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***The Transformation of Political  
Mobilisation and Communication in  
European Public Spheres***

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EUROPEAN COMMISSION

# **EU RESEARCH ON SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES**

## **The Transformation of Political Mobilisation and Communication in European Public Spheres**

**EUROPUB.COM**

**Final report**

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## Preface

Within the Fifth Community RTD Framework Programme of the European Union (1998–2002), the Key Action 'Improving the Socio-economic Knowledge Base' had broad and ambitious objectives, namely: to improve our understanding of the structural changes taking place in European society, to identify ways of managing these changes and to promote the active involvement of European citizens in shaping their own futures. A further important aim was to mobilise the research communities in the social sciences and humanities at the European level and to provide scientific support to policies at various levels, with particular attention to EU policy fields.

This Key Action had a total budget of EUR 155 million and was implemented through three Calls for proposals. As a result, 185 projects involving more than 1 600 research teams from 38 countries have been selected for funding and have started their research between 1999 and 2002.

Most of these projects are now finalised and results are systematically published in the form of a Final Report.

The calls have addressed different but interrelated research themes which have contributed to the objectives outlined above. These themes can be grouped under a certain number of areas of policy relevance, each of which are addressed by a significant number of projects from a variety of perspectives.

These areas are the following:

- ***Societal trends and structural change***

16 projects, total investment of EUR 14.6 million, 164 teams

- ***Quality of life of European citizens***

5 projects, total investment of EUR 6.4 million, 36 teams

- ***European socio-economic models and challenges***

9 projects, total investment of EUR 9.3 million, 91 teams

- ***Social cohesion, migration and welfare***

30 projects, total investment of EUR 28 million, 249 teams

- ***Employment and changes in work***

18 projects, total investment of EUR 17.5 million, 149 teams

- ***Gender, participation and quality of life***

13 projects, total investment of EUR 12.3 million, 97 teams

- ***Dynamics of knowledge, generation and use***

8 projects, total investment of EUR 6.1 million, 77 teams

- ***Education, training and new forms of learning***

14 projects, total investment of EUR 12.9 million, 105 teams

- ***Economic development and dynamics***

22 projects, total investment of EUR 15.3 million, 134 teams

- ***Governance, democracy and citizenship***

28 projects; total investment of EUR 25.5 million, 233 teams

- ***Challenges from European enlargement***

13 projects, total investment of EUR 12.8 million, 116 teams

- ***Infrastructures to build the European research area***

9 projects, total investment of EUR 15.4 million, 74 teams

This publication contains the final report of the project 'The Transformation of Political Mobilisation and Communication in European Public Spheres', whose work has primarily contributed to the area Governance, citizenship and European integration.

The report contains information about the main scientific findings of EUROPUB.COM and their policy implications. The research was carried out by eight teams over a period of three years, starting in September 2001.

The abstract and executive summary presented in this edition offer the reader an overview of the main scientific and policy conclusions, before the main body of the research provided in the other chapters of this report.

As the results of the projects financed under the Key Action become available to the scientific and policy communities, Priority 7 'Citizens and Governance in a knowledge based society' of the Sixth Framework Programme is building on the progress already made and aims at making a further contribution to the development of a European Research Area in the social sciences and the humanities.

I hope readers find the information in this publication both interesting and useful as well as clear evidence of the importance attached by the European Union to fostering research in the field of social sciences and the humanities.

J.-M. BAER,

Director

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We also extend warm thanks to our own institutions, the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin, ASEP, CRAPS/CNRS, the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, the International University Bremen, the European University Institute, the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (Stanford), and the Universities of Leeds, Florence, Amsterdam, Hohenheim, Geneva, and Zurich. They have enabled the principal investigators to spend the greatest part of their research time over the last more than three years on this project, they have provided secretarial and infrastructural support, and some of them have made important contributions to the successful completion as well as the future continuity of the project by extending the contracts of temporary researchers beyond the 2.5 year period that we could finance with our EU funding.

Much of the success of this project is due to the hard work, dedication, and insights of the junior researchers that were involved in the project on a full-time basis (though regrettably not always enumerated as such). The principal investigators would like to express their sincere gratitude and their respect for the Herculean tasks that they have accomplished. This was an exceptionally high-quality and motivated group of young researchers and we count ourselves lucky to have worked with them. They are, listed in alphabetical order: Silke Adam, Massimo Andretta, Olivier Baisnée, Barbara Berkel, Jovanka Boerefijn, Manuela Caiani, Jessica Erbe, Julie Firmstone, Elisa González Galán, Emily Gray, Olivier Grojean, Margit Jochum, Carolina de Miguel, Jeannette Mak (postdoc),

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This final report was written by Ruud Koopmans, with contributions of Jos de Beus, Donatella della Porta, Hanspeter Kriesi, Barbara Pfetsch, Paul Statham, and Ann Zimmermann.

## **Abstract**

This project investigates the discrepancy between Europe's institutional development, and the continuing predominance of the national political space as the arena for public debates. This "public sphere deficit" is a core aspect of Europe's "democratic deficit". We study the Europeanisation of public communication and mobilization by comparing across seven countries (D, F, GB, I, E, NL, and CH), seven issue fields (monetary politics, agriculture, immigration, defense, education, pensions, and European integration), and across the period 1990-2002. We also investigate differences among collective actors, with a special focus on the contribution of civil society actors to Europeanised public debates and controversies. Methodologically, we combine content analysis of thousands of newspaper articles and web pages, network analyses of weblinks, and interviews with hundreds of representatives of interest groups, NGO's and political parties, as well as with policy makers and news media professionals.

Our results indicate that the Europeanisation of public contestation has strengthened the influence of state and executive actors who have almost exclusive hegemony in debates over European issues. Civil society actors have hardly gained any foothold on the European level. Europeanisation of public spheres has therefore tended to make public debates less inclusive and less egalitarian. The differential access of actors to European public debates is strongly related to actors' evaluation of the European integration process and their assessment of European institutions. This suggests that the unequal access to European public debates has negative repercussions on support for European integration and European institutions, especially among civil society actors.

Contrary to previous assumptions, there is a remarkable level of Europeanised debate in the print media. Moreover, the evaluations of European issues and actors show that European integration is supported by most newspapers. The media tend to hold more positive or at least less negative attitudes about EU political actors than about actors from their own country. The British press deviates in almost all dimensions from the general picture. The British media are by far the most self-referential, they oppose the political project of Europe and the attitudes of journalists towards European integration are overwhelmingly negative. In spite of the technological possibilities, multi-lingual websites turned out to be excessively rare and therefore the average web user is confronted primarily with websites of actors from the own country or the same linguistic area. We conclude that the Internet facilitates access to and exchange with the supranational level, but it does not nearly to the same extent fulfill its promise of being a transnational communicative space.

We thus find evidence of a clear democratic deficit in Europeanised public communication. However, the nature of this deficit is not – as is often supposed – that the media give us little information about Europe or that such information is particularly negative. Neither is it true that European institutions receive little attention in the media. The true nature of the democratic deficit of Europeanised political communication lies in the difficulties that less powerful civil society groups face in getting access to this emerging Europeanised public arena. Our results suggest that the solution to the deficits of the European public sphere must not be sought primarily in the media themselves, but in the way in which the European policy process is structured, which strongly privileges executive actors compared to the legislative, and even more so compared to interest groups, NGO's, and other civil society actors. Mass media coverage merely mirrors and reproduces these structural inequalities. Without political reforms that improve the accessibility of the European policy process, the stark inequalities in access to European public debates will continue to reinforce the elite bias of the European policy process, with the risk of further undercutting public support for European integration and European institutions.

## I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This project investigates the discrepancy between Europe's institutional development, its increasing competences and influence on Europeans' conditions of life, on the one hand, and the continuing predominance of the national political space as the arena for public debates and the source for collective identification and notions of citizenship, on the other. **We believe that this “public sphere deficit” is a core aspect of Europe's “democratic deficit”.** The increasingly controversial nature of the integration process, the need to fundamentally reshape the EU's institutional structure and decision making process in the context of enlargement, as well as the heightened visibility of Europe in people's everyday life (e.g., the euro), make further advances in the integration process increasingly dependent on active engagement, acceptance, and legitimacy among the citizenry. Even more than on the national level, the communication flow between Europe and the public depends on the mass media. The mass media fulfil at least four crucial functions in the European policy process. First, in the absence of direct communicative links, European actors, issues, and policies have to be made visible by the mass media, and it is in this public forum that they may gain (or fail to obtain) public resonance and legitimacy (*legitimation function*). Second, with the partial exception of opinion polling – which provides only punctual, pre-structured, and non-discursive access to the public opinion – European policy makers must depend for their information about the desires and concerns of the citizenry on the communicative channels of the mass media (*responsiveness* function). Third and conversely, the public can build its opinion about the distant European institutions and the complexities of multi-level policies only to a very small extent on direct personal experience and therefore must also rely on how Europe becomes visible in the mass media (*accountability function*). Finally, participation of citizens in the European policy process usually also requires access to the mass media. Although a small number of resourceful and well-organized actors may gain access to European policy-makers directly (e.g., in the context of the Brussels lobbying circuit), most forms of citizens' participation through NGOs, civic initiatives, and social movements can only influence policy-makers by way of the visibility, resonance, and legitimacy they may mobilize in the mass media (*participation function*).

In this project, we study three theoretically possible forms of Europeanisation of public communication and mobilisation:

- 1) The emergence of a *supranational European public sphere* constituted by the interaction among European-level institutions and collective actors around European themes, ideally accompanied by (and creating the basis for) the development of European-wide mass media.
- 2) *Vertical Europeanisation*, which consists of communicative linkages between the national and the European level. There are two basic variants of this patterns, a bottom-up one, in which national actors address European actors and/or make claims on European issues, and a top-down one, in which European actors intervene in national policies and public debates in the name of European regulations and common interests.
- 3) *Horizontal Europeanisation*, which consists of communicative linkages between different member states. We may distinguish a weak and a strong variant. In the weak variant, the media in one country cover debates and contestation in another member state, but there is no linkage between the countries in the structure of claims-making itself. In the stronger variant, actors from one country explicitly address, or refer to actors or policies in another member state.

Our **research design** includes **three comparative dimensions**. **Cross-nationally**, the design includes seven national case studies of **Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and Switzerland**. This set of countries was chosen so as to include the most important EU member states, and to provide for sufficient variation along potentially relevant dimensions such as the size of the country and the date of entry into the EU. Moreover, this choice provides for a large variety of political systems (e.g. federal versus centralised, majoritarian versus proportional electoral systems, important differences in the composition of party systems). Switzerland has been included as a non-member state because the structure of its highly fragmented, multi-lingual public sphere may provide interesting clues as to the possible future development of European public spheres. In addition to these national cases, the design includes a separate case study of transnational political mobilisation and communication on the **EU level**. Along the **time dimension**, our main focus will be on the **period from 2000 to 2002**. In order to be able to place the findings for this period in a long-term perspective, we have gathered data for the central work package 2 (political claims) also for two years somewhat further in the past, 1990 and 1995. This allows us to investigate in how far important institutional changes, such as the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 or the

introduction of the common currency Euro in 1999 have had an impact on levels and forms of Europeanisation of public communication and mobilisation.

Because we expect degrees and forms of Europeanisation of public spheres to vary with different institutional settings, we have chosen **seven different policy domains** on which our study will focus. The choice of these domains was structured by the EU's pillar structure as defined in the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties, which defines different distributions of competencies for decision-making, policy development and implementation between the European and national levels. Thus, each pillar defines a specific multi-level political opportunity structure (which is further complicated by nationally specific distributions of power in policy domains among national, regional and local levels of governance). Because of the fact that it has hitherto been the dominant driving force behind integration, we will choose two issue areas from the first, common market pillar. Moreover, the domain of agricultural politics takes up such an important place in the EU's competencies and budget that it merits to be considered separately from other common market issues. From those policy areas outside the pillar structure two will be chosen as well, one example (pensions and retirement) of a socio-economic redistributive issue, and another (education), which has a strong cultural and identity component. Finally and for obvious reasons, we also choose the meta-field of European integration itself (in the strict sense a *polity* issue rather than a *policy* issue), which includes all debates, decisions, and mobilisation around general questions of the EU's institutional structure, its collective identity, its normative foundations, its finality, as well as the discussions around EU enlargement. Thus, we arrive at the following selection of policy domains:

- Common market policies: **agriculture: subsidies, livestock and dairy quotas, animal disease control** (e.g., BSE, EU quota regulations, GATT negotiations on agricultural subsidies).
- Common market policies: **monetary politics** (e.g., introduction of the Euro, interest rate adjustments).
- Foreign and defence policies: **troop deployment, for both military and humanitarian purposes** (e.g., ex-Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq).
- Justice and internal policies: **immigration politics** (e.g., Schengen cooperation, asylum and refugee policies).
- Cooperation outside the pillar, socio-economic: **retirement and pensions** (e.g., retirement age, pension funds).

- Cooperation outside the pillar structure, culture and identity: **education** (all questions relating to primary, secondary, and tertiary education, including on the European level the Bologna and Lisbon processes).
- **European integration** (e.g., enlargement, the “Haider debate”, institutional reform, constitutional discussions).

We use a **variety of methods** to analyse the Europeanisation of public communication and mobilisation along these comparative dimensions: content analyses of public statements and demands (“claims”) made by a variety of collective actors, as well as of newspaper editorials; keyword searches on the Internet, as well as a network analysis of connections among websites; and finally interviews with key representatives of collective actors and with media professionals. The overall data gathering effort that we have undertaken in the context of this project deserves some emphasis. We content coded literally tens of thousands of newspaper articles and editorials for work packages 2 and 3, analysed the websites of thousands of collective actors and the network links among them for work package 4, and interviewed about 500 people for work packages 5 and 6. We are quite confident that no other project working in this field has ever gathered or is presently gathering data on the Europeanisation of public communication and mobilisation that approaches this effort both in its size, qualitative scope, and breadth of different methods and types of data. We offer here some main results by work package.

In **work package 2**, we look at patterns of Europeanisation of the public claims-making of a wide variety of collective actors. We look at the actors that make claims that are reported in European print media, the addressees at which they direct their demands, and the geopolitical frame of reference in which they discuss different issues. The report presents data on public claims-making in European print media in the years 1990, 1995, 2000, 2001, and 2002. The data refer to seven issue fields: monetary politics; agriculture; immigration; troop deployment (for military as well as humanitarian purposes); pensions and retirement; education; and finally the meta-issue of European integration. The report discusses the issue of the Europeanisation of claims-making along four themes:

- Levels of Europeanisation of public claims-making.
- Temporal trends in the Europeanisation of public claims-making.
- Support for, and opposition to European integration and European institutions.
- Who profits? The winners and losers of Europeanisation of public claims-making.

Our most important conclusion is that the Europeanisation of public contestation has thus far above all strengthened the influence of state actors – above all the executive – who have almost exclusive hegemony in debates over European issues. Civil society actors, on the contrary, have hardly gained any foothold on the European level and are much better represented in debates that remain within the national political arena. In other words, Europeanisation of public spheres has so far tended to make public debates less inclusive and less egalitarian. We thus find evidence of a clear democratic deficit in Europeanised public communication. However, the nature of this deficit is not – as is often supposed – that the media give us little information about Europe or that such information is nationally focused. The true nature of the democratic deficit of Europeanised political communication seems to lie in the difficulties that less powerful civil society groups face in getting access to this emerging Europeanised public arena.

The result that the blame for Europe's democratic deficit lies not with the media not covering European issues or being too negative about European integration, is confirmed by **work package 3** on newspaper editorials. We coded the editorials of four newspapers in each country, two national quality papers, one tabloid, and one regional paper, for the years 2000-2002. The overall picture that emerges is that – contrary to previous assumptions – there is a remarkable level of Europeanised debate in the media of the countries under study. Moreover, the evaluations of European issues and actors point to the fact that the political project of Europe is welcomed and that European integration is supported by the media of most countries under study. The media tend to hold more positive or at least less negative attitudes about EU political actors than about actors from their own country. While this general conclusion is true for six of our seven countries under study, there is one exception. The British press deviates in almost all dimensions from the general picture. The British media are by far the most self-referential, they oppose the political project of Europe and the attitudes of journalists towards European integration are overwhelmingly negative. The UK press is also one out of only two countries in the sample in which national actors are more positively portrayed than EU actors. Not surprisingly, we find that the frontrunners in negativism are the British tabloids. Finally, European integration in the UK editorials is interpreted with strong references to instrumental frames. The contrast is strongest with the French press. In French editorials there is strong support for the enlargement of EU political competences and for EU integration in general. Moreover, the French press stresses normative identity frames and values in their interpretation of European integration.

**Work package 4**, on the potential of the **Internet** as a new arena for political communication is a particularly challenging and innovative part of our research. We began this work package with a secondary analysis of the available material, both in the

literature, in policy reports, and on the web itself. We focused on three aspects: the internet policies developed by the EU and the member states; patterns of internet usage; and the internet strategies of collective political and social actors. There turned out to be a very poor state of knowledge regarding the role of the internet as a new arena for political communication, and how collective actors use it, in particularly in relation to Europe. We therefore had to invent much from scratch, not least the special methodological approaches that are needed to study the Internet. The first step in our own data gathering consisted of a series of internet searches by selected topical keywords, simulating the search behaviour of an average common user. Altogether, 2,600 texts from the web were coded. The results suggest that the Internet offers somewhat better opportunities to less institutionalised actors than the traditional mass media. The differences are, however, not very large, and national, institutional actors and traditional mass media organisations are also the dominant actors on the web in as far as it is made visible by search engines. Given the hopes that have been attached to the democratic potential of the internet as a technology enabling unlimited communication without the institutional biases that characterise the traditional media, this is a somewhat sobering conclusion. As for the question of the Internet as a potential for transnational, Europeanised political communication the results were perhaps even more disappointing. Multi-lingual websites turned out to be excessively rare and therefore our searches in national languages mainly led us to the websites of national actors or in the same linguistic area. In a second step, we investigated the links among the websites of actors. We have analysed a sample of websites in our seven countries and on the EU and other supranational levels in three different issue fields (agriculture, immigration, and European integration). To complete the data file on web links among our selected websites has been a huge effort. Altogether, more than 16 million links were traced. Of these, those had to be selected that were references among our sample of selected sites in the seven countries and on the EU and supranational levels (altogether 1,078 websites). The results indicate strong linkages among websites within the same country, but also strong connections from the national level to the European and other supranational levels. In other words, vertical Europeanisation and globalisation tendencies are quite strong. The literature, however, tends to emphasise the Internet's potential for stimulating *transnational* linkages, i.e. link connections between websites in different countries. However, our results show that these horizontal forms of Europeanisation and globalisation are very underdeveloped, both compared to the within-national, and to the vertical links. This confirms the result of our study using search engines. Our main conclusion from this work package is therefore that the Internet facilitates access to and exchange with the supranational level, but that it does not nearly to the same extent fulfill its promise of being a transnational communicative space.

In **work package 5**, which consists of interviews on the political mobilisation and communication strategies of collective actors, we studied the action repertoire of collective political actors in our seven countries and at the EU-level against the double background of the transformation of representative democracies into “audience democracies” and the European integration process. We wanted to find out to what extent these repertoires are oriented towards the public audience and to what extent they are Europeanised. We have conducted a total of 345 interviews with representatives of the four most important organisations in each one of four categories of actors – state actors, political parties, interest associations, and SMO-NGOs – in three policy fields (immigration, agriculture and European integration) in each country. The results are tentative and largely exploratory, but they are quite unique. In all countries, the action repertoire of all types of actors is still predominantly focused on the national level. Partly, this is a result of a division of labour, which induces national-level actors to delegate the representation of their interests at the European level to European federations or to partner organisations. Partly, this is however also a result of the fact that national governments constitute the members of the most important legislative body at the EU-level – the Council of Ministers. We further find – confirming results from work packages 2 and 3 – that precisely the weak actors who most depend on public-related strategies have the greatest problems with the media, irrespective of the country and the actor type. While weak actors mainly have problems of access, strong actors often are not satisfied with the way they are covered by the media. Moreover, no actor can control the flux of information in the public arena. All actors depend on the issue attention cycle, which is largely determined by exogenous factors, and on constraints imposed by the characteristics of the policy domain. Thus, all political actors engaged in agricultural policy and EU integration have to cope with the fact that these policies are highly technical and complex, and all actors involved in immigration policy have to deal with its divisiveness.

**Work package 6** complements work package 5 with 110 interviews with journalists and editors of the newspapers that were also used for the content analyses of work packages 2 and 3. Where possible sixteen journalists were interviewed for each national case, composed as follows: four from each of the four newspapers included in work packages 2 and 3, and from each of these newspapers, one General Editor, the (main) European correspondent, as well as the journalists or correspondents specialising in immigration and agriculture issues. In addition, interviews were conducted with eight representatives of European or transnational media. Here we interviewed the chief leader writer and EU or European Correspondent from the Financial Times (Europe), International Herald Tribune, European Voice, and Wall Street Journal Europe. In general, we found that

newspapers tend to treat Europe as a topic to be reported using exactly the same criteria for news selection and values that are applied to other types of news. There are some special adjustments necessary for gathering and reporting news on Europe, but newspaper organisations tend to see these as technical matters. Overall, the press appears much more in the 'passive' role as a supplier of news about European politics and not to any great extent an active protagonist dedicated to promoting a specific political stance on European affairs. Journalists did see themselves as having a responsibility for addressing the 'democratic deficit', but much more by filling the information gaps of the public, than by engaging in political advocacy. We found little evidence for explicitly politicised campaigns on Europe by newspapers (the one newspaper which does this, The Sun in Britain, took an institutional decision not to speak to us), nor do journalists appear to make particularly strong efforts to influence elites and parties and shape the political agenda on Europe. Of course, we did find some cross-national and cross-newspaper type differences in the contents and style of reporting on Europe, but these were basically a reflection of the different types of political debates over Europe in those countries (e.g., contentious debates in Britain compared to consensual in Germany), and the overall self-understanding of the newspaper's political line (e.g., left versus right, professional versus popular general readership).

Originally, a set of future-oriented qualitative questions pertaining to actors' views on the future of Europe, was planned as work part of work package 6, and therefore only for media professionals. This we found on closer reflection an unfortunate restriction given the importance of this prospective dimension at a time when the future direction Europe will take seems to be more open and contested than ever before. We therefore decided to create a separate and expanded **Delphi work package** ("Delphi" after the oracle) based on qualitative, open questions to all interviewed actors, including the state and civil society actors from work package 5 (i.e., a total of more than 400 actors). This means that our Delphi material is based on about four times as many interviews as originally planned. In line with results from other work packages, there was a general tendency for state actors to be particularly positive towards European integration, the exception being the UK, where state and party actors were the most negative of any type of actor regarding European integration. NGOs were typically less positive than other actors. Differences between national contexts were apparent, with Spanish and German broadly positive regarding the benefits of European integration, while a second bloc of Dutch, British, Swiss and Italian collective actors were less positive. An issue frequently raised as a matter of concern was the EU's relationship to European citizens. Many interviewees mentioned the need for enhanced citizen participation in European integration, and the need to address the gap between elites and citizens regarding

European integration. This issue was brought up by actors in all member states in the study as well as those on the EU level, suggesting a Europe-wide consensus on the importance of these questions, if not on how to address them. Several actors also raised the issue of political integration, though in relation to markedly differing visions of EU political union. In Germany, many actors stressed the necessity for a stronger political union, going beyond the EU as an economic, market-driven project. Many Spanish actors argued that the EU needed to become more political, although by this they often appeared to be expressing a preference for the EU to develop instruments to tame market forces, thus conflating a political Europe with a social Europe. This need for a social Europe was raised by left-wing Spanish and Italian actors in particular, who tended to criticise the EU's neo-liberalism and lack of welfare and social policies. A particular political issue for British and Dutch actors was the question of a federal union, with no Dutch actors favouring a federal future for the EU, and British state actors being especially concerned that European integration was not evolving in a federalist direction.

**The main conclusions that can be drawn from our data and analyses are:**

- The primary result of the Europeanisation of public contestation has thus far been a strengthening of the influence of state and executive actors who have almost exclusive hegemony in debates over European issues. **Civil society actors**, to the contrary, **have hardly gained any foothold on the European level** and are much better represented in debates that remain within the national political arena. **Legislative actors** – both national parliamentarians and members of the European Parliament – **are also less strongly represented in debates on European issues than in national public debates**. In other words, **Europeanisation of public spheres has so far tended to make public debates less inclusive and less egalitarian**.
- The differential access of actors to European public debates is strongly related to actors' evaluation of the European integration process and their assessment of European institutions. Civil society actors, who find themselves on the losing side of Europeanisation, are also most critical about European integration and institutions, whereas the state and executive actors who dominate European public debates display the strongest support for European integration (legislative actors take an intermediate position). This suggests that the **unequal access to European public debates has negative repercussions on support for European integration and European institutions, especially among civil society actors**.

- In spite of what is sometimes said about its deficient communication strategies, **the European Commission is by far the most often cited European-level organisation.** Across the twenty-eight newspapers in seven countries that are included in our sample, **Commission President Romano Prodi is cited more often than any national politician** (the closest runner up is German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder). While this may be considered positive news by supporters of European integration, the **European public sphere deficit is illustrated by the fact that Prodi alone appears in the media almost three times more often than all European-level civil society actors taken together.**
  
- Contrary to previous assumptions, there is a **remarkable level of Europeanised debate in the print media.** Moreover, the evaluations of European issues and actors show that European integration is supported by most newspapers. **The media tend to hold more positive or at least less negative attitudes about EU political actors than about actors from their own country.** While this general conclusion is true for six of the seven countries in our study, there is one exception. **The British press deviates in almost all dimensions from the general picture.** The British media are by far the most self-referential, they oppose the political project of Europe and the attitudes of journalists towards European integration are overwhelmingly negative. The UK press is also one out of only two countries in the sample in which national actors are more positively portrayed than EU actors. The contrast is strongest with the French press. In French editorials there is strong support for the enlargement of EU political competences and for EU integration in general.
  
- Our study of patterns of **political communication on the Internet shows that national, institutional actors and traditional mass media organisations are also the dominant actors on the web.** Given the hopes that have been attached to the democratic potential of the internet, this is a sobering conclusion. In spite of the technological possibilities, **multi-lingual websites turned out to be excessively rare** and therefore the average web user is confronted primarily with websites of actors from the own country or the same linguistic area. Our investigation of web links among sites of organisations likewise reveals strong linkages among websites within the same country, but also **strong connections from the national level** to the European level. Confirming its prominent position in our newspaper data, we find that also on the Internet, **the European Commission website turns out to be the most frequent receiver of weblinks:** almost half of the organisation websites across our seven countries provided links to the Commission's official website. Common opinion, however,

tends to emphasise the Internet's potential for stimulating **transnational linkages**, i.e. link connections between websites in different countries. Our results show that these horizontal forms of Europeanisation **are very underdeveloped**. We conclude therefore that the Internet facilitates access to and exchange with the supranational level, but it does not nearly to the same extent fulfill its promise of being a transnational communicative space.

- Our interview data with representatives of political institutions, political parties, news media, interest groups, and NGO's in the seven countries and on the EU level, confirm many of the findings from our media and Internet analyses. **In all countries, the action repertoire of all types of actors is still predominantly focused on the national level**. Partly, this is a result of a division of labour, which induces national-level actors to delegate the representation of their interests to European federations or to partner organisations. Partly, this is also a result of the fact that national governments constitute the members of the most important legislative body at the EU-level – the Council of Ministers. We further find that precisely the **weak actors who most depend on public-related strategies have the greatest problems with getting access to the media**.
- As in our media analyses, we found that the **state actors interviewed were particularly positive about European integration**, the exception being the UK, where state and party actors were the most negative of any type of actor regarding European integration. **NGOs were typically less positive than other actors. Many interviewees mentioned the need for enhanced citizen participation in European integration, and the need to address the gap between elites and citizens**. This issue was brought up by actors in all member states as well as those on the EU level, suggesting a Europe-wide consensus on the importance of these questions, if not on how to address them.
- Summing up, **we find evidence of a clear democratic deficit in Europeanised public communication**. However, the nature of this deficit is not – as is often supposed – that the media give us little information about Europe or that such information is particularly negative. Neither is it true that European institutions – and especially the European Commission – receive little attention in the media. **The true nature of the democratic deficit of Europeanised political communication lies in the difficulties that less powerful civil society groups face in getting access to this emerging Europeanised public arena**. While civil society actors are also underrepresented in national public debates, their position is much more marginal still in debates on European issues. Our results

suggest that the **solution to the deficits of the European public sphere must not be sought primarily in the media themselves**, but in the way in which the European policy process is structured, which strongly privileges executive actors compared to the legislative, and even more so compared to interest groups, NGO's, and other civil society actors. Mass media coverage merely mirrors and reproduces these structural inequalities. **Without political reforms that improve the accessibility of the European policy process, the stark inequalities in access to European public debates will continue to reinforce the elite bias of the European policy process, with the risk of further undercutting public support for European integration and European institutions.**

## II. BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES OF THE PROJECT

While policy decisions in Europe are increasingly taken in the supranational and inter-governmental arenas, the nation-state has remained the primary focus for collective identities, and public debates and citizens' participation in the policy process still seem mainly situated on the nation-state level and directed at national authorities. This discrepancy between Europe's institutional development, its increasing competences and influence on Europeans' conditions of life, on the one hand, and the continuing predominance of the national political space as the arena for public debates and the source for collective identification and notions of citizenship, on the other, is at the core of Europe's "democratic deficit". Since the beginning of the 1990s, the former "permissive consensus" on EU integration has eroded, increasingly after the Treaty on European Union of 1992, which was ratified only with great difficulty in those countries where it was subject to popular referenda. Trust in European institutions and support for the integration process have steadily declined, and so has in many countries voter participation in European elections (Schmitt and Thomassen, 1999). In addition, tendencies of a "re-nationalisation" of politics are observable, e.g., in the form of increasing support for xenophobic parties, which usually also have a strong anti-European profile.

The increasingly controversial nature of the integration process, the need to fundamentally reshape the EU's institutional structure and decision making process in the context of enlargement, as well as the heightened visibility of Europe in people's everyday life (e.g., the euro), make further advances in the integration process increasingly dependent on active engagement, acceptance, and legitimacy among the citizenry. Even more than on the national level, the communication flow between Europe and the public depends on the mass media. The mass media fulfil at least four crucial functions in the European policy process. First, in the absence of direct communicative links, European actors, issues, and policies have to be made visible by the mass media, and it is in this public forum that they may gain (or fail to obtain) public resonance and legitimacy (*legitimation* function). Second, with the partial exception of opinion polling – which provides only punctual, pre-structured, and non-discursive access to the public opinion – European policy makers must depend for their information about the desires and concerns of the citizenry on the communicative channels of the mass media (*responsiveness* function). Third and conversely, the public can build its opinion about the distant European institutions and the complexities of multi-level policies only to a very small extent on direct personal experience and therefore must also rely on how Europe becomes visible in the mass media (*accountability* function). Finally, participation

of citizens in the European policy process usually also requires access to the mass media. Although a small number of resourceful and well-organized actors may gain access to European policy-makers directly (e.g., in the context of the Brussels lobbying circuit), most forms of citizens' participation through NGOs, civic initiatives, and social movements can only influence policy-makers by way of the visibility, resonance, and legitimacy they may mobilize in the mass media (*participation* function).

Our aim in this project was to make a significant and innovative contribution to our scientific and practical knowledge of political mobilisation and communication in European public spheres and their relations to European policies and institutions. It addressed core issues identified in the call for proposals of the Fifth Framework Programme under the heading of "Governance, citizenship and the dynamics of European integration", emphasizing the emergence of a European public space, deliberation and participation, and the development of active European citizenship. In addition, we wanted to provide key information on interactions between European policy-makers and institutions, on the one hand, and intermediary collective actors and media, on the other. In order to contribute to resolving these issues, we have analyzed the role of *intermediary public spheres*, and *mass media* and *collective mobilisation* in particular, in the process of European integration. We focused on public spheres both as channels for citizen participation and the expression of citizenship identities, and as arenas in which EU policies and institutions can be held accountable and where their legitimacy is at stake.

The problematic of the *democratic deficit* is often discussed in terms of institutional design and reform (e.g., extending the powers of the European Parliament), or of a lack of interest in, and identification with the European Union among European citizens (e.g., low turnout in European elections). While we do not want to deny the importance of these factors, we argue that the success of both institutional reforms, and efforts to strengthen citizens' identification with Europe depend on the development of an intermediary public sphere of political communication and mobilisation that can help bridge the gap between European policies and institutions and the European citizenry. As the seminal work of Habermas (1990) and those who have followed in his footsteps (Calhoun 1992) have shown, the emergence of the nation-state as the predominant unit of political space superseding formerly important local and regional levels of political organisation was not just a question of institution building from above or pre-existing identifications among the citizenry, but depended crucially on the development of a civic public sphere, which increasingly involved citizens in national public debates and collective action.

Political discourse which is constructed in the public sphere is more than an intertextual activity, it is a cultural field where specific actors are able to exert power over others. It is in the public sphere that political actors mobilise claims, 'frame' social problems, and engage in conflict over the basis of social relationships. Dahlgren's emphasis on the interactional basis of the public sphere is pertinent (1995: pp.50): 'A 'public' is not an inert mass of people, nor is it a product derived from opinion polling. Publics exist only in so far as there are active exchanges of views and information among citizens: this is the interactional dimension of the public sphere.'

To study the Europeanisation of public spheres, **we compared degrees and forms of Europeanisation of political mobilisation and communication in seven countries, across six selected policy domains** characterised by different degrees and forms of involvement of European institutions, **as well as over time.**

Our **first aim** was to fill the empirical void that existed in discussions on the topic, by providing a detailed map of emergent tendencies towards a Europeanisation of public spheres along the three comparative dimensions of countries, policy domains, and time. We addressed differences in degrees and forms of Europeanisation across countries and policy domains, differences in the positions of collective actors with regard to European institutions and policies, as well as developments, convergences and divergences in these aspects over time.

In a **second** step, we took the patterns of Europeanisation thus found as a dependent variable and tried to explain them by drawing on theories of 'political opportunity structures' as developed in the sociological and political science literature on political mobilisation and social movements, and theories of news production and media agenda setting drawn from mass media and political communication research.

**Thirdly**, on the basis of interviews with collective actors we wanted to assess chances and constraints for the further development of Europeanisation tendencies of public spheres of political mobilisation and communication. In a field that is undergoing rapid transformations involving the emergence of historically new and unprecedented patterns of political mobilisation and communication, such a collection of expert evaluations of possible future trajectories provides important clues, both for scientific enquiry, and for practitioners' strategies and policies (see the discussion of the work packages 5, 6, and Delphi below).

In a **fourth** and final step, these descriptive, explanatory, and prospective findings serve as a basis for policy recommendations aimed at improving the preconditions for the further development of a European sphere of political mobilisation and communication as

a basis for a deepening of the integration process and for developing an active European form of citizenship (see the executive summary and part IV on policy implications).

Within the time frame of the project funding (three years), we have been able to achieve the first aim completely, and the other three aims partially. It has been impossible to develop all the theoretical and policy-relevant implications of the extremely rich, extensive, and varied set of data that we have gathered over the course of this project. For instance, we have not yet arrived at the point where we analyse our data across work packages, e.g. combining interview with media data, or comparing the internet to the print media. Obviously, there is much further potential in such triangulation of topical and methodological approaches. Although the project has already been very productive in terms of papers and publications, its period of greatest output productivity still lies ahead of us (see Part V on dissemination and exploitation). In that sense, this final report only describes an intermediary stage in a very much ongoing effort to which we all remain committed for the years to come.

### III. SCIENTIFIC DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT RESULTS AND METHODOLOGY

#### 1. The public sphere and European integration: why it is relevant and what forms it may take

Given the growing dependence of advances in the integration process on the emergence of a European public sphere, it is no wonder that the conditions for the emergence of a European public sphere have come to the foreground of the social-scientific debate about European integration (e.g., Gerhards, 1993; Erbring, 1995; Kopper, 1997; Schlesinger, 1995). However, so far this discussion suffers from insufficient empirical grounding, and has a tendency to remain highly speculative. Moreover, there has been a tendency in the literature to view the notion of a European public sphere in a narrow way, implicitly or explicitly derived from an ideal-typical conception of the national public sphere. Several authors have focused on the probability of the emergence of transnational mass media or transnational collective action on the European level. This way of approaching the problem usually results in a negative answer to the possibility of a European public sphere, and emphasizes linguistic and cultural boundaries as an insurmountable barrier to the Europeanisation of public debates, collective identities, and collective action. Although some authors reckon with the emergence of English as a true lingua franca in Europe that would allow direct transnational communication on a mass level (De Swaan 1993), for the moment this prospect seems to be very distant, not least because of strong resistance against such cultural homogenisation in many non-English speaking member states. In our view, this perspective on the Europeanisation of the public sphere is deficient because it views Europeanisation as a replication, on a higher level of spatial aggregation, of the type of unified public sphere that we know – or think we know – from the nation-state context. This perspective often presupposes a degree of linguistic and cultural homogeneity and political centralisation that cannot be found in many well-functioning democratic nation-states. For instance, the Dutch consociational democracy has proved to be a successful way to politically integrate a population characterised by deep socio-cultural cleavages (Lijphart, 1968). Similarly, Switzerland is one of the most stable and successful Western democracies, despite important cultural differences, not least of which the existence of four different language regions (Ernst, 1998).

If one looks for a genuinely transnational European public sphere, there is not much to be found (see also Schlesinger, 1999). There have been a few attempts to establish European-wide mass media, but most of these have either quickly disappeared (such as the newspaper *The European*) or lead a marginal (and often heavily EU-subsidized) existence (e.g., the television station *Euronews* or the independent, but in terms of

expert readership limited, *European Voice*). In as far as transnational media have been able to carve out a niche in the media landscape, the successful examples have a global, rather than European profile and audience (e.g., *CNN*, *BBC World*, *International Herald Tribune*, *Le Monde diplomatique*, *Financial Times*). Regarding collective action and social movements, Imig and Tarrow (2001) have similarly shown that mobilisation on the European level by transnationally organised European actors is still a rare phenomenon.

Gerhards (1993, 2000) has rightly emphasized that the more realistic scenario is not that of a genuinely supranational European public sphere in the singular, but the Europeanisation of the various national public spheres. This view assumes that – also because of the language factor – nationally-based mass media are there to stay, but that their content may become less focused on the nation-state context and will increasingly include a European perspective. Gerhards (2000: 293) mentions two criteria for such Europeanisation of national public spheres: an increased proportion of coverage of European themes and actors, on the one hand, and the evaluation of these themes and actors from a perspective that extends beyond the own country and its interests, on the other. Using media content data drawn from Kepplinger (1998), he shows that between 1951 and 1995 there has in Germany hardly been an increase in European themes and only a very slight increase – at a very low level – in the coverage of European actors. These data, however, were gathered for other purposes and it is therefore questionable whether they accurately measure the European dimension of themes and actors, let alone the intricacies of multi-level politics that may result in varying mixtures of national and European dimensions in news coverage. These methodological reservations notwithstanding, we agree with Gerhards that an increased presence of European actors and themes in national media would be an important criterion for the Europeanisation of public spheres. However, Gerhards' second criterion seems unnecessarily restrictive in that it demands an orientation on a European common good in order for an act of public communication to qualify as "Europeanised" (for this criticism see also Trenz 2000). If we use this common good criterion of orientation on more than self-interest, we should also exclude much of the routine national claims-making (e.g., of many socio-economic interest groups) from the national public sphere.

Even though Europeanisation in Gerhards' view does not require supranational mass media, it presupposes a form of Europeanisation of policies and politics along similar lines as in the traditional nation-state. Consequently, Gerhards (2000) arrives at the conclusion that the European public sphere deficit is a direct consequence of the democratic deficit, which he sees in the lack of the kind of government-opposition dynamics, and the direct accountability of office holders to the electorate that we know from the national level. This position has been criticized by Eder, Kantner, and Trenz

(2000) as too restrictive. They assume that because of the complex nature of multi-level politics, we will not necessarily find a strong orientation of public communication on European institutions. In their view, the Europeanisation of policies and regulations may instead lead to a parallelisation of national public spheres in the sense that increasingly the same themes are discussed at the same time under similar criteria of relevance. An example would be the debates on asylum policies in different European countries during the 1990s, following European-level discussions and the Dublin Agreement. National political actors carried the ideas developed here into their national public spheres, and as a result discussions started more or less simultaneously in several member states about establishing lists of "safe third countries", a notion that was developed in Dublin. However, the fact that such policies had a European-level origin was hardly mentioned in the coverage of these debates on the national level. Although what we see in such cases is certainly a consequence of the Europeanisation of policy-making, it does not in our view constitute a Europeanisation of the public sphere. As long as the European dimension remains hidden from the public's view, one cannot call such debates "Europeanised". For the citizen, unaware of what was discussed in Dublin or of the similar discussions in other member states, these appear to be purely national debates. If anything, such examples illustrate the nature of the public sphere deficit rather than being a solution to it.

Nonetheless, Eder et. al. are on the right track in insisting that direct references to the EU are not a necessary precondition for the Europeanisation of public spheres. What Gerhards' perspective forgets is namely that although, particularly in the first pillar, the EU has some supranational features, much of its policies have an intergovernmental basis. These intergovernmental features of the EU polity are more likely to be expressed in an alternative form of Europeanisation of public spheres, which has thus far received almost no attention in the literature (a partial exception is Risse, 2002). This type of Europeanisation would not consist of direct references to European actors and themes, but of increased attention for public debates and mobilisation in other member states. In an intergovernmental polity, the other member states can no longer be treated as foreign countries whose internal politics are not really relevant for one's own country. To the contrary, in an intergovernmental polity, it may matter a great deal who wins the elections in another member state, or what kind of new policy another member state develops in a particular policy field. Such tendencies are reinforced by the interdependencies created by common market policies and the freedom of movement within the EU. Under such conditions, policies in one country may become relevant for one's own country in a way that goes far beyond traditional international relations. For instance, if Germany liberalises its naturalisation policies, this is immediately relevant for

other member states, because once naturalised, immigrants from Germany can freely travel to, and take up work in another EU country. Similarly, the Northern EU countries watch closely what measures countries such as Italy, Greece, and Spain undertake to prevent illegal immigration from Africa and the Middle East, which under the Schengen conditions is no longer just “their” problem.


We thus arrive at three theoretically possible forms of Europeanisation of public communication and mobilisation:

- 1) The emergence of a *supranational European public sphere* constituted by the interaction among European-level institutions and collective actors around European themes, ideally accompanied by (and creating the basis for) the development of European-wide mass media.
- 2) *Vertical Europeanisation*, which consists of communicative linkages between the national and the European level. There are two basic variants of this patterns, a bottom-up one, in which national actors address European actors and/or make claims on European issues, and a top-down one, in which European actors intervene in national policies and public debates in the name of European regulations and common interests.
- 3) *Horizontal Europeanisation*, which consists of communicative linkages between different member states. We may distinguish a weak and a strong variant. In the weak variant, the media in one country cover debates and contestation in another member state, but there is no linkage between the countries in the structure of claims-making itself. In the stronger variant, actors from one country explicitly address, or refer to actors or policies in another member state.

It is important to note that we can only speak of “European”, “global”, “national”, or “local” public spheres in a relative sense. We propose that the spatial reach and boundaries of public communication can be determined by investigating patterns of *communicative flows* and assessing the *relative density of public communication* within and between different political spaces. In *Figure 1.*, we have drawn a set of concentric spheres delimiting different political spaces that are of interest to us in this study. At the centre, we find the national political space of a particular country (*sphere 1*, for illustrative purposes, we take the German political space as an example here). In the next sphere around it (2) are the respective national political spaces of other European countries. In the next sphere (3), we find the supranational European political space, in which the European institutions and common policies are situated. Beyond that, the next circle (4) contains all other countries of the world and their national political spaces.

Finally, the outer sphere (5) contains global supranational institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the G-8, the International Court of Justice or the United Nations (UN), as well as international treaties and conventions. The nature of public spheres, now, is constituted by the density of communicative linkages (symbolised by arrows a-r in *Figure 1.*) within and between these spaces.

**Figure 1.** Model of intra- and inter-sphere communication from the perspective of national media from EU member states



**Areas** mark the spheres to which actors belong. In this example, sphere 1 “national (own country)” corresponds to the national sphere whose mass media are analysed (in our case it corresponds to the German national sphere).

**Each arrow** represents a possible communicative linkage between actors, as explained in the text.

In terms of our model, the ideal-typical national public sphere is characterized by communicative linkages that remain completely confined to one national political space. An ideal-typical national claim would be a German claimant making demands on a German addressee in the name of the interests of a German beneficiary, referring to a set of aims and frames that refer only to the German political space. An example is when German media report a call by the German government on the German Trade Union Federation to cooperate in a reform of the (German) retirement system in order to secure pensions for future (German) generations (corresponding to *arrow a*). The degree to which we can speak of a nationally confined public sphere is then measured by the relative amount of all communicative action that conforms to this ideal-typical national pattern of claims-making. A fully nationalised public sphere would have a density of 100% of such nationally confined communicative linkages. In a fully denationalised public sphere the density of purely national communicative linkages would be 0%. This would not imply that national actors, addressees, interests, and issues do not play a role any more, but that these always appear in combination with some sort of reference to political spaces beyond the country in question.

Along similar lines, we may speak of the emergence of a *supranational European public sphere* to the extent that we find claims that link European claimants to European addressees in the name of European interests, without referring to any other level of political space. An example is a motion passed by the European Parliament urging the Commission to undertake institutional reforms in the context of the enlargement of the Union (*arrow k*). Similar to the density scores for nationally confined political communication, we can conceptualise a supranational European public sphere as the percentage of all communicative action in which European actors refer to European addressees, interests, and issues.

This would be the replication of the classical pattern of the national public sphere on the level of the European Union. However, if Europe is indeed a new type of multi-level polity, this should not be the most frequent type of Europeanised claim. Within the model of *vertical Europeanisation*, we may distinguish a number of varieties in which vertical communicative linkages between the national and the European political space can be made. In the *bottom-up variant*, the simplest form is when national actors directly address European institutions (*arrow c*; e.g., when a national actor brings a case before the European Court of Justice, or German foreign minister Fischer demands that the European Parliament be strengthened in the next treaty revision), but there are also

more complex patterns in which national actors address national authorities asking them to promote the group's interests on the European level (a case with national claimant, addressee, as well as object actor, but an issue with a European scope). The *top-down variant* of vertical Europeanisation occurs when European actors address national actors, usually regarding common European issues and interests (e.g., when the Commission threatens sanctions against governments that do not meet the criteria of the stability pact).

The *weak variant of horizontal Europeanisation* occurs when German media report on what happens within the national political spaces of other member states, for instance that the French national assembly adopts stricter laws on begging in French streets (*arrow f*). In terms of the structure of claims-making, this case is similar to the purely German claims, but the difference is that by their coverage the German media transport these non-German claims into the German public sphere. The degree to which such coverage represents a form of Europeanisation of the German public sphere can only be evaluated in a relative sense. Horizontal Europeanisation may be said to occur if coverage of other EU member states is over-represented in comparison to that of non-EU countries. If, on the other hand, references to France and Italy are not more frequent in the German public sphere than, say, to Japan or Mexico, we may perhaps still speak of a transnationalisation of the German public sphere in a wider sense (if such references have increased over the course of time relative to purely national coverage) but not of a more specific Europeanisation of public communication.

The *stronger variant of horizontal Europeanisation* is brought about by direct communicative linkages between two member states' political spaces (*arrow b*). Examples are Prime Minister Tony Blair issuing a statement in support of Gerhard Schröder's bid for the Chancellorship, or the German government criticising the French government's handling of the BSE epidemic. As in the case of vertical Europeanisation, there may be cases where all actors involved remain national (German) ones, but the issue is framed in a comparative way with one or more other member states, e.g., when the German opposition criticises the government's economic policies pointing out that Germany has the worst performance of all EU countries. In such a case, the policies and performances of other EU countries are deemed relevant as benchmarks or possible examples for German policies, thereby inserting a European dimension in the German public debate.

Of course, there can also be mixtures of horizontal and vertical Europeanisation. A common example is when government representatives of several member states issue a common statement on some European issue, e.g., when the Spanish, British, and Italian governments presented common proposals for institutional reform of the EU. Another

common combination of vertical and horizontal dimensions occurs when the media of one country report on interactions between the EU and another member state, e.g., when the German media report about the FPÖ's warning that Austria can veto decisions in the Council of Ministers (*arrow h*).

All these forms of Europeanisation of public communication must not only carve out a communicative niche in competition with purely national public communication, but also relative to transnational communicative interaction that goes beyond Europe. It is after all possible that a de-nationalisation of public communication and mobilisation occurs, but that most of the resulting linkages beyond the national level refer to supranational institutions and regulations with a wider scope than Europe alone (e.g., the UN), or to national political spaces outside of the European Union., e.g., to the United States, Russia, or Japan. In as far as claims-making referring to political spaces wider than or outside Europe involves the EU and its institutions, this would still be a form of Europeanisation, of the supranational variant to be more precise. Such claims constitute the foreign political dimension of the EU polity, e.g., when the EU and the US criticise each other's positions in the GATT negotiations (*arrow l*), or when the EU General Affairs Council agrees on embedding WEU in NATO structures (*arrow m*).

Another form of communicative interaction involving supranational political spaces or countries beyond Europe that might still constitute a form of Europeanisation, is when German media report on interaction between actors from other member states, on the one hand, and supranational institutions or non-European countries, on the other (e.g., when they report on Haider visiting Saddam Hussein in Iraq (*arrow l*), or on French human rights NGOs calling on the UNHCR to improve the protection for female refugees (*arrow j*). As in the case of coverage about other Member states' internal affairs, the coverage of such claims in the German media might indicate a growing awareness of the relevance of other EU countries' foreign relations to one's own country's (or Europe's) position in the world. Of course, a precondition would again be that such coverage of other member states' foreign politics would be over-represented compared to coverage of international and supranational politics in which other member states do not play a role (e.g., relations between the US and Russia) or in which they appear only as part of broader international coalitions or members of supranational institutions (e.g., claims made by the UN Security Council on Iraq).

Finally, there are two types of communicative linkages that are – like the purely nationally-confined claims we began with – clearly competitors to Europeanised political communication. The first are communications which link a particular national political space to non-European countries or to supranational institutions, and which bypass the

European level. Examples are the debate about US-German relations in the context of the Iraq conflict (*arrow d*), or chancellor Schröder asking the UN Secretary General to mediate in a conflict (*arrow e*). Second, a substantial part of foreign political coverage consists of the internal affairs of non-European countries (*arrow n*), relations between such countries (such as president Bush's claims on regime change in Iraq, *arrow o*), between them and supranational institutions (e.g., the USA asking NATO for support after September 11, *arrow p*), or among supranational institutions (the UN, for instance, calling on the World Bank to include poverty reduction in its funding criteria, *arrow r*). If such forms of political communication and contestation receive prominent coverage that increases relative to other types of coverage over time, we may consider them as an indicator of a denationalisation or transnationalisation of the public sphere, but not of a more specific and delimited form of Europeanised public communication.

Summing up, we can speak of a Europeanised public sphere to the extent that a substantial – and over time increasing – part of public contestation neither stays confined to the own national political space (the European public sphere's inner boundary), nor extends beyond Europe without referring to it (the outer boundary of the European public sphere). Coverage of other member states' internal and foreign affairs constitutes a borderline case and can only be interpreted as a form of Europeanisation if such coverage is over-represented (and over time increasingly so) compared to the coverage of the internal and foreign affairs of non-EU countries.

## 2. Explanatory Framework and Hypotheses

Turning to the explanatory level, we analyse our findings regarding different extents and forms of Europeanisation using a theoretical framework combining insights from research on political mobilisation and social movements, on the one hand, and media and political communications research, on the other. Recent work on collective political action has emphasised that levels and forms of mobilisation by social movements, interest groups and citizens' initiatives are strongly influenced by so-called ***political opportunity structures***, the set of opportunities and constraints offered by the institutional structure and political culture of the political systems in which these groups operate (e.g., Kitschelt, 1986; Tarrow, 1994). From this perspective, we can derive a series of guiding ***hypotheses*** regarding differences among countries and policy areas, as well as temporal trends. We only discuss the more general hypotheses here. The reader can find a much more detailed treatment in the final report of our theoretical work package 1 on multi-level political opportunity structures and differences among issue fields. This report, as well as all other final work package reports are online available at our project website <http://europub.wz-berlin.de>.

We hypothesise that ***cross-national differences*** in political institutions (e.g., degree of centralisation, nature of the electoral system), as well as differences in elite approaches to European integration (e.g., from widespread euroscepticism in the UK to a relatively strong pro-European elite consensus in Germany) are important determinants of cross-national differences in degrees and forms of a Europeanisation of political mobilisation and communication. Similarly, we expect systematic differences in patterns of Europeanisation ***across policy domains***, since each is characterised by a particular multi-level opportunity structure defining among other things the distribution of decision-making and implementation competences and capacities across the European, national and subnational levels.

On the ***temporal dimension***, the political opportunity perspective leads us to generally expect increased levels of Europeanisation of political communication and mobilisation as a result of advancing European integration. However, unlike in the functionalist perspective, this connection between European integration and patterns of mobilisation and communication is not seen as a more or less automatic process of adaptation, but as depending crucially on the mediating role of political institutions and power configurations. With the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties, and especially with the introduction of the common currency Euro in most member states on January 1, 1999, the European integration process has taken a qualitative leap forward. This entails important changes in the political opportunity structures facing different collective actors. First, the increased competences of European institutions and reach of European policies may imply new opportunities for collective actors to influence the policy process on issues relevant to their constituencies. E.g., on several occasions, actors have successfully appealed to the European Court of Justice to overturn national policies and regulations. Second, however, the increasing importance of the EU may also impose new constraints that make it more difficult for collective actors to exert influence on the policy process. Unitary regulations on the European level often strongly limit the latitude of national policies and may thereby constrain the mobilisation opportunities of groups which were traditionally well-connected to national policy-arenas (e.g., labour unions). In addition, due to the consensus model of decision-making in the Commission and Council of Ministers and the lack of transparency of the debates which lead up to many European-level decisions, it is often difficult for groups to keep track of the European policy-process and to make out which channels of access to use and which institutions or policy-makers to address and to hold accountable.

The exact mix of opportunities and constraints that European integration implies for political mobilisation and communication will in our view be highly variable depending on the policy-area in question. In addition, there will be important ***differences among***

*collective actors* within policy areas. While for some contenders 'Europe' may on balance imply a more positive balance of opportunities, other actors in the same policy field may stand to lose influence (e.g., as a result of the predominance of 'negative integration' through deregulation, employers associations seem to have been better placed to exploit new opportunities produced by European integration than labour unions). Further, the balance of opportunities and constraints may look different for the same collective actors and the same policy areas in different countries. For collective actors from countries with strongly centralised political systems which provide relatively few institutional channels of citizens' access to the policy process (e.g., France), European integration may on balance imply an improvement in the balance of opportunities and constraints. However, for collective actors from countries whose political systems offer multiple points of access to the citizenry (e.g., Germany) the reverse may well be true, because the loss of national influence opportunities may not be outweighed by the new European channels of access.

Because in modern democracies media coverage is crucial for gaining political resonance and influence, we additionally draw on **theories of media agenda setting and news value** as developed in political communication and media research (Rogers and Dearing, 1986; Iyengar, 1993). In this approach, whether and how news events are covered by the media is explained by event characteristics such as their intensity, proximity, the status of the actor, or the possibilities for dramatisation and polarisation, as well as their fit with substantive media agendas and frames. Here we expect important differences in the degree to, and forms in which mobilisation and communication attempts related to the European Union enter the public sphere, depending on the public relations strategies used by collective actors and the selection criteria used by media professionals. In addition, we expect such differences to be related to differences in political opportunity structures across countries and policy domains. E.g., similar instances of political communication directed at the European Union will be treated differently depending on the degree of Europe's actual influence in the respective policy domain, or on the extent to which European integration is a controversial issue in the country in question.

More generally, analyses of the reasons behind the **weak media presence of the EU's institutions and policies** often point to characteristics of the EU decision-making process that do not match the news value criteria journalists use in selecting news (Meyer 1999). The negotiations and consensus-building processes leading up to many important decisions in the EU, for instance in the Council of Ministers, are often kept outside the media spotlight in order not to endanger compromise solutions. However, this often entails that EU policies do not receive much media attention at all. Newsworthiness is promoted by such factors as the possibility of clear attributions of


responsibility for policy problems and solutions, the presence of pronounced conflict lines, or opportunities for personalisation and dramatisation. In the case of many EU decisions, however, it is unclear who is responsible, conflicts remain invisible, and the emphasis in the EU's public relations on consensus and collegiality offers few possibilities for personalisation and dramatisation. More generally, the binary logic of opposition versus government, which is crucial to assuring media attentiveness in national democracies, is weakly developed in the EU.

The degree to which EU policies and institutions conform to media news selection criteria is however not uniform. Again, we may assume that important differences occur here across our three comparative dimensions: time, countries, and policy domains. Regarding **developments over time**, there is a growing commitment among European policy-makers to improve the Union's public presence and transparency. Moreover, there seems to be a related tendency to be more open about conflicts of interest among EU institutions and among member states. Further, recent institutional reforms have relativised the consensus principle and opened up the way to majoritarian forms of decision-making that are better geared to capturing media attention. **Among countries**, differences in the newsworthiness of EU policies and institutions may be expected to occur as a function of the degree to which EU integration is a controversial issue in national politics. Where this is the case, EU events will tend to draw more media attention, although that attention is likely to be focused on the implications of the event for national politics, rather than on the European dimension itself. Finally, we may expect differences in the degree and forms of media selection **across policy fields**. For instance, in such areas where the European Parliament has gained significant co-decision powers vis-à-vis the Commission, something resembling a government-opposition binarity may develop and enhance media attention. One example – albeit a not very positive one for the EU's public image – of this has been the stepping down of the previous Commission under pressure from the Parliament.

Figure 2. (next page) presents a simplified graphical overview of our theoretical framework and the relations of the theoretical variables to our data work packages. On top of the figure, we find configurations of multi-level governance, which present different types of policy outputs and political opportunity structures to collective actors who seek to intervene with their demands and proposals in the policy process. As indicated, such outputs and opportunity structures will vary from country to country, among policy domains, as well as over time. For the policy areas included in our research design (see below), work package 1 provides an analysis of the relevant institutional configurations and policy settings that influence collective actors' communication and mobilisation strategies. Work package 5, consisting of interviews with collective actors in

selected policy fields, aims at finding out how collective actors perceive and strategically react to the emergent structures of European multi-level governance in different policy fields. In addition, this work package asks how collective actors design their strategies to obtain favourable coverage in the media. In modern democracies, much of political mobilisation and communication that seeks to affect policies has to pass through the filter of the mass media to reach policy makers as well as the wider public. Of course, there are more direct ways for collective actors to intervene in the policy process, for instance by way of lobbying or institutionalised consultation procedures. Such strategies are, however, not our main focus in this study because they cannot substitute for the public deliberation, participation, and transparency effects from which political communication and mobilisation in the public sphere derive their special role in democratic polities. Our work packages 3 and 6, which respectively consist of an analysis of newspaper editorials, and interviews with media professionals, are designed to inquire into the filter function of the media, and provide us with information on the criteria media employ for selecting and presenting particular types of political communication and mobilisation, and not others. The outputs of this process of news production in the form of publicly visible forms of claims-making is our main dependent variable, since it is here that political communication and mobilisation attempts become part of the public sphere in the proper sense, and thereby have the potential to influence policy deliberation as well as public opinion. Work package 2, which consists of an analysis of political claims by collective actors as they appear in the media, therefore plays a crucial role in our research design.

**Figure 2.:** Simplified Version of the Theoretical Model



Two other empirical work packages are not represented in the figure. In work package 4, we analyse the internet as a potential new arena for political communication and mobilisation. One might visualise the main question of this work package as an horizontal arrow (with a question mark) going through the middle of the figure from left to right, i.e. investigating whether the internet enables collective actors to make their claims publicly visible under circumvention of the traditional mass media. This work package is designed to find out whether the internet has the potential to provide collective actors with new channels to insert their claims effectively in the public sphere, without having to first pass through the mass media filter. This is arguably a highly important question that may have far-reaching effects on the structure of politics in the near future. For the EU this seems to be of even greater potential relevance given the weakness of traditional mass media on the European level, on the one hand, and the inherently transnational mode of communication that the internet seems to enable, on the other.

Finally, our so-called "Delphi" (after the oracle) work package explores the prospective dimension of our research questions. In the interviews of work packages 5 and 6 we have integrated a set of prospective questions where interview partners were asked to provide us with their informed estimates about the future development of European

political mobilisation and communication along a number of dimensions. In addition to these estimates of probable future scenarios, we asked respondents to indicate to what extent and in which sense these expectations differ from the scenario they find most desirable, and how they think their organisation will adapt and respond to these trends. This prospective analysis offers an overview of relevant actors' ideas and expectations about possible future scenarios and public conflicts surrounding European institutions and policies.

### 3. Research Design

Our *research design* includes three comparative dimensions. Cross-nationally, the design includes seven national case studies of *Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and Switzerland*. Apart from considerations having to do with the qualifications of the investigators and with building on existing cross-national research co-operation, this set of countries was chosen so as to include the most important EU member states, and to provide for sufficient variation along potentially relevant dimensions such as the size of the country and the date of entry into the EU. Moreover, from the theoretical perspective of political opportunity structures it is important that this choice provides for a large variety of political systems (e.g. federal versus centralised, majoritarian versus proportional electoral systems, important differences in the composition of party systems). Switzerland has been included as a non-member state because the structure of its highly fragmented, multi-lingual public sphere may provide interesting clues as to the possible future development of European public spheres. In addition to these national cases, the design includes a separate case study of transnational political mobilisation and communication on the *EU level*. Along the *time dimension*, our main focus will be on the *period from 2000 to 2002*. In order to be able to place the findings for this period in a long-term perspective, we have gathered data for the central work package 2 (political claims) also for two years somewhat further in the past, 1990 and 1995. This allows us to investigate in how far important institutional changes, such as the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 or the introduction of the common currency Euro in 1999 have had an impact on levels and forms of Europeanisation of public communication and mobilisation.

Because we expect degrees and forms of Europeanisation of public spheres to vary with different institutional settings, we have chosen *seven different policy domains* on which our study will focus. The choice of these domains was structured by the EU's pillar structure as defined in the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties, which defines different distributions of competencies for decision-making, policy development and implementation between the European and national levels. Thus, each pillar defines a

specific multi-level political opportunity structure (which is further complicated by nationally specific distributions of power in policy domains among national, regional and local levels of governance). Because of the fact that it has hitherto been the dominant driving force behind integration, we will choose two issue areas from the first, common market pillar. Moreover, the domain of agricultural politics takes up such an important place in the EU's competencies and budget that it merits to be considered separately from other common market issues. From those policy areas outside the pillar structure two will be chosen as well, one example (pensions and retirement) of a socio-economic redistributive issue, and another (education), which has a strong cultural and identity component. Finally and for obvious reasons, we also choose the meta-field of European integration itself (in the strict sense a *polity* issue rather than a *policy* issue), which includes all debates, decisions, and mobilisation around general questions of the EU's institutional structure, its collective identity, its normative foundations, its finality, as well as the discussions around EU enlargement. Thus, we arrive at the following selection of policy domains:

- Common market policies: ***agriculture: subsidies, livestock and dairy quotas, animal disease control*** (e.g., BSE, EU quota regulations, GATT negotiations on agricultural subsidies).
- Common market policies: ***monetary politics*** (e.g., introduction of the Euro, interest rate adjustments).
- Foreign and defence policies: ***troop deployment, for both military and humanitarian purposes*** (e.g., ex-Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq).
- Justice and internal policies: ***immigration politics*** (e.g., Schengen co-operation, asylum and refugee policies).
- Co-operation outside the pillar, socio-economic: ***retirement and pensions*** (e.g., retirement age, pension funds).
- Co-operation outside the pillar structure, culture and identity: ***education*** (all questions relating to primary, secondary, and tertiary education, including on the European level the Bologna and Lisbon processes).
- ***European integration*** (e.g., enlargement, the "Haider debate", institutional reform, constitutional discussions).

The data gathering effort that we have undertaken in the context of this project deserves some emphasis. We content coded literally tens of thousands of newspaper articles and

editorials for work packages 2 and 3, analysed the websites of thousands of collective actors and the network links among them for work package 4, and interviewed representatives of about 500 collective actors for work packages 5 and 6. We are quite confident that no other project working in this field has ever gathered or is presently gathering data on the Europeanisation of public communication and mobilisation that approaches this effort both in its size, qualitative scope, and breadth of different methods and types of data. In the following, we present our main results by work package.

#### **4. Multi-level political opportunity structures**

##### **(work package 1)**

WP1 dealt with the multilevel political opportunity structures for the Europeanisation of the public sphere. In the social science literature, political opportunities have been considered as main determinants of mobilisation level, repertoire of action, and success of social movements. More recently, the concept of political opportunities has been imported in other research domains, bringing „politics back in“. In this process, the meaning of the concept is sometimes stretched to include the most various indicators of environmental conditions. For our research, the challenge extended to adapting the existing hypotheses on actors' protest at the national level to discursive interventions in a European public sphere.

In our research, in fact, the dependent variable is not protest, but claims-making—i.e. various forms of discursive intervention in the public sphere (operationalized as printed media). In this specific arena, we aimed at measuring various indicators of Europeanisation: from the participation of truly supranational organisations (such as the European Parliament or the European Trade Unions Confederation) as claimants or object of claims to the reference to European issues and object; from support to European institutions and European integration to the willingness and capacity to organize at a European level.

In order to address the shift from the analysis of protest to claims-making, and from the national to the supranational level, in WP1 we have combined the hypotheses developed in social movement research with hypotheses emerging in the studies on Europeanisation, as well as with communication and media studies. The WP1 was indeed organized into three main parts, addressing the national political opportunities, the media structures and cultures and the Europeanisation of specific policy fields, in our selected countries and supranationally. In the various parts, we have selected existing cross-national data sets, as well as used secondary sources.

After defining Europeanisation in terms of not only the creation of supranational institutions, but also its effects at the national level, we singled out some main clusters of variables that could affect the opportunities for the spreading of Europeanised claims (in the different mentioned forms) as well as the degree of support for European institutions and European integration. A first cluster of variables looks at the geopolitical location of our selected countries. Drawing especially upon *neorealist* interpretations of the European integration process, we assumed that the degree of Europeanisation would tend to be higher, and Europe would be less contested, in those countries that are more advantaged by European integration, both directly in terms of net transfers from the EU and, indirectly, in terms of national economies which would gain more from the construction of a European (free)-market. Our cross-national results in terms of degrees of Europeanisation and level of consensus about European integration do not give much support to this set of hypotheses. True, especially in claims-making, support for regarding the EU is clearly higher in Germany and France than in Italy and Spain, even though these Southern European countries have much more benefited from cohesion-oriented transfers from the EU. Moreover, small countries with open economies (such as the Netherlands and Switzerland), which political economists usually consider as favourably oriented towards free-market economic policies, expressed only hesitant support for EU integration.

We next consider a cultural type of explanation, usually addressed in *constructivist* approaches to international relations. The readiness to identify with a supranational level tends to decrease when there are strong, competing and exclusive national identifications (the UK is often quoted as an example). A second cluster of variables analysed in our WP1 therefore refers to a more constructivist approach to Europe as an „imagined community“, whose advantages and disadvantages are contrasted with other territorial loyalties. We have looked at a cluster of variables referring to attitudes and beliefs, and found that popular support for European integration tends to be higher in those countries that first joined the European project (such as Germany, France and Italy). Moreover, a positive identification with Europe seems to balance negative images of one's own national past (such as Nazism in Germany, late modernisation in Spain, and corruption and lack of efficacy in Italy), confirming the role of a „constructed“ image of a supranational community. Additionally, in most cases, mistrust towards institution at the European level does not follow from discontent with one's own political system, but to the contrary seem to balance it.

Constructivist explanations alone, however, do not account for the observed increase in contestation of the European policies and politics, even in countries (such as Italy or Spain) that have been traditionally less Eurosceptical. Attention for Europe and

consensus about European integration do not proceed together. As *neofunctionalists* had foreseen, European integration is indeed a more and more contested issue. In WP1, a third cluster of variables addressed the strength and position of various political and social actors (what political opportunities approaches refer to in terms of configuration of power). We addressed this level by looking at national political actors' positions towards European integration, with particular attention to Eurosceptical parties. Various mechanisms of politicisation emerged indeed in our research on claims-making as well as from the interviews that confirmed the relevance of the configuration of power in the explanation of Europeanisation of the public sphere—from externalisation of responsibility for painful policy choices to the European Union to growing involvement of national actors in multilevel governance. The presence of Eurosceptic actors helps explaining, for instance, the consistently low level of attention and support for Europe in the British public sphere, as well as some scepticism in Switzerland. In most of the cases, however, the growing contestation of European policies and politics is not so much related with the tradition of Eurosceptical parties. We found many instances of a conflictual path of Europeanisation, characterized by support for the process of Europeanisation in principle, but growing discontent with its actual development. This path—defined as search for “another possible Europe”—is particularly visible in those countries (such as the Southern Europeans ones) in which social movements on global justice issues, with their concerns for global governance, have been stronger. The part of WP1 devoted to social movement characteristics is useful to explain differential levels of attention and support for Europe among civil society actors and helps addressing the explanation of the different strategies used by national actors, with Southern European actors preference for “going public”, Dutch and EU actors propensity to lobbying, and the adoption of mixed strategies in other countries.

These processes of contestation “from below”, with the development of a European identity and multilevel strategies, is however not always visible in publicly visible claims-making, which is dominated by elites, but emerge more clearly from the interviews. The WP1 chapter devoted to the cross-national analysis of the *media system* stresses a lower level of pluralism and a higher level of politicisation in the Southern European countries, which may give rise to an increased selection bias towards weaker actors. Additionally, in countries with a tradition of bipartisan support for European integration, Mediterranean media systems characterized by “polarized pluralism” may be less available to channel criticisms to Europe coming from outside the establishment than elsewhere.

Finally, we elaborated hypotheses on multilevel governance by investigating the different levels of Europeanisation in the six substantive policy fields on which we focus our analysis. For each policy field, we have described not only the level of transfer of

powers to European institutions (simplifying, high for monetary and agriculture; intermediate for immigration and defence; low for education and pensions), but also the specific configuration of decision-making between the different European institutions, i.e. the competences on each terrain of the European Parliament, the European Commission, the European Council/s, the European Courts and the European Bank). The cross-issue results of our research confirm that actor strategies are influenced not only by the total amount of competence devolved to the European institutions, but also by the main institutions involved in decision-making. Lower than expected levels of Europeanisation of claims-making in agriculture can be explained, for instance, by the power of the European Council, which favours intergovernmental strategies, as well as by the shifting of decision to supra-European institutions, such as the WTO.

Concluding, WP1 provided the information necessary for cross-national, cross-issue, cross-time and cross-media analysis of claims-making and interviews, allowing to go beyond monocausal explanation and to combine macro and meso levels of analysis.

For a detailed integrated report of the results of this work package, please consult the reports section of our website: <http://europub.wz-berlin.de/project%20reports.en.htm>.

## **5. Multi-level and transnational patterns of claims-making**

### **(work package 2)**

This first and most central part of our empirical research entails a cross-national, cross-time, and cross-issue analysis of patterns of Europeanisation of the public claims-making of a wide variety of collective actors. We look at the actors that make claims that are reported in European print media, the addressees at which they direct their demands, and the geopolitical frame of reference in which they discuss different issues. Obviously, many attempts at making public claims never reach the columns of the news media because they fail to pass the media's selection filters. For our research question, however, it is the publicly visible claims that count, since by definition only those that become public can contribute to a Europeanisation of public spheres.

Our data on public claims-making in European print media cover the years 1990, 1995, 2000, 2001, and 2002. The data refer to public claims-making in the seven above-mentioned issue fields: monetary politics; agriculture; immigration; troop deployment; pensions and retirement; education; and finally the meta-issue of European integration. All in all, our dataset comprises almost 24,000 different claims, which can be broken down along different (combinations of) axes, such as country, year, issue, actor type,

geopolitical scope, etc. In the report of this work package, we discuss the issue of the Europeanisation of claims-making along four themes:

- Levels of Europeanisation of public claims-making.
- Temporal trends in the Europeanisation of public claims-making.
- Support for, and opposition to European integration and European institutions.
- Who profits? The winners and losers of Europeanisation of public claims-making.

For the empirical data collection we use the methodology of *political claim analysis*, which goes beyond traditional media content analyses. The latter usually focus on newspaper articles as the unit of analysis, and use article-level variables to investigate the way in which journalists frame the news. Traditional approaches to content analysis are media-centric, and neglect the role of other political actors in shaping the nature of public discourse and contestation. Media professionals certainly contribute to shaping the public sphere, but to do so they have to draw on the raw material of communicative actions and events that are produced and staged by non-media actors such as politicians, interest groups, and NGO's. Traditional content analysis on the article-level offers no possibility to map fields of political communication in terms of actors, issues, and the relations between them. It is precisely such information about who addresses who on which issues and in the name of whose interests, which we need in order to answer questions about the Europeanisation of public spheres and the different forms it may take.

In each of the seven countries, two quality newspapers, one more left-oriented, and one more right-oriented, have been chosen as our main sources. For the year 2000, we additionally include two other newspapers: a regional newspaper from a region with a specific regional identity, and a tabloid newspaper catering to a non-elite public. Where no genuine tabloid was present, we either chose a newspaper that is close in style to a tabloid, or another fourth newspaper, the choice of which depended on the particular composition of the national media landscape.

Claims are included in our data regardless of who makes them and where they are made. I.e., our data include claims by state actors, economic actors, journalists and news media, as well as representatives of civil society. Claims can be made by organisations and their spokespersons, as well as by diffuse collectivities (e.g., a group of farmers). The actors behind claims (claimants) may be from the European, other supranational, as well as national, regional, and local levels, and they can be from the country where the newspaper is published, as well as from any other country of the world. Likewise, no restriction applies to the location where a claim is made. E.g., claims on the situation of

refugees in Australia, or the deployment of African troops in Liberia are just as much included as claims that are made in the countries of our study or on the level of the European Union. Thus, our data gathering strategy is completely neutral with regard to the geographical and political scope of claims. This allows us to make the question of the extent of Europeanisation (or broader supranationalisation) of public claims-making in the print media a matter for empirical investigation. This methodological strategy is not as self-evident as it may seem, since several past studies on the Europeanisation of the public sphere have employed data gathering strategies that bias the results in advance (e.g., by using keywords such as “Europe” or “EU” to search for articles).

## **5.1. Levels of Europeanisation of public claims-making**

### **5.1.1. European actors**

To investigate levels of Europeanisation of claims-making, we look at several dimensions of claims and ask to what extent they have a European dimension: the actor who makes the claim (the claimant), and the geo-political framing of the issue by the claimant (issue scope, including the actors and institutions at whom claims are directed) In each of these cases, we distinguish between vertical and horizontal forms of Europeanisation of public political communication. The vertical variant of Europeanisation consists of direct references to the European Union or other European-level actors, in terms of the claimant (e.g., a statement by a Commissioner), the addressee (e.g., a demand addressed at the European Court of Justice), or the framing of the issue (e.g., a reference to the need to strive for common European asylum regulations). The horizontal variant consists of references to other European member states, be it in terms of the claimant (e.g., a statements by Tony Blair reported in the German press), addressee (e.g., a call by a German actor on the French government), or issue framing (e.g., a comparison of one’s own country to other member states).

Our first attention naturally goes to the frequency with which actors from the European level appear in the media as speakers. EU-level actors are most strongly present in discussions on European integration (28%), followed by the two fields where the EU has substantial supranational prerogatives: monetary politics (22%) and agriculture (16%). In the other four issue fields, by contrast, actors from the EU level play a marginal role. This is largely as expected for the two issue fields where European competencies are institutionally very weak: pensions and retirement (2%) and education (0%). More remarkable are the low levels for the two issue areas where the EU at least aspires to play an important role. Immigration is since the Treaty of Amsterdam scheduled to become part of the first pillar, but European-level actors have not played a large role in

debates on this issue (4%). In the field of troop deployment, little is reflected of the EU's aspirations to set up a meaningful common foreign and security policy. The creation of a special Commission representative for these issue areas has not made much of an impact on public debates on troop deployment, where EU-level actors are responsible for only 2% of all claims.

Next, we look at the extent of horizontal Europeanisation in the form of the appearance of actors from other European countries in the media of a particular country. For European integration, monetary politics, and agriculture, the results are almost identical to those for the vertical form of Europeanisation: 30%, 23%, respectively 16% of the actors in these three fields were actors from other European countries. In the fields of European integration and monetary politics this implies that a majority of claims can be considered Europeanised in one way or another: 59% and 55% of claims, respectively, were made by either actors from the EU level, or actors from another European country. In the other four issue fields, horizontal Europeanisation tendencies are clearly more outspoken than vertical ones. This is related to the fact that in as far as the EU plays a role in these fields, it is by way of intergovernmental rather than supranational forms of decision-making. As a result, attention is drawn toward actors from other member states, rather than actors from the EU level. Although still not at a high level, 6% of the reported claims on pensions and 8% on education were made by actors from another European country. In these two fields, coverage of claims by actors from European countries is about twice as frequent as that of actors from other parts of the world. In other words, what we see here cannot be simply explained as coverage of foreign affairs, but suggests a more specific attention for European countries. Although the levels of claims from other European countries are higher in troop deployment and immigration (19% in both cases), it is less clear in these cases that we can interpret this as a sign of Europeanisation. In the case of immigration, actors from other parts of the world appear almost as often (14%) as European ones, while in the field of troop deployment actors from the non-European world clearly dominate (43%), above all the USA (20%), which appears more often as the country of origin of speakers on this topic than all European countries taken together.

If we look from which other European countries the reported claimants stemmed, we see a predominance of German and French actors in the issue field of European integration – corresponding to these two countries' self-image as the "motor" of the integration process. The levels of French and German actors in this field (6% and 5%, respectively) are especially striking when compared to the much lower level of actors from the United Kingdom (2%). Otherwise, a broad spectrum of countries is represented among the speakers on European integration. Actors from the "big three" (France, Germany, and the

United Kingdom) are together responsible for only about 40% of the horizontally Europeanised claims. The rest is distributed across all member states, as well as the enlargement countries and Turkey. This indicates that Europeanisation in the integration field is not only quantitatively strong but also qualitatively broad.

Turning from issue differences to country differences, we find that – as in all of our other work packages, see below – the United Kingdom is the deviant case. Only 7% of all claimants cited in the British press are from the EU-level, which is even less than in Switzerland (11%), which is not even an EU member. The deviance of the United Kingdom is more pronounced still if we look at horizontal Europeanisation in the form of coverage of claims made by actors from other European countries, which make up only 8% of the British press content, against 15-30% in the other countries. The UK is the country that has the most strongly nationalised public sphere: two thirds of all statements that were reported stemmed from British actors. If the UK press reports statements from actors outside the UK, the focus tends to be not so much Europe, but the non-European world and the United States in particular. Actors from the latter country were more often cited (11%) than actors from all European countries taken together. Britain's distant and sceptical relation with the EU and with the European "continent", as well as its strong Atlantic orientation, are thus clearly visible in our data.

Switzerland also displays a particular pattern. Although vertical Europeanisation in the form of coverage of claims by EU-level actors (11%) is second-lowest after the UK, Switzerland has by far the highest level of horizontal Europeanisation in the form of claims by actors from other European countries (30%). Overall, the Swiss public sphere is the least nationalised of the seven countries (only 41% of coverage concerns claims by Swiss actors). Thus, even though it is not an EU member, Switzerland certainly forms part of Europe in terms of its public sphere. The fact that EU membership must not be decisive in this regard is made clearest by the contrast to Britain. In Switzerland, 43% of all claims come from actors either from the European level, or from other European countries. The corresponding level of Europeanisation of claims-making in the British public sphere is only 15%.

Among the other five countries, the differences are not so large. Italy perhaps comes closest to the Europe-distant, nationalised pattern of the UK: it has the second-lowest coverage of actors from other European countries (15%), and the second-highest level of own national actors (57%). Contrary to its (self-) image as a particularly European-minded and cosmopolitan country (but in line with our results for the other work packages, see below, especially work packages 6 and Delphi), the Netherlands also score somewhat below the average in terms of Europeanisation, and above average in terms of

the focus on own national actors (53%). Spain has the highest overall levels of Europeanisation, on about the same level as Switzerland: 20% of claimants in the Spanish press are from the EU level, and another 22% are from other European countries. France (48%), Spain (45%), and Switzerland (41%) are the three countries where own national actors do not form a majority of claimants. In Germany they make up exactly half of the actors (50%).

### **5.1.2. European issue framings**

As a next step, we looked at the geopolitical frame of reference into which claimants situate an issue. For the two most nationalised policy fields, pensions and education, we find almost the same pattern as for the actors who appear as claimants: 84% and 86% of claims, respectively, had a purely national frame of reference, with no reference whatsoever to other countries or to European or other supranational contexts. In the field of troop deployment, we find that almost two thirds (65%) of the claims have a multi- or bilateral scope, implying that they are framed in a traditional international relations fashion, i.e., in terms of relations between two or more nation-states. Next to the traditional international relations framework for debating troop deployment, we also find a significant number of claims (31%) that refer to supranational contexts such as the UN or NATO. Europe, however, remains marginal in this field: not more than 4% of troop deployment claims refer to the EU or other European contexts.

Purely national frames of reference become rarer in the immigration field compared to the results for claimants (44% of claims refer only to the context of the own country, against 59% of the claimants who are from the own country). However, the main beneficiary of this trend is not the European level (13% of immigration claims contain some reference to Europe), but references to multi- and bilateral contexts (25%). In most cases, this does not concern relations between European countries, but relations between countries of immigration and emigration (although sometimes, as in the case of Turkey, the country of origin of immigrants happens to be a European country). In monetary politics and agriculture, finally, we find strong references to the European level. In the agriculture field claims with a European frame of reference (40%) surpass in importance those with an own national frame of reference (35%). The same tendency can be found even more pronounced in monetary politics, where 66% of claims have a (vertical) European frame of reference, and only a small proportion of 10% remain which refer only to the own country.

Turning again from differences among issue fields to differences across our seven countries, we see that everywhere claims with a vertical European frame of reference are

more numerous than claims by European actors. Even in Britain, more than a third of all claims (35%) refer to the European context, and less than half can be classified as purely own national (41%). Interestingly, the UK is now surpassed narrowly by Italy (34% European and 42% own national frame of reference) as the country with the least Europeanised and most nationally focused public sphere. Generally speaking, the relative differences between more and less Europeanised countries are smaller for issue scopes than for claimants. This suggests that the public sphere of countries such as the UK and Italy, and to a lesser extent the Netherlands, qualify as less Europeanised only partly because they contain less discussion about European issues, but more because these discussions tend to be among own national actors with relatively little voice for actors from the EU-level or from other European countries. The UK displays this pattern most pronouncedly. The debate on European issues is in this country to a large extent an internal debate among British actors *about* Europe, rather than a genuinely Europeanised debate *among* European actors.

## **5.2. Trends over time in the Europeanisation of public claims-making**

Europeanisation of political communication is not just a matter of relative degree, but it should also be judged as a developing process. From the theoretical perspective of political opportunity structures that we take in this project it is to be expected that political communication and mobilisation react to shifts in competencies from the national to the European level. Such an effect is most likely in those fields where the expansion of the EU's prerogatives has been strongest. The introduction of the common currency Euro in twelve member states and the related transfer of decision-making power from national governments and central banks to the European Central Bank is certainly the most important transfer of power that has occurred in the period of study. In the other five substantive fields, institutional developments at the EU level have been less spectacular and one may even have doubts whether any significant transfer of power to the EU level has occurred in some fields. For instance, little of a common security and defence policy could be seen in the recent Iraq conflict, the EU's common agricultural policy is under increasing pressure and criticism, and attempts to formulate a common immigration and asylum policy have thus far largely failed.

### **5.2.1. European actors**

We indeed find the expected strong increase in the relevance of European-level claimants – above all the newly formed European Central Bank – in the field of monetary politics (from 10% of all claimants in 1990 to 31% in 2002). Less spectacularly, the debate about European integration is also becoming more vertically Europeanised over the

course of the period of study: the share of European-level actors in debates on European integration steadily increases from 24% in 1990 to 34% in 2002. However, in the other issue fields, no clear and strong Europeanisation tendencies can be observed. In agriculture, the share of European-level actors oscillates strongly, without a clear trend. On a much lower level, the same is true for the immigration field. In troop deployment and education politics, European actors are stably irrelevant. In the pensions field, finally, there is a steady increase in the share of European-level actors from 0% in 1990 to 3% in 2002, but these figures are on such a low level that it is hard to make much of a Europeanisation tendency out of this.

That Europeanisation tendencies are weak to inexistent in the majority of our issue fields is also borne out by the share of claimants from other European countries as an indicator of horizontal Europeanisation. In the pensions field, the slight increase in European-level claimants is more than offset by a decrease (from 11% in 1990 to 7% in 2002) of claims made by actors from other European countries. Such a decrease in attention for actors from other European countries can also be found in the field of education (from 11% in 1990 to 6% in 2002). In other words, claims-making in these already strongly nationalised policy fields has a tendency to become less rather than more Europeanised over time. A similar tendency is also observable in the immigration field, where claimants from other European countries declined from 25% in 1990 to 18% in 2002. In the troop deployment field, we find erratic oscillation without a clear trend. In the agriculture field we do find indications for an increase in attention for actors from other European countries (from 12% in 1990 to 17% in 2002), although the trend is not linear and not very strong. The same is true for the slight increase in the prominence of actors from other European countries in debates on European integration (from 27% in 1990 to 29% in 2002). In monetary politics, finally, we find a decrease in the relevance of actors from European other countries (from 22% in 1990 to 18% in 2002). This decrease is easily explained by the fact that national governments and central banks have lost most of their powers in this field to the European Central Bank.

If we combine vertical and horizontal indicators of the Europeanisation of claimants, we arrive at a strong net increase in Europeanisation in debates on monetary politics (from 32% in 1990 to 49% in 2002) and on European integration (from 51% in 1990 to 63% in 2002). In the agriculture field, there is a sizeable increase in Europeanisation from 1990 (28%) to 1995 (38%), but stability after that. In immigration, we find a reverse pattern: a strong decline in Europeanisation from 1990 (32%) to 1995 (19%), and then a modest recovery until 2002 (23%). In troop deployment, not more than erratic shifts in levels of Europeanisation can be discerned, which is certainly related to the fact that debates in this field are strongly tied to particular deployment contexts, some of which may more

strongly involve European actors than others. Europeanisation in the pensions field is stable and low at around 10%, whereas in education there is a consistent decline from 12% in 1990 to only 6% in 2002.

Turning from issue to country differences, we find, combining vertical and horizontal indicators of Europeanisation, that in most countries there is an increase – though mostly not a very pronounced and not always a linear one – in the level of Europeanisation in 2002 compared to 1990. Only in Switzerland (a decline from 39% in 1990 to a still comparatively high 37% in 2002) and more importantly in the UK (from 22% in 1990 to 19% in 2002) do we observe decreases over time in the level of Europeanisation of claimants. The UK thus not only has by far the least Europeanised public sphere, but is also the only member state that tends to become on the important dimension of who is offered a voice in public debates *less* Europeanised over time.

### **5.2.2. Europeanised issue framings**

We find stronger increases in levels of Europeanisation if we look at the framing of issues. In line with our earlier results in this section, the trend is most pronounced in monetary politics, where claims with a European scope double from 40% in 1990 to 78% in 2002. In agriculture, there is a similarly strong increase from 36% in 1990 to 61% in 2002. In troop deployment and pensions, the share of claims with a European issue scope is much more modest, but in both cases there is a consistent increase over time (from 2% in 1990 to 5% in 2002 for troop deployment, and from 0% to 5% in pensions). Across all countries, the share of claims with a vertical European frame of reference increased consistently from 15% in 1990 to 28% in 2002. This time the trend holds in all seven countries without any exception. Even in the UK we now find a substantial increase from 16% in 1990 to 25% in 2002. This confirms our earlier interpretation that the lack of Europeanisation of the British public sphere is less a question of a lack of debate about European issues, but rather of the low prominence that is given to non-British actors in these debates.

### **5.3. Support and opposition regarding European institutions and integration**

An increase in Europeanised political communication does not necessarily imply increasing support for European institutions or a growing consensus about the integration process. European integration is increasingly a contested issue, and it is therefore to be expected that different actors will take different positions regarding integration and European institutions. In the report, we investigate this question first by looking at the evaluation of addressees from different geopolitical levels and regions in our seven

countries. When actors are the target of claims, this may entail criticism or support, or a more neutral appeal. We measure this by given each addressee each time it is addressed by another actor a score of +1 if it is the target of support, -1 if it is the target of criticism, and 0 if it is targeted in a neutral or ambivalent way. These scores are then averaged across claims per addressee. The resulting score on a range between +1 and -1 indicates to what extent a particular category of addressees is evaluated positively or negatively by other actors in the public sphere.

If we compare the different categories of actors, we find that there is only one type of actors that on average receive a slightly positive evaluation, namely the UN (+.09) and other supranational actors (+.07). Compared to these supranational actors, EU-level actors are more often the object of criticism (-.14). However, actors and institutions on the EU level systematically receive a more positive evaluation than own national actors (-.31 on average). The difference to the benefit of EU-level actors compared to own national actors can be found in all seven countries, but it is strongest in France (+.01 for EU against -.33 for French actors) and weakest in Switzerland (-.10 for EU against -.12 for Swiss actors).

Next to these evaluations of addressed European institutions, we look at actors' evaluation of the European integration process, which we coded in a similar way as the evaluations of addressees. These results show that the evaluation of the European integration process is much more positive than that of concrete EU institutions. In fact, the evaluation of the integration process across all actors (including citations of actors from outside the own country) has been on balance positive in the each of the seven countries during each of the five years under study. While this is encouraging evidence for supporters of European integration, the fact that there is also a strong decline in support over time in all seven countries provides less reason for optimism. The average cross-country position score declined steadily from +.39 in 1990 to +.15 in 2001. In 2002 there has been a slight recovery of support in all countries, but the magnitude of this improvement is marginal (+.19).

Actors from those countries that are not yet part of the EU, but aspire to become members tend to give the most positive evaluations of the EU, as suggested by the +.58 evaluation among actors from Eastern European countries that are not (yet) accession candidates, the +.32 score of the 2004 enlargement countries, and the +.29 score of Turkey. Not surprisingly given the fact that they would be beneficiaries of deepened integration, actors from the EU-level itself also tend to be supportive of further integration (+.32). Among the member states, we by and large find the familiar picture. German (+.29) and French (+.26) actors are most supportive of the integration process.

They are followed by Italian (+.20), and Spanish and Dutch (both +.18) actors. British actors again close the ranks with a slightly negative score of -.01.

#### **5.4. Who profits? The winners and losers of Europeanisation of public claims-making**

The erosion of the permissive consensus and growing contestation over European integration are linked to the fact that European integration is not – or at least not always – a “win-win game”, in which every actor stands to win, and nobody suffers any losses. The transfer of competencies from the national to the intergovernmental and supranational European arenas opens up opportunities and makes resources available for some categories of actors, but not – or not to the same extent – for others. Similarly, the erosion of undivided national sovereignty may improve the opportunities of some actors, but may also negatively affect those of actors who had obtained institutionalised access to national resources and opportunity structures. Thus, European integration unavoidably also implies a redistribution of power. About the question what form this redistribution takes, opinions in the literature are divided. Some see Europe as an ally of weaker players in the political game, i.e. civil society interests such as human rights organisations, migrants, consumer organisations and other NGO’s. Others see the EU as further strengthening the position of those who are already strong on the national level, i.e. executive actors and business interests.

The report addresses the question of the “winners” and “losers” of Europeanised claims-making by looking at support for the European integration process by different categories of actors. The main results in the different countries are strikingly similar. Everywhere support for the integration process is stronger among state and party actors (+.26 across all seven countries) than among various categories of civil society actors: economic interest groups (+.12), the media (+.13), and other civil society groups (+.13). Within the category of state and party actors, support is highest among the most powerful, governmental actors (+.34), and clearly lower among those actors that can be directly held accountable by the electorate, i.e., the legislative (+.24) and political parties (+.02). The stronger socio-economic actors, employers and business organisations, are in most countries more supportive of the integration process (+.20) than the trade unions (+.12). Across the board, these results suggests that European integration finds most support among actors that are already powerful on the national level, namely those of the executive within the state sector, and powerful economic interests within civil society. For all the idealist talk in certain pro-European circles about the EU as a protector of the weak against the encroachments of the evil nation-state, the results indicate that the more weakly institutionalised civil society actors, as well as those actors

within the core of the political system that depend more closely on a mandate of the populace tend to be much more sceptical about European integration than the “powers that be” from which Europe is supposed to protect them.

But is this perhaps a form of “false consciousness” that prevents actors from doing justice to the opportunities that European integration offers them? We investigate whether this is the case by looking at the participation of different categories of actors in public debates on European integration compared to the other issue fields. If Europe indeed opens up new opportunities for actors whose interests are more weakly represented on the national level, then these actors should be more visible in debates on European integration than in the other fields where the nation-state context is still important or even predominant. However, debates on European integration turn out to be highly elitist. State and party actors dominate each issue field, but nowhere as strongly as in debates on European integration, where 81% of the speakers are state or party actors. Within that category, moreover, governmental actors occupy a much stronger position in debates on European integration than in the other issue fields, where legislatures and parties are comparatively more prominent. Economic interest groups (2% in European integration, against 10% on average), and other civil society groups (5% in integration debates against 11% average) are much less prominent in debates on European integration than in the other issue fields. Only the media appear somewhat more often than average as speakers on European integration issues – a finding which, by the way, corrects another popular misperception, namely that the democratic deficit would be related to a lack of media interest in European affairs (see further the results discussed under work package 3 below). The EU political process apparently puts up important barriers for less institutionalised civil society groups, and seems to be especially suited to the publicity needs of actors from the executive.

This interpretation is strengthened by a detailed analysis of Europeanised and non-Europeanised claims in the six substantive policy fields. These results clearly confirm that thus far, European integration has remained a project by political elites, and at least in as far as discursive influence is concerned, also to the benefit of political elites. Core state actors such as heads of state and government, cabinet ministers, and central banks are by far the most important beneficiaries of the Europeanisation of public debates in each of the policy fields and of whichever form of Europeanisation (supranational, horizontal, or vertical) we consider. Legislative and party actors – those actors from the core of the political system who are directly accountable to the electorate – are much less well represented in Europeanised public debates, both in an absolute sense, and even more so relative to government and executive actors. Such an erosion of the contribution of parliaments and political parties to public debates on Europeanised issues seems

problematic from the normative point of view of democratic legitimacy and accountability. The same is true for the extremely weak representation of civil society actors in Europeanised public debates. Less resourceful civil society interests such as consumers' organisations, environmental groups or pensioners are even more strongly underrepresented in Europeanised public debates than more powerful groups such as labour unions and business interests.

The differences among the various forms of Europeanisation are also problematic from the point of view of the democratic quality of public debates. The strongest form of Europeanisation, namely the participation of European-level actors in public debates, is also by far the most exclusive. Civil society actors are almost completely absent from the voices that reach the national level coming down from the European level. Transnational flows of political communication across member-state boundaries are less exclusive, but still this horizontal form of Europeanised political communication is mainly a playground for statesmen and a few other powerful interests. The only form of Europeanised political communication in which the role of civil society actors approaches that in purely national debates is the vertical variant, in which national actors make claims within a European frame of reference, either directly addressed at European institutions, or more often addressed at national authorities but referring to European identities, norms, and legal frameworks. But even there the position of most civil society actors is weaker than in public debates of the "traditional" type, which remain confined to a purely national frame of reference. This becomes more meaningful and important still if one realises that vertically Europeanised claims making is virtually the only form in which civil society actors are significantly represented, whereas state and party actors are also strongly present in supranationally and horizontally Europeanised claims making.

We show that these shifts in discursive influence go a long way in explaining patterns of support for and opposition to European institutions and the European integration process among different categories of actors. As a general rule, actors who are less influential in Europeanised public debates also tend to be more critical of European institutions and less supportive of the integration process than actors whose voices are more prominent in Europeanised public debates. Our analysis suggests that the impact of European integration on the distribution of influence in public debates should be added to the determinants of actors' position on issues related to European integration.

Thus far, the Europeanisation of public contestation seems to have above all strengthened the influence of state actors – above all the executive – who have almost exclusive hegemony in debates over European issues. Civil society actors, on the contrary, have hardly gained any foothold on the European level and are much better

represented in debates that remain within the national political arena. In other words, Europeanisation of public spheres as it has occurred so far has tended to make public debates less inclusive and less egalitarian. We thus find evidence of a clear democratic deficit in Europeanised public communication. However, the nature of this deficit is not – as is often supposed – that the media give us little information about Europe or that such information is nationally focused. This view is contradicted by the strong correlation between EU competencies in a field and the amount of Europeanised coverage of claims, as well as by the strong presence – with the exception of the UK – of both EU institutions and actors from other European countries in debates on European integration. The true nature of the democratic deficit of Europeanised political communication lies in the difficulties that less powerful civil society groups face in getting access to this emerging Europeanised public arena.

For a detailed integrated report of the results of this work package, as well as separate reports on each of our seven countries, please consult the reports section of our website:

<http://europub.wz-berlin.de/project%20reports.en.htm>.

The codebook that was used for the analysis is also available from our website:

<http://europub.wz-berlin.de/codebooks.en.htm>.

## **6. The European perspective in newspaper editorials**

### **(work package 3)**

Our findings on the comparative analysis of newspaper editorials in this work package highlight that the media's voice cannot be dismissed in the debate about the emergence of a European public sphere. The media play a significant role as political actors as they use the format of editorials for claims-making, thereby assigning relevance and frames to political issues and introducing their own opinions into public discourse and political debate. In their dual role as communication channels for political actors and as actors in their own right, they constitute the major communicative linkages within and between national public spaces, which are a basic prerequisite for the Europeanisation of public sphere.

The report on the comparative analysis of the newspaper editorials across seven countries and issue fields discerns the voice of the media by focusing on four dimensions of Europeanisation of a mass mediated public sphere: (1) the salience of European integration, (2) the levels of Europeanisation, (3) the evaluations of European issues and actors, and (4) the framing of media claims on European integration. We do so by a

detailed content analysis of more than 5,000 newspaper editorials in our seven issue fields for the period 2000-2002 in altogether twenty-eight different newspapers, including left-leaning and right-leaning national quality dailies, as well as tabloids and regional papers.

The overall picture that we can draw from our findings is that – contrary to previous assumptions – there is a remarkable level of Europeanised debate in the media of the countries under study and an even greater potential to further develop transnational communicative linkages within the public space of the European Union. This conclusion can be reached not only from the salience of European integration on the issue agenda, but also from the analysis of European scopes in media claims-making. Moreover, the evaluations of European issues and actors point to the fact that the political project of Europe is welcomed and that European integration is supported by the media of most countries under study. Eventually, in the majority of the countries, the media hold more positive or at least less negative attitudes about EU political actors than about actors from their own country. While this general conclusion is true for six of our seven countries under study, there is one exception. The British press deviates in almost all dimensions from the general picture, as European integration is played down on the issue agenda, European scopes are neglected, European issues are opposed, and European actors are portrayed in a very negative light.

Against the background of this general conclusion, we find of course more or less stark contrasts between the national media that point to the fact that each media culture does feature its idiosyncrasies that are also prevalent in their voice about Europe. For instance, we find that the propensity to open up to European scopes depends largely on whether the media engage in the debates in issue fields that are characterised by strong political competences of the EU. Thus, if the media concentrate on issues like education or social policy, which are decided foremost on the national level, there is not much room left for representing European perspectives. On the other hand, if the press engages in discussing monetary politics or the issue of European integration, there is space to overcome the parochial perspective. What we can conclude from the analysis of EU scopes is that the more the national debates recognize issue fields with strong political competences of the EU, the more the media open up to transnational perspectives.

While the openness of mediated political debate to EU scopes is largely a residual of the issue fields under discussion, the evaluation of EU issues and actors in editorials depends on the country where the newspaper is published. It seems that the media's opinion about Europe resonates with the position of the national political elites and at the same time reinforces it. For instance, the media in France and Germany are most open to EU

scopes and most supporting of the integration and the deepening of the EU, while the British press opposes the political project of Europe strongly. Even the Dutch and the Swiss media, which turned out to be rather reluctant to open up to European scopes, are in favour of EU integration. And while the Italian and Spanish media are most open to European perspectives in their editorials, their opinions about European issues are either mixed or indifferent. Finally, we see that the British press is not only more parochial than the press in other countries in the scope of its editorials but also overall more negative about European issues and actors.

As becomes clear at several points in the report, the British media are the clear outsider in the chorus of the national media that are studied in the Europub.com project. The British media seem to try hard to ignore European scopes whenever possible. They are the most self referential with respect to their own country. The UK press is opposing the political project of Europe and the attitudes of journalists towards European integration are overwhelmingly negative. The media in Britain stand out by their deviant pattern of evaluating political actors. The UK press is one out of two in the sample in which national actors are more positively portrayed than EU actors. Not surprisingly, we find that the frontrunners in negativism are the British tabloids. Finally, European integration in the UK editorials is interpreted with strong references to instrumental frames.

There could be no stronger contrast than the contrast between the British and the French press. Our analysis clearly shows that French editorials are most open to European scopes of all national media. Moreover, there is strong support for the enlargement of EU political competences and for EU integration in general. Interestingly enough, the French media are rather assertive in their evaluations of political actors, whereby EU actors are judged in an overall positive manner. Finally, the French press stresses normative identity frames and values in their interpretation of European integration.

The German newspapers resemble the French media voices insofar as they are rather open to transnational EU perspectives. They also support the deepening of the political EU and a very large majority of commentators hold favourable opinions about European integration. Yet, the German press is quite negative towards political actors of all levels. Against the background of widespread criticism, we find that EU actors are being treated less critically than national political actors. Concerning the framing of European integration, the media in the Federal Republic focus on identity frames as regards both values and governance as well as on economic frames.

The Spanish media share with the French and the German media their proneness to include European scopes in their editorials. The level of EU scopes is high on all

dimensions of claims-making. However, the media in Spain are ambivalent in their evaluations of EU issues. Concerning the political project of Europe and European integration we find a widespread indifference or mixed feelings of Spanish journalists. On the other hand, if we look at the evaluation of political actors, EU actors fare much better than Spanish political actors. The latter are basically portrayed negatively, while EU actors are evaluated positively. As regards the interpretations of EU integration the Spanish media more than other media stress frames internal to the EU integration process.

Incoherence also characterizes the media in Italy. Like the Spanish press, the newspapers in Italy are among the national newspapers that are most inclined to represent European perspectives. We find a quite high level of completely Europeanised claims dimensions. However, concerning the opinions of the Italian media about European issues and actors, the picture is not consistent. On the one hand, the Italian editorials are highly polarized in opposing or supporting the deepening of the EU. On the other hand, Italian journalists seem to be most supportive of European integration. In addition, concerning the evaluations of political actors, the press in Italy is quite negative about actors from its own country and far less negative about EU actors. Eventually, the interpretation of European integration in the Italian press emphasizes identity frames with respect to normative dimensions of belonging and values.

In the period of 2000-2002, the Dutch media were strongly occupied with issues in the national political domain, so that they rank rather low in European scopes. The media in the Netherlands seem to be reluctant to open up to European perspectives. They are second most self centred in their claims-making and reveal a profound tendency to be skeptical about European actors. Although half of the claims in the Dutch press are supportive of EU integration and further EU political competences, EU political actors are judged in an overall negative fashion. Like the editorials in Britain, the commentaries in the Netherlands hold positive opinions of their own country's political actors, while EU actors are characterized with an overall critical tone. Finally, European integration is interpreted against the background of governance and constitutional frames.

The Swiss media share with the Dutch media a rather strong reluctance to include EU scopes. The vast majority of claims in the Swiss media do not contain any reference to the EU. The rather strong focus on national matters is all the more plausible as Switzerland has not decided yet to join the EU. The same reason might account for the finding that the press in Switzerland is indifferent about further EU competences. On the other hand, regarding the opinions about European integration, we find that every second commentator of the Swiss press under study is favourable towards European

integration. Moreover, we also observe in the media in Switzerland that EU actors are less negatively judged than Swiss actors. The most prevalent angle through which European integration is interpreted consists of constitutional and governance frames.

For a detailed integrated report of the results of this work package, as well as separate reports on each of our seven countries, please consult the reports section of our website:

<http://europub.wz-berlin.de/project%20reports.en.htm>.

The codebook that was used for the analysis is also available from our website:

<http://europub.wz-berlin.de/codebooks.en.htm>.

## **7. The Internet as a new arena for political communication?**

### **(work package 4)**

Today, the Internet allows collective actors to circumvent the traditional mass media, and to directly mobilise public visibility through their online presence. At first sight, the Internet seems to be a non-hierarchical communicative space allowing everybody to present and retrieve information and opinions without being dependent on the selection and description biases of traditional mass media. With a very limited investment of resources, everybody can set up a homepage and thereby make his or her opinions accessible to a worldwide public. It would be naïve, however, to assume that selection processes do not play a significant role within the Internet. It is clear that a heavy selection pressure is present in the Internet, too. Precisely because it is so easy to set up a web page, a large oversupply of web offerings vies for the attention of the online public. The amount of available websites is so vast that even for a relatively limited topic it would be impossible for a user to look at all websites offering information or opinions on the issue. Apart from the impossibility to look at everything that might be worth consideration, the enormous number of websites also creates the problem of finding the relevant websites. Without the assistance of some kind of map that guides one through the sheer endless web space, the Internet would be a labyrinth in which nobody would be able to find what he or she is looking for. Therefore, the question arises how Internet users reach the information they look for.

Obviously, orientation within the Internet is no problem if the user knows exactly those actors' sites s/he wants to visit. In this case s/he simply needs to find out the web-address. To facilitate this, resourceful actors with a web presence are willing to pay substantial sums for a web address that is easy to identify and to memorise. If this were the only way to retrieve information online, the Internet would be nothing more than a

new way of accessing information on actors already known by the user. For assessing the Internet's new potential, it is more interesting to look at how information retrieval is structured for users who do not have a pre-existing interest in one particular site of one particular actor, but who want to find information and opinions about a certain topic from a variety of actors and perspectives. In such cases, several studies show that the most often used means of access to web information are search engines and links, or recommendations from other websites. Among several studies analysing how Internet users search for information on the Internet or find out about websites they did not know before, the number of people using search engines varies between 70% and 90%. Links or recommendations on other websites account for 60% to 90% of all means of finding information online.

On the theoretical level, we distinguish between two forms of selection influencing the structure of political communication on the Internet as a platform of online public spheres:

- Vertical, hierarchical selection: search engines guide the user through the Internet by presenting a hierarchical sample of relevant websites in regard to a certain search issue defined by the Internet user. In this way, search engines act as gatekeepers to the web space and disclose a certain part of "online-reality" according to particular criteria.
- Horizontal, network selection: the second important way in which Internet users find websites online is to follow the links that are offered on websites. Here, the collective actors themselves act as gatekeepers that strongly influence the structure of the online sphere by way of their selection of actors they offer links to, and, alternatively, of actors they exclude from their selection.

Because of the relatively underdeveloped state of our knowledge about the role of the internet as a potential arena for political communication, our first step for this work package consisted of a secondary analysis of the available material, both in the literature, in policy reports, and on the web itself (separate reports on all three stages of our Internet work packages are available on our website). This search was focused on three main aspects:

- The internet policies developed by the EU and the seven member states included in our project, regarding equality of access, market regulation, as well as e-government, online administration, and e-democracy.
- Patterns of internet usage in the EU and in our seven countries in particular.

- The internet strategies of collective political and social actors, both institutional and non-governmental ones.

This provided us with a solid basis of background information on the structure and usage of the internet in Europe and policies regarding it, but also revealed a very poor state of knowledge regarding the topic that our project focuses on, namely the role of the internet as a new arena for political communication, and how collective actors use it, in particular in relation to Europe. Although we did not expect to find a wealth of studies here, the available material – as evidenced by the respective sections in the integrated report – was even scarcer and more impressionist than we had expected it to be. Particularly, we had hoped to at least find some examples of methodologies that can be used to analyse political communication structures in the internet, but found virtually nothing. We therefore had to invent much of our methodologies from scratch.

### **7.1. Search engines as gatekeepers to political information on the Internet**

The first phase of our own primary research was based on a simulation of internet searches by a hypothetical common user, using two different search engines in each of the seven countries in two coding phases in August and November 2002. Altogether, 2,600 texts from the web were coded. The results suggest that indeed the Internet offers somewhat better opportunities to less institutionalised actors than the traditional mass media. The differences are, however, not very large, and national institutional actors and traditional mass media organisations are also the dominant actors on the web in as far as it is made visible by search engines. Given the hopes that have been attached to the democratic potential of the internet as a technology enabling unlimited communication without the institutional biases that characterise the traditional media, this must be seen as a sobering conclusion. The sheer success of the internet has resulted in such a vast supply of messages that new institutions such as search engines have emerged in the internet that assist the user in finding his or her way in the vast web space. Within a short period of time, these new internet selection mechanisms seem to have introduced strong hierarchies of visibility among different suppliers of political information on the internet. If this process of hierarchisation, which given the logic of search engines has a self-reinforcing character, continues, even the small advantages for non-institutional actors that we still found in our data may disappear altogether in the near future.

As for the question of the Internet as a potential for transnational, Europeanised political communication the results were perhaps even more disappointing. Given the fact that most people search the web in their own language, such transnationalisation would

depend on actors on the transnational level or in other countries offering information in several languages, along the lines of the official European Union website (although even on this website a lot of the more detailed information is only available in English or a few other “big” languages). Such multi-linguistic websites turned out to be excessively rare and therefore our searches in national languages mainly led us to the websites of national actors or in the same linguistic area.

## **7.2. How hyperlinks structure online public spheres**

Secondly, we looked at the way in which so-called “hyperlinks” among websites facilitate the movement from one website to another by way of one simple mouse click. By connecting websites of different actors, hyperlinks open up a specific sphere of information and communication. Thus, hyperlinks are not to be conceived of simply as a technological tool but as a newly emerging social and communicational channel. This function of hyperlinks including actors in a communicative context implies, naturally, the exclusion of other actors. On the one hand, groups of highly interconnected websites emerge, or websites that are most frequently hyperlinked to but are not necessarily hyperlinking in the same way to other websites. On the other hand, there are more peripheral actors that are embedded to a minor degree in the connected group of actors, because they only receive a few hyperlinks from other actors within the group. Or, actors may only be associated to the group by hyperlinking to actors within this group, but do not receive any hyperlinks themselves.

In order to be able to conduct a comparative analysis of seven countries as well as of the European and other supranational levels based on an adequate sub sample for each country and level, we focused our analysis on the hyperlink structures among the websites of selected collective actors. The first decision was to narrow down the sphere of political online communication to three exemplary issue fields: agriculture, immigration and European Integration. The issue fields were selected in such a way that the comparison between them allows us to consider the influence of policy regulation on different levels. Thus, immigration is a policy field mainly in the competence of the nation state. Agriculture is to a minor degree regulated on the EU level and EU integration is obviously the political core issue of the European Union. The second decision was to define strict criteria about the kind of actors that should be selected in each of our seven countries as well as on the European and other supranational levels. The criteria were mainly formulated in a way that describes the function or position of actors. Thus, the task of each country team was to identify the corresponding actors within their country. The actors included in our sample were differentiated in three overall groups: (1) state actors (including legislative and political party actors), (2) economic interest groups and

other civil society actors, and (3) media actors. We used a detailed list of selection criteria to ensure strict comparability of the actors chosen for each country and for the supranational level. We thus selected 134 actors in each country as well as 70 actors each on the European and on the supranational level, i.e. a total of 1,078 websites were include in the analysis.

For a research purpose such as ours, which is aimed at analysing the hyperlinks among more than 1,000 websites, including very large websites, such as the websites of national governments or the European Union, we needed to use a computer assisted tool (the XENU Link Sleuth web crawler) that collected the link data from the websites automatically. XENU searches websites and compiles a list of all hyperlinks available, internal hyperlinks as well as external hyperlinks. Altogether, the programme traced more than 16 million links on the 1,078 websites. Several computers at the WZB Berlin had to run for weeks on end to compile these data. Most of these were links within one website, but still some 400,000 external links remained to be analysed. From this still huge number we had to manually select those that were references among our sample of selected sites.

Across all seven countries, the European Commission website turns out to be the most frequent receiver of links: 489 actors, i.e. almost half of our sample, provided links to the Commission's official website. The second most important receiver of hyperlinks was the website of the United Nations – trailing, however, the European Commission by more than 200 links. The following nine most important link receivers are all governmental and executive actors of the EU or UN. The first non-governmental actors are the French newspaper Le Monde on rank 11 and the international non-governmental organisation Human Rights Watch on rank 15. Apart from media, the only national actors among the top 30 are the German government and parliament (rank 23 and 25), and the British House of Commons (rank 24). While the list of the most prominent receivers of hyperlinks was clearly dominated by European and supranational actors, the list of the thirty most important sources of links contains mainly national actors, except the European Commission, the World Bank, the television channel Arte and the European University Institute in Florence. The European Commission and the World Bank are, together with the German Parliament, the only three actors that are very prominent as receivers as well as sources of links. Media actors such as the Guardian, CNN, and Deutsche Welle account for half of the ten most important link sources, which suggests that also on the Internet, media play an important role as distributors of attention. We find surprisingly few transnational links across national boundaries, ranging from 6% in the United Kingdom, which once more turns out to be the least Europeanised among our countries, to 19% in Italy. Except for Germany, actors in all countries are more likely to

link to supranational than to European actors. These results are confirmed by a statistical network analysis, which shows that the density of the networks between single countries and the European level is almost as strong as the density within single countries. However, this strong degree of vertical Europeanisation combines with very low densities of cross-border communicative networks.

In regard to the potential contribution of the Internet to a Europeanisation of the public sphere, our findings suggest that the sphere of political communication constituted by hyperlinks among the most important state, civil society and media actors, is limited to strong tendencies of Europeanisation in a vertical sense. Apart from the generally dominant concentration on the own national level, national actors pay a lot of attention to European actors. Vice versa – even though to a lesser extent and focused on the three largest member states – EU actors also direct attention to the websites of EU member state actors. However, contrary to what one might have expected, the Internet does not seem to foster a deepening of the informative and communicative exchange among actors from different European countries. This is in line with the results of our analysis of search engine returns. However, there the possibility still existed that the low levels of horizontal Europeanisation were a methodological artifact caused by the fact that we searched in the national languages of each of the countries. The tracing of web links, however, is independent of language, so there is no methodological reason why we would not find more transnational linkages in this case. Summing up our main conclusion then, hyperlink structures among websites facilitate access to and exchange with the supranational level, but the Internet does not nearly to the same extent fulfill its promise of being a transnational communicative space.

In the reports section of our website, you can find an integrated cross-country overview of Internet usage and policies, as well as separate reports on the seven countries. Also, you find two integrated empirical reports, one on the search engine analysis, and one on the network analysis of hyperlinks: <http://europub.wz-berlin.de/project%20reports.en.htm>.

The two codebooks that were used for the search engine and hyperlink analyses are also available from our website: <http://europub.wz-berlin.de/codebooks.en.htm>.

## **8. Political mobilisation and communication strategies of collective actors**

### **(work package 5)**

While in work package 2, we look at that part of collective actors' strategies that become publicly visible in the news media, work package 5 investigates these strategies at the source by way of interviews with key representatives of selected organisations. This allows us to assess the relative importance of public strategies as compared to non-public strategies such as lobbying, and to compare the degree to which different actors experience difficulties in gaining access to the mass media, both in general, and more specifically with regard to mobilisation around European issues and institutions.

### **8.1. Theoretical Background**

We investigated the action repertoire of collective political actors in seven European countries – six EU-member states (Germany, France, Holland, Italy, Spain and United Kingdom) and Switzerland – and at the EU-level against the background of a momentous shift in the repertoire of doing politics, which involves political communication and mobilisation of all relevant political actors – state actors, political parties, interest associations, and SMO-NGOs (social movement organisations). This shift is taking shape because of two crucial transformations of the current political opportunities – the Europeanisation of politics and what we may call the “publicisation” of politics. On the one hand, to the extent that European integration proceeds and politics at the EU-level become ever more important for the policies implemented in the member states, the action repertoire of political actors in Europe becomes *more Europeanised*. On the other hand, as political communication is increasingly media-centered and as the public opinion – the singular product of the public debate in the public sphere – becomes an ever more crucial determinant of politics, the political action repertoire becomes *ever more oriented towards the public-sphere*. The Europeanisation of politics implies that the political actors increasingly intervene at the EU-level in order to influence the political process in terms of their own interests. The enhanced role of the public sphere implies that the political actors increasingly “go public” in order to find support for their positions in politics both, at the national and the EU-level. In democracies, public opinion has, of course, always been of crucial importance – not only directly, at election day, but also indirectly, by its influence on the rational anticipations of the political decision-makers during the legislative period between elections: as they want to be reelected, politicians have to anticipate the judgement of their voters at election day and, therefore, adapt their decisions to the public opinion of the day. However, with the increasing relevance of media-centered public opinion formation in today's “audience democracy”, the political

actors no longer just adapt to the ups and downs of the public opinion cycle, but also try to influence public opinion to get attention and support for the own positions in politics.

## 8.2. Method

For this study, we have interviewed key political actors in each country and at the European level. For these interviews, we had selected, per country, the four most important organisations in each category of actors – state actors, political parties, interest associations, and social movement organisations (SMO-NGOs) – in each policy field – European integration, immigration and agriculture, i.e. altogether 384 actors. Our selection procedure did not necessarily include all the most important actors in a policy domain of a given country. It is, for example, possible that all of the SMO-NGOs in a given policy domains constitute marginal actors, while several additional state actors play a key role. In other words, this procedure may neglect some key actors, but it has the advantage of providing us with informations about the action repertoires of all four types of actors. The interviews were held in 2003 by members of the different country teams. They were based on semi-structured questionnaires which were analogously structured for all interviews, but adapted to the specificities of the actor types, of the three policy-domains and of the political levels. In practice, we obtained 345 interviews, i.e. 90 percent of the targeted value, which not only documents the effort we put into these interviews, but also the exceptional degree of cooperation on the part of our interlocutors.

For the study of the action repertoires, we presented the interviewees with a list of strategies and asked them to indicate which of these strategies they used “regularly or occasionally”. We asked the question twice, once for the *national level* and a second time for the *European level*. The list included a series of inside strategies directed at policy-makers as well as three types of public-oriented strategies – media-related strategies, informing strategies, and campaigning and mobilizing strategies. Based on the responses to this list, we constructed several *indicators* for the action repertoire of the various actors. The simplest set just records for each level, whether or not an actor has used any inside or public-related strategies at all. More sophisticated indicators take into account *the range and intensity* of the different types of strategies. They represent weighted averages of the set of strategies used by a given actor for both inside and public-oriented strategies at each level. In addition, we have constructed analogous indicators for each category of public-related strategies – media-related strategies, informing and mobilizing.

### 8.3. Selected results

#### 8.3.1. Country-differences in the action repertoires

We find that *national* actors mainly focus their activities on the national level, while EU-actors are mainly focused on the EU-level. National actors delegate the representation of their interests in policy-making at the EU-level to European federations or allied partners specialized in EU-politics. Thus, interest groups have created specific umbrella associations at the EU-level to represent their collective interests in European politics. Moreover, since the most important legislative body of the EU – the European Council of Ministers – is composed of representatives of national governments, it is all the more important for national political actors to influence above all their own national governments in order to obtain advantages at the EU-level. However, the action repertoire of national actors of EU-member countries is more Europeanised than that of Swiss national actors, given that Switzerland is not a member of the EU. The Swiss actors are least involved at the EU-level, since the European political opportunity structure is least relevant for them.

With respect to the degree of *publicisation* of action repertoires, we find that:

- *Inside strategies and media-related strategies dominate everywhere*, while informing and mobilizing are of considerably less importance in all countries and at both levels. Everywhere, media-related activities are even more widespread than inside activities. They appear to be of paramount importance for EU-actors at the EU-level in particular. EU-level actors in all policy domains try to influence national mass media. This set of results provides strong evidence for the trend towards media-centered political communication.
- The fact that *informing and mobilizing strategies* are used less frequently than media-related strategies does not necessarily mean that they are not considered to be important, but may rather reflect *a lack of resources* on the part of some actors. While giving interviews to media, issuing press declarations or running an Internet presentation (all media-related strategies) are relatively low cost activities, several of the components of the set of informing (e.g. running advertisements in the media, appointing a PR agency or running opinion polls) and mobilizing strategies involve considerable costs. Thus, German pro-European campaign groups claim to be very active in holding public speeches but they do not have the financial resources to use the entire repertoire of informing activities.

- At the *national level*, the *Swiss national actors' repertoire* is broader in scope and more intense than that of national actors in the EU-member states. The corresponding differences are most pronounced for mobilizing. This result confirms earlier results of a comparative analysis of the level of mobilisation by social movements in Western Europe. It can be explained by the *direct-democratic institutions* which are crucial for Swiss politics, but (with the exception of Italy) not for the politics in the EU-member states, and which provide ample opportunities and incentives for political actors to mobilize the national citizenry.
- At the *EU-level*, the EU-actors strategic profile resembles that of the national actors at the national level, except for the fact that mobilizing is even less relevant for them than it is for national actors in member states. This may be attributed to the lack of a proper European public sphere, which makes mobilizing at the EU-level less attractive. It may also be attributed to the time and money constraints that discourage outside mobilisation compared to inside lobbying activities at the EU-level.

### **8.3.2. The action repertoires of different types of actors**

Contrary to what one may have thought, policy domains turn out to be relatively unimportant with respect to the shaping of the political action repertoires. Actors tend to use the same kinds of strategies in all policy domains. Moreover, the power of the actors is not very important in this respect either. Thus, contrary to expectations, weak actors are not more publicly oriented than strong actors. As a matter of fact, action repertoires mainly differ with respect to countries, as we have just seen, and with respect to *actor types*. As far as *inside activities* are concerned, *interest groups* not only have the most wide-ranging and intense repertoire at the national level, but also the most Europeanised inside repertoire, in spite of the fact that they often delegate lobbying to their EU-level umbrellas and partners. *Parties* follow in line with respect to Europeanised inside activities, *SMO-NGOs* are next, while state actors are by far the least involved in inside activities at the EU-level. This exceptional lack of inside activities among *state actors* at the EU-level poses a puzzle that we are unable to resolve at this stage. As far as the *Europeanisation of public-oriented activities* are concerned, there are few differences between the actor types. All of them use public-oriented activities much more frequently to influence policy at the national level than at the EU-level.

### 8.3.3. The relative importance of public and inside strategies

We also asked the political actors to evaluate the relative importance for their organisation of public-oriented strategies as compared to working with policy-makers. For *state actors* and *interest groups* insider activities turn out to be more important than public-oriented strategies, while the reverse is true for *parties and SMOs-NGOs*. For the former two actor types, working with policy-makers constitutes the core business, even if, as we have just seen, media-related activities have become an important part of their action repertoire as well. By contrast, for *political parties*, public related activities are of prime importance. For parties, the relative weight of inside and outside strategies depends, among other things, on whether or not they are part of the government. Public strategies become particularly important for opposition parties. Somewhat unexpectedly, parties are even more oriented towards the public sphere than *SMO-NGOs* who typically lack direct access to policy-makers and who are, therefore, supposed to mainly focus on public-oriented strategies. This somewhat surprising result may be due to our selection procedure: as the reader may recall, we selected the most important SMOs, for whom “lobbying” appears to be more important than for the more peripheral challengers. Overall, there are somewhat more actors who assess public-related activities as more important than working with decision-makers – 45 percent compared to 38 percent. One sixth of the actors we interviewed consider the two sets of strategies as equally important insisting that they are complementary.

The relative importance of public-oriented in inside activities for a given type of actor varies, however, from one country to the other. We can distinguish between three types of contexts:

- First, there are the contexts, where both interest groups and SMOs predominantly work with policy-makers: in this group we find *above all the EU*, but also the Netherlands and the UK. For actors at the EU-level, the lack of a proper European public sphere does not make public-oriented strategies at the EU-level very attractive. In addition, time and money constraints discourage outside mobilisation compared to inside lobbying activities at the EU-level. The relative preference of Dutch and British interest groups and SMOs for working with policy-makers may possibly be attributed to the cooperative policy style of both governments.
- Second, there are the *Southern European countries* – Spain, France and Italy, where both interest groups and SMOs consider public-related activities as more important than working with policy-makers. We may attribute this result to the rather uncooperative policy style of centralized states.

- Third, in *Switzerland and Germany*, interest groups and SMOs tend to emphasize different strategies: in these contexts, interest groups prefer inside activities, while SMOs tend to put more emphasis on public-related strategies. This may be attributed to a selective accessibility of the policy-makers in these Germanic contexts.

#### **8.3.4. The impact of the actors' policy positions**

We have also analyzed the impact of the actors' attitude about European integration on their action repertoire. Mainstream political actors in the Western European countries under study (including Switzerland) generally support the EU integration process, while more peripheral actors sometimes do not. This is to suggest that access to decision-makers is more difficult for the eurosceptics than for supporters of the integration process. In other words, we expected the strong EU opponents to rely more heavily on public-related strategies than the EU supporters. This is, indeed, the case. The relationship holds across all countries and all policy domains. Even at the EU-level, where all actors are more inside-oriented, the inside orientation still is much more pronounced among the EU-supporters than among the EU-sceptics. Although there are some exceptions to this general pattern, they do not change the general impression that eurosceptics are obliged to rely more heavily on public-related strategies, because they find it difficult to get access to decision-makers at the national or the EU-level.

#### **8.4. Conclusion**

These are a few results of WP5. The work package has produced additional results concerning the relative power of national and European actors in the three policy domains, and about the networks which exist in these policy domains – results which we could not present here given the space constraints, but which certainly merit to be made accessible to a wider public, too.

For a detailed integrated report of the results of this work package, as well as separate reports on each of our seven countries as well as on the EU level, please consult the reports section of our website: <http://europub.wz-berlin.de/project%20reports.en.htm>.

The questionnaires (six different variants for each of the three issue fields for the national as well as for the European level) that were used for the interviews are also available from our website: <http://europub.wz-berlin.de/codebooks.en.htm>.

## **9. How media professionals deal with Europe**

### **(work package 6)**

In work packages 2 and 3, we have analyzed the content of mass media coverage of European issues. Work package 5 sought to explain these patterns by investigating the strategies of collective actors who seek (or do not seek) to mobilize public opinion. Work package 6 complements this picture by analyzing the news production process from the side of media professionals. To this end, a total of 110 interviews were conducted with journalists and editors of the newspapers that were also used for the content analyses of work packages 2 and 3. Where possible, sixteen journalists were interviewed for each national case, composed as follows: four from each of the four newspapers included in work packages 2 and 3 (a left and a right quality paper, a tabloid, and a regional newspaper), and from each of these newspapers, one General Editor, the (main) European correspondent, as well as the journalists or correspondents specialising in immigration and agriculture issues. In addition, interviews were conducted with eight representatives of European or transnational media. Here we interviewed the chief leader writer and EU or European Correspondent from the Financial Times (Europe), International Herald Tribune, European Voice, and Wall Street Journal Europe. These were the only newspapers that are transnational and also daily and therefore came closest to comparability in terms of news structure with the national dailies (with the exception of the European Voice which is a weekly newspaper, but worthy of study as a special EU-level supranational newspaper). For the supra/transnational study, we did not conduct interviews with agriculture and immigration correspondents, because our inquiries showed that such positions do not exist within the selected newspapers.

In some countries, and for some newspapers, there were difficulties in gaining access to key individuals. One general problem was gaining access to the Editor of the newspaper, who in most cases did not have time to take part in a semi-structured interview that takes more than an hour to complete. In such cases, we decided to switch our attention to the chief leader writers for those newspapers. This has in fact proved to be fruitful, because the chief leader writers are in a key position to answer our questions about editorial policy, and in addition are more able to talk freely about the more sensitive topics – for example, the relative influence of the proprietor on editorial line – than the Editors themselves. Another example of a difficulty in gaining access is demonstrated by the case of The Sun tabloid newspaper in Britain, where after several attempts to interview the four selected journalists, an institutional decision was taken by the editor of the newspaper not to co-operate with our study. This was because of the sensitive nature

of the European issue in Britain during this phase of interviews, and the fact that The Sun has waged an explicit Euroskeptical campaign. Some journalists were dissatisfied with the stance taken by their newspaper and one gave an off-the-record interview. In order to have a tabloid newspaper for the British study, we subsequently interviewed journalists from the Mirror, although this newspaper is not used in the other work packages. The Mirror is The Sun's main tabloid competitor and takes diametrically opposed positions on most issues, including Europe. In other cases, when, for example, the newspaper did not have a European or EU Correspondent, or an Agriculture correspondent, then we attempted in each case to select an interviewee who came closest to our 'ideal type', for example, by taking the political correspondent who writes on the topic of Europe or the journalist who covers agricultural issues. Overall, in part due to the persistence and efforts of the national teams in addressing these specialist media actors, we have been able to complete more interviews than originally envisaged in the proposal.

### **9.1. Method**

The semi-structured interviews took approximately one hour to conduct. Prior to conducting the interviews, the interviewer gathered and compiled a basic information fact-sheet on the journalist (e.g., on the history of the post, career of journalist) so that the information gained could be correctly contextualised. The first interviews were conducted face-to-face, but it was agreed that when interviewers were accustomed to the interviewing task, then interviews could also be conducted by telephone and recorded (of course, with the permission of the interviewee). This is unproblematic for journalists who are used to spending much of their working lives in exchanging detailed information through telephone conversations. All interviews have been recorded, copied and stored. In addition, a coding schedule was designed for the interview materials. The coding scheme for interview material was transformed into a machine readable Access Database interface, which allowed interview material to be stored and ready for comparative analyses using statistical packages (for numeric variables), across key variables. Coding of interviews took between two and three hours per interview. Thus we were able to store our data in a way that makes it available for comparative analysis using simple descriptive statistical techniques (across countries, newspapers, and type of journalists), and in addition allows us access to the key qualitative statements in a systematic way.

### **9.2. Approach**

There has been very little systematic empirical research on this topic in the past, in particular with regard to cross-national comparison. Overall this is a fragmented and underdeveloped field of research. Nonetheless, the stance put forward in the extant

literature tends to emphasise characteristics of the media and news reporting that purportedly act as barriers to, or at least slow down, an Europeanisation of the public sphere. Newspapers are often blamed for their poor performance in reporting European affairs, or even seen (especially in Britain) as promoters of Euroscepticism. Among such purported tendencies are: journalists' using their traditional 'national' frameworks of interpretation, thereby missing the special, new and different qualities of Europeanised politics; the prevalence of national networks and use of national sources among journalists; the poor linkages of the news production process to the EU institutions and Brussels; the poor language skills of journalists; the remoteness of the EU and Brussels from editorial meetings and decisions; the knowledge deficit of journalists and editors with respect to the workings of European politics; the obscurity of European politics, its lack of 'news values', in part due to an absence of central and charismatic public figures representative of the EU; the political agendas of newspapers and their proprietors with leanings toward Euroscepticism (especially in Britain with regard to the Murdoch-owned press).

In this study we attempted to address such questions in an open empirical way, with the aim of filling some of the many gaps in knowledge on this topic. As a mass medium, the national press has a vitally important role in making European issues visible in the public sphere. Its news coverage determines the extent to which Europe as a political institution is made open to broader public constituencies, and thereby has the potential to impact upon the public perceptions of citizens and policy deliberations. Our aim was to empirically assess the provision of the newspaper media with regard to its democratic function of reporting on European politics. Previous research has shown relatively little cross-national and empirical insight, but, especially with respect to Britain, a lot of conjecture regarding the purported deficits and biases of the media with regard to Europe. To investigate our central research question, we started from the idea that the news agenda may be influenced by several factors, which may be more or less important relative to each other in shaping the amount, contents, style and political stance of reporting on European politics.

Initially we assessed the internal infrastructure and scope of the news gathering capacity of the newspapers for reporting on Europe, for example, whether it has a specialised EU correspondent based in Brussels. Then we examined the news production and practices for reporting on European affairs, for example, to see what factors and news values made Europe newsworthy or not within a particular newspaper's self-understanding.

With regard to explaining the level and type of European coverage in a newspaper, we saw this as a possible outcome of three competing factors, which we investigated in

detail: the source strategies of collective actors; the readership's demand for news; and the newspaper's own political agenda. First, the communicative actions of collective actors external to news production and practices may influence and shape the contents of European news, for example, when government officials leak stories to journalists, or campaign and protest groups contact journalists with specialist knowledge or information with regard to a protest event. Secondly, it may be the readership's thirst for a specific type of news that is a factor which either enhances or reduces the scope and style for reporting on Europe, for example, popular tabloid newspapers may consider their readership has no interest in the EU and European affairs which would significantly reduce the chances of EU stories being reported. Thirdly, the newspaper and journalists may see themselves as a political actor with regard to European integration and seek to put forward and promote their own agendas. This will again determine the level and type of reporting on Europe, for example, when a newspaper decides to run a campaign and promote a specific stance on an issue, such as the benefits or disadvantages of monetary Union. Finally, by evaluating the influence of these three general factors relative to one another, we tried to reach an overall understanding of whether it is the source strategies of external collective actors, readerships' demands for news, or newspapers' own political agenda-setting, which are important in determining how Europe is made visible to the public in the news.

### **9.3. Selected Key Findings**

#### **9.3.1. Producing the News Agenda: Infrastructure, Newsgathering Scope, and Reporting Practices**

##### **National and sub-national press**

With regard to the capacity for reporting on European affairs an important determining factor was whether the newspaper had specialists posted in Brussels or not. Broadsheet newspapers were much more likely than tabloids, popular and local newspapers to have specialist correspondents in Brussels. Institutional decisions to have an EU correspondent or increase resources in Brussels were usually taken simply in response to the increasing importance of EU politics, and not due to any attempt by the news organisation to take a political stance on Europe. The networks and relationships of such actors both with EU institutions not surprisingly facilitated a greater possibility for EU affairs to reach the news. Among the broadsheets, the relationship between EU correspondents and the specialist political reporters from their own newspaper covering national parliamentary affairs was decisive in determining whether politics was more likely to be reported as 'EU supra-/transnational affairs' or alternatively as an external factor impacting 'national

political affairs.' Tabloid and local newspapers, had by comparison fewer institutional links at the supra- and transnational levels. Journalists on popular and local papers claimed that their styles of news coverage (sensationalist/local interest) were not conducive to reporting EU affairs, which provided few opportunities to present news in narratives that are designed to grab readership attention or inform about local affairs. Overall, it seems that people working in newspaper organisations have a clear idea in their own minds of the editorial stance and tradition of their newspaper's line. These self-perceptions of editorial stance and readership requirements were often cited as the most influential factor that determined: a) the place of Europe within news coverage; and b) the communicative style applied by the newspaper to present its message to its perceived readership (populist/serious; political line: left/right; Europhile/neutral/Eurosceptic). When deciding how to cover stories about Europe, journalists applied the same professional norms and practices as for other stories, making decisions based on their 'internalised' perceptions of their newspaper's character and tradition. Covering European stories was therefore considered simply as 'business as usual' for most newspapers, and there was relatively little evidence for newspapers making a special institutional effort to cover Europe, or for newspapers changing their usual formats to treat European news stories in a special political way.

There are nonetheless particular concerns, considerations and difficulties, facing journalists when they report on political events with respect to Europe. Overall, after weighting our sample to give each country the same impact, journalists from across Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, France, Switzerland, Spain and Italy, cited the following factors as specific 'concerns/considerations/difficulties' when reporting on Europe (in rank order with most important first): 1) Availability of news space; 2) Necessity to capture audience attention; 3) Lack of expert knowledge on topic; 4) Access to important public figures; 5) Availability of resources for research/investigation; 6) Pressure of deadlines; 7) Lack of clear cues and positions from politicians; 8. Access to official documents; 9) Own lack of understanding of topic; 10) Pressure from management/organisational pressure.

The limited availability of news space was the primary consideration for journalists in each of the six EU countries. This was most likely due to difficulties in finding appropriate ways of reporting on European politics in a way that reflects what journalists perceive as its actual importance. Problems of capturing the audience's attention and the lack of available expert knowledge were also prominently cited. However, by comparison, journalists felt under no management or organisational pressure when reporting on Europe. This indicates that the complexity and obscurity of the topic, and competition for news space with issues that have more obvious and clear-cut news values, and not the

institutional stances of the news organisation, appear to be the key problems facing journalists writing on European politics.

### **Transnational press**

To the extent that it exists at all, the transnational sector of the press is fragmented and specialised. We included the only four examples we could find: two newspapers with a parent newspaper base in the US, the International Herald Tribune and Wall Street Journal Europe; the Financial Times (Europe); and the European Voice (which is not even daily). This transnational press aims for niche markets consisting of European elites, businesspersons, EU politicians, and transnational individuals. Many of their readers have professional stakes and interests in EU politics and the economy, in which the EU is increasingly the important regional actor. Thus reporting targeted the concerns of European elites and businesspersons rather than 'ordinary' citizens. Journalists on these papers also expressed that they had difficulties bringing EU stories 'alive' and making complex EU issues of interest to their readers, although their readerships are specialist and interested in the topic. Overall, we found that for the transnational newspapers, the self-perception of the newspaper's editorial line and stance on issues was the important factor in influencing the level and style of reportage, just as it was for the national newspapers.

#### **9.3.2. Sources Strategies: an external factor influencing news agenda**

### **National and sub-national press**

Another factor to assess with regard to news coverage of Europe was the extent to which journalists felt that their reporting was influenced or shaped by the mobilisation activities and communication strategies of collective actors. Here we asked journalists to state from a given list of actors, how frequently they were contacted by specific types of collective actors who were attempting to have influence on their news reporting, for example, by providing new information or evidence, i.e., 'source strategies'.

After weighting our sample to give each country the same impact, journalists from across Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, France, Switzerland, Spain and Italy, cited the following actors in order of their frequency of 'source strategy' communication activities (in rank order with most frequent first - based on 72 responses by journalists across UK, F, D, CH, ESP, I, NL): 1) National government; 2) National interest groups (e.g., Trade Unions, employers' associations); 3) National political parties; 4) European Union institutions and Commission; 5) National campaign and protest groups; 6) Regional or local interest groups; 7) Regional or local government; 8) Scientific experts/policy think

tanks working in this field; 9) Supranational or transnational institutions (Non-EU) (e.g., WTO, World Bank, UNHCR); 10) Regional or local campaign and protest groups; 11) European interest groups; 12) International or transnational interest groups; 13) International or transnational campaign and protest groups; 14) European campaign and protest groups.

Overall, our findings demonstrate that national actors made the most efforts to mobilise information in the attempt to influence journalists' reporting of stories on Europe. Four out of the five most prominent 'source strategists' were actors with a national scope, which demonstrates the importance of national-level lobbying to set the news agenda on Europe, compared to the efforts of regional/local, European, and non-EU international actors. Interestingly the EU's own institutions appeared to be the only actor above the nation-state, which made any significant efforts to contact journalists in the attempt to shape the news on Europe. However, one also needs here to give an idea of how frequent such activities were. Whereas journalists were 'regularly' contacted by national governments, interest groups and political parties, EU institutions and the Commission were in touch with journalists 'occasionally' for such purposes.

Turning to European interest groups and campaign and protest groups, these like their non-EU transnational counterparts, made least efforts of all to reach and shape the news on Europe. This underlines the 'non-public' invisible nature of EU and international lobbying in general, such organisations appear to largely ignore the national press as an outlet for their activities. By contrast, national social movements were more frequent source strategists on Europe than even regional/local governments and supra/transnational institutions. Given that powerful institutional actors usually find it easier than interest groups and NGOs to reach the news, this emphasises once more that national actors of all types attempt more than any others to shape news on Europe. Also it shows that media strategies and public constituency-building activities are more important for national interest groups and NGOs, than for international ones, which most likely pursue insider lobbying strategies away from the public domain (see also the results of work package 5).

In general, it should be noted that apart from 'regular' contact from nationally-based government actors, interest groups, and political parties, journalists receive only very limited and intermittent contact from any type of actor. This underlines that source strategies of external collective actors probably have a very limited effect in shaping news coverage of Europe. To the extent that they have an effect, it will be to emphasise national concerns rather than international ones.

### **Transnational press**

The transnational newspapers seemed to be targeted to an even lesser extent than the national media by collective actors. It is worth noting, however, that in contrast to the national newspapers, EU actors were more likely to be used as sources of news than national based ones.

#### **9.3.3. Readership Demand: an external factor influencing news agenda**

### **National and sub-national press**

Overall, we found that the journalists' perceived relationship with their readerships was an important consideration in their reporting of news. However, this tended to be in a rather indirect way, with journalists constructing a general image of their readership that fitted in with the self-perceptions of their newspaper's editorial line. Journalists felt an obligation to inform readerships about European politics, because European issues are becoming more important to their lives. However, they did not think that the political stance of their readerships on Europe was a factor that impacted on their coverage to any extent. In fact we discovered that journalists considered their readerships to have a low interest and understanding of European politics. Journalists considered their readerships to be more than 'moderately' interested in politics, but significantly less interested in European politics, and to have only a little understanding of European politics. It is thus the readerships' perceived lack of interest in European affairs and ignorance of them which is a consideration for journalists covering such political events, and not whether the public may be Eurosceptic or Europhile.

### **Transnational press**

By contrast, readers of the transnational press are perceived by their journalists to be more strongly interested in European politics. Such journalists actually considered the role of transnational publications in educating the public to be hindered by national newspapers. They thought that the tendency of national newspapers to report EU politics through a 'national filter' and in simplistic terms was detrimental to public knowledge on the important issues concerning European integration.

### **9.3.4. Political Journalism: an internal factor influencing news agenda**

#### **National and sub-national press**

Another important factor shaping the national press coverage of Europe is the extent to which journalists themselves try to influence public and policy agendas by taking a political stance. First we tried to establish which type of actors journalists tried to influence when they commented on political events. Journalists attempted to influence the general categories of actors in the following rank order (most often first): public actors; governments and political parties; interest groups; and campaign and protest groups (based on 73 responses by journalists across UK, F, D, CH, ESP, I, NL). This shows that journalists' own activities are more directed towards public agenda-setting and reaching general publics, than towards policy agenda-setting among governments and elites, or towards targeting specific interest and campaign groups. Indeed, of all the different actor types, and across all countries, journalists cited their readerships as the group whom they attempt to influence most through their commenting on political events relating to Europe. Although this seems a rather obvious response, it does underline that Europe tends to be 'business as usual' for journalists, and that they simply follow their routine perceptions of their newspaper's line to communicate with their readerships about Europe. It is indicative that newspapers perform a more informative and educative function about Europe than an explicitly political one.

Further support for this interpretation comes from the fact that that journalists perceived that the 'newspaper has more of a duty to improve public knowledge' to be the most significant difference between commenting on European political affairs, when compared to national ones. Overall, however, we found that journalists did not tend to see many differences between commenting on European affairs compared to national ones. In general, the impression given was that Europe is just another topic and that normal commentary practices are applied. In general, we concluded that journalists on national newspapers do not set out to take an explicitly politicised stance on European politics, but see it more as a subject matter to be reported, evaluated, and communicated, just like any other topic.

#### **Transnational press**

Similar to the national newspapers, the transnational press did not tend to take explicitly political stances on European issues.

#### 9.4. Overall Findings

In general, we found that newspapers tend to treat Europe as a topic to be reported using exactly the same criteria for news selection and values that are applied to other types of news. There are some special adjustments and difficulties necessary for gathering and reporting news on Europe, but newspaper organisations tend to see these as technical matters which they need to address to keep in step with their job of reporting on politics. Changes are thus seen to have occurred within the nature of politics, through processes of Europeanisation. However, journalists do not see the advent of a more Europeanised politics to in any way change or challenge their existing professional norms and practices. To the extent that reporting has changed at all, this has been a response to perceived changes in politics, and the journalists' professional aim to continue providing the relevant information to their specific readerships. News coverage of Europe is very much 'business as usual' for journalists. Overall, the press appears much more in the 'passive' role as a supplier of news about European politics and not to any great extent an active protagonist dedicated to promoting a specific political stance on European affairs. In many cases, newspapers seem to take an agnostic and detached view towards European politics, seeing their role as more of educating and informing the public about the changes which are occurring as a consequence of Europeanisation. Readerships were thought to be less interested in European than national politics and have a poor understanding of its workings. Journalists did see themselves as having a responsibility for addressing the 'democratic deficit', but much more by filling the information gaps of the public, than by engaging in political advocacy. We found little evidence for explicitly politicised campaigns on Europe by newspapers (the one newspaper which does this, *The Sun* in Britain, took an institutional decision not to speak to us), nor do journalists appear to make particularly strong efforts to influence elites and parties and shape the political agenda on Europe.

Overall our findings indicate that it is general processes of political change, whereby national politics is becoming more closely related to other European countries, and the increasing role of the EU institutions, which appears to be important in shaping news coverage of Europe. Newspapers have responded to these perceived changes by adapting their organisational and working practices for purposes of professional efficiency, and not because European issues have changed their worldviews or the established editorial lines of their newspapers. Of course, we did find some cross-national and cross-newspaper type differences in the contents and style of reporting on Europe, but these were basically a reflection of the different types of political debates over Europe in those countries (e.g., contentious debates in Britain compared to consensual in Germany), and the overall self-understanding of the newspaper's political line (e.g., left versus right,

professional versus popular general readership). We found very little evidence for newspapers and journalists consciously introducing a Europhile or Eurosceptic bias into their coverage in an attempt to be protagonists on issues of European integration.

For a detailed integrated report of the results of this work package, as well as separate reports on each of our seven countries as well as on the EU level, please consult the reports section of our website: <http://europub.wz-berlin.de/project%20reports.en.htm>.

The questionnaires (six different variants for home affairs, agriculture, and European correspondents, as well as Editors for national newspapers; and for European correspondents and Editors of transnational newspapers) that were used for the interviews are also available from our website: <http://europub.wz-berlin.de/codebooks.en.htm>.

## **10. Future Visions of Europe**

### **(Delphi work package)**

Originally, a set of future-oriented qualitative questions pertaining to actors' views (both in normative terms and in the sense of realistic expectations) on the future of Europe, was planned as work part of work package 6, and therefore only for media professionals. This we found on closer reflection an unfortunate restriction given the importance of this prospective dimension at a time when the future direction Europe will take seems to be more open and contested than ever before. We therefore decided to ask these so-called "Delphi" (after the oracle) questions to all interviewed actors, including the state and civil society actors from work package 5. This means that our Delphi material is based on about four times as many interviews as originally planned.

In this work package, we examined how specialist collective actors drawn from different national contexts, as well from the EU level, perceived the imminent future of the European integration process. Our aim was to track actors' perceptions of the emergent trends and patterns of change that are occurring as a consequence of European integration in the future. Comparing the insights which these key individuals put forward regarding past and future developments in Europe allowed us to examine how national and supranational actors perceive and define the process of European integration, the overall balance of benefits and drawbacks they believe the integration process has made to the European region to date, and the directions in which they predict European integration will evolve in the coming years. In contrast to the semi-structured interviews where in many cases actors were asked to respond to closed categories of questions, here we wanted to give them the opportunity to speak more openly, in their own words,

and choosing where to place emphasis themselves in their answers. The nature of our questions also required the interviewees to be speculative with regard to the topics. Thus our aim was to catch a 'flavour' of how these key individuals view the process of European integration based on their own experiences.

We compared collective actors' assessments of the future of European integration along three dimensions: by country (and on the EU level), by policy field, and by type of collective actor. Our sample includes all the actors interviewed in work packages 5 and 6, to whom these special 'Delphi-like' questions were addressed. Thus our actors were drawn from 3 issue fields: European integration, agriculture (a policy field in which the EU has long-standing competences) and immigration and asylum (a policy field in which the EU has had relatively little capacity to act), and covered 5 types of collective actor in each country, as well as on the EU supranational level: state actors, political parties, interest groups, NGOs, and media actors.

Interviewees were asked to give open-ended responses to a set of questions regarding how they perceived the process of European integration, the future direction they saw it taking, whether they were in favour of the current direction of the European integration process, and how they viewed the role and performance of the EU institutions in this context. Our dataset, which was typed into a text database, consists of a set of open-ended prognostic statements about the future paths and possible outcomes of the processes of Europeanisation operating in the three issue fields, which can be differentiated further by actor type, by country and by national versus EU supranational level. Our aim was to compare the range of opinions that are expressed by collective actors of different types, in different countries, or active in different fields.

Here we give an overview of our main findings on: actors' views on the contribution of European integration to the European region, the main challenges they see facing European integration in the near future, and the degree and pace of change which they have experienced.

### **10.1 Collective actors' positions on the benefits of European integration**

Generally speaking, collective actors tended to perceive that European integration had contributed to peace and security, political stability and economic growth in Europe. There was less of a consensus on whether it had contributed to economic competitiveness, and even less agreement on whether it had benefited Europe in terms of environmental protection or social equality. There was a general tendency for state actors to be particularly positive towards European integration, the exception being the

UK, where state and party actors were the most negative of any type of actor regarding European integration. Interestingly, NGOs were typically less positive than other actors.

Differences between national contexts were apparent, with Spanish, German and EU-level actors broadly positive regarding the benefits of European integration, while a second bloc of Dutch, British, Swiss and Italian collective actors were less positive. Spanish actors emerged as particularly likely to believe that European integration had brought significant benefits to the European region, emphasising the economic achievements of the process for both Europe and Spain. In Germany also, there was a clear consensus among collective actors that Europe had benefited from European integration. Many German state and party actors in particular cited the lasting peace in Europe since World War II as one of the major achievements of the integration process, and as proof that the EU is politically the right direction in which European states should proceed. EU-level actors uniformly gave a positive assessment of the idea of European integration. Perhaps surprisingly, given the Europhilic reputation of Italian political actors, Italy emerges as the country where collective actors are least positive towards European integration, though actors in Britain, the Netherlands, and Switzerland are only marginally more positive towards the process.

These national differences in enthusiasm for European integration also colour attitudes towards the EU institutions. There was a trend for a strengthening of the institutions to be called for by those collective actors more favourable towards the integration process, in Spain, Germany, among some Euro-enthusiastic actors in Italy, and on the EU level. There was less consensus as to which institutions should be strengthened, with many actors advocating greater powers for the European Parliament, others preferring a power shift in favour of the intergovernmental Council of Ministers, and a few actors (particularly in Spain) desiring more power for the Commission. A particular concern among both German and Spanish actors was that national interests were too influential within the EU, weakening the institutions' capacity to act, and that the political will was lacking to transcend the national interest and to take into greater account the European interest. A number of collective actors (especially in the Netherlands and Britain) were critical regarding the EU institutions, criticisms typically relating to their remoteness from the citizen, lack of accountability, and bureaucratic character.

## 10.2. Main perceived areas of change

The principal challenges that collective actors mentioned as facing the EU in the near future were enlargement, citizen participation, and institutional efficacy, with the issues of political integration and the possibility of a federal Europe, the social role of the EU, and the importance of respecting diversity among member states and preserving national and regional identities also being raised by actors in a number of countries.

The crucial issue of future change, mentioned by an overwhelming majority of collective actors, was the enlargement of the European Union from 15 to 25 member states. Opinions differed as to the types of changes perceived as likely to come about following enlargement. Several Dutch, British and Swiss interviewees saw the creation of a 'two-speed Europe', a 'variable geometry Europe', or 'Europe a la carte' as likely, where some member states forged ahead with deeper integration while others would not participate in selected areas of the integration process. Several of the actors mentioning this development commented that it would lead to larger differences between member states, a gradual fissure opening up between states that prefer integration and states that do not. Others mentioned the institutional challenges brought about by enlargement, or expressed concern that it would hamper the functioning of the EU. Spanish and Italian actors in particular were concerned about the economic risks of enlargement, an awareness perhaps reflecting the fact that Spain and Italy have themselves received significant amounts of development support from the EU budget in the past.

Another issue frequently raised as a matter of concern was the EU's relationship to European citizens. Many interviewees mentioned the need for enhanced citizen participation in European integration, and the need to address the gap between elites and citizens regarding European integration (the EU's 'democratic deficit'). These issues of public communication and citizen participation were brought up by actors in all member states in the study as well as those on the EU level, suggesting a Europe-wide consensus on the importance of these questions, if not on how to address them.

Several actors raised the issue of political integration, though in relation to markedly differing visions of EU political union. In Germany, many actors stressed the necessity for a stronger political union, going beyond the EU as an economic, market-driven project. Many Spanish actors argued that the EU needed to become more political, although by this they often appeared to be expressing a preference for the EU to develop instruments to tame market forces, thus conflating a political Europe with a social Europe. This need for a social Europe was an issue raised by left-wing Spanish and Italian actors in particular, who tended to criticise the EU's neoliberalism and lack of welfare and

solidarity policies. A particular political issue for British and Dutch actors was the question of a federal union, with no Dutch actors favouring a federal future for the EU, and British state actors being especially concerned to put the argument that European integration was not evolving in a federalist direction.

While attempts to create a European Constitution were mentioned by many of our interviewees, this was brought up as an area of change and catalyst for institutional reform less than other areas such as enlargement or the EU's relationship to the citizenry. Respecting diversity among member states and the preservation of distinct national identities was a concern for many actors in the Netherlands, while the preservation of distinct regional identities was mentioned as an issue of concern in both Switzerland and Germany. Collective actors in Britain also raised the single currency and of the EU's relationship with the US as important issues in the EU's near future.

### **10.3. Degree and speed of change**

While many actors expressed the view that the EU was at a turning point, there was a conspicuous lack of consensus as to which way European integration would develop and the pace of that change in the coming years. Some actors, particularly in Spain and Germany, expressed the view that European integration was proceeding far too slowly and called for the process to speed up. Others perceived it as proceeding rapidly and inexorably; for example, in the Netherlands a striking number of collective actors viewed European integration as a development that was proceeding irreversibly and unstoppably, most agreeing that this was related to the equally unstoppable process of globalisation and increasing economic interdependence. In Britain there was no consensus, some actors seeing the coming period as a time of consolidation for the EU when little further integration was likely, others expressing uncertainty, and still others seeing the EU heading for a gradual breakdown or crisis.

### **10.4. Country-specific perceptions**

Finally, it is worth commenting on some national specificities that set British and Swiss actors apart from other collective actors in the study. In both countries, but particularly in Britain, there was a marked cleavage between pro-European and Eurosceptic actors, which forms a key dividing line between actors' perceptions of the European integration process. For example, in Britain, Eurosceptic actors tended to predict a growing democratic deficit, express concern about the gap between elites and citizens, and forecast serious problems ahead for European political elites given the lack of a European demos. In contrast, pro-European actors typically advocated EU reform but were more positive regarding the EU's future prospects than were the Eurosceptics.

Lastly, Swiss actors had a strong tendency to discuss future developments in European integration in terms of how they were likely to affect Switzerland. For example, many interviewees referred to the Swiss political model of federalism, democracy and peaceful co-existence between different cultures when they either criticised the EU or expressed hope that it would change. This type of discussion of European integration in terms of the national interest was much less prevalent in the EU member states in the study than in non-EU member Switzerland.

The detailed country reports of the Delphi work package can be found in the reports section of our website: <http://europub.wz-berlin.de/project%20reports.en.htm>.

The Delphi questions were an integral part of the interview questionnaires of work packages 5 and 6. These can also be found on our website: <http://europub.wz-berlin.de/codebooks.en.htm>.

#### **IV. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS**

##### **Ten recommendations with a special focus on the European Commission:**

- 1) The strategy of the new European Commission of President Barroso, in particular its commissioner Wallström for institutional relations and communications, for promotion of European ideals, identities and images as well as promotion of democratic values, norms and rules in institutions and policies of the European Union, should be a mixture of consolidation and innovation. The European Commission has a traditional strategy for Europe building and for democratisation of European politics, focused on both the organisational and the communicative dimensions of the emergent European civil society (beyond national governments and European agencies). The organisational dimension entails consultation, invitation, formal incorporation and policy integration - as in the open method of coordination - of interest groups of labour and capital, producer and consumer lobbies, nongovernmental organisations, social movements, regional minorities, local levels of national government, lobbies, and communities of policy experts. The communicative dimension entails creation of symbols of European unity, diffusion of information free of charge and in the vernacular of member states, public campaigns (such as the campaign for smooth introduction of Euro notes and coins), the creation of sites on the internet and a television channel (Euronews), and press conferences as well as interviews with journalists.

Our research demonstrates the success of this dual strategy in two areas. The European Commission is central in the strategies of influence and mobilisation of both national state actors (in particular political and administrative representatives of the executive branches of government) and vested interest groups (in particular large corporations, employers' associations and national trade unions). The Commission and its president are also central in the coverage of European news by national newspapers and journalists and on the internet. These results imply the need for consolidation. Furthermore, the politics of European integration on national and supranational levels as well as its coverage in mainly national newspapers (and television channels) is all but inaccessible for weaker actors – less organized, less rich and less transnational actors - in the involved states (parliaments, political parties) and civil societies (social movements, nongovernmental organisations, initiatives of citizens).

This result concerning a public sphere deficit points at **failure** of the European Commission and the need of rethinking and renewing its policy mix of Europe building and democratisation. That particular policy mix has always been based on the twin ideas of political equality and neutrality in the political process of European integration and policy making (associative democracy, competitive democracy, deliberative democracy and steering democracy at both the national and supranational levels of representation and participation; see also the draft of a European constitution of 2003). Since explicit and resigned acceptance of a closed public policy sphere is a non-starter, the new European Commission must invent new ways to promote and protect an open public sphere of an ever closing European Union of 25 states and peoples.

- 2) The European Commission should be quite **explicit** about its main reasons and main modes for expansion and enrichment of the public sphere in the European Union. Strong actors that today hold a privileged and entrenched position in the underdeveloped public sphere as well as the overdeveloped high politics of European integration (traditional diplomacy and balance of power politics, informal governance) do not have a short run interest and incentive to share certain representational and participatory roles in an extended public sphere with weak actors that in many cases articulate new visions and opposite interests. An explicit public philosophy of the European public sphere in the European Commission is necessary to overcome this zero-sum aspect of improvement of European democracy.

Good **reasons** for a European public sphere are (1) the strengthening of political agency of millions of individual ordinary citizens and members of old and new European nations alike (their knowledge, commitment and freedom of participation), at the backdrop of inclusion of legitimate representative associations; (2) the invention of fair and workable democracy at the level of the European Parliament, at the backdrop of a continued prominence of national parliaments and political parties; (3) the formation of a truly European public opinion, intermediate between national and global opinion, at the backdrop of free and plural journalism; (4) the improvement of input-oriented legitimacy (responsiveness), throughput-oriented legitimacy (transparency) and output-oriented legitimacy in essentially complex and contested processes of European policy-making; (5) the selection of effective regulations, policies and interventions by European authorities (Commission, Council, Parliament, Court) based on the informational function and learning potential of democracy as to the use of best information about preferences of voters and clients; and (6) the reduction and domestication of traditional demonic

forces in European history, like militarism, chauvinism, protectionism, colonialism, totalitarianism and racism.

Good **modes** of making a European public sphere include temporary subsidies of collective action by weak actors, broad platforms of consultation in committees and councils, regulation of media markets in the context of European competition policy (antitrust), promotion of English as *lingua franca* in supranational settings, and – more controversially – introducing membership of individuals as criterion of subsidy and network entry in Brussels, Luxemburg and Strassburg as well as promotion of contemporary European history and philosophy in national curricula and secondary schools.

- 3) The European Commission should understand **and take for granted** that the European public sphere (if any) is compound and in many ways **nationalized**. While the supranational sphere of political associations and mass media in Europe is in many ways backward and sub-optimal (compared to the ideal of civil, liberal, democratic and reasonable publicity as conceptualized by thinkers such as Bourdieu, Etzioni, Giddens and Habermas), the public spheres within the member states are still alive, resilient and open with respect to internationalisation (Europeanisation, globalisation). Our research uncovers a substantial Europeanisation of professional politics and journalism within all member states in our sample, irrespective of periods, sectors, and constituencies. It suggests that the Europeanisation of national public spheres – whether horizontal or vertical – will sharply increase if the following preconditions are fulfilled.

First, growing penetration of European and **(quasi-)federal** policies and policy makers in the **core area of control** of national governments (monetary policy, fiscal policy, defence and foreign policy, justice and police, and so on) is conducive to a politicisation of national and international conflicts and problems that speeds up Europeanisation. Second, growing ambitions of European agencies and elites in shaping a **European identity and community** (for example a European constitution or European public morality) is conducive to the rise of salient issues for widening national electorates and publics, since they affect not only basic interests of nationals but also their basic political passions and principles (national identity, minoritarian identity). Third and finally, certain **new European projects**, such as Turkish enlargement, are conducive to a breakdown of the separation between foreign and domestic policy. There is a diaspora of millions of Turkish people already living in Germany, France, Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands. The majority of polled citizens in these member states oppose Turkish membership,

partly because of a negative attitude towards Turks in their national habitat. This implies a linkage between the issue of Turkish enlargement of the European Union and the issue of integration of Turkish minorities in Western European societies as well as certain minorities in Turkish society. Projects such as Turkish entry in 2005-2020 will contribute to further Europeanisation of national public spheres.

- 4) The European Commission should understand and **take for granted** that there are **constitutional and social limits** to European central creation and control of a public sphere in the European Union polity. The history of Europe's public spheres beyond the scopes of states and markets is filled with cases of protest behaviour against measures and projects of central governments, subversive actions, creative enjoyment of the rights to organisation and organisational autonomy, strong asymmetry and rivalry between different social collectives (sometimes on the edge of civil war), and cycles of organisation growth and strength in the dual field of mobilisation and communication of masses and segments of society. Likewise, a two-level public sphere of Europe may well be the partial result of resistance against concrete European projects and directives, such as EMU and Eastern enlargement in the past and the constitution, the Turkish enlargement and the liberalisation of transnational services in the near future. During the next 18 months referenda on the new constitutional treaty of Rome will be held in ten of the 25 member states. Such events may well trigger unintended and unforeseen transformations of the public sphere. Furthermore, media owners and journalists are in many ways – in terms of law, power and popularity - protected against the risk of usurpation by politicians.
- 5) The European Commission should **take seriously** a recent trend that is partly related to changes in all mature Western democracies (including the United States) and is partly related to delegation of power and competence to supranational levels of public administration. This trend is the rise of **audience democracy**. Modal citizens are not regular members of political parties and other political associations in civil society anymore. They have become spectators of the spectacle of politics on television. They still practice representation, indeed they accept the inevitability of multi-level presentation and the increase of removes between the life world of citizens and the political system in an era of internationalisation and scale enlargement. Yet their trust in elected and appointed policy-makers is conditional. Disagreement may lead to low turn out, major changes of party votes and occasional outbursts of front-

stage action, such as the February 15, 2003 demonstrations against the Iraq intervention of the United, States and its European allies.

Changes such as the rise of political media (both public and commercial), the multiplication of spokespersons beyond parliamentary party politics **and the rise of multilevel governance** have engendered a structural condition of conditional trust and distrust for members of national and European parliament as well as members of national governments and international authorities. If many voters are passive while a growing number of them are successfully mobilized by conservatives and populists in favour of national policy autonomy and other small scale politics, this condition may well become prohibitive. The European Commission must take into account that its counterparts – the Councils of heads of state and ministers and the European Parliament – are facing an audience that is increasingly sensitive to European skepticism. Furthermore, even the most justified and well-prepared strategy of public sphere promotion and democracy deficit reduction of European commissioners may fall apart because they themselves are seen as integral part of a political class (“they” against “us”).

- 6) The European Commission’s efforts to protect national public spheres and critical cultures of consent should take **international differences** into account. The United Kingdom is the most nationalised member state, as far as public spheres are concerned. Other member states in the rear-guard of Europeanisation are Italy and the Netherlands. The stylised fact that two large states and one founding small state of the European Union are relatively more prone to neglect or negative appreciation of the record of performance of European policy-makers should give the new Commission President food for thought. Will his priority of economic reform, based on a painful reappraisal of the so-called Lisbon strategy (the Kok report of 2004), reduce the attention deficit in these countries? It is important to reflect upon this type of questions where substantive politics on matters of constitutional regulation, (re-) distribution and binding public choice become enmeshed with matters related to the politics of style (presentation, frames, symbols, identity).
- 7) The European Commission is much less involved in difficult and sometimes messy interplay with owners of mass media and journalists than heads of state, ministers of government and leaders of parties at the national level. Hence it is less willing to blame radio, television and newspaper messengers for bad news or a bad standing in the news. However, many pro-European elites do think and feel that both the lack of public support for the European Union and the sentiment of malaise with respect to the (dys-)functioning of European politics

are related to strategies of journalists with respect to denial, simplification, fading and negative presentation of newsworthy events in the capitals and bulwarks of power of the European Union. Our research shows that, while leaving out the deviant case of active Eurosceptic media in the United Kingdom, there is **no empirical evidence that could justify an official strategy of European commissioners – or other European authorities – to blame mass media, in particular newspapers, for a lack of legitimacy and effectiveness of the European Union and its specific policies and institutions**. In many ways European items have become part and parcel of a normal routine of journalism, while most editors and correspondents feel abnormally responsible and want to educate their readers into the values and benefits of European integration (European paternalism).

- 8) The European Commission's strategy of political and administrative communication should take the **importance of framing** into account. Frames of Europe are more or less explicit and coherent conceptual frameworks and general views with regard to justification of European cooperation and unity. There are principle-based frames with regard to Europe's constitutional law or Europe's ideal of civilisation. There are interest-based frames with regard to Europe's unification of market economies or Europe's abolition of competitive policies of national governments. And there are passion-based frames with regard to Europe's history of war and division as well as passion-based frames with regard to the presence of deep cleavages and conflicts about the terms of European integration. Our research shows that all actors (representatives of national governments, of electoral constituencies, of interest groups of producers, of nongovernmental organisations, of national newspapers, **and** of European agencies) shape and use frames. New policy framing of the Commission (if any) should be based on a thorough examination and assessment of the dominant framing by the Commission-Prodi.
- 9) The European Commission should continue to explore the possibilities of mobilisation and communication via its websites **without overrating the perspective of Europeanisation of the internet**. Our research shows that, on the one hand, the internet to date does not correct representational and participatory failures of national and supranational public spheres, and, on the other hand, the internet to date does not promote horizontal and multilingual Europeanisation and globalisation.

10) All strategies of the European Commission (old and new ones) concerning Europe building and democratisation via public spheres should be **connected to an argument about the new political space of the European Union, that is, current politicisation of European issues and agendas**. The old political space was marked by the left-right distinction and distinctions related to the ordering of capitalism (the debate on the social model of Europe). The new political space will be influenced by the decreasing relevance of routine European policies – such as protection of farmers and French-German initiatives – and the increasing relevance of new policies, such as European foreign policy in cooperative conflict with the United States, counter-terror policies, and a European consensus on pluralism (state treatment of religious and ethnic minorities). All these factors engender a new round of politicisation of European policies within a new constitutional framework, a new understanding between larger numbers of large and small member states, and the new force of Eurosceptic parties (old and new). Like national governments, the European Commission should be as explicit and coherent as possible about different types of reasons for influencing and cultivating the public sphere (new actors, such as members of parliament, in intergovernmental conferences; open methods of coordination; referenda): reasons related to the substantive merits of the Commission's policy, reasons related to Europe building and democratisation of the European union, and reasons related to the institutional interests of the Commission itself.

## **V. DISSEMINATION AND EXPLOITATION OF RESULTS**

Annex 4. lists the considerable scientific output that the project has delivered so far. Altogether, 46 scientific publications (books, articles, and book chapters) have been published over the course of the project that are either directly based on empirical material gathered within the context of this project, or develop theoretical issues with which we have engaged over its course. In addition, we delivered a total of 88 conference papers, presentations, and (keynote) lectures, most of them directly based on data from the project. We also organized four workshops related to our project theme at the American Political Science Association (APSA; organizer Jos de Beus), the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR; organizer Virginie Guiraudon), the International Political Science Association (IPSA; organizers Barbara Pfetsch and Ruud Koopmans), and the Association Française de Science Politique (organizer Virginie Guiraudon).

We also organized two conferences over the course of the project. The first was held at the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB) on 20-22 June 2003, and was organized by Ruud Koopmans, Paul Statham, and Jeannette Mak. The conference offered a platform for the presentation of the first results from our project to the wider scientific community, and to exchange insights and results with other projects working on related topics. External scientific participants included many of the core people and ongoing projects on the Europeanisation of political communication and mobilization, from a variety of countries: Belgium (Jan Beyers), Germany (Thomas Risse, Christoph Meyer, Hans-Jörg Trenz, Cathleen Kantner, Bernhard Peters, Stefanie Sifft), the Netherlands (Marianne van der Steeg), Turkey (Aykut Celebi), the United Kingdom (Thomas Diez, Peter Anderson, David Morrison), and the United States (Doug Imig). Two of the external papers represented other projects financed within the context of the Fifth Framework Programme, GOVECOR and the European Public Space Observatory (also abbreviated as EUROPUB). In addition to the scientific exchange, we invited members of our Board of Advisors to the conference in order to receive input from, and disseminate our results to leading practitioners in the field of European political communication. To this end the conference included a Panel Discussion on the topic "Experiences of Europeanisation – Past, Ideal, and Realistic Paths", in which our Board members Fritz Groothues (former Head of Strategy at the BBC World Service), José Manuel Costa (correspondent in London for Abc), Bino Olivi (former spokesperson of the European Commission), Andrea Romano (Director of Italianeuropei - Fondazione di cultura politica), and Dario Valcárcel (Editor of Política Exterior and collaborator with Abc) participated.

On 25 November 2004 we staged a public presentation (organizer: Ruud Koopmans) of our project's results at the Hotel Leopold in Brussels, which was attended by some 40 people, including representatives of the European Commission, the press, and NGOs. Juan Díez Medrano, Ruud Koopmans, Hanspeter Kriesi, Ann Zimmermann, Jos de Beus, Barbara Pfetsch, and Paul Statham presented different parts of the project's results and conclusions. In the morning, Markus Jachtenfuchs (International University Bremen), Liesbeth Hooghe (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam), and Christoph Meyer (University of London) commented on scientific aspects. Quentin Peel (European correspondent of *The Financial Times*) closed the afternoon programme with reflections on the implications of the project for European journalism and its relationship to the policy-making process.

While both these conferences already had important dissemination components directed towards non-scientific practitioners in policy-making and journalism, Annex 5. gives an overview of our further non-scientific dissemination activities over the course of the project. They encompass various newspaper, radio, and television interviews, articles written for newspapers, and presentations before policy-makers and NGO and business representatives in various countries as well as on the European level.

We are particularly proud of our accomplishments in the area of teaching and training, which we regard as a crucial channel for the further diffusion of the knowledge generated in the context of the project, with effects that will last far beyond the life-time of the project. During the project period, eleven full project-related courses (in addition to several contributions to lecture series) were taught by various project members, often involving direct engagement of students with data and products from the project. Further, one BA Thesis by Martín Federico Meyer and one MA Thesis by Tobias Schlecht resulted from these teaching efforts. More important still, our project has spawned no less than ten dissertation projects, most of which are nearing completion. The titles of these projects are listed among the scheduled dissemination and exploitation activities in the table below. Abstracts of the dissertation projects can be found in Annex 3.

The table below lists our most important scheduled dissemination and exploitation activities. The most central of those is a common book project, of which the annotated table of contents is included in Annex 2. This book project will involve almost all of the project members. A first draft is scheduled to be ready in September 2005. Besides this, several country teams have planned to write a book on their national case. Three of these teams (The Netherlands, Italy, and Spain) have progressed to the concrete production stage and are listed in the table. The table then lists the ten dissertations (nine of which are near completion – see the abstracts in Annex 3. – only the last-mentioned one is in an earlier stage), which expand on the main project in various ways,

often also enriching the analysis with additional data. Altogether, this means that at least fourteen books will result from the project. In parallel, we plan to publish a series of articles for international refereed journals. The table lists only three of those that have at the time of writing been accepted or offered for publication. Many more papers are in an earlier stage of preparation (e.g. as conference papers) or have been planned for the future.

All in all, this implies that the output listed in Annex 4. that was produced during the funding period is only a beginning. The most important products are still to come and will be published within the next one or two years. Through our teaching activities and our engagement with news media, policy-makers and stakeholders we want to continue our effort to diffuse our findings to broader audiences.

#### **List of the Most Important Scheduled Dissemination and Exploitation Activities**

<b>Title</b>	<b>Partners involved</b>	<b>Type of product</b>
<b>Postnational Conversations or Bable Revisited? Public Debates, Democracy, and European Integration</b>	Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham (Editors), Jos de Beus, Barbara Pfetsch, Silke Adam, Jessica Erbe, Martin Federico Meyer, Barbara Berkel, Anke Tresch, Donatella Della Porta, Manuela Caiani, Julie Firmstone, Margit Jochum, Juan Díez Medrano, Emily Gray, Ann Zimmermann, Lorenzo Mosca	Common book project
<b>Nederland europeaniseert maar niet van harte</b>	Jos de Beus, Jeannette Mak	Book project on the Dutch case
<b>Quale Europa?</b>	Donatella Della Porta, Manuela Caiani	Book project on the Italian case
<b>España y el espacio público europeo</b>	Juan Díez Medrano, Martín Federico Meyer, Jillian Reynolds	Book project on the Spanish case
<b>Public spheres as symbolic networks: a comparison of the German and French debates on the EU Constitution and on EU enlargement</b>	Silke Adam, Barbara Pfetsch	Dissertation
<b>European Integration due to Conflicts. Conflict as a motivating factor of a Europeanisation of national public spheres</b>	Barbara Berkel, Barbara Pfetsch, Winfried Schulz	Dissertation

<b>Europeanised social movements? Public Debates and Contentious Politics in a Cross-time and Cross-issue Perspective: A Research on the Italian case</b>	Manuela Caiani, Donatella Della Porta	Dissertation
<b>Europeanising national communicative spaces through horizontal linkages. The case of cross-border press reviews in German newspapers and radio</b>	Jessica Erbe, Barbara Pfetsch, Ruud Koopmans	Dissertation
<b>Newspapers as opinion leaders on European Integration</b>	Julie Firmstone, Paul Statham, Katrin Voltmer	Dissertation
<b>The Politics of Pressure: Campaigning For and Against Europe in Britain, 1997-2003</b>	Emily Gray, Paul Statham, Katrin Voltmer	Dissertation
<b>Political process and public debate. Communication &amp; mobilization strategies of political actors and the "published debate" in the field of agricultural policy in Switzerland and six EU countries</b>	Margit Jochum, Hanspeter Kriesi	Dissertation
<b>Segmented public sphere? Public communication and opinion formation on Europe in the Swiss language regions</b>	Anke Tresch, Hanspeter Kriesi, Pascal Sciarini	Dissertation
<b>Democratisation and Europeanisation Online? – The Internet's Impact on Structures of the Political Public Sphere</b>	Ann Zimmermann, Ruud Koopmans, Dieter Rucht	Dissertation
<b>Title still to be decided</b>	Martín Federico Meyer, Juan Díez Medrano	Dissertation

<b>Who Inhabits the European Public Sphere? Winners and Losers, Supporters and Opponents of Europeanised Public Debates</b>	Ruud Koopmans	Refereed journal article (offered for publication)
<b>Going Public in the EU. Changing Strategies of Western European Collective Political Actors</b>	Hanspeter Kriesi, Margit Jochum, Anke Tresch	Refereed journal article (offered for publication)
<b>European integration without Europeanisation</b>	Jos de Beus, Jeannette Mak	Refereed journal article (accepted for publication in <i>Acta Politica</i> )

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## VII. ANNEXES

### 1. List of Deliverables

No.	Deliverable title	Status	Delivery date	Dissemination level
D1.1	Case reports on multi-level opportunity structures	Completed (combined with D1.2)	December 2002	PU
D1.2	Integrated cross-national report on multi-level political opportunity structures	Completed	December 2002	PU
D2.1	Codebook for political claims analysis	Completed	January 2002	PU
D2.2	Papers for mid-term conference (D9.1) on the basis of the first phase of coding and data of political claims analysis	Completed	June 2003	PU
D2.3	Final case reports of political claims analysis	Completed	April 2004	PU
D2.4	Integrated cross-national report on political claims analysis	Completed	April 2004	PU
D3.1	Codebook for analysis of newspaper editorials	Completed	January 2002	PU
D3.2	Papers for mid-term conference (D9.1) on the basis of the first phase of coding and data of analysis of newspaper editorials	Completed	June 2003	PU
D3.3	Final case reports of analysis of newspaper editorials	Completed	July 2004	PU
D3.4	Integrated cross-national report on analysis of newspaper editorials	Completed	July 2004	PU
D4.1	Case reports on policy approaches to new media	Completed	February 2002	PU
D4.2	Integrated cross-national report on policy approaches to new media	Completed	April 2002	PU
D4.3	Codebook for exploratory analysis of internet political communication	Completed	June 2002	PU
D4.4	Case reports of exploratory analysis of internet political communication	Completed (combined with D 4.5)	March 2003	PU
D4.5	Integrated cross-national report of exploratory analysis of internet political communication	Completed	March 2003	PU

D4.6	Codebook for in-depth analysis of selected internet sites	Completed	June 2003	PU
D4.7	Case reports of in-depth analysis of selected internet sites	Completed (combined with D4.8)	June 2004	PU
D4.8	Integrated cross-national report of in-depth analysis of selected internet sites	Completed	June 2004	PU
D5.1	Questionnaire for interviews with collective actors in claims-making and political mobilisation	Completed	June 2003	PU
D5.2	Case reports of political mobilisation and communication strategies of collective actors	Completed	July 2004	PU
D5.3	Integrated cross-national report of political mobilisation and communication strategies of collective actors	Completed	July 2004	PU
D6.1	Questionnaire for interviews with media and communication specialists	Completed	June 2003	PU
D6.2	Case reports on communication strategies of media and political communication specialists	Completed	August 2004	PU
D6.3	Integrated cross-national report on communication strategies of media and political communication specialists	Completed	October 2004	PU
D6.4	Delphi questionnaire for a sub-sample of media and political communication specialists	Completed (combined with D5.1 and D6.1)	June 2003	PU
D6.5	Case reports on the responses to the Delphi questionnaires	Completed	September 2004	PU
D6.6	Integrated cross-national report on the responses to the Delphi questionnaires	Completed	September 2004	PU
D7.1	First workshop with Board of Advisors	Completed (decentralized)	January/February 2002	RE
D7.2	Finalised research design and project workplan	Completed	September 2001	PU
D9.1	Expert conference on European public spheres	Completed	June 2003	PU
D9.2	Final manuscript for an edited volume derived from the expert conference	Abandoned		

D10.1	Second workshop with Board of Advisors	Completed (combined with D9.1)	June 2003	PU
D10.2	Finalised dissemination and exploitation plan	Completed (see Part V of this report)	November 2004	PU
D11.1	Integrated scientific report of project results and conclusions	Completed (this report)	February 2005	PU
D12.1	Executive summary report of project results and conclusions	Completed (this report)	35	PU
D13.1	Final public presentation of project results and conclusions	Completed	November 2004	PU

**Note:**

With one exception, all the agreed deliverables were completed. The edited volume based on our June 2004 conference (D9.2) was first postponed because the papers from our group were all based on preliminary data. We felt that it did not make sense to publish when we would soon have more and better data. Now, at the end of the project the data are cleaned and complete, but we have decided at our last meeting that at this stage priority should be given to the swift completion of a common book project (see Annex 2.). When that product is finished, we will consider anew whether there is enough material left to go ahead with an edited volume that also involves the people from outside the group who were present at our conference.

We have chosen to make our project maximally transparent and to make all written deliverables public, even the reports that were originally scheduled as restricted. All steps in our research reporting, as well as all the codebooks and questionnaires are now accessible to outsiders through our website at <http://europub.wz-berlin.de>.

**2. Scheduled Dissemination/Exploitation: Annotated Table of Contents of Common Book Project**

**Postnational Conversations or Bable Revisited? Public Debates, Democracy, and European Integration (provisional title)**

Edited by Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham

*And they said, "Come, let us build ourselves a city and a tower with its top in the sky. Let us make a name for ourselves; otherwise, we will be scattered over the face of the whole earth." Then the Lord came down to look over the city and the tower that the men were building. The Lord said, "If, as one people all having the*

*same language, they have begun to do this, then nothing they plan to do will be impossible for them. Come, let Us go down there and confuse their language so that they will not understand one another's speech." So the Lord scattered them from there over the face of the whole earth, and they stopped building the city. (Genesis 11: 4-8)*

## **Chapter 1: The European Union and the Public Sphere: Normative Issues and Empirical Questions**

Authors: Jos de Beus, Ruud Koopmans

*Introduction of the problematic: why is the public sphere important and what are the unresolved questions. It gives an overview of earlier research on Europeanisation and public communication and mobilization and situates that research in a wider context of European integration, denationalization, etc. It ends with an overview of the chapters to come.*

## **Chapter 2: General Trends and Dimensions of Variation: Issues, Countries, Actors**

Authors: Ruud Koopmans, Paul Statham

*This chapter main task is to introduce the theoretical building blocks of the project (opportunity structures, collective action strategies, media selection, public claims making), present the research design with its various dimensions of comparison, and to give an overview of the multiple methods used. The chapter should end with some general expectations and hypotheses that are relevant across chapters. (e.g., why do we expect some issues to be more Europeanised than others? What factors might account for cross-national differences in levels of Europeanisation and support for European integration? Given the state of knowledge, this will be a rather loose and very selective set of hypotheses, not a consistent deductive theory to be tested.*

## **Chapter 3: The Selection of European News**

Authors: Barbara Pfetsch, Paul Statham, Silke Adam

*This chapter should discuss how journalists view the European Union and Europeanised politics. It should focus on the news selection process and how and if this is different for European than for national news. It should also highlight*

*differences in the degree and type of selectiveness among newspaper types and individual newspapers. Information drawn from wp's 2 and 6.*

#### **Chapter 4: Europeanisation of Public Spheres: Where, When, and How Is it Happening?**

Authors: Ruud Koopmans, Jessica Erbe, Federico Martin

*Introduces the concentric model of communicative spheres and the different types of Europeanisation that we distinguish (supranational, horizontal, vertical, with subtypes; see Koopmans/Erbe). Presents the results regarding differences across issues and countries and trends over time in levels of Europeanisation as well as levels of support for European integration. No differentiation here according to actors. Combines information from wp's 2, 3, and wp 5.*

#### **Chapter 5: Who Inhabits the European Public Sphere? Winners and Losers, Supporters and Opponents**

Author: Ruud Koopmans

*Having established issue, country and time differences, we turn to the question which actor types participate in Europeanised public debates of different forms. This leads to the question who profits and who stand to lose from Europeanisation in public communication. Next to who participates, we look at which positions these actors take on European integration, and investigate how differential access to Europeanised and support for European integration are linked. Among the state and party actors, this chapter does not distinguish by party adherence. Information is combined from wp's 2, wp3, and 5.*

#### **Chapter 6: Partisans of Europe: European Integration and Party-Political Cleavages**

Authors: Paul Statham, Barbara Berkel, Anke Tresch

*This chapter takes up the support/opposition and winner/loser dimensions from the preceding chapter but instead of looking at actor types such as government, labour union, etc. it should focus on differences across parties and party families. Information drawn from wp's 2 and 5.*

## **Chapter 7: Struggling to Get in: Europeanised Claims-Making by Civil Society Actors**

Authors: Donatella della Porta, Manuela Caiani

*This chapter presents a mainly qualitative analysis of the subset of claims from wp2 that have a European dimension. It starts out from the quantitative results regarding these actors that are presented in chapter 5, but goes into qualitative depth to explore the strategies that civil society actors use to influence European institutions and policies. Probably, this is best done by choosing a limited number of civil society actors, e.g., farmers, unions, employers, immigrants. This chapter also has the function to showcase how our claims data can be put to use for qualitative analysis. Information mainly drawn from wp 2, combined with qualitative wp5 results.*

## **Chapter 8: The Media's Own Voice: Editorials and European Integration**

Authors: Barbara Pfetsch, Paul Statham, Julie Firmstone

*This chapter should discuss how journalists view the European Union and Europeanised politics. It should take up the issues of chapters 5 and 6, but now focusing on differences among individual media, and on whether there we can distinguish systematic cleavages in the media landscape (e.g., between countries, between left and right, center and periphery, elite and mass-oriented). Information drawn from wp's 2, 3 and 6.*

## **Chapter 9: Going Public in the EU. Changing Strategies of Collective Actors**

Authors: Hanspeter Kriesi, Margit Jochum, Anke Tresch

*Previous chapters will to some extent have remained inconclusive as to the precise causes of levels of Europeanisation across issues, countries, and actors. Is it because actors try to make Europeanised claims, but are not able to cross the selection hurdles? Do they not try because they expect it will bring much result (or less than national alternatives)? Do they not need to mobilize publicly, because they are able to get their way sufficiently through insider channels? Also the chapter should take up the question whether our results in Chapter 4 on actors' influence and in Chapters 4-6 on support and opposition for European integration matches actors' subjective views. Information drawn from wp5.*

## **Chapter 10: Framing Europe: How Actors See Europe and How They Would Like to See It**

Authors: Juan Diez Medrano, Emily Gray

*Here we turn to the reasons that actors give for opposing or supporting European integration, and their ideas about what should and could be improved. It combines the analysis of the frame variables in wp's 2 and 3 with the Delphi questions from wp's 5 and 6. It looks both at the descriptive dimension of how actors see Europe and its advantages and disadvantages as they are, and at their ideas about what Europe should become.*

## **Chapter 11: Internet: A New Potential for European Political Communication?**

Authors: Ruud Koopmans, Ann Zimmermann, Lorenzo Mosca

*Will address to what extent the Internet as a new communicative medium can help resolve problems identified in Chapters 3 and 4, and the traditional media selection processes identified in Chapter 6. I.e., is the Internet more Europeanised, less nationally focused than traditional mass media public spheres. And is the Internet a more favourable arena for actors that find themselves on the losing side in traditional media public spheres? Information drawn from wp4, comparing levels and actor shares to Chapters 3 and 4.*

## **Chapter 12: Broadening the Conversation: Strategic and Policy Implications for the Future of European Integration**

Authors: Jos de Beus, Paul Statham

*This concluding chapter summarises the results and develops two types of implications. First, for the validity of existing theories and future desirables for scientific research. Second, the implications for policies and polity-building. "Broadening the conversation" refers to both. Scientifically, it argues that our work shows that the public sphere needs to be given its due place in research on European integration and offers important new insights. Politically, it argues that the main problem with the European public sphere is not that it doesn't exist or isn't growing, but that it still is an extremely elitist affair that threatens to make politics less inclusive and less democratically controlled. This, in turn, if not repaired, will erode the popular basis for European integration. No hand of God will come from above to strike down the European project. But if the European*

*conversation is not broadened, it may well be torn down from below by increased euroscepticism, euro-apathy, and euro-indifference among the citizenry.*

### **3. Scheduled Dissemination/Exploitation: Dissertation projects**

#### **3.1. Dissertation project of: Silke Adam (University of Hohenheim)**

##### **Supervisor:**

Prof. Dr. Barbara Pfetsch (University of Hohenheim)

##### **Working title:**

“Public spheres as symbolic networks: a comparison of the German and French debates on the EU Constitution and on EU enlargement”

##### **Abstract:**

The goal of this research project is to describe public debates on core issues of European integration. As research has shown that Europeanisation of debates follows the distribution of competences to the EU level, both debates are expected to be forerunners for Europeanised debates within national media. It is assumed that the level and forms of Europeanisation differ in the two policy-centered debates in France and Germany. The adaptation of common topics takes place “with national colours” (Risse et al. 2001:1). To analyse these debates, debates are conceptualised as symbolic networks. These networks are constituted by agenda-setters –be it political actors or actors from the media that raise their voice in order to push their policy ideas - who make other actors responsible, criticise them or support them. These called-upon actors in turn can become agenda-setters themselves. Thus actors in debates are connected by communicative interactions. This communication network that is reflected in the media is called “symbolic network”. It is symbolic in the sense, that it does not represent the policy process per se, but that part of it that becomes public in the media. To analyse these symbolic networks, I will draw on social network analysis. Three indicators that allow to describe the level and forms of Europeanisation will be measured by means of network analysis:

- 1) *Power*: Each actor (EU, member states, possible member states and national actors) in a network has a specific share of agenda-setting and reputational power.
- 2) *Communicative connectedness*: This indicator shows how actors are connected within the communication network: the main path of discussion, the extend to

which an EU issue is domesticated, the way a specific actor serves as a broker bridging holes in the communication structures or the extent to which the network resembles a core-periphery or hierarchy structure. The level and form of Europeanisation can be shown in the extent to which communication stretches beyond the boundaries of each country.

- 3) *Conflict lines*: This indicator shows how actors are positively or negatively connected within a debate: the main path of criticism, the main path of support, the extent to which criticism and support is domesticated; the way a specific actor serves as a broker bridging support or criticism holes, etc. The level and forms of Europeanisation can be shown in the extent to which conflict lines are interest-bound, not nation bound. Thus in Europeanised debates conflict occurs, but conflicting parties are not the countries as a whole, but conflict itself divides a country into opposing coalitions that seek coalition partners outside.

As the network methodology allows me to analyse media and political actors within one network per debate, I draw on content analysis data of WP2 as well as WP 3 regarding two issues fields of European integration: EU enlargement and the EU Constitution from 2000 to 2002 in two quality newspapers in Germany and France. To enrich the quantitative information some qualitative information is derived from interviews with political actors.

### **3.2. Dissertation project of: Barbara Berkel (University of Hohenheim)**

#### **Supervisors:**

Prof. Dr. Barbara Pfetsch (University of Hohenheim)

Prof. Dr. Winfried Schulz (University of Erlangen-Nuremberg)

#### **Working title:**

“European Integration due to Conflicts. Conflict as a motivating factor of a Europeanisation of national public spheres”

#### **Abstract:**

Against the background of the discussion how a European public sphere will eventually emerge the aim of my study is to empirically test the hypothesis that conflict and crisis will lead to a Europeanisation of national European public spheres. It is assumed that especially during times of conflict it will become necessary to communicate in order to find solutions across countries (Eder and Kantner, 2000: 323). Thus European conflicts

were identified as one possible major driving force of Europeanisation. Many authors see a process of learning through common conflicts as a precondition of the emergence of a European public sphere (Kleinsteuber, 2001, Weßler, 2004).

Basically this argument reflects an old sociological idea that conflict and integration are two sides of the same coin. And indeed the sociological analysis of conflicts as a driving force of societal change has a long tradition. It therefore seems valuable to draw on thus developed theoretical concepts to systematically study whether and how conflict could contribute to a process of Europeanisation. To specify the relation between a Europeanisation of public spheres and conflicts theories of *public sphere* and approaches of *conflict communication* are linked. For a better understanding of the role of mass media in public conflicts I will additionally use theories of *political communication* and *news production*.

Following the theoretical clarifications it has to be empirically tested, whether European conflicts lead to a Europeanisation of national public spheres in such a way that they can better fulfil the functions of transparency, validation and orientation across borders. For this analysis a quasi experimental design is chosen. To systematically analyse the relation I look at several different European countries, namely Austria, France, Germany and the United Kingdom, and at issue fields of the different European pillars. Within the policy fields Agriculture and European Integration I analyse the conflict about the combat of the food-and-mouth-disease in 2001 and the so-called "Haider"-conflict in 2000. This design requires a dense sample. Therefore I collected the data by myself, using the methodology of Claims-Analysis.

### **3.3. Dissertation project of: Manuela Caiani (Università di Firenze)**

#### **Supervisor:**

Prof. Dr. Donatella Della Porta (European University Institute)

#### **Working title:**

"Europeanised social movements? Public Debates and Contentious Politics in a Cross-time and Cross-issue Perspective: A Research on the Italian case"

#### **Abstract:**

This research addresses the debated issue of the Europeanisation of social movements. Social movements literature has so far stressed that the European institutions building is transforming the political context within which social movement mobilise, but there is no

agreement on the outcomes of such impact. While some think that the EU is widening the political opportunities available for movements mobilisation, others put emphasis on the "democratic deficit", arguing that the EU, while narrowing nation states sovereignty, does not give analogous access to power-less actors. If Europeanisation is seen as a producing more decision layers, collective action should, then adapt itself to a new structure of 'multilevel governance'. Social movements, seem in fact, to adapt their action so as to communicate directly with the various territorial levels of government, developing strategies of 'crossed influence'.

The first aim of this research is therefore to distinguish different typologies of Europeanisation of public debate and contentious politics (mobilisation at the national level to change decisions at the European level, the use of the European level as resource for addressing national decision makers, and finally the EU as increasingly 'object' of lively responses by collective actors), and to test them with empirical data referring to the Italian case. However, this is only one way to see the Europeanisation process, which focus on a top-down impact. I will also demonstrate that social movements are not merely adapting to the transforming political context, but they also bear specific visions of 'what' Europe is, and should be. In fact, social movements are not only passive subjects which adapt their organisations, strategies and identities in a transforming institutional context, they also promote social and political changes and bear specific visions of 'Europe'. By framing the process of Europeanisation in a positive or negative way, social movements contribute to the legitimacy of institution building at the European level.

Combining quantitative data deriving from a detailed political claim analysis of national newspapers, and qualitative information coming from interviews with representatives of the most important collective actors, I shall discuss different paths of Europeanisation of political debate and mobilisation in Italy, in a cross-time (1990, 1995, 2000, 2002), and cross-issue (monetary policy, agriculture, education, troop deployment, pension, immigration, as well as the issue of European integration itself) comparative perspective. The data will allow in particular to look at the organizational characteristics, network structure, repertoire of actions, and discourse of actors involved in different forms of Europeanisation.

### **3.4. Dissertation project of: Jessica Erbe (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin)**

#### **Supervisors:**

Prof. Dr. Barbara Pfetsch (Universität Hohenheim)

Prof. Dr. Ruud Koopmans (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)

#### **Working title:**

“Europeanising national communicative spaces through horizontal linkages. The case of cross-border press reviews in German newspapers and radio”

#### **Abstract:**

For contributing to the discourse on an emerging European public sphere, this dissertation focuses on fragmentation of public spheres and on how such fragmented public spheres can be integrated. The basic idea is to first look in depth at the mechanisms which, at national level, ensure that terms such as ‘the German public sphere’ are not contested. Although political mass communication in modern democracies occurs through thousands of different channels (national/regional/local newspapers, other print media, radio/TV programmes, Internet) simultaneously, there seems to be enough coherence between the output of these arenas for us to speak of a public sphere. I will then discuss the potential and limits of applying these arena linking mechanisms to the transnational setting of the EU. The main mechanisms consist in overlapping publics (individuals participating in several arenas), in political actors introducing their claims in different arenas, in news agencies, and finally in mutual media observation. A third step is to indicate on which of these mechanisms there is already empirical evidence produced in other studies. The least studied mechanism seems to be that of mutual media observation. It includes both practices that are invisible to the audience, namely the adaptation of journalists to what they observe in other media, and visible practices, namely inter-media references. The latter consist a) in media using other media explicitly as a source of information, and b) in media reporting to their own audience what other media have on their agenda and how they comment actual political processes. Such inter-media references may play a lesser role than news agencies in providing coherence between mass media output. But they are meaningful in as far as they are a factor which is visible to the audience. This argument will be grounded in theories on the construction of spaces by communication, as well as on the news geography approach. In the empirical part of the dissertation, I will analyse in how far the press review practice in Germany is currently Europeanised, how this has evolved since the 1960ies, and what

are the underlying factors. For the dependent variables, I will use data from my own content analysis and interviews. For explaining these findings, I will draw on specific data from several work packages of the Europub project (WP1 on media structures, WP2 on media claims, WP3 on editorials, and WP6 on media actors).

### **3.5. Dissertation project of: Julie Firmstone (University of Leeds)**

#### **Supervisors:**

Dr. Paul Statham (University of Leeds)

Dr. Katrin Voltmer (University of Leeds)

#### **Working title:**

"Newspapers as opinion leaders on European Integration"

#### **Abstract:**

The thesis makes a new contribution to a relatively scarce body of empirical research. It investigates the relationship between the media system and the political system by focusing on the agenda setting and opinion leading potential of newspaper editorials. Its main focus is a comparison of internal and external factors that contribute to the formation of political agendas and editorial policies on the politics of European Integration in the British press. By using empirical research into editorial processes the thesis aims to explain and account for the differences in the way that newspapers present and frame the issue of European Integration. The thesis presents a comparative analysis of data from interviews conducted with twenty-seven key opinion leaders from eight British national newspapers, one elite and one regional newspaper. In addition, a content analysis of editorial comment in these ten newspapers has been conducted. This data is used to comparatively evaluate the differences between the selection and framing of European issues by different newspapers. The interview material is used to explain how factors internal and external to newspaper organisations influence the production and framing of editorial comment on European issues. Conclusions from the research are then used to explore hypotheses about the nature of the relationship between news organisational factors and editorial content.

### **3.6. Dissertation project of: Emily Gray (University of Leeds)**

#### **Supervisors:**

Dr. Paul Statham (University of Leeds)

Dr. Katrin Voltmer (University of Leeds)

#### **Working title:**

"The Politics of Pressure: Campaigning For and Against Europe in Britain, 1997-2003"

#### **Abstract:**

The thesis explores the part that challenging groups have played in political campaigning for and against European integration in Britain in recent years. Existing research on Britain's relationship to the European Union has tended to concentrate on the actions and attitudes of government and political parties, neglecting the role of pressure groups and other civil society organisations, and only rarely considering the importance of political communications in campaigning. In contrast, this thesis examines the way in which challenging groups have mobilised and made their cases for or against European integration in the British context. Two research questions are posed regarding the role of these groups within the democratic process: first, whether these pressure groups create new spaces for political participation among citizens, and secondly, whether these groups have formed new channels for political communication, both horizontally among citizens, and vertically between citizens and political elites.

Bringing together social movements and communications theories, the thesis sets out five concepts which are helpful in analysing how groups communicate and mobilise: 1) political opportunity structures, 2) networks of organisation, 3) campaign strategy, 4) framing and 5) transnational action. Each of these five aspects of group activity is then investigated in depth in a subsequent chapter of the thesis, using a multi-method approach which combines quantitative (social network analysis, media content analysis, frame analysis, and survey data) and qualitative (semi-structured interviews) research methods. A first aim is to describe the field of groups that campaign and the different sets of political opportunities available to pro-European and Eurosceptic groups in Britain over the time period in question. Secondly, the networks of coalition, opposition and influence between the groups and other political actors in the field are analysed. The third avenue of investigation is the campaign strategies used by the pressure groups, where we examine whether the groups tend to use insider strategies, such as lobbying,

or outsider tactics, such as attempts to work through the media or to mobilise the public. Fourthly, we look at the way in which groups attempt to argue their case and frame the issues at stake, and how these frames compare with those employed by pro-European and Eurosceptic political elites over the same time period. In a fifth step, we address the issue of whether UK challenging groups are increasingly engaged in transnational action, whether by undertaking activism in other countries, running campaigns on a European-wide basis or addressed at the European as well as at the national level. The final chapter of the thesis brings the previous chapters together by considering whether these challenging groups have had any impact in the British case, examining their success both in the policy domain and in the public arena.

### **3.7. Dissertation project of: Margit Jochum (University of Zurich)**

#### **Supervisor:**

Prof. Dr. Hanspeter Kriesi (University of Zurich)

#### **Working title:**

“Political process and public debate. Communication & mobilization strategies of political actors and the “published debate” in the field of agricultural policy in Switzerland and six EU countries”

#### **Abstract:**

Following a twofold research interest, the dissertation firstly tries to depict communication and mobilisation strategies of collective actors, as well as the “Europeanization” of these strategies within the field of agricultural policy. In trying to account for certain patterns within and across countries, the influence of explanatory factors such as political institutions; the affiliation to certain types of actor and position in the policy specific actor constellations; actor preferences; and resources on the strategic communication choices are considered. Additionally, exogenous variables, i.e. the nature of the policy problem; the salience of the issue; the policy phase as well as media opportunity structures are taken into account. Secondly, the dissertation explores the actors and themes of agricultural policy appearing in the “published debate”, i.e. “media-generated” public sphere. It tries to investigate to what extent the above mentioned factors as well as communication and mobilisation strategies themselves influence the timing and the extent of public debate on agricultural policy, the visibility of sub-issues as well as the visibility of political actors.

Agricultural policy seems particularly pertinent for such an analysis, since the traditionally closed character of this policy field has been challenged in recent years due to a wide range of issues such as the BSE crisis, budgetary shortages, EU enlargement and not least WTO negotiations. However, despite these recent challenges, which undoubtedly lead to a widening of the circle of actors involved, agricultural policy issues as well as agricultural actors prove to appear only sporadically and very selectively in the “published debate”. The question therefore arises, whether in times of “mass-mediated” politics, political debate has indeed left the “smoky back rooms” and is being played out more frequently on the “front stage”, and to what extent this is the deliberate choice of collective political actors.

The first part of the empirical analyses – investigating the strategic orientation of collective actors – is based on interview data gathered within the “Europub.com” project for Britain, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland as well as the European Union level. In order to draw a comprehensive picture of the “published debate” on agricultural policy and in order to be able to establish the *link* between communication strategies and the visibility of agricultural actors and issues in the “published debate” however, the focus on a case study seems more adequate. This approach, looking at the case of Switzerland, allows for an in depth analysis of mechanisms at work by using (1) detailed information from the interviews with Swiss agricultural actors which I had the pleasure to conduct personally as part of the project, and (2) claims-making data that has been generated exclusively for the purpose of this dissertation. The time period covered in the claims-making data is 2000 to 2002, coinciding with the time frame covered in the interviews.

### **3.8. Dissertation project of: Anke Tresch (University of Zurich)**

#### **Supervisors:**

Prof. Dr. Hanspeter Kriesi (University of Zurich)

Prof. Dr. Pascal Sciarini (Idheap Lausanne)

#### **Working title:**

“Segmented public sphere? Public communication and opinion formation on Europe in the Swiss language regions”

**Abstract:**

Recent academic work has raised concern about the increasing ethno-linguistic segmentation of the mass-mediated public sphere in Switzerland (Erk, 2003; Jarren/Imhof/Blum, 2000; Altermatt, 1997). In the Swiss multicultural context, such fragmentation is seen as particularly problematic because mass-mediated communication between political actors may develop in different directions among the language regions, and lead to divergent collective opinion formation processes and voting behavior among the citizenry (e.g. Kriesi et. al., 1996). Seemingly confirmed by sharply different voting behaviors among the language regions in a referendum vote on the European Economic Area in 1992, this assumption however suffers from insufficient and inadequate empirical testing. In order to systematically test this assumption, empirical work must follow a two-step procedure. First, it has to examine the specific pattern and content of mass-mediated communicative processes in each language region, and to determine the degree of (in)congruity between them. Second, it has to establish how, and if, the delivered messages within each language region impact on voting decisions.

It is the aim of this dissertation to address both aspects with the example of two recent major referendum campaigns on European integration in Switzerland. In the first part, the dissertation performs a content analysis of mediated public debates as reported by two main newspapers in each language region, and assesses the degree of congruity between actor configurations, issue positions and arguments. While some authors (e.g. Kriesi, 1992) claim that the national scope of the topic and the dominance of national actors in foreign affairs deploy a coordinating effect and may favor synchronicity between communicative processes in the regions, factors drawn from media research (e.g. distinct editorial lines) and theories of political and discursive opportunity structures (e.g. presence of outsiders, divided vs. consensual elite) rather predict linguistic segmentation of mass-mediated communication processes.

The second part of the dissertation relies on post-electoral survey data and attempts to correlate, within each language region, the prominence of arguments during the campaign with citizens voting motives, and to determine if, how and under what conditions the direction and intensity of the campaign affects voting decisions.

This analysis will allow drawing conclusions on the function of the public sphere in a multilingual setting, as well as on the relationship between mass-mediated communication in the public sphere and public opinion as measured by survey data. Although restricted to Switzerland, the dissertation might provide fruitful insights to researchers working on the European public sphere.

### **3.9. Dissertation project of: Ann Zimmermann (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin)**

#### **Supervisors:**

Prof. Dr. Dieter Rucht (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin)

Prof. Dr. Ruud Koopmans (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)

#### **Working title:**

“Democratisation and Europeanisation Online? – The Internet’s Impact on Structures of the Political Public Sphere”

#### **Abstract:**

The dissertation aims to explore the Internet’s impact on structures of the political public sphere. The underlying theoretical question is: in which circumstances and in which ways may the Internet (as a new media technology) change the social structure of political communication? This is explored empirically by analysing whether or not the inherent non-hierarchical and transnational character of the Internet technology leads to more democratic and Europeanised public spheres.

The analysis is focused on the comparison of seven countries (Germany, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, Switzerland) and based on data generated within the framework of Europub.com’s search engine analysis and hyperlink analysis carried out in work package 4: “The Internet as a New Arena of Political Communication”. The data are analysed in a more in-depth manner than the scope of Europub.com had allowed for and focuses especially on revealing the influencing factors lying behind the patterns identified. The exploration of the search engine analysis data is focused on comparing the seven countries. Additionally, the work package 2 data of the Europub.com project, “Political Claims Analysis of Newspapers”, are included in the analysis. In this way, the dissertation project does not only describe the structures of online public spheres, but is able to quantify to a certain extent whether these structures are determined by the Internet – as a new medium – or whether other factors are more important (e.g. country or issue-field). On the level of hyperlink analysis, the data are interpreted by using the network-analysis method in order to reach beyond the descriptive level of exploration and to try and show causal connections.

The theoretical attempt developed in this dissertation, and further elaborated by the empirical analysis, aims at providing a deeper understanding of the characteristics of the

political public sphere's social and technical determinants and the way in which they define the Internet's possibilities for having an impact.

#### 4. Scientific Output

##### 4.1. Publications (books, journal articles, book chapters)

Andretta, M., D. della Porta, L. Mosca, H. Reiter, *Global, new global. Soziale Bewegungen und Globalisierung*, Frankfurt am Main, Campus Verlag, 2003.

Baisnée, Olivier (2001) 'Les relations entre la Commission et le Corps de presse accrédité auprès de l'Union européenne: crise et renouvellement des pratiques', in: *Pôle Sud*.

Baisnée, Olivier (2002) 'Les journalistes accrédités auprès de l'Union européenne: correspondants à l'étranger ou généralistes spécialisés?', *Réseaux*, n° 111, pp. 101-162.

Baisnée, Olivier (2002) 'Can political journalism exist at the EU level?', in: Raymond Kuhn and Eric Neveu (eds.), *Political Journalism*, Routledge, pp.108-128.

Beus, Jos de, and Jeannette Mak (2001) 'The Missing European Public: A Note on the Ethics and Politics of Contemporary European Integration since Nice', *Acta Politica* 36 4: 339-357.

Della Porta, Donatella (2003) 'Social Movements and Democracy at the Turn of the Millennium', in: P. Ibarra (ed.) *Social Movements and Democracy*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, pp. 105-136.

Della Porta, Donatella, et. al.: 'Global, Nogloba, New Global'. Roma: Laterza 2002.

Della Porta, Donatella (2003) *I New Global*, Bologna, Il Mulino.

Della Porta, Donatella and Lorenzo Mosca, eds. (2003) *Movimenti sociali e globalizzazione*, Roma, Manifestolibri.

Díez Medrano, Juan. 2003. *Framing Europe*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

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Eilders, Christiane, Neidhardt, Friedhelm, Pfetsch, Barbara (2004), *Die Stimme der Medien: Pressekommentare und politische Öffentlichkeit in der Bundesrepublik*. Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

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Guiraudon, Virginie (2004) 'Immigration and Asylum: A High Politics Agenda', in: Desmond Dinan et Maria Green Cowles (eds), *Developments in the European Union*, second edition, London, Palgrave.

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Medrano, Juan Díez (2001) 'Die Qualitätspresse und Europäische Integration', in: *Forschungsjournal Neue Soziale Bewegungen* 14 (2001) 4: 30-41.

Meyer, Martín Federico. 2004. "Political Claims-Making on Monetary and Education Issues in Spain and Germany between 1990 and 2000". Bachelor of Arts Thesis, International University Bremen.

Mosca, Lorenzo (2004) 'Cybersfera: balcanizzazione del dibattito pubblico o crogiolo 'astratto' di culture?', in L. Mosca. *L'impatto di Internet sull'azione collettiva: effetti sulla*

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Schlecht, Tobias (2002) 'Europa in den deutschen Fernsehnachrichten. Eine Analyse des Nachrichtenmagazins *Tagesthemen*'. MA Thesis, Freie Universität Berlin.

#### **4.2. Conference papers, lectures, presentations, and workshops**

Adam, Silke and Barbara Berkel 'Media structures as a brake block of the Europeanisation of public spheres? Development of a cross-national typology. Presented at the International Conference: Europeanisation of Public Spheres? Political Mobilisation, Public Communication, and the European Union'. WZB, Berlin 2003.

Adam, Silke 'Power in public spheres – a network analysis. Comparing the German debate on EU governance structures and pension politics'. Paper presented to the international „Sunbelt Social Network Conference“, Portoroz, Slovenia, May 12-16, 2004.

Adam, Silke (2005): Medien als Akteure in symbolischen Netzwerken. Ein Vergleich der Rolle national medialer und politischer Akteure in der EU-Erweiterungsdebatte mit Hilfe der Netzwerkanalyse. Conference „Medien als Akteure im politischen Prozess“, Hohenheim, February 10-12.

Adam, Silke (2004): Stärke, Formen und Folgen der Europäisierung medialer Öffentlichkeiten. Ein Vergleich der Machtstrukturen in europäisierten und nationalen Debatten mit Hilfe der Netzwerkanalyse. Conference „Medialer Wandel und Europäische Öffentlichkeit“, Vienna, November 11-12.

Adam, Silke & Barbara Berkel (2004): How media systems can influence the success of European campaigns. Conference “Campaigning for Europe. Parties, campaigns, mass media and the European Parliamentary Elections 2004“. Landau. October 1-3.

Andretta, Massimiliano, Manuela Caiani and Sara Valenza: 'Social Movements and Public Sphere: the case of Italy during the 1990s', paper presented at the ECPR JOINT SESSION OF WORKSHOPS- EDINBURGH MARCH 28-APRIL 2 2003; workshop on: New

Social Movements and Protest in Southern Europe. Directors J. Karamichas and Y. Papageorgiou.

Baisnée, Olivier 'Le corps de presse accrédité auprès de l'Union européenne comme révélateur des logiques institutionnelles et politiques des institutions communautaires'. Communication à la 1st Pan-european Conference on European Union Politics, Panel "The Institutional Sociology of Europe", Bordeaux, 27.09.2002.

Berkel, Barbara (2004) 'Conflict as a Driving Force of a European Public Sphere'. Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the International Communication Association in New Orleans, USA, May 27-31, 2004.

Berkel, Barbara (2005): Medien in europäischen Konflikten: Mediatoren oder politische Akteure? Conference „Medien als Akteure im politischen Prozess“, Hohenheim, February 10-12.

Beus, Jos de 'A European Public Sphere'. Paper presented at the panel "The European Union and Democratic Theory", Division Normative Political Theory, at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 29.08.-01.09.2002.

Beus, Jos de, Organization of the panel 'The European Union and Democratic Theory', Division Normative Political Theory, 2002 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston (Mass.), 29/8-1/9.

Beus, Jos de and Jeannette Mak: 'Does Monetary Integration Engender Europeanisation of National Politics and Society? An Analysis of the Dutch Case'. Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions, Workshop "How Economic Integration Matters: Europeanisation, Discourse and Policy Regimes", Turin, 22.-27.03.2002.

Beus, Jos de and Jeannette Mak: 'An analysis of the degree of change in Dutch political culture', ECSA-C Conference, Bigger and Better?', The European Union; Enlargement and Reform, Panel on 'Europeanising Domestic Politics in EU Member States', Toronto, Canada, May 2002.

Beus, Jos de and Jeannette Mak: Presentation at the yearly meeting of the Dutch Association for Political Science, Workshop 4: Quo Vadis Europa?, Noordwijkerhout, May 2002.

Beus, Jos de and Jeannette Mak, presentation of the paper 'Speaking Double Dutch? Communicating 'Europe' in the National Political Domain: the Case of the Netherlands',

paper voor de Workshop 'Political Cultures and European Integration', voorgezeten door Daniele Caramani, ECPR Joint Sessions, Edinburgh, 28 March – 2 April 2003.

Beus, Jos de, Jovanka Boerefijn and Jeannette Mak, presentation of the paper 'De geleidelijke Europeanisering van Nederland', paper voor de Workshop *De impact van Europeanisering* van het Politicologenetmaal van de NKWP, Dordrecht, 22-23 Mei 2003.

Beus, Jos de presented the paper 'The Idea of a Political Union of Europe. On the Europeanization of Political Society in Member States of the European Union' in the conference *Eurotrain in Motion*, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen: Department of Law, International Relations Group, 21 November 2003.

Beus, Jos de presented the paper 'Competitive Discussion. Testing and Reformulating the Political Theory of Deliberative Democracy' in the Amsterdam Political Science Seminar, 22 January 2004.

Beus, Jos de, and Jeannette Mak, presentation of paper 'European integration without Europeanisation, the interplay of European economic policy and national political culture in the Netherlands', at the 'Atelier of Democratic Governance', University of Amsterdam, Department of Political Science, 15 January 2003.

Caiani, Manuela, presentation at the Conference on Globalizzazione, conflitti, movimenti sociali, Trento, 5-6 June, 2003.

Della Porta, Donatella, Manuela Caiani, Lorenzo Mosca, and Sara Valenza, Forms of Europeanization of the Public Sphere in Italy in a Cross-time, Cross-issue and Cross-media perspective, paper presented at the conference on Europeanization of Public Spheres? Political Mobilisation, Public Communication, and the European Union (Berlin, June 20-22, 2003) and at the 19th IPSA World Congress (Durban 29 June - 4 July 2003).

Della Porta, Donatella, presentation at the Conference on Globalizzazione, conflitti, movimenti sociali, Trento, 5-6 June, 2003.

Della Porta, Donatella: presentation of paper at International Conference on "Conflitti, teorie dei conflitti e mondializzazione", Università di Napoli "Federico II" - Dipartimento di Filosofia, December 18-20 2003.

Della Porta, Donatella International: presentation of paper at International Conference on "Anti/altermondialisation. Anti/Alter globalization", Paris, Fondation National des Sciences Politiques, December 3-5, 2003.

Della Porta, Donatella International Conference on "Debating the Democratic Legitimacy of European Union", Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES), November 27-29, 2003.

Della Porta, Donatella and Caiani Manuela, 'Europeanisation and the Civil Society in the Public Sphere: Some results from a research on claims-making in Italy', paper presented at the ECPR ANNUAL CONFERENCE Joint Sessions, Uppsala, Sweden, April 2004.

Díez Medrano, Juan. 2003. "Political Culture, Resonance, and Frames about European Integration". Paper presented at the 19th IPSA World Congress. Durban (South Africa).

Erbe, Jessica. Presentation in mid-October 2003 of the Europub approach to empirical research on the EPS, at a seminar on the European Public Sphere of the course Journalisten-Weiterbildung (JWB), organized by 'Journalisten-koleg der Freien Universität Berlin'.

Erbe, Jessica. Participation in the International interdisciplinary conference for PhD students and young academics on 'The European Public Sphere', held in Berlin in November 2003 (presentation of a paper on International press reviews as a linkage between media arenas and their potential contribution to the Europeanisation of public spheres).

Firmstone, Julie. Paper presentation 'Britain in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the British Media Agenda on Europe'. ESCUS International Conference, 'Changing European Public Spheres', University of Sheffield. 23<sup>rd</sup> September 2004.

Firmstone, Julie. Paper presentation 'Britain in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the British Media Agenda on Europe', Sociology of Media Study Group session, British Sociological Association Annual Conference, University of York. 22<sup>nd</sup> March 2004.

Firmstone, Julie. Chair and discussant of panel on 'Representations of Europe: implications of media coverage of European politics for legitimacy and democracy in the EU' in Section 13: Political Communications and the Media, 2nd ECPR General Conference, Marburg, Germany, 18-21 Sep 2003. Also presented a paper on 'Framing 'Britain in Europe': a comparative analysis of the British media agenda on Europe' in a panel on 'Comparative Perspectives on Media Framing' in the same section of the conference.

Firmstone, Julie: *Britain in the Euro?: British newspaper editorial coverage of the introduction of the euro*. Paper presented at UK Political Science Association [PSA] Media and Politics Group one-day workshop, Loughborough University, UK, 9 January 2003;

additionally presented at a research seminar series on Britain and Europe at the Europe in the World Centre, School of Politics and Communication Studies, University of Liverpool, UK, 12 February 2003. The paper has additionally appeared in European political communication working paper series 5/03, University of Leeds, available online at <http://www.leeds.ac.uk/ics/euro/papers.htm>.

Firmstone, Julie, 'The Euro Debate In Britain: The Battleground of the British Press', Paper presented at the 23rd General Conference and General Assembly of the International Association for Media and Communication Research, Panel for Journalism Session, Barcelona, 21.-26.07.2002.

Firmstone, Julie, 'Britain in the Euro?' British Newspaper Editorial Coverage of National Interest in Relation to EMU, at 'Understanding the Europeanisation of Public Policy'. Paper presented at the 32nd Annual Conference of the Public Administration Committee, Department of Politics, University of York, UK, 02.-04.09.2002.

Gray, Emily, and Paul Statham. 'Single Currency, Divided Country? Political Mobilisation over EMU in the UK' Paper presented at the 1<sup>st</sup> Pan-European Conference on European Union Politics, Bordeaux, 26.-28.09.2002.

Gray, Emily, 'The UK's pro- and anti-euro campaigns'. Paper presented at UK Political Science Association [PSA] Media and Politics Group one-day workshop, Loughborough University, UK, 9 January 2003. The paper has additionally appeared in the European political communication working paper series 3/03, University of Leeds, and is available online at <http://www.leeds.ac.uk/ics/euro/papers.htm>.

Gray, Emily, 'Referendum Democracy? Political contention over the euro in the UK'. Paper presented at a research seminar series on Britain and Europe at the Europe in the World Centre, School of Politics and Communication Studies, University of Liverpool, UK, 12 February 2003.

Gray, Emily. 'Campaigning Across Borders: Transnational Networks and the UK's Pro- and Anti-EU Campaigns'. Paper presented at 6th European Sociological Association Conference, 'Viejas Sociedades, Nueva Sociología', Murcia, Spain, 23-26 Sep 2003. Subsequent version of paper also presented at the Graduate Conference on the European Public Sphere, Europäische Akademie, Berlin Grunewald, 28-30 Nov 2003.

Gray, Emily, Paper presentation 'Public Debates over Europe in Britain', UACES 34th Annual Conference and 9th Research Conference, University of Birmingham. 7<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> September 2004.

Gray, Emily and Paul Statham. Paper presentation 'Public Debates over Europe in Britain: Exceptional, Conflict-Driven and Path-Dependent?', at a one-day ESRC/UACES-sponsored conference, 'Britain in Europe and Europe in Britain: The 'Europeanisation' of British Politics?', Sheffield City Hall. 16th July 2004.

Gray, Emily and Paul Statham, Paper presentation 'A 'Europeanisation' of the Public Sphere in Britain: path dependent or conflict driven?', at ECPR 2nd Pan-European Conference on European Union Politics, Bologna. 24<sup>th</sup> June 2004.

Gray, Emily, Paper presentation 'The Europeanisation of Collective Action in Britain', at ESRC/UACES seminar on The Europeanisation of British Politics and Policy-Making, University of Sheffield. 23<sup>rd</sup> April 2004.

Gray, Emily, Seminar speaker on 'The Politics of Pressure: Political Campaigning over European Integration in the UK, 1990-2003', Centre of International Studies, Cambridge University. 9<sup>th</sup> March 2004.

Guiraudon, Virginie: Participation in a workshop on Europeanisation called "How economic integration matters: Europeanisation, discourse and policy regimes" convened by Claudio Radaelli and Vivien A. Schmidt at the joint sessions of the European Consortium for Political Research, Turin, Italy, 22.-27.03.2002.

Guiraudon, Virginie: Participation in the Thirteenth International Conference of Europeanists, Chicago. Activities included organising a panel entitled "Rebordering Europe", chairing and commenting in a panel called "European Journalists as Political Actors", March 2002.

Guiraudon, Virginie: Participation in the Workshop "Theorising the Communitarisation of Migration" of the Group on the Evolving European Migration Law and Policy of the UACES, Foresight Centre, University of Liverpool, 17.05.2002. (Paper online at [http://www.liv.ac.uk/ewc/html/body\\_guiraudon.html](http://www.liv.ac.uk/ewc/html/body_guiraudon.html)).

Guiraudon, Virginie: Setting the Agenda on Immigration and Asylum in the EU: Experts and "the Public". Paper presented at the American Political Science Meeting in Boston, 29.08.-01.09.2002, (<http://apsaproceedings.cup.org/Site/abstracts/074/074001GuiraudonV.htm>).

Guiraudon, Virginie, Olivier Baisnée and Olivier Grojean: 'Mesurer la place de l'Europe dans les débats de politique publique nationaux: enjeux théoriques, protocole méthodologique et premiers résultats empiriques à partir du cas français'. Paper delivered in the plenary session "L'institutionnalisation de l'Europe" at the congrès de

l'association française de science politique in Lille, 18.-21.09.2002, ([http://congres-afsp.univ-lille2.fr/docs/tr5\\_guiraudon.doc](http://congres-afsp.univ-lille2.fr/docs/tr5_guiraudon.doc)).

Guiraudon, Virginie: Co-organization of a workshop at the Congrès de l'Association Française de science politique in Lille on "transnational political actors" where we discussed the theoretical and empirical challenges when studying the transnationalization of actors' strategies. 21-23 September 2002.

Guiraudon, Virginie: The dynamics behind the "Europeanization" of migration and asylum. Second colloquium of the Institute of European Studies of Mac Gill university and the université de Montréal, "Unity and Diversity: European and Canadian Debates," Montréal, Canada, 27-28 September 2002.

Guiraudon, Virginie. 'Les politiques d'immigration en Europe: étude comparée', Seminar in the 'Séminaire de sociologie de migrations et des relations interethniques', ULB, Brussels, 10 March 2003.

Guiraudon, Virginie. 'Les directives européennes de lutte contre les discriminations', Paper given in the workshop « Comparer les discriminations positives » organisé par Daniel Sabbagh au CERI, Paris, 10 January 2003.

Guiraudon, Virginie. 'The Dynamics of Immigration Reform in Comparative Perspective: Sunshine and Shadow Politics in Europe and the US', Paper for the workshop "Comparative Politics and Policymaking at the New Century" (organized by Martin Shapiro, UC Berkeley et Martin Levin, Brandeis), Brandeis university, Boston. 21-23 November 2003.

Guiraudon, Virginie. '*DG JAI*: une DG nouvelle generation'. Workshop on Justice and Home Affairs in the EU. GSPE (Group on the Political Sociology of Europe), IEP de Strasbourg. 24 June 2003.

Guiraudon, Virginie co-organized of a two-day conference 'Europe/Etats-unis: convergences ou divergences politiques?' in Lille, 15-16 May 2003.

Guiraudon, Virginie. 'Asile et immigration: une politique "exemplaire" du nouveau jeu institutionnel européen'. Seminar of the Forum européen of Sciences-po Paris, 24 February 2004.

Guiraudon, Virginie co-organized a ECPR joint session entitled 'Who makes immigration policy? Comparative Perspectives after 9/11' in Uppsala, Sweden. Two days were

dedicated to framing, discourse and public opinion in the EU and one day to EU-level policies. *13-18 April 2004.*

Guiraudon, Virginie, EU immigration policy, speaker series du Centre for European and Comparative Governance, Department of Politics and International Relations, university of Kent, Canterbury. (6 may 2004).

Jochum, Margit and Jeannette Mak, 'Europeanisation without membership, membership without Europeanisation? An analysis of monetary and agricultural issues in the national public spheres of Switzerland and the Netherlands'. Paper presented at the the International Conference on Europeanisation of public spheres?, Political Mobilisation, Public Communication, and the European Union', WZB, Berlin, 20-22 June 2003.

Jochum, Margit und Anke Tresch (2004) 'Die Europäisierung der Schweizer Öffentlichkeit', Vortrag im Rahmen der Reihe: Politische Kommunikation in der Schweiz, unter der Leitung von Dr. Patrick Donges, Institut für Publizistikwissenschaft und Medienforschung der Universität Zürich, 15. Januar 2004.

Koopmans, Ruud, presentation at the expert workshop on 'Migrant transnationalism', Wissenschaftskolleg Berlin, 13-14 april 2003.

Koopmans, Ruud and Jessica Erbe: 'Towards a European public sphere? Vertical and horizontal dimensions of Europeanised political communication'. Paper presented at the conference on "European Governance and Democracy", Brussels 14-15 November, 2002. A revised version was presented at the International Conference on Europeanisation of public spheres, Political Mobilisation, Public Communication, and the European Union', WZB, Berlin, 20-22 June 2003.

Koopmans, Ruud and Barbara Pfetsch: Towards a Europeanised public sphere? Comparing political actors and the media in Germany, paper presented at the International Conference on Europeanisation of public spheres?, Political Mobilisation, Public Communication, and the European Union', WZB, Berlin, 20-22 June 2003. The paper was additionally presented at the 19th IPSA World Congress (Durban 29 June - 4 July 2003).

Koopmans, Ruud and Ann Zimmermann: 'Internet: A New Potential for European Political Communication?', Paper presented at the conference on "European Governance and Democracy", Brussels 14-15 November, 2002. A revised version was presented at the International Conference on Europeanisation of public spheres, Political Mobilisation, Public Communication, and the European Union', WZB, Berlin, 20-22 June 2003.

Koopmans, Ruud 'Who Inhabits the European Public Space? Evidence from Claims making in German Print Media, 1990-2002', Presentation given at the conference "One EU – Many Publics?", Stirling University, 5-6 February 2004.

Koopmans, Ruud, Session Chair and commentator at the Conference "Incorporating Minorities in Europe", Center for European Studies, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 16-17 April 2004.

Koopmans, Ruud 'Who Inhabits the European Public Space? Evidence from Public Claim Making in Seven European Countries 1990 – 2002', Paper presented at the ECPR Standing Group on the European Union 2nd Pan-European Conference on European Union Politics 'Implications of a Wider Europe: Politics, Institutions and Diversity' Bologna, 24-26 June 2004.

Koopmans, Ruud and Barbara Pfetsch. 'Towards a Europeanised Public Sphere? Comparing Political Actors and the Media in Germany', Presentation at ARENA in Oslo on 2 December, 2003. Published subsequently as ARENA Working Paper 03/23.

Koopmans, Ruud: Presentation of the Europub.com project at a workshop on 'Europeanisation and the Public Sphere', organised by the IDNET thematic network at the European University Institute in Florence on 20-21 February, 2002.

Kriesi, Hanspeter, Margit Jochum und Anke Tresch (2004) 'Europäisierung der Öffentlichkeit als Legitimitätsbedingung der EU'. Vortrag im Rahmen des interdisziplinären Forschungskolloquiums "Legitimitätsgrundlagen der EU" unter der Leitung von Prof. Francis Cheneval und Prof. Georg Kohler, Universität Zürich, 11. Juni 2004.

Pfetsch, Barbara and Frank Esser 'Amerikanisierung, Modernisierung, Globalisierung – Neue Forschungsperspektiven für neue Formen der Politikvermittlung', Annual Conference of DGPK „Chancen und Gefahren für die Mediendemokratie“, 30.-.31. May 2002, Dresden.

Pfetsch, Barbara and Ruud Koopmans organised a session on 'The Europeanisation of public spheres' at the 19th IPSA World Congress in Durban, 29 June - 4 July 2003.

Pfetsch, Barbara (2004) 'Auf dem Weg zu einer europäischen Öffentlichkeit. Medien und politische Akteure in Deutschland.' Paper presented at the University of Basel, Switzerland, May 5, 2004.

Pfetsch, Barbara (2004) 'Interpreting the European Public Sphere: A Theoretical and Empirical Assessment of The Voice of the Media', Paper presented at the conference „Changing European Public Spheres: New Cultural and Media Contexts in Western and Eastern EU – Prospects and Challenges“, University of Sheffield, UK, September 23-24.

Pfetsch, Barbara (2005), Politische Medienwirkungen im Prozeß der Europäischen Integration. Theoretische Überlegungen und empirische Befunde. Lecture at the Free University Berlin, February 25, Berlin.

Pfetsch, Barbara (2005), „Überbringer der schlechten Botschaft“? Zur politischen Funktion der Presse bei der Europäischen Integration. Lecture at the Ludwig-Maximilian-University Munich, February 2, Munich.

Pfetsch, Barbara (2005), Die Stimme der Medien in der Europäischen Öffentlichkeit. Ergebnisse einer international vergleichenden Untersuchung. Lecture at the University of Zürich, January 21, Zürich.

Pfetsch, Barbara (2004), The Media's Role in Europe's Communication Deficit: Blaming the Messenger? Presentation at the Europub.com-Conference „The European Union and the Public Sphere“, November 25, Brussels.

Pfetsch, Barbara (2004), Europäische Öffentlichkeit. Wie können Medien zur Demokratisierung der Europäischen Union beitragen? Presentation in the Lecture series „Europe in search of its profile“, Hospitalhof, Evangelisches Bildungswerk Stuttgart, April 22.

Pfetsch, Barbara and Ruud Koopmans (2004), „Massenmedien als Hindernisse oder Motoren einer europäischen Öffentlichkeit?“ Conference „Medialer Wandel und Europäische Öffentlichkeit“, Vienna, November 11-12.

Statham, Paul: A Europeanisation of British NGOs in the Asylum Field? Paper presented at the International Studies Association Conference, New Orleans, USA, 24.-27.03.2002.

Statham, Paul: The Role of Public Debates and the Extent of 'Europeanisation' within British Immigration and Asylum Politics: Some Empirical Findings. Paper presented at 1st Pan-European Conference on European Union Politics, ECPR Standing Group on the EU, University of Bordeaux, 26.-28.09.2002.

Statham, Paul: Social Exclusion, Activation and Welfare. Paper for the conference organised by DG Research European Commission, with DG Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL). Albert Borschette Centre, Brussels, 10.10.2002.

Statham, Paul. 'Public Debates, Claims-making and the Visible Extent of 'Europeanisation' within British Immigration and Asylum Politics: An Empirical Analysis'. Paper for ECPR General Conference, Symposium on 'The Europeanization of Immigration Policy', Marburg, 18-21 Sep 2003.

Statham, Paul. Paper presentation 'Different Paths of 'Europeanization'? Evidence from the Public Debates over Europe in Britain and France'. ESCUS International Conference, 'Changing European Public Spheres', University of Sheffield. 23<sup>rd</sup> September 2004.

Statham, Paul. Keynote speech 'A 'Europeanisation' of the Public Sphere in Britain?', at Cosmopolitanism and Europe conference, Royal Holloway, University of London. 23<sup>rd</sup> April, 2004.

Statham, Paul, and Virginie Guiraudon. 'Different Paths of 'Europeanization'? Evidence from the Public Debates over Europe in Britain and France'. Paper presented at 'One EU – Many Publics?' workshop, Stirling University, 5-6 Feb 2004.

Statham, Paul: Keynote speaker at expert workshop on Governance, Enlargement and Media Issues [GEMI], Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Florence, 28 February – 1 March. 2004.

Statham, Paul and Virginie Guiraudon: 'Europeanization, public debates and contentious politics in Britain and France: Two different paths?', paper presented at the International Conference "Europeanisation of Public Spheres? Political Mobilisation, Public Communication, and the European Union", Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), June 20-22, 2003.

Tresch, Anke, Presentation of paper 'Fragmented Public Sphere? Focusing and consonance in media discourse on European integration in Switzerland', at the International Interdisciplinary Conference "The European Public Sphere" at the Humboldt University at Berlin, November 28-30, 2003.

Tresch, Anke and Carolina G. de Miguel. 'Europeanisation of Public Spheres: a regional perspective'. Paper presented at the International Conference "Europeanisation of Public Spheres? Political Mobilisation, Public Communication, and the European Union", Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), June 20-22, 2003.

Tresch, Anke 'The role of the media in the public sphere: Framing and agenda setting strategies of Swiss newspapers', Paper presented at the staff meeting of the Department of Political Science, University of Geneva, 24 May 2004.

## 5. Non-Scientific Dissemination Activities

Jos de Beus wrote several contributions related to the project topics to non-scientific journals and newspapers:

- "De impasse van de intercontinentale democratie", *Euforum*, 2, 2, Juli, 2003 18-21.
- "Ware democraat is half Big Mac and half croissant", *NRC Handelsblad*, 15 Juni 2003 (a reaction to the new European doctrine of Derrida and Habermas).
- "De onuitstaanbare leegte van links", *de Volkskrant*, 27 September 2003.
- An article on the relations between journalism and politics, *Trouw*, 1 July 2004.

On 6 September 2002, Jos de Beus presented the paper 'On the Idea of Global Sharing of Powers, Morals and Costs, a Critique of Amitai's Etzioni's *From Empire to Community* before the Raad van State and the Wetenschappelijke raad voor het regeringsbeleid, two of the most important advisory bodies of the Dutch government.

On 23-24 May 2003, Donatella Della Porta gave a presentation at the International Conference on "La Toscana e la globalizzazione dal basso" organized by the Regione Toscana.

Virginie Guiraudon participated on 22.10.2001 in a TV debate with policy practitioners on the French senate public TV channel on EU immigration policies (program "Paroles d'Europe").

During two trips to Brussels (05.-07.12.2001 and 27.-29.05.2002), Virginie Guiraudon met with EU correspondents, in particular Jean Quatremer, of the daily *Libération*. She also met with members of the Commission and of the permanent representations responsible for two of the policy areas (immigration and social policy).

Virginie Guiraudon participated in two radio debates on *France culture* (public radio channel) on the stakes of the Seville summit on 19.06.2002 (program "La suite dans les idées") and 21.06.2002 (program "Pot-au-feu").

Virginie Guiraudon gave a plenary session lecture on the EU and EU policies with respect to the question of 'Citizenship, Societal Membership, and the Integration of Immigrants.' Seventh international METROPOLIS conference, Oslo, Norway, 11 September 2002. Metropolis is attended by 800 immigration and integration policy-makers (governments and NGOs), academics and experts.

Virginie Guiraudon delivered a keynote address at the 8<sup>th</sup> international METROPOLIS conference in Vienna in the plenary session “Patterns of governance in migration and integration policies - defining roles for public and civil society actors” (18 September 2003).

Virginie Guiraudon presented written evidence to the House of Lords select Committee on the European Union (sub-committee F) on the inquiry into proposals to establish a European border guard published in June 2003.

As executive board member of the European Union Studies Association, Virginie Guiraudon edits the association’s newsletter and organizes forums that are disseminated to all 1500 members and a wide range of institutions worldwide. Two of the last forums focused on issues related to the project: the Convention on the future of Europe, and the so-called “democratic deficit.” They can be consulted at: <http://www.eustudies.org/fora.html>. Also as part of her duties as EUSA board member, she organized a half-day conference at sciences-po Paris where policy practitioners, think tanks and researchers were invited on the future of Europe and the Convention.

On 22 January 2003, Virginie Guiraudon gave a lecture on EU policy towards illegal migrants at a day-event for 400 social workers and NGO members working with immigrants and refugees organized by the French legal aid NGO GISTI L'Europe face à l'asile et l'immigration: quelles politiques communes?

On 28 November 2001, Ruud Koopmans was plenary panel discussant at a conference in Berlin jointly organised by the Representation of the European Commission and the Centre for Turkey Studies in Essen, Germany on the position of immigrants, particularly also in the public discourse, in Germany and the European Union.

On 28 February 2002, Ruud Koopmans held a presentation at an Expert Meeting on “European Public Sphere – Missing Link of European Politics”, organised by the German Foreign Affairs Ministry in cooperation with the European Commission’s Berlin Representation. The meeting brought together social scientists working on the topic, staff members of various German ministries, as well as journalists and editors of key news media, mainly in Germany, but also in some other European countries, including accession countries such as Poland.

On 22 and 23 April 2002, Ruud Koopmans gave several interviews (with Agence France Press, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, and Estado de Sao Paulo – one of the largest Brazilian newspapers) on the election victory of Le Pen in the first round of the French Presidential elections and possible repercussions on the European integration process.

On 16 May 2002, Ruud Koopmans gave several interviews with German radio stations (Radio Eins, Inforadio Berlin, Hessischer Rundfunk, Südwestrundfunk) on the results of the Dutch elections, among other things addressing the possible impacts on the European integration process and Eastern enlargement.

On 18 March, 2004, Ruud Koopmans addressed a meeting of the Royal Academy of Science of the Netherlands on the future of sociology. Among other things, he emphasised the need for European comparative approaches and the strengthening of research networks within Europe.

On 31 March, 2004, Ruud Koopmans was interviewed by Dutch national KRO television about Dutch national identity in the context of globalization and Europeanization.

On 28 April, 2004, Ruud Koopmans was interviewed by the German radio station Südwestfunk on the difficulties and advantages of common European policies with regard to immigration.

On 6 May 2004, Jeannette Mak gave a public presentation on the image of Europe in newspapers in the centre for public debate De Balie in Amsterdam.

On 22-23 November 2001, Barbara Pfetsch held a lecture on 'Kommunikation als Schlüsselkategorie politischen Handelns – Veränderungen politischer Öffentlichkeit in der Mediengesellschaft' at the 4th Freiburg Economy Symposium, „Die New Economy und ihre Herausforderungen“.

On December 10-11, 2001, Barbara Pfetsch spoke about 'Political Communication in Europe and the US' at the Media and Elections Conference organised by the European Institute for the Media with Charter-4 and the OSCE Co-ordinator in Kiev, Ukraine.

Barbara Pfetsch gave a lecture on 'Europäische Öffentlichkeit. Wie können Medien zur Demokratisierung der Europäischen Union beitragen?' in the context of the Lecture Series *Europe in search of its profile* of the Evangelisches Bildungswerk Stuttgart, April 22, 2004.

In May and August 2002, Paul Statham met with Damian Tambini, Senior Research Fellow, Media and Communications Programme, Institute of Public Policy Research, London. In October 2002, he also had a meeting with Andrea Millwood Hargrave, Research Director, Broadcasting Standards Commission, London.

On 25 November 2004, the project's end presentation was held in Hotel Leopold in Brussels before a public mainly consisting of practitioners. Juan Díez Medrano, Ruud

Koopmans, Hanspeter Kriesi, Ann Zimmermann, Jos de Beus, Barbara Pfetsch, and Paul Statham presented different parts of the project's results and conclusions. In the morning, Markus Jachtenfuchs (International University Bremen), Liesbeth Hooghe (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam), and Christoph Meyer (University of London) commented on scientific aspects. Quentin Peel (European correspondent of *The Financial Times*) closed the afternoon programme with reflections on the implications of the project for European journalism and its relationship to the policy-making process.

## **6. Teaching and Training Activities**

Note: A total of ten dissertation projects have been initiated, which are directly linked to the project and nine of which are now nearing completion. We do not reiterate these projects here, but refer to Annex 3. above.

During the Spring Semester 2002, Silke Adam gave a course on 'International Media Systems and Comparative Political Communications' at the Communications Department of the University Hohenheim.

Jos de Beus taught a semester MA course on 'The European Political Space' for political science students in the track 'European politics' in autumn 2003.

Jos De Beus, Jovanka Boerfijn, and Jeannette Mak, gave a two-trimester research seminar for students political science on 'The Missing European Public; forms of Europeanisation of the national public sphere' at the University of Amsterdam, Department of Political Science.

Emily Gray, Julie Firmstone and Paul Statham organised a seminar series on the theme of 'Contesting Europe' at the Institute of Communications Studies, University of Leeds, that ran throughout the autumn semester of 2002.

Virginie Guiraudon ran a working group and seminar series 'action publique en Europe' at her institution (the Centre for Administrative Political and Social Studies in Lille, France) where the project results were discussed and related research agendas e. g. on Brussels journalists presented.

Virginie Guiraudon taught a master's course at the University of Lille called "transnational collective action" for students specializing in European and international public affairs. The course discusses research on transnational mobilization in the EU and includes presentations by practitioners such as "how to organize a EU-level campaign?".

In the Fall of 2003, Virginie Guiraudon was Professor in the Northwestern/sciences-po Paris program, responsible for the course 'The Dynamics of Law-Making in the European Union'.

Virginie Guiraudon, La représentation des intérêts des migrants au niveau européen: une approche historique et compare, Séminaire 'l'adaptation des ONGs à l'eupéanisation de l'immigration et l'asile', séminaire TERRA, Université Paris I. (24 mai 2004).

Virginie Guiraudon, 'Asile et immigration: une politique "exemplaire" du nouveau jeu institutionnel européen', Seminar of the Forum européen of SCIENCES-PO Paris (February 2004).

Virginie Guiraudon, 'What common borders and common identity for the New Europe? Insights from EU immigration and asylum policy'. Leiden Honors Course in Public Administration and Political Science 2004 program on the European Constitution.

As a member of the organising committee of 'Rencontres doctorales sur l'Europe', where a network among doctoral students working on the EU is trained and established, Virginie Guiraudon co-organised the second meeting of the group in Paris on 25-6 October 2002 that focused on "The Transformation of Governance in Europe".

In a graduate research seminar devoted to EU studies entitled 'Actors and Processes in the European Union' (séminaire de D.E.A. de sciences politiques "acteurs et processus politiques de l'Union européenne"), Virginie Guiraudon focused inter alia on the issue of mobilisation and mediatisation of the EU.

Ruud Koopmans took the initiative to set up a regular discussion group of senior researchers and graduate students in Berlin, meeting about once every 2-3 months, on the topic of European public spheres. It brings together the Europub.com research group at the WZB with research groups at the Humboldt University Berlin (where Prof. Klaus Eder leads a project on the topic financed by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft), the Free University Berlin (where Prof. Thomas Risse is one of the partners in the thematic network "Europeanization, Collective Identities and Public Discourses" (IDNET) – also part of the Fifth Framework Programme), and the University of Leipzig (the research group around Jürgen Gerhards). This discussion group focussed on theoretical and methodological approaches, and exchange of results from the different projects.

During the Winter semester 2001/2002 Ruud Koopmans taught a seminar on 'The Public Sphere and European Integration' at the Department of Communication of the Free University Berlin.

Jeannette Mak taught a six weeks MA course on 'European Policies and Politics' at the Amsterdam School of International Relations/UvA in autumn 2003.

Jeannete Mak organised a staff seminar, including an informal student workshop beforehand at the Amsterdam School of Social Science Research on April 8 2003, with Prof. Dr Chris Shore (University of London) on the topic "Is Europe Corrupt?: Reform of the European Commission's Organisational Culture and the Scandal of 1999".

In the Spring Semester of 2002, Barbara Pfetsch taught a course on 'Theories of the Public Sphere' at the Communications Department of the University Hohenheim.

Barbara Pfetsch taught a graduate seminar (summer term 2004) at the University of Hohenheim 'Politische Kommunikation, Medien und Governance in Europa'.

Anke Tresch taught a seminar during the Winter semester at the Département de science politique of the Université de Genève on 'le système politique suisse face à l'intégration européenne: adaptation sans intégration?'.

In 2004, Martin Federico Meyer completed his Bachelor of Arts Thesis at the International University Bremen on the topic "Political Claims-Making on Monetary and Education Issues in Spain and Germany between 1990 and 2000".

Tobias Schlecht, student research assistant in the WZB team, successfully completed his MA Thesis at the Freie Universität Berlin in August 2004. His thesis, based partly on europub.com data and partly on additional data gathering by himself, is titled "Europa in den deutschen Fernsehnachrichten. Eine Analyse des Nachrichtenmagazins *Tagesthemen* (2002)". He compares newspaper and television news coverage on European issues in the year 2002, applying the codebook of work package 2 to his own extensive data gathering of the coverage of a major television news show. His results show that television news is more selective in reporting on European actors and issues than daily newspapers.

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