortimore 1994), and attention has been paid to national determinants of popular support for European unification (Deflem and Pampei 1996).

This branch of studies shares a common interest with an emerging school of thought in the area of international relations: namely scholars who study the intertwining of national and nation-state identities with attitudes and views of a united Europe (Jauregui 1999; Marcussen *et al.* 1999; Risse *et al.* 1998). This is in fact a new perspective on European integration as a process of Europeanisation of national identities, institutions and party politics in the EU (Cowles *et al.* 2000).

The process of European integration and the related debate on European identity and culture has been discussed by nationalism theorists, too. Research in this field has tended to disconfirm the emergence of some sense of belonging to Europe or the European Union. Scholars have rather pointed to the persistence and continuing strength or revival of national identities and nation-state loyalties (Mann 1996; Smith 1995a; Smith 1995b among others). Other writers, in contrast, have investigated the historical and social foundations of nations and nation-states in the European continent and examined the identity dynamics between the nation and Europe (Haller, Richter 1994; Kriesi *et al.* 1999; Pocock 1997; Spiering 1996).

Within this area of studies, there is an emerging culture and identity perspective which concentrates on the re-definition of the idea of Europe after the Cold War and with the Eastern enlargement and its impact on national identities in Western and Eastern Europe (partner 3, #1, and also Robert Schuman Centre Policy Papers series). The imminent accession of Central and Eastern European countries to the European Union has prompted a scholarly debate not only about the social, institutional and economic challenges involved, but also in relation to culture, religion and identity issues. Attention has been paid to the changing international context in the 1990s and the related transformation of the legitimacy basis of the EU (Fierke and Wiener 1999). Research on the turn eastwards and the reconfiguration of the European Union in this context is very recent (Amato and Batt 1999; Friis and Murphy 1999; Grabbe and Hughes 1998), but it is rapidly expanding.

In this area of studies however, two main theoretical and policy concerns have emerged. On the one hand, there is a need for comparative studies of the interrelation between national and European identities. With very few exceptions (Spohn, 2000; Strath, 2000; Mouritzen 1996; Kriesi 1999), only Western European countries and here mostly the big ones have been to date examined. Moreover, a systematic comparison of different European regions within the centre-periphery matrix of European integration has not been developed. This project, in contrast, provides for a systematic comparison of national and European identities and their interrelation in Western, Southern and Central Eastern European countries.

On the other hand, there is a need for empirical research on collective identities. Often, scholars have adopted a mere macro-analytical conceptualisation and operationalisation of collective identities taking into account either the speeches of political leaders and programs of parties or the generalising results of public opinion research. Or conversely, there is a conspicuous lack of analysis of the different layers and their aggregate composition in collective identities. This project examines collective identity (trans)formation at different levels, with a special emphasis on the media and their discursive role in constructing collective identities by mediating between the political elites and lay people. This research will combine a quantitative and qualitative, macro- and micro-analytical and comparative perspective of the role of the media in the formation of national and European identities in the nine countries chosen.

This project lies at the crossroads between different research traditions, drawing at the theoretical and methodological levels from political science, sociology, social psychology, cultural studies, history and international relations, in an examination of nations and European integration. The project aimed to analyse and compare the intertwining of European and national identities and, in particular, the role of the Eastern enlargement in this, in nine countries in Western, Southern and Central Eastern Europe. In each case, the relationship between national and European identities is analysed through the images, representations, understandings and meanings of Europe in the various nations at the different levels of political elites, the media and civil society. In the empirical research, special emphasis is laid on the role of the media as the discursive universe within which national and European identities are formed. The party platforms analysis revealed how parties build a coherent worldview that frames and supports their policies; furthermore, it showed that European integration and the relationship between Italy and the EU are important political issues. However, the analysis of parliamentary debates, especially those on Kosovo and Afghanistan, revealed that parties shape their nation and EU representations in ways that respond best to the given political dilemma or challenge with which they have to deal.

5 SCIENTIFIC DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT RESULTS AND METHODOLOGY

In the following sections we shall present the main research findings and the methodologies used to obtain them in each country case. At the end of the section we shall provide for our general comparative findings and observations.

5.1 Southern Europe

5.1.1 Greece

The Greek case study adopted and followed the general methodology and the hypotheses of EURONAT. Here, we shall present briefly the methodology and data collection for each phase of the research and engage in a short comprehensive discussion on the findings of the study which are presented and analysed in detail in the appropriate reports.

Data and Methods

In the first report entitled *Modern Greece: A profile of Identity and Nationalism* we provided a historical profile of the formation and transformation of Greek ethnic identity and also presented its specific relation to Europe, especially since the establishment of the Greek state in the 1830s. At the same time, we presented a social profile of contemporary Greece and its relationship to Europe and the EU by reviewing relevant literature; we thus presented state of the art knowledge in this area. The data were drawn largely from secondary sources, namely academic literature (books and articles), but also from various government publications, pamphlets and also articles from the press.

In the second report entitled *Representations of the Nation, the EU and Europe in the Greek Media and the Greek Political Parties*, we combined two different sets of data and different methodologies. In the media section of the report we collected and analysed data from five major national newspapers (*Eleftherotypia*, *To Vima*, *Kathimerini*, *Apogevmatini*, and *Rizospastis*). These newspapers represent the whole spectrum and profile of Greek politics and carry amongst them collectively over 70% of the readership of all national newspapers.

The events examined were the Nice Summit and the launching of the Euro (as was the case with the other partners in EURONAT). The method of analysis and synthesis adopted was *Discourse theory and methodology* and *content analysis* combined. We also carried out research in TV coverage and presentation of the same events in one major national and one big independent channel. The data were collected through transcription of specific news bulletins and were analysed and interpreted again within discourse methodology drawing largely on relevant literature which is very wide and elaborate in this area.

The representations of Europe and the nation arising from political parties were studied on the basis of data drawn from the analysis of party platforms, parliamentary debates, speeches by political elite, party literature, other secondary literature and relevant articles from the press. The parties included were the *PASOK* (socialist party, then in Government); the *New*

Democracy (then in opposition now in Government), the *Synaspismos of the Left and of Progress*, and the *Communist Party of Greece*, which is anti-EU, anti-European and anti-everything. Special attention was given to the positions of the parties on the war in Kosovo and Afghanistan, and their positions on the enlargement and on Europe in general were examined. The method of analysis again was within the parameters and methodology of Discourse theory.

Along with all the other partners in EURONAT we participated in the Survey conducted by Eurobarometer (wave 57.2) for each national case study. The survey was applied in Greece by Market Analysis (Opinion Research Company) between 11 May and 10 June, 2002. It was conducted on a random representative stratified sample, known as national probability sample, on the Greek population over 15 years of age (8,793 million). The sample was stratified according to sex, age and regions of residence. The questions asked were the same as in all case studies of the EURONAT project, except for the inclusion of three out-groups specific to Greece (Albanians, Kurds, and Philipinos). The groups were categorized according to geographical, ethnic-cultural characteristics and ranged from those who lived in the same town/village, region, nation (in-groups), to those people coming from Europe and from different countries and nationalities. The respondents indicated their level of closeness to these groups by responding on a 4-point Likert-type scale. Two other batteries of questions (Q.26, Q.27) contained 14 items, each concerning constitutive elements or components of national and European identities respectively.

Initially, a descriptive analysis of the data was carried out in order to identify the socio-demographic characteristics of the Greek sample and also to establish the proportion of the people who responded positively to the basic questions. Then, contingency tables were used to investigate the relations between the variables. Factor analysis followed for the basic questions to obtain summary variables. Finally, analysis of variance was used to explore the existence of differences in factor variables among groups determined by socio-demographic characteristics.

A further interpretation of these results was carried in the final text of the report.

The views and attitudes of lay people were further explored through qualitative analysis of in-depth interviews which were interpreted and synthesized in the report entitled: *Nation and Europe: The views and attitudes of lay people in Greece*. The sample of the respondents was drawn according to the guidelines agreed by the partnership. We included an equal proportion of two age groups, 20-45 years and 45-70 years, and equal proportion of genders. We also included one lower and one middle-high socio-economic category. We ensured that the socio-demographic composition of the sample was as inclusive and as diversified as possible. The sample of course was in no way meant to carry any statistical, quantitative significance. The interviews (36 in all and 5 pilot) were carried out in three local settings: Athens, Thiva and Zakynthos. All the interviews were carried out by experienced interviewers, graduates and PhD candidates in the social sciences.

The interviews were transcribed and the data were classified systematically and interpreted using again an overall *discourse* theoretical framework but more specifically within *grounded theory* methodology.

Comprehensive presentation of the findings on the Greek case

Here the aim is to discuss, in a brief and comprehensive manner, the general findings of the Greek case study in the context of the objectives and hypotheses set out in the research proposal of EURONAT. The findings, which were presented and analysed in some detail in the reports, will be synthesized here so as to highlight the specificity, indeed the uniqueness, of Greek identity on the one hand, and its complex relationship to Europe and European identity on the other. By achieving deeper insight into the discourses of modern Greek identity we also enhance our theoretical and conceptual understanding of its relation to Europe and the process of European integration which has been under way since the end of the Second World War. We are particularly concerned to distil the meaning of the findings of the Greek case study so that we can go beyond static conceptions of identity and superficial dichotomies pertaining to Europe and the nation and to thus reach deeper into the dialogical processes which underpin the entanglement between national and European identification.

Concerning the first objective of the EURONAT project, namely to enlarge and revise existing knowledge on the representations and meanings of the nation, of Europe and the European Union in different member states, the findings contributed variously in meeting this objective for Greece both in a theoretical conceptual and in an empirical context. The research enhanced our knowledge in this area by examining the state of the art both in an historical and contemporary social context and by delving deeper into the discourses of identification at an empirical level, thus producing European added value.

The second objective, which was to assess and analyse the degree of compatibility, even the mutual exclusiveness, between national and European identities, was also met by the findings. Here the results of the research helped to clarify questions about the nature and the different levels of loyalty pertaining to Europe and the nation. These results should be highly relevant to debates about various models of European unification. They are also closely related to questions concerning the structures and processes of the ethnic-civic conceptual continuum in analyzing national and European identity patterns.

In presenting and analyzing representations of Europe and the nation in the domains of media, political elite and lay people, which was the third objective, the study produced very significant findings not only at a conceptual level but also in highlighting the different forms of interests involved and the ways national and European identities are being constructed. Here the patterns of interaction between the three different domains proved highly interesting and produced valuable knowledge.

In meeting these objectives the findings from the Greek study also confirmed the first basic hypothesis of the general project: namely, that historical-objective and relational-subjective elements are closely intertwined in conceptions of Europe and the nation and cannot be separated from one another in real life. In this sense the second hypothesis of the general project was also strongly confirmed. EURONAT hypothesized that conceptions of and attitudes and orientations to Europe within national and other collective identities would cluster around relational dimensions concerning the economic/political, centre-periphery location of each country within the European economy. In this respect power and economic asymmetries within Europe would also be reflected in representations of European and national identities.

The hypothesis that the timing (whether at the start, early, midway or late) of integration of each country in the EC/EU as a member would also affect representations did not seem very relevant for Greece, whereas the following hypothesis was strongly confirmed. It was hypothesized that historical and political trajectories in national societies (state formation, nation-building, and democratisation) as well as cultural traditions (in particular, religion and secularisation as well as cultural homogeneity or diversity) would affect representations of identities variously in different countries. The findings of the Greek study showed that these various parameters largely determined and explained the specificity of Greek identity and its complex relationship to Europe.

The findings of the Greek study also confirmed the hypothesis that political elite would use conceptions and representations of Europe and the nation as rhetorical devices in order to promote their political programmes and strengthen the electoral prospects of their parties. Lay people representations of Europe and the nation, by contrast, would reflect their social and personal experiences related to their socio-economic positions. In this context the hypothesis included two scenarios concerning lay people discourse. Either such discourse would be organized around issues, values and arguments put forward by the political elite and constructed by the media, or ordinary citizens would bring to the debate alternative critical conceptions of Europe and the nation arising out of their interests and social experiences and perhaps reflecting deficits of the democratic process at both national and European levels. Here also the findings provided ample evidence concerning the strength and the interaction between these scenarios.

Tackling the main objectives of the project

Reaching a deeper understanding of the specificity of the Greek case

A first step towards reaching the first objective was through an attempt to provide a profile of Greek identity and nationalism by highlighting the ambiguity and the fluidity of the concepts and stressing their strained, open and debated character, in literature, in the media, in political platforms and in everyday life. Presenting this profile first through a historical narrative which emphasised the strands of religious and political culture, combined with a review of literature, threw into sharp relief the complex historical relation and interaction of the concepts of the nation and Europe in Greece.

There is a paradox in the Greek case, often highlighted by scholars (Mouzelis, 1978; Tsoukalas, 2002; amongst many others), that on the one hand most Greeks feel or aspire to be quintessentially European and on the other they conceive of Europe as something different and often totally other. One after the other Eurobarometre survey shows that the great majority of Greeks are well disposed towards the EU. The results of our own survey confirm this as 78.7 of the respondents said that they feel European. In the qualitative interviews, most interviewees went a long way to extol the political, economic and social benefits of the country's membership in the EU and many of them saw in the project of European integration a vision of an advanced democratic civilized society with Greece playing a significant role in it.

At the same time all our findings show that loyalty to Greece comes first and the symbolic, cultural elements of Greek identity score very high, whereas the corresponding elements for identification with Europe score quite low.

How then is the paradox, if it is a paradox, to be explained? It should be emphasized that the tension which exists between European and national identity in Greece derives from the tension and the ambivalence which exists within Greek identity itself. The tension exists and is deeply rooted in Greek history, going back to Byzantium and beyond, but it became particularly acute since the establishment of the Greek nation state in the 1830s. The state of the art report goes some way in explaining this apparent paradox and ambivalence by highlighting the constituent cultural element of Greek identity within the turbulent political history of the country, on the one hand, and its aspirations to modernization and its entanglement with Europe, Greece, and the west on the other. Thus, the paramount problem of modern Greece has been how to transform a long glorious historical cultural identity into a modern political one. The ambivalence itself had partly to do with the fact that the image of classical Greece was such an important component of European modernity. In this context Tsoukalas (2002) described 'The Greek Meaning of 'Europe' as an Historical Inversion of the European Meaning of "Greece" '.

In the struggle for modernisation, politics became the central arena underpinned often by strongly opposed political ideological and cultural orientations throughout modern Greek history. Depending on the circumstances, such orientations often took an anti-European or broadly anti-western character in the context of tradition/modernity or left/right wing politics. It should be noted here, however, that in the Greek case these dichotomies have been characterised by their own specificity compared with corresponding dichotomies in other European countries. In Greece, the communist party elite and the intellectuals of the left, for example, have been largely pro-modern but mainly anti-European and anti-western and largely anti or indifferent to religion. Yet voters of the left, including those of the communist party, have been largely pro-tradition and even very religious.

Religion and the Church were always involved in political ideological tensions. For historical reasons, Greek Orthodox Christianity became entangled with Hellenism and with Greek identity since early Christian times and became fused with it in subsequent historical periods. The strand of religious culture thus became an important aspect of political theology in Greece, not only in Byzantium and during the Ottoman rule but especially after the establishment of the Greek nation state. Throughout this period, religion and the Church have been used by political forces for sectional and party political interests. Political forces of the right have been in power for most of the time in the history of modern Greece, and Church and religion have been used not only for political legitimisation but also for purposes of social control. Often, one was not considered a good Greek citizen without being an Orthodox Christian. This was particularly so after the civil war and up to the collapse of the dictatorship of the Colonels in 1974. But residues of this political dimension of religious culture are deeply rooted in Greek society and are operational at various levels of public life and in formal political structures to the present day. Thus, recently a new party called LAOS (which stands for Popular Orthodox Rally), with explicit religious/nationalist symbolism, was created but because of its strong nationalist right wing image it attracts only around 2% of the electorate.

An additional significant point, which arises from our findings generally, should be made here. In the Greek case the dichotomy between tradition and modernity is not as explicit and clear as it is in other European countries. There was no Reformation and no indigenous Enlightenment in Greece and, because of late and low industrialisation, and other cultural and structural features of Greek society, traditional values and practices never ceased to function in mainstream society. Secularisation, for instance, never developed in Greece to the same extent or took the same forms as in most European societies. This was due to the cultural nature of Orthodoxy itself, which, as a religious culture, is substantially different from both Roman Catholicism and Protestantism; but besides this, tradition in Greece was not interrupted by historical and social developments as was in the rest of Europe. Thus tradition, broadly defined, continues to function in Greece to a much larger degree than, perhaps, in any other European country, and this holds true from practicing the rights of passage, to festivals such as Easter etc, to family life and food habits. Modernity on the other hand has never entered the public and private life in Greece to the same degree as it has in the rest of Europe, especially western Europe. Thus, modernisation in Greece still remains a social and political goal to be achieved, and civil society is still weak compared to average European standards. At the same time, the cultural shortcomings of modernity – especially its stress on individualism and its spiritual bareness – are apparent in Greece as elsewhere, and this makes diachronic traditional values significant again.

Greece's membership in the EU has added a new dimension to the historical relationship between Greek and European identity. Greece, being a member state since 1981, experiences now directly the merits and shortcomings of a largely imported civil society. EU treaties and directives concerning rules of membership in economics, politics, law, education, agriculture, and even eating habits are now part of the direct experience of every Greek citizen. This, our findings show, brings Europe home in the consciousness and everyday life of every Greek in a direct tangible way and creates a new dialectic between national and European identity. The problem, however, remains: how far is Greek national identity compatible with European identity? Are these two concepts of identity of the same or of a different order? We shall discuss these questions next by drawing on our research findings.

National and European identities

Mutually exclusive or closely intertwined?

In attempting to tackle this question, which addresses the second objective set out in the proposal of the project, it should be stressed that there is extensive literature dealing with it and shows that the answer to it is complex and multifaceted (Strath, 2002). Here, however, the aim is to discuss this question in the context of the empirical findings of the research and thus produce added European value. EURONAT is unique in attempting to analyse representations of Europe and the nation at levels of political elite, the media and lay people separately and in combination, and thus aiming to produce empirical evidence about the process of European integration which no other research or literature has provided in the same way. The other important factor is that this empirical evidence is forthcoming from a variety of European states involving different geographic, socio-economic and cultural areas of Europe. In this sense the evidence from the specificity of the Greek case is of special significance in that it demonstrates how identities with substantially different socio-cultural

components and differing loyalties can co-exist and interact moving along toward increasing integration while retaining and even strengthening their individual entities.

The apparent paradox of the Greek case – namely, a highly pro-EU orientation combined with a consideration of Europe as generally *other* – has been noted above, and an attempt of some interpretation of the paradox was made. In attempting to answer the question whether Greek identity is compatible with a European one, it must be first pointed out that the results of the research produced an image of Greek identity as highly ambivalent, dynamic and fluid and, to a large extent, highly strained. This applied to the data from the discourses of the lay people, the media and political elite as well. All three sets of data also showed that the meaning of European identity was not clear and univocal. The data thus did not produce clear but rather ambiguous representations of Europe and the nation; accordingly, a straightforward analysis of the compatibility or incompatibility of the two notions of identity could not be made. Rather, the data immediately and at first glance posed the problem of the meaning and content of the two notions of identity.

From the data it was readily obvious that the representations of national/ethnic and European identity referred to concepts of different affective identification. This posed the question of a conceptual distinction between the two notions of identity. In analysing the data, in all three sets of discourse, it was obvious that national ethnic identity was considered as an identity of a first order. European identity on the other hand, apart from its ambiguity, was considered as an identity of second order. Thus, one could not consider herself/himself as both Greek and English or French etc but could and most respondents did well consider themselves as both Greek and European. The meaning and the nature of loyalty is attributed, of course, to the fact that their national/ethnic and European identity were entirely different. This became clear in all three sets of data and, especially in the data from the Survey and the lay people interviews, the respondents conceived their national/ethnic identity explicitly in symbolic, affective terms.

In the platforms of all political parties as well as in the speeches of the political elite and in parliamentary proceedings, the discourse focused on *Greece as our country*. The emphasis was thus on the national interest and how to serve it best, and the debate between the government and the opposition parties was precisely that the former presented its policies and administration as producing increasingly a '*strong Greece*', whereas the latter argued that the opposite was true. PASOK, the governing party at the time of this study, thus claims to be '*a patriotic movement par excellence*' and the main opposition party New Democracy gave its manifesto the title: '*There is a better Greece and we want it*'. Both parties, however, presented the image of Greece as open and in dialogue with the outside world. Concerning Europe and the EU especially, all parties (with exception of the Communist party which is anti-EU) saw and presented Greece as part of Europe and an essential partner in the European project. PASOK claims to visualize 'a democratic Europe which brings the union closer to the people and the provinces within the physical boundaries of Europe'. The New Democracy Party, calling itself 'the party of Europe par excellence', states in its manifesto that: 'The European Union, as we understand it...consists of a democratic, polyphonic entity, which demands convergence in the quality of life and closeness and mutual understanding of European citizens.' From these and other statements by the political elite it follows that Greek national identity and European identity are conceptions of different order. Hierarchically national identity comes first as that which defines 'us' and to which 'we' belong first. European identity comes second as an association of identities primarily with

common socio-economic and civic aims. The former is given and open; the latter is understood as a union in the process of becoming. Further analysis of the political elite discourse shows that in the present and future historical circumstance, the two identities are understood not only as compatible but also as indispensable of each other.

The Greek media also presented Greece, Europe and the EU in similar terms, often reflecting and analysing the positions of the political parties. In the two events analysed in our data, the Nice Summit and the launching of the Euro, the representations of the nation, of the EU and of Europe were not incompatible or in open conflict, although the relation between them was presented as problematic and characterized by tension. The general reporting of the Nice Summit highlighted a discourse of conflicting and in some sense incompatible national interests. The image of the nation was taken as self evident, clear and dominant, but Europe as a concept and as an identity emerged very vague and undefined, with no clear political, cultural or geographical boundaries and with centrifugal tendencies. Using a critical but flexible language, some serious press presented a positive image of the EU and of Europe, both of which are involved in close dialectical and substantive socio-economic and political relation with the nation. As expected, TV representations tended to be mainly constructed, aiming at emotional appeal. In this sense the Nice Summit was presented much like a battlefield. The image of the nation was often emotionally charged, but even so, no incompatibility or open conflict emerged between national and European identity. The launching of the Euro on the other hand was presented, by both television and the press, as a symbol of European unification and hope for the future of the union.

The findings from the survey pointed to a clear-cut boundary of closeness between *us* the Greeks and all the *others*, thus indicating a strong image of the nation (with 99.4% of the respondents declaring that they feel Greek). It is important to note that for the respondents' sense of belonging to the nation, crucial were the following items in the following order: history and destiny; sovereignty; national character; ancestry; national symbols; language; and national pride. Last down the list came national economy and welfare. Is this strong image of national identity compatible with that of European identity? Again the findings here show that the two identities are of different order. EU citizens and Europeans are the people to whom, apart from fellow Greeks, the respondents said they feel closer compared to all other groups. Also, 78.7% of the respondents said that they feel European, thus declaring their European identity. Analysis of data, however, showed that this identity was of different character to that of their national/ethnic one. The most important elements of the respondents' European identification were: Free movement within the EU, common currency and common borders. Last down the list came ancestry, history and destiny, and symbols – namely, the very elements that scored highest in national identification. This analysis again shows that although the national identity is very strong and the European one very weak there is no incompatibility between the two.

But the relationship between the two identities was clarified and elaborated in the qualitative in-depth interviews. The analysis confirms that the ethnic, cultural and symbolic elements of Greek identity are strong and that Greeks are very proud of their history and civilization, which many respondents considered the pioneer of European civilization. Yet, the image and the boundaries of this identity were not in any way understood to be exclusive or rigid by the great majority of the respondents. Despite the strong loyalty to the symbolic and cultural components, the respondents were concerned about the level of development of Greece and its weak civil society. But now Greece, being part of the European Union, could aspire along

with fellow Europeans to a civically advanced, democratic, just and civilized society. The image of Europe itself came out as ambiguous and multifaceted, but most respondents realised that Greece now has joined irreversibly a wider socio-economic, political and cultural entity; they also realised that this entailed a transformation of the Greek identity itself without losing its essential cultural and historical features. This wider European identity seemed to include various civic, developmental economic and cultural components and, above all, a vision for a better democratic, civilized society. In this sense the great majority declared that they felt European and this they meant in geographic, economic and cultural terms, above all as EU citizens. There were two or three respondents who saw their national identity in exclusive terms and thus incompatible with a European identity which they disowned. But for most the Greek identity was understood as entirely compatible with their belonging to Europe, confirming thus the theory of concentric circles and the model of multilingual and pluralistic European society of which respect for *the* other is the cornerstone.

Looking closely at the three categories of Greek data it is clear that the two notions of identity – national and European – apart from being analytically different are fully compatible and interacting dynamically especially within the economic and political field and in the area of civil society in particular. Awareness of Europe and the EU as a common field of operation of public life is increasingly developing in the awareness of Greek citizens, without this being at the expense of their national consciousness, which remains central.

The ethnic-civic analytical continuum

In discussing various forms of nationalism and the interaction between national and European identity, the analytical model of the ethnic-civic continuum has often been used. It is doubtful whether this analytical tool can have great heuristic, scientific value in the analysis of the transformations of national identities and in the formation of a European identity today. National identities were always fluid, but in contemporary history they have become even more so. The nation state has been rapidly losing its erstwhile economic, political and cultural role and functions now as an important unit within wider socio-economic and power political entities and frameworks. The analytical value of the concept of national identity itself seems now in question, given the rapid socio-economic transformation and the geopolitical power structures and shifts within a globalised post-cold war world.

Nevertheless, looking at the Greek data it was clear that in the minds and consciousness of the respondents, the image of the nation was composed and underpinned primarily by ethnic cultural and symbolic elements. We have pointed out already that in the survey, history and destiny, sovereignty, national character, ancestry, national symbols, language and culture were mentioned as crucial elements in their sense of belonging to the Greek nation. Civic elements on the other hand such as welfare, political and legal system, rights and duties, together with the national army, scored at the bottom of the list. The low rating of the army is explained by its connection with the military dictatorship (1967-1974), but the low rating of the civic elements require explanation given the fact that in Greece the need for a better civil society is felt by everybody. In fact, there is a widespread image and universal experience of ‘the Greece that hurts’ and this refers primarily to bureaucracy, corruption and malfunctioning of the public sphere at large, and lack of respect for legality and norms. So the low rating of civic elements seems to be part of the paradox mentioned earlier and we tried to delve deeper into this question in the qualitative interviews.

Most respondents who were interviewed in depth also identified the ethnic components of identity as crucial. But in their discussion on the civic elements, it became obvious that these elements too were of paramount importance and were considered inseparable from the first. In fact, the future prospects of Greek society were understood as dim unless these components were strengthened. This was the view of most respondents and in this sense they identified with Europe, which, for most of them, brought to mind the EU and European integration. So in the juxtaposition of ethnic and civic components the two identities seemed to merge. But national ethnic identity always remained primary and this explained the emphasis on the ethno-symbolic components. This was also obvious in the discussion of Greek-Turkish relations and the European prospects of Turkey. It was revealing that in this context the Greeks were presented as quintessential Europeans who can help Turkey's European candidature if the latter improves its civic and democratic image and its record on human rights.

In the political elite discourse the civic components were dominant with the ethnic components in the background. As mentioned earlier, the national interest was the cornerstone of the discourse, but serving the national interest was understood almost entirely in civic terms. Thus the paramount goal of the policies of the governing party PASOK was modernisation and the advancement of civil society in the country. In this context Greece's position in Europe is understood as central, and this was also the position of the main opposition New Democracy Party.

The media presentation was an admixture of ethnic and civic components depending on the circumstances and the commercial exploitation of the attraction of readers and viewers. The serious press though always delved deeper into the issues, exploring their civic significance with the national interest in the background.

The discussion above shows that the ethnic-civic model should not be understood to function as an either-or but as a continuum, an admixture and as a process of ethnic and civic elements intertwined. This was true in all three domains: media, elites and civil society. In fact all discourses involved ethnic and civic elements and the relation between the two featured higher in the context of the interaction between national and European identity. Both concepts seem to be interacting and entangled in an open dialectical process, and it is increasingly difficult, in operational as well as in conceptual terms, to separate the one from the other.

Lay people, political elite and the media

The discussion in the preceding section covered to a large extent the third objective of the project, which was to compare the representations produced by political elite, the media and lay people. Here we shall elaborate further in order to address also the hypothesis concerning lay people's acceptance or not of the representations produced by political elite and the media.

When respondents were asked in the qualitative interviews to indicate their sources of information for the topics of Europe and the nation, all of them mentioned media (television, radio and the press) as the main source. Through the media also the respondents acquired the views of the politicians and the positions and policies of the political parties.

Most respondents believed that the image presented by the media was not authentic. Indeed, many of them spoke about ‘constructed truth’ and even ‘fabricated information’. Regardless of education the respondents appeared quite sophisticated and critical of the discourses presented by the media. They did, however, make a distinction between the television and the serious press: ‘In the good newspapers there is a chance to get a glimpse of the truth but most of the television is hopeless.’ The private channels especially were understood to be motivated by various vested interests, apart from the fact that by nature they are prone to sensationalism. The following statement by a respondent was representative: ‘I do not believe they give us true information. The big channels are motivated by political and economic interests. But none of the media can be completely trustworthy really.’ There was a general sense that the media vulgarised the truth and somehow distorted reality.

The respondents appeared equally sceptical of the views and statements of the political elite. They could clearly see that much of what was presented as political truth was in fact rhetoric intended to earn votes and support political power positions. So both media and political representations were understood as constructions and it was up to the critical ability of the citizens to unmask them and attempt to get to the truth. In this respect the first part of the hypothesis of the project, that lay people did not accept at face value the discourses produced by the media and political elite, was clearly confirmed. People clearly criticized and were sceptical or rejected outright these discourses on the basis of their personal and social experience, which derived from the struggle and the problems of everyday life.

As regards the second part of the hypothesis concerning two scenarios – whether people organized their discourses around the main issues values arguments produced by the politicians and the media or brought alternative dimensions to the debates – the data did not seem to produce a clear answer. As we explained, there was clearly a critical approach by the citizens to the political and media discourses. In this sense lay people organized their critiques around the issues and arguments put forward by the media and the politicians. As to whether, however, such critiques posed alternative positions and dimensions in the discourses, this could not really be ascertained. The only thing which was clear, and this may amount to alternative dimensions, is that the people’s discourse pointed to a perceived clear deficit in the democratic process and in the general functions of institutions; this referred to both the national and the European level. This did not seem to be just a theoretical assessment but an evaluation derived from everyday difficult personal and social experience.

Lay people discourse and their European orientation

Unlike the results of the survey, which could be interpreted to show a weak and lukewarm European orientation of the Greek citizens within an inward looking nationalist image, the results of the qualitative interviews showed a sophisticated European orientation of most respondents. Even in the survey, however, as mentioned earlier 78.7% of the respondents said that they feel European without the content of this identification being investigated in depth. In the qualitative interviews the content and the reasons for the orientation and commitment to Europe varied but there was a general emphasis in the political and economic benefits for Greece in participating in a large democratic European Union. On this the aspirations of ordinary people did not differ much from those put forward by the political elite and the media. Where people’s discourse differed from that which the government specifically put

forward was that the latter claimed that Greece now had earned and achieved a strong and significant position within Europe and the EU whereas the perception of the former was generally different.

The image of Europe itself came out as ambiguous and multifaceted and included a conglomeration of economic, political and cultural elements intertwined. Although the economic and political dimensions appeared to be dominant, the cultural, symbolic and especially the moral dimensions appeared also central. Questions of morality and values appeared to underpin most interviews implicitly and issues of democracy, freedom, combating social inequalities and social exclusion were mentioned emphatically. These were also central in the discourses presented by the politicians and the media. People, however, did not seem to trust that the political elite either at the national or the European level actually pursue those values. Indeed, many respondents perceived global economic forces and political power interests at various levels to be serious intervening obstacles in the pursuit and realization of such values.

There was a high level of ambiguity when people attempted to define Europe, and they had great difficulty in describing how Greece was the same or different from Europe. In this context various perceptions of Europe, indeed different Europes, emerged. There was a general understanding that North and South Europe are two different entities, and this referred not only to socio-economic development and to the level of civil society but also to culture, life-styles and temperament and personal characteristics. Such images seemed to be based largely on stereotypes as they seemed to be based on little or on no documented knowledge.

Most respondents seemed aware of the problems and complexities involved in European integration and unification, and on this many echoed the presentation by the media and the conflicting interests of the member states as these are put forward and pursued by the politicians. Many expressed their concern and disappointment regarding the fragmented and divided picture of the EU over the war in Iraq. The unification and the integration of Europe, however, and this included the issue of the enlargement, seemed to be the topics which engaged the respondents' concerns and commitment most. On this again many of the themes and arguments seemed to be those, which the politicians and the media tackle everyday. In this context Cyprus and Greek-Turkish relations seemed to engage the affective and emotional commitment of the respondents most. On the whole their views had a character of a vision of a union to come based on sound principles for an advanced civilized and just society.

Conclusion

In this short presentation we have attempted to sum up the findings of EURONAT in the Greek case study and to place those findings in the context of the three out of the five objectives set out in the general research proposal of the project. At the same time we tried to assess how far the findings confirm or deny the hypotheses formulated in the proposal concerning these objectives. In pulling the findings together in this condensed form, it seems that the objectives of the research have been met and the hypotheses have been confirmed with certain variations within the context of the specificity of the Greek case.

More specifically, in the state of the art report the specificity of Greek identity and its particular relation to Europe has been highlighted, enlarging our knowledge by drawing a historical profile of Greek identity and nationalism. Our knowledge also has been enhanced by juxtaposing findings emerging from the analysis of media and political elite discourses as well as from findings of lay people's perceptions and attitudes derived from a survey and qualitative in-depth interviews. These results show that national and European identity in the Greek case are concepts of different order in the sense that national identification carries with it strong symbolism and affective sentiments which establish a sense of direct belonging to a historical and cultural collectivity. This sense of identity is primary compared to identification with Europe, which is understood in associational, socio-economic, political and civic terms.

Hierarchically, then Greek identity comes clearly first at all three levels of discourse: Media, elites, and civil society. This primary national identity, however, is fully compatible with a European one as the two identities are fully entangled and interacting at an economic, political, civic as well as cultural level. Of this the Greek citizens seem to become increasingly aware without feeling that their national/ethnic identity is in any way threatened. At least this seems to hold true for the majority of respondents and the images drawn from the media and the major political parties, with the exception of KKE. So it seems that Greek people in general hold a highly positive orientation towards Europe and the EU, while at the same time upholding a high and steadfast commitment to their national identity.

This does not mean that this interaction and entanglement between national and European identity in Greece is perceived as unproblematic. The representations arising from all sets of data are highly complex, problematic and entangled, thus reflecting the flux and the tensions of the contemporary historical circumstance in Europe and the world at large. Such representations are problematic in that they reflect the tensions and the uncertainties of a highly uncertain world and a European society in tension and low level of social cohesion. They are open and in many ways reflexive in the sense that they are being shaped and reshaped by complex socioeconomic, power political and cultural factors in Europe within the framework and the vision of European unification.

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5.1.2 Italy

Data and Methods

The Italian case study followed the five different stages of research and analysis as set out in the project proposal and in Annex I to the contract. Thus, we started with a historical review of nation and national identity formation in Italy and a review of the literature regarding the political, symbolic and discursive aspects of the relationship between the Italian nation(-state) and the European Union. In this first part of our study we used mainly secondary sources (notably books, articles and other material available in libraries and on line) and some survey data.

In the analysis of the press and political party discourse the following methods and data were used. Concerning the Italian media, the data set analysed was composed of articles from five large daily newspapers and the transcripts of TV news broadcasts from the two major television channels. More specifically, the material analysed has been collected from the dailies *Corriere della Sera* (*CdS*), *La Repubblica* (*LaR*) and *Il Giornale* (*GIO*), which have a national circulation, *Il Mattino di Napoli* (*MAT*), which is a major regional newspaper, and *La Padania* (*LaP*), which is a smaller regional newspaper. Among the five newspapers presented above, the two major national dailies, *LaR* and *CdS*, were assumed to express the mainstream discourse. *GIO* represented the views of the current government and of the Forza Italia party in particular. *MAT* was included because it is a major southern regional newspaper and represented a different media corporation than those owning *LaR* and *CdS*. *LaP* expressed the more extremist and often anti-European views of the Northern League party. Concerning the TV discourse, we have selected the prime time evening news of the two major TV channels, RAI1 and Canale 5 (*CAN5*), representing respectively the public TV corporation RAI and the Mediaset group.

The material collected includes the press coverage of the Nice summit in the period between 3 and 13 December 2000 by the five newspapers selected, and the TV coverage of the same event in the evening news of RAI1 and *CAN5* on 7 and 11 December 2000 (starting and ending date of the summit). Concerning the launch of the Euro currency, we have selected the press coverage on the dates 30-31 December 2001 and 2-3 January 2002 (newspapers are not published on January 1 in Italy) and the relevant TV coverage on the prime time evening news of 1 January 2002.

With regard to the press coverage, the data set includes in particular the titles, subtitles and leading paragraphs of all articles related to the two events in the periods specified. It includes also the full text of opinion articles, editorials and, where available, of letters to the editor and political cartoons. The newspaper titles and articles were analysed qualitatively with the scope of revealing the different representations of the EU, Europe and the nation as well as of the relationship between them. Attention was paid to references to specific values, symbols, elements from the national history and the perceived compatibility of the nation and national identity with the creation of a European polity and identity. Moreover, the extent to which Europe was identified with the EU was investigated. A social semiotic approach was adopted for the analysis of the TV coverage. The verbal text was transcribed in combination with the visual text features on which extensive notes were taken.

The analysis of the political elite discourse included party platforms and parliamentary debates. We collected the electoral platforms of four parties (or party coalitions) from the May 2001 national election: the right-wing coalition *Casa delle Libertà* (CL), the centre-left-wing coalition *Ulivo* (UL), the Northern League (LN), which although a member of the CL coalition, follows its own extremist and populist policies in a number of issues and *Rifondazione Comunista* (RC), currently the main left-wing force outside the UL coalition.

As regards parliamentary debates, we identified seven sessions in the Senate Assembly and seven sessions in the Chamber Assembly related to the Kosovo issues (the selection was based on the identification of key dates, when the Parliament discussed the Kosovo and Afghanistan events through a quick reading of the Parliament minutes available online). Similarly, 13 sessions of parliamentary debate in the Senate and eight in the Chamber concerning the Afghanistan intervention were identified through the relevant internet page of the Parliament sessions' minutes. With regard to the Eastern enlargement process, we have selected seven sessions of parliamentary debates in the Senate and six in the Chamber referring to the European Council summit meetings in Nice and Laeken.

The party platforms and parliamentary debates were analysed qualitatively with a view to highlighting how the nation, the EU and the Europe are defined and related to one another in the party discourse. Attention was paid to how such representations frame the actual party positions on the issues debated and even define the focus of such issues.

The survey study included 999 respondents (46.8% males and 53.2% females) resident in Italy; all of Italian nationality. The respondents were between 15 and 88 years old. They all responded to a questionnaire with three scales that had been created by the EURONAT consortium for the purposes of our research. The first scale regarded the question: 'How close do you feel to the following groups of people?'. The questionnaire contained 15 items measuring levels of closeness with various social groups: in-groups (the place of living, region, and nation), with the European Union citizens, fellow Europeans and people living in Central and Eastern Europe, and with nine out-groups: Arabs, Turks, Russians, United States citizens, Gypsies and Jews and the three most numerous immigrant communities in the country: Moroccans, Albanians and Filipinos. Responses were given on a 4-point Likert-type scale (1 = very close, 4 = not at all close).

The second scale contained 14 items concerning the elements that are relevant for the definition of a sense of belonging to the nation: 'Different things or feelings are crucial to people in their sense of belonging to a nation. To what extent the respondents agree with the following statements: I feel (ITALIAN) because I share with my fellow (ITALIANS)...'. The respondents evaluated a level of agreement for each of the 14 elements on a 4-point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly agree, 4 = strongly disagree). The feelings of belonging to the nation referred to concrete features: ethnic (e.g., a common culture, customs and traditions), civic (e.g., a common political and legal system), instrumental (e.g., A national army), and affective-symbolic (e.g., A feeling of national pride; national symbols - the flag, the national anthem, etc.).

The third scale contained 14 items concerning the features that are relevant for the definition of a sense of belonging to Europe: 'Different things or feelings are crucial to people in their sense of belonging to Europe. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? I feel European because I share with my fellow Europeans ...'. The respondents evaluated their

level of agreement for each of the 14 elements on a 4-point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly agree, 4 = strongly disagree). As in the previous scale, these elements concern the concrete factors that can make a citizen feel European, e.g. a common civilisation; the European Union institutions and an emerging common political and legal system; an emerging European Union defence system, and a set of European Union symbols (flag, anthem, etc.).

The questionnaire was translated from English into Italian by a bilingual speaker. The translation was double-checked by another bilingual speaker through translation back to English. This questionnaire was presented individually by INRA experts as part of Eurobarometer research. We also gathered information about demographic characteristics: gender, age, marital status, country of origin, education, place and region of living (ranged across rural area or village - small or middle-sized town, and large town), political orientation (in terms of a self-placement scale with scores ranging from 1 'extreme left-wing' to 10 'extreme right-wing'), occupation (self-employed, managers, other white collars, manual workers, house person, un-employed, retired, and students) and monthly income (classified in 4 categories: (1) 0 – 1000 Euro; (2) from 1000 – 1.500 Euro; (3) from 1.500 – 2500 Euro; (4) 2.500 Euro and up).

The qualitative interviews were conducted in and around Florence in winter and spring 2003. Respondents were identified initially through acquaintances of the researchers (e.g. friends of colleagues, friends of friends, neighbours). Later a chain referral method was used to ensure that a variety of socio-economic and geographical backgrounds and experiences were included in the sample. The interviewees' privacy was protected through false names used in the analysis. We conducted 24 interviews with men and women from two different age categories (20-45 and 40-65 years of age), living in small towns or villages, medium-sized cities and the capital city, with lower and higher educational levels and with a variety of professional profiles including unemployed and retired people as well as house persons.

Interviews were conducted in a variety of settings, often at the interviewee's place of work, in some cases in the interviewee's home and in other cases at a public venue like a café. The interviewer presented herself as a researcher and explained that she is doing a study on Italians' attitudes and feelings towards European integration. She emphasised that this was not an interview on people's knowledge on the EU but rather on their opinions and experiences of it. She also made all possible efforts to create a context of informal social interaction where interviewer and interviewee have equal status. The interviews followed a loosely structured interview scheme, starting with a topic of personal relevance (asking the interviewee if s/he had travelled or lived abroad) and then moved on to more general European and national issues including the common currency, the dismantling of borders within the EU, Eastern enlargement, immigration (as a nationally relevant topic) and the interviewees understanding of Italian and European identity and culture.

Interview transcripts were analysed qualitatively following a perspective that combines the deterministic, 'objective' viewpoint of positivism and an interactionist, inter-subjective approach. We have sought to explore how our informants engage into self-presentation discursive tactics, how they employ common sense knowledge of social and political reality and ultimately how they construct their social world and their position in it. However, we assume that their position is also defined by some 'objective' parameters related to their gender, socio-economic status, place of residence and educational profile. We assumed that

each of our informants represent only themselves. However, we looked into their discourse for rhetorical strategies or interpretative frames that were common with other informants.

Last but not least, in the comprehensive Italian report, we examined how our research results respond to the main objectives and hypotheses of the project.

Achieving a better understanding of Italian reality and the links between party and media discourses

Italy has been known for the pro-EU attitudes of both its public and its elites, even if Italian administration has often been criticised for its failure to adopt and comply with European legislation. Italian public opinion, the behaviour of Italian political parties, and the Italian media discourse on the European Community/Union have been the object of various sociological and political science studies. However, in few cases, scholars have tried to combine the different levels – party elites, media and lay people – in their analysis and to relate them systematically with one another. EURONAT is unique in this respect, as it juxtaposes the media, party and lay people discourses during the same period of just over two years (end of 2000-early 2003) and also seeks to put them into their historical and relational context. Having presented our detailed findings on the different discourses in the appropriate project reports and publications, we shall here re-capitulate the main representations of Europe and the nation put forward in the political party and media discourse highlighting the similarities and differences between them.

Our analysis of the political elite discourses in the form of political party electoral platforms and parliamentary debates on specific moments of crisis revealed a complex picture.

In their **political platforms**, regardless of their differing positions, all parties – except the Northern League, which has a regional nationalist orientation – defended the national cultural heritage, the role of the nation and its government in EU politics, and the importance of the national interests. At the same time, all parties claimed to be in favour of or at least not against European integration despite occasional severe criticisms. All parties used the term ‘Europe’ as synonymous to the ‘European Union’, and while in some instances a reference to accession countries and an enlarged Europe was made in the party platforms, the EU was ultimately represented as Europe, *tout court*. The implicit claim – turning upside-down the formulation of Article 0 of the TEU – seemed to be that the countries and peoples that are not members of the EU are not European countries or peoples, properly speaking. This implies that EU member states – the ‘real Europeans’ – have the power to decide who will be included to the Union and hence who else will count as European and who will not.

In line with our hypothesis that parties would use national and European identities as rhetorical devices to support their positions, representations of the nation, Europe and the EU and of the relationship between them were integrated in the party platforms in ways that framed and supported the party’s electoral programme. Thus, *Casa delle Liberta* (CL) (the centre-right wing party coalition) represented the EU as an economic entity of intergovernmental character and argued for the maintenance of national sovereignty and the prevalence of the national interest at the expense of EU policies. In line with a neo-liberal free market view of the world, CL emphasised competition between national interests and the weakness of collective identity as a lever for political unity. Its vision of the nation-state, Europe and the world reproduced a ‘West and the rest’ dichotomy within which each country

had to position itself. This discursive framing supported the CL policy positions and presented them as the ‘correct’ answer to contemporary dilemmas.

Similarly the Northern League and *Rifondazione Comunista* (RC) (heir of the more radical wing of the Italian Communist Party) offered a biased representation of the EU, and the nation(-state). The former presented them as oppressive authoritarian political and economic structures, alien and oppressive to regional lay identities and cultures. Through this common framing of the nation and of the EU, the Northern League justified its own identity and interest claims and rendered them more distinctive. RC, on the other hand, represented the nation(-state) and the EU as neo-liberal, capitalist, imperialist and alien to lay people and in particular to the working class. While cherishing the national culture and heritage, RC rejected both a national and an EU affiliation in favour of a working class identity (organised at either the national or the European level). Although RC’s is clearly a class discourse as opposed to the populist frames used by LN, their discourses resembled one another in that by constructing both the nation(-state) and the EU as alien and exploitative, they appealed to the ‘true’ identity and interest of lay people. Indeed, their representation of a desirable European Union was that of a ‘Europe of the lay people’ – with a different socio-economic outlook for each party of course.

The centre-left party coalition of *L’Ulivo* (UL) represented the EU and Europe as inextricably linked with one another and with the Italian nation and nation-state. According to the UL electoral platform, the relationship between these entities was based on feelings of belonging, historical roots and a set of values that are universal and uncontested, indeed beyond ideologies. The UL adopted an apparently a-ideological position in which policy decisions are no longer organised along a Left-Right dimension but rather by reference to the fusion of national identity and interest with that of other nations and nation-states into a common European entity. It thus avoided discussing controversial issues such as social justice, welfare policy, and the role of the state in society and in the economy (for which left-wing parties in general do not seem to have good answers in the post-1989 era).

In sum, the analysis of the party platforms showed that representations of the EU, Europe and the nation by Italian political elites were shaped by their left or right wing ideology, even if some of them seemingly adopted a post-ideological stance. Our analysis also largely confirmed that parties used national and European identities as rhetorical devices to support their electoral programmes.

We have compared our findings from the party platform analysis with the party rhetoric adopted during the **parliamentary debates** on Eastern Enlargement, on the NATO intervention in Kosovo and on the US and allies war against Afghanistan. While obviously the ideological orientation of each party remained relevant, their discourses changed in relation to the task at hand.

At moments of crisis and in relation to the Eastern Enlargement, both right and left wing parties affirmed the importance of Italy in EU politics and in the overall process of European integration. This importance was framed historically (a founder state) and politically (an active mediator of political solutions and a contemporary leader in the process of integration and Eastern enlargement). This finding supports our hypothesis that historical dimensions, such as the timing of accession to the EU, would affect the European orientations developed in a country. It also indirectly supports the hypothesis that earlier accession would facilitate

the acceptance of a closer political integration and a European citizenship in that a country like Italy with a long experience of negotiation and compromise within the EU would favour pro-EU solutions and would more easily accept to transfer parts of the national sovereignty to the Union. However, this is a rather indirect inference that needs further confirmation.

When confronted with political dilemmas such as those posed by the NATO intervention in Kosovo or the war in Afghanistan, all parties emphasised that national interests and decisions could also develop autonomously – national sovereignty was underlined in this context – even if in close connection to the EU and NATO policies. Ultimately, all parties presented national policies and interests as interdependent with those of the EU and NATO and, to a certain extent, as subordinate to them. Both major party coalitions – UL and CL – represented Italy, the EU, Europe and the West as concentric circles of belonging, sharing the same values and to a certain extent the same interests. This representation obscured the power relations between the parties involved such as the weakness of EU member states in resisting US military supremacy or their own representation of accession countries as ‘less equal’ in the common European ‘home’. These context-related findings support the idea that relational factors shape party representations of Europe and the nation and of the relationship between them. However, they indirectly disprove our hypothesis that earlier accession would facilitate the acceptance of a deeper political integration. Italian elites, even if Italy has been a founding member of the EC, revert to national sovereignty and the national interest when faced with a situation of crisis. Indeed, evidence on this hypothesis remains rather inconclusive.

There was agreement among all parties that the EU is a powerful economic entity albeit politically weak and internally fragmented. All parties argued in favour of a common foreign and security policy and a stronger EU at the political level, when confronted with the Kosovo and Afghanistan crises. However, in their party platforms, their positions differed. Left-wing parties argued that the national interest was best served within a deeper and larger Union while right-wing parties re-affirmed national independence and positioned Italy in a global West-and-the-rest context. These findings further support our hypothesis that relational factors organise the representations of Europe, the EU, the nation and the relationship between them.

On the cultural dimension, in line with our hypothesis concerning the importance of historical factors alongside relational ones, left-wing party platforms emphasised the common values and principles that inspired the Italian Republic and the EU integration project, namely peace, humanitarianism and social solidarity. Right-wing parties too, even if less enthusiastically, affirmed their European vocation and represented Italy, fellow member states, the EU and the US as part of a common civilisation that is the ‘European,’ ‘Western’ civilisation. The value framing of Italy, the EU and Europe was anchored in the Christian tradition. Parties put emphasis to the Christian origin of the values of humanism, liberty, solidarity and peace. This value framing reproduced the religious dimension in Italian politics, a dimension that had divided the post-war Italian party system between Communists and Catholics. The Catholic tradition seems now to have been reconciled with national history and identity through the backdoor of the European integration discourse. Quite interestingly, this representation was common in both left and right-wing party discourse. It seems here that relational factors such as membership to the EU take the lead over historical factors, notably the controversial role of the Catholic Church in national unification and the political divide that marked Italian politics during the Cold War era.

In conclusion, contrary to the general view that Italian elites are enthusiastically pro-EU, our analysis of the parliamentary debates and party platforms revealed a more complex picture. Views on EU integration and the representations of the nation, of the EU and of the role of Italy within it differed among parties, even if they all ultimately affirmed their ‘Europeanness’ and overall pro-EU orientation. Indeed, their support of the EU integration process was shaped by their perception of the national interest and also by their own definition of the national (or regional) culture and identity. At the same time, parties used specific representations of the nation, its relationship with the EU, the EU or Europe and the West in constructing a meaningful framework that framed their positions as the only possible, if not the best ones.

On the whole, the study of the political elite discourses in Italy showed that the EU has come to play an important part in the definition of national identity and interest. Regardless of its pro- or anti-EU orientation, no political party could afford to ignore the question of Europe. At the same time, though, the political role of the nation-state in the EU, the protection of the national interests and the concession or preservation of national sovereignty in a number of policy areas remained contested issues. Thus, one might question the stability of the relationship between national and European orientations. Political parties may change their discourse and privilege again the national identity and interest, if this proved to be a more rewarding electoral strategy. Such a shift appears relatively probable in conditions of national or international/European change such as the imminent enlargement of the EU to Central and Eastern Europe.

Political orientation (right- or left-wing) proved to be relevant not only for the political elites’ discourse but also for the **media** (daily press and television) **discourses** analysed. The right-wing media and political elites represented the EU as a battlefield between competing national interests and state powers and the launch of the Euro as potentially an important economic development but not as a step towards political integration or a common identity feeling. They thus opened the debate on what kind of Europe is the one built through European integration which privileges an economic perspective.

By contrast, the centre-left-wing parties and a larger spectrum of mass media that included also state TV and the large centre-right-wing newspaper *Corriere della Sera*, represented the EU as a competitive game where, however, negotiation and eventually compromise prevail.

An unexpected finding from the media discourse analysis concerns the ways in which the media covered the two events studied (Nice European Council summit and launch of the Euro currency). The Italian media engaged into different types of discourse when covering the two events. Reports on the Nice European Council Summit offered a conflictual even if relatively elaborate representation of the EU, the member states, accession countries, the competing national interests and the historical background as well as contemporary context of all this. The coverage of the Euro launch – which coincided with the New Year Eve of 2002 – by contrast had a ceremonial and celebratory character. The Italian media represented the Euro as a symbol of unity and highlighted the long-term symbolic and historical aspects of the European integration process.

This brief review of our findings highlights some **important links** between the political elite and media discourses. Not surprisingly, the media often followed party interests and, even when independent from the state or a political party, organised their representations of

Europe, the EU and the nation in line with their right- or left-wing political orientation. In this way, the party and media debates tended to reproduce a cohesive discursive universe.

In a comparative perspective, it is worth noting that there is no tabloid press in Italy. There may be more or less ‘serious’ newspapers or newspapers that use more or less sensational language, but on the whole only *Padania* might ‘qualify’ as a tabloid in the sense of how the term is used in Britain for instance.

On the other hand, the particular function of the media as the main communication instrument in contemporary society affected their discourse. The type of event that they had to cover, the amount of information available, the complexity of the issues at stake, the high news value of a given aspect of the event (e.g. the riots in Nice or the New Year celebrations in European capital cities) were all elements that shaped the media discourse and conditioned the kind of representations they developed with regard to the EU, the nation and the relationship between them. This finding suggests that political ideologies, party interests and a market logic are all entrenched in media discourses.

National and European identities

Mutually exclusive or closely intertwined?

In this section we shall try to answer the second main research question posed by the EURONAT project, notably the extent to which national identity and an (emerging) European identity may be mutually exclusive or compatible and intertwined.

The findings from the Italian media confirm largely our hypothesis that elements of the national identity shape the developing European identity, while a sense of Europeanness has in turn become part of national identity. A telling example of this mutual entrenchment is the representation of Italy as the ‘referee’ between other member states and the ‘architect’ of ‘European’ solutions promoted by the centre-left and part of the centre-right-wing press and the state television. This mediating role of the country and its elites was grounded in the recent political history of the country as a founder state and as an always actively pro-EU nation. This ‘referee’ role was framed by the media as a specifically Italian value and as a national contribution to the EU project. The role of mediator was seen to strengthen Italy’s position as one of the powerful European nation(-states). This discourse supported a view of Italian national identity and sovereignty that is compatible with the emergence of an autonomous EU sovereignty and identity by underscoring the contribution of the former to the latter. The compatibility between the two was framed in terms of material and emotive advantages to be gained from participation in a European society and polity. The historical role and national consciousness of Italy and Italians was re-constructed as inseparable from the project of a united Europe. Thus, early Italian Europeanists were represented as important national figures and a pro-European attitude as an issue of national pride. We can thus see here how national history and identity were creatively shaped to promote the Europeanness of Italy and Italians while, at the same time, the European vocation of the national elites became a source of national pride. Eventually, the link between the two – the national and the European – was represented as intrinsic to the national identity and history. The timing of

accession thus acquired here high symbolic value, although the timing of accession was not generally used to distinguish among member states.²

The **survey** results also suggest that in Italy feelings of closeness to the nation, region, city or village and to Europe or the EU are compatible. More specifically, the analysis has shown that local, regional and national identities were fully compatible. People might feel very close to their city/village or region but they also felt close to their fellow nationals. Those who felt distant from people from their region felt close to the nation, while few Italians felt close to their region but distant from the nation. Interestingly, among respondents with a high level of closeness to people from their own region or nation, there was a high percentage that also felt close to EU citizens (about two thirds), while about one third among them felt distant from EU citizens. These findings suggest that regional and national identity are compatible with a feeling of closeness to the EU and may even, at least to a certain extent, reinforce such a feeling. Our results however also confirm the primacy of national identity over a sense of Europeaness. Italians feel European but only as a secondary attachment to their national identification.

These results are confirmed also by the **qualitative interview** analysis where informants suggested that they felt both Italian and European even if they had difficulties in clarifying what it means for them to be European. Elaborating further on the relationship between Italy and the EU, although many were sceptical about the process of European integration, hardly anyone questioned the fact that Italy should be part of the EU and/or that Italy was part of Europe. They debated rather the role of the country as an EU founder state, and judged its economic performance or its legal and institutional system by 'European' standards. They also elaborated on the different member state interests and the power differentials that structure their relations. Concerning the national culture and traditions, few informants considered that these were at risk because of the European integration process. Some even saw EU integration as an opportunity for testing the validity of the traditions and also for diffusing Italian culture and lifestyle to other countries.

In conclusion, the findings from the different parts of the research converge to the conclusion that belonging to the nation and belonging to the EU are not perceived as mutually exclusive. On the contrary, the two are intertwined in the public, political and lay people discourse.

The ethnic-civic analytical continuum

Concerning the links between national and European orientations, we have questioned the usefulness of the ethnic-civic continuum in describing and analysing national (and European for that matter) identity patterns. In the **survey** conducted as part of our work, we did not explicitly formulate an ethnic or civic definition of national or European identity but we did include ethnic and civic elements among the items that respondents had to consider as important for their feeling national or European.

Italian respondents considered as most important for their feeling national, their common culture and customs, their language and to a slightly lesser extent, common rights and duties,

² However, the timing of accession was an important dimension for discriminating against new accession countries and current member states. This point is further discussed below.

common ancestry and the national symbols. They thus indicated that their identification with the nation was based on both ethno-cultural (ancestry, language, culture) and civic (rights and duties, symbols) elements. The factor analysis of the data, however, revealed an ethnic-civic organisation of the responses. Thus, we distinguished between an ethno-cultural concept of the nation that included common culture, language, ancestry and national history; a state-centred concept of the nation that included mostly civic and territorial aspects (common political and legal system, common rights and duties, welfare system, national economy, national army and common borders); and an emotional dimension that included a feeling of national pride, national independence, the national character and the national symbols. The statistical analysis however showed a high correlation between the dimensions, thus suggesting that the distinction between the three factors is not clear-cut. Testing the role of socio-demographic characteristics, we found a significant effect of the regional variable (people from Southern and north-east regions for instance perceived the ethno-cultural factor as less important than those from the Centre regions and from Lombardy) and of the age variable (older people give more importance to the ethno-cultural dimension than younger ones); this tends to confirm the factorial structure of the responses. These findings support the hypothesis that people organise their understanding of national identity along ethnic and civic dimensions.

Concerning the content of European identity, Italian respondents distinguished again between ethnic and civic features. They rated as most important for their feeling European the common currency and the right to free movement and residence, while they rated as least important the common history and destiny and common ancestry among Europeans. However, a closer look showed that the results were not entirely clear as the elements considered quite important included both cultural features (common civilisation, membership in a European society) and civic ones (a common EU defence system, common institutions and common rights and duties). The factorial analysis confirmed the ethnic-civic distinction, as the two factors emerging from the analysis were organised around the ethno-cultural (common civilisation, membership in a European society, common ancestry, common history and destiny) and civic-instrumental (common institutions, rights and duties, common system of social protection, Euro currency and the right to free movement and residence, the emerging EU defence system, common borders, sovereignty of the EU, and feeling of pride and EU symbols) dimensions.

In our qualitative interviews, informants did not elaborate much on their feeling Italian so that we could assess whether their feeling Italian relates more to civic or ethnic, or indeed both, types of elements. However, they talked more about what it means to be European and who is European. Their sense of Europeanness was related to their cultural heritage, and the long even if internally fragmented and diverse history of European countries. The cultural dimension was also emphasised when judging the Europeanness of people from Central Eastern Europe. However, in that case, civic and instrumental elements were also seen as criteria of Europeanness. Thus, respect for the law, respect for the common rights and duties and for a given political system and a market economy were all defined as features that marked Europeans from others.

Thus, our quantitative and qualitative analysis of the European orientations of Italian people suggests that the ethnic-civic distinction is useful for analysing people's feeling of closeness to fellow Europeans, but that it should be seen as a continuum along which people may move

freely, at times emphasising either ethno-cultural or civic features while on other occasions blending the two together.

Do lay people reproduce the media and elite discourse or do they develop their own views and arguments?

One of the main objectives of the EURONAT project was to investigate the ways in which ordinary citizens organise their discourse on the nation, Europe and the EU. We hypothesised that people may refer more to their personal experience and their knowledge from their immediate social environment when talking about the EU, Europe and their relationship with the nation rather than merely reproducing the dominant elite and media discourses. Our findings to a large extent confirmed this hypothesis. Our interviewees had a rather sophisticated understanding of identity. By contrast to the view commonly promoted by politicians and the media that identities are fixed and boundaries between groups are clear and rigid, Italian lay people were aware that identities are contextual, fluid and evolve with time. They were thus able to elaborate ambiguity and diversity in their accounts and develop complex and shifting representations of the nation, Europe and the EU. These representations confirm that identities are discursively constructed through reference to their social, political and economic features but also and more importantly through reference to the relations between the in-group and relevant out-groups. These relational aspects of identity were emphasised in the discourse of our informants as they sought to position themselves and their nation in relation to different groups that are perceived as closer or more distant, depending on the topic discussed. Not only did they shift their in-group/out-group representations in relation to the topic at hand (economy, culture, politics), but they also understood that these identity networks are structured by power relations.

Our informants were also aware of the complexities of the EU integration process even if they had a limited knowledge of it. By contrast to the media, they did not use a battle or fight vocabulary, although they were conscious of the competing national interests, the diverse national and regional realities, and the complex political and social issues involved in European integration. These findings suggest that lay people are less naïve in their understanding of national and European politics than most politicians or media experts would have it.

The interviewees were also cautious about the elites' handling of national and European affairs and argued that economic and political elites looked after their own interests and took advantage of the EU integration process, the common currency in particular, to make money at the expense of lay people. Their representation of the elites encompassed both national and European elites without making a distinction between the two: 'They [politicians, elites] are red, green, black of all colours [colours refer to political orientation]. They only sit there, in their armchair. They do nothing good for Italy ... what do they do?'

Our study thus confirmed the hypothesis that ordinary citizens do not uncritically accept and/or reproduce the dominant media and elite discourses. They were relatively suspicious – in line with the overall mistrust between citizens and the state that characterises the Italian political culture – of the elites' discourse and actions and displayed an advanced level of understanding of the workings of national and European politics. They actively elaborated on stimuli and information received from the environment in their representations of the nation, the EU, Europe and the relationship between them.

Having said this, we need also to acknowledge that lay people reproduced to a certain extent the main media and political debates in their talk. Their spontaneous reference to the United States as the main contrasting other of Europe appeared to reflect the media and political debate of the months with regard to the US invasion of Iraq and the related controversy between US and several European countries in the UN Security Council. Informants represented the EU as culturally and politically cohesive by contrast to the United States and its world geopolitical and cultural dominance. However, even in this case lay people discourse only partly reproduced the political debate concerning the same issues. In the parliamentary debates analysed, the image of the 'West' and of 'European civilisation' as politically and culturally compact entities was much more emphasised, pointing to a sense of commonality between EU and the United States. Moreover, lay people were more parsimonious in their statements about European and Italian values than Italian politicians.

With regard to the common European currency, lay people discourse differed to a large extent from the media representations of the Euro launch. The latter underscored the symbolic aspect of the new currency. Our informants recognised the symbolic value of the common currency but without any strong emotive statements. They concentrated more on the practical implications of the conversion.

Lay people discourse and their European orientations

We have highlighted already that our informants displayed a rather sophisticated understanding of the identity dynamics and politics of European integration. In order to complete our analysis we shall briefly discuss here how their representations of Europe, the EU and the nation differed from or resembled those of the media and the political parties.

In the survey, 3.4 % of the respondents declared that they do not feel Italian. However, in the qualitative interviews, informants did not show a strong emotional attachment to the nation. Some even expressed a certain ambiguity towards their feeling Italian. When the discussion turned however to the issue of national culture, most informants cherished their traditions and also perceived them as vital and valid enough to resist any kind of homogenisation pressures resulting from the European integration process. Several informants took pride in their traditions and lifestyle. These findings were in line with the media and political elite emphasis on the national cultural heritage and on the Italian contribution to the European project, both in past decades and today.

Concerning their feeling European, 9 % of the respondents in the survey declared that they do not feel European. In the interviews, informants generally admitted feeling European but had difficulties in explaining in what sense they conceived themselves as European. Eventually, they emphasised the cultural and historical heritage of Europe as the main anchoring of their Europeanness. This was largely congruent with the media debate which, especially in relation to the Euro launch, underlined the symbolic and historical aspects of the project of European unification. No informant took a fervent anti-European stance, although many saw the European integration process as unfavourable to their personal economic interests, and generally most informants questioned the progress and direction of European integration. This type of discourse was in contrast to the centre-right wing party attitude which envisaged that Italy might decide to part from the EU – this might if course be more an electoral

rhetorical device than a true intention of the CL coalition – if the latter adopted too state interventionist a policy. The lay people discourse resembled more the centre-left wing party discourse that emphasised negotiation and compromise as the keys to intra-EU politics, the fundamental Europeaness of Italy, and the importance and value of the national cultural heritage. There are two possible explanations for this commonality between lay people and centre-left party discourse. First, most of our informants resided in Florence and in the nearby villages and small cities. The whole Tuscany region is in fact known to be a stronghold of the Left. Hence, possibly our informants supported the centre-left party coalition and tended to reproduce this coalition's arguments in their discourse. The second explanation has more to do with the nature of everyday talk and an informal private interview as a communication situation that is radically different from a parliamentary session or a party platform. In the latter, a party emphasises its distinctiveness by assuming clear-cut militant positions even if its actual policies may be more moderate. By contrast, in a face to face interview, the interviewee is likely to adopt a more consensual attitude, expressing her/his views but without too aggressive a tone, in efforts not to displease the interviewer, in case s/he maintained a different opinion.

Our findings concerning the representations of Central Eastern Europe deserve a special note here. In Eastern Enlargement parliamentary debates, all parties were in favour of Enlargement, which they represented as a moral and political obligation of Italy and all member states, in line in particular with the Italian political and civic national tradition (reaching back to the Roman Empire!). In the Nice summit coverage, the media referred to the Eastern Enlargement process only briefly, highlighting the powerless and marginal position that accession country leaders had in the summit, even if they had been invited to join the meeting. Ordinary Italian citizens maintained a more cautious attitude towards Enlargement. Both in the survey results and in the qualitative interviews, they expressed a feeling of distance from people from Central and Eastern Europe by comparison to EU citizens. This perceived distance from accession countries was constructed around two main dimensions: a cultural-historical one and an economic one. At the same time, informants did not declare openly their disagreement with the Eastern Enlargement process. They adopted several discursive strategies (the 'we need more time' frame, the 'I am not selfish but...' rhetoric, the 'I do not know' rhetoric, and the 'law and order' frame) to mitigate their negative views. Contrasted to a recent Eurobarometer survey (no. 58, March 2003) – where 64% of the respondents stated that they are in favour of the Eastern Enlargement – our findings suggest that when confronted with an up-front question, Italians responded favourably but when given the possibility to explain their thoughts and feelings, they hesitated much less to express their negative opinion. In sum, Italian political elites discourse is much more pro-Enlargement than that of lay people, while the media are moderately in favour of Enlargement. This finding brings further evidence in support of the hypothesis that lay people opinions and discourse may depart from the dominant elite and media frames.

This perceived 'distance' between current member states and the Central and Eastern European countries that will join fully the EU in May 2004 raises the question whether the emerging sense of belonging to a common socio-political entity might recede and/or indeed disappear when the ten new member states enter the EU. Is the sense of alienation and difference from people in these countries going to give way to more positive feelings or will the opening up of the EU to a larger number of countries lead to a further feeling of losing one's sense of identity or community. If the latter is the case, will this lead to the

disentanglement of national and European orientations among the citizens of the current EU 15?

Contrary to the political elite discourse that emphasised the primary role of Italy in the EU, lay people perceived their country and nation as a second-rate member of the EU by comparison to the most powerful countries like Germany, France or Britain. They pointed to the relative economic superiority and higher political weight of these member states by comparison to Italy. This view was in agreement with the centre-right wing media representations of Italy's role in the Nice summit but in opposition to the centre-left wing press and state television coverage, which tended to emphasise the historically important role of Italy in the European Community and later in the European Union. In our view, parties, especially those in government and the media supporting them, overemphasised the Italian role in European politics to boost their power profile. Lay people discourse, on the other hand, reflected perceptions of Italy's economic backwardness – by comparison to France, Britain or Germany – which marked the development of Italian national identity in the early twentieth century as well as in the post-war period when Italy sent large numbers of emigrants to work in northern European industry. Thus, here again we can see the weight of historical factors on the development of a sense of European identity in Italy.

This observation leads us to a more general comment regarding the relevance of the supposed North-South and East-West social, cultural, economic and geopolitical axes organising the European continent. Our findings suggest that rather the axes that are politically and symbolically – if not also economically – relevant today are the distinction between small and large member states (Italy is striving to secure a position among the latter but constantly fears that it stands with the former), and the discrimination between current and new member states. This last distinction represents better the content of the public and private discourses analysed rather than a reference to the historical and geopolitical East vs. West boundary.

Conclusion

In sum, our findings show that Italian national (as well as local and regional) identity is compatible and indeed intertwined with feelings of closeness to Europe and the EU. We have shown that the ethnic-civic continuum is conceptually useful in analysing national and European identities, provided it is interpreted as a continuum rather than as an either-or dichotomy. We have also investigated how historical and relational factors are intertwined in the development of a European-Italian national identity and in ideas concerning the Italian contribution to European culture and the EU integration. Third, we have highlighted the main representations of Italy, Europe, the EU and the relationship between them in the media, elite and lay people discourses. We have explored the differences between them showing that media and elite discourses tend to form a cohesive discursive universe within which political issues are debated. Lay people discourse has been shown to be quite independent from both media and elite discourses. While obviously people gathered information and borrowed arguments from the media and party debates, they elaborated on these in their own creative ways, showing a high level of awareness and understanding of the European integration process despite their actual limited knowledge of its detailed workings. Most interestingly, lay people show a high level of mistrust towards the elites. These last seem to lack legitimacy both at the national and the European level. This is probably one of the most important challenges in European politics today.

5.1.3 Spain

Data and Methods

From a methodological point of view, the Spanish team emphasised the design of the investigation that combines the study of identities in three different levels (sub-national, national and supranational), includes both elites (political parties and mass media) as well as citizens, and uses both qualitative and quantitative data and analysis. It is, therefore, a comprehensive study that, in terms of design, goes beyond similar studies.

In the historical and the state of the art report, the Spanish team revised the existing literature on Spaniards' European identities and the research on national identity formation in Spain.

For the purpose of elite's discourse analysis, the Spanish team selected several mass media and political parties. For the mass media analysis, three relevant nationwide newspapers (*El País*, *El Mundo* and *ABC*), which represent the main ideological currents (centre-left, liberal, and conservative, respectively) were selected. To complement this selection, the analysis was extended to the two regional newspapers (*Avui* and *Deia*) which are closest to the governing parties in Catalonia and the Basque Country and Catalonia respectively. The sample also included two nationwide TV channels, one public and one private (*TVE1* and *Tele 5*), and two regional public channels (Basque *ETB-2* and Catalan *TV3*). A total of 1067 articles concerning Europe and the EU were selected for analysis over the period 3rd-15th December 2000 and 30th December-3rd January 2002. The TV evening news on 7 and 11 December 2000 and 1st January 2002, were obtained directly from the different channels. A total of 7 ½ hours of broadcasting were analysed. In the same vein and regarding the analysis of political parties, the Spanish team selected the main representatives to the centre-right and centre-left, as well as nationalist parties: that is, they studied the Socialist Party PSOE (*Partido Socialista Obrero Español*, Spanish Socialist Workers' Party) that ruled the country for fourteen years (from 1982 to 1996); the conservative party PP (*Partido Popular*, Peoples' Party) that held office from 1996 to 2004; IU (*Izquierda Unida*, United Left), which has obtained between three and six per cent of the seats in the Parliament, includes the Spanish Communist Party and is the only Spanish party which offers an alternative vision of Europe; and the two nationalist parties CiU (*Convergència I Unió*, Convergence and Union) in Catalonia, and PNV (*Partido Nacionalista Vasco*, Basque Nationalist Party) in the Basque Country.

As regards public opinion, the Spanish team conducted a quantitative survey and a set of qualitative interviews and focus groups. In the quantitative part of the study, three batteries of questions regarding National and European identities (designed by EURONAT) were inserted in Eurobarometre 57.2; a total of 1,000 Spanish citizens were polled by INRA between April and June 2002 and invited to answer the questions designed by the EURONAT team. The qualitative investigation was based on 24 semi-structured interviews and three focus groups. Interviews were carried out in Madrid between January and May 2003, while focus groups were completed in May 2003. Interviews took into account a number of other socio-demographic variables: gender, size of habitat, educational level, and personal experience having lived, worked, or studied in different EU member states (for at least one year). Focus groups were conducted with different groups of people having some kind of European experience, having lived, worked, or studied in different EU member states (for at least one year): returned immigrants, Erasmus students and executives from firm of European capital.

Findings

National and European Identities: Inclusive or Exclusive?

An important objective of the investigation has been to investigate the extent to which national loyalty and identification with Europe and/or the EU are mutually exclusive or compatible and intertwined with one another within Spaniards' collective identity, and to assess the relative importance of ethnic versus civic elements in the configuration of Spaniards' collective identities.

In Spain all political parties showed a strong European identity which was sometimes nested, nevertheless, with other identities. For the conservative party (PP), its European identity was deeply interwoven with a strong Atlantic identity. For the nationalistic parties, CiU (Catalan) and PNV (Basque), their European identities were intensely mingled with their nationalist identities. Interesting enough, Spanish and European identities did not blend similarly in all the parties analysed. Both facts are related to Spain's memory of the dictatorial past and the rejection of everything that it represented, either by conviction or by electoral needs.

Our quantitative and qualitative investigations on citizens' public opinion confirm that the discourse of ordinary Spanish citizens is congruent with that of the elite. Hence, our survey research revealed that 58 percent of the interviewees felt close to European Union citizens, 40 percent to their fellow Europeans expressed in broader terms, and 25 percent to the people from Central and Eastern Europe. Only a small percentage of 3.1 of the interviewees explicitly stated that they did not feel European. In the same vein, the percentage of population who felt proud to be European was higher in Spain (88.3 percent) than in other member states. At the same time the largest part of the population (90 percent) felt close to their fellow Spaniards. Only a percentage as low as 2.8 explicitly said that they did not feel Spaniards. As expressed by our survey interviewees, their national and European identities were compatible: 61 percent of the respondents stated that they felt simultaneously very close to their fellow nationals and to Europeans. Thus, Spaniards with a strong national identity were 90 percent more likely to identify strongly with the EU too, 84 percent more likely to identify strongly with the European people in general, and 77 percent more likely to identify strongly with the people from Central and Eastern Europe. Moreover, there was a positive correlation between being proud of being Spanish and being proud of being European.

Nevertheless, in comparative terms, Spaniards were still more attached to their national identity than to their European identity, with an index of 0.718.³ That is, ties to the nation were still seen as stronger than bonds to Europe. Our qualitative interviews show surprisingly similar results. Most of our respondents stated that they felt European. Most declared themselves to be Europeans when distinguishing themselves from people from other countries or cultures, or when their national identity felt too narrow. Nevertheless, their European identity was almost always identified as secondary to or weaker than interviewees' national, Spanish identity. But both were also considered compatible.

³ This is the median value of subtracting the median identification with the EU from the median identification with the nation. The positive value indicates that attachment to the nation was still stronger than attachment to the EU.

We labelled those who expressed strong attachment to the nation and Europe simultaneously as ‘dual identities holders’. In comparison to them, citizens with an exclusive national identity were a minority, and those with an exclusive European identity were even fewer. In our survey research we were able to point to a number of factors that increased the probability of holding a dual identity (national and European at the same time; as opposed to holding an exclusive national identity). The most important one was education. As respondents’ years of education increased, European identification also increased by 0.22 for each additional year of schooling. Similarly, as size of locality increased, so did respondents’ identification with Europe too. In contrast, as ideology moved from Left to Right, identification with Europe decreased. Region appeared also as a relevant factor. According to our results, Basques tended to hold exclusive identities with a probability slightly higher than other Spaniards, while Catalans felt slightly more European than other Spaniards.

From the survey findings presented above, we would conclude that a European identity incompatible with, and does not endanger, national loyalties. However, this picture was less clear from our qualitative interviewees. While for some of them, the emergence of a European identity was a potentially enriching process, for others it represented a threat to national identity. The latter linked this danger more generally to the supposed impact of cultural and economic globalization on Spain and Europe. But even though they feared the weakening of national identities, they thought that the emergence of a European identity was desirable and exhibited themselves positive attitudes toward the EU.

The ethnic-civic analytical continuum in the construction of National and European identities in Spain

Spaniards hold a problematic relation with their national identity, stemming from two different sets of issues: First, the weaknesses of the liberal (more civic) nationalist mobilisation during the 19th century, and second, the abuses of conservative (more ethnic) nationalism during the Francoist regime in the 20th century.

Despite being one of the earliest ‘political nations’ or ‘states’ in Europe (with almost identical borders since the 16th century), the complete social, cultural and territorial integration of Spain was still unfinished by the 19th century. The Liberals’ intermittent grip on power, the financial difficulties resulting from the loss of the American empire during the 1820s, and the political demobilisation of the masses under the oligarchic party system, among other factors, hindered the realisation of their (liberals’) nationalistic ideas. However, there was also a problem of lack of political will on the part of the liberal state to implement nation-building policies more efficiently when they held power. For Liberals, the Spanish nation did already exist, as proved by Spaniards’ resistance against Napoleon’s troops. Therefore they did not bother either to ‘create’ or reinforce it. Thus, before 1911 the Liberals had not established a truly compulsory military service that might have served, as in France, as an effective means to integrate the rural population into the new national identity.

Official promotion of national symbols such as the flag or anthem was weak. In fact, there was no official agreement over the Spanish flag until 1843, and it was only in 1908 that all official buildings were obliged to fly it. Moreover, its legitimacy was questioned by *carlistas* (radical monarchic conservatives) and the design itself of the flag was changed on various occasions, most notably by the Republic (1931-1939) which changed to a tricolour flag which

is still shown by left-oriented citizens in some demonstrations. Equally so, the Spanish national anthem was not officially defined as such until the 20th century, and even now it still has no words (only for a short period during the dictatorship was the national anthem given lyrics). Nor did the State build many monuments, or name streets or buildings in honour of national heroes, with the exception of very divisive monuments paying homage to the winners of the Civil War.

Although a liberal nationalist discourse has continued to exist in Spain, the conservative elites turned, especially at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, to nationalism as an alternative to socialism and to channel social 'indiscipline'. National mobilisation had been used by Spanish conservative elites during the 20th century as a political weapon against leftist ideologies and the Spanish Second Republic, established in 1931. In fact, the two most important and serious nationalising drives in Spain were undertaken by the conservative dictatorships of Primo de Rivera (1923-1931) and Franco (1939-1975). After the Civil War (1936-1939), the Francoist regime needed to legitimate itself. It was legitimated only in part by its victory, but it needed to justify the rebellion against the legally established Republican regime and the terrible conflict that followed. The dictatorship made unprecedented use of all the means at its disposal to socialise people into the idea of one Spanish nation: school textbooks, radio, movies, monuments, etc. However, this first large-scale campaign of 'nation-building' suffered from a twofold problem, which ultimately alienated Spanish public opinion from the idea of Spanish nationalism. First, it was exclusively Castilian and meant the repression of any other regional identities (especially Basque and Catalan). Second, it was based on the intolerant Catholic-conservative tradition that rejected Spain's liberal past and exclusively represented the victors of the Civil War. As a result of the repression of peripheral nationalisms by Francoism, these movements were associated with the ideas of democracy, civilization and modernity, while 'Spanishness', *nacional-catolicismo* or *españolismo* became linked with the dictatorship.

As a consequence of the rejection of the Francoist regime and the Spanish nationalism associated with it, opposition forces to Franco renounced the use of nationalist discourse, or at least agreed to give it a very low profile. They even abandoned the term 'Spain' in favour of the politically more acceptable 'Spanish State'. The ethno-cultural dimension stressed during the previous authoritarian regime was substituted also by civic references centred mainly on the 1978 Spanish democratic Constitution. At the same time a whole new wave of nationalist movements emerged during the 1970s. Once the transition was underway (1975-1977), virtually all the political forces in Spain agreed that the old unitary framework of the Spanish State would have to be converted into a much more decentralized structure. In this context, 'Europe' came to be the mythical aspiration of the future which the majority of Spaniards desired to realize, as well as the means to secure those future achievements. All political parties, including the Communist Party, were in complete agreement regarding the importance of joining the EU and the positive consequences that it would have for the country's economic prosperity and international influence. A consensus developed which took almost for granted that only through the EU could Spain guarantee its future economic progress, as well as its capacity to maintain a significant degree of influence in the international arena.

The investigation on political parties has shown that the issues related to the EU have kept actuality and saliency, while on the other hand it shows that parties still have a problem with the representation of the Spanish nation. Despite the abandonment of a Spanish nationalist

discourse as such, nationwide parties are still nationalist in the sense that none of them proposes the dissolution of the Spanish identity within a European identity, and they defend Spain as one State no matter how many competencies are transferred or how slack the link among the different regions might be. On the other hand, none of the parties (except the Basque) emphasises an ethnic or religious notion of the nation, as is the case with other parties in Europe. Among the political formations that we examined, only nationalist parties in the Basque Country and Catalonia felt legitimised to defend a nationalist (regional separatist or independent) discourse. Similarly, we did not find either a nationalist Spanish discourse in the analysis of the mass media. The discourse was about government performance, successes and failures, either during the Nice summit coverage and the 2002 Spanish presidency of the EU, or during the Euro launch coverage. The image was generally more positive among nationwide newspapers than among regional ones. In contrast to elites' complexes and prejudices regarding the Spanish national identity, ordinary Spanish citizens have little difficulty in defining themselves as Spaniards. Surprisingly, they even do so in overall ethno-cultural terms. But, as with the parties, citizens also find it quite difficult to identify with a set of national symbols (flag, anthem and the coat of arms) which had been inherited practically untouched from the dictatorship. We shall deepen into these congruencies and divergences below in section four.

In contrast to the difficult representation of the Spanish nation, our analysis of parties shows that support for European integration continues to be widespread, either on the left-right or centre-periphery dimensions of Spanish political life. There are, of course, differences among parties regarding the model for the European Union, as well as an interesting instrumental use of the EU to put forward or justify preferred policies, but we shall touch upon these issues below. In a similar vein, neither the newspapers nor TV stations analysed or criticised the process of European integration, contrary to what had happened in other countries. The differences among them and the comparison with the political parties' discourses will be developed also in section four. In general, the relational dimension (economic growth, political influence, international prestige) has continued to be stressed at the elites' level. Citizens do also agree with elites in their strong support of the process of European integration. Both our quantitative and qualitative data reveal that a large proportion of Spaniards feel European, which is also in line with previous Eurobarometer studies regarding the level of support for the European Union. This high degree of identification with Europe cannot be explained, however, with reference to the length of time that Spain has belonged to the EC/EU, given that it has only been a member since 1986. Nor can it be explained by the widespread perception of a common European culture, since Spaniards rank well below the EU average (coming in 13th place) when asked whether they agree or disagree that European share a common cultural identity.⁴ Hence, considering the historical trajectory outlined above, the most plausible explanation of the attachment that most Spaniards feel towards Europe is that EU membership has been closely identified with their country's achievement of modernisation and democratisation, as well as with the recovery of its international prestige.

⁴ Eurobarometer 52 (Autumn 1999).

The ethnic-civic continuum as evaluated by citizens

Concerning the links between national and European orientations, we have questioned our respondents also about the ethnic-civic continuum in describing and analysing national and European identity patterns. In the survey conducted, we did not explicitly formulate an ethnic or civic definition of national or European identity but we did include ethnic and civic elements among the items that respondents could consider as important for their feeling national or European.

In our survey research, those who declared themselves as Spaniards conceded similarly great importance to all the items of national identification tested, but the analysis was also able to capture small but significant differences among items. Thus, common culture, customs and traditions, in the first place, and common language, in the second, which could clearly be characterised as ethno-cultural elements of attachment, were the items agreed to be most important for national identification. In contrast, national army, national independence and sovereignty, national pride and national symbols, were held to be a little less important as mentioned above. These latter elements are deeply linked in Spaniards' consciences with the country's authoritarian past which is strongly rejected in Spain. Civic components of national identities (common rights and duties in the survey), emphasized by contemporary Spanish elites, are also important for Spanish citizens, over and above other ethno-cultural elements such as common ancestries or history. Thus, we would define Spanish identity as being a mixture of ethno-cultural and civic elements in which symbolic nationalist components have little importance.

The findings derived from our analysis of qualitative interviews were very similar. When asked why they felt Spanish, our respondents stated that the 'Spanish way of life' was the strongest determinant of Spanish identity. This answer enabled us to clarify the meaning of the item 'common culture, customs and traditions' included in the survey research. This way of life could be summarized as a leisure culture, the main feature of which would be the understanding that work is an instrument to obtain the resources needed to live a happy, easy, care-free life. From this perspective, the fundamental objective seemed to be the enjoyment of time spent outside the work place. Language appeared also in the qualitative interviews as one of the elements with the strongest consensus among the interviewees when it came to specifying what made them feel Spanish (and proud). Therefore, in the qualitative research, ethno-cultural elements appear also as quite important for Spaniards' attachment to their nation. In contrast to these elements, but in line with the results of our survey, most of our qualitative interviewees found it difficult to identify with national symbols (the flag or anthem). Even if they acknowledged that these symbols did represent Spain, they associated them with a series of historical and ideological elements (specifically, with the Francoist dictatorship and, more particularly, with the victors in the Spanish Civil War) that made the identification difficult.

In short, both interview and survey respondents coincided in stressing various ethno-cultural elements as the main basis for their national identity (common culture, customs and traditions, as well as common language). At the same time, they dismissed the symbolic components (the flag and anthem) as the least important. Civic components of identities were given medium level importance in our survey research, but were not mentioned in our qualitative interviews.

Regarding the European identity of Spanish citizens, in our survey research only a small set of items were considered important, while another larger set of items had less bearing on this identity. The most important dimension of Spanish citizens' representation of Europe was the economic one. The single currency, followed by freedom of movement and residence throughout the EU, were the two most important items in their identification with their fellow Europeans. This is congruent with the conclusions of a recent qualitative study on perceptions of the EU carried out by the European Commission (OPTEM).⁵ Rights and duties figured also prominently among the components of identification with Europe, which resonates well with the important role that the democratic elites have assigned to European integration as a means of modernising the country and consolidating democracy during the transition period. In contrast, symbolic elements were far less significant. Common ancestry, European symbols and pride in being European were the items considered least important for Spaniards' identification with Europe. This represents a different kind of attachment in comparison to national identity. In this case, and according to our survey research, European identity would be basically instrumental, while national identity was more ethno-cultural. Civic elements of attachment played, again, of middle importance role.

The results from our qualitative interviews are slightly more complex. Most of our respondents distinguished between Europe and the EU. Europe was seen as a larger, earlier and different entity to the EU. While Europe was perceived in more historical and cultural terms (ethno-cultural), the EU was mainly understood as an economic and political project promoted by the political elites with the aim of competing with the United States, i.e. the same instrumental considerations that arose in the survey research.

Our conclusion here would then be that the ethno-cultural elements are overall important for Spaniards' attachment to their national identities. While these elements are also important in the representation of Europe, the EU is perceived mainly in instrumental terms. Factor analysis of the items included in the survey research showed that Spaniards distinguished mainly between an ethnic dimension of identification with their fellow nationals, which was the most relevant for their national identification, and merged all other items (civic, instrumental and symbolic) in the same group. Also, at the European level, Spaniards distinguish between an ethnic dimension of identification with their fellow Europeans, and merge all other elements of attachment (civic, instrumental and symbolic) in a different dimension. Civic attachments either to national or European identities were weaker than ethno-cultural attachments, but still more important than symbolic-affective links.

Public discourses on Europe and the European Union

Another objective embraced by the investigation was the comparison between elites' (mass media and parties) and ordinary citizens' understanding and representations of Europe, the EU and the nation. Ordinary citizens and elites (media and parties) would either organise their discourse around the main issues, values and arguments or they would bring into the debate alternative dimensions. At the elite level, we hypothesised the instrumental use of a specific representation of Europe and the EU by political leadership to put forward their

⁵ European Commission. 2001. Perceptions of the European Union. A qualitative study of the Public's attitudes to and expectations of the European Union in the 15 Member States and in 9 candidate countries. http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/quali/ql_perceptions_summary_en.pdf

preferred policies. We also suspected a correlation between parties' ideological orientation and mass media along the editorial lines of the media. Regarding citizens, we expected them to organize their discourse around the same main issues which parties and media propose. We hypothesize a convergence between the supply of and demand for discourses on identities. From the supply side (the kind of discourse offered by elites), elites would tend to tell audiences and voters what they wanted to hear; from the demand side ordinary citizens will consume those messages which resonate more closely with their views/identities.

Before entering into the comparison between elites and ordinary citizens, we will summarize the discourse of elites. In reviewing these discourses, we will also evaluate the following hypotheses: (1) that political leaders use specific representations of Europe and the EU to put forward their preferred policies, and (2) that there is a correlation between parties' ideological orientation and mass media editorial lines.

We have already commented about the difficulties in the representation of the nation, which occupy only a very small space in the documents analysed. The representation of Spain as a nation was almost absent in the parties' platforms and was a little more visible in the mass media analysis. The association between Spanish nationalism and the previous dictatorial regime and the problem it poses for parties' representation of Spain have already been addressed. Mass media, however, are more unbound in this sense. Different media reflect the differences among parties. While *ABC*, ideologically linked to the Conservatives, exhibits a more positive representation of Spain and the government, *El País*, ideologically linked to the Socialists, was milder in its evaluation of the government but had also a positive representation of Spain. Meanwhile, the nationalist newspapers hardly paid any attention to the Spanish nation.

Since the discourse on the nation is limited in scope, we shall rather focus on the discourse about Europe and the European Union. We have already mentioned that all Spanish political parties strongly identified with the process of European integration. None of the parties analysed -- parties which are a good representation of the Spanish party system -- exhibited negative attitudes toward the EU. On the contrary, all of them showed a strong European identity which was sometimes nested with others.

Nevertheless, the analysis also shows that there were differences regarding EU representation by Spanish parties. Disagreements were noticeable regarding the relative importance that the economic, social and civic, and political dimensions should have in the future design of the EU and about preferred political models for the Union (federal or intergovernmental). Thus, the conservative party (PP) preferred an economic and intergovernmental Union, while the rest of the parties (PSOE, IU, CiU and PNV) would give more importance to the civic, social and political dimensions and were prone to federalist tunes. Nationalistic parties (CiU and PNV) especially favoured a federal design of the Union that would facilitate the transfer of sovereignty from the national government both to the EU institutions and to the regions which they represent. On the issue of enlargement, there was, again, consensus in supporting the process, giving higher importance to the 'moral' and 'historical' obligation to help those countries than to the negative consequences that it would bring for Spain.

We have been able to find some evidence regarding the instrumental use of the EU by parties in front of their constituencies, and the public at large, to legitimise their preferred policies. First of all, the general lack of debate among Spanish parties regarding the costs and benefits

of the process of European integration provides them with a considerable room for political manoeuvre. In our survey research we found that European identifications were not significantly lower among respondents from occupational groupings which have been hurt by the single market and EMU. This implies that parties can use citizen's identification with the EU when it comes to implementing their own preferred policies, which can then be presented and justified under the cover of 'Europe', thereby freeing them from the need of engaging in debate with their euro-sceptical bases. There might be other occasions when a European identity is needed to support costly policies coming from the EU. In our understanding, parties have contributed toward this high support of the EU through their positive discourse on the issues related to integration and by not entering the debate about the negative consequences of the process. Parties have reasons for not entering into this debate, since the two largest competing parties in Spain (the PSOE and the PP) include, among their constituencies, 'losers' from European integration and hence they both have an interest in not engaging in a debate on the impact of integration, since both might face electoral consequences if they decided to do so.

Regarding the instrumental use of specific European policies, there are both agreements and disagreements among parties. Most of the political parties have seen the development of a European Common Foreign and Security Policy as a new respectable outlet for the country's modernized armed forces, especially meaningful for a country such as Spain with a history of military intervention in internal politics and resounding defeats abroad. Furthermore, the creation of a common European security space has been welcomed by nationwide parties and CiU as a fundamental weapon to combat the continuing threat of ETA terrorism. Among the particular instrumental uses, and as seen during the Spanish 2002 Presidency, the PP uses the EU to promote its liberal economic policies (the Lisbon Agenda). Both the PP and the PSOE have tried to develop Spanish Mediterranean and Latin America foreign policies more effectively through the EU. Nationalist parties, on the other hand, attempt to use the EU to circumvent, weaken or get rid of the Spanish Central government in some policy areas. Using the EU as their referent, the parties' preferred policies obtain a symbolic value that makes them more appealing and legitimate while at the same time putting the responsibility on external factors.

As has been mentioned on several occasions before, in congruence with the discourse of parties and contrary to what happened in other countries, neither of the issues analysed (the Nice summit and the Euro launch) prompted newspaper or TV stations to criticise the process of European integration. The analysis found that no station made any criticism of the direction taken by the process of European integration. Nor did any of the newspapers analysed, irrespective of their editorial line and political closeness to different parties see any contradiction between Spanish national interest and the pursuit of 'more Europe'. Not only were Spanish identity and sovereignty seen as compatible with the emergence of a European sovereignty and identity, but in fact the media disseminated also the political elites' view that they were the same thing. Most interestingly, nationalist newspapers did not translate their anti-national discourse with an anti-EU discourse.

The media also coincided with parties in the predominantly economic vision of the European project portrayed in the newspapers. The Euro launch, in particular, was seen as the tool that would bring economic growth and give Europe a leading role in the international context. It has been more difficult to derive this interpretation from the TV news broadcasts, which were more reactive in this dimension. The correlation hypothesised between political elites and

mass media representations of Europe and the EU is observed in this economic dimension, which being fairly important for all parties except IU is also salient in mass media. However this was also a consequence of mass media preference of the ‘economic consequences frame’ (together with the ‘conflict frame’) when dealing with European issues. The sub-national dimension, central for CiU and PNV, was quite visible in Basque and Catalonia media *TVE-3*, *ETB-2*, *Avui* and *Deia*, compared to other nationwide TV stations and newspapers. The civic and social dimension, more relevant for CiU, was also significant for the Catalan newspaper *Deia*. Mass media exhibit also a nationalist and partisan point of view regarding their account of the Nice summit, as we detail below.

The two elements selected for analysis were presented with different discourses and levels of political capitalisation. The coverage during the Nice summit was more confrontational and elitist, stressing the differences and the particular interests of each member state, while the euro launch coverage spoke of similarities and the common interest and future of Europeans. These differences were due, in part, to the different nature of the two events analysed. The Nice summit was interpreted by newspapers and TV channels as an intergovernmental negotiation concerning national interest. The event was portrayed as a political fight between governments and presented in accordance with each particular newspaper’s editorial line. Thus we found that *ABC* and *El Mundo* were especially favourable to the government, while *El Pais* was the strongest critic. Similarly, TV channels also presented differences in the evaluation of the summit and the relative success of the Spanish delegation, with *TVE1*, the public-owned nationwide channel, adopting the most sympathetic attitude towards the government, and *Tele 5* and *ETB-2* adopting the most critical outlooks. In contrast, the euro launch was interpreted in a symbolic level as strengthening the European integration and identity, with much less political capitalisation.

Comparison between citizens’ and elites’ discourses

Regarding the comparison, we have found more congruencies than divergences among elites’ and ordinary citizens’ discourses. We think that there are reasons both from the supply side (the kind of discourse offered by elites, who would be always chasing either audiences or voters and would tell them what they want to hear) and the demand side (the kind of discourses consumed or preferred by ordinary citizens) to expect a convergence between the two. Nevertheless, as a process in flux, the convergence is expected not to be absolute and hence we looked also for divergences that may reveal the particularities of the kinds of discourses analysed.

Regarding the representation of the Spanish nation, the divergences are more noticeable than those regarding the representation of Europe and the European Union. It seems that the complexes and prejudices about the Spanish nationalism after the dictatorship are confined to the political and part of the cultural elite, while ordinary Spanish citizens have little difficulty in defining themselves as Spaniards and in feeling proud of it. One of the most important sources of national pride in modern Spain is the image that Spaniards have of the way in which they behaved during the transition. The importance that ordinary citizens give to ethno-cultural factors for their national identity also differentiates them from the elites. On the coincidences, we must mention the rejection of the typical symbols of nationhood, whose linkage with the dictatorial past is more direct, since they were inherited practically untouched.

In the European domain, the high percentage of citizens with dual identities (national and European at the same time) is the first strong coincidence. In fact, we have proved that the probability of holding an exclusively national identity (as opposed to a dual identity) decreases as interest in politics increases. In other words: those with a higher interest in politics (hence more exposed to the pro-European message of political parties) are also more likely to have a dual identity. Similarly the probability of being proud of being European (as opposed to not being proud) increases as interest in politics (and exposure to its pro-European message) rises. The impact of interest in, and attention paid to, the mass media runs in the same direction, although this was not statistically significant. Another interesting finding in this sense shows that citizens of the right-oriented voters are less likely to have a European identity and generally felt closer to US citizens (as happened with the conservative party PP) than left-leaning Spaniards do.

Another striking coincidence appears regarding the kind of arguments used to support European enlargement. Although from an economic point of view, Spain is not going to benefit much from the enlargement and is even facing significant losses, Spanish parties have supported it. Spain itself took full advantage of the Community's commitment to the integration of all European democratic countries when it applied to join the EEC and, despite the bad economic situation of the country, it was admitted to the EU. Consequently, political elites would be in a very uncomfortable situation if they denied Central and Eastern countries the opportunity to consolidate their democracies by way of joining the EU. Hence, even though Spain had little to win from enlargement, both the Socialist and the Conservative governments have given their support to the process.

Similarly, Spanish public opinion has largely supported the process of European enlargement. Opposition is much stronger in France, Austria or Germany than in Spain. In 1998, when the negotiations first began, public support for the process stood at 51 percent in Spain (in fifth place only behind Sweden, Denmark, Greece and Finland), when the European median was around 42 percent. Moreover, the Spanish (along with the Danish and Portuguese) were the national group to attach least importance to the fulfilment of the economic conditions for accession. Only 65 percent of Spaniards considered that the accession countries should be obliged to reach a similar level of economic development to the other member states before concluding the negotiations, while 92% considered that the most important criteria for admission should be respect for human rights and the rule of law. Even though the support dropped to 48 percent in 1999, in 2000 58 percent of the Spanish people favoured enlargement (putting them behind only Greece and Italy). At the same time, only 18 percent of Spaniards expressed opposition to enlargement (the lowest figure of all the member states except Greece). In 2002 Spain continued to rank fourth in terms of the percentage of the population which supported enlargement (64 percent), behind Greece, Denmark and Sweden. In April 2003 this figure stood at 60 percent of the population. At that time Spain still ranked third in terms of the level of public support for the process. It was then also the country with the lowest percentage of opposition to enlargement (17 percent), behind Greece (19 percent) and Denmark (25 percent).

It does not seem that Spaniards' support for enlargement is based on ignorance. Support is still expressed even when it is recognised that enlargement will 'cost too much money' and that monetary transfers from Brussels to Spain will decrease. According to a 2002 survey, for example, 48.5 percent of Spaniards agreed that enlargement would mean a reduction in the

amount of money that Spain receives from the EU,⁶ 37.2 percent thought that it would imply costs for our country,⁷ and 60.1 percent considered that agreement would be more difficult to reach after the enlargement.⁸ The results of our qualitative interviews reveal the congruence between the kind of arguments used by the Spanish elite to justify enlargement and the reasons Spanish citizens give for their support for the process. Using the moral line of reasoning of elites, several respondents state that it is now Spain's turn to pay back the support it received from the EU when it joined the Union.

Another important coincidence has to do with the importance given to the economic-instrumental representation of the EU. As mentioned above, the vision of the European project found in Spanish newspapers and on TV was primarily economic. In particular, the launch of the euro was seen as the tool that would bring economic growth and give Europe a leading role in the international context. This vision is shared by citizens. They also shared the discourse of parties which portrayed the EU as an emerging new world power able to stand up, and in some instances superior, to the United States in several domains.

Among the divergences we have found, the most relevant are that citizens distinguish between Europe, which they represent in ethno-cultural terms, and the European Union, which they understand in more economic-instrumental terms. There is also a relevant difference with respect to the bellicose language that mass media sometimes uses, as in the account of the Nice summit, which is absent among the citizenry.

One of the most relevant differences/divergences/contradictions is the one found between Basque and Catalan nationalist parties and citizens. These nationalist parties convey the idea that regional (nationalist) identities are incompatible with national (Spanish) identities but compatible with European identities; however, the reality is that among the citizenry, regional, national and European identities are compatible with each other in a sort of concentric circles shape. Still, the discourse of the PNV in the Basque Country was even more distant from Basque citizens than the discourse of the CiU in Catalonia is from Catalan citizens. Both parties have a similar pro-European discourse, but citizens are more pro-European in Catalonia than in the Basque Country. This implies that it is misleading to take the discourse of the political parties as reliable or even the only indicator of European identity in those regions of Spain with significant nationalist movements.

Political elites in the Basque Country and Catalonia tend to portray their regional identities (nationalist) as being compatible with their European identities, while at the same time using the latter to reject a Spanish identity. But our data has not confirmed this finding at the aggregate level. Nor was this hypothesis confirmed by our survey respondents in the Basque Country and Catalonia.

⁶ As opposed to 24.8 percent who did not agree with this statement, and 26.7 percent who did not know or did not answer. Data from the Standard Eurobarometer 57.1.

⁷ As opposed to 32 percent who thought that EU enlargement would not have costs for Spain, and 32.2 percent who did not know or did not answer. Data from the Standard Eurobarometer 57.1.

⁸ As opposed to 21.9 percent who thought the contrary and 18 percent who did not know or did not answer. Data from the Standard Eurobarometer 57.1

Conclusion

We believe to have deepened the existing knowledge about the representation of the nation, Europe and the European Union in Spain. It is clear from this case study that Spanish historical legacies are fundamental to understand the high level of support for the European Union and the large percentage of people that hold dual identities (who felt Spaniards and European at the same time). Among other factors, Spaniards' historically troubled relation with their national identity and the rejection of the legacies from the Francoist regime must be taken into account. History continues to leave a visible imprint in the configuration of Spanish national identities, which does not mean that any of the political actors consciously manipulates it. The perceived relative weaker position of Spain regarding its European neighbours was another fundamental factor explaining the high popularity of the EU during the transition. The timing of accession, however, is not relevant in this equation, since Spain is one of the latecomers. Rather, the opposition between big vs. small countries is the cleavage more frequently used, especially by the political elites, when trying to make sense of the role that Spain should play within the EU.

We have shown also that collective identities in Spain are rather inclusive. If this is less surprising regarding the compatibility of national and European identities given the particular historical trajectory of Spain, the compatibility of regional-nationalist and national-Spanish identities represents a more startling finding. Although nationalist parties in Catalonia and the Basque Country tend to instrumentalise their European identity to reject a national-Spanish identity, regional-nationalist, national-Spanish and European identities are inclusive and concentric among ordinary citizens in these regions. The attachment to national identity remains, however, stronger than the bonds to a European identity.

An unexpected finding has been the relative importance of ethnic elements for the national identity of ordinary citizens. In this regard, it seems that the complexes and prejudices of a Spanish nationalism associated with the previous Francoist regime is limited to the elites, who prefer to use civic references to ethno-cultural ones. Nevertheless, the identification with typical nationalist symbols, such as the flag and the anthem, continues to be difficult at both the elite and the ordinary citizen levels, since they were inherited practically untouched from the dictatorship. Meanwhile, attachment to the EU is mainly instrumental, although ethno-cultural factors seem to have some importance regarding identification with Europe.

However, the distinction between ethno-cultural identities and civic identities has not been especially fruitful in Spain. Some ethno-cultural elements are considered important for the Spanish national identities, while others are not; at the same time, some civic elements are just as important as other ethno-cultural ones. Spanish national and European identities, therefore, cannot be so easily located on a continuum that would go from pure ethno-cultural identities to pure civic identities. Besides, instrumental considerations are also mixed and are quite important both for Spanish national and European identities. At least regarding the Spanish case, it would be more appropriate to talk about different combinations of identity elements (including ethno-cultural, civic and instrumental) rather than of a location in the an ethnic-civic continuum.

Finally, we have stressed the strong convergence in the discourse of Spanish elites and ordinary citizens regarding their pro-European attitudes. We have, nevertheless, pointed up some divergences too. Although all the Spanish parties are unequivocally pro-European, they

have different ideas about how the EU should evolve and be in the future. Those ideas are linked to their political preferences, which they also try to promote through an instrumental use of the EU. Mass media, on the other hand, follow the ideological orientation of parties in their editorial lines. The unity of discourse at the elite level is mirrored by the congruencies at the ordinary citizen's level. As mentioned above, there are reasons to expect this convergence from both the supply and the demand sides. Only the relative importance of the ethno-cultural elements of national attachment and the inclusiveness or exclusiveness of regional-nationalist and national-Spanish attachments are serious divergences between both levels of discourses. Among the more remarkable convergences we found, the moral discourse used to justify European enlargement is noteworthy.

Some scholars have pointed to the distance that exists between the pro-European attitudes of political parties and more euro-sceptical attitudes of citizenry. If, similarly, citizens distrust elites as well, we might wonder about the future of public support for integration. While some differences exist in the particular case of Spain, however, the number and the nature of congruencies between elites and citizens in Spain seem to reveal a more optimistic landscape.

5.2 Central Western Europe

5.2.1 The Czech Republic

The added value of the Czech part of the EURONAT project consists of: 1. clarifying the status of the hypotheses, with which the EURONAT project departed; 2. offering synthesis of some considerations that were only sketched in the previous reports; 3. evaluating the practical importance of the research findings in the Czech field; and finally 4. summarising the suggestions for further research and policy implications.

The Czech national identity between ethnic and civic elements

The EURONAT project was launched with the intention to rank national identities and representations of the nation in different cases on an ethno-cultural vs. civic-territorial scale. In the Czech case we faced difficulties when working with this distinction. Generally speaking, the dichotomy works, and could be used to compare different national identities against each other. However, the closer we moved towards the practical analysis of discourse, the less useful the ethnic-civic dichotomy proved. It could neither describe nor explain all we have found; and this might mean that an additional theoretical model is needed.

The survey research dealt with the identity issue non-discursively, on the basis of a closed questionnaire – thus it clearly supported the view that the ethnic-civic distinction works well. Analyzing the components of national identity, we arrived at two empirical factors: the cultural – loaded with items such as language, culture, ancestry and history – and the political, connected mostly to the institutional and territorial properties of the state. The cultural factor, which was reasonably close to an ‘ethnic’ definition of a nation, outscored the political by far in the importance for the national identity.

We began to face more confusion in the historical/state of the art report. We found out that the different elements of national identity had obviously merged throughout history, although the ethno-cultural elements somehow prevailed. On the other hand, there was a very important civic dimension in the identity. This dimension was strongly connected to the identification with the state after the foundation of the Czechoslovak nation-state in 1918, and the modernisation and democratisation efforts after the 1989 only strengthened it.

The media analyses were the first to go deeper into the living discourse. Suddenly, these analyses provided us with a picture of a spontaneously undifferentiated representation of the nation/nation state, where there was hardly much to say about its either ethnic or civic emphasis. The ethno-national collectivity and the state merged to the extent that it was often impossible to distinguish who or what is exactly indexed by the ‘Us’ perspective: the state, its citizens, or the Czech ethnos. This undifferentiated unity was obviously an intellectual point of departure, and also object of emotional attachment for numerous opinions. The discourse of politics displayed the same characteristics in this respect.

In the qualitative interviews we did not focus on the very issue of national identity. Still, it was typical for the respondents to talk about the nation/nation-state in a similarly undifferentiated manner. The lay people even did not mention any differences in the impact

of the EU Accession on different social groups within the nation/nation-state. This further corresponds to the fact that the opinions expressed in the survey phase were surprisingly homogeneous. However, one part of the Czech population was effectively excluded from the civic-ethnic image: the Romanies, who were on the very edge of being considered as foreigners. This observation was confirmed also by the extreme coefficient of social distance from Romanies detected in the public opinion survey.

Thus, we have found that cultural and ethnic items somehow prevailed in the Czech national identity, but also that the distinctions based on an ethnic criterion were not that important and they merged with the civic and political ones. Furthermore, we have found that people treated their compatriots in a rather homogenizing manner, but also that they excluded certain social group(s) from this community. In order to account for these important observations, we propose interpreting the Czech material in terms of a model that would not over-emphasize the ethnic vs. civic dichotomy. Instead, we suggest focusing on a historical account that would show how a new kind of community has been established in the Czech lands, and what kind of identity it inspired. In this new kind of levelled, homogeneous, and totalizing community, it has been the political and social qualities of the community that finally shaped the members' identities, and determined its reactions to the environment. But we shall start first with the historical account.

The key event here was the Second World War and its consequences. The German politics of genocide, together with the massive transfers of German speaking population from the post-war Czechoslovakia in 1945–46, brought about an unprecedented ethnic homogeneity on the post-war Czech territory. The Jewish and Romany minorities were almost extinct, and the Germans and other ethnic minorities either expelled abroad, or forced to social invisibility.

The politics of the Communist regime further contributed to the creation of a homogeneous (or levelled) nation-state body, and, even more so, a homogeneous *representation* of such a body. Along with further emphasis on ethnic homogenisation came also the social and cultural levelling, as the old social distinctions stood under massive and systematic attack across the society. The new community that was created, together and its representations, displayed two important qualities with respect to the identity.

First, if the ethnic and political notions of the Czech identity had always had a tendency to merge, their also now became indissoluble. No more could any of these be told to dominate; the ethnic was formulated in terms of the social, that, in turn, in terms of the cultural, that again in terms of the civic, and that in terms of the ethnic within the closely-knit nation/state community. For that sake, the 'ethnic' and 'civic' elements do not struggle in the practical discourse any more, and they can be easily be said to be confused, and sometimes to stand in for each other.

As an example, let us point to just one puzzling instance: The commercial TV Nova's star Ray Koranteng is of colour. That is, he could hardly conform to the ethnic criterion of a national identity. However, he is widely accepted throughout the society. He is a native Czech speaker, resides in the country, and conforms to the mainstream social standards. On the other hand, there are Czech emigrants abroad that have a 'proper' ethnic origin, but they still have problems with acceptance in the Czech Republic. The reason seems to be the fact that they are not conforming to the other social standards: namely, to the norms of behaviour that originated in the levelled totalitarian society, to the norm of permanent residence, which

would make them share the fate of the community, and perhaps they even speak Czech with a slight accent. The contrast between the acceptance of a 'non-Czech' TV star and rejection of the 'Czech' emigrants obviously transcends an ethnic logic. It operates through a complex of criteria, cultural, social, economic, political etc. Certain ethnic grounds of this complex still are perceptible, as the survey research has shown, but the ethnic element operates *through* the civic, not against it. We suggest perceiving its prevalence as part of discursive striving for complex social/cultural homogeneity, and not as a one-sided attack.

Second, the representations of nation/state/society were not subject to any further challenges, as (a) in the Communist regime, they circulated within a closed environment, which suppressed diversity, and (b) the discourse itself was hostile to any disconformities. The tendency to discursive closure was inherent to the dynamics of nation-state creation since the late 19th century, but the forty years of the Communist regime made it a virtual stronghold. This mental inertia easily survived the decline of the Communist regime, and it still rules the Czech discourse.

This is most obvious in the case of Romanies, who have serious difficulties to be acknowledged as part of the Czech nation/state community at all. The Romanies are nowadays the minority that is the most numerous, the most obviously different in ethnic terms, the most deviant from the cultural and social norms, and the most socially disfavoured. Their status is effectively marginalized in the discourse, so that it is hard even to find a common ground to discuss their problems. Either they are not represented at all (because the differential representation is unacceptable within the discourse on Czech identity), or the problem is posed simply as that of their non-conformity: as long as they do not conform, they are not part of the national community, and the Czechs therefore should not assume any responsibility for their fate. This is obviously a *cul-de-sac*, which can only generate major trouble in the future.

To summarize what has been said so far: the Czechs have been for several decades at transition from an ethnic identity proper to some other model. Their national identity is no more simply based on the ethnic or cultural criteria; the state has been playing an increasingly important role, and their identity has been connected somehow to the community of a state/nation/society, which is represented as homogeneous in ethnic, cultural, civic and social terms. This model of representing the nation can have disastrous effects on the minorities whose status as minorities, and right to differ from the general standards, is not acknowledged.

On the other hand, we do not suggest that this identity is simply bad, as it is not exclusively civic. For instance, it allows a self-confident and less aggressive attitude toward neighbours. In our opinion, this is exactly the reason why the Czech relationship to the Germans seems to improve.

Once the Czech national identity is not challenged on the daily basis by the German minority *inside* the nation-state, a benevolent attitude based on sovereignty and mutual respect is much easier to adopt. And it seems that exactly this has been the case after the WWII.

It is thus not advisable to try simply to discard the current Czech identity, even if it seems too ethnocentric and reactionary. It is an outcome of long historical trends, it is deeply embedded in the current structure of experience, and its purely ethnic/cultural predecessor was even

more conflict-based. Constructing a civic alternative out of abstract considerations would probably not lead us very far either, as the civic element is already present. Instead, we suggest making the current identity more dynamic, and promoting further changes that would weaken the notion of homogeneous collectivity and would support the idea of unity in plurality. This would also prove useful for the future construction of European citizenship.

The easy way in: ‘Europe’ as a value

What we have to say about the European identity begins with the statement that *Europe is a positive value*. Since the early stages of the national movement, the Czechs have increasingly defined their identity as bound to their role within Europe, and today, they would hardly question their belonging to Europe at all. The Czech definition of Europe is that of common culture, societal community, history, and civilization, perhaps also that of democracy, security, prosperity and peace, all of which are perceived as positive. Europe is thus an ideal that goes unquestioned, as was most clearly demonstrated in our analysis of the political discourses. There, even those political actors who opposed the EU had to play the representation of Europe (or Euro-Atlantic values, for that case) *against* that of the EU, as they could not simply question the European values as such.

Throughout the research stages, we found hardly any evidence that the USA would be excluded from the European sphere thus defined. The Czech representation of Europe obviously has not been modelled with the distinction from America as Other; rather it has been employing other contrasts, probably those against the East, or the Islamic world. To explain this, we suggest recalling the influence the Iron Curtain division had upon the Czech perceptions of world. The world after the collapse of the Soviet empire tends to be perceived as unipolar, with the USA and Europe more or less sharing a common status as the core of the world.

The image of Europe was not only normative, but also undifferentiated, and above that ethnically-culturally loaded. In contrast to many other country reports, especially in the qualitative interviewing stage, we have hardly encountered representations that would emphasize diversity as a constitutive European quality. On the contrary, Europe (or for that matter Western Europe) was often employed as a notion from which one would be excluded on the basis of his/her non-compliance with the standards. The exclusion would have deadly consequences for a country’s status: no community, no solidarity, and no benefits, as we have demonstrated with respect to the national identity of the Romanians.

The EURONAT project proposal was substantially concerned with the question of whether European identity would be compatible with the national one in different cases. The answer for the Czechs is obvious: of course it would. All the research stages focused on the present discourse showed that it actually **is** compatible, as the Czechs currently declare themselves to be part of the normative field of Europe. It seems that tuning the ethno-cultural accent of the Czech identity with the cultural-civilisational accent of the European identity of the Czechs will not be much of a problem. Loyalty to the European values is considered part of the loyalty to the nation. Deeply illegitimate as it is, the appropriation of the label ‘Europe’ by the European Union would work very well with the Czechs. Once they accept that ‘Europe’ is at stake here, they’ll most probably go on to comply with the idea of the Union. Indeed, perceiving the European Union as an extension of some ‘European’ principles is exactly what the Czechs, including their politicians, are currently doing. Of course, there are several

problems with this identification with Europe, and we shall discuss them in the following section.

EU citizenship? No, thanks.

Another important concern of the EURONAT was to detect the possible indications of an emerging citizenship-identity connected with the EU. Again, an unequivocal answer can be given for the Czech case: no such thing is on the horizon. The very fact that representations of the EU were taken over by the normative motive of 'Europe' is critical here.

Items connected to the EU institutions were lagging far behind the cultural qualities of Europe in the survey question on European identity. Throughout the survey and qualitative interviewing, we have observed lack of knowledge about or experience with the EU, which disabled practical representation of the EU citizenship. Political and media discourse, on the contrary, offered a 'pragmatic' perspective, which set the national interests against the interests of the EU and its members. But above all: the Czechs have the civic notions deeply embedded in an ethno-national identity (see section above).

It is easy to predict that in such conditions, a shift to European Union citizenship would be a major problem for three interconnected reasons: First, because the EU has been so far widely connected to the image of Europe with its values, culture etc., while the concrete political and social institutions were omitted, or missing from the picture; the institutional environment of the EU thus would be perceived as novel and unpredicted, especially by the lay discourse. Second, because there will be no free sources available for creating the civil solidarity with those institutions, as the civic discourse is occupied by the state-national perspective, which is hardly able of dynamic expansion right now. And third, because the only model of attitude left would be that pragmatic outlook that has been for quite some time employed by in the public discourse; thus, the Czechs would probably define themselves as profiteers, or losers, of these institutions, but never as their part.

There is even more prospective trouble to the Accession, and this time it stems from the very limits of the representation of Europe. The general representation of Europe in the Czech discourse is normative and undifferentiated, as already said; in this respect it resembles the representation of nation. If such an image is confronted with the diversity of populations of the member states of the EU, it will probably bring about yet another surprise, for which the Czech society is not very well prepared. To put it in an anecdotic manner, the Czechs expect to meet a White, Culturally Distinguished Bourgeois (Goethe, Beethoven, or Voltaire?) in 'Europe'. How would they react to their first encounter with a Black Muslim Immigrant? It is hard to predict what exactly will result from the confrontation of the normative image of Europe with its diversified reality. But it is obvious that either the culture-centred representation of Europe, or the Czechs' attitude toward the European compatriots, will have to change.

Euro-fatalism and the Czech way to the West

Euro-fatalism is typical of the Czech discourse. The number of principal opponents of Accession is rather low among politicians, journalists as well as among the population in general. This does not mean, of course, that there are no critical voices. But as the qualitative interviews have shown, even those who are sceptical about the consequences of Accession,

generally acknowledge the necessity to join the EU, and more or less the same may be said about the political discourse. By saying this, in turn, we do not mean that there are no euro-optimists in the Czech Republic. Quite the contrary: we have already discussed several problems that stem from a value-laden euro-optimism. Here we address the issue of what are the minimal reasons for the Czechs to join the EU.

The more we moved into the popular discourse, the more the Accession was associated with the discourse on the post-Communist transformation. In the survey research, we hypothesized that the positive attitude toward post-1989 transformation was directly connected to the respondents' identification with the EU political institutions and to the feeling of closeness to its citizens. In the qualitative interviewing phase, the interviewees identified Accession to the EU as an important step in overcoming the handicap of the former Iron Curtain. The EU represented the direction of increasing prosperity, security, economic performance or level of democracy, although the concrete advantages or disadvantages were subject to numerous disputes.

The respondents were well conscious of the scales of hierarchy between the West and the East. And, being conscious of the techniques by which such a hierarchy can be turned into a stronghold of exclusion from community-solidarity-benefits (see the analogous process in the sections above), they attempted to moderate and finally overcome the Czech disadvantage. A fine example of these efforts is given in the subtle ways by which the respondents handled Europe's regional boundaries between Western, Central and Eastern Europe.

This way, the value-laden representation of Europe is also connected to what the enlargement means to the Czechs. The representation of Europe is normative, and it even allows exclusions from the community of normatively acceptable countries. Furthermore, sharing the European values, and talking about them for that matter, helps to erase the boundaries between the West and the Czechs discursively. Constructing the EU on the basis of European values thus fits to the scheme of the Western drive, and even manages to advance the Czechs discursively.

To sum up: the integration to the EU is widely perceived as another step in overcoming the heritage of the Iron Curtain, and particularly in erasing the levels of hierarchy that divide the Czechs from Western Europe. As long as the Czechs perceive the West-East hierarchy, and the need to overcome their handicap, their positive political attitude toward the EU is guaranteed. The only question is, exactly how strong will these perceptions remain once the Czechs join the EU, and what will come to replace them?

The gap between the public and lay discourses

Finally, the EURONAT project aimed to clarify the relationship between different levels of discourse that employed the representations of nation and the EU or Europe. It was particularly interested in the role of media, which supposedly mediated between the discourse of political elites and that of the lay people. With respect to this analytical focus, we have reasons to conclude that the intensity of correspondence, not to say mutual influence between the different levels of discourse, was surprisingly low.

It is important to notice, however, that comparison was particularly difficult. The reports on media, politics, public opinion and lay people discourse with their respective methodologies weren't really commensurable. Integrated together, our different reports offered a rich and flexible perspective on what the discourse of Europe and the EU was about in the Czech Republic. For a comparison between themselves, however, their value was reduced. We often had to compare the different levels of discourse with arguments *ex silencio*, with respect to what would have been said and recorded, if a representation of this or that kind was really present; concrete explicit hypotheses were often missing from the different research designs.

Given the provisional status of our conclusions on this point, we would like to pinpoint the following differences between the lay people and public discourses:

Boundaries within Europe. There was a consciousness of distinction between European regions in the lay people discourse, which was connected to the perceptions of hierarchy between the Western Europe and the rest of the continent. This distinction was very important for understanding the way interviewees spoke about accession. In the media discourse, we have addressed the question of West and East with two interrelated hypotheses for qualitative falsification. The hypotheses completely failed, as the media addressed the issue very scarcely. The political discourse also did not use the representations of Central and Eastern Europe, even if the value-laden notion of Europe was somehow centred to the West.

The context of post-Communist transformation. The lay discourse has shown substantial embeddedness in the story of post-Communist transformation. The story, however, has not been a crucial political or media topic for years. The politics obviously followed an 'ordinary', or 'general' discourse on the integration, led by topics of national interest, European values, and so forth. The media might have discussed the transformation topic time to time, but obviously not in connection to the European enlargement.

The popular narratives. The qualitative interviewing showed several strong, original narratives that explained what was at stake during the accession. Among those, we particularly emphasize two: the expectation that accession would bring an economic shock, perhaps parallel to that after 1989 (this was typical for not less than 13 interviewees); and the related hope that accession would finally bring a better world for the next generation of Czechs (or, to 'our children') If there were these grand narratives present in the media and politics, we suppose that we would have noticed them despite the different methodologies. However, we found no traces of them in media or political discourse.

The attitude towards Germans. Last but not least, several political parties seemed preoccupied with the Czechs' relationship to the Germans. We didn't search for the independent representations of this relationship as we did in the interviewing stage, but we encountered the German issue connected to the European integration by the major conservative party (ODS) and by the Communists. These two often invoked the images of past, especially of WWII, and represented Germany as a threat. We connected these representations to the antithesis between German and Czech (Slavic) that was often invoked throughout the Czech history in 19th and 20th centuries, and particularly fostered by the school education. We held that these representations continued to play an important role in the construction of national identity, and would be occasionally employed by populists seeking to enlarge the popular support for their program. The lay discourse gave us a picture that

significantly differed from such an assumption. No doubt, there were still considerable conflicts present. However, the respondents, when directly asked about the relationship to Germans, formulated an explicit message that the Second World War and the issues connected to it were over and should not be revived any more. They were ready to perceive Germans as a nation as any other, and expected the Czech-German relationships to take an untroubled course.

Of course, the interviewees in the qualitative stage employed many particles of representation that were present in the media and political discourse. Still it seems that the public and lay discourses missed each other's point on at least two topics: the complex narratives underlying the discussion of accession, and the current stage of the Czech-German relationships. This gap between the discourses is as surprising as inexplicable, and we can hardly offer a ready explanation. Several different ways of further reflection open up. First, there is still the possibility that we have simply overlooked the presence in the media and politics of the lay narratives, and of the changing relationship to the Germans. We do not hold this hypothesis as probable, but its status could become clear after another, more focused research in the media and politics discourses.

Second, if the differences we have observed are to be taken seriously, we suggest that there is a **taboo** in the public discourse on something that is still vivid in the personal discourse of the lay people. But, why would it be there? We can offer now only a provisional explanation that has to be elaborated upon, or altogether rejected.

The connection between the post-Communist transformation, the West-East hierarchy, and joining the EU *was* outspoken publicly in the 1989, when the leaders coined the slogan 'Back to Europe'. Since that time, the public discourse on lagging behind 'Europe' seems to have disappeared very quickly. Within a few years, the public discourses switched to 'standard' terms, discussing the idea of the EU in relationship to different political ideologies, advantages and disadvantages of the accession for the national interest, and so on. Obviously, to go on with the inferiority discourse would be politically incorrect, internationally handicapping, and psychologically disfavoured. The lag was thus overcome discursively by the public taboo, long before it disappeared in reality.

The topic, however, has retained its importance in the lay discourse, be it in open declarations, or in minute techniques of manipulation of difference (boundaries' shifting). The lay people often keep naïve views of the practical consequences of EU membership, supplanting instead their non-public narratives. The level of sophistication the Czech media and politics have attained in discussing the EU Accession (which is not excellent by any means) has been left without impact on the popular opinion. The relationship between the public and media discourse thus seems to lack feedback, which would be even more so in the case of the Czech-German relationship.

With the Germans, one can easily imagine that several actors continue to exploit the historical-cultural background, which is full of conflicting representations of the Germans. The nation-like-any-other narrative hardly brings any advantage as an explicit political ideology, and this topic remains tacit in the public discourse, whatever the shifts in the public opinion might be. The other possible suggestion is that we actually get relatively **few** anti-German utterances in the public discourse, exactly because the politicians cannot really raise much popular contention by invoking negative representations of the past any more. This

issue, however, certainly has to be subjected to a detailed scrutiny, which would review a broader collection of material from different perspective than was that of the EURONAT project.

5.2.2 Hungary

The Hungarian case in the EURONAT project was studied by the methods commonly agreed upon in the whole consortium. **Media analysis** was done both in printed and electronic media. For the printed media analysis, we chose four daily newspapers. *Népszabadság* (People's Freedom, NSZ), *Magyar Hírlap* (Hungarian Newsletter, MH), *Magyar Nemzet* (Hungarian Nation, MN). All three of these authoritative dailies come out in the early morning hours. In our sample, *Blikk* (whose name is borrowed from the German *Blick*) represented the popular press, another national paper. Of the programme of the electronic media, we have examined the evening news bulletins on three television channels broadcast at peak viewing times: *The first channel of the Hungarian Television* (MTV1), *RTL Klub*, and *TV2*.

The Hungarian papers involved are not published on Sundays and other holidays, and TV news bulletins are not broadcast at the usual time and length either. Therefore, in order to grasp the media representation of the two events to be analysed in their totality (looking at the whole process), in the case of the Nice Summit we looked at the material recorded between 7th and 12th December 2000, while regarding the introduction of the Euro, we scanned the news between 27th December 2001 and 5th January 2002.

In the study of political discourse, we analysed party platforms and parliamentary debates to explore long-term political strategies and applications of the principles. The relation between the verbal arguments and political actions could be tested in the parliament as political debates lead to accepting policy proposals. Both party platforms and parliamentary debates were analysed in a written format. Although the latter is rich in non-verbal communication, here we concentrated on the content of representations, thus we used the written Journals of the Parliament (www.parlament.hu/napló) as our source. Party platforms were collected between 1998 and 2002 (years of national elections in Hungary). We have chosen the largest parties from the left and the right (i.e. MSZP, FIDESZ-MPP) and two smaller parties that had a characteristic opinion on national and European issues (SZDSZ and MIÉP).

Survey research was standardised for reasons of comparability. Instruments were developed together with all partners and the conduction of survey was done through Eurobarometer. We had a national representative sample (N=1027) of Hungarians. The three questions that we asked formed a part of an omnibus survey. The *first* was a Bogardus-type attitude measure of social distance (in 4-grade scales from 'very close' to 'not at all close'). We had a delicate ensemble of targets as we asked: (1) *Parochial in-groups*: inhabitants of locality, inhabitants of the region, fellow nationals; (2) *European extended in-groups*: Europeans, EU citizens⁹, and Central Eastern European people; and (3) *Out-groups*: Jews, Gypsies (as minority groups or internal others) and Americans, Russians, Chinese, Arabs, Turks (as distant groups or external others). With these measures we tried to grasp the attitudinal element of identification with in-groups and the social attitudes towards out-groups. In the *second* set of items we asked about the most important cognitive elements in representing the nation. Various kinds of possible attributes were listed, which respondents judged in a 4-grade scale as characteristics of the nation. In a *third* set of items we asked the same or similar items

⁹ Subsequent analyses will show that this group is treated as a quasi-in-group by Hungarian respondents.

about Europe. The second and third questions were mapping the cognitive aspects of national and European identification.

In the qualitative interview phase we took particular efforts to maximise variability among interviewees. Altogether, we conducted 24 interviews with people differing in *socio-economic status* (SES), *size of locality* they lived in (village, city, or capital), *age*, *sex* and *region* (Eastern-Western Hungary). Socio-economic status was dichotomised into the categories high versus low. We defined high SES as a person possessing a higher education diploma *and* as having a white-collar job. In contrast, low SES interviewees had only secondary or primary education *and* blue-collar jobs. For size of locality, we differentiated between villages, mid- size cities, and the capital city, Budapest. Regional diversity was also introduced, as the cities were Nyíregyháza (Eastern Hungary) and Székesfehérvár (Western Hungary). Half of the villages were chosen near Nyíregyháza, half were chosen near Székesfehérvár. Half of the interviewees were women, half were men. According to our previous agreement, we defined two age groups, a younger (born between: 1958-1973) and an elder (born between: 1940-1956).

An interview was designed to be 40-50 minutes long. Before starting the specific topics of the research, we introduced a version of the Twenty Statement Test for self-representation (Kuhn & McPartland, 1954). The main part of the interview contained four general topics: 1. Hungary joining the European Union; 2. Introduction of the Euro; 3. Hungarian national and state borders (the issue of the ‘Status Law’); and 4. Relations between Europe and Hungary. For all topics, we began the interview from a personal perspective (inquiring about the interviewee’s first-hand personal experiences, feelings and reactions, and the nature of their discussions with friends), and then we turned to perceived representations of the media and political discourse. Following the last topic, we asked them to draw a depiction of *themselves*, *Hungary* and *Europe* on a plain sheet of paper.

General research questions in EURONAT and Hungarian specificities

The general aims of EURONAT help us to identify which aspects to highlight in a summary of all the results about Hungary:

- One of the principal research questions has been about the relationship between national loyalty and identification to Europe. A presumption of ours was that these identifications suit each other well . This was found previously in other research, hence a second question of *how* this compatibility is sustained taking the historical, elite and lay perspectives into account. A second question was raised about the relation between identification (attachment) and representations of the nation and Europe.
- According to major theorists of nationalism, national identity is multidimensional. These accounts even distinguish between different ideal types of nations emphasising one or the other aspect (e.g. civic-ethnic nationalism). These typologies and analyses of multidimensionality often made one rely on theoretical, historical-cultural analysis. Therefore, reflection on the multidimensionality of national identities and their specific compositions in each nation forms an interesting terrain of empirical social science. .
- Given the specific composition of elite (media and political discourse) and lay (quantitative and qualitative) information sources used in our empirical analyses, the following important questions appeared: how do these different perspectives in a

given society relate each other, and are there intelligible differences or signs of interactions between these points of view?

- Our research has been conducted in crucial times for Europe when enlargement appeared as a major challenge for both ‘old member states’ and ‘candidates’. Even though our analyses were not explicitly focusing on the change during the last years of the accession process, it was inevitable that we recorded some signs of changing climates and representations about Europe in our case.

Some theoretical considerations

Nation – Europe intertwined

National identification is natural in everyday communication and self-reflection. People categorise themselves in terms of national categories (and gender, generation, religion etc.). Developmental studies show that the concept of the national in-group develops together with other social concepts, when a child gradually learns to give up her own (egocentric) perspective. This process might be conceptualised as decentralising perspective-taking from the self to an increasingly inclusive social category. It begins with taking the perspective of the immediate social groups (family) to go further (e.g. town, region) gradually. It does not stop with national categories, but may reach more inclusive social categories, up until an all-inclusive concept of humanity.

Nations are compared to each other not only in political philosophy or in studies of national character but in the development of social categorization in childhood. National identity is embedded in the ‘international context’ not only contrasting foreigners but as embedded in identifications with general, inclusive human groups and categories (reaching an all inclusive category of humanity itself). As social identity theory in psychology predicts, comparison with out-groups has an important role in national identity. But a growing body of research shows that inclusive relationships between social categories might have just as important consequences.

In understanding the interplay between European and national identities, most of the studies use a theoretical framework of inclusive identity patterns with correlating identification at different levels in integrative theoretical approaches. It seems that the mutual exclusiveness in self-categorisation does not have predictive power in the European context. Results showed instead that European identity might be built around a synthesis of values, sentiments of attachments, and social representations that are associated with cognitive factors structuring the identification process. But the existence and relevance of a European identity does not diminish the difference between various national perspectives. Subordinate identities seem to be retained in the super-ordinate common group identity, and perceptions of the position of each subgroup as well as the relative status of the super-ordinate group (with respect to the subgroup) will organise the representation of the super-ordinate group.

Relations between representations and identifications

National identity, as any other social identity, should be conceptualised as a multidimensional construct. Leaving aside different political, historical and economic considerations, individual attachment to the nation itself has many distinguishable aspects. One aspect of it is representational. National in-groups have to be ‘imagined’, and it is important to see how they are thought of. Another aspect of national identity is that it is a result of self-

categorisation, as a process whereby the self is associated to the national (in)group. This categorisation results in the distinction between in-groups and out-groups. Finally, national identification as any other social identification has an evaluative aspect, which might be expressed as a sense of belonging to or an attitude towards the national in-group. It is important to see that (self)categorisation affects (social) representation, and social representational processes, in turn, influence social identifications. Within a shared system of inter-group relations, social identity processes provide us with the group perspectives from which a specific object or target is viewed (out-groups or the in-group itself). Social representations, on the other hand, set the paths of inter-group comparisons, thus determining the content dimensions of inter-group comparison. Within a given group there are specific agreements in members' representation of the world that enhance cohesion and identification.

In our analysis we found the concept of perspectives useful in accounting for commonalities and differences in the representation. It is an everyday observation that groups of people see the social world with a different eye. Thus the social representation processes in which there is a certain inter-group agreement along with significant differences are particularly interesting. All representations have a perspective, all groups or individuals have a viewpoint that affects what is represented and how they represent it. A perspective is more than a mere self-categorisation; it may contain general representation of the social world (beliefs, worldviews and naïve theories), personal or group values, perceived position of the self and the in-group, and/or recollections of the past and future goals.

Key elements in representing the nation and Europe

The most important context for national identity and representations of Europe in Hungary are set by the historical processes of nation-formation. Hungarian national identity in the 20th century has had important aspects of (1) being in the centre of Europe (in the geographical sense) but on the edge of Eastern and Western European cultures; (2) being a small nation after gaining independence; (3) having considerable Hungarian minorities in neighbouring countries; (4) falling repeatedly into the shadow of great empires, thus forming and preserving national identity in a minority position; and (5) having a national self-esteem relatively negative (or moderate) in comparison to western nations.

History is in the core of Hungarian national identification. It is very much based on the early establishment of the state, and on subsequent challenges to national sovereignty. In terms of civic and cultural national identifications, it is interestingly a modern historical change, the separation of large Hungarian communities from Hungary in the Trianon Treaty after WWI that reinforced cultural aspects of national identifications. Thus the emphasis on language and culture could well be connected to the propagation of individual decision as the bases for citizenship.

The relationship between European affiliations and national identification was generally not seen to be conflicting. Europeanism has often been linked to modernising national institutions in Hungarian history; thus, it is generally connected to a sense of development. Hungarians emphasise that they have belonged to Europe ever since the founding of the Hungarian state, even if historic barriers have separated them from Europe for shorter periods or in certain respects.

The mutual reinforcement in national and European orientations can be best shown in an example from foreign policy. There is a generally accepted set of three priorities or principles in Hungarian foreign policy since the democratic changes in 1989-1990: (1) Euro-Atlantic integration; (2) Regional politics (good neighbourly relations); and (3) protection of Hungarian minorities in the Carpathian Basin (integrating the Hungarian nation across borders). These principles set a consensual framework for Hungarian foreign policy, but they also give ground for differences between political parties and governments as they are in conflict at times.

Hungarians generally have positive attitudes towards Europe and towards the European Union in particular, but their representations are rather superficial. They have limited knowledge about the institutions of the European Union and about the effects of accession on their everyday lives. Thus they perceive mostly general reasons for joining the EU (e.g. it is the only way to attain economic prosperity), but they have preoccupations about its possible negative consequences.

East-West differentiation is important for Hungarians. They have positive impressions about the Western part of the continent, and differentiate Western Europe from the countries lying east of them. Furthermore, they represent their own status between East and West with ambivalence. While there is motivation to catch up with Western European development, it is not always seen to be easy. Some critics even say that it is not a desirable goal. Thus, positioning Hungary as Central Europe (placing it between East and West) is not without controversy.

The representation of elites about the nation, Europe and the EU

We estimated the elite representations by analysing the media coverage of selected events and bits of political party discourse. In reviewing these results we should not forget that these selections have had impact on the picture that we could draw. The introduction of the euro, for example, had obviously different media representations in the countries that actually introduced it, than in other countries. The emphasis on violence in the media had an effect on the representation of the EU Summit that we analysed. The representations of nation and Europe (European Union) in political discourse might have been also blurred for several reasons: (1) National identity tends to be implicit in political debates. The nation itself is rarely addressed; rather, it appears in relation to other policy questions (e.g. cultural or foreign policy). Given the diversity of these topics, it is necessarily restrictive to address some of them for analysis. (2) We have to be cautious when analysing the appearance of these general (thus vague) and positively evaluated concepts in political debates, as they are part of party competition. They might also be merely 'rhetoric' in justifying a policy position taken. However, national and European identification are assumed to affect profoundly the political actions taken.

Media representation

In the analysis of Hungarian political and media discourse we paid attention to a major dimension in building representations. We concentrated on the interrelatedness of 'State', 'Nation', 'EU', 'Europe' and 'the (globalised) world'. These interconnections are well represented in the threefold priorities of Hungarian foreign policy (helping Hungarian minorities in neighbouring countries, good neighbourly relations, and Euro-Atlantic

integration of Hungary). We also considered the possible constraints of this discourse set by its most relevant contexts. The state of the art report within this research highlighted some characteristics of Hungarian national identity: a small country, alone between East-West in the shadow of great empires with considerably minorities in neighbouring countries.

About the analysis of the specific events chosen, some points should be underlined:

- In the Hungarian media, both in the written press and in television news broadcasts, the two events examined were given special coverage and were introduced as historical events.
- While the Nice summit was presented in the media as a complex, rather controversial event full of conflicts, which did not manage to answer all the questions raised or ultimately to resolve problems, the introduction of the euro was represented as a success story suggesting unity, strength and optimism.
- The themes of defining nations and Europe were not at the forefront of media attention in connection with either of the analysed events. The media represented these European events in the tone of foreign news. These events were taken as something ‘out there’, with no direct involvement of Hungarians.
- If any of the events that were interpreted in the media, they were shown and evaluated according to what they may mean for Hungary’s accession.

Political discourse

The analysis of the political discourse showed the relevance of another context for representing the nation and Europe, that of the ‘international community’. We were interested to see what Hungarians consider as the international community. Wars and conflicts as borderline situations have an important role in the international context, thus we used them to explore fundamental characteristics of political goals and positions. A third context of the political discourse between political parties is that of the public opinion, which sometimes has a pronounced main effect on political positions.

The specific results of the analysis are as follows:

- A consensual basis for Hungarian political discourse was built around a core of seeing Euro-Atlantic integration as reinforcing democratic change within the region. European integration in the long run was also interpreted as a peaceful transformation easing tensions between nations and helping to solve the problem of minorities.
- NATO policies were generally regarded as being derived from norms and values that Hungary deliberately accepted. High levels of consensus appeared in adopting international policies that might even possibly endanger national interests (e.g. in the Kosovo war).
- Differences in representations appeared more in parliamentary debates than in actual political behaviour (voting). These differences reflected the political strategies as shown in party platforms, while actual decisions were influenced more by the given international situation. Governing parties seemed to carry more of this international responsibility that shaped their original views to a greater extent.
- The Kosovo conflict was much more dilemmatic for the political elite. Values or political priorities of all political parties were not easily applied to this complex situation. Paradoxically, the governing right-wing coalition, which had been distancing itself more from the EU and emphasized the Hungarian interests more, stood firm,

while the pro-European socialists became surprisingly hesitant in supporting NATO. In response to terrorism the values of all parties were expressed more consistently in political debates and decisions.

In summarising and discussing our results regarding elite representations, we might return to the key elements of the Hungarian representation of the nation and Europe. The media and political discourse reflected upon these elements. In political debates, it has been repeatedly emphasised that the Euro-Atlantic integration of Hungary (NATO membership, possible EU membership) reinforces the nation's belonging to the West, while in the discussions some distinctions showed the survival of the dilemmatic aspects of being between East and West.

Many arguments acknowledged the fact that Hungary, as a small nation, may even gain more sovereignty with the Euro-Atlantic integration instead of losing much. There was distinguished attention to the chances of small nations within the changing European institutions. European integration on the whole was seen as positive for the Hungarian minorities in the region. NATO and the EU were also distinguished from other great powers entering into the region by the important fact that this integration is not based on sheer geopolitical dominance but rather on the nations' free choice and interest. As the time of accession had been constantly postponed, a somewhat critical attitude has grown where elements of power politics have been attributed the EU.

The understanding of the international community appeared as a second important context for representations of the nation and for Euro-Atlantic integration. From a Hungarian perspective, the Euro-Atlantic integration was equivalent to adopting the standards of the international community. General human and democratic values were attached to different Euro-Atlantic organizations of NATO and the EU. A specific characteristic of Europe in this sense was gained by a greater cultural and national diversity; this makes the main difference between the EU and the USA.

For both the media and the political discourse we should not forget an important internal context, that of the public opinion in Hungary. There is a high popular support for the Euro-Atlantic integration here, which is even higher than in most of the Central European countries. The referendum on joining NATO only reinforced the opinion polls showing that the Hungarian public overwhelmingly supports joining NATO and the EU. However, this support does not mean that the public would be well informed about these institutions or about the short-term consequences of accession for Hungary.

Within these representative contexts the Hungarian national identification and European integration were seen as mutually reinforcing. When considering the differences, the political right would emphasise more the nation, while the left more the European values and norms. The extreme right placed itself outside this representational paradigm. The political differences were less pronounced in the media representations.

Lay representations

We investigated lay representations in our project through both quantitative and qualitative methodologies. In the spring of 2002 we asked a representative sample of Hungarians to explore attitudes and representations. A year later, just after the referendum about EU

membership was held in Hungary, we interviewed a small but diverse sample of lay people about the nation and the EU.

Survey results

National and European identification was explored from various angles in this analysis. In its two attitudinal aspects (closeness), Hungarians seem to identify with the nation very much (more than with their region or locality). They regard EU citizens as a quasi in-group (a reference group) that is positively distinguished from any other social groups mentioned in this question and put closer to the parochial in-groups. It is interesting to see that the other two European categories (European people and Central East Europeans) were not as attractive to the Hungarian respondents as the category of EU citizens. Concerning out-groups, there was a remarkable distinction between internal and external others. Minority groups were seen more positively than distant out-groups. This result shows how judgements of cultural closeness and attitudes were confounded in our measure. A hidden ambivalence between the positive attitude and perceived social distance might be a reason for placing Americans in the middle of all out-groups. It is worth noting that the Americans (and the Gypsies) had the most stable meanings/evaluation.

These attitude measures allow us to examine the patterns of European and national identification. It is important to see that there were significant correlations between the national level identifications and the closeness of European overall categories. Furthermore, a relational identity measure was constructed out of the national and European attitude items. Especially interesting was the closed or open forms of national identification. There are systemic differences in the representation of nation and Europe among these people. Those with open national identification tended to have a more positive view of all out-groups. Their representation of the nation had more emphasis on both its Civic/institutional and Symbolic aspects. Thus they expressed a modern national identity by not denying its symbolic aspect (e.g. Pride, Symbols). In representing Europe we do not find such a characteristic difference between the two types of identification. The only significant relation is that those with open national identification have generally more positive evaluation in all aspects of representation.

In the survey we could also examine the representational side of our identity measures. We found a threefold structure in representing the national identity. The Symbolic factor questions the bipolar models of ethnic/civic national identity. There is an independent factor that reflects important concepts of the traditional social identity theory (Sovereignty, Borders, Symbols, and Pride). In the case of Europe, the cultural aspects emerge from all different kinds of answers.

Age turned out to be the most important background variable that affected representation of the nation. In multivariate analyses, elderly people seemed to invest more in the symbolic and ethnic/cultural aspects of the nation. Thus a shifting emphasis from the cultural to the institutional/civic understanding is detectable between generations, which may predict the future change in national identity.

Based on these first demographic analyses, a threefold system of background variables were created. Age was recoded to a generation factor; elite/non-elite positions were approximated by length of education; the constructed inclusive/exclusive identification was also used. We

clearly need further exploratory analysis in order to develop the structure of Hungarian public opinion about the nation and Europe. Our results showed an intergenerational dynamic of beliefs: younger people reject direct measures of national identification but accept more indirect measures. European identification corresponds to national identity among these young people the most. The main characteristic of elite positions is a mixture of scepticism toward specific policy outcomes (e.g. euro, free movement) of European integration and openness to other people (out-groups) and to change in general. The nation itself is also critically assessed. Exclusive national identification is not only a good predictor of ignorance of European issues but goes together with greater social distance to out-groups in general; it is not, however, connected to a specific ethnic conception of the nation.

Interviews

In the qualitative interviews, the general view of the European Union was positive, although lacking details. The EU was primarily seen by interviewees as an economic community based on exchange processes and a system of norms¹⁰ that regulate (public) behaviour. One has to bear in mind that ‘reference groups’ have just as great significance in a psychological sense in the lives of individuals and groups than do social values. The EU serves as such a reference group for Hungarians. The positive and norm-forming sense attributed to the modifier ‘European’ also confirms this role of the EU. The overall picture is nevertheless split up by various group perspectives. These different perspectives have in principal developed through the identification of those gaining and those losing with accession. This division consequently resulted in distinctions such as rural–urban, old–young, wealthy–poor, educated–uneducated and having foreign language skills or lacking foreign language skills. Interviewees generally claim that the elite in political, economic and intellectual terms (those already living under better circumstances) will benefit more from EU membership.

The introduction of the euro seemed distant enough not to concern Hungarians very much at present. Notwithstanding, similar worries are expressed concerning this issue as articulated regarding accession: namely, who will in practice benefit from its introduction, whether Hungarians will face consequent negative financial effects, or whether they will lose some of their national identity by the launch of the new currency. Although the symbolic aspect of the euro also emerges in the interviews, the functional approach (what the introduction of the euro will make easier and what it will hinder) is emphasised more in the representations.

In addition to the continuous establishment of European identity, respondents naturally feel the maintenance of Hungarian identity also to be of great significance. No general discrepancies emerge between objectives arising from Hungarian national identity and European aims. What is more, there is a positive relationship between the two concerning the issue of Hungarian minorities. Upon comparison with Europe, the majority of interviewees emphasise the inadequate state of preparedness concerning issues such as the introduction of the euro and the date of accession, an idea that reflects a moderately negative collective self-evaluation. A problematic issue with regards to Hungarian identity was the assessment of the conditions of the large number of Hungarian minorities outside the country. The question of the ‘Status Law’ which was implemented, and later amended, to serve their benefit, divides not only the political parties but respondents as well. Resolving the problem of Hungarians

¹⁰ Consonant with this idea is the popular analogy between the EU and a club. Accordingly, Hungarian accession is viewed as admission to a restricted, prestigious club.

living beyond the borders of the country is deemed exceedingly challenging by the interviewees.

Respondents are hopeful that Hungary's present Eastern identity will alter with accession. In twenty years, Hungarian individuals are believed to represent little dots within the great mass of the EU, whose sense of Hungarian identity will not be expressed through state borders but in the act of sufficiently representing and preserving their culture in multi-coloured Europe. What consequently poses a challenge to Hungarians is the acceptance of Eastern European people to be considered European within European representations.

Lay people interpreting the media and political discourse

The referendum about EU membership set the explicit context for the interviews. People were not all positive about the communication campaign that preceded it. Although the interviews reflected the general support that had been shown at the elections, people perceived the Hungarian media as not playing an informative role throughout the process of European integration. Respondents maintained that the media had depicted an uncritically positive picture of the EU and had failed to deal with practical issues of everyday life. Thus as was found before, Hungarians see the EU as being positive, although they are also prepared for (rather unspecified) obstacles in this process. They not only have limited knowledge about the Union and the possible changes in their lives, but they also blame the media and other social factors for not providing enough relevant information.

In addition to this, people do not distinguish between the stands of different parties. But there is another view that parties continue their heated political discussions under the pretext that they are debating issues concerning the accession. Respondents of the interview research also claimed left-wing parties to be representing more resolute views concerning the EU, while right-wing parties emphasise Hungarian interests to a larger extent, and seem to be rather restrained with regards to the accession.

Concluding remarks

The EURONAT project deepened our understanding of the processes involved in representing the nation and the European Union. Subsequent phases of our years-long research project allowed us to examine some temporal changes to the representation of Europe and the EU throughout an important phase of the accession process. There was a noticeable change between the media analysis and the interview phase: in the former the EU was represented even more vaguely and in an abstract language of diplomacy. The need for further information, together with the criticism of the media representation, appeared in the interview phase.

It was interesting to see a common national perspective in the lay and public (elite) representations of Europe, and it was even more instructive to see that important group differences exist in it. The main intranational differences investigated include the effect of age and elite vs. non-elite positions. These intranational dimensions for differences may deserve a systematic international comparison.

5.2.3 Poland

Data and Methodology

The data and methods used during the various phases of the Polish case study are described below:

TV discourse

The television discourse analysis comprised main editions of the TVP1 and the TVN news bulletins of 7th and 11th December 2000 and of 1st January 2002. The archival recordings of the news were made accessible by the TVP S.A. and the TVN.¹¹ As the aim of analysis was to ascertain the way the nation, the EU, and Europe are represented, we analysed the language of the broadcasts, setting the findings against the background of appearing film reports, pictures, and scenes shown in the background for the journalists' and reporters' statements. This eventually allowed us to conclude about extra-linguistic phenomena (Mayntz et al. 1983:192-193; Bell 2001:10-35). Special attention had been paid to the arrangement of scenes and their sequence in main editions of the TVP1 and the TVN news bulletins. It is obvious that the mere sequence of appearance of information items influences the degree they are being noticed by the viewers. The first news item has the greatest chance of being noticed (the primacy effect), as well as the last news item, which reaches the viewer more effectively than the information given in the course of the whole statement because of the last word effect (Aronson, Wilson, Akert 1997:147). Moreover, the sequence in which news items in main editions of the news influences also the directions and hierarchy of viewers' thinking process. Mass media not only provide the audience with knowledge of certain events, but they also convince it of the importance and value of particular problems. This phenomenon was defined as the agenda setting (Lippmann, 1992), and it influences the way the world is perceived and the opinions formulated by the viewers.

For the sake of the analysis of the television discourse the main editions of the news of the two main television stations - the TVP1 and the TVN – have been chosen. The former one represents public television TVP S.A., whereas the latter one represents commercial television. TVN has been chosen for its share in the television market equalled 11.8% (Jan. 2002), and 14.5% (Dec. 2000) respectively (www.WirtualneMedia.pl). Although the Polsat has a greater share in the market than the TVN (Table 1), the size of the audience attracted by the main edition of the TVN news bulletin is far greater than in the case of the Polsat. In January 2002 the main edition of the TVN news bulletin *Fakty* was watched by 4665.15 viewers, and that of the Polsat news by 3051.34 viewers. The most numerous audiences, however, was gathered by the evening edition of the TVP1 news bulletin: *Wiadomo ci*. It was watched by 81117.58 viewers (www.WirtualneMedia.pl).

Press Discourse

For our analysis we have selected four big, all-Polish daily papers:

the Gazeta Wyborcza, (G.W.) - the biggest daily newspaper issued in Poland; published in a tabloid format; it is of the centre-left political orientation and supports centre-oriented political parties. It is divided into two main parts: one has an all-national and the other a regional character. The language is sober and objective. In last the elections (2001) it

¹¹ The archival recordings of the news of TVP1 were made accessible only in main archives TVP S.A in Warsaw, and we were not able to copy these recordings.

supported the centre-oriented UW party. Since Sept. 2001 it has supported the policy of the government (<http://www.WirtualneMedia.pl>);

the Rzeczpospolita (Rz) - a daily of an all-national scope; up to 1989 it was a government's newspaper; it is of the centre political orientation; its language has an objective and sober character (<http://www.WirtualneMedia.pl>);

the Trybuna (T) – has an all-country scope, and is of the left political orientation. It supports the party which has been governing since Sept 2001 and it was opposing the former (1997 – 2001) government coalition. Orientated towards working-class. Its language has an objective and sober character (<http://www.WirtualneMedia.pl>);

the ycie – has an all-national scope. It is of the right political orientation, and has supported right and centre-right wing parties which are now in the opposition. In the years 1997-2001 it supported the governing formations (<http://www.WirtualneMedia.pl>);

the Gazeta Krakowska- a local newspaper that covers the south of Poland; most space is devoted to the local news. Some information from the world is given only on the third page (<http://www.WirtualneMedia.pl>).

The analysis of the newspapers covered 2 events: the Nice Summit and the launch of the euro. In the case of the former event we analysed the newspapers that appeared from 3rd to 13th December 2000 on a sample of 5 titles. In the latter case we analysed the newspapers published from 30th December 2001 to 3rd January. The basic unit of analysis was a single article. The headings, subheadings, leading paragraphs and full texts of articles, feature articles, commentaries and letters to the editor had been analysed. As there are no political cartoons in the Polish press, they could not be analysed.

In order to investigate the representations of the nation, the EU, and Europe as well as both the national and the European identities, a qualitative analysis has been adopted. Particular attention was paid to the significance of the used symbols, allusions, specific values and the aspects of national history.

The Discourse of Politics

Three forms of political expression from 1997 to March 2002 – party programs, speeches of party leaders and parliamentary debates – constituted a highly variegated body of texts which arose in two parliamentary configurations (which by itself makes them hard to compare) and which do not have similar diagnostic value. Party programs and manifestos are drawn up quickly and modified frequently. Their value to the researcher is directly proportional to the longevity of the given party. The speeches of party leaders at conventions and during election campaigns, which are not always made fully public, do not play as important a role as the speeches of politicians in Parliament. The latter have the greatest research value because they are the sharpest, often to the point of rhetorical exaggeration, on account of the strong ritualisation and ideologisation of issues related to the given party's political identity. Among the aforementioned means of communication, parliamentary debates merit particular attention because the strong emotions that accompany them often lead to the express articulation of things that would otherwise be hidden beneath the cover of calculated language. With the above in mind, the analysis was narrowed to texts in which issues related to Polish identity in the context of Europe and Europeanisation play an important role. Consequently, **twenty four texts** of party leaders' speeches and party manifestos as well as stenographers' notes of **three parliamentary debates** in which the leaders of all the parties took part (speaking officially on behalf of their parties) as well as individual party members (as discussion participants), form the corpus analysed in this study. Selected qualitative tools of critical discursive analysis

were used (Czy ewski, Kowalski, Piotrowski 1997; van Dijk 1988, 1990, 1993, 1995; Barker and Galasi ski 2001; Fairclough 1993), limiting it – on account of the scope of the material – to the dimension of topicality, with a special emphasis on the referential function of the text. After determining the basic subjects and structures of representations (later in this analysis), the texts were subjected to stylistic and rhetorical analysis in order to describe the basic forms and structures of valuation (on the lexical and connotational levels). The study employed simplified notation showing the source of a quotation — e.g. '(1)' means that the quotation comes from President Kwa niewski's Programmatic Declaration entitled 'Let's choose the future'. In the case of parliamentary debates (in which all the political parties took part) double citation is used: the number in parentheses indicates the debate, and the number in brackets indicates the type of interactive idiom.

Qualitative research design

In the course of the qualitative research, the Polish team conducted in March and April 2003 thirty-three interviews with respondents who fulfilled the adopted criteria. The criteria taken into account while sampling the respondents were the following:

- **place of residence** (determined by the location and size of a place). The research was carried out in three places: in Warsaw (the capital city), in Gda sk (a medium-sized city in the north of Poland) and in villages in the south of Poland;
- **sex** 50% of the respondents were women and 50% were men;
- **age** The respondents were above 18;
- **education** The respondents who took part in the research had different levels of education, starting with primary and finishing with higher education;
- **socio-economic status** The interviews were conducted both with people who had jobs and with those who did not (unemployed, housewives), with people working in the public sector, and with those employed in private companies. Among our respondents there were also owners of companies, civil servants, people who had worked abroad and people who had worked for international corporations.

A professional survey network recruited the respondents. Trained interviewers were given the task of finding persons possessing specified qualities, persuading them to take part in the research and making an appointment for them with a person conducting an interview. In most cases people invited to participate in the research agreed to an interview. There were some problems with recruiting persons with high socio-economic status, especially persons running their own businesses, due to the lack of time. In the course of the recruitment another difficulty was encountered, namely the fear of being interviewed: this phenomenon could be observed mostly in the case of persons with poor education living in small villages. It was observed that the main reason for this fear was respondents' belief that they did not have enough knowledge to be able to discuss problems connected with the research¹². Interviews were usually conducted in the respondents' flats, except for Warsaw, where most interviewees met the researcher in a cafe. It should be stressed that this was not caused by the respondents' unwillingness to meet at home but rather by the wish to make the interviewer's work easier. In practice, however, it had some negative consequences, first of all the poorer quality of the recording.

¹² In most cases these fears were overcome when the researcher explained that the purpose of the interview was not to diagnose the extent of the respondent's knowledge but to find out his/her opinions, views and feelings. However, in one case (a young unemployed woman with vocational education, living in a small village), the fear of the interview was so strong that it almost made the conversation impossible.

Interviews lasted from 45 to 90 minutes and were recorded on an audiotape. While conducting the research it was observed that the duration of an interview was connected with the level of the respondent's education and his/her communication skills¹³. Needless to say, better educated persons, marked by deeper knowledge of the discussed problems tended to talk longer, their comments were much more complex and better ordered and propounded arguments more diverse. The dynamics of conducted interviews was quite good: in the course of the conversation the respondents were becoming more open, their utterances were less controlled and they paid more attention to expressing their genuine opinions than to making a favourable impression on the interviewer. Interviews had an open-ended character, and they were partly structured and conducted on the basis of the guide which, in accordance with the nature of qualitative research, was rather a list of problems to be discussed during an interview than a list of ready-made questions asked in a specified order. In each case an interviewer adjusted questions to a particular respondent and to the situation in order to create the atmosphere of a casual conversation.

Each interview started with the discussion of topics unrelated to the object of research, which served the purpose of putting the respondents at their ease and accustoming them to the interviewer and the recording equipment. Thus, respondents were asked about matters connected with their life, occupation, interests, and plans for the future. Personal topics were a good starting point for discussing the process of Poland's integration with the European Union and the consequences of this process for the respondent and for the whole society. In this part of the interview, respondents were asked to indicate opportunities and threats for Poland connected with the integration process and to express their views on issues which had most often been brought up in the political and media discourse, such as the problem of agriculture, unemployment, opportunities for working abroad, and the evening up the standard of living. In this part of the interview the researcher also tried to reconstruct the respondent's perceptions of the European Union and Europe. Discussing the image of the European Union and its relation to Europe – differently perceived by our respondents – allowed the interviewer to move smoothly on to the problems connected with national identity and European identity. The objective of this part of the interview was to obtain information about ordinary people's opinions on issues repeatedly raised by opponents of the European integration process, according to whom the process constitutes a serious threat to Polish national identity. Factors constituting national identity and its importance to an 'average Pole' were also discussed. The respondents were asked simple questions like: 'What does it mean to be a Pole here and now?' or 'What does it mean to be a good Pole?' Although these questions were simple, the informative value of answers given is high as they give us an insight into changes that can occur in the national identity of the society that is transforming itself and experiencing various crises.

Having discussed the national identity we moved on to European identity, trying to define relations between the two categories. The respondents were asked what characterised Europeans and whether Poles could be called Europeans. Issues connected with the vision of

¹³ Assuming that the willingness to discuss a given topic is related to the knowledge of this topic, the observed tendency can be confirmed by quantitative research dealing with the level of Poles' knowledge about the European Union and their interest in the problem. The results of the research show that both interest taken in the issue of European integration and the level of knowledge about the integration are correlated with respondents' education. The higher the education level of the respondent, the better knowledge s/he has of the issue and greater interest in it s/he declares.

Europe and the European Union after the integration were also touched upon. The respondents were asked what, in their opinion, the European Union would look like in the future: if it would be the commonwealth of nation states, 'the Motherland of motherlands', or if it would be one multi-national state, 'the Motherland Europe'. The next issue discussed during the interview was the respondent's attitude towards foreigners. Thus, the respondents were asked if they had any contacts with foreigners, if they had stayed abroad, if they had any foreign friends or acquaintances. Not all the respondents had ever been abroad. Making a generalisation, we can state that among the persons who had had the experience of staying abroad, more were inhabitants of big cities than villages, more highly educated persons than those with poor education, and more persons having a high socio-economic status than those with a lower status. The question concerning contacts with foreigners allowed us to establish a frame of reference for the respondents' opinions and judgements on representatives of other states and nations.

Towards the end of the interview the respondents were asked about their views concerning the introduction of a common currency euro. However, for most respondents the issue was of marginal importance at the moment since, as they pointed out, it was difficult to predict now what consequences the introduction of euro would bring about in Poland. The respondents considered both positive and negative aspects of a common currency; they stressed however that it was difficult to discuss the problem without any previous experience of using the currency. Needless to say, well-travelled persons emphasized the convenience of using the euro while travelling.

While analysing the collected data we used two complementary analytical approaches: we conducted a qualitative analysis of the content, consisting in systematic analysis of transcribed interviews, and we also applied a holistic, interpretative approach, drawing on phenomenology and symbolic interactionism. (Miles and Huberman 2000). Embarking on the qualitative analysis of the content, we aimed first of all at ordering the collected material, selecting key terms and defining relations between them (Carley 1993). This part of the analysis was made easier by the use of the winMAX computer program, which facilitated the process of data segregation, coding and selecting key terms and fragments of utterances. The analysis of the content was complemented by the interpretative analysis understood first of all as focusing attention on how the respondents themselves and the researchers interpreted meanings. Thus, in the analytical approach we adopted, we tried to carry out a systematic analysis of what the respondents had said but, at the same time, we also aimed to gain insight into the meanings ascribed by them to concepts they used. While carrying out the qualitative analysis of the content, we were trying to separate mental maps and communication patterns characteristic of the respondents; we also attempted to find their structural determinants. However, in accordance with our premises concerning the nature of the social reality, which is both external in relation to social actors and constructed by them (Berger and Luckman 1983, Giddens 2001), we also aimed to reconstruct the way in which our respondents perceived their own situation, how they interpreted it and what actions they undertook as a result.

The process of data analysis consisted of the following stages:

1. getting acquainted with the data;
2. ordering and segregating the material;
3. describing the collected data;
4. interpreting the data and forming conclusions

In the first stage of analysis we became acquainted with the material: we read the transcripts, we tried to find some regularity in the data and we produced memos including various general remarks, comments and reflections that we made while reading the text (Miles and Huberman 2000). Having become acquainted with the data, we moved on to ordering and segregating it. This stage of analysis is essential for the quality of conclusions formed subsequently although, as Amanda Coffey and others (1996) write, it is often treated as a part of the research process of little importance. Qualitative researchers' reluctance to order systematically and segregate data is probably connected with the fact that it is a burdensome and time-consuming process: as Miles and Huberman (2000) as well as Carvajal (2002) write, it is often believed that these tasks take too much of the precious time, which could be used for e.g. in-depth analysis or interpretation of data. Such statements are justified to some extent, as the necessity to find all segments of the text referring to a particular aspect of the problem – a given code or research category, as qualitative researchers would say (see e.g. Marying 2000; Krippendorf 1980) – makes the analysis really burdensome, which results in fatigue and discourages people who are carrying it out.

This stage of analysis can be considerably facilitated by the use of the computer software specially designed for the purpose. The winMAX program we used helped us not only to code texts, but also to administer them more effectively and to find categories or fragments of utterances in which we were interested. In the third stage of the analysis we aimed first of all to make generalisations allowed by the ordered data. While describing the collected data we took into account two elements: we were looking for similarities and typical patterns of responses, and for characteristic differences between the respondents. Bearing in mind that qualitative research not only permits learning what respondents have to say but also getting acquainted with their linguistic picture of the world, we devoted attention to the terms used by the respondents, to the way in which they justified their standpoint and to the category of arguments they quoted.

The final stage of the analysis was data interpretation. This stage abounded in difficulties as it was not easy to create clear-cut and transparent categories, draw simple conclusions, and reconstruct distinguishable patterns. At this stage of the analysis we could see what problems 'contextuality' of qualitative data can cause: taking a remark out of context, the way in which it was expressed, and/or separating it from preceding part of the statement, can strip it of the meaning that a respondent wanted to convey and thus change its basic sense. All these difficulties, so typical of qualitative research, make the picture of Poland, Poles, Europe, the European Union and national, as well as European identity, reconstructed on the basis of the respondents' statements neither clear nor unambiguous or easy to interpret. It seems, however, that because of it, this picture better reflects the reality which it describes: it is similarly complex and constitutes a mixture of various interlinked feelings, threads, and experiences, rather than a set of easily ordered categories and concepts.

The survey

The Polish sample consisted of 1000 respondents and was weighted by the weighting vector prepared by the data provider. The sample was representative of the population of Poland aged 15 years or more (29 Millions). The survey has been conducted by IQS and the QUANT Group between 20/05/2002 and 30/05/2002.

The weighted structure of the sample is the following: 51 percent are female and 49 percent are male; the average age is almost 40 (mean 39.7; median 39); 37 percent lives in rural settlements and 23 percent in large cities over 200 inhabitants. Every fourth respondent stopped his/her education at the age of 15, 43 percent studied until the age of 19, and 20 percent continued education beyond this limit; 13 percent of respondents still attends schools or universities. The Polish data did not contain variables available for other countries, like civil status, occupation or left-right orientation. The occupational variable, provided extra on demand by the Polish agency which conducted this research, was defined in categories different from other countries: it contains the declaration of the last job of respondents without differentiating between employed and non-employed. Therefore, the comparative analysis with other countries is not possible in this respect. According to the last job the most frequently reported, 30 percent are qualified workers; the unqualified add another 13 percent. White collars and other workers in administration comprise together almost 25 percent. Farmers have the 5.4 percent share in the sample. Directors and firm owners are not very numerous (5 percent all together), but as firm owners, they can also be considered self-employed. The rule for comparative income-based classification provides the distribution which does not reconstruct the typically positively skewed income distribution: after excluding 18 percent of missing answers, 41 percent of remaining ones belong to the top income group (++), and only 9 percent to the bottom income group (--).

The main research findings

The understanding of the meanings of the nation, Europe, and the European Union in the media, political party, and the lay people discourses in Poland

The Nation

As revealed in the first Report, the historical route of the Polish nation development fits both ideal types of nation-building: the civic-territorial, allegedly specific to the western parts of Europe, and the ethnic-genealogical one, allegedly characteristic of eastern Europe. The political nation developed within the realm of the Royal Republic constitutes the first stage of national development, and it was the political nation which drew up and passed the written Constitution in 1791. The annihilation of the state by the absolutist neighbouring powers resulted in a separation of the nation from the political community. The modern Polish nation could develop at the 'grassroots' level only while these 'roots' could be fed by the living memory of the political nation; after its disappearance, they were grounded not in the civic criteria of national distinction but rather in ethnic ones (language, the literature written in it, religion, and a traditional way of life). Thus, both types of routes to nation formation have not been followed simultaneously, but each in its own time. Once taken, each has found its proponents and this has led to confrontations in the twentieth century. These two understandings of the nation – the civic and ethnic – are constantly present, as mirrored in the gathered and analysed data: the political and media discourses, the survey and the interviews. The re-interpretation of the ideal types, now seen as the ethnic-civic analytical continuum, does not allow for an adequate description of the historic route of Polish nation formation. The ethnic-civic continuum presupposes that between the two opposite poles there is an area of 'mixed types' constituted by a combination of the two extreme types. As presented above, this is not the case in Poland.

In light of the quantitative research findings, the meaning of the nation relates primarily to national symbols, common language, common borders, and common history, and, secondarily, to the factors shaping a society into an organised political and economic system (e.g., national independence and sovereignty, national army, common political and legal system, civil rights and duties, etc.). These findings have also been confirmed by the interviews. They reveal that, in the first place, lay individuals tend to point to national tradition, history, language and culture as the formative elements of the nation, and then point to current political and economic events (such as Poland's accession into the EU or the globalization process). Thus both elements – the ethnic and civic – are present in lay, 'grass-roots' discourses on the nation.

Strangely enough, in the mainstream media discourse, 'the nation' notion is absent, and Poland is basically referred to as a state, and rarely, as a society. Contrary to the mainstream media, the discourse of politics enlivens both perceptions of the nation; hence, for the interpretation of these various stands the ethnic-civic conceptual continuum is very useful. One extreme of the continuum occupies the interpretation of the nation as an ethnic, linguistic and cultural community with a historical right to its own state, and is proffered by the new radical formations (the populist agrarian party, SRP, and the national-Catholic, LPR). In accordance with this interpretation, the nation's interests are defined vis-à-vis supra-national initiatives such as European integration, and vis-à-vis 'Others,' both internal (non-Poles, non-Catholics, the Catholics who do not share nationalist ideas), and external. The understanding of the nation offered by the centre right-wing formation Law and Justice Party (PiS) – in which both ways of perceiving the nation, the civic and the ethnic, are present and entwined – is located somewhere in the middle of the ethnic-civic conceptual continuum. The nation is most often spoken of from an historical perspective, in the context of 1000 years of shared political experience, territory, and the Latin-Christian tradition but, at times, also as an ethnic community inhabiting the same territory, using the Polish language and sharing traditional values. The two most powerful and influential formations attracting the majority of voters – the centrist Civic Platform (PO) and the ruling Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) – draw upon a civic understanding of the Polish nation located on the other side of the ethnic-civic continuum. The former party (PO) conceives the nation as a politically organised community, performing a subservient role in relation to the free individuals who form it. The nation is construed as a community of fates, interests and challenges; the key concepts used are civil society and a state subordinated to public interests. The ruling SLD organises the discourse of the nation in purely socio-economic categories, showing a tendency to blur the distinction between the categories of 'nation,' 'state,' and 'society.' Hence, the political discourses on the nation seem 'compatible' with the lay persons', 'grass-roots' discourses. In light of the collected and analysed data, the ethnic-civic conceptual continuum appears to be a useful analytical tool for the segregation and interpretation of current discourses on the nation. This analytical tool, however, does not allow for an adequate interpretation of the historical trajectory of Polish nation formation.

Europe

It seems that while Europe has been perceived in the media discourse basically through the prism of historical-objective elements as a historical, cultural and geographical entity, political party discourses apply both historical-objective and relational-subjective elements. The key concepts used in representation of Europe have been closely tied to history and geopolitics. The majority of the parties construe Europe as a political emanation of the

democratic West, perceived as the 'First World.' All political parties place Europe in the West-East context, but the geopolitical perspective is favoured by the SLD which emphasises that the close link with the West suits Poland's political (military security), and economic interests. This rhetoric is enriched by the right-wing formation which also points to Christianity as a common European heritage, and to this the centrist formation adds the axiological-civilisational element when perceiving Europe as a source of cultural and civilisational values. A characteristic feature of the discourse of politics drawing upon the relational-subjective elements is perception of Yalta as a milestone event that split Europe into East and West. Irrespective of the prism chosen, Poland is construed as having always been a part of Europe from the beginning of the Polish state (since 966), despite forced political and economic separation of the country from the West after WWII. Accordingly, the majority of the political formations in Poland see the country's integration with the European Union as supporting national interests.

Interviews conducted have added further insights into this issue as most respondents do not identify Europe with the EU: Europe is defined in geographical and cultural categories. The respondents explicitly expressed their conviction that Poland belongs to Europe (the insider stand); however, when describing living conditions in Poland they compare them to those in Europe (the outsider stand). This reveals that, for them, Europe means two things: a cultural entity to which Poland belongs, and a technological (civilisational) entity to which Poland still aspires (and integration with the EU is aimed at speeding up this process). Research findings have largely validated the hypothesis stating that the historical-objective and relational-subjective elements are closely intertwined in the understandings of Europe and the nation and cannot be separated from one another.

The European Union

In the mainstream media discourse the EU is portrayed as an economic and political edifice, sometimes as the 'Union Club' or 'European Club' that fears the Eastern Enlargement (see the left-wing *Trybuna*, and centre-right-wing *ycie* newspapers). In its relation to the EU Poland is presented either as a client (petitioner) or as a state that with much effort is trying to acquire partner status. Occasionally a binary representation of a strong EU and weak Poland can also be spotted. Characteristically, presentation of the EU as a dynamic and developing structure welcoming the Eastern Enlargement and deeper integration of Europe accompanies the portrayal of Poland as an EU partner. In the media discourse the representation of Poland in relation to the EU is prone to strong evaluation, too.

Perception of the European Union seems to be a strong differentiating element in the discourse of politics as some formations employ the rhetoric of fear of the EU, others the rhetoric of security, and still others the rhetoric of 'diversity and community.' This variety suggests that party leadership use specific representations of the EU as rhetorical devices to strengthen their electoral power. Generally, the new radical formations (LPR, SRP), and partly the post-communist agrarian party (PSL), use the populist rhetoric of fear of the European Union. They portray the EU as an emanation of all evil in Europe; European integration is construed in terms of a new imperialism, of the construction of a European Empire that threatens the sovereignty of weaker nations. Among the metaphors used to build this image of the EU, the Tower of Babel is the most telling. Added to this by individual politicians of the peasant party (PSL) is the metaphor of the EU as a 'Rich Man's Club' with the potential to exploit farmers. Dominant, however, are the rhetoric of security and the rhetoric of diversity. The image of the EU in the dominant discourse of politics promoted by

the left-wing, and a majority of the right-wing parties, is multi-dimensional. One dimension that contrasts with the anti-EU rhetoric portrays the European Union as a shelter and guarantee of *security* for Poland; but while the left-wing formation refers to *economic* security, the right-wing parties emphasize *state* security, i.e., the country's sovereignty. In contrast to this, the rhetoric of the centrist formation (PO) is enthusiastic. It emphasises and evaluates strongly the cultural diversity of the EU, formed of many nations who are nevertheless able to arrive at a 'consensus in fundamental matters' which is perceived as an asset.

Poland in relation to the European Union is an important element in the discourse of politics, and the country's integration with the EU is most often defined as a priority of Polish foreign policy. However, the relevant discussion ranges from arguments perceiving integration as a goal, to arguments presenting it as a means to achieving an end. The former construe Poland-EU relations with regard to the country's expected benefits from integration, while the latter speculate on whether and on what terms *it is worth integrating*. The pro-European Union parties focus on the opportunities for development, enumerating a catalogue of political, economic, social, cultural and civilisational benefits that Poland, portrayed as an active EU partner, will derive from integration. The right-wing formation (PiS), which sees integration as a means of continuing Poland's modernization, states the conditions for integration as such: in the 'Europe of nations' the member states should preserve their values and identity, and all member states should participate in the reconstruction of the EU. In this context the categories of 'first-class,' 'second-class,' and 'full' membership are employed. Yet another condition states that Christian civilisation (i.e., Christian ethics) is the foundation of a desirable European social order.

One of the most striking findings from the interviews is the ambivalence of the respondents' attitudes towards Poland's integration with the EU, seen as promoting the interests of its powerful member states. Nevertheless, the integration is perceived as a necessity and the best solution the country has. Expected advantages (inflow of capital, new workplaces, economic development) and concerns (annexation, exploitation, market for foreign goods) are purely of an economic nature. Hence, respondents were unable to decide whether Poland, as a country, will benefit from integration as, most certainly, the elite (i.e., people with the capital of education, connections, and money) will. Differentiated from Europe, the European Union is perceived mainly in economic terms as an organization of countries aiming at creating a counterbalance to US economic power. However, according to the respondents the desired shape of the EU would be a 'Europe of Motherlands' that allows all member states to maintain their identity, peculiarity, and independence. Interestingly enough the respondents point out that neither thinking in universalistic terms nor the common market, economic policy, or currency will conquer the pursuit of national interests by any of the member states (as they say, German national interests will always be closer to every German's heart than the EU common interests or the interests of any other member state). The European Union and Poland in relation to the EU have been perceived in the mainstream media and political party discourses through the prism of relational-subjective elements. Hence, Poland is portrayed as either a client of the 'European Union Rich Man's Club,' whose integration promotes the political and economic interests of the EU's most powerful member-states, or as a partner in the dynamic and expanding EU, or finally as a country integrating with the EU in order to strengthen its political and economic security and pursue its modernisation. To this the respondents add their substantial doubts regarding the expected benefits of the integration.

The national and European identities of Poles

The quantitative research shows that the national identity of Poles clusters both around ethnic elements, such as language, national symbols, ancestry, and common historical heritage, as well as (to a slightly lesser degree) to the civic factors like a common political and legal system, civil rights and duties, and the national economy. It also reveals the greater importance of the ethno-cultural items rather than the civic ones among women and the rural population; with this in mind, caution should be taken when attempting generalisations on the national identity of all 'Poles.' Thus, in the light of the survey, the content of the national identity is formed by both the ethnic and civic factors. These findings correspond with the results of analysis of the political discourses which revealed that, on the Polish political forum, both discourses regarding the Polish nation are present – the ethnic and civic one. Applying the civic-ethnic analytical continuum for the interpretation of findings, one can state that the meanings of the national identity are distributed along this continuum, but the dominant political discourses cluster around the civic end of the continuum, while the lay public discourse tends towards the ethnic end.

The qualitative research generally confirms this tendency. On the one hand, national identity is considered with regard to national heritage, language and culture. However, at the same time, it is discussed with regard to current political and economic events. Most specifically this pertains to Poland's accession into the EU, the globalisation process seen as the spread of Western cultural patterns, and the country's economic situation, in which context the respondents referred to their fears regarding the rate of unemployment and poverty in the country. When addressing the national identity issue through the prism of the ethnic elements such as tradition, historic heritage, language and culture, the respondents often used the term of 'Polishness.' Interestingly enough, none of them referred to Catholicism when asked about the meaning or the content of 'Polishness', which means that the respondents did not connect religious identity with the national one. Moreover, 'Polishness' was described with regard to emotions when the respondents talk about their fondness, pride, and the feelings that bind them to Poland. This translates or, as they point out, should be translated into everyday economic decisions, such as choosing Polish products, Polish companies as contractors, etc. The pragmatic rather than ethnic understanding of national identity reveals itself, too, in an observation that being a Pole currently has its bad sides because of the economic hardships, and the threat of unemployment results in the lack of future prospects for many. Yet another important finding is that the respondents strongly identify with society – in this context they interchangeably use such terms as the nation, the Poles, and the inhabitants of Poland rather than the state. The reason for this may be the corruption of the political elites presented and widely discussed by the media.

The meanings of national identity as reflected in the discourses of politics can be situated on the ethnic-civic analytical continuum. For the liberal centrist parties, the content of the national identity comprises civil society and its values; for the right-wing parties, this content consists of the historical past, culture, language, and homeland (territory). The radical formations, and occasionally agrarian parties, tend to equate national identity with the religious (Catholicism) and ethnic identities, as well as the ethnic/national territory. Findings presented so far validate a hypothesis stating that the content of the national identity reflects the political trajectory and cultural tradition of the nation. They also reveal the usefulness of the civic-ethnic analytical continuum as a tool for interpretation of the findings.

In light of the quantitative research, the national identity is inclusive in relation to the European identity: being a Pole means being a European. With regard to the project hypothesis, the findings clearly show that both identities of the Poles, the national and the European one, are closely intertwined. In accordance with this, Poles point to a common European civilisation as the strongest unifying factor, followed by another most frequently chosen factor, i.e., membership in a European society with many languages and cultures. Meanwhile, such items as common ancestry, a set of European Union symbols, common history and a common destiny were seen as the weakest unifying factors. Hence, the respondents construe their European identity with regard to civic rather than ethnic or emotional factors. Aside from this, however, the European identity is less significant for the rural population and the inhabitants of the smaller towns; again, this reminds us that caution should be taken when attempting generalisations on the national identity of all 'Poles'.

The qualitative research adds a relational dimension to all this. Firstly, the respondents spoke of a European identity in terms of being 'a European', which means being an open, tolerant, good mannered, educated person that speaks foreign languages. This is an ideal not matched by all Poles nor all Germans, French or English people, etc. A European is also a person who thinks in wider terms, like the united Europe. The respondents sometimes correlate this with education which moves away from stereotypes, and with a place of residence that promotes the openness of city dwellers. According to the respondents, young Poles can be regarded as Europeans (in the given sense) as they are open, tolerant, mobile, full of dynamism, and oriented towards the future. Secondly, the respondents differentiate between themselves as Europeans and the Western European. They perceive the latter as superior in aspects referring to civilisational elements (e.g., infrastructure, technological advancement, standard of living, etc.) and social elements (e.g., behaviours, manners, or daily culture). Explaining the reason for the stated difference, they point to historical events (i.e., the post-war political arrangement, the Iron Curtain which cut the country off from the Marshall Plan), arguing that economic advancement shapes not only the living standards but, in due course, creates circumstances that promote the purification of behaviour, manners, or the social culture in general. Concurrently, many respondents, especially those well educated, perceive a certain cultural superiority of Poles vis-à-vis the Western Europeans, and this time they do not refer to daily or pragmatic features but to the spiritual culture, the sensitivity of Poles or the quality of their education. Making comparisons between themselves as Europeans and the Western European, the respondents also observe that the latter do not always treat Poles as equal partners. Thus, the qualitative research findings show that the national and European identities are by no means mutually exclusive, and neither are they closely intertwined. Rather they are complementary, developing in a different frame of reference. Thus, being a Pole does not, in and of itself, include or exclude being a European in the sense given by the respondents. And, as shown, the European identity reflects relational dimensions. An interesting finding in the media and political party discourses regarding the relation between the national and European identities is the postulate formulated by the ruling left-wing party (SLD) that we Europeans need to build the new, enlarged European identity.

The data gathered and analysed validate the hypotheses put forward proving that the national and European identities are not mutually exclusive but rather tend to be closely intertwined; the European identity reflects the relational dimension; the national identity reflects the political trajectory and cultural tradition of the nation; and the civic-ethnic analytical continuum serves as a useful tool for the interpretation of the data.

The Links between Party and Media Discourses

Analyses of the political elite discourses in the form of political party electoral platforms and parliamentary debates on the Kosovo war and the Alliance against Afghanistan at moments of crisis, and the media discourse during the Nice European Council summit and the launch of the euro currency, arrive at significant findings. As stated in previous sections, the perceptions of Europe and the European Union are much richer, and attitudes towards integration with the EU are more polarised in party political discourse than in the media discourse; this may be attributed to party leadership preoccupation with strengthening electoral power.

In the mainstream media discourse, Europe, when perceived through the prism of historical-objective elements, has been construed as a historical, cultural and geographical entity; the EU has been portrayed as an economic and political edifice; and EU-Poland relations have evoked strong opinions. In political party discourses that apply both historical-objective and relational-subjective elements, the perceptions of the European Union as well as of Poland in relation to it differ significantly. While some formations employ the rhetoric of fear of the European Union, others find the rhetoric of security most persuasive, while still others choose the rhetoric of ‘enriching diversity.’ Additionally, discussions on Poland in relation to the European Union range from presenting the integration as a goal to seeing it as a means towards achieving further modernisation of the country. In the mainstream media discourse no coherent policy of presenting ‘Europe’ and ‘the EU’ has been detected; in accordance with this, in both press and TV, discourses on the categories of ‘the nation,’ ‘European identity,’ or ‘national identity’ have been absent along with references to Polish history or tradition. Generally, in the media discourse Poland is referred to as a state and rarely as a society. Contrary to this, the discourse of politics employs a wide range of perceptions of the nation – from the ethnic to the civic interpretation with the ethno-civic in the middle of the continuum. As confirmed by the survey and the interviews, this broad spectrum is represented by various attitudes present in contemporary Polish society.

A striking finding in the analysis of the media and political party discourses is that both have joined in the nationwide discussion on ‘the Poland-belonging-to-Europe’ issue. Moreover, it was made clear that the culture and history of Europe is also the culture and history of Poland. The relevant discourses share a stance expressly articulated in a government document (the National Integration Strategy, 1997) that reads: ‘For over a thousand years Poland has belonged to Europe in a geopolitical, cultural and economic sense and has shared its basic values, which Poland has co-created and defended.’ On this basis an argument has been formulated that full institutional integration is advantageous for both sides, the EU and Poland, and is an obvious direction for the development of the continent. In this context *ycie* (the centre-right-wing newspaper) would argue that Poland is an important partner for the EU because it is an integral part of Europe, to which right-wing parties add the argument that Poland is simply returning to its former place in Europe to which it has always belonged civilisationally. The majority of the parties and the media – be they left, right or centre – seem to have reached a consensus regarding the Poland-belonging-to-Europe issue. As demonstrated, there are links between party and media discourses. Nevertheless, these findings permit neither validation nor invalidation of the hypothesis stating that the media play a significant role in setting the discursive context in which opinions on public issues are formed and debated.

Relations between lay people, media and elite discourses

As revealed in the qualitative research, lay people relate to their immediate and personal experiences in accounting for their idea of the nation and Europe. They add a new dimension to this discourse, which is completely absent from the media and political discourses, i.e., the economic situation and the hardships of life in Poland. From this negative evaluation arises a negative image of the elite as being corrupt, and interested only in assuming power and promoting their own particular interests rather than those of the society or state. Nevertheless, in their 'grassroots' discourses, ordinary people, still confident in their own judgements, also refer to the issues and arguments put forth by the media and the political elites. For instance, they do not perceive Poland's accession to the EU as threatening to the national identity of Poles (recall that this has been one of the strongest arguments put forward by the new radical formations opposing accession and campaigning against it in the media). In the opinion of the majority of respondents, the threat of losing a distinct identity is an issue invented by the media, and/or as an instrument in the political game, but not a real danger. They also emphasised that Poles had succeeded in preserving their national identity under severe conditions (the Partitions, the wars, subjection to the USSR, etc.). Again, opposing the rhetoric of the opponents of accession, most respondents emphasizs that the integration process does not pose a threat to the cultural distinctiveness of EU member states; national identities will constitute a point of reference for their citizens for a long time to come.

Lay people also introduce new dimensions to the debate on threats to national identity, alternative to those already discussed by the radical formations, and they point to the globalisation process which is causing unification of cultural patterns and lifestyles, fostering the consumer culture, and, in turn, (re)orienting persons towards career and success and away from the family. According to the respondents these are the changes that pose a real threat to the national identity (not only the Polish, but in general). A new dimension brought into the debate on European identity is a European ideal type and an observation regarding 'the contextual' factors of the Europeanness of an individual, i.e., level of education and place of residence.

On the basis of the interviews it is not possible to validate the hypothesis stating that lay people organise their discourse around the main issues, values and arguments put forward by the media and the political elites. They employ in their 'grassroots' discourse, however, certain values, issues, and arguments of the 'grand' discourses, i.e., media and political party ones. For instance, like the mainstream media, they form strong opinions on EU-Polish relations, seeing the EU as an edifice directed by the egoistic interests of its powerful member-states (resembling 'the Rich Men's Club' rhetoric), and, like the political elite, they look through the prism of relational-subjective elements and joined the nationwide discussion on the Poland-belonging-to-Europe issue.

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5.3 Central Western Europe

5.3.1 Austria

Approach and methodologies

As outlined in the project proposal, one of the main objectives of EURONAT is to enlarge and revise the existing knowledge regarding the entanglements of Europe and the nation in collective identities in current and prospective member states. For this purpose, the German-Austrian team has developed an analytical model for enquiring about the relationships between Europe and the nation in collective identities, which is more complex than the usual distinctions between the national and European levels as well as that between civic and ethnic dimensions of collective identities. This more complex model has then been applied to the several research steps: the historical-sociological analysis of the construction of Austrian collective identity from 1945 to 1989, its historical foundations in the 19th and 20th centuries and its reconstruction in the decade after 1989 as well as the empirical analysis of the development of Austrian collective identity in the years 2000-03 regarding the political elites, the media, public opinion and lay persons in civil society.

The analytical framework for investigating the entanglements of Europe and the nation in collective identities assumes that collective identities are formed by various constitutive dimensions and spatial levels. Regarding the constitutive dimensions, the analytical framework presupposes five major components of collective identity: primordial-ethnic, religious-cultural, political, socio-economic and military components. Each component of collective identity is relational, entailing both identity and boundary constructions. Following Eisenstadt/Giesen (1995) and Smith (2001), this analytical framework is more complex than the usual civic/ethnic distinction in most of the literature on nationalism and national identity literature. Thus, instead of an ethnic-civic continuum, we assume a multi-dimensional identity space in which ethnic and civic identity components, amongst others, have varying weight and valence. At the same time, the analytical framework assumes that these components relate to several spatial levels of boundary constructions: the sub-national, national, European civilisational and European integrational levels with linkages to the world. These spatial or relational dimensions are again more differentiated than the conventional binary combination of national and European levels. Particularly, the distinction between two distinct levels of the European civilisation or Europe and European integration or European Union is an innovation as compared to the existing theoretical as well as empirical literature (Kohli 2000; Spohn 2003).

On the basis of this analytical framework, we shall present, in the context of the existing historical, political and sociological literature, an interpretive outline of the construction and reconstruction of the Austrian nation in the context of Europe and European integration regarding the changing role of the constitutive identity dimensions; this outline focuses on the main periods of Habsburg and Austrian history in the 19th and 20th centuries, with a particular attention to the decade after the geographical shift in Europe.

In the study of political party and media discourses, we have applied interpretive and discursive methods in order to analyse, comprehend and describe the meanings, values,

symbols, attitudes, orientations and their intensities characteristic of the Austrian national and European identity mix in its constitutive and spatial dimensions.

We have also designed in collaboration with the Eurobarometre a survey in Austria, concentrating again on the spatial dimensions from the local and regional to the national and European levels and on the composition of the Austrian identity profile in the constitutive ethno-cultural, political, socio-economic and symbolic identity dimensions. The survey was conducted in April and May 2002 and was based on 1000 respondents.

We also conducted semi-structured, in-depth interviews with 24 lay persons and 6 teachers in March, April and May 2003. The interviewees were selected according to residence (city, middle-sized and small town) in four different Austrian regions (NW, NE, East and SE), class (middle vs. working class), education (high vs. low), gender (male and female) as well as age (old and young). Again the aim has been to find out and describe the complex national and European identity mix on the individual level and to classify it along the constitutive and spatial dimensions. Although the low number of interviewees (due to practical-financial reasons) did not permit any representative conclusions, the interviews were able to illustrate major types of national and European identity mixtures of lay people and their political socialisation in the educational system.

Historical construction and reconstruction of Austrian collective identity

In the present, Austria in its relation to Germany is an autonomous and self-conscious nation. On this backdrop, the tendency in the social, political and to some extent also the historical sciences is to project the Austrian nation as a primordial entity into the past. This projection, however, presents an objectivist fallacy (Bruckmüller 1996). In early modern Europe, Austria had ascended to the double political centre of the German Roman Empire as well as Habsburg Empire and, despite the expansion and relocation of the Habsburg Empire to the East, it remained so until the dissolution of the German Roman Empire under the impact of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic European wars. Under those circumstances, the emerging modern nationalism in Austria since the early 19th century oscillated between an Empire-oriented, an Austrian regional as well as pan-German nationalism. In the 1848 revolution, the German Austrians, though not without tensions, were an integral part of the pan-German Frankfurt Parliament. After the defeat of the Habsburg army against Prussia in 1866, the ground was prepared for the unification of Germany under Prussian hegemony and for the closer unity between Austria and Hungary as the double centre of the Habsburg Empire. At the same time, the growing German-Austrian nationalism developed still in the triadic form of an Empire-preserving, Austrian regional as well as pan-German nationalism. After the collapse of the Habsburg Empire after World War I, the First Austrian Republic defined itself as an Austrian nation, but at the same time as an integral part of the German Reich, though hindered by the victorious Allies to join it. And when the Nazi Third Reich annexed Austria in 1938, almost two thirds of the Austrian population saw it as a fulfilment of national aspirations. Only with the experience of Nazi totalitarian dictatorship and its collapse in World War II, was the ground prepared for a separate formation of an Austrian nation and national identity.

On this historical background, the post-War II development of an Austrian national identity has to be seen as an Empire-contracting nationalism, separating from its double imperial

legacy of the Habsburg as well as the German Empire. Four major topics in the public and scholarly debates accompanied this transformation process from an imperial to a national identity in post-World War II Austria. Firstly, in separating from the Great-German and Nazi past, the dominant Austrian discourse interpreted the *Anschluss* by the Third Reich as an imposed annexation rather than a voluntary affiliation, downplaying the active role of Austria in the Nazi Third Reich and instead emphasising the victimisation of a small nation under Nazi rule. As a corollary, the impetus to come to terms with the past was much weaker than in Germany and scandals around Austrian Nazi complicity have continued. Secondly, in separating not only from the Nazi past but also from the Great German legacy, the public and scholarly controversy has centred on the relationship between the German and Austrian layers of Austrian collective identity. Though after 1945 a pragmatic political consensus on the formation of a separate Austrian state had emerged, it took quite some time to arrive also at a political and public consensus of the legitimacy of an autonomous Austrian nation. This process of Austrianisation came to completion only with the FPÖ's renunciation of its German national course after 1990. Thirdly, the German cultural elements in the Austrian nation and national identity such as German language, culture and history and their role in public education remained, until recently, quite controversial. From the perspective of a culture-centred nationalism, an Austrian nation-state on the bases of German language and culture still seems to be a contradiction. Accordingly, Austrian scholars have argued for the specific Austrian, non-German historical and cultural foundations of modern Austrian national identity referring to the ethnic-territorial foundations of an Austrian regional identity; the Austrian contribution to German culture; the Habsburg legacies of Austria; and the historical importance of a specifically Austrian nationalism. Austrian scholars wanted to prove that the post-World War II development of a separate Austrian nation was not simply a voluntaristic-political construct but based on objective historical and cultural foundations.

A fourth topic in the public and scholarly debates has centred on the relationship between Austria and Europe. In the context of the emerging Cold War confrontation between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union, the Austrian neutrality was an essential precondition for the unification and independence of Austria and, as such, became institutionalized in the constitution of the newly founded Austrian nation-state. However, with the increasing dependency of Austria from the West and particularly integrating Western Europe, this neutrality doctrine has become more and more contested. Austria's neutral attitude began only to change when, with the erosion of the Cold-War system, the likewise neutral Scandinavian countries decided to apply for European Union membership: Austria, with Sweden and Finland, became member of the European Union in 1995. At the same time, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emerging eastern enlargement of the European Union, the relationship of Austria to Eastern Europe has now become a controversial topic in political and public debates oscillating between a pro-Western orientation and a mediating role between the West and the Eastern neighbours, a role through which there is a reconstituting of the Habsburg legacy within the extending European Union. From a comparative perspective, three characteristics of the entanglements of Austrian national and European identity are particularly worthwhile to note. First, the primary identification of Austrians with their nation alone and their nation first and then with Europe has been relatively high, and it remained so throughout the decade after 1990. Second, the primary identification with Europe alone or Europe first and then the nation has been relatively low throughout the same period. The support of the eastern enlargement has been with around 30% the lowest in the old member states, indicating a mixture between fears of the negative economic consequences of the eastern enlargement and xenophobic sentiments against

foreigners, particularly strong at the post-cold-War fault-line between Western and Eastern Europe.

National and European identities in the Austrian party system

The historical-sociological perspective on the reconstruction of the meaning of the nation and Europe in Austrian collective identities after 1945 and its transformation after the collapse of communism in 1990 has provided a comparative framework that allows one to determine the ways in which two major actors in the Austrian public sphere -- political parties and the media -- have influenced the reconstruction of the Austrian national-European identity mix in the two years from 2000 to 2002. The public sphere can be seen as an open communication space between the official and the private constituted by various arenas, actors and audiences. As such, the public sphere is a relatively autonomous, mediating, discursive sphere in which collective identities are articulated, represented, constituted and reconstituted. Two major actors and arenas of the public sphere are the political parties and the media. The media in their different forms of newspapers, radios, television, etc. constitute institutions and collective actors concerned with the production and distribution of communication and, as such, are simultaneously a forum and an actor in public opinion making. Political parties are political organisations of sectors of the population that compete for political power, decision-making and influence on public opinion. As major arenas and actors in the public sphere, both media and parties depend on each other and at the same time on the public in its double role as recipient and voter. Thus, the core question is how the historically transmitted forms of the Austrian national-European identity mix are present in these two public actors, taken up, shaped, reproduced and transformed in specific ways in the analysed time-period and events.

Regarding the Austrian party system, first, it represents a whole spectrum of political value orientations to the nation and Europe, partially overlapping, partially diverging; combining political-ideological elite levels with popular opinion; and articulating overarching state as well as particularistic regional attitudes. The contemporary right-left spectrum ranges from the conservative-liberal Austrian People's Party (ÖVP), the Socialist Party of Austria (SPÖ), the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), and the Green Party, whereas the Communist Party of Austria (KPÖ) has been completely marginalised. The ÖVP as the one, primarily middle-class based pillar of the traditional Austrian political system of *Proporzdemokratie* has presented a mixture of Christian, social and democratic values on the basis of long-standing Austrian national-regional orientations. The SPÖ as the other, primarily working-class based pillar of the Austrian political system, has articulated a mixture of socialist, anti-clerical and democratic values gradually adjusting to Austrian-national orientations, but for a while in tension with the internationalist and Great-German legacy. The KPÖ, as a rather traditionalist Soviet-oriented communist party, had had a certain influence in the immediate post-World War II period, but lost it in the following decades of the Second Austrian Republic and particularly after the collapse of the Soviet Empire. The FPÖ has formed the third camp between the dominating people's party with a mixture of right-wing radicalism and anti-system liberalism, transforming the Great-German legacy after the collapse of Soviet communism into an Austrian neo-nationalism. The Greens, copying the German model, brought to the fore ecological-pacifist and socialist-feminist orientations, but in the context of an established Austrian identity. The post-communist decade has experienced a rise of the two populist parties of the right and the left at the cost of the traditional conservative and

socialist political mainstream, contributing to a considerable pluralisation of the Austrian party system and political culture.

In a parallel to this process of political pluralisation, also a transformation of the attitudes towards Europe and European integration within the Austrian political party spectrum took place. With the geopolitical sea-change in Europe, the coordinates of the received neutrality doctrine of Austrian foreign policy underwent a fundamental transformation. The main people's parties, the ÖVP and SPÖ, carried through this transformation without giving up the neutrality doctrine by leading Austria into the European Union but keeping Austria out of NATO. The Greens were rather split regarding this course, only recently being more supportive of European integration. The FPÖ remained critical about the EU, viewing it as a new Empire to endanger Austrian sovereignty, but started to opt for membership in NATO. Also in the Austrian population, despite the EU sanctions against Austria, the support for EU integration, though comparatively seen on a medium level, was rather increasing than declining.

The qualitative analysis of the party programs and party attitudes regarding European political, military and economic integration as well as the eastern enlargement has been able to specify the changes in the meanings at work in restructuring the European orientations within the party spectrum. On the basis of the EURONAT framework for analysing the national and European identity mix, these changes can be summarized as follows: Regarding the different conceptions of Europe, the ÖVP emphasises particularly the Christian-humanist traditions in the European civilisation as well as the Habsburg legacies in Central Europe; at the same time, it underscores the cultural and ethnic foundations of the Austrian *Heimat* as part of the European family of nations. The SPÖ has a rather secularist-humanist view of Europe, supporting more the political, social and citizen-centred integration of Europe. The FPÖ holds also to a secularist notion of Europe on the basis of a sort of anarchist-liberal view on individual and collective freedom, turning against a transnational-functionalist form of European integration. And the Greens are basically for European integration, but in a less capitalist and more social and feminist form. Regarding the eastern enlargement, the ÖVP has been the most vocal supporter, while, however, limiting it primarily to the Habsburgian space of small nations in Central Europe. The SPÖ and Greens have been more critical, focusing on the potential social or ecological implications. Only the FPÖ has been negative, mobilising Austrian fears against foreigners and immigrants. Regarding the euro, again the ÖVP was unconditionally supportive, whereas the SPÖ and Greens at least at the beginning stressed the potential negative effects on the Austrian economy, and the FPÖ turned against it on behalf of Austrian national sovereignty. And regarding Austrian foreign policy, the ÖVP adjusted the Austrian neutrality doctrine to the post-Cold-War world order, whereas the SPÖ and the Greens tended to keep the restrictive meaning of this doctrine seriously and the FPÖ argued for replacing it by a more active military policy in the face of international terrorism.

In comparison to the German political party spectrum, the Austrian parties are characterised by three particularities. Firstly, the support for European integration by the political parties is generally lower and more split between the main parties than in the German case; this can be interpreted as a higher concern about national sovereignty in Austria. Secondly, the notion of Europe articulated in the Austrian party system is divided, as in Germany, between a Christian-humanistic and a secularist-humanist camp, but the Christian camp has a stronger Catholic-Habsburg shape; in a sense, the imperial background is stronger in Austria than in Germany. Thirdly, the concern about the eastern enlargement regarding its impacts on

migration and labour markets is considerably higher in Austria than in Germany. Fourthly, regarding the key issues of European integration such as the euro, the European constitution or a unified European foreign and military policy, the political orientations in the party spectrum reflect the concern of a small nation being overwhelmed by the European Union, in contrast to a big nation actively involved in its construction and direction.

The representation of Europe and the nation in Austrian media

As compared to the political party analysis, the investigation of the Austrian media has been rather selective. Three of the six newspapers studied are national or trans-regional print-media: *Der Standard*, *Die Presse* and *Kronenzeitung*—all published in Vienna; the other three are regional newspapers: *Salzburger Nachrichten* from Salzburg, *Oberösterreichische Nachrichten* from Upper Austria and *Kleine Grazer Zeitung* from Carinthia. The *Standard* and the *Presse* are educated middle class papers, the *Standard* in a social-liberal orientation, the *Presse* in a liberal-conservative one. The tabloid-populist *Kronenzeitung* attracts primarily lower middle-class and working-class readers. The *Salzburger Nachrichten*, *Oberösterreichische Nachrichten* and the *Kleine Grazer Zeitung* reach primarily local and regional middle-class and lower middle-class readers; the *Salzburger Nachrichten* follows a rather liberal-conservative orientation, the *Oberösterreichische Nachrichten* a social-liberal direction, and the *Kleine Grazer Zeitung* a more conservative-populist course. In addition, two national television channels were included in the study: the *Austria I* and *SAT*; the first is a public channel with mostly a middle-class audience and the second a German-owned private channel with rather working class and youth appeal.

Whereas the political party analysis has given, on the basis of changes in voter alliances in the post-unification phase, some indications about the general shifts in the national/European identity web, the media analysis could provide only some indications of the qualitative form of this identity web over a short time-span on the educated middle-class national and regional level as well as the less educated national and regional working-class level. Despite this limitation, the media analysis has been able to give some insights into the various components of the European/national identity mix, as articulated in the selected major events of the Nice Summit in December 2000 and the launch of the euro in January 2002. The Nice Summit was primarily dedicated to a reform of the EU institutions and decision-making processes in the face of the prospective new members from East-Central, Southern Europe and South-Eastern Europe, and it thus primarily addressed the relation of the various nation-states to European integration as well as its enlargement to the East. The launch of the euro was primarily an economic event, but as such it was embedded in various dimensions in the relationships between national and European identity. Thus, despite the focus on highly selective events, the results of the media analysis have provided novel insights into the role of the media in the public sphere in constructing the national/European identity mix in the current time-period.

Considering, first, the research results regarding the national educated middle-class newspapers, the *Presse* and the *Standard* cover most comprehensively European matters, but the *Presse* more from a liberal-conservative, Christian-humanistic world-view and the *Standard* rather from a social-liberal, humanistic-secularised value frame and thus cover the main political spectrum from the ÖVP to the SPÖ. Both die *Presse* and the *Standard* share a basic vision of a democratic Europe, viewed from the perspective of a small, democratic and neutral nation-state and the peaceful coexistence and cooperation of the small and big nation-

states; but the *Presse* emphasises more the European Christian-humanistic foundations and Habsburg legacies with more exclusive boundaries vis-à-vis Orthodox-Christian and Islamic countries, whereas the *Standard* stresses more the European humanistic-civic foundations with more inclusive tendencies. Accordingly, both newspapers were critical of the nationalist power struggle in Nice, particularly vis-à-vis France, but at the same time insisted on the Austrian commissioner, welcomed the European constitution in the making, tried to support the eastern enlargement against a sceptical public. They reported with a certain lack of enthusiasm on the launch of the euro. Finally, the *Presse* emphasized more a pro-government and less EU-oriented view, whereas the *Standard* was more critical against the Austrian government and more European in its outlook.

Reviewing, second, the findings on the three regional newspapers, all of them are less European and more national and regional in their focus, but at the same time with considerable differences in their political and cultural orientations. The *Salzburger Nachrichten*, on the basis of a primarily cultural vision of Europe, is very critical of the results of the Nice summit, defending Germany's normal claims against a backward-looking France and at the same time supporting an Austrian commissioner. The *Oberösterreichische Nachrichten*, from a liberal-social perspective on Europe, defends particularly the claims of the small nations in Europe against the power ambitions of the big ones. The *Kleine Grazer Zeitung* is rather resentful against the EU and particularly France as the epitome of a centralized Europe. In this spectrum of European attitudes, the *Salzburger Nachrichten* makes a plea for European cultural understanding, supports the eastern enlargement, welcomes the euro, and recognises the need for further EU reforms; the *Oberösterreichische Nachrichten* expresses its hopes for a more democratic and equal Europe, supports the eastern enlargement and is sceptical about the euro; and the *Kleine Grazer Zeitung* is against further steps of European integration, emphasises the dangers of the eastern enlargement and shows a certain nostalgia for the *Shilling*. Despite these differences in key issues of European integration, there is a common support for Austria as a small nation against a Europe of the big ones.

Looking, third, at the results on the tabloid mass paper *Kronenzeitung*, the national-European identity web displays a rather different construction. Of importance here is the fact that most topics are addressed in a sensationalist-populist way. The focus is clearly on the Austrian nation as a small nation within a Europe of equally small nations linked with openly anti-French and ambivalently German attitudes as two big nations with hegemonic aspirations. Accordingly, the sanctions against Austria are resented, the anti-EU position of Haider is supported, the eastern enlargement is weighed regarding its positive and negative effects on Austria, and the euro is rather greeted for its economic opportunities, though criticised for its inflationary tendencies.

In sum, the media analysis has revealed a remarkable spectrum of national-European identity webs: a) an elite layer of educated middle-class attitudes with pro-Austrian and pro-European orientations, and a clear divergence between a Christian-humanist and secularist attitudes to Europe; b) a regional layer with diverging pro-European cultural, pro-European political-economic and anti-European-Union attitudes; and c) a popular lower middle- and working-class layer with strongly Austrian-centred and ambivalent European attitudes. The educated middle-class opinion overlaps basically with the political mainstream between ÖVP and SPÖ. The divergent regional opinions cover the political mainstream, but include also FPÖ positions. The lower middle- and working-class opinion represents a populist frame of reference as well as a critical antipode for all mainstream parties; as such, it underlies the

political mainstream of ÖVP and SPÖ, but it can also serve as a potential for a neo-nationalist populism. Thus, the media and party discourses show different, partially overlapping and reinforcing, partially diverging and contradictory, collective identity spaces within the Austrian public sphere. From the perspective of the historical-sociological macro-analysis, three major specifications in the construction of Europe and the nation in Austrian collective identity have been identified: a) the lasting impact of the construction of Austria as a small nation in the wider Europe, b) the importance of regional differentiation, and c) the importance of social-structural distinctions between the educated middle-class strata and the lower middle-class and working-class strata.

The Austrian national and European identity profile

The survey research on the Austrian national and European identity profile in collaboration with Eurobarometer in 2002 was new insofar as it applied the multi-dimensional analytical scheme of national and European identity construction and thus generated more complex data sets than those from previous survey research (Haller 1996). Although there is an established Austrian and international survey research tradition on national identity and European orientations in Austria, the relationship between the national and European identity profile in Austrian collective identity has been rarely explored; in such rare cases, no analysis of the interconnections between the ethnic, civic, instrumental (or socio-economic), and symbolic-affective dimensions in the national and European layers of Austrian collective identity has been undertaken. Thus, the Austrian survey part investigated and produced data on four main areas in the entanglements of national and European identity: 1. The closeness or distance of Austrians to other national and ethnic groups; 2. The constitution of each national identity regarding the ethno-cultural, political-civic, instrumental and symbolic-affective components; 3. The constitution of each European identity regarding again the ethno-cultural, political-civic, instrumental and symbolic-affective dimensions; and 4. The social structure of the carriers of these national and European identities, regarding class, gender, age, educational level and area of residence in large cities, medium-sized towns and small towns or villages.

Regarding the closeness to or distance from other people, the following features of Austrians have been found: On the one hand, as regards in-group closeness, Austrians feel closest to their home place as compared to the overarching region and nation; but interestingly, the attachment to the region is close to the East German rather than the West German pattern. This finding indicates lower social mobility between the Austrian regions than that between the West German regions. On the other hand, as regards closeness to out-groups, there is a general shared gradient from Western Europe, Central and Eastern Europe, North America, and the Middle East as well as related minorities. In more detail, however, as compared to West and East Germans, Austrians feel closer to EU citizens and fellow Europeans, closer to Central and Eastern Europeans and closer to Turks and Yugoslavs, but conspicuously more distant to people from Italy, North America, Poland and Russia as well as from Gypsies and Jews. These findings show a closer affinity to the neighbouring nations in Western, Central and East-Central Europe, including Yugoslavs and Turks, remaining national conflicts with Italians and stronger rejection of Slavs, Gypsies and Jews; as such, they corroborate the reported findings on the relatively high degree of Austrian xenophobia similar to that of East Germans and unlike that of West Germans. One can interpret these findings as demonstrating a combination between a Habsburg legacy (cultural affinity to neighbouring people) and an ethno-culturally centred Austrian nationalism.

Regarding the Austrian national identity profile, common language, culture and borders rank highest; common history, national independence and national pride as well as a common political and legal system, and a common social and welfare system, lie in the middle; and common ancestry, a national economy, national symbols, and particularly the army rank lowest. These findings confirm the strong importance of cultural nationalism, the lasting irritation with the German elements in Austrian national identity, as well as the suppression of the Great-German/Nazi past. At the same time, a number of differences are obvious in comparison to West Germans: in all dimensions of the national identity profile—the civic, instrumental, political-military as well as symbolic-affective components—the Austrians score higher, indicating a generally stronger identification with the nation than the West Germans. This is only partially true regarding the East Germany national identity profile, in which the ethnic dimension is stronger, the instrumental dimension similar, but the civic and symbolic components in national identification are weaker.

Regarding the European identity profiles, the Austrians identify most with a common European civilization, freedom of movement, a common European currency and membership of a common European society, whereas a common ancestry, the EU defence system and EU symbols are valued least. In the middle there lie first common European right and duties, social protection, common borders and pride, and second a common European history, EU institutions, and EU sovereignty. In comparison to the West Germans and even more to the East Germans, Austrians score again considerably higher in all cultural, socio-economic, political and symbolic-affective dimensions. The only explanation which comes to mind is that Austria as a small state has to define Europe as a much more needed safety valve for the also higher valued nation, whereas the West and East Germans, though less identified with their nation, represent consciously or unconsciously a big nation less in need of European protection.

Taken together, the Austrian national-European identity mix shows, in comparison with West and East Germans, the following characteristics: Austrians identify stronger and unambiguously with their nation in almost all ethno-cultural, political-civic, social-economic and symbolic-affective dimensions of their nation and accordingly stronger with Europe in its different ethno-cultural, political-civic, social-economic and symbolic-affective dimensions, as well. Related to the four core issues of Austrian collective identity formation as highlighted in the country report, this means: 1) Austrians do not share the same guilt-feeling as regards the Nazi past and therefore show a higher identification with their nation; 2) Austrians identify more with the ethno-cultural features of their nation while, at the same time, rejecting the common historical-cultural Great-German legacy and fearing more the cultural threat of the Austrian nation by foreigners; 3) Austrians identify slightly less with the political and instrumental features of their nation, indicating a lower confidence in the state-elements of national identity; and 4) Austrians identify more with Europe in both senses of a civilisation and an integrated institutional body as a protecting shield of the Austrian small nation, despite the recent sanctions against Austria by the European Union.

A puzzle remains regarding the lack of significant correlations between socio-demographic variables such as gender, age, marital status, residence, education, occupation and political orientations. On the basis of the results in the media analysis regarding the significant differences in national and European attitudes between educated middle class and less educated lower middle- and working-class strata, it can be expected that this significant difference also appears in public opinion. In some instances, this is also the case, e.g.

regarding the Austrian findings that older, less educated, small-town and political right-wing people feel closer to their in-group (Q25); that older, female and more educated people share more cultural components of national identity (Q26); or that the civic-political and symbolic-affective dimensions of European identity are shared more by more educated and middle and larger towns people (Q27). But all of these hints do not seem to be conclusive. Thus, there is only a methodological answer: the survey questions did not sufficiently discriminate between a rather Austrian -centred nationalist (instrumentalist as well as ethnic), a more European-centred cosmopolitan (civic as well as cultural) attitude, and clear-cut socio-demographic dichotomy in more educated middle-class and less educated lower and working-class – distinctions that obviously matter for the media and their reading publics as well as individual opinion as represented in the in-depth interviews.

Individual European and national attitudes in Austria

The Austrian civil society discourses on Europe and the nation as articulated in 30 interviews with teachers and lay people are by no means representative, but they allow for a more extensive analysis of the meaning spaces in the entanglements of national and European identities in Austria with some systematic references. On the one hand, four major Austrian regions have been selected: Lower Austria with Vienna (East); Upper Austria (North); Salzburg (North-West), and Carinthia (South), enabling the comparison between the centre and four peripheral regions bordering to four different nation-states: Germany, Czech Republic, Hungary and Italy. On the other hand, the selection has included a systematic variation of socio-demographic differences regarding age, gender, class, and residence, enabling a more detailed analysis of their influences on the national/European identity mix.

Considering, first, the 24 interviews with lay persons, all in all six major types of collective identity can be distinguished: 1) the national-regional type (here there is a predominantly regional focus with less emphasis on Austria or Europe); 2) the national-anti-European type (here the primary emphasis is on the nation combined with negative or critical attitudes towards Europe); 3) the national-ambivalent European type (here, the primary identification is also with Austria and Europe is seen positively as well as negatively); 4) the European-national type (here, there is a more out-spoken identification with Europe, though clearly on the basis of a primarily positive attitude towards the Austrian nation); and 6) the European-cosmopolitan type (here, a primary identification with Europe in a universalistic orientation goes together with a critical attitudes towards Austria).

Summarizing, second, the 6 interviews with teachers, only four major types of collective identity have been found: 1) the national-regional type, focusing again more on regional orientations in the framework of a positive Austrian identity; 2) the national-European type, sharing a strong identification with the Austrian nation but combined with a generally positive, but less important attitude towards Europe; 3) the European-national type, where Europe plays a more important role on the basis of a self-reflexive Austrian identity; and 4) the European-cosmopolitan type; here, there is a strong identification with Europe and the European integration process combined with a critical, but not negative attitude towards Austria.

In view of the results in the party and media discourse analysis, as well as the survey results, again the socio-demographic distinctions clearly matter in the construction of the national-European identity web. Firstly, class in a strong correlation with education levels matters. The

lay persons from an educated middle-class background (inherited or achieved, with language skills, travel experience, social mobility and reading habits) are mostly positively oriented to Europe (in its cultural or its universalistic meaning), with a critical-reflexive attitude towards Austria, its past and its ethno-nationalist-xenophobic currents in the present. The teachers mostly from an educated middle-class background represent these attitudes even more in a principled-programmatic way, although the Austrian, like the German school system in its socialising function, reproduces rather than changes these class distinctions. In contrast, the lay persons from a less educated lower middle-class and working-class background (with lower language skills and more limited travel experiences and social mobility) are mostly and primarily positively-uncritically oriented to the Austrian nation and their *Heimat* region, and are divided equally between an either positive, ambivalent or negative, but secondary orientation to the European Union. Secondly, in addition, age, less so gender, and residence, but only in the primarily determining context of class and education, matter. Older lay people tend to have stronger national orientations and connect Europe more to a cultural-geographically defined and limited Europe, whereas younger people tend to be more oriented to a more civic definition of Europe and European integration and connect it with a more inclusive notion of Europe and Eastern Europe, often including also Turkey.

Considering the results of Austrian lay people and teachers interviews in comparison to the results of the previous phases of the research, it is worthwhile to note the following points: Firstly, most Austrians independent of the socio-demographic background do not refer to the Nazi Third Reich as an explicit frame of reference for their national identity; there is only a low or marginal consciousness of a national co-responsibility or co-guilt for Nazi crimes as a moral basis for an Austrian and European identity. Secondly, class in correlation with education matters most with regard to a self-reflexive Austrian and European attitude; the higher the social status, the more open towards Europe and European integration, and the lower the social status, the more ambivalent, defensive or negative with regard to Europe and European integration. Thirdly, region matters; the differences in social class and social experiences are most pronounced in Vienna where a higher social status is often connected with Habsburg legacies, whereas lower social status is linked to a life-world in working-class neighbourhoods with a high proportion of foreigners; in the other regions, class differentiation is less pronounced and thus the differences between national and European orientations of middle and working class interviewees less marked; in addition, the closeness to the neighbouring nation in each region plays an important role with respect to their positive and negative images: in Vienna the proximity to East-Central Europe, in Upper Austria to the Czech Republic, in Salzburg to Germany and in Carinthia to Slovenia and Italy. Fourthly, age matters; the older generation tends to share a more cultural, Christian or humanistic notion of Europe, identifying Europe more with Western and Eastern Europe, including Russia, whereas the younger generation often connotes with Europe also European integration and is more open to include also Turkey. Fifthly, gender does not really matter; rather, indirectly gender reflects different degrees of education, social mobility, travel experiences, and professional horizons and through these elements, men connect Europe more with European integration whereas women share a stronger cultural notion of Europe. Sixthly, in comparison to Germany, the institutionalised socialisation efforts to educate children and pupils in matters of European integration is clearly less developed, so Austrians share more strongly family, peer group, everyday-life and media opinions. Seventhly and lastly, the interviewees' opinions are indeed by no means representative: in comparison with the survey results, the national-European, the European-national and the European-cosmopolitan types are over-

represented, whereas the national-regional, national-anti-European and national-ambivalent-European types are under-represented.

Conclusion

As an explorative comparative study on the entanglements of national and European identities in nine countries, the Austrian study as one part of the overall research project has provided several new insights:

On the basis of the complex analytical framework at the core of the EURONAT project, as compared to other approaches, a more complex historical-sociological interpretation of the legacies of the Austrian national-European identity mix after World War II and after the collapse of Soviet communism has been developed.

In an attempt to disaggregate the macro-analytical overview, the empirical analyses of the political party and media discourses have given rich empirical insights on two main actors in the German public sphere. As compared to similar analyses, both empirical studies are valuable particularly with regard to their qualitative materials. Political party analyses have seldom analysed the national-European identity mix and, in such rare cases, they have seldom concentrated on macro- or meso-analytical comparisons. Media analyses of national-European identity entanglements do not yet exist. So in both instances, important contributions have been provided.

In order to analyse the civil society contribution to the construction of the Austrian national-European identity web, a quantitative survey analysis and a qualitative interviewing have been combined. Again, in both instances, new territory has been explored. On the basis of the complex EURONAT framework, a novel data set (in comparison to other surveys) on Austrian in comparison to German (East and West) national as well as European identity profiles has been delivered. Also, the qualitative interview has provided novel results on the individual level – adding knowledge to very few other similar attempts.

Each phase of the research is valuable in itself, providing rich results on each level of historical-sociological interpretation and empirical research. Methodologically positioned at different levels of analysis, the results on each level have confirmed and complemented rather than contradicted each other. At the same time, it has also become clear that the systematic connections between each research step are sometimes unclear or under-developed and are in need of further interpretative clarification or, beyond this project, further empirical investigation.

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5.3.2 Britain

Findings and methodologies

Methodologies

The British team has employed a variety of methodologies in carrying out research activities for each phase of the project in accordance with the consortium's decision and the suggestions from the co-ordinator.

At the first phase of the study, we have conducted a literature review. The main method employed there is archival and internet research.

The study of media and political party discourses draws on the practice of discursive analysis. One of the proponents of discursive analysis of news, van Dijk, has argued that there are a number of levels of discursive analysis ranging from phonetics to strategies (van Dijk 1991: 110). In this report, however, in order to identify various representations of the nation and Europe from a large amount of material, the focus of analysis is on the rhetorical and discursive devices used to convey a specific meaning in the form of metaphors, symbols, and so on, in the newspaper articles and TV news bulletins. The representations of Britain, the EU, the relationship between the two, and of Europe as distinct from the EU and Eastern enlargement are then related to the contemporary context for an understanding of their meanings and roles in shaping British national identity.

A special note on the analysis of TV news bulletins: As Marcus Banks argues, the visual in human society is constrained by the language, and more than anything else, news bulletins are based on language-base discourse (Banks 2001: 8-9). In this report, therefore, the focus of analysis of TV news bulletins is still placed on the voiced text. Due attention is, however, paid to the visual side in order to decipher what the image's content is and why the image is used.

The survey data were collected by EORG in April and May 2002 from 1,038 residents of Great Britain. In order to make sense of the data, a variety of quantitative methods from cross-tabulation to factor analysis and regression analysis were employed.

In studying public opinion, we opted for semi-structured, in-depth interviews were carried out as a means of collecting data and the transcripts of the interviews. Interviews were carried out in three locations – London, Inverness and Blandford Forum – between August 2002 and March 2003. Three locations represent a metropolis, a regional centre and a rural town and thus reflect an urban-rural contrast; they somehow reflect the regional axes which are significant in contemporary Britain – North (Inverness) vs. South (London), South East (London) vs. West (Blandford Forum); they also represent England and Scotland to reflect the diversity of the constituent nations of Great Britain. However, Wales could not be incorporated in the fieldwork due to the limited scope of sampling, which needs to be borne in mind.

The interviewees were selected through the snowball method with the sampling categories in mind. A 'gate keeper' was first identified in these locations, and potential interviewees were

identified with help from the gatekeepers. All in all, thirty-six interviews were conducted: nine in London, thirteen in Inverness, and fourteen in Blandford Forum. The breakdown of the interviewees according to the main socio-demographic is as follows:

Gender	Male	Female
	18	18
Age group	-45	46-
	19	17
Socio-economic strata	'Lower'	'Higher'
	15	21

It was originally expected that Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) would guide the analysing phase. However, since CDA is focused on 'the role of discourse in the production and reproduction of power abuse and domination' (van Dijk, 2001: 96), it was felt that the Grounded Theory approach was more suitable in examining the interview results for representations of Britain, the British and Europe. Following the basic principles of the Grounded Theory approach, several categories were created during the coding stage according to the specified dimensions of analysis, then the relationship between the categories were sought. The analytical perspective adopted in this report is that of constructivist in that the data was created in a certain situation with the participation of the interviewer, not just a reflection of objective truths which are to be uncovered.

Achieving a better understanding of the British case: Britain and Europe

Our research activities have tackled the first objective, that is, to expand the knowledge of the representations and meanings of the nation, Europe and the European Union in Britain head-on and deepened many dimensions of what has already been known and added some new insights.

Britain as a reluctant European and Europe as 'elsewhere'

The widely held ideas that Britain is a reluctant European and that Europe is 'elsewhere' for the majority of the Britons are repeatedly picked up in all the phases of the research and each phase has added more depth to the existing knowledge. The first report has noted that there is a consensus among the scholars that Britain is indeed a reluctant European and that the British on the whole tend to see Europe as elsewhere, a place and entity to which they do not really belong. These points are often justified with reference to the history of the relationship between Britain and the continent. At the same time, the report has recognised that there are some historians who are engaged in a re-examination of this conventional view to seek images of a European Britain. The public discourse report has also observed that the British media tend to describe Britain as being different from the continental countries, thus reinforcing the boundary between the British ('us') and the continental Europeans ('them'). It is interesting to note, however, that the tone of description of Britain as being different from other continental countries has shifted from an overwhelmingly triumphant one to more self-critical one during the investigated period. Politicians, on the other hand, depending on their position regarding the issue of Europe, sometimes try to emphasise that Britain's interests lie

in the closer co-operation with continental countries, and therefore attempt at highlighting the similarity that allegedly binds the British and the continental Europeans together.

One of the most striking findings of the survey was that 62 per cent of the respondents said they did not feel European, which appears to be an unequivocal endorsement of ‘the British the reluctant European’ label on the popular level. This tendency is in line with the findings from the past Eurobarometre surveys, and therefore can be considered to be reliable. The survey has found at the same time that possessing British identity does not necessarily hinder developing one’s European identity; on the contrary, it has been found that there is a positive, albeit insignificant, correlation between feeling British and feeling European. The survey has also revealed that the British respondents in general show a lower level of identification with any given groups, and suggested that reasons for the relatively lower level of identification with Europe amongst British population should be sought in further study in the patterns of identification; accordingly, the survey proposed a new research agenda.

The qualitative interviews phase has explored this dimension further and picked up antipathy towards politics as one important factor in defining the respondent’s view of Europe. The feelings that politics are irrelevant to the respondents’ everyday life and that they are powerless in influencing the course of politics appear to foster a feeling among the respondents that Europe has nothing to do with them. In other words, the qualitative interview analysis has detected some sign of legitimacy crisis of the ‘establishment’, be it the government, the conventional way of doing politics or the media. This suggests that the state of European identity in Britain is less to do with its potential conflict with British identity but more to do with people’s sense of not being involved with the ‘bigger picture’: ‘Europe’ is felt to be irrelevant and distant, and similar antipathy has been expressed in regard to the British government. Two points derive from this observation. First, some rather abstract objectives such as empowerment of the people are more urgent than it is often assumed by cynics, if a greater degree of interest in European affairs and identification with Europe among British people are to be sought. Unless Europe becomes relevant to British people by being seen as another entity in which they actively participate, a sense of being European would be difficult to grow. Secondly, since the feeling of irrelevance has emerged as a major factor in shaping the British respondents’ European identity, social communication theory, one of the classical models of national and European integration, might still prove to be a sharp analytical tool of the situation. This is yet another topic for separate investigation.

The World War II and the special relationship with the US

All phases of the research point to the importance of the experiences and memories of WWII and the special relationship with the US in British self-understanding and Britain’s relationship with Europe. The public discourse report has repeatedly noted that the experiences of WWII constituted some of the most frequently mobilised material in both media and political elite discourse, which has found some resonance in the in-depth interviews with lay people. Interviews suggest however that although the recognition that WWII was important in shaping Britain’s relationship with continental Europe is widely shared, as the time passes, it is increasingly felt as part of knowledge rather than something that touched one’s emotion.

The special relationship with the US is another issue which has repeatedly come out in the different phases of the research. The role of the US as the significant other for Britain might

have been particularly accentuated in this project because the period of investigation has coincided with the war on terror. Nonetheless, the first report has already confirmed the importance of what is perceived as a special relationship with the US in literature, and the effect of the war on terror on this aspect is to enhance it rather than to invent something that was not there in the first place. The special relationship with the US has been time and again recalled in political elite's discourse although there were some attempts to cast the tie with continental Europe as equally special. The emphasis on the special relationship with the US has led the pro-Europeans – those who advocate an even closer co-operation with the EU and continental Europe in general – to argue that it is essential for Britain to be at the heart of Europe in order to maintain the special relationship with the US. Britain's role in the world, according to these parties, is now defined by its relationship with the US, the sole superpower in the world, and therefore in order to maintain its position in the international arena, Britain has to be a leader of Europe, which means it is a worthy partner of the US.

The interviews have added further insights into this issue. When discussing the role of the US in the contemporary world, 'Europe' is often used as a reference point and vice versa. Some respondents have made it clear that Europe can have two meanings: Europe as opposed to the US and Europe as opposed to Britain. In the former case, Britain's position is perceived to be basically in between Europe and the US but much closer to Europe than to the US in its inclination towards social democracy and other issues. In the latter case, Britain is perceived as much closer to the US because of its Anglo-Saxon heritage. The significance of the special relationship with the US in British politics and Britain's relationship with Europe is widely acknowledged, but what the interviews have detected is not a blind support for the maintenance of the special relationship with the US. Instead, in the respondents' efforts to make sense of the world, they envision a balancing act between the US and Europe.

The survey has offered one more clue as to how the British people perceive their relationship with Europe. In the question about the feeling of closeness, people from the dominions came forth ahead of the EU citizens (5th) and US citizens (6th), followed by Fellow Europeans, Jews and people from the Commonwealth. Although in public discourse the tie with the US is often emphasised, in people's everyday life, ties with former colonies, especially in the form of the dominions, are at least as equally as important. Taken together, it is suggested that Britain's relationship with Europe should be understood not in a bilateral situation of Britain and Europe, but in a triangle of Britain, Europe and the US plus former colonies. This is the reflection of the historical baggage Britain carries and this framework appears to continue to inform people of Britain for a foreseeable future.

National and European identities

Mutually exclusive or closely intertwined?

Conventional theories of integration have often argued that the issue is the transfer of ultimate loyalty of the citizens from the nation-state to the European level, and therefore national and European identities are more often than not seen as mutually exclusive. The evidence the British case provides in this regard is very complex.

On the one hand, our research has come across a large quantity of evidence to indicate that British identity and European identity are seen as mutually exclusive and to some extent felt as incompatible. This has been most evident in the public discourse analysis. The right-wing

newspapers tend to propagate that being British and pursuing the British ways of doing things are incompatible with being part of Europe and therefore being European. These arguments are often presented with much reference to economy and finance, thus giving an impression that it is a rational argument. However, the images invoked in these articles are often of a vague and emotional nature, such as ‘Anglo-Saxon model’ or ‘the queen’s head on the coin’.

The interviews have produced some evidence that may support the thesis British and European identities are seen and felt mutually exclusive. Quite a number of the respondents have shown indifference to a European identity. It is not necessarily incompatible with British identity but for them it is largely irrelevant for a number of reasons. Some have, however, reproduced the tabloid view that becoming European would mean losing one’s British identity. Taken together with the aforementioned survey result that 62 per cent of the respondents have chosen to declare that they do not feel European, it is very tempting to conclude that British identity and European identity are incompatible and therefore, in this sense, too, Britain is a bad European.

Our research has, however, also produced evidence that British and European identities are not universally seen and experienced as mutually exclusive. For instance, some pro-European politicians have been arguing that becoming more European does not mean becoming less British; on the contrary, this is the only way to secure Britishness in this globalising world. They would refer to the special relationship with the US to add that becoming more European is the best way to maintain this relationship; only by being at the heart of Europe will Britain’s voice carry some weight both in the US and Europe. This may in the end be just a piece of propaganda shamelessly fed into the public domain for the purpose of securing their interests. However, the interviews have also found that it is not all propaganda. A relatively small number of the respondents described themselves as both European and British; a few even used the word ‘us’ to describe what Europe is. Another group of the respondents have also expressed their view that although a European identity at the moment is irrelevant to them, they do not see any contradiction in being British and European at the same time.

Two issues stand out in examining the relationship between British and European identities. First of all, the best word to describe the state of a European identity in Britain is ‘irrelevant’. ‘Europe’ is certainly an important political issue over which the Conservative Party has recently fallen. The media also devotes a considerable amount of energy to cover European issues from mainly a negative perspective but sometimes with a positive framework. However, a lot of ‘ordinary’ people are not simply interested in Europe, as the survey result shows. The interviews have confirmed that for many people Europe is simply an irrelevant issue. This may do with the fact that the benefits of membership of the EU are not too visible in Britain with small agriculture and fishery sector.¹⁴ The ease of travel which comes with EU membership is not much appreciated either. Perhaps this is a colonial legacy; it may be nothing new for the British. Perhaps it is because the UK has opted out from the Schengen agreement and the euro, two tangible arrangements through which ordinary Europeans could feel the benefits and disadvantages of European integration. The fact that the right to free movement and settlement has come last in the respondents’ appreciation of European identity in the survey appears to support my speculation. Perhaps another issue is the language; a large number of the interview respondents have acknowledged that in general British people are not too good at mastering another language. The special relationship with the US and

¹⁴ In 2002 agriculture employed 1.5 per cent of the UK working population (Defra Statistics, 2003)

affinity to the former dominions are partly cemented by the common language, English, while with the European countries, there is none (although English seems to be emerging as a *lingua franca*). In addition, some interview respondents have also commented upon the negative coverage of Europe by the media as an 'off-putting' factor. The fact that Europe is largely seen as a political issue is another point to be added to the list. Antipathy towards politics, which seems to be spreading in contemporary Britain, is having an effect on people's perception of Europe. All these factors seem to play their own part in making Europe irrelevant to the ordinary people of Britain.

Secondly, for those minorities who are interested in Europe, it is above all a political issue. It has transpired during the interview stage that the respondent's political orientation is strongly linked to whether he/she feels European and to what images of Europe he/she has. In general, if the respondent holds a social democratic or liberal perspective, he/she is likely to admit to having a European identity. For the left-wingers, the EU at present represents progress, empowerment and human rights and is seen to ensure peace in Europe. Also, they want to be part of the enterprise. This is indeed an interesting development in recent British history, given the fact that Europe was for long seen by the left as a capitalist enterprise. The legacy of Thatcherism is palpable here. In the case of liberals, they would not hesitate to admit to a feeling of being European, but their images of Europe are a mixture of positive and negative aspects. Those would appreciate the free and integrated market emerging in the EU, deplore the growth of bureaucracy and worry about democracy. It is evident from all the phases of the study that Europe is first and foremost a political issue, not an emotional one.

The ethnic-civic analytical continuum

Another issue the EURONAT project has been paying attention to in its research endeavour is the usefulness of the ethnic-civic axis. The dichotomy has been developed from Hans Kohn's scheme of Western vs. Eastern nationalism (1955) and has attracted a fair amount of scholarly work (Smith 1991; Brubaker 1992; Nielsen 1999). In these schema, Britain, or more precisely, England, together with France, is often portrayed as a model case of civic nationhood. The question addressed here is whether the ethnic-civic axis is useful in analysing contemporary British identity, the emerging European identity, and the relationship between the two.

We have looked into details of the current state of British identity in the first stage of the project. The first report has argued that the predominant discourse on Britishness is that British identity is a civic one because it is not ethnic in the sense that 'it did not organically grow out of a pre-existing entity, but was forged or constructed'. In this perspective, Britishness is largely seen as something that is based on the territorial and institutional aspects of the nation and state, and is contrasted to constituent ethnic identities such as English, Welsh, Scottish and Irish. The emergence of the combination of a civic Britishness and an ethnic Englishness/Welshness/Scottishness/Irishness is usually explained in reference to the history of British state formation: the entity which came into being officially in 1707 for the first time. The civic-ethnic axis is therefore mobilised to understand the relationship between Britain and its constituent nations, and this has been successfully applied to the analysis of collective identities of the second- and third- generations of immigrants. According to this mapping, the second- and third- generations of immigrants can acquire British identity without losing their ethnic identity. This is only possible, according to the

scholars who have examined the issue, because Britishness is largely seen and experienced as a civic and inclusive form of identity.

However, as seen in the first report, this neat classification has been called into question by another group of scholars who are concerned with racism in contemporary Britain. According to them, Britishness is not an inclusive and civic form of identity; it represents whiteness, a highly exclusive category. This is manifest in prevailing racism in contemporary Britain – from government institutions to the street level. The thesis that Britishness is a civic and inclusive category is therefore rigorously questioned in contemporary Britain. However, having concluded that the present form of Britishness is a racist and exclusive one, these scholars call for a construction of truly civic and inclusive Britishness. The spell of the ethnic-civic axis seems to be irresistible.

In the current discussion of Britishness, one can detect a confusion over what Britishness means. Sometimes it is taken up as indicating a member of the British state, which is symbolised by being a British citizen or having a British passport; sometimes, it is discussed as an issue of being a member of a nation, of a community of fate. It is more to do with the sense of loyalty and pride. Because we live in the world of nation-states where the ideology that a nation and a state should be co-extensive is dominant, this confusion is understandable. However, the ethnic-civic axis does not seem to bring clarity in this debate; this constitutes another reason to doubt the utility of the ethnic-civic dichotomy in analysing a concrete case.

In regard to the issue of Britain's relationship with Europe, it has been observed that when new forms of Britishness are discussed, no reference is made to Europe or European heritage. 'Europe' is acknowledged as one of the factors why Britishness needs to be reconsidered in the contemporary UK, but what European means is not taken into account in these discussions. Europe seems to remain distant from Britain even in this respect.

The debate over a European identity is less marked with the reliance of the ethnic-civic dichotomy although there are some scholars who argue that it can only be civic because of the lack of unifying ethnic elements in Europe.

The survey has produced interesting data in addressing the analytical utility of the civic-ethnic dichotomy. Two concepts of the British nationhood extracted from the data cannot be classified either as ethnic or civic; both contain dimensions which are associated with the ideal types of ethnic and civic nations. Our respondents clearly see their nation not in 'either-ethnic-or-civic' terms but possess a complex understanding of what it is. The interviews have also hinted that the respondents' understanding of the British nation is not a clear-cut one. The island metaphor which has come up repeatedly in describing Britain can be interpreted in both predominantly civic and ethnic terms. If the geographical fact that Britain is an island is emphasised in the respondents' description of what Britain is and therefore who the British are, it would fit with the civic-territorial ideal type of nations: Britain is an island and the British are those who live on the island. On the other hand, if 'island mentality' is considered to be significant, this view of Britain and the British is closer to the ethnic type of nationhood: the British are those who share this 'island mentality', which is acquired through birth. There is nothing new about realising that there are competing visions of nationhood within what is supposed to constitute a single nation. The point here is that the ethnic vs. civic dichotomy loses its sharpness when applied to a concrete case.

As for European identity, the survey analysis has extracted two separate concepts, neither of which is entirely consisting of civic dimensions. Although a geographical definition of Europe has been repeatedly put forward by the respondents during the interviews, the hierarchy of closeness to other groups has revealed that the respondents feel closer to people from the dominion, EU and US citizens than people from the Commonwealth. One could speculate at this stage that in this expression of social distance, race – shared whiteness – might play a role, and consequently, Europe may be defined in a racialist manner, which would be a more ethnic than civic definition of Europe by all accounts. This possible racial dimension of Europe has also been detected during the interviews. One respondent has even described the Europeans as ‘an ethnic group’. Others have described Europe ‘as the same, we are just one big place’ or ‘us’. All these suggest that even Europe which is still irrelevant for most of the British people could be felt and experienced as something similar to an ethnic group with an emphasis on the racial aspect. For the majority of the respondents, however, Europe is first and foremost a geographical category. The conventional dichotomy of ethnic vs. civic nationhood does not assist our understanding of how Europe is seen and felt by the ordinary people.

The above reflection leads to a conclusion that although the ethnic-civic axis may be a brilliant tool in a theoretical work, its practical use is in question. This means that further work on operationalising the concept is needed.

The links between party and media discourses

Analysing the media and political elite discourses in contemporary Britain we have noted that attitudes towards European integration are more polarised in the media discourse than in political party discourse. While none of major parties (Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democrats) advocates the withdrawal from the EU, some right wing newspapers, most notably the *Daily Mail*, do not hesitate to suggest that it is the best way forward for both Britain and the EU. Similarly, although the major parties are at pains to acknowledge in public some of the achievements of the current processes of European integration, the tabloids and the right wing papers tend to neglect this aspect and to concentrate on the perceived ‘harm’ of the process. This is probably as a result of the different aims and objectives the political parties and the media are pursuing. For major political parties, what is important is to win as many hearts and minds of the voters as possible, and in order to widen their appeal, they tend to send out relatively moderate messages. Radical views are aired by fringe parties such as the British National Party, UK Independence Party and Referendum Party, which do not necessarily aim to win the absolute majority in the House of Commons. The press on the other hand is first divided along the class line (broadsheets vs. tabloids) and then along political orientations. With fairly well established readership, each paper appears to strive to make it more distinct and therefore tends to send out more radical messages to the public.

In terms of the representation of Britain and the British, there are also differences in emphasis. While the political elite often describe Britain as a moral force with reference to history, especially to the experiences of the WWII (Britain the good), the media seems to eschew the good vs. evil framework in general. Although Britain is often described as superior in the media, the description is usually justified on the basis of material wealth, what is perceived to be a democratic system, and Britain’s influence in the world. This is partly to

do with the timing of our research: we have examined the post-9/11 political discourse in which the issue of good and evil has come to the fore. At the same time, in the contemporary British setting, there still seems to be a classical division of labour between the political elites and the media; politicians are paying attention to set the vision while the media concentrating on scrutinising what the politicians are up to.

The fact that there is no neat alignment of political parties and the media supports the above observation. There are some patterns: the Conservative Party's line is often followed by the right-wing press such as the *Daily Mail* and the *Telegraph*, and some left-of-centre newspapers, such as the *Guardian* and the *Observer* show some sympathies to the lines taken by the Liberal Democrats and the Labour Party. However, at a closer inspection it becomes clear that quite a few newspapers take the populist stance that the real 'enemy' of the British people is the politicians of all persuasions, with some papers adding the 'fat cats', unions and illegal immigrants to their list of enemies. The worldview submitted by the British news papers reveals their belief in the autonomy of the media and their role to represent the 'real' people's voice. While the political elites discourse and the media discourse shares the overall framework of reference – history and geopolitics – the two discourses do not inhabit an identical universe. The two sets of discourse overlap each other while maintaining their boundaries. Whether this is a sign of maturity of British democracy, as both political parties and the press would allege, is beyond the scope of this study.

Do lay people reproduce the media and elite discourse or do they develop their own views and arguments?

In tackling this question, it is first of all interesting to note that although the media in general assumes to represent the 'real' people's concern, much scepticism towards the media hype has been expressed during the interview stage. This is particularly notable in relation to the asylum seekers' issue. The respondents often make a clear distinction between what they have experienced and what they have heard through the media, and some expressed their concern that the media is blowing the problem out of proportion. Quite a few have acknowledged that their personal experiences do not match what is reported in the media, and some would opt for what the media present as the description of the reality, while others would volunteer their own view. One respondent, for instance, has declared that 'bogus' asylum seekers are swamping the country as reported in the media, although his personal experience with them has been quite limited and on the whole cordial and positive. Another respondent, while witnessing the worst case scenario because of his position as a prison officer, still presented a liberalist view that any individual with that much determination could make positive contribution to society and therefore should be welcomed. What seems to be at stake here is trust in the media. Many respondents are mindful not to generalise from their personal experiences only; they are at pains to qualify that their experience is not necessarily a reflection of the majority of the British population. Having clarified this, those who in general trust in the media would adopt and reproduce the media discourse while those who have some reservation of trustworthiness of the media, because they are after all commercial enterprises, would attempt to interpret what is happening around them without being entirely dependent on the media reporting.

In regard to the representation of the EU or Europe, the same attitudes have been observed. As noted earlier, one of the recurring themes during the interview stage was the claim of

ignorance/lack of knowledge in relation to the EU. The respondents are aware that they do not know much about the EU and what they know about the EU comes from the media. They tend to hesitate to present what they have learned from the media as their view of the EU. When negative images of the EU are brought up, it is often followed by an expression of a certain amount of scepticism towards the media. Even those whose personal experiences with the EU are in line with the media reporting tend to qualify that it may not be everyone's experience. In a sense, the respondents are quick to point their fingers to the media, especially the tabloids, in discussing the images of the EU. Together with the claims of ignorance/lack of knowledge, the tabloid bashing can also be seen as the central self-defence strategy adopted by the respondents. The reasons why the respondents have felt the need to justify themselves are beyond the scope of this investigation. Perhaps this is to do with the earlier point that 'Europe' is above all a political issue in the contemporary UK, and the respondents may have felt some pressure to provide a coherent, well-supported narrative regarding the issue.

The euro is the topic where some hints regarding the kinds of relationship between the ordinary people's view and political elites' discourse have emerged. The political elites' discourse concerning Britain's adoption of the euro is not clearly formulated. While the Liberal Democrats advocate the adoption of the euro, the stances of the Conservatives and the Labour Party are not clear. Both parties have internal divisions on this issue, and they focus on more technical issues such as the promised referendum on the introduction of the euro. The interviews have shown that the opinions of lay people are divided, but the overwhelming feeling is that the introduction of the euro is inevitable. It is inevitable, according to the respondents, because the politicians and big businesses have already made up their minds to adopt it and because the ordinary voters are powerless facing the perceived united front of the politicians and business. What has been detected here is not so much a reproduction of the political elites' discourse by the party faithfuls but a feeling of detachment or split from politics.

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5.3.3 Germany

Approach and methodologies

As outlined in the project proposal, one of the main objectives of EURONAT is to enlarge and revise the existing knowledge regarding the entanglements of Europe and the nation in collective identities in current and prospective member states. For this purpose, the German-Austrian team has developed an analytical model for enquiring about the relationships between Europe and the nation in collective identities which is more complex than the usual distinctions between the national and European levels as well as that between civic and ethnic dimensions of collective identities. This more complex model has then been applied to the several research steps: the historical-sociological analysis of the historical construction of German collective identity until 1989 and its reconstruction after German unification as well as the empirical analysis of its development in the years 2000-03 regarding the political elites, the media, public opinion and lay persons in civil society.

The analytical framework for investigating the entanglements of Europe and the nation in collective identities assumes that collective identities are formed by various constitutive dimensions and spatial levels. Regarding the constitutive dimensions, the analytical framework presupposes five major components of collective identity: primordial-ethnic, religious-cultural, political, socio-economic and military components. Each component of collective identity is relational, entailing both identity and boundary constructions. Following Eisenstadt/Giesen (1995) and Smith (2001), this analytical framework is more complex than the usual civic/ethnic distinction in most of the literature on nationalism and national identity literature. Thus, instead of an ethnic-civic continuum, we assume a multi-dimensional identity space in which ethnic and civic identity components, amongst others, have varying weight and valence. At the same time, the analytical framework assumes that these components relate to several spatial levels of boundary constructions: the sub-national, national, European civilisational and European integrational levels with linkages to the world. These spatial or relational dimensions are again more differentiated than the conventional binary combination of national and European levels. Particularly, the distinction between two distinct levels of the European civilisation or Europe and European integration or European Union is an innovation as compared to the existing theoretical as well as empirical literature (Kohli 2000; Spohn 2003).

On the basis of this analytical framework, and in the context of the existing historical, political and sociological literature, we have drafted an interpretive outline of the construction and reconstruction of the German nation in the context of Europe and European integration; the study examines the changing role of the constitutive identity dimensions in the main periods of German history in the 19th and 20th centuries with a particular attention to the decade after German unification in 1989/90.

In the analysis of the political party and media debates we have applied interpretive and discursive methods in order to analyse, comprehend and describe the meanings, values, symbols, attitudes, orientations and their intensities characteristic of the national and European identity mix in its constitutive and spatial dimensions.

We have designed in collaboration with Eurobarometer two separate surveys in West and East Germany, concentrating again on the spatial dimensions from the local and regional to the national and European levels and on the composition of identity profiles in the constitutive ethno-cultural, political, socio-economic and symbolic identity dimensions. The two surveys were conducted in April and May 2002 and were based on 1000 respondents each in West and East Germany.

Last but not least, we conducted semi-structured, in-depth interviews with 24 lay persons and 6 teachers in March, April and May 2003. The interviewees were selected according to residence (city, middle-sized and small town) in four different German regions (SW, NW, NE and SE), class (middle vs. working class), education (high vs. low), gender (male and female) as well as age (old and young). Again the aim has been to find out and describe the complex national and European identity mix on the individual level and to classify it along the constitutive and spatial dimensions. Although the low number of interviewees (due to practical-financial reasons) did not permit any representative conclusions, the interviews were able to illustrate major types of national and European identity mixtures of lay people and their political socialisation in the educational system.

Historical construction and reconstruction of German collective identity

The conventional view is that modern German national identity evolved in the 19th century as a mixture of an ethnic, cultural-romantic and politically unifying nationalism. After German unification in 1871 and with World War I, its composition shifted gradually towards the ethnic-primordial side, culminating in *völkish*-racist Nazism. Only with the collapse of the Nazi-regime, a democratic-liberal form of national identity was able to crystallize, first in West Germany and then with the second German unification in 1990 also in East Germany. However, on the backdrop of Germany's reluctance to accept the reality of an immigration country, the ethnic components as a legacy of the past are seen as continuing to be relatively strong.

Within the more complex analytical framework of EURONAT, the conventional view is revised in several respects: First, the existence of ethnic-primordial elements is nothing specific only to Germany or Eastern Europe, but is also relevant for the political-civic cases in Western Europe; but in the German case, the cultural-romantic and ethnic-*völkish* currents, in the context of a strongly conflictive form of nation-building, gained a specific form and strength. Second, from the beginning, the political-civic dimension of nationalism also played a crucial role, but oscillating between democratic-federal and authoritarian-centralizing poles; only with recent German re-unification has this political German *Sonderweg* come to an end. Third, of crucial importance for German nation-building has also been the circumstance that Germany consisted of two major conflicting religions -- Catholicism and Protestantism -- and this conflict remained crucial also after the 1871 German unification under Prussian-Protestant hegemony. Nazism as a political religion overcame this dualism in a totalitarian form, whereas re-unified Germany has bridged this religious divide in an economical and secular form. Fourth, a core element of German national identity is based also on its imperial background, so Germany was imagined as an economically, politically and militarily strong, great nation and from this perspective, the unified German nation-state in 1871 was incomplete, attempting to complete itself in World War I and II. It was only the disaster of

these imperial reconstructions that led to the Empire-contracted form of a nation-state that has limited itself to a state with middle range power amongst equals in Europe.

On this historical background, post-WWII German national identity has been characterised by the following features: Firstly, the ‘catastrophe of 1945’ was experienced not only as a military, political and social destruction of the German nation, but also, particularly with regard to the Holocaust, as a moral disaster. This was first openly articulated only by few; this moral stigmatisation during the course of German post-WWII seized wider sections of the German elite and population, and with it the search for a re-moralisation of the German nation became an integral part of the reconstruction of German national identity. Secondly, German national identity as a result of the division of Germany into West and East Germany became reconstructed in two diverging forms. In West Germany, defining itself as the legal successor state of the Third Reich, national identity was based on the assumption of its full responsibility for the past, on a growing orientation to a constitutional and federal democracy, as well as on a socially tamed market capitalism. In East Germany, national identity dissociated itself from the past in its orientation to a people’s democracy and socialism. In United Germany the past legacies were still felt as divided forms of collective memory and national identity, and they combined through the unequal form of German unification in distinct Western and Eastern forms of national identity and boundary constructions. Thus, thirdly, under the roof of unifying German national identity crystallizing around a civic-territorial constitutional-federal form of democracy and a social welfare form of market capitalism, the West Germans identify more with the political-legal and social welfare system; whereas the East Germans are more proud of cultural, scientific and sports achievements indicating a certain resentment against West German domination in political democracy and welfare capitalism. Furthermore, the West Germans are less oriented to an ethnically homogenous nation than the East Germans.

As in other European nations, also the formation of German nationalism and national identity contains a European dimension, both in relation to the surrounding neighbours as well as the broader European civilisation (Malmborg and Strath 2002). The traditional European orientation in German national identity had centred on its imperial legacy of the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation, implying a Central European hegemonic position. Despite the dissolution of the Old Empire at the beginning of the 19th century, this imperial legacy did not vanish, but remained a layer of unifying German nationalism. The Second Reich contained an element of un-fulfilment, to be completed by the materialisation of a German dominated *Mitteleuropa* during World War I and the racial reconstruction of continental Europe under the hegemony of the Nazi Third Reich (Spohn 2002). After World War II, the defeated and stigmatised German nation in its divided form identified strongly with its respective hegemonic power: West Germany with the Western model of liberal democracy, East Germany with Soviet communism. West Germany’s Western orientation included not only an economic, political and military *Westbindung*, the precondition and pillar of developing (West) European integration, but also a means to come to terms with the past and to re-moralize the German nation. East Germany’s Eastern orientation had parallel material and moral functions, though increasingly questioned by the reproduction of the authoritarian and totalitarian structures of the German *Sonderweg*.

On this background, the German unification process showed a mixture of a tamed manifestation of German nationalism and national identity with a medium strong orientation towards Europe. Europe and European integration still had a strong compensatory function

for an insecure and stigmatised nation—an insecurity heightened not only by the uncertainties of the unification process, but also by a wave of xenophobic neo-nationalism. At the same time, as West and East German national identity still differed, their European orientations, as well as the strength of xenophobic neo-nationalism, also differed. However, with the progressing German unification process, the recession of xenophobic nationalism and the redefinition of United Germany within integrating and enlarging Europe, distinct tendencies in the reconstruction of German European orientations or Europeanness have crystallized: Firstly, there has been a growing re-nationalisation in this German national/European identity mix; in both parts of Germany, the national identification has increased considerably against European identification. Second, there has remained a stable difference between a more European West Germany and a more national East Germany, pointing to a continuing ambivalence of a considerable part of East Germans vis-à-vis West German-dominated national unification and Western centred European integration. Thirdly, this difference is revealed also in the differing attitudes towards the Eastern enlargement: West Germans are less supportive to include the Eastern neighbours, indicating a stronger estrangement and related fears, whereas East Germans are more supportive, indicating the legacy of a common communist past and a remaining sense of solidarity.

National and European identities in the German party system

The historical-sociological perspective on the reconstruction of the meaning of the nation and Europe within German collective identities since German unification has provided a comparative framework that allows us to determine the ways in which two major actors in the German public sphere -- political parties and the media -- have influenced the reconstruction of the German national-European identity mix in the two years from 2000 to 2002. The public sphere can be seen as an open communication space between the official and the private constituted by various arenas, actors and audiences. As such, the public sphere is a relatively autonomous, mediating, discursive sphere in which collective identities are articulated, represented, constituted and reconstituted. Two major actors and arenas of the public sphere are the political parties and the media. The media in their different forms of newspapers, radios, television, etc. constitute institutions and collective actors concerned with the production and distribution of communication and, as such, are simultaneously a forum and an actor in public opinion making. Political parties are political organisations of sectors of the population that compete for political power, decision-making and influence on public opinion. As major arenas and actors in the public sphere, both media and parties depend on each other and at the same time on the public in its double role as recipient and voter. Thus, the core question is how the historically transmitted forms of the German national-European identity mix are present in these two public actors, are taken up, shaped, reproduced and transformed in specific ways in the analysed time-period and events.

Regarding the German party system, first, it represents a whole spectrum of political value orientations to the nation and Europe, partially overlapping, partially diverging; combining political-ideological elite levels with popular opinion; and articulating overarching federal as well as particularistic regional attitudes. The contemporary right-left spectrum ranges from the conservative-liberal CDU and its Bavarian conservative-social sister party CSU, to the liberal FDP, the social-democratic SPD, the social-ecological Green Party and the socialist, East German based, PDS. At the extremes of this spectrum, there are a variety of neo-nationalist parties on the right and communist-socialist splinter groups on the left. Regarding

their political weight, the conservative liberal CDU-CSU and FDP coalition dominated West-German politics for a long time, only briefly interrupted by a social-liberal SPD-FDP coalition in the 70s and early 80s. This dominant role of the conservative liberal parties is reflected also in their leading role in the first phase of the German unification process. In the meantime, however, the political impact of German unification and the weight of the East German voters can be seen also in a crucial shift, though probably temporary, towards the social-ecological SPD-Green coalition and the continuing importance of the PDS in the East German regions.

With this political shift within the German party spectrum, a re-composition of the national and European orientation articulated in the party system has also been taking place. The conservative-liberal coalition has stood particularly for national, federal and Western European value orientations and was, therefore, also the leading political actor in German unification. But with the task of political-legal unification accomplished, the issues of the social and ecological shape of Germany, the social unification between West and East Germany, as well as the role of United Germany within the European Union have come to the fore. As a consequence, the national-European identity mix on the party level underwent an important re-composition. In terms of the support of European integration, the CDU and the FDP remained the strongest pro-European parties, the Greens (though from a medium level) became even slightly more pro-European, whereas the CSU and the SPD became more nationally oriented and the PDS added a rather ambivalent EU attitude. In terms of their support for the euro, a similar picture was originally characteristic: the CDU, CSU and FDP were mostly for it, whereas the SPD and Greens and even more so the PDS remained ambivalent regarding the social impacts of the euro-zone. After the launch and irreversibility of the euro, the support became less in the CSU and SPD and more in the Greens and PDS, but with continuing ambivalence. Regarding the party support for the eastern enlargement in 1999, the FDP scored highest, the CDU and SPD slightly behind, but the Greens and particularly the PDS were not much less supportive. In sum, the most pro-European conservative-liberal camp slightly weakened inside, whereas the traditionally less European and more national, social and ecological orientations became more important. These findings clearly corroborate and specify the historical-sociological statements regarding the reconstruction of German collective identity in a more national self-assured and less European compensatory direction.

The qualitative analysis of the party programs and party attitudes regarding European political, military and economic integration as well as the eastern enlargement has been able to specify the changes in the meanings at work in this re-composition of the national-European orientations within the party spectrum. On the basis of the EURONAT framework for analysing the national and European identity mix, these changes can be summarised as follows: The CDU is primarily oriented to a Western Christian and humanist-enlightened Europe with soft boundaries vis-à-vis Orthodox Europe but strong boundaries vis-à-vis Turkey; within these boundaries, however, on all political, military and economic levels, it stands for a leading role of Germany in its federalist model for a European regime balancing out regional, national and European levels; at the same time, the ethnic-exclusionary definition of the German nation is slightly opened towards a classical cultural notion (German *Leitkultur*). The sister party CSU emphasizes more narrowly a Western Christian notion of Europe; has a stronger regional-ethnic focus; and is, from the perspective of the Bavarian border to the Czech Republic, rather concerned about the social implications of the eastern enlargement.

In contrast, all the other main parties share a more enlightened-secularised notion of Europe, thus with only weak cultural boundaries vis-à-vis Christian Orthodox and Islamic cultures. However, in concretising these European values in terms of democratic, economic and ecological standards, civic-political boundary constructions reappear. The FDP is consistently oriented to a liberal model of the European Union, emphasising economic and political liberties, supporting the inclusion of the eastern enlargement on these grounds, favouring a liberal immigration and integration policy, and oriented towards furthering economic, political and military European integration in cooperation with the US. The SPD supports also further economic, political and military European integration as well as the eastern enlargement, though with a strong emphasis on the social and ecological dimensions and, with it, a deeper concern about the social effects on the German economy and labour markets; as a consequence, a rather defensive attitude towards the eastern enlargement creeps in. The Greens, though more the leadership than rank and file, do now support much more than before a deeper and wider Europe, but again restricted by social and ecological concerns. And finally, also the PDS is moving towards more Europe, though with a socialist-anti-capitalist ambivalence as well as a social solidarity with the prospective East-Central European member states.

The representation of Europe and the nation in the German media

As compared to the political party analysis, the analysis of the German media has been rather selective. Three of the six newspapers studied are national or transregional print-media: *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ)*, *Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ)*, and *Bildzeitung*; whereas the other three are regional newspapers: *Leipziger Volkszeitung* from Saxony, *Bayernkurier* from Bavaria and *Neues Deutschland* from Berlin-Brandenburg. The *FAZ* and the *SZ* are educated middle-class papers, the *FAZ* in a liberal-conservative orientation, the *SZ* in a social-liberal one. *Bildzeitung* attracts primarily lower middle-class working-class readers. *Leipziger Volkszeitung* is political independent, reaches local middle-class readers; *Bayernkurier* is close to the CSU and covers regional, urban and agrarian, middle class strata; *Neues Deutschland* again is close to the PDS and reaches also more educated middle-class readers in East Germany. In addition, two national television channels were studied: the *First Program ARD* and *SAT*; the first a public channel with mostly a middle-class audience and the second a private channel with rather working-class and youth appeal.

Whereas the political party analysis has given, on the basis of changes in voter alliances in the post-unification phase, some indications about the general shifts in the national/European identity web, the media analysis could provide, though these media reach a large sector of the German population, only some indications of the qualitative form of this identity web over a short time-span on the educated middle-class national and regional level, as well as on the less educated national and regional working-class level. Despite this limitation, the media analysis has been able to give an insight into the various components of the European/national identity mix as articulated in the selected major events: the Nice Summit in December 2000 and the launch of the euro in January 2002. The Nice Summit was primarily dedicated to a reform of the EU institutions and decision-making process in the face of the prospective new members from East-Central, Southern Europe and South-Eastern Europe, and it thus primarily addressed the relation of the various nation-states to European integration as well as its enlargement to the East. The launch of the euro was primarily an

economic event, but as such it was embedded in various dimensions in the relationships between national and European identity. Thus, despite the focus on highly selective events, the results of the media analysis have provided novel insights into the role of the media in the public sphere in constructing the national/European identity mix in the current time-period.

Considering, firstly, the research results on the national educated middle-class newspapers, the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* and the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* cover most comprehensively European matters, but the *FAZ* more from a liberal-conservative, humanistic-Christian world-view and the *SZ* rather from a social-liberal, humanistic-secularised value frame and thus cover the main political spectrum from the CDU to the FDP and SPD. Both *FAZ* and the *SZ* have a basic vision of a democratic-civic Europe and link it to a German national identity that has its foundations in the re-moralisation of Germany and its reconciliation with its neighbours; but the *FAZ* emphasises more the European Christian and cultural-humanistic foundations with more exclusive boundaries vis-à-vis Orthodox-Christian and Islamic countries, whereas the *SZ* stresses more the European humanistic-civic foundations with more inclusive tendencies. Accordingly, both newspapers were critical of the nationalist power struggle in Nice, welcomed the European constitution in the making, insisted on EU reforms in order to include the Eastern newcomers, and celebrated the launch of the euro. However, the *FAZ* emphasised more Germany's moral responsibility and implicitly its political and economic leadership role for Europe, whereas the *SZ* focused rather on the social problems and the repercussions of the Eastern enlargement.

Reviewing, secondly, the findings on the regional newspapers, all of them are less European and more national and regional in their focus. The *Bayernkurier* combines a strongly ethnic and cultural notion of the Bavarian *Heimat* with a Christian or rather Catholic idea of Europe. The *Leipziger Volkszeitung* is rather social-liberal and secularised in its outlook with an element of an East German counter-identification against Western Germany and the Western-based European Union. And the *Neues Deutschland* represents an East Berlin-Brandenburg focused socialist reform orientation with a strong anti-religious and anti-Western German and European attitude. These value orientations cover opposing poles of a political spectrum from the West German social-conservative CSU to an East-German CDU and SPD social liberalism and PDS socialism. Accordingly, the national/European attitudes presented in the reports and comments on the Nice Summit and the euro launch, though in all three cases basically pro-European, vary from a) a strongly regional focus on the subsidiarity principle, the concern about the social consequences of the eastern enlargement and the celebration of the euro in the case of the *Bayernkurier*, to b) a regional focus on the problems of a new, relatively successful *Bundesland* with a sympathetic, but rather distanced view on European integration and the euro as well as a commitment to the Eastern enlargement, though aware of Saxony's problems as a border region to the Czech Republic and Poland, and to c) a regional focus on the problems of East Berlin and Brandenburg as less successful instances of post-communist transformation with an ambivalent orientation towards European integration and the euro, perceived as core institutions of a capitalist Europe that have to be countered by a social Europe, including the East-Central European candidates.

Looking, thirdly, at the results on the tabloid mass paper *Bildzeitung*, the national/European identity web displays a rather different construction. Of importance here is the fact that there is a primary focus on the German nation, centred on its economic superiority and its social achievements, but at the same time lamenting the inadequate political role in Europe and the never-ending moral punishment for its past. On this backdrop, the Nice Summit was

interpreted in the light of the usual French intrigue against Germany and the honourable German broker role; and the eastern enlargement was generally supported on the grounds of its importance for the German economy, but connected with strong concerns about the negative repercussions of cheap labour competition and over-boarding immigration. The euro-launch was highly celebrated on the grounds that it will be a means to make the German economy, living standards and welfare state stronger; but at the same time the following crisis-prone development of the German economy was quickly blamed on the euro as 'Teuro'. The core of this attitude is a German-centred welfare nationalism with a more or less open claim for political and economic European leadership and a resentful rejection of a continuing moral degradation in Europe.

In sum, the media analysis has revealed a remarkable spectrum of national-European identity webs: a) an elite layer of educated middle-class attitudes with decidedly pro-European and self-critical German national orientations; b) a substantial divergence between a Catholic West German region and two different Protestant East German regions with widely diverging European and national attitudes; and c) a popular lower middle- and working-class layer with decidedly German-centred and European-critical attitudes. The educated middle class opinion overlaps basically with the political centre of CDU, FDP and SPD. The divergent regional opinions are articulated in separate party formations such as the CSU and the PDS. The lower middle- and working-class opinion represents a populist frame of reference as well as a critical antipode for all main-stream parties, but also a potential for neo-nationalist party formations. Thus, the media and party discourses show different, partially overlapping and reinforcing, partially diverging and contradictory, collective identity spaces within the German public sphere. From the perspective of the historical-sociological macro-analysis, two major specifications in the construction of Europe and the nation in German collective identity have been found: a) the lasting impact of the differences between West and East Germany and b) the importance of social-structural distinctions between the educated middle-class strata and the lower middle-class and working-class strata.

National and European identity profiles in West and East Germany

The survey research on West and East German national and European identity profiles in collaboration with Eurobarometer in 2002 was new insofar as it applied the multi-dimensional analytical scheme of national and European identity construction and thus generated more complex data sets than those from previous survey research. Although there is an established German and international survey research tradition on national identity and European orientations in Germany, the relationship between national and European identity profiles in German national identity has been rarely explored and, in such rare cases, no analysis of the interconnections between the ethnic, civic, instrumental or socio-economic and symbolic-affective dimensions in the national and European layers of collective identity has been undertaken. Thus, the West and East German survey investigated and produced data on four main areas in the entanglements of national and European identity: 1. The closeness or distance of West and East Germans to other national and ethnic groups; 2. The constitution of each national identity regarding the ethno-cultural, political-civic, instrumental and symbolic-affective components; 3. The constitution of each European identity regarding again the ethno-cultural, political-civic, instrumental and symbolic-affective dimensions; and 4. The social structure of the carriers of these national and European identities, regarding class,

gender, age, educational level and area of residence in large cities, medium-sized towns and small towns or villages.

Regarding the closeness or distance to other people, the following commonalities and differences between West and East Germans have been found: On the one hand, as regards in-group closeness, West and East Germans feel closest to their home place as compared to the overarching region and nation; however, the East Germans feel closer to their region than to the German nation. This finding evinces the lasting ambivalence of East Germans to the unified German nation-state. On the other hand, as regards closeness to out-groups, there is a general shared gradient from Western Europe, Central Europe, North America, Eastern Europe and the Middle East as well as the related minorities. In more detail, however, as compared to West Germans, East Germans feel more distant from EU citizens and fellow Europeans, closer to Central and Eastern Europeans (including Russians, but except Poles), and again more distant from people from North America, Yugoslavia, Turkey and Arabic countries as well as to Jews and Sinti-Roma. These findings show a stronger primordial-ethnic definition of East German collective identity, the particular effect of the German-Polish nationalist conflict, and the lasting impact of a Central and Eastern European communist and post-communist commonality.

Regarding the national identity profiles, again some commonalities between West Germans and East Germans can be observed: common language and culture rank highest, whereas national character and symbols, national pride and particularly the army rank lowest. These findings confirm the continuing strong importance of cultural nationalism and the lasting impact of the stigmatising past on German national identity in West and East Germany in the present. At the same time, a number of differences are obvious: as compared to West Germans, in East Germany the primordial-ethnic components (customs, language, ancestry and history) have more weight; the civic components (political system, rights and duties) have less weight; and the instrumental components (social welfare, economy), the political-military (army, borders, sovereignty) as well as the symbolic-affective dimensions (national pride, national character, national symbols) are again more important. These findings again confirm that in all dimensions of national identity, except the civic-democratic components, East Germans score higher and thus display a stronger ethnic and nation-centred identity than West Germans. This also explains the basic ambivalence of East Germans regarding the overarching, pre-dominantly West German nation-state.

Regarding the European identity profiles, there is a common hierarchy: freedom of movement, a common EU currency and a common civilisation are valued most, whereas common ancestry and EU symbols are valued least. But in more detail, several differences are obvious: in comparison to East Germans, West Germans score higher on the political-civic EU dimension (institutions, rights/duties), and the instrumental dimensions (social protection, free movement, defence, currency), whereas the political-territorial components (sovereignty, borders), and the symbolic-affective components (European pride, EU symbols) are valued less. Finally and interestingly, in ethno-cultural dimensions West Germans score higher on the cultural components (common civilisation, member of a European society), whereas East Germans stress more the primordial components (common ancestry and history). In other words, the West Germans feel closer to all civic, instrumental and cultural aspects of European integration, but feel uncomfortable with an over-powerful European super-state and European symbolism; meanwhile, the East Germans feel closer to the primordial and political-territorial components.

Taken together, the national-European identity mix in West and East Germany shows the following differences: East Germans are generally characterised by a stronger primordial-ethnic, political-territorial and symbolic-affective definition of national and European identity (common descent, customs, history, borders, sovereignty, pride, symbols), whereas the West Germans generally value higher civic and instrumental components in national and European identity (institutions, rights and duties, economy, currency). Regarding the welfare state, the East Germans connect it primarily to the nation, whereas West Germans link it also to the EU. The West/East German differences are also indicated in the differing feelings of proximity vis-à-vis ethnic minorities. These differences in the East-West German national-European identity mix can be explained by a) the impact of the German authoritarian *Sonderweg* and lack of political-civic experience in the East; b) the late inclusion into the European Union and lack of political-civic experience with European integration; c) the until recently low rate of immigration and lack of civic experience with ethnic minorities; d) the need for political-territorial sovereignty and security; e) the lasting ambivalence towards the West German dominated nation-state as well as the Western European centred EU; and f) a solidarity feeling with the post-communist Eastern neighbours, except with Poland as the country with lasting nationalist resentments.

A puzzle remains regarding the lack of significant correlations between socio-demographic variables such as gender, age, marital status, residence, education, occupation and political orientations. On the basis of the results in the media analysis regarding the significant differences in national and European attitudes between educated middle-class and less educated lower-middle- and working-class strata, it can be expected that this significant difference also appears in public opinion. In some instances, this is also the case, e.g. regarding the West German findings that older, less educated, and politically right-wing people feel closer to their in-group (Q25); that older, female and more educated people share more ethnic and cultural components of national identity (Q26); or that the symbolic-affective dimensions of European identity are shared more by older people (Q27). Similarly, regarding the East German findings, it can be said that older and less educated people feel closer to their national co-citizens (Q25); that older people agree more with the ethnic aspects of national identity (Q26); or that people with more income share a stronger instrumental and civic sense of European identity (Q27). But all these hints do not seem to be conclusive. Thus, only a methodological answer may be presented: the survey questions did not sufficiently discriminate between a rather German-centred nationalist (instrumentalist and ethnic) and a more European-centred cosmopolitan (civic and cultural) attitude – a distinction that has been crucial for the media and their reading public.

Individual European and national attitudes in West and East Germany

The German civil society discourses on Europe and the nation as articulated in 36 interviews with teachers and lay people are by no means representative, but they allow for a more extensive analysis of the meaning spaces in the entanglements of national and European identities in Germany with some systematic references. On the one hand, five major German regions have been selected: Bavaria (South-East); Baden-Württemberg (South-West); North-Rhine-Westphalia (North-West), Brandenburg (North-East) and Berlin (East and West), enabling a comparison between three/four West German and one/two East German regions. On the other hand, the selection has included a systematic variation of socio-demographic

differences regarding age, gender, class, and residence, enabling a more detailed analysis of their influences on the national/European identity mix.

Considering first the interviews with lay persons, six major types of collective identity can be distinguished: 1) the European-cosmopolitan type (here regional and national identifications contain a critical-reflexive distance in combination with a strongly universalistic orientation transcending European boundaries); 2) the European-national type (here the primary emphasis is on Europe and European integration with a positive-critical attitude towards Germany), 3) the national-European type (here, the primary identification is with Germany and Europe plays a positive complementary role); 4) the regional-European type (here, the primary identification is with the *Heimat* region, but connected with a positive orientation to Europe and a more critical distance to the nation); 5) the nationalist-anti-European type (identifying strongly with the German nation combined with a negative attitudes towards European integration); and 6) the regionalist-anti-European type (here, a strong identification with the *Heimat* goes hand in hand with negative attitudes towards the German nation-state and European integration). An additional seventh type with a strongly negative feeling against the German nation and an idealistic picture of Central Europe has been observed, but it can be neglected as a rather idiosyncratic case.

Summarising, second, the interviews with teachers, five major types of collective identity have been found: 1) the European-cosmopolitan type (here the guiding teaching ideas attempt to convey a universalistic message criticizing ethnic-nationalist particularism); 2) the European-national type (here a strong identification with the European idea goes together with a positive-reflexive attitude towards Germany); 3) the national-European type (here a primary focus on Germany is linked to a positive, but secondary orientation towards European integration); 4) the regional-European type with a primary identification to the region and a positive-regionalist orientation to European integration; and 5) a nationalist identification with Germany against European integration. In comparison to the lay persons, the teachers have a stronger principled orientation, trying to teach these values on the basis of school books and other teaching materials and to influence the socialisation process of their students or pupils. Teachers thus belong mostly to the educated middle-class stratum, though do not necessarily come from a similar family background. Meanwhile, the lay persons are equally from middle class as well as lower-middle and working-class backgrounds. As teachers, they identify more with the national or European layers of collective identity and thus a primary orientation to the region (type 4) is represented only by one case.

In view of the results in the party and media discourse analysis as well as the survey results, again the socio-demographic distinctions clearly matter in the construction of the European-national identity web. Firstly, class in a strong correlation with education levels matters. The lay people from an educated middle-class background (inherited or achieved; with language skills, travel experience and reading habits) are mostly positively oriented to Europe (or its universalistic components) with a critical-reflexive attitude towards Germany, its past and its ethno-nationalist-xenophobic currents in the present. The teachers mostly *qua* function from this educated middle-class background represent these attitudes even more in a principled-programmatic way; though the German school system in its socializing function rather reproduces than changes these class distinctions. In contrast, the lay persons from a less educated lower middle-class and working-class background (with lower languages skills and more limited travel experiences) are mostly and primarily positively-uncritically oriented to the German nation and their *Heimat* region and are divided equally between an either positive

or negative, secondary orientation to the European Union. Secondly, in addition, age, less so gender, and residence, but only in the primarily determining context of class, matter. Older lay people tend to have a stronger national orientation and connect Europe more with Eastern Europe and Russia, whereas younger people tend to be more oriented to Europe and connect it (depending on the region they live) more with Western and Southern Europe, often including Turkey.

Considering the results of lay and teacher interviews from an East-West German comparative perspective, there is a clear correspondence to the results of the other steps of research. Firstly, there is an East-West gradient in class. Educated middle-class people with higher language skills and wider travel experience are mostly West Germans, whereas East Germans from a different educational background and with only recent experience travelling to Western and Southern Europe or beyond, belong more to the less educated lower middle-class and working-class category. Accordingly, also the predominant attitudes to the nation and Europe differ: More West Germans are more positively oriented to European integration than East Germans are, with their more national or regional focus and an either distanced or negative attitude towards European integration. Secondly, the past legacy and the form of German unification matter. More West Germans connect with Europe a critical attitude towards the Nazi past and see European integration as complementary to the German nation, whereas East Germans concentrate more on the experience of German unification and, with it, show a more distanced attitude towards European integration and a more ambivalent attitude towards the German nation-state. Thirdly, West Germans have generally a more distanced-- either positive or negative -- attitude towards the eastern enlargement, reflecting their lack of experience with East-Central and Eastern European countries, whereas East Germans show generally more positive attitudes. The interesting exception is again Poland: for the majority of West Germans (although mostly with few direct experiences), Poland symbolises the core of coming to terms with the past and defining a new Germany in Europe, whereas for the majority of East Germans (the interviewees however concentrated in the Brandenburg border region to Poland), Poland is linked to the past nationalistic antagonisms that were never overcome in the GDR and which still influence the perceptions in present post-communist East Germany.

Conclusion

As an explorative comparative study on the entanglements of national and European identities in nine countries, the German study as one part of the overall research project has provided several new insights:

On the basis of the complex analytical framework at the core of the EURONAT project, as compared to other approaches, a more complex historical-sociological interpretation of the legacies of the German national-European identity mix until German re-unification and its following reconstruction has been developed.

In an attempt to disaggregate this macro-analytical overview, the empirical analyses of the political party and media discourses have given rich empirical insights on two main actors in the German public sphere. As compared to similar analyses, both empirical studies are valuable particularly with regard to their qualitative materials. Political party analyses have seldom analysed the national-European identity mix and, in such rare cases, they have not

concentrated on macro- or meso-analytical comparisons. Media analyses of national-European identity entanglements do not yet exist. So in both instances, important contributions have been provided.

In order to analyse the civil society contribution to the construction of the German national-European identity web, a quantitative survey analysis and qualitative interviewing have been combined. Again, in both instances, new territory has been explored. On the basis of the complex EURONAT framework, a novel data set (in comparison to other surveys) on German (East and West) national as well as European identity profiles has been delivered. Also, the qualitative interview has provided novel results on the individual level – adding knowledge to very few other similar attempts.

Each phase of the research is valuable in itself, providing rich results on each level of historical-sociological interpretation and empirical research. Methodologically positioned at different levels of analysis, the results on each level have confirmed and complemented rather than contradicted each other. At the same time, it has become also clear that the systematic connections between each research step are sometimes unclear or under-developed and need further interpretative clarification or, beyond this project, further empirical investigation.

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5.4 Comparative Remarks and Overall Policy Recommendations

Between crisis and eu(ro)phoria

Today the European Union stands at yet another critical juncture in its history. Recently it nearly doubled the number of its member-states from fifteen to twenty-five, incorporating a number of countries from Central and Eastern Europe that were part of the so-called 'Eastern block' only fifteen years ago. At the same time, member state governments and citizenries face a moment of disorientation in front of the United States economic and political hegemony in the world, despite its questionable strategies and the increasing wave of international terrorism. International challenges also foster a sense of disunity within the EU.

The combined effect of the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties – which gave the European project a much wider set of objectives than simply market integration – together with the Eastern enlargement and the end of the Cold War have created new power alliances within Europe.

Far from one unified EU, we see today the establishment of a two or three-tier Europe with radically different agendas and perhaps also schedules of integration. The core is formed by France, Great Britain and Germany (once great powers in Europe); the other member states are connected to these big three in a complex net of interrelationships. The extent to which such a balance of power is helpful in the establishment of a viable future Europe is very difficult to foresee.

An issue of increasing importance is whether the process of European integration contains a social dimension and to what extent the question of social inequality is dealt with. This issue has a bearing on the question of the overall legitimacy of the EU. Participation rates in the elections to the European Parliament are a clear indicator of a lack of legitimacy for the whole project. The expectations on the euro have changed to complaints that the European currency only triggers inflation.

One major result of the EURONAT project was the discovery of how fast the moods change and how transient and inconsistent Europe is, far from frequent imaginations of Europe as a fixed and rigidly institutionalised category, be it a market or a polity. What seems to be stable and certain is the instability and constant transformation of the whole process. Solutions to one problem are pregnant with new challenges and new problems. In one version Europe can be seen as a project towards ever deeper and more refined integration. In another version Europe has for half a century been a project developing from crisis to crisis.

Various scenarios are proposed for the completion of the European Union project. There are, for instance, voices for a European Union organised in two concentric circles: an inner club moving fast towards fuller integration and a larger circle of satellite states. Others invest their hopes and expectations in a new European Constitution. Still others believe that the Open Method of Coordination is the saviour of Europe, much more than the centralised and hierarchical Commission.

These developments raise not only issues of power and governance, but also - and perhaps

most importantly - questions of ethics and identification. Will the EU stay together and if it does so, does it have the potential for giving EU citizens a sense of belonging together? Is such a sense of belonging running in parallel to national allegiances or is it cast against them? What is the role – actual and potential – of political leaders and the mass media in these developments?

The confusion about what the EU is and what it should be seems greater than ever, while the EU is heading towards its next round of enlargement to include Romania and Bulgaria, and has also opened negotiations with Turkey. Some see the EU as a project on track, moving from enlargement to enlargement. The results of the EURONAT project demonstrate, however, how overtly simplistic such a view is.

This project was devoted to the study of European and national identity patterns, and to the connections between them, in nine European states (six older EU member states: Austria, Britain, Germany, Greece, Italy and Spain; and three newcomers in Central Eastern Europe: Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland). The point of departure of this research project was the rapidly expanding interest in the development of a European identity as a legitimacy basis of European integration. Our question was what the obvious trend of Europeanisation meant for national patterns of identification. What does Europe mean in various national settings?

The answer to that question is that there are many and contested views on what Europe is and should be, not only among but also within the nations of Europe. Member states play an important part here as arenas for political debate. This variety modifies every image of Europe as a cohesive polity. Against the backdrop of this variety, the present confusion about what Europe is or should be is perhaps not very astonishing. Europe as a cacophony of voices is, perhaps, what it always was. The EU integration as a process on track, without deviations or major delays, becomes in this perspective a utopian dream.

In each of the nine member states, the relationships between national and European identities were analysed through selections of images, representations, understandings and meanings of Europe and the various nations at the levels of political elites, the media and civil society. In the empirical research, special emphasis was given to the role of media as the discursive universe within which national and European identities are formed.

How do Europeans imagine Europe?

Feeling attached to one's nation prevents people from sharing a sense of belonging to Europe?

Our survey analysis showed that in most countries, national identity and a feeling of belonging to Europe are based on different sources. National and European attachments are not competing with one another. Rather, a European level of identity is included in citizens' national identities. This in fact explains that both identities may be strong, and still the individual citizen does not perceive a conflict between them. National identity, based on ethno-cultural elements, is of course stronger and could be represented as a kind of inner circle, while a European identity, based more on instrumental elements, is weaker and could be thought of as an outer circle.

In our survey research we asked people to state how close or distant they felt from a list of groups, including people from their own locality/village, region, nation, EU member states, other European countries, 2004 enlargement member states (at the time still accession countries), and a list of other national groups including US citizens, Arabs, Turks and immigrant diasporas.

Our findings show that in eight countries (i.e. except Great Britain), Europe comes right after parochial in-groups (village, region, nation), being closer to those in-groups than to other groups. That is to say, Europeans are not perceived as an out-group. Further analysis of the nature of such local or national identities through our qualitative interviews suggests that the majority of interviewees in the different countries hold an open and inclusive image of their nation, which leaves room for appreciation of other Europeans and their countries, of Europe and the EU as a whole.

Our findings also confirmed that European identification is weaker than its national counterpart. Citizens from all member states feel much closer to their national in-groups (nation, region or village) than they feel to any other groups (including European groups). On one hand, the percentage of citizens with dual identities, national and European at the same time, is fairly large in all the member states considered (although with great differences between national samples). But on the other, attachment to national identities is stronger than attachment to a European identity. The percentage of people who feel only European is rather small. This means that people do not stop feeling national and start feeling European; rather, they incorporate these different (levels of) identities.

This point was further investigated through our qualitative interviews, which confirmed the survey findings. Only a handful of informants from various countries presented themselves as 'Eurocentric', identifying with Europe first and with their nation only at a second level. Similarly however, there was only a small group of 'Europhobics' who expressed xenophobic attitudes towards the EU, the 2004 enlargement and other nations in general.

Our survey data showed that feelings of belonging to the nation and to Europe refer to different elements. We found that national identities are stronger and primarily 'cultural', or in some cases 'ethno-cultural', based on a common language, shared customs and culture, or a common religion. European identities, on the other hand, have a more pronounced 'instrumental' dimension. A word of caution is necessary here. We are not arguing that national identities are emotive and cultural while European identities are instrumental. Rather we state that the instrumental component is more important in European identifications than the cultural one – although cultural elements are not absent, especially among citizens of the 2004 enlargement states. Conversely, in national identities the instrumental features are weaker than the ethnic or cultural ones.

Our qualitative interviews confirmed the importance of the instrumental dimension in feelings of attachment to the EU. Indeed, people consider economic prosperity as the most important feature and the main advantage of EU membership.

The fact that European identities have an important instrumental dimension leads to a number of considerations. This finding suggests that the EU may be able to strengthen European citizens' loyalty by increasing the perceived (economic or political) benefits of membership. At the same time, such a strategy may have only limited effects, confined to those citizens

who actually benefit from European policies. The reinforcement of such an instrumental view of the EU may not affect the feelings of citizens who have a strong emotive attachment to their nation.

The cultural dimension of European identities is worthy of attention too. Cultural elements are mentioned among the five most important items in nearly all countries (linguistic and cultural diversity is mentioned by nine out of ten countries, and a common European civilization by seven of them). Several scholars have hypothesised that it would be extremely difficult for a European identity to emerge because of the strength of national cultural identities and because of the simultaneous lack of ‘cultural’ elements, traditions, and historical memories shared by all European citizens. Our survey results prove them wrong. European identifications have emerged in all the countries studied. Dual – national and European – identities are possible. And, most importantly, European identity has a cultural component too. There seems to be much more common ‘cultural’ ground among the European countries on which to build a European identity than nationalism theorists have argued.

This finding is important because this ‘cultural’ aspect of European identity complements instrumental considerations and may touch a sensitive chord among citizens who do not benefit, at least not directly or in ways that are obvious to them, from European integration. Of course, a cultural Europe may also develop an exclusionary aspect: excluding and marginalising those who are not EU citizens or who are perceived to be culturally or racially different from ‘Europeans’.

A civic type of European identity is indeed more desirable as it does not suffer from the limitations of the instrumental attachment, nor does it have a strong exclusionary potential as a cultural European identity does. However, our data suggest that the emergence of a civic European identity is unlikely to take place in the near future. Only in three out of nine countries did rights and duties figure among the five most important items for citizens’ European identifications. Civic elements play a minor role in the configuration of contemporary European identities. Nevertheless, the cases of Italy and Spain support the idea that in countries in which civic elements are important, both for national and European identifications, the compatibility of these two kinds of identities is easier and higher.

Our labelling of certain identity features as instrumental needs also careful consideration. We assumed that the right to freedom of movement and residence in any part of the EU is an instrumental aspect of feeling European. However, our qualitative interviews (in line with European statistics on intra-EU migration) suggest that most citizens live, have lived, and will continue to live, in their own country, never moving to a neighbour member state, except for tourism. Hence, we may hypothesise that the freedom of movement within the EU is emphasised for its symbolic character rather than for the actual possibilities of legal intra EU migration that it opens. From this perspective, the right to move freely within the territory of the Union may be considered as a civic feature of European identification.

Our interviews suggest that the right to free movement has also a class and demographic dimension inherent to it. Those most likely to move between member states are young people, relatively well educated (or moving to study), living in urban areas and of middle or upper class background. Thus, the right to free movement may have both a symbolic and an

instrumental value for these categories of citizens while for older, less educated and less affluent groups of citizens, free movement is mainly a right with a symbolic value.

The above findings indirectly emphasise the importance of developing a civic level of attachment to Europe and the EU. In this respect, the European Constitution could be a major landmark in the development of European society. The Constitution gives citizens new civic rights and can contribute to making them feeling closer and more attached to the EU. Such a development, however, is conditional upon the citizens being made aware of their common rights and obligations under the Constitutional treaty and of the relevance that these (may) have for their daily lives.

The development of a united Europe and of a common European civic society is not a smooth process. Our study points to at least two important obstacles. First, the qualitative interviews suggest that EU citizens still perceive Europe as divided between ‘Western’ and ‘Central Eastern’ Europe, as if the ‘Iron Curtain’ was still there. Categories such as Western and Eastern Europe are still relevant for citizens, denoting important economic, political and cultural disparities. Attitudes towards the 2004 enlargement (which at the time of our fieldwork was imminent) range from reluctance (the accession countries are not ready, and in many respects are perceived as too distant and alien), or realism (the enlargement is an ongoing process), to a lukewarm (the process brings some opportunities), or wholehearted (the process means welcomed reunification of Europe) welcome. Informants from 2004 enlargement member states perceive EU membership as at best a costly necessity, at worse a necessary evil. On both sides sober attitudes and the evaluation of the process prevail. Only a handful of informants from different countries view the enlargement as an opportunity for cooperation in building a new Europe.

The second obstacle comes from the fact that citizens perceive the EU as wrought by internal conflict among competing national interests. They also emphasise competition between two perceived categories of member states: the ‘first class’ members of large and powerful countries such as Britain, France and Germany, and the ‘second class’ partners including all the smaller and less powerful member states (with Spain and Italy in a somewhat uncertain situation of whether they should be classified with the former or with the latter). The former are perceived to dictate decisions and policies, catering mainly to their own national interests, and neglecting the views and interests of the latter. At the same time, though, our qualitative interviews show that citizens have a good understanding – even if limited knowledge – of European integration politics. They appreciate that European integration is a complex process that involves conflicting interests and requires negotiation and compromise.

Our survey study confirms that national historical narratives remain highly relevant for understanding the emergence of a European identity. Internal divisions in Italy; the Spanish experience with fascism during much of the twentieth century; Hungary’s historical experience with Empire and Communism; and the British Empire legacy in the UK all form important lenses through which citizens view the EU. In the first three countries such historical experiences have become reasons for welcoming European integration as a counterweight to such national problems and as a guarantee of political and economic stability. In the case of Britain, the imperial past’s influence over attitudes towards Europe is more ambivalent. While some citizens remain ethnocentric, and privilege a view of Britain as an independent global force, others realise that times have changed and that Britain should not distance itself too much from ‘the continent’ and the EU. In conclusion, the effects of

history are not straightforward: countries with similar experiences may perceive contemporary developments in different ways. Indeed, this finding suggests that the emergence of European identifications is dependent on national dynamics more than on EU policies or performance.

How do the media represent Europe and the nation in times of crisis and in moments of celebration?

Our research examined the coverage of the Nice summit in December 2000 and the launch of the euro in December 2001-January 2002 in 4-5 major daily newspapers (both national and regional ones) and 2 major television channels (one private and one public) in each of the countries studied. Our findings highlight some common features that organise the media discourses, features which appear to be relevant in all or most of the countries studied.

We had hypothesised that the early or late accession to the European Union would influence the media discourse on Europe and the nation. However, our analysis shows that the timing of accession of a country to the EC/EU is relevant only as regards the Central Eastern European states that, during the periods analysed, were not yet full fledged members of the EU. Their media coverage of the euro launch and the Nice summit was unavoidably influenced by their non-participation to the decision-making at the summit and to their provisional exclusion from the euro-zone. The recent or earlier accession to the EU does not appear to condition the media discourse in the other member states.

The model of socio-economic and political development of each country was found to play no role in the media discourse. The relatively recent authoritarian experiences of Spain or Greece were not reflected in the media discourse. Similarly, the Communist past of the accession countries was only indirectly relevant, as they were still striving to catch up economically with Western European countries. From a political perspective, this past is no more relevant than the existence of Communist parties in several member states.

The same is true for the early, medium or late achievement of national independence. The more medium - to - long term historical perspective that refers to the processes of nation and state formation in each member state or accession country is not taken up by the media in their coverage of the euro launch or the Nice summit. Only the British media emphasise the separate historical path and the Empire experience of Britain as opposed to that of the continental countries. The recently re-acquired national independence proves to be a concern for Central Eastern European countries; however no media put into question their interest in becoming members of the EU.

On the whole, an inflection on national identities may be more or less prominent in the media debates. However, contrary to our expectations, the predominantly civic-territorial or ethno-cultural definition of the nation does not influence the media discourse on European integration.

The geopolitical and socio-economic centre-periphery location of a country within Europe proved to be a relevant factor shaping the media discourses, albeit in a way different than that anticipated. The media discourse was structured along the big and powerful vs. small and with limited influence member states/accession countries. It was not the historical centre-

periphery location in Europe or the level of economic development as such that counted, but rather a combination of member state or accession country status (as already mentioned above) as well as the geographical, demographic and economic weight of a country within the EU. All media appear to recognise that there is a power imbalance between the few big and powerful states of Germany, France, Britain and perhaps Italy (although the positioning of this last seems ambivalent); the small countries like Greece, the Czech Republic, Hungary and others; and those that are small in terms of power but could be big from a geographical or demographic point of view, such as Spain and Poland.

In sum, our analysis suggests that long term historical arguments are less important in shaping the media discourse on European integration than present considerations and relations of power. This finding should be considered however in its post-1989, 'end-of-history' context. During the past fifteen years, European politics have witnessed landslide changes through the dismantling of the 'eastern block', the 'rapprochement' of Western and Central-Eastern European countries, the exponential increase of communication and trade among the two sides of the continent, the recuperation of national sovereignty by Central Eastern European countries and at the same time their regional integration into the EU, the re-organisation of left- and right-wing ideologies and, finally, the fact that loyalty to the nation is contested both from above by transnational entities like the EU and from below by minority groups and immigrant communities.

National politics also influence the media discourse. However, here too a word of caution is necessary. It is not the left or right wing political orientation of a newspaper or a television channel that conditions its discourse. It is rather its support of or opposition to the party/ies in government that taints its representation of specific European integration events and their handling by the national government. Also the tabloid/populist vs. broad sheet/quality character of specific newspapers and television channels conditioned the media discourse. However, this has little to do with the European or national character of the events covered and more to do with the overall language and coverage practice of the given newspaper or television channel.

How do political parties evaluate the EU integration process? How do they understand Europe and the EU?

In the EURONAT study, we have examined how parties evaluate the pros and cons of belonging to the EU. Economic arguments were shown to include more than the preference for a social or a free market economy. Parties also take into account the impact of the EU in their national economies, as well as the general context of economic globalisation, to assess their positions regarding the integration process.

In the political dimension, worries about the federal or intergovernmental form of the Union are only a part of the arguments that parties use and take into account. Questions regarding the external and internal security of the Union (and countries within it), demands of regional or nationalistic representation, and political globalisation are also important elements of the party discourse.

In addition to these economic and political considerations, there exist values and symbolic dimensions that parties debate when considering their positions in relation to the European integration process.

We question here the notion of ‘Europeanism’ as an analytical tool to classify political parties according to their level of support for further integration at the European level. Scholarly research in this field suggests that preferences for a federal political organisation of the EU and the intervention of the State in the economy (at the European level) are a sign of pro-European attitudes, and relate them to the left. Meanwhile, preferences for an intergovernmental political organization of the EU and a market economy (at the European level) are interpreted as Euro-sceptical positions and related to the right.

Our findings show that leftist parties had a preference higher than expected for federalism and a social economy. We also find that the positive evaluation of the EU integration process was slightly higher than expected among leftist parties. Right wing parties preferred an intergovernmental Union and a free market economy more often than expected. However, they exhibited neither lower probabilities of positive evaluation, nor higher probabilities of negative evaluation, of the EU integration process.

Notwithstanding these results, we will be taking an unjustified step if, from them, we simply assume that the preference for federalism and social economy makes leftist parties more favourable to the integration process, since this could be a spurious correlation. We should rather ask how it is that the preference for a federal model, on one hand, and for a social economic model, on the other, are related to favourable stances towards the EU. We should also interrogate ourselves about the mediating role that national contexts play in the preference of political parties for federalism and a social economic model. What is it that really counts? How do ideologies and national contexts interplay and influence parties’ preferences and support for the EU integration process?

Our analysis suggests that preferences for federalism are correlated, weakly though, with positive evaluations of the integration process, while preferences for inter-governmentalism correlate with negative evaluations. There exists also a negative correlation, however even weaker than the previous one, between preferences for more free market economy and a positive evaluation of the EU.

However, a better look into the data produces more interesting results: preferences for federalism and inter-governmentalism are related to the national context, as well as the preferences over the future evolution of the EU market. Western and more populated countries prefer a federal Union, while Eastern and less populated countries, as well as member states from the 2004 enlargement, prefer an intergovernmental Union. In the same vein, preferences for more free market economy were higher among parties from the 2004 enlargement member states.

When we control parties’ support for the European integration process, taking into account not just ideologies, but also national contexts, we find that the positive evaluation of the EU integration process is always higher than expected in Western countries, both among parties from the left as well as from the right and nationalist parties. The same happens when we control ideology and country population. Parties from all ideologies, left, right, regionalist and nationalist as well as agrarian and green, from more populated countries are always more

favourable to the EU than expected. Finally, both left and right parties, as well as agrarian and green ones, are always less supportive than expected of the integration process, in countries from the 2004 enlargement. These findings suggest a stronger correlation between national contexts and support for integration process than the correlation between party ideology and their positive stance towards the EU.

The fact that ideology is less important than expected in explaining party attitudes towards the EU may depend also in the wide range of issues that they take into account. First, parties might be aware about the EU having negative consequences on their countries in one aspect, but not in several others. Hence, they may acknowledge these negative consequences and still support the EU.

Second and most important, parties do not consider themselves as passive actors within the EU. They do not just assess the consequences that the EU has on their nation states; they go further and take into account the fact that they can shape the Union and influence the final outcome. So the process is more complex than a simple calculation of costs versus benefits with a touch of ideology. A party evaluates the consequences of EU integration for its country as well as the political game at the EU level. If the latter is found to be fair and open enough to allow for participation and at least some influence, the party may be favourable to further EU integration with a view to influencing the latter's development and outcome. Parties do not see the EU as a given, but as a living and changeable reality. So the attitude towards the EU does not depend as much on the current form of the Union as it does on the future expectations of parties about what it would be and about how they would lead the Union in that direction. The big stake for the EU's future is in the nature of the political process rather than in its outcome, narrowly understood as a cost-benefit sum.

6 POLICY IMPLICATIONS

6.1 Southern Europe

6.1.1 Greece

Looking at the findings from the Greek case at face value, one could conclude that national and European identity are, for Greek citizens, two incompatible concepts. Yet, taking the findings as a whole, especially considering that Europeans are the group to which Greeks feel closest from all other 'out-groups', the Greek and European identity can be depicted as concentric circles. The policy implications of these findings are clear. Policies of European integration, whether at the national or central EU level, especially those which deal with national symbols, culture, language religion etc., have to go out of their way to be sensitive to and respect absolutely cultural specificity and difference. In a certain sense this implies a novel philosophy in policy making. Policies underpinned with respect for difference aim to build something common through consensus and to thus enhance and consolidate social cohesion and the democratic process.

The need for such sensitive policies at both national and EU level became even more evident through the qualitative analysis of interviews with lay people from three different locations in Greece: Athens, Thiva and Zakynthos. Investigating their views and attitudes on the nation, Europe and the EU, the finding of the survey that the ethnic, cultural and symbolic elements of Greek identity come first was confirmed. Greeks are close to their customs and traditions and are very proud of their history and civilisation, which many respondents consider the pioneer of European civilization. Despite the emphasis on history and the ethnic, symbolic and cultural elements of Greek identity, it is important for policy purposes to stress that the image of that identity emerged, at the same time, as open, dynamic and fluid. Its boundaries appeared not only flexible but also reflexive, and this seemed conducive to policies which accepted and embraced the *other*. There were, of course, those who held highly ethnocentric, rigid and excluding conceptions of the *other*, and this included Europe. But this was a minority reflecting the minority of such views in society at large. Many respondents were concerned about the civic image of Greece and its level of development, which, they thought, is lagging behind that of North-Western Europe. Yet, in this developmental civic aspect as well as the cultural symbolic one, Greek society was understood as entirely compatible with European society. The policy implication of this is that policies which pursue a higher interaction between Greece and Europe are welcome at the level of civil society, provided that such policies are sensitive to symbolic areas of Greek identity.

The policy implications at European level, arising from all sets of data, seemed to be that the cultural model of European integration could be built primarily on difference and real dialogue. This implied an open interactive process at all levels, with absolute respect of the *other* and the democratic process. The vision in the background of the findings seemed to be for an open, just, democratic society with respect for the individual and for cultural collectivities. The general conclusion of the study is that both Greek and European identity are fluid and largely ambiguous concepts. National identity is, of course, close to the sentiments and the loyalty of the respondents to a degree that the notion of European identity

cannot be. Almost all respondents however, seemed to be committed to the European project and many seemed to place high stakes on it for the sake of ‘the children’ and the generations to come.

6.1.2 Italy

Our findings from the media phases suggest that EU information campaigns aiming at increasing citizen interest and active participation in the EU governance may be more effective if concentrated on celebrations and symbols than on the actual workings of the EU institutions and governance system. Such an information policy however is unlikely to address the democratic deficit and lack of citizen participation in EU politics, even if it fostered a feeling of belonging to the EU among lay people.

Also, our analysis of the party discourse urges for caution when taking at face value the party platforms and ideological positions, since these may be modified when parties are confronted with a political crisis or dilemma. At the same time, this points to another interesting element: nation and EU representations seem to develop more actively in response to national or international problems rather than as a linear ideology-guided cumulative process. For instance, the creation of a common EU foreign and defence policy and identity may be more the result of specific international challenges that rendered such a development a necessity than a matter of political will of the EU and member state political leaders.

Our study confirmed the hypothesis that ordinary citizens do not uncritically accept and/or reproduce the dominant media and elite discourses. They were relatively suspicious – in line with the overall mistrust between citizens and the state that characterises the Italian political culture – of the elites’ discourse and actions, and they displayed an advanced level of understanding of the workings of national and European politics. They elaborated actively on stimuli and information received from their environment in their representations of the nation, the EU, Europe and the relationship between them. Having said this, we need also to acknowledge that lay people reproduced to a certain extent the main media and political debates in their talk.

Last but not least, our overall findings suggest that the axes that are politically and symbolically – if not also economically – relevant today are the distinction between small and large member states (Italy is striving to secure a position among the latter but constantly fears that it stands with the former) and the discrimination between current and new member states. This last distinction represents better the content of the public and private discourses analysed rather than a reference to the historical and geopolitical East vs. West boundary.

6.1.3 Spain

Implications for Spain

Contrary to what happens in other European countries, and despite the generalised belief, the national identity of Spanish citizens is stronger than it is usually thought. 90 percent of the Spanish citizens feel close or quite close to their fellow Spaniards. This is a figure slightly higher than the percentage of citizens who feel close to their region (87 percent), and similar to the percentage of citizens who feel close to their place of living. This percentage is also

higher than it is in Great Britain, the Czech Republic and Germany, whose citizens show a low tendency to identify with any group in particular.

However, and due to the Francoist past, Spanish citizens do not identify with their national symbols, and that is experienced as an anomaly in the context of the contemporary democracies. The flag and anthem are the elements less important for the Spaniards' identification with their country and their fellow Spaniards: 23 percent of Spanish citizens reject them openly. These symbols are rejected due to their identification with the Francoist regime. They are symbols that do not represent all the Spaniards, but rather a part of them. Some Spaniards regret this situation and, in comparison to countries such as the United States or France, think that it is an anomaly weakening the Spanish national identity.

After concluding the EURONAT research, we are confident that, in comparison with the low importance of Spanish symbols, the EU does play a relevant symbolic role holding Spaniards together. In contrast to what happens in other neighbouring countries, Europe is something that ties Spaniards together, instead of dividing them. The European Union does not generate divisions among political parties, nor does it create relevant criticism in mass media. Both Spanish mass media and political parties hold a positive vision of Europe and the European Union. This is reflected in the messages that they transmit to the public, in which both terms are used as synonyms. The fact that there is no criticism with regard to the European Union is a circumstance particular to Spain, while the common situation in other countries is that there are parties and mass media both in favour and against.

As an indication of such an adhesive character, we see that a huge amount of Basques and Catalans feel also Spaniards and Europeans. Despite the existence of political discourse that considers the incompatibility between the Spanish identity and a Basque and Catalanian identity, Basque and Catalanian citizens do not find it difficult, in general, to identify themselves as Spaniards. According to the survey carried out for this investigation, 93 percent of Catalanian citizens feel close to the rest of their Spanish fellows, while 88 percent feels simultaneously close to their region and their country. Regarding Basque citizens, 81 percent of them feel simultaneously close to the Basque Country and Spain.

Mass media and political parties tend to simplify their message about the European Union excessively, while the Spanish citizens constitute a sophisticated audience regarding their perception of their European identity.

Implications for Europe

Mass media is reactive regarding the representation of the EU depending on the kind of event, showing different (and contradictory?) images of Europe. Would it be possible to design common strategies and directions for the representation of the EU? Would national TV cooperate?

Religion has appeared as a relevant variable for European citizens in a number of countries, in explaining their European identity. In the current state of our research, we are not able to see if this could be a divisive issue, or rather a cohesive one. There are normative-ideological positions regarding the role that it should play (or rather not play), but what we need further empirical investigation to delve into its potential for union or dis-union of the European citizens. The EU should take very seriously how to deal with this issue. Would it ignore the

opinion of an important number of European citizens? Would it be wise, taking into account the debate about legitimacy? If religion is taken into account, how must the EU deal with it?

National parties use the EU in a partisan way to support they preferred national policies. This comes in part as a consequence of how they deal with the European elections, which are fought over domestic issues rather than European ones. Because of this, the representation of the EU is quite different in different countries, and tinted in quite different colours. Maybe having true European parties competing at the European elections could be a solution to this situation. We guess that this would also help creating European identity among citizens. Or, at least, it would help the lay European citizen to clarify what the European Parliament is 'good for'. Is it the case that what work is conducted at the European Parliament is not conducted in the national Parliament? How would the European elections results affect European citizens' lives? These issues could be discussed in the European elections run by European parties, while national parties running for European elections do not usually discuss them.

6.2 Central Eastern Europe

6.2.1 The Czech Republic

We suggest the practical recommendations that seem to stem from our findings for further research activity.

Most of the topics we have been dealing with throughout all the stages of EURONAT are seriously under-researched in the Czech Republic – particularly as concerns the lay people discourse and the media. From this perspective, the Czech EURONAT obviously brought an important progress. On the other hand, exactly because of this, we were not able to grasp all the issues in their complexity. A lot remains to be done, and it is even possible that some of our elementary conclusions above will be put in question. To such a future research, we would like to suggest a few promising fields:

Research on the issue of **Romanies** is one of the deepest debts of contemporary Czech social science. In our opinion, the representations of Romanies in both popular and public discourse could be the key to the death trap, in which this issue is currently caught in the Czech society. Another important challenge comes with respect to the **Czech-German** relationship. The hypothesis that representation of the Germans and of the Czech-German relationships currently undergoes a major shift should be further falsified. Its possible political and social consequences are obvious.

The EURONAT project has been pioneering in its interest in connecting the study of representations, the issues of identity, and the different social levels of communication. The results are still very moderate. The next research stage should be more socially focused, in order to bring practical insight into the structured communication mechanisms. The closer we studied the popular discourse, the less historical and cultural connotations of the identity issues we found. Therefore, we would urge for a more detailed research on the role of what the Czech historians call '**historical consciousness**' in creating the national identity of different social strata.

The Czech EURONAT has been very general in both research scope and the level of its conclusions. One reason for this was the fact that the Czech society itself is still very homogeneous in the way it lives and represents itself. In order to get deeper insight into this, and especially into the alternative scenarios that open up, the time has come to look for the existing alternatives to the mainstream representations. What is their social background, what possibilities do they offer to represent nation and Europe? And – last but not least – what are the limits of their future development: can they be offered to the other social groups as well?

6.2.2 Hungary

Our analysis of national identity and national policy tries to reveal contingencies within the subject. What interactions have formed Hungarian national identity? What is the international context behind Hungarian national identity? Based on the historic analysis of Hungarian nation-formation, we argue that *adaptation* has long been a fundamental aspect of Hungarian national identity. The people of a relatively small country at the crossroads of imperial interests were not free in evolving their separate national identity. Imperial domination of many kinds seriously constrained the development of national identity, while inspirations from the West motivated national development, to take two examples.

Examining elite views represented in media and political discourse, we found that the understanding of the international community appeared as an important context for representations of the nation and of European integration. From a Hungarian perspective, the Euro-Atlantic integration was equivalent to joining the standards of the international community. General human and democratic values were attached to Euro-Atlantic organisations such as the NATO or the EU. This is how Hungarian national identification and European integration were seen as mutually reinforcing. European integration was also seen as providing a hope for answering crucial problems of Hungarian national identity, with many Hungarians living in minority within the neighbouring countries. New understandings of the nation appeared (nations as cultural communities in Europe), and European integration appeared as an alternative to the return of the 19th century concepts of nationhood in the region.

From lay perspectives in quantitative and qualitative analysis we could see that no general discrepancies emerge between objectives arising from Hungarian national identity and European aims. On the other hand fears also arise as the majority of interviewees emphasise the inadequate state of preparedness for Hungary in joining the EU. This reflects a moderately negative collective national self-evaluation, feelings of inferiority with regards to European partners.

In a differential analysis our results show that those with inclusive national/European identification tend to be more open to all out-groups. They represent the nation with more emphasis on both its Civic/institutional and Symbolic aspects, while not denying cultural bonds. There is a clear intergenerational dynamic in beliefs. Elder people seemed to invest more in the symbolic and ethnic/cultural aspects of the nation. Thus, a shifting emphasis from the cultural to the institutional/civic understanding is detectable, which may indicate a future change in national identity. Another interesting result is that while the younger generations reject direct measures of national identification, they rate high on more indirect measures. European identification carries elements of national identity among these young people. The

main characteristic of elite positions is a mixture of scepticism toward specific policy outcomes (e.g. euro, free movement) of the European integration and openness to other people (out-groups) and to change in general. The nation itself is also critically assessed by those in the elite.

These results altogether show that European integration is among the rare policy issues that the Hungarian public and elites accepts as a high priority. It is considered as a historic chance for national reforms too. It seems that the Hungarians await for outside stimuli and frames of reference among rapid and fundamental internal social changes. Despite shades of scepticism, careful reflections on these outside influences are not emphasized equally in public thought at the time of analysis.

6.2.3 Poland

Our research worked out the implications for both the European Union member-states and for Poland. It suggests that in the EU as a whole, the media and party leaders need to cooperate actively by working towards the development of the EU citizens' common European identity, as this layer of the Europeans' identities still necessitates further development. With regard to Poland, our research suggests that the media need to work out and carry out a coherent policy of informing about the European Union, and about the nation within this structure. Moreover, the media and the mainstream political parties should not hand over the issue of the modern Polish nation, its interpretation and relation to the other nations, to the right-wing radicals as they do currently. Finally, our research suggests that lay people need to be surveyed on the issues regarding their attitudes towards their fellow European Union member states and citizens; this would provide the elite with the knowledge on the popular moods and attitudes that, in turn, may be influenced by an adjusted policy aiming at the common European good.

6.3 Central Western Europe

6.3.1 Austria

In the decade after the collapse of communism and the dissolution of the Cold-War divide of Europe, the Austrian nation has been affected by these geopolitical changes in several important ways. Firstly, the process of the formation of the Austrian nation as an Empire-contracting form of nation-building was completed by the transformation of the pan-German Haider party into a nationalist-populist party, resulting in a stronger pluralisation of the Austrian political system and culture. Secondly, Austria became a member state of the EU, integrating into Western Europe and giving up the neutrality status between East and West. Thirdly, the opening of the East and the eastern enlargement of the European Union presented a particular challenge, strengthening the need for a Western European protection of a small nation-state and, at the same time, reviving a Habsburg tradition in the form of a common bond of the small nations in the Danube cultural space of *Mittleuropa*.

In the context of these major geopolitical changes of Austria within Europe, the Austrian national-European collective identity mix has also undergone important reconstruction. On

the basis of the EURONAT findings of the Viadrina team, the following transformations in Austrian collective identity are particularly important: Firstly, on the elite level of the political party spectrum there was found a marked tension between a renewed Habsburg conception of Europe, a Western EU orientation as well as a nationalist-defensive attitude. Secondly, in the media these tensions were mediated and reproduced in the more educated middle-class and regional press, but in the tabloid mass press primarily represented in ambivalences between hopes for economic gains and fears of economic losses in an enlarged Europe. Thirdly, as the results on public opinion have demonstrated, these tensions were based on a relatively high ethno-cultural and political identification with the Austrian nation as well as a high cultural-civilisational and economic-instrumental identification with Europe and the EU. Fourthly, as the interview results have shown, the more open European orientations are expressed by more educated, mobile and experienced middle class people, whereas the more closed national orientations are carried by less educated, mobile and experienced lower-middle and working-class people.

From the perspective of strengthening a European political-civic identity and on the basis of the indicated empirical findings, several policy recommendations can be formulated. Firstly, the EU sanctions against Austria had a rather ambivalent result insofar they did not enhance the political-civic identification with Europe, but rather strengthened a cultural identification with Austria and Europe. Secondly, the positive economic impacts of the eastern enlargement for Austria turned the previously predominantly negative attitudes into more positive attitudes; accordingly, it will be important to soften the implications of the completed eastern enlargement regarding the shift of EU structural and agrarian funds to the new East Central European member states.

Thirdly, the knowledge of the European Union is rather low. Here it is a special task of the media to report and inform more extensively and specifically about the nature of the European Union and the role of EU policies. As well, the public education system should offer more European components in their curricula. Fourth, the building of a European identity is also a matter of positive experiences and related social education in Europe. Here a special attention should be paid to social and educational programs for lower and working class people in order to overcome the predominant local-national orientations by more European directions.

6.3.2 Britain

In the British media discourse, Britain is usually represented with an emphasis on Britain's being different from other European countries. The supposed difference between Britain and continental countries is sometimes essentialised as a deeply ingrained one deriving from the differences between Anglo-Saxon and continental cultures. Secondly, the EU/Europe is on the whole cast in a negative light. It is also found that the USA occupied an important position in defining the identity of Britain and Britain's relationship with the EU. In other words, the relationship between Britain and the EU is in fact a triangle relationship involving the USA.

In public political discourse, there is a consensus that the EU is basically good; all the major parties appreciated the EU's achievement so far in bringing peace and stability in Western Europe, although anxiety over the possible emergence of a European superstate was aired.

The perceived mal-functioning of the EU was a cross-party concern, and main parties often described Britain as a saviour of the EU from its incompetence. The relationship between Britain and the EU was more often than not described in a positive light in stressing Britain's significance in the European context.

The analysis of the survey results has showed that it is not necessarily the national identity that is in contradiction to a kind of '*supra-national*' European identity. In that sense, the results have revealed that the respondents who express some level of identification with Europe are not necessarily those who do not feel British. On the contrary, a small insignificant but positive correlation between these variables was established ($\Phi=.234$). The reason for a low level of identification with Europe and the EU among the British population has to be searched for somewhere else than national identity.

One 'clue' for interpretation of this finding is the fact that the British respondents express a relatively low level of identification with all groups, even towards their own in-groups. Further research is therefore call for to confirm our, still ungrounded, conclusion that on average the British population is inclined to individualism rather than collectivism. This could mean that the future efforts to increase the support of the British population for further unification of Britain and the EU should not be based on attempts to increase their level of identification with the concept of Europe, but on proving benefits of that '*supra-state*' structure.

One of the recurring themes in the interview stage is the claim of ignorance. There seems to be two different reasons why the respondents claimed ignorance. First, there is a group of interviewees who feel in general alienated from 'politics'. 'Europe' belongs to the real of 'politics' in which he/she has little say. Therefore their weariness is not directed to Europe/EU as such, and in promoting EU issues. Secondly, most of the respondents who professed to their ignorance about certain European issues were those who took active interest in the EU and related topics. Addressing this kind of concern requires a different approach from making the EU relevant to those who are not interested in it because it is political. More relevant to this report, the claim of ignorance or lack of knowledge by these respondents suggest that their in-group category is wider than those who might shut out anything to do with the EU or politics in their daily life.

6.3.3 Germany

In the decade after the collapse of communism and the dissolution of the Cold-War divide of Europe, Germany has been affected by these geopolitical changes in several crucial respects. Firstly, divided Germany became reunited though, due to the hegemony of the West German political-economic system, in unequal ways. As a result, also a divided form of German national identity emerged: a West German and East German national identity with internal boundary constructions of the *Wessis* and the *Ossis*. Secondly, in continuing the Westbindung of the West Germany, United Germany pressured also for the inclusion of East Germany into the EU; as a result the pattern of a compensatory relationship between Germany and the EU continued. Thirdly, the opening of the East and the eastern enlargement of the European Union presented a particular challenge, strengthening the need for a Europeanisation of Germany, but at the same time reviving traditional, though reconstructed Eastern European orientations. Fourthly, these internal and external shifts resulted in a stronger German

national self-confidence, transforming the compensatory relationship between German national identity and German European orientation into a more complementary and partially conflictive one.

In the context of the major geopolitical changes of the German nation within Europe, the Viadrina team was able to find, on the several analytical levels, important aspects of the reconstruction of the German-European identity mix. Firstly, on the elite level of the political party spectrum there is a consensus on a stronger emphasis on national matters. Particularly the Social-Democrat and Green coalition government is a conscious vehicle in this direction, on the grounds that it perceives it as a representative of the morally right Germany. But the other parties also, in different ways, contribute to the re-nationalisation of German collective identity. With it, German national interests are more distinct from Europe and European integration. Secondly, in the media the reconstruction of the German national-European identity mix goes parallel to that in the party spectrum, particularly regarding its diversification in the elaborated and regional press. The tabloid mass press, however, elaborates in a populist concentration on economic and welfare issues in a more nationalist and European-distanced orientation. Thirdly, the results on German public opinion confirm the (from a low level) rising identification with the German nation at the cost of Europe, but at the same time with a rising salience of the political-civic and economic instrumental components, though stronger in West than East Germany. Fourthly, as the results of the interviews show, there are strong class differences in the national-European identity mix: the more open European orientations are expressed by the more educated, mobile and experienced middle class people, the more close national orientations are carried by the less educated, mobile and experienced lower middle-class and working-class people.

From the perspective of strengthening a European political-civic identity, the empirical findings can be translated into several policy recommendations. Firstly, the re-nationalisation of German national identity and its clearer distinction from a German European identity is unproblematic as long as it goes hand in hand, as it does, with a stronger sense of political-civic values on both identity levels. Secondly, there is a certain danger that the marked impacts of the eastern enlargement have also an effect of strengthening ethno-cultural nationalist and Euro-sceptical attitudes. So far, the economic effects of the eastern enlargement are ambiguous: the positive effects for the German economy in creating new Eastern markets are balanced out by negative effects on the German labour markets and social security systems. However, the negative consequences of the eastern enlargement may deteriorate after its completion; therefore, particular attention should be paid regarding the planned shift of EU structural and agrarian funds to East Central Europe at the cost of German border regions. Thirdly, the knowledge of the European Union is rather unequally distributed. Here, it is a special task of the regional and working-class media to report and inform more extensively and specifically about the nature of the European Union and the role of the EU policies. Also, the public educational system at the elementary and medium level should offer more European components in their curricula. Fourth, the building of a European identity is also a matter of positive experiences and related social education in Europe. Here, special attention should be paid to social and educational programs for lower and working-class people in order to overcome the predominant local-national orientations by more European orientations.

7 DISSEMINATION AND EXPLOITATION OF RESULTS

All teams engaged into systematic dissemination activities through the usual channels of academic dissemination (including scholarly publications, presentations at conferences and workshops, informal networking, participation in meetings of other projects). A list of all the publications and other output of the project is given in Annex II. The following section describes the dissemination and exploitation of results **to non-academic users**.

7.1 Southern Europe

7.1.1 Greece

The dissemination took the form of a day conference which was held on June 21 at Panteion University, Athens (amphitheater, George Karageorgas.) The Conference was well-prepared and 150 printed invitations were sent to journalists, politicians, public servants, researchers and academics. The conference was well publicised with posters. A press release in Greek and a policy brief was distributed to the participants.

The theme of the conference was: Results of the Project EURONAT Greece: 'National and European Identities: Convergences and Divergences'.

In the morning (9.30- 13.30) the results of the EURONAT projected were presented in six half-hour presentations followed by discussion. In the afternoon, invited speakers presented papers on the theme, combining results from other relevant research.

The programme in detail was as follows:

09-09.30 Greetings and opening by the official representative of the European Parliament in Athens, Mr. P. Papadopoulos

09.30-11. Session A. Chair Prof. Koula Kassimati

'The project EURONAT and the Greek participation' (K. Kassimati)

'Greek identity and Europe: A specific historical relation' (N. Kokosalakis)

'The nation and Europe: the views of Greek citizens' (N. Sereti)

Discussion.

11.30-13.30. Session B. Chair. Prof. Gefou Madianou

'Ethnic Identity and Europe: The attitudes, views and dispositions of the Greeks' (N.Kokosalakis)

'Representations of the Nation, of Europe and the EU, in the Greek Media and the Greek political parties' (I. Psimmenos)

'The national identity of Immigrants. A factor of xenophobia and racism' (K. Kassimati)

Discussion.

13.30-14.30. Lunch

14.30-16.00. Session C. Chair Prof. L. Moussourou

'National and European Identity: The Educational dimension of Convergences and divergences.' (in two parts.D. Tsaousis)

Discussion

16.30-18.00. Session D. Chair Prof. A. Moysides (Vice-rector)

‘Combination of Educational services and the needs of the economy of the knowledge society: Assessment for Greece and other European practices’ (A. Tortopides)

‘The continuous need of the connection of Education and training and employment: Greek experience and European practices’ (G. Toutziarakis)

Discussion.

The presentations and the discussion were of very high standard. Around 80 people took part in the conference. The presentations will be revised and will be published in a volume in Greek by the Greek publishers Guttenberg. The volume was published in January 2005.

On December 3, 2004 the Greek team of EURONAT and the EUI coordinators took part at a roundtable with politicians, policy makers, scholars, trade unions and NGO representatives regarding the signature of the European Constitutional Treaty. The EURONAT results, both as regards Greece and as regards the EU as a whole, were given great prominence. This conference was videotaped by major TV channels, both private and public.

Also, an article on the EURONAT results was published in the large Athens daily ‘*Ta Nea*’ on November 19, 2004. Following this article, Professor Kokosalakis was interviewed by several radio channels of the Athens metropolitan area on that day and during the week that followed.

7.1.2 Italy

The Italian team wrote both a short and a longer version of a policy report as well as a press release for general dissemination and as an introduction to meetings with media professionals. The short policy report and the press release were translated from English to Italian by a native Italian speaker.

We contacted all the regional/national newspapers with offices/correspondents in Florence: *La Repubblica*, *La Nazione*, *Il Corriere della Sera*, *La Stampa*, *EU Newsletter*, *Emmegi Press*, *Ufficio Stampa*, and *TV Serenissima*. As EU matters are dealt with in the national offices, none of the journalists working locally was eventually available for a meeting either at the EUI or in their workplace. Only one contact with a journalist of the newspaper *Mondo Libero* was successful. Contacts were also taken through a series of academic-public type of events called EUROFORUM, organised by the Municipality of Florence. The organiser of the event refused to include the EURONAT findings presentation during the formal programme of the event on April 22, but Dr. Kotic commented on some of the EURONAT findings during the discussion which followed the papers presented by other speakers. Also during the event Dr. Kotic distributed the press release and the short policy report to all interested participants.

We organized a small workshop with students/young media professionals that have graduated from a technical course on journalism organised by the Municipality of Florence. About ten students plus the two organisers of the course attended the meeting. We had the opportunity to present and discuss our findings with them.

After contacting the national newspapers (mentioned above) the results of the project were published in *La Repubblica* on 30 April 2004. The title of the article was: ‘*Ma l’allargamento a est piace poco ai toscani*’. In this short article, the EURONAT project was mentioned in a separate column and some survey data concerning the Region of Tuscany were reported.

Also through contacts of the General Secretary of the EUI, Gianfranco Varvesi, the press release was published in the Newsletter *InEurop@ Newsletter della Rappresentanza in Italia della Commissione europea (Newsletter of EU Commission Representatives in Italy)*, n. 536, 23 April 2004 (pages 4, 5, 6). An article on EURONAT was also printed in the local newsletter *Firenze in Europa* (Socio-cultural and tourist monthly review), December 2002, p. 11.

7.1.3 Spain

Non-academic activities of dissemination

During the last ten months, the Spanish team drafted a policy memo and carried out some activities of dissemination. Among them, specially professor Torreblanca has been a regular collaborator in the radio program ‘*Nosotros los Europeos*’ (‘We the Europeans’) broadcasted since September, 9, 2004 by a Spanish nationwide channel. He has taken the opportunity to bring into the discussion the findings and policy implication of the EURONAT project. Recorded programs are available for listening in <http://www.rtve.es/rne/r5/europeos.php>. Dr. Ruiz Jiménez have presented several workshops on the findings or EURONAT, most recently in the summer courses organized by the University *Pompeu Fabra* and *Universidad de Málaga* (June 2004) and the Center for European Studies at the University of Mimi (august 2004). She also realized an interview with the nationwide TV channel *Tele5*, that is waiting to be broadcasted.

For the public meeting in Brussels we contacted the following persons. None of them was able to come to the meeting however. Some MP excused themselves because of agenda compromises due to the close date of the European Election.

Newspapers journalists in Brussels:

EL PAÍS- Carlos Yarnoz, cyarnoz@elpais.es and Gabriela Cañas, gcanas@elpais.es

ABC- Enrique Serveto, serveto@compuserve.com

EL MUNDO- Juan Carlos González, jcg@eis.be

LA VANGUARDIA- Fernando García, fernando@lavanguardia.es

Members from the European Parliament:

PARTIDO POPULAR

Iñigo Méndez de Vigo, imendezdevigo@europarl.eu.int

Teresa Zabell, tzabell@europarl.eu.int

A Vidal, avidal@europarl.eu.int

PARTIDO SOCIALISTA

Rosa Díez, rdiez@europarl.eu.int

E. Baron Crespon, ebaroncrespo@europarl.eu.int

J. Mendiluce, jmendiluce@europarl.eu.int

M. Medina, mmedina@europarl.eu.int

Members from the Spanish Permanent representation (www.es-ue.org):
Spanish Ambassador- Carlos Basterreche, carlos.bastarreche@reper.mae.es
Cristobal González-Aller, Cristóbal.gonzalez-aller@reper.mae.es

Interviews with mass media:

- Ruiz Jiménez, A. Interview with Ximena Villalón (xvillalon@mercurio.cl) for the Chilean newspaper *El Mercurio* (special report on the EU, May 2004).
- Ruiz Jiménez, A. Interview for the private nation-wide TV channel TELE 5 (recorded on June 28th with Vanesa Moltó. To be broadcasted in mid July within the program ‘We are European’ as part of the weekend mid-day newsbroadcast)

7.2 Central Eastern Europe

7.2.1 The Czech Republic

The Czech team wrote both a short and a longer version of a policy report as well as a press release with topics for discussions. These papers were used for dissemination of the findings of the Czech part of the EURONAT project. The policy reports and the press release were written in Czech and were translated into English only for the purposes of incorporating them into the final report of the whole project.

The Czech team has contacted journalists, members of the Czech government (prime minister, vice-premier responsible for minorities, human resources and science) and members of the European Parliament. In October we organized a small session with PhD students of politics and we discussed with them the main findings of our part of EURONAT project. The most discussed topic was the national identity and its attributes.

The workshop with journalists from *Pravo* and *Dnes* focused on the contrast between the political discourse and the media discourse of the European and the Czech identity at the one hand, and the public opinion, on the other. In the political and media discourse, the ethnic based national identity is preferred to the civic based identity. The Czech nation is mainly defined ethnically – as a natural home to the Czech nation.

7.2.2 Hungary

Press communication

We collected some of the main results of EURONAT about Hungary to communicate them to wider public. Originally we planned to schedule our public appearance before the European parliamentary elections to gain more public interest. As it turned out in the last phase of the political campaigns the pre-election period became overheated, therefore we decided to postpone our press communication until after the elections.

We established co-operation with the Communication Department of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. They offered us the use of their press communication channels in reaching journalists. We also received internet publicity on their internet site.

We also invited journalists to a press conference. The Hungarian Academy of Sciences offered their facilities in the centre of Budapest in their prestigious and historic building. We thus invited a selection of journalists to a press conference on 25th June 2004. The press conference was hosted by *György Fábri*, head of Communications Department of Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Prof. *György Hunyady* and *Paszkal Kiss* were presenting our EURONAT results. As it turned out, all this organisation was not enough to bring a wide circle of journalists. Luckily a representative of the Hungarian National News Agency did come, but apart from him only one more person, a local journalist came. We presented the main points of our results (see Appendix) and there was a discussion afterwards. Questions came about the issue of ‘accommodation’ in Hungarian national identity. We assessed how much accommodation is necessary and to what extent does it endanger national identity itself. Following this press conference we were approached by an editor of a Hungarian public radio channel, who expressed a wish to interview leading researchers of our team and outside experts about national identity issues. We agreed on a studio discussion to be held this autumn. A programme for popularizing science (initiated by a telecommunication company and the Hungarian Academy of Sciences) asked for an interview with Prof. Hunyady, who had a televised talk about national character and national stereotype research just recently before.

To sum up, dissemination of our results to a wider public was not very widespread, but we did reach some media attention mainly in the specialised media. This attention is also connected to the forthcoming publications. This is an experience that other partners might benefit from: we might try a wider dissemination of our results when they are formed for publications.

Communication to policy- and decision-makers

We did have an interesting result in reaching policymakers with our results. Generally, it is not easy to bridge the difference between academics and decision-makers, but we had a good opportunity for this as Prof. *Hunyady* was asked to participate in a series of discussions and as an author of a collective volume that would contain individual contributions in a summarised format. The Prime Minister’s cabinet asked the Sociological Institute of Hungarian Academy of Sciences to coordinate this discussion that would lead to the publication. Eventually it was *Paszkal Kiss* who participated in the debates and collected EURONAT and other results of our research team for a foreseen policymaker audience. Our team was among the few who actually had research on majority national identity; therefore our results were warmly welcomed.

The series of discussions reached their end in early summer of 2004 and our paper was accepted for publication. The planned appearance of this publication was this autumn. The naturally growing uncertainty accompanying the mid-term change of the government in late summer defocused these efforts. Despite this, in our best hopes the publication will appear and it may provide a chance for communication with policymakers as well.

7.2.3 Poland

Publications:

On the basis of the first report a chapter has been prepared by Krystyna Romaniszyn, submitted for publication in a planned volume edited by A. Ichijo and W. Spohn entitled: *Entangled Identities. Europe and the Nation in Old and New Member States of the European Union*.

On the basis of the reports on: *National and European Identity in Poland: Results from Public Opinion Survey*, and *Lay People about Themselves, Polishness, Other Nations and Europe: Results from Qualitative Research*, an article has been prepared by Krystyna Romaniszyn, 'Poles-Europe-European Union: identity, images, expectations', published [in Polish] in: 'Studia Polonijne', KUL: Lublin vol. 24, 2004.

Dissemination to policy users:

A session with journalist and politicians, although they arrived in a small number, was a success with regard to the quality of the discussion. The discussion focused on and explored the following issues: the usefulness of Anthony Smith's theoretical model of the two routes of the nation's development; the issue of the modern Polish nation and the absence of this topic in the mainstream media; the information policy on the European Union in the media; and the European identity of Poles. Among the main arguments offered were: the statement that the theoretical model should be applied carefully, and without an a priori assessment that it already grasps the reality it is to explain, as too often it rather blurs and simplifies it like in the Polish nation formation case; the conviction that the strategy about informing the public about the European Union and the Polish state within it need to be worked out in the media; the opinion that the issue of the modern Polish nation, its identity, place in Europe, etc. should be raised by the mainstream Polish media; and the opinion that both the media and the politicians need to cooperate on strengthening the Poles' European identity.

7.3 Central Western Europe

7.3.1 Austria

In view of the crucial importance of the eastern enlargement for the reconstruction of Austrian national and European identities, the Viadrina team, particularly Willfried Spohn and Katharina Stankiewicz, contacted the trans-regional elaborated newspaper agencies: *Die Presse* und *Der Standard* for their journalists writing on European integration and the eastern enlargement. As it turned out, both newspapers agencies rely on few free-lance journalists who write for several Austrian as well as German and Swiss newspapers. Under the circumstances of the celebrations of the eastern enlargement on May 1, 2004, it was however difficult to find journalists for commitment outside their journalistic *métier*. One of them, Gabriele Lesser could finally be invited to Frankfurt-Oder to a joint workshop on the eastern enlargement.

The workshop carried the title: National Traumas and the Enlargement of the EU to the East. Views from the Austrian, German and Polish Media. The workshop was held on May 7, 2004 at European University Viadrina Frankfurt-Oder. The first part of the workshop presented the media reports on Austria and Germany with some references to that on Poland with a particular focus on the eastern enlargement of the European Union. The second part presented the work of the invited journalists on European integration and the eastern enlargement: Gabriele Lesser discussed her experience with Austrian and Swiss press and in addition her connections to the Berlin based *Tageszeitung* and Polish press organs in Warsaw; and Michael Schröder discussed his work in the local Frankfurt-Odra based *Märkische Oderzeitung* and his professional connections to the Polish local press on the other side of the border.

Though small, this workshop explored several important themes bridging EURONAT media research with the every-day life experiences of journalists. Of particular importance was the contrast between the journalistic practice of elaborated newspapers attempting to inform and influence an educated reading public about Europe and the eastern enlargement, and that of a local newspaper at a troubled border trying to establish journalistic cross-border contacts and to build some rudimentary transnational European identity in a quite nationalistic East German border region. On the basis of this very fruitful first experience, the Viadrina team plans a second workshop with journalists of two national and two regional newspapers in the fall of 2004.

7.3.2 Britain

A press release was issued by the LSE Press Office on 2 March 2004 and a few news media organisations got in touch with the researcher.

The press release was then published in the *News and Views*, the LSE's newsletter (Vol. 33 No. 9) on 8 March 2004. See:

<http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/pressAndInformationOffice/staffStudentsAndAlumni/newsandviews/08-03-2004.htm>.

Contacts were made with the following media organisations:

BBC World Service (maya.fish@bbc.co.uk; will.grant@bbc.co.uk);

Reuters (Reuters Group PLC, 85 Fleet Street, London EC4P 4AJ, UK; editor@reuters.com);

The Press Association (292 Vauxhall Bridge Road, London, SW1V 1AE, UK; <http://www.pa.press.net/>); and

Bloomberg (City Gate House, 39-45 Finsbury Square, London, England EC2A 1PQ; <http://www.bloomberg.com/>).

7.3.3 Germany

In view of the crucial importance of the eastern enlargement for the reconstruction of Austrian national and European identities, the Viadrina team, particularly Willfried Spohn and Katharina Stankiewicz, contacted the trans-regional elaborated newspaper agencies: *Die Presse* und *Der Standard* for their journalists writing on European integration and the eastern enlargement. As it turned out, both newspapers agencies rely on few free-lance journalists

who write for several Austrian as well as German and Swiss newspapers. Under the circumstances of the celebrations of the eastern enlargement on May 1, 2004, it was however difficult to find journalists for commitment outside their journalistic *métier*. One of them, Gabriele Lesser could finally be invited to Frankfurt-Oder to a joint workshop on the eastern enlargement.

The workshop carried the title: National Traumas and the Enlargement of the EU to the East. Views from the Austrian, German and Polish Media. The workshop was held on May 7, 2004 at European University Viadrina Frankfurt-Oder. The first part of the workshop presented the media reports on Austria and Germany with some references to that on Poland with a particular focus on the eastern enlargement of the European Union. The second part presented the work of the invited journalists on European integration and the eastern enlargement: Gabriele Lesser discussed her experience with Austrian and Swiss press and in addition her connections to the Berlin based *Tageszeitung* and Polish press organs in Warsaw; and Michael Schröder discussed his work in the local Frankfurt-Odra based *Märkische Oderzeitung* and his professional connections to the Polish local press on the other side of the border.

Though small, this workshop explored several important themes bridging EURONAT media research with the every-day life experiences of journalists. Of particular importance was the contrast between the journalistic practice of elaborated newspapers attempting to inform and influence an educated reading public about Europe and the eastern enlargement, and that of a local newspaper at a troubled border trying to establish journalistic cross-border contacts and to build some rudimentary transnational European identity in a quite nationalistic East German border region. On the basis of this very fruitful first experience, the Viadrina team plans a second workshop with journalists of two national and two regional newspapers in the fall of 2004.

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10 ANNEXES

10.1 ANNEX I: A list of the agreed deliverables and their status

Deliverable no.	Deliverable title	Nature	Status
D1	State of the art report	R	Done
D2	National histories	R	Country reports available at the project web site Collective report published in hard copy and available at the web site Collective volume edited by Ichijo and Spohn, forthcoming by Ashgate
D3	Media report	R	Done
D4	Report on political élite discourse	R	Country reports available at the project web site
D5a	Database on nation and EU representations	O	Done
D5b	Report on survey research	R	Done Country reports available at the project's web site
D6	Report on interviews	R	Done Country reports available at the project's web site
D7	Comprehensive country reports	R	Done Comprehensive country reports available at the project's web site Forthcoming as research monographs in the national language volumes prepared by the Greek, Hungarian, Polish and Spanish team.
D8	First draft of the final report: Regional comparisons (East, North, South)	R	Done
D9a	Policy memo	O	Done National policy briefs (in national languages) available at the project's web site Comparative policy paper (in English) available at the project's web site
D9b	Dissemination workshops	W, C	Done
D10	Final report	R	Done Collective comparative volume edited by Strath and Triandafyllidou, forthcoming

Note: O = Other

10.2 ANNEX II: A list of the publications and other output of the project (in alphabetical order of country names)

AUSTRIA

Project reports:

1. Willfried Spohn

Europe and the Nation in Austrian National Identity (state of the art and historical country report) (D1 and D2)

2. Willfried Spohn and Michael Minkenberg with the assistance of David Wagner:

Nation and Europe in the Austrian Public Sphere: An Analysis of Media and Political Party Discourses, 2000-2002 (D3 and D4)

3. Maren Kandulla with the assistance of Willfried Spohn:

A Quantitative Analysis of National and European identities in Western, Germany, Eastern Germany and Austria, 2002 (D5)

4. Willfried Spohn with the assistance of Martin Friedrich-Frekša and Annette Hienerwadel:

Civil Society Discourse on Europe and the Nation in Austria: Qualitative Interviewing (D 6)

5. Willfried Spohn:

Entanglements of Europe and the Nation. Aggregate Findings on Austria (D 7)

For list of publications, see Germany, below.

BRITAIN

Project reports:

Atsuko Ichijo (2002) 'Britain: State and nation formation, and Europe' (2002) State of the art and historical report for the EURONAT project, <http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/Research/EURONAT/Projects.shtml> and Bo Stråth and Anna Triandafyllidou (eds) *Representations of Europe and the Nation in Current and Prospective Member-States: Media, Elites and Civil Society*, Brussels: European Commission, pp. 30-85

Atsuko Ichijo (2002) 'Nation and Europe in British public discourse' (2002) <http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/Research/EURONAT/Projects.shtml>

Gordana Uzelac and Atsuko Ichijo (2003) "Us and them": a quantitative analysis of perceptions of the nation and Europe among the British population' <http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/Research/EURONAT/Projects.shtml>

Atsuko Ichijo (2003) 'Britain, the British and Europe: A qualitative analysis', <http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/Research/EURONAT/Projects.shtml>

Other related publications:

John Hutchinson (2004) 'Myth against myth: the nation as an ethnic overlay', *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 10 Nos. 1-2, pp. 109-124

John Hutchinson (2003) 'Nationalism, Globalism and the Conflict of Civilizations' in U. Ozkirimli, *Nationalism and its Futures*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 71-92.

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