



EUROPEAN
COMMISSION

Community research

EU RESEARCH ON SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES

***Values Systems of the Citizens and
Socio-Economic Conditions –
Challenges from Democratisation for
the EU-Enlargement***

Democratic Values

Interested in European research?

Research*eu is our monthly magazine keeping you in touch with main developments (results, programmes, events, etc.). It is available in English, French, German and Spanish. A free sample copy or free subscription can be obtained from:

European Commission
Directorate-General for Research
Communication Unit
B-1049 Brussels
Fax (32-2) 29-58220
E-mail: research-eu@ec.europa.eu
Internet: <http://ec.europa.eu/research/research-eu>

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Directorate-General for Research
Directorate L — Science, economy and society
B-1049 Brussels
Fax (32-2) 2994462

<http://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences>
http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/cooperation/socio-economic_en.html

EU RESEARCH ON SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES

Values Systems of the Citizens and Socio-Economic Conditions – Challenges from Democratisation for the EU-Enlargement

Democratic Values

Final report

HPSE-CT-2001-00062

**Funded under the Key Action
'Improving the Socio-economic Knowledge Base' of FP5**

**DG Research
European Commission**

Issued in
May 2005

Coordinator of project:

European University Viadrina (EUVF.CSC)
Frankfurt (Oder), Germany
Prof. Dr Detlef Pollack
<http://amcd.hit.bg/en-projectdv.html>

Partners:

Association of Middle Class Development, Sofia, BG
Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Prague, CZ, Klara Plecitanova
Institute of International and Social Studies of Tallinn Pedagogical University, EE, Raivo Vetik
Institute for Sociology, Slovak Academy of Sciences, Bratislava, SK, Luba Zaloudkova
Department of Political Science and Public Administration at the National and Kapodistrian
University of Athens, GR. Helias Nikolopoulos
Department of Political Science at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, ES, Mariano Torcal,
Lorenzo Brusattin
Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Ljubljana, SI, Ivan Bernik, Brina Malnar
Institute for the Study of the Quality of Life, Romanian Academy, Bucharest, RO, Ioan Marginean,
Marius Precupetu, Iuliana Precupetu
Co-operation: Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Tirana, AL, Teuta Starova
Russian Center for Public Opinion and Market Research/Levada Center, Moscow, RU, Natalya A.
Zorkaya, Marina Krasynikova

***EUROPE DIRECT is a service to help you find answers
to your questions about the European Union***

Freephone number(*):
00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11

(* Certain mobile telephone operators do not allow access to 00 800 numbers
or these calls may be billed

LEGAL NOTICE

Neither the European Commission nor any person acting on behalf of the Commission is responsible for the use which might be made of the following information.

The views expressed in this publication are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Commission.

A great deal of additional information on the European Union is available on the Internet. It can be accessed through the Europa server (<http://europa.eu>).

Cataloguing data can be found at the end of this publication.

Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2007

ISBN 978-92-79-07570-4

© European Communities, 2007

Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged.

Printed in Belgium

PRINTED ON WHITE CHLORINE-FREE PAPER

Preface

Within the Fifth Community RTD Framework Programme of the European Union (1998–2002), the Key Action 'Improving the Socio-economic Knowledge Base' had broad and ambitious objectives, namely: to improve our understanding of the structural changes taking place in European society, to identify ways of managing these changes and to promote the active involvement of European citizens in shaping their own futures. A further important aim was to mobilise the research communities in the social sciences and humanities at the European level and to provide scientific support to policies at various levels, with particular attention to EU policy fields.

This Key Action had a total budget of EUR 155 million and was implemented through three Calls for proposals. As a result, 185 projects involving more than 1 600 research teams from 38 countries have been selected for funding and have started their research between 1999 and 2002.

Most of these projects are now finalised and results are systematically published in the form of a Final Report.

The calls have addressed different but interrelated research themes which have contributed to the objectives outlined above. These themes can be grouped under a certain number of areas of policy relevance, each of which are addressed by a significant number of projects from a variety of perspectives.

These areas are the following:

• ***Societal trends and structural change***

16 projects, total investment of EUR 14.6 million, 164 teams

• ***Quality of life of European citizens***

5 projects, total investment of EUR 6.4 million, 36 teams

• ***European socio-economic models and challenges***

9 projects, total investment of EUR 9.3 million, 91 teams

• ***Social cohesion, migration and welfare***

30 projects, total investment of EUR 28 million, 249 teams

• ***Employment and changes in work***

18 projects, total investment of EUR 17.5 million, 149 teams

• ***Gender, participation and quality of life***

13 projects, total investment of EUR 12.3 million, 97 teams

• ***Dynamics of knowledge, generation and use***

8 projects, total investment of EUR 6.1 million, 77 teams

• ***Education, training and new forms of learning***

14 projects, total investment of EUR 12.9 million, 105 teams

• ***Economic development and dynamics***

22 projects, total investment of EUR 15.3 million, 134 teams

• ***Governance, democracy and citizenship***

28 projects; total investment of EUR 25.5 million, 233 teams

• ***Challenges from European enlargement***

13 projects, total investment of EUR 12.8 million, 116 teams

• ***Infrastructures to build the European research area***

9 projects, total investment of EUR 15.4 million, 74 teams

This publication contains the final report of the project 'Values Systems of the Citizens and Socio-Economic Conditions - Challenges from Democratisation for the EU-Enlargement', whose work has primarily contributed to the area 'Governance, citizenship and European integration'.

The report contains information about the main scientific findings of Democratic Values and their policy implications. The research was carried out by 11 teams over a period of 43 months, starting in September 2001.

The abstract and executive summary presented in this edition offer the reader an overview of the main scientific and policy conclusions, before the main body of the research provided in the other chapters of this report.

As the results of the projects financed under the Key Action become available to the scientific and policy communities, Priority 7 'Citizens and Governance in a knowledge based society' of the Sixth Framework Programme is building on the progress already made and aims at making a further contribution to the development of a European Research Area in the social sciences and the humanities.

I hope readers find the information in this publication both interesting and useful as well as clear evidence of the importance attached by the European Union to fostering research in the field of social sciences and the humanities.

J.-M. BAER,

Director

Table of contents

Preface	v
Acknowledgements	11
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	13
1. Conceptual background	13
2. Objectives	14
3. Scientific results	15
3.1. Political support in new democracies: the comparative view	15
3.2. Social and cultural bases of democratization	17
3.3. Democratization and EU enlargement	20
4. Policy implications	22
II. BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES OF THE PROJECT	24
1. Research background	24
2. Objectives of the project	25
III. SCIENTIFIC DESCRIPTION OF PROJECTS RESULTS AND METHODOLOGY	28
1. Theoretical framework	28
2. Methodology	33
2.1. Methodological framework	33
2.2. Data base	35
2.3. Country selection	36
3. Results	37
3.1. Peculiarities and common grounds of democratization: Country studies	37
3.1.1. Bulgaria	37
3.1.2. Czech Republic	38
3.1.3. Estonia	40
3.1.4. East Germany	41
3.1.5. Hungary	42
3.1.6. Russia	43
3.1.7. Romania	44
3.1.8. Slovakia	45
3.1.9. Slovenia	46
3.2. Political support in new democracies: the comparative view	47

3.2.1. Overview	47
3.2.2. Anti-system attitudes and rejection of democracy	49
3.2.3. Trust in institutions	51
3.2.4. Attitudes towards the reactivity of the political system and to the personal role within the political sphere	51
3.2.5. The role of the political elites	53
3.3. Social and cultural bases of democratization	56
3.3.1. Social inequality and justice: the problem of exaggerated expectations	56
3.3.2. Political support in new democracies: sozialization vs. situation of life hypotheses	60
3.3.3. Third Wave and Forth Wave democracies in comparison	62
3.4. Democratization and EU enlargement	65
3.4.1. Institutional and historical background	66
3.4.2. Attitudes towards the EU	67
3.4.3. Political orientations and EU enlargement	70
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS	75
1. Beyond institutional and economic integration: the relevance of attitudes and values for the EU enlargement process	75
2. Main results and conclusions	77
3. Policy implications	82
4. Providing a basis for future research	83
V. DISSEMINATION AND EXPLOITATION OF RESULTS	86
1. Dissemination strategies	86
1.1. Web site	86
1.2. E-mail distribution list	86
1.3. Publications	86
1.4. Conferences and workshops	87
1.5. Media	87
2. International co-operation and follow-up projects	87
VI. REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY	89
VII. ANNEXES	102
1. Tables	102
2. Publications related to the project	115
2.1. Books	115
2.2. Journal articles	116

2.3. Book sections	119
2.4. Other	123
2.5. Policy papers	124
2.6. Policy bulletins	126
3. Presentations	128
4. Status of the deliverables	136
5. List of project participants	137

Acknowledgements

The *Democratic Values* project was a collaborative effort. Therefore, we would like to acknowledge the work of all the national members and affiliated persons (Nikolai Tilkidjiev, Klara Plecítá-Vlachová, Raivo Vetik, Lubomira Žaloudková, Brina Malnar, Ivan Bernik, Ioan Marginean, Iuliana and Marius Precupetu, Mariano Torcal, Irene Martín-Cortés, Lorenzo Brusattin, Manina Kakepaki, Marina Krassilnikova, Natalya Zorkaya, Zsolt Spéder, Susanne Pickel, Teuta Starova, Detlef Pollack, Jörg Jacobs, Olaf Müller and Gert Pickel). Furthermore, we would like to thank the polling institutes in the countries that collected the data for our *PCEND 2000-02* survey, particularly Christian Holst at the coordinating institute Ipsos GmbH, Mölln. Also, we thank the Frankfurt Institute for Transformation Studies (F.I.T.) for providing office technology and supporting the publishing of discussion papers and project reports. For administrative support, we would like to thank our former and current student assistants Grit Lemke, Anja Galeski, Katharina Gaber, Susanne König, Ania Kobus, and Lukas Oldenburg. Last but not least we would like to thank the European Commission for their support, particularly the scientific officer responsible for this project, Aris Apollonatos, for his guidance and helpful suggestions and comments.

Abstract

The Democratic Values project deals with the **social and cultural bases for the determinants of political attitudes towards the European integration** in the frame of the transition processes in Central and Eastern Europe. One specific point in this context is the relation to aspects of social inequality and the political support of the democracy in the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe.

For the analysis, we use data from East and East Central European countries (Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, East Germany, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Russia, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia), from "Third Wave"- transition countries (Spain, Greece), and from West Germany. The central results are:

- 1) As far as the peoples' support of democracy is concerned, the situation in many countries gives little cause for pessimism. Though attitudes towards the performance of the political system (specific support) are relatively negative in almost all countries of Central and Eastern Europe observed, diffuse democratic support (i.e. attitudes towards the principles and the idea of democracy as such) is much higher. There are good reasons to assume that it is the latter that is decisive for securing the attitudinal basis for democracy.
- 2) One main problem emerging from the situation in the transition countries is the rising social inequality, which has to be considered as an important topic the national governments as well as the EU have to deal with.
- 3) With regard to the integration of the Central and East European countries into the European Union, our investigations have shown that the consolidation of the democracies in the Eastern European countries proves to be a motor for the integration into the European Union – and is at the same time a beneficiary of this perspective. The lessons that the European Union could draw from the successes of the Southern Enlargement could so far successfully be applied in Eastern Europe and lead the member states of the European Union toward the aim that they had visualized: market-economical, constitutional, liberal-democratic acceding states with populations that wish for joining the European Union.

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Conceptual background

After the collapse of the socialist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe new constitutions were designed by the parliament, or the socialist constitutions were strongly modified, and political institutions were established that are compatible with the concepts of order inherent in a liberal democracy and market economy. However, the formal implementation does not yet guarantee a fully functional political and economical system; for that the institutions must prove themselves in the daily political routine. Most scholars agree that citizens' experience with a well-functioning democracy encourages their support for the regime (democratic legitimacy). It makes it easier to reject the prior regime after a democratic transition and is vital for the consolidation of democracy.

In order to be able to estimate the degree of democratic and market economy consolidation, it is necessary to examine how congruent the new institutional orders and political cultures are in the Central and East European transition countries. It is by no means a given evolutionary fact that a relatively stable political system must necessarily adhere to the laws of a liberal democracy, or that a relatively stable economic system must follow the concepts of order belonging to a market economy. Rather, the new structures must prove to be functional in the daily routine of transition, and a large majority of the population must be convinced that these new structures are the most suitable for solving the problems occurring in such a society as their own.

Only if the elites keep to the new rules of the game, and only if the population supports the new institutional order (on the political and economic dimension), can a certain democratic durability and stability be achieved. If these conditions are fulfilled over a longer period of time, one can say that the democratic consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe has been completed. As several empirical studies show, the degree of legitimacy is not as high as it should be to speak of consolidated political systems.

But in contrast to the support of liberal democracy, the legitimacy of the prior socialist regime through state services, such as welfare and social security, could weaken political stability, due to the economic faults of the transition. If a certain proportion of the population supports this nostalgia, there might be demands for a return to a totalitarian rule. Thus democracy and market economy in the transition countries are still going through a period of trial. If people still support a socialist democracy, they might not wish for a liberal democracy.

The price to be paid for more freedom and the chance of individual welfare is social insecurity, inequality and, of course, individual responsibility. The question is, whether this is accepted by the citizens. Through institutional changes of the social system the benefits of the communist systems are now gone. Virtually no unemployment, guaranteed housing and low prices for food and child care organized by the state, gender equality and equal incomes compared with western countries are longer experienced by the public at large and no longer promised by the government. But social benefits had been the main achievements of communist societies, driven by their ideology. Most people in the countries in transition favored the creation of market economies, but also demanded the social welfare programs provided by the previous regimes.

A key to solve this problem might be the understanding of equality as equality of opportunity or equality of outcome. This is based on differing perceptions of justice and social order. Today it is just not only a question of confronting equality and inequality. Today's question is also, what kind of equality is just and attainable. The egalitarian point of view found in Eastern Europe is, that justice requires the absence of inequality. Inequality is here defined as the difference in outcome. The market economy needs a different understanding of equality. Justice in a market economy requires not equal results, but equality of opportunity: equality before the law, equality in certain basic resources. Competition with unequal results has to be explicitly tolerated and reward is given according to what one does and how well one does it. Neither equality of result nor equality of opportunity is to be found totally realized in any society. Modern societies are always a mixture of both, but the latter should also be accepted within the transition countries. If there is no such understanding, an important fundament of the European Union is missing.

2. Objectives

Aim of the project was to identify the social and cultural bases for an integration of the Central and European nations into the European Union. At the core of our analyses was the interrelationship between political, economic and cultural values and in which way these values shape peoples' opinion about the European Union. Our initial assumption was that especially the economic hardships and the decline of the socialist welfare state might cause political attitudes, which are not compatible with a European value community and lead to obstacles for the enlargement of the European Union. To give account of the impact of peoples' belief systems on the political processes, we tried to analyse the interrelationships between economic attitudes/values, social attitudes/values and political attitudes/values. It was our hope that an analysis of peoples' belief systems

would improve the understanding of individual coping strategies in times of institutional uncertainties and societal changes.

The main objective concerning the dissemination of results was to give decision makers a better understanding of the political culture of Central and Eastern Europe. In case the European Union will develop further, it will also need the support of its citizens, not only of the national governments. The experiences with the decline of social welfare and economic hardship can give an insight which difficulties decision makers have to face if a reform is not build on economic development and carried through against the attitudes of the people. In this sense, our analyses were also done in order to be used for the preparation of political decisions.

3. Scientific results

3.1. Political support in new democracies: the comparative view

The populations of the countries investigated are in their majority still dissatisfied with how the democracy is developing in their own respective countries. Generally, satisfaction with the democracy's performance is much lower in the transformation countries than in established democracies. Obviously the political institutions in Central and Eastern Europe do not yet work the way the populations expect. With the exception of East Germany, Estonia and the Czech Republic, there is no country, where more than one third of the citizens positively evaluate the performance of the present democracy. The most adverse conditions are to be found in Romania, Bulgaria and Russia. Considering temporally comparable results, Russia can be seen as a country facing a permanent political crisis.

At the same time, however, the data for autumn 2000 indicate a thoroughly good assessment of the main democratic principles, i.e. its value foundation and its general acceptance as a good form of government. Almost all citizens of the new transition countries think that these general elements of the democratic legitimacy are on principal good and worth to be supported. Alone in Russia and, with some restrictions, in Bulgaria, the population values the idea of democracy and "democracy as best form of government" somewhat more unfavourable.

There is no country where non-democratic forms of government are approved by a majority. Only an (autocratic) government of experts is considered to be desirable by majorities of all countries. In most of the transition countries, the return to socialism attracts support of only about 20%. The return to socialism, the abolition of the parliament or the possibility to establish a dictatorship is supported most in Russia,

Bulgaria and Romania. Generally, one can not proceed from an acute endangerment of the existing orders in post communist Europe. This also shows when the results are compared with those from the existing democracies: At most, the call for a strong leader is more pronounced in some countries in Eastern Europe than it is the case with Western Europe but here also, it seems more like this expresses the wish for a competent and professional single person rather than for a dictator.

With regard to institutional trust, it can be shown that the political institutions of the judicative and executive enjoy a considerably higher confidence than the core institutions of the legislative. All in all, one can state: the less connected to the main characters of politics the institutions are conceived to be, the more trust citizens place in them. Particularly, political parties and politicians that are in the spotlight of everyday politics do not get really good trust-values – a fact that also effects the important democratic institution of the parliament. However, the trust in institutions in Eastern Europe is not at all everywhere lower than in the established democracies (trust in the courts e.g. is lowest in Spain, where only one third report to have confidence). The values for trust in parliament and the trust in the person of the president for instance, are as a rule even slightly higher than in Western Europe.

There is a relatively large proportion of the population that values the reactivity of the political system (External Political Efficacy) as low. About 65 to 80% of the respondents do not believe that politicians still hold their promises after the elections. Apart from the slightly better evaluation in Hungary, the differences between the examined countries are rather small. There is a general doubt that the political system can fulfil its function. Also, the prevailing majority of respondents express scepticism towards the “caste of the politicians” as bearer of authority.

With regard to the perception of the individual’s commitment to the political system (Internal Political Efficacy), most of the post-communist countries show rather weak values, although there are also remarkable deviations. The majority of the populations of Estonia, the Czech Republic and Russia find that there is the possibility of individual influence on political decisions.

The own political competence, compared to the other three indicators, is also valued relatively good. In Eastern Germany, only a little more than one third of the respondents claim to have no competence in political questions, in all other countries these figures rank around 50%. Viewing this discrepancy between the self-assessment of competence and the attitudes to the reactivity of the political system, it becomes clear that an

improvement of political knowledge will probably not suffice for correcting the negative attitudes of the citizens towards the rulers in Central and Eastern Europe.

All in all, the populations of Central Eastern Europe are as a rule capable of distinguishing between the principle of democracy and the realization of this principle. (Dis-)Satisfaction with the working of democracy is only loosely connected to affirmations of the democratic principle. Our data indicate a thoroughly good assessment of the main democratic principles, i.e. its value foundation and its general acceptance as a good form of government. Almost all citizens of the new transition countries think that these general elements of the democratic legitimacy are on principal good and worth to be supported.

The course of political consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe does not only depend on the support of the current system by the population but also on the way how the "old" elites were involved into the democratization process. Whereas during the initial stages of the transition, the leading players were large social movements that in many cases took the form of unified national fronts, which in their majority won the first (or founding) elections, the former (communist) elites came back on the agenda during the mid-1990s. Soon, it became evident that the much anticipated collapse of the ex-communist parties at the founding elections was only temporary, if occurred at all. In the second round of elections, despite their initial defeat – or exactly because of it – the majority of them made an impressive return, by increasing their share of the vote, as a result of their transformation and adaptation to the new political environment. Under certain circumstances, their comeback played a positive role on the issue of democratization: the inclusion of post-communist parties in the electoral competition of the countries of ECE contributed to the consolidation of democracy, provided that the following conditions were met: the party underwent an internal transformation that enabled it to commit to the democratic rule *and* had a significant electoral appeal. In those countries where one of these conditions was lacking, the transmission of democratic values by the communist successor parties could not, and did not, occur.

3.2. Social and cultural bases of democratization

The people in most countries of Eastern Europe do not cherish an ideology of complete equality. Yet they can probably neither be described as strong advocates of a market-economic liberalism. Though the principle of the equality of opportunities, which is generally preferred by adherents of a market economy, is in all countries accepted by a majority, there are conversely also people that favor the equality of resources. All in all, there seems to emerge a certain "reluctant arrangement" with the principles of market

economy: social differences are perceived as just, if equally available opportunities were not utilized.

All in all, the people in the transformation countries of Central and Eastern Europe are not completely opposed to a certain social differentiation in their societies. Nevertheless, the Eastern European citizens release their political system only reluctantly and unwillingly from its social responsibility. More than a decade after the societal upheaval, a vast majority of the citizens call for a strong and intervening government that above all should balance and compensate the "injustices" of the market economy in the social sector.

The notion that this attitude shall predominantly be the expression of an ideological legacy of the extinct societal system seems rather doubtful. There are quite some indications that such attitudes have to do with the real experiences of the new era. In the first place, it is then the perception of unequal opportunities that arouses criticism. It seems as if the citizens do not trust the new economic system to guarantee a just distribution of wages, employments and an at least tolerable standard of living. In the view of the population, the market economy per se is arranged on social inequality and reproduces, respectively enforces them. The general demand, accordingly, is that state and government shall adopt the role of a social regulator.

There are some implications that the state- and equality-oriented attitude structures are not to be understood as specific post-socialist legacies that take effect in the young democracies of Central and Eastern Europe only. At least with regard to the spreading of statist orientations, the differences seem to be much less enormous than generally assumed. Moreover, the people have a lot of demands on their political systems everywhere. Many of these tasks, that are assigned to the state, do not even belong to its "classical" sphere of responsibility, others, given the changed demographic and global economic conditions, are almost unaccomplishable. As far as the transformation states in Central and Eastern Europe are concerned, we consider the thesis of a lasting and ubiquitous effect of social legacies in Eastern Europe, as well as the claim of a regional peculiarity doubtful.

One of the most challenging aspects for the success of the transformation process in Central and Eastern Europe is to improve the socio-economic circumstances of the East European people. People judge their personal situation often better than the general situation in the country is assessed. But the share of those noticing an improvement in their own economic status since the eighties is conspicuously low. These rather negative

assessments of the economic performance result in a general sceptic orientation towards the market economy.

Dissatisfaction with the socio-economic situation influences the assessment of the current political system strongly. There is a very strong and significant relationship between the economic situation and the attitudes towards the capacity of the political regime.

Furthermore, the assessment whether the democracy works or not is by no means independent of the current achievements of the political system itself; i.e. the reactivity of the political elites and the trustworthiness of the government. Whether the society is judged as just or unjust, has also its impact on the assessment of the regime's performance.

And even though the achievements described above are judged negatively, the majority of the population in most of the countries examined hold on to the ideal of democracy. Hence, we are compelled to interpret this as expressing relative stability regarding the agreement to democracy as an idea. E.g., in most countries the change in personal status either exerts no influence or only a very slight degree of influence over the affirmation of the democratic principle. This implies that the acceptance of the idea of democracy in most countries is largely independent of personally experienced material changes over the last years. Thus one must assume that, in many countries of Eastern and Central Europe, a clear distinction was made between the level of legitimation and that of economic performance only a few years after the political and social upheaval.

More influence is exerted over the acceptance of democracy as an idea and form of government by the value orientations included in the analysis, of which the degree of importance attributed to political and civil rights, the value of equality of opportunities, a liberal understanding of the economy as well as the rejection of the economy's nationalization are the most influential. As far as the topic of social justice is concerned, the comparison of the present system with the past seems to effect the attitude towards the idea of democracy only slightly and in some countries.

Resuming our analyses of the social and cultural bases of democratization, one can state that attitudes towards democracy as an idea are determined more strongly by value orientations than by the assessment of the political system's functionality or even the economic situation. All in all, therefore, it can be said that neither the performance of the political system nor the efficiency of the economy represents a crucial factor in the affirmation of the democratic principle. Affirming this principle, then, is much more, and mainly, dependent upon internalized convictions that are possibly more closely interlinked with each other.

As long as a population makes a clear distinction between dissatisfaction with the system's performance and the approval of democratic principles, one can reckon with reforms within the political system, not, however, with a reform of the political system. Only if this separation is no longer made and agreement to democratic principles decreases dramatically at the same time, can there also be ensuing consequences affecting the complete political order. Such a case can occur if the performance of the political and economic system is judged negatively over a longer period of time. The likelihood that people differentiate in their support between different levels of the political system would decrease and the perceived performance would effect the perceived legitimacy of a regime. Nevertheless, our analyses have shown that currently the legitimacy of democracy (which is in our opinion decisive for securing the attitudinal basis for democracy) is mainly determined by the support for modern values in the transformation countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

At the same time, however, it is necessary to point out again that the degrees of consolidation reached in each of the countries differ strongly from each other. In most countries the principle of democracy is accepted by the majority and the level of legitimation and that of performance are clearly separated from each other, whereas in Russia there is no definite majority that approves of democracy as an idea, even though the two levels are also clearly distinguished.

All in all, it can be said that there is a limited threat to democracy in Eastern Europe, which turns out differently concerning the respective regions. Most states of Central and Eastern Europe do relatively well concerning their political-democratic legitimacy. Yet, their democratic leaders do not reach a level of efficacy that convinces their populations. Assuming that the inefficiency, as perceived by the citizens, has long-term consequences on the still rather high legitimacy, clear potentials of danger for the democratic legitimacy can be foreseen. It rather appears to be the question, why, in spite of the rather unfavourable assessments of performance, there is such a high extent of democratic legitimacy. Possibly, the hope for a rising welfare within the European Union contributes to this advance of democratic legitimacy.

3.3. Democratization and EU enlargement

When asked in 2000, in all countries of Eastern Europe, the vast majority of the citizens were consent to join the EU. As people did not decide on joining the EU, this resembles less a general rejection than a certain lack of interest for this matter.

There seems to be a clear difference between the desired speed of negotiation and the perceived progress of the negotiation process. The majority in the populations of the new

Eastern European democracies supported a fast joining of the European Union. Especially the citizens from states that are expected join on a later date or that have at the moment no perspective of being admitted to the European Union (Albania) wish for joining the EU soon. The longer the way to Europe is, the more the citizens want to speed this dynamic up. The unanimous attitude of the Southern Eastern European citizens in this respect is noteworthy. They probably hope that joining the EU offers considerable economic improvements, which, from their point of view, are urgently needed for the development of their countries. Thus it is especially the Albanians – so far not even associated with the European Union – and the Romanian people that plead for adapting to the rules of the European Union, even if that causes temporary deteriorations at the labour market.

In 2000, there was a fundamental discrepancy between the clearly pro-European statements and the preference to first develop an own self- confidence before associating with the European Union. This does not mean that both convictions have to be diametrically opposed to each other. After all, the statement “develop more self- confidence” relates directly to joining the EU and thus almost determinedly presupposes it. Thus, the agreement with that item does not indicate a rejection of the joining per se but rather some scepticism concerning the timing of it.

It seems quite a lot like the development of an independent national position is of fundamental importance to all citizens in Eastern Europe. This has substantial consequences for those countries that had already advanced further in the process of joining the European Union: under no circumstances did they want to be an (associated) junior partner within the European social and economic area but rather have had the same rights as all other EU member states. The statement of a “negotiation at the same eye level”, as the Hungarian ambassador made it, describes this wish forcefully.

Most Eastern Europeans feel connected to several collectives and presumably do not see a fundamental conflict in doing so. There are groups that define themselves by dissociating themselves from a European identity. This seems to be the case in Russia (67%) and Bulgaria (68%) as well as with a considerable number of people in Albania (45%) and Estonia (31%). The closer a country is situated to the EU border, the more often its citizens define themselves as Europeans.

Nationalism only opposes a European identity if it takes on a very closed form in the nation as well as features of regionalism and if it aims at preserving local traditions. Concerning the investigated countries, this holds only true for Russia and, to some extent, for Bulgaria.

People who support the idea and structure of democracy are more inclined to support a rapid way into the EU than critics of democracy. It is true that also the advocates of democracy wish for their nation to gain more self-confidence (before joining the European Union) but they absolutely do not want the process to stagnate. Within this constellation, it is rather the acceptance of the liberal democratic principles than the current situation which is the decisive factor for the attitude toward the joining: compared to the indicators of political legitimacy, the interaction of the indicators for joining the EU with the democratic performance is weaker but still remains as a positive relation. At the moment, the question about joining the EU seems to be rather a long-term value decision than an ad-hoc estimation which is based on short-term opinions and mood changes.

The support for a democratic political culture and attitudes towards the European Union induce and strengthen each other. The consolidation of the democracies in the Eastern European acceding countries proves to be a motor for the integration into the European Union – and is at the same time a beneficiary of this perspective. The lessons that the European Union could draw from the successes of the “Southern” enlargement (Greece, Spain, Portugal) could so far successfully be applied for the further “Eastern” enlargement process and lead the member states of the European Union toward the aim that they had visualized: market-economical, constitutional, liberal-democratic acceding states with populations that wish for a EU joining.

4. Policy implications

- 1) The fact that democracy as an idea and principle is supported by the majority of the population in most countries gives cause for optimism but should not lead to the conclusion that the democratic consolidation has come to its end. Increasing social inequality has to be considered as an important topic the national governments as well as the European Union have to deal with. The problem of social inequality refers to the objective situation in some countries but also to its critical perception by the people. Keeping in mind that market economy is increasingly judged negatively (not only concerning its performance but also with regard to its general ideas and principles), the European Union should pay attention to promote the chances resulting from its social/economic policy (i.e. with regard to its implications for the improvement of the social/economic situation in the countries). Concerning the legitimacy of the EU social policy, it would be advantageous to promote a steady dialogue between the policy makers and the national interest groups (unions).

- 2) To deal with the problem of exaggerated expectations concerning the state's capacity to regulate all sectors of society will be a general problem of all European governments. However, the need to transform the political, the social, the legal, and the economic system simultaneously, and the fact that for the majority of the East Europeans social inequality is a relatively new phenomenon, makes this problem particularly important in the transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The European Union should enforce programs that promote the understanding of complex interactions within the field of social and economic policy. Apart from the national political elites and interest groups, the media should be integrated in such a communication strategy.

- 3) It is exactly because of the fact that Eastern Europeans are by themselves aware of their own political and economic backwardnesses that they should always be treated as equal partners. Regardless of the mere formal-institutional process, the social-cultural integration into the European Union will be only successful if East Europeans feel to be welcome and accepted as contributors to the unification process. A European identity can only build on a well-balanced conglomerate of self-conscious national identities. The perception of first- and second-class members has to be prevented in any case (this refers to the population of the countries as well as to the national elite). Appropriate strategies to reach this aim are the strengthening of the dialogue between the European Union and the national actors and interest groups in the preliminary stages of negotiations and political decisions and the promotion of programs that explicitly refer to co-operations and activities between the European Union/Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe (exchange programs, political and cultural events, etc.).

To sum up: programs to improve the political and economic development, to drive forward the professionalization of the reform elites and to promote political decisions via interest groups and the media will be the best investment in the future of a stable and prospering democratic European community.

II. BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES OF THE PROJECT

1. Research background

Directly after the collapse of state socialism in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe there were more than a few that assumed the development of stable democracies in these countries would be a lengthy process, in spite of the bad experiences made by the populations during the communist phases and their resulting openness towards the Western system. Influenced by the forty or seventy-year rule of communist parties and unacquainted with the procedures and mechanisms of modern democracies, the political elites as well as the masses in these countries would thus need more time to build up a democratic state system, and not only introduce a democratic rule of the game but also accept and adhere to it. Claus Offe and Jon Elster even spoke of the "dilemma of contemporaneity" (Offe 1991 1994; Elster 1990), which rendered the development of consolidated democracies extremely improbable. With this term they described the problematic issue that, if a modern democratic order with a market economy were meant to emerge, two or three transformation processes would have to take place simultaneously, as opposed to the capitalist and democratic states of Western Europe, or the transformation states of southern Europe, Latin America and East Asia: the political transition from a dictatorship to a democracy, the economic transformation from a planned economy to a market economy, and in some cases even the change-over from nation empires or state alliances to nation states. In Western Europe these processes had evolved gradually, one after the other, whereas the states of Central Eastern Europe would have to tackle them simultaneously. In view of the social costs that are likely to ensue from the economic reforms, one can, according to Offe and Elster, hardly assume that the population will support the necessary economic reorganization measures. Due to the fact that the democratic order had been introduced simultaneously to the market economy, the population's unavoidable dissatisfaction could directly affect the policy of reform of the reforming elites and thus lead to a delay in the reforms, to the current elites being voted out, and even finally to a return to an authoritarian regime. The simultaneously implemented processes of transition could have "mutual obstruction effects" on each other (Offe 1991: 283).

The experiences of the Weimar Republic and the early Federal Republic of Germany show that such anxieties regarding the effects of economic processes of change on the legitimization of a democracy not only refer to hypothetical postulates but genuine occurrences. The economic crisis in Germany contributed to the political delegitimization of the Weimar Republic, whereas the economic upswing of the Federal Republic in the

fifties and sixties contributed to its legitimation. When one considers the fact that people in the countries of Central Eastern Europe in the years directly following the collapse of state socialism suffered a more serious loss of wealth than those living in the capitalist nations at the end of the twenties during the world economic crisis, then it is really not unrealistic to assume that the support of the democracy that might have been considerable at the beginning will soon dwindle in these countries and the starting capital will be used up quickly (Rose 1997 1999).

In view of such reflections ten years after the systemic transition the question therefore arises, what degree of legitimacy the new democratic orders in the post-communist states of Central Eastern Europe have reached in the meantime. Have Offe's and Elster's prophecies of gloom turned out to be realistic, or were their fears exaggerated? The *Democratic Values* project goes into the question to what degree the democracy in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe is legitimized and stabilized. The question poses itself most poignantly with regard to the expansion of the EU towards the East.

2. Objectives of the project

The main goal of the project was to identify the social and cultural bases for an integration of the Central and European nations into the European Union. The complex transformation processes towards democracy and market economy were the frame for this project. At the core of our analyses was the interrelationship between political, economic and cultural values and in what way these values shape peoples opinion about the EU. One specific point in this context was the relationship between social inequality and support of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe 10 years after the breakdown of communism. Our initial assumption was that especially the economic hardships and the decline of the socialist welfare state might cause political attitudes, which are not compatible with a European value community and lead to obstacles for the enlargement of the European Union.

In most transformation countries, the old social contract aiming at collective goals was abandoned and replaced by a new one with predominantly individualistic orientation. The fundamental changes of the interplay between state, market and society, to be observed in Central and Eastern Europe, raise the question which individual and collective strategies the citizens have to cope with the new situation. To give account of the impact of peoples' belief systems on the political processes, we tried to analyse the interrelationships between economic attitudes/values, social attitudes/values and political attitudes/values. It was our hope that an analysis of peoples' belief systems would

improve the understanding of individual coping strategies in times of institutional uncertainties and societal changes.

At the time when the project was started, most governments of Central and Eastern Europe wished to join the European Union. But the countries differed concerning the progress they made to meet the requirements for joining the EU. Therefore, we included European nations where the transformation from an authoritarian to a democratic system was successful and already led to an EU membership (Greece and Spain), where the transition process was advanced (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Estonia), where the transition process was on a good course (Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia), and where the transition process was in the initial phase (Albania, Russia). West Germany has always been seen as paradigmatic case for a change towards a democratic political culture. The unification of East and West Germany could also be seen a paradigmatic case for the cultural integration of post-communist nations into the EU.

The main objective concerning the dissemination of results was to give decision makers a better understanding of the political culture of Central and Eastern Europe. The effects of an extremely rapid and radical change of the societies can be observed as a quasi experiment in the post-communist countries. In the long run, the legitimacy of the new institutional structure will be decisive for a certain degree of stability and the consolidation of the new political systems. In a sense, the revision of the European institutions will have to do the same thing. In case the European Union will develop further, it will also need the support of its citizens, not only of the national governments. The experiences with the decline of social welfare and economic hardship can give an insight which difficulties decision makers have to face if a reform is not build on economic development and carried through against the attitudes of the people. In this sense, our analyses were also done in order to be used for the preparation of political decisions.

Central questions of the project were:

- 1) What are the effects of political culture on the process of European integration?
Do the cultural conditions of the transition countries cause different paths towards the European Union? Is there a danger, that the enlargement of the EU undermines the cultural basis of the European Union?
- 2) Would the EU be able to stabilize the transformation process in Central and Eastern Europe if the democracies are not consolidated and the market economies not fully functioning?

- 3) Would we find a considerable proportion of the public that rejects the principles of a liberal democracy and market economy? Do citizens in Central and Eastern Europe distance themselves from these principles, which are basic principles in the European Union?
- 4) Compared to the EU members Germany, Greece and Spain we expected to find a considerable proportion of the public that rejects the principles of a liberal democracy. For further development it will be important to know what mainly causes these orientations. Is it mainly the situation of life that determines political support or is it the socialization under communism? Would we find a certain kind of nostalgia for the benefits of the communist regime, or has the example of the EU caused a diffusion of values? Only if the delivery of goods and services are the main factor for political attitudes do the decision makers have a chance to change peoples' attitudes. If political attitudes are mainly caused through socialization, it will take a generation or longer until we find a majority of democrats in Central and Eastern Europe.
- 5) What kind of relationship exists between the recent economical situation, the social situation, the changing social structure, the developing political culture, specific political attitudes of the citizens and political behaviour? Does the growing social inequality also cause a low political support for the new democracies?

A policy orientated question was, whether the pattern of orientations are compatible with an EU membership of the transition countries. Are there regional differences concerning the political culture? What is the effect of differences in the political culture on the consolidation of democracy? A comparison between members of the EU and the transition countries should reveal, whether there is a common cultural basis in the 13 nations we will analyse.

III. SCIENTIFIC DESCRIPTION OF PROJECTS RESULTS AND METHODOLOGY

1. Theoretical framework

The fall of the Iron Curtain gave the nations of Central and Eastern Europe the chance to take part in the processes of modernization taking place in Western Europe. But the transformation of Central and Eastern Europe is not a one-way street. The institutional framework, measured in terms of the civic and political rights indices developed by Freedom House, shows that there is a great diversity in the degree to which East and Central European countries have moved towards full substantive, competitive democracies. Some countries, such as Poland, the Czech Republic, or Hungary, have reached the status of fully-fledged competitive democracies with well-protected civic and political rights, and with only minor infringements, whereas other countries, like Byelorussia, the Ukraine, or Albania, though formal democracies, display tendencies toward authoritarian, personalistic if not despotic governments. As, however, the crisis in the Czech Republic indicated in 1997 or the most recent parliamentary elections in Poland show, even countries that are the most advanced in establishing a liberal democracy have a rocky path ahead of them for a sustainable development. The diversity of the post-communist political regimes and the specific problems of some East European countries in introducing democracy raise some doubt about whether it is a given evolutionary fact that a relatively stable political system must necessarily adhere to the laws of a liberal democracy, or that economic ideals must follow the concepts of order belonging to a market economy. Therefore it is crucial for research to analyse the conditions of a successful democratization.

There is a large number of different aspects that have to work together to make a sustainable development likely, and a lot has been written about them (Przeworski 1995). West Germany after World War II certainly demonstrates that a prosperous economic development helps to anchor a democratic regime. As Chile under Pinochet or the developments of the Asian tiger-states have shown, however, economic development is not a guarantee for a democracy to come into being. It is also possible that economic development is congruent with an authoritarian regime. Obviously, other factors are also needed to craft a sustainable democratic regime, like the rule of law and an appropriate institutional framework. Not only the economic, juridical or political environment and performance are important, however, for it seems also necessary that citizens relate to their political institutions and support them. Some even say political culture is the element without which a consolidated democracy will never be warranted. And political

support is seen by many as a main defining feature of democratic regimes (Easton 1975, 1979; Rose et al. 1998; Norris 1999).

Therefore, from a culturalist perspective, the main aim for the consolidation of a new political system is to legitimize implemented political institutions so that the power to resist external (e.g. war) or internal (e.g. a financial crisis or putsch attempt) shocks is maximized (Plasser et al. 1998; Diamond 1999). Practically, people have to get used to the new rules, seek to reach their aim within the given rules, and be convinced that a democracy is the best way of solving the problems of a community such as their own. They do not have to be convinced that it is the best political order but that it is better than any other that has been tried from time to time, as Churchill (1947) put it (Mishler/Rose 1999). At least the elites in all European transformation countries (maybe with the exception of Byelorussia) have proclaimed their aim to establish fully functioning democracies and market economies. Through this focus on the procedure of systemic change, the question "what democracy do the people in Central and Eastern Europe want?" (Fuchs 1997) becomes a central aspect of research, and the attitudinal dimension of a regime change comes to the fore – a question that was already introduced to research 40 years ago by Almond and Verba with their definition of the term political culture. They confined the political culture of a nation to "the particular patterns of orientation toward political objects among members of a nation" and as "internalized in the cognitions, feelings, and evaluations of its population" (Almond/Verba 1989: 13).

The political culture of a nation is also, however, strongly related to its international environment, and complex institutional and social issues as well as the economic development determine the pattern of political orientations within a society. At the same time, the political culture is strongly influenced by national traditions. *Obstacles and barriers* when forming a democratic political culture can be:

- 1) economic crises;
- 2) the increase of social inequality;
- 3) inefficient and ineffective political institutions;
- 4) irritations in the relationship with Western Europe/the European Union (e.g. imposing one's will, lack of interest);
- 5) the cultural inheritance from the communist regime and national traditions from pre-communist times.

In short, hardships caused by the social and economic transformations and cultural traditions in Central and Eastern Europe might lead to political attitudes that endanger the process of democratization and the further development of the European social culture. Therefore we have to ask what determines the development of a political culture that is compatible with a democratic regime.

Easton and others support the idea that durability, stability or persistence of a political system will only be achieved, if the people support institutions for their own sake and thus legitimize these institutions. But is it really so that political culture has this enormous meaning? Is it not rather likely that stability is mainly influenced by the efficiency of political and economic institutions, the performance of political authorities, and the rational calculation of each individual? Because of this uncertainty, one of the most important and difficult questions to answer in political culture research is what it is that determines support for the new order. And to answer this question, it is not enough to concentrate on political attitudes alone. The specific situation of a simultaneous change in the political, economic and social system in Central and Eastern Europe demands that the interdependence of political, economic and social attitudes and value orientations be focused on as a main issue. The gist of this interdependence is the connection between economic development and political development. If the assumption holds that culture is durable, the cultural heritage of communism exerts great influence on the willingness and ability of the population to support democratic institutions. Cultural changes would occur only slowly over time. If political culture is short-lived and highly volatile, the ability of the population to adapt to unfamiliar circumstances depends more on the specific situation, on a successful transformation of the economy, and on the performance of political institutions (Mishler/Pollack 2003). According to these thoughts, the universe of possible determinants of political support for a new order can be clustered into two hypotheses:

Hypothesis of socialization: Should the hypothesis of socialization apply, the ruling political regime would be judged mainly by communist values, because people are influenced strongly by their socialization under the socialist regime. A prolonged process of democratic consolidation would be the consequence, in which time a political culture must first develop among the successor generations that is congruent with the structures of a liberal democracy. The success of this process is by no means guaranteed and can not, or only in a limited fashion, be achieved via short-term economic prosperity, since it is not by economic success that attitudes consistent with the political order can be generated. According to socialization hypothesis, the process of democratization is mainly influenced by the legacy of the former communist rule. Old values are deeply anchored and might be in conflict with newly introduced institutions, or, at the least, some old and

some new values might contradict each other. Especially the former legitimacy of the socialist regime through state services, such as welfare and social security, could weaken the support for a highly competitive regime and promote demands for an antidemocratic alternative. This means in particular that the people expect the state to take on a dominant role in all spheres of economic and social life, since they are used to expecting this. Therefore, in Central and Eastern Europe one could reckon with a development of the political system being more oriented towards real socialist ideals (e.g. social justice and equality in results) than anything else, so that the attitudes of the people and the demands of the competitive system contradict each other. By its very nature, however, a democracy needs to be culturally embedded.

Underlying the socialization hypothesis are some assumptions that are central to the culturalist approach, which should be made explicit. To a certain degree we refer with the following to Harry Eckstein's (1988) account of culturalist thinking:

Firstly, the development of democracy is not only a consequence of economic factors, of the standard of living conditions or the level of welfare, but is also influenced by the shape of the political culture in a given society. This means that the culturalist approach postulates cultural variability as having an impact on the political system.

Secondly, the assumption of cultural variability as politically influential would be meaningless without the addition of another postulate, which might be called the postulate of oriented action. Actions are not direct reactions to objective conditions but respond to them through mediating orientations. Actions are seen as culturally formed. The processing of experiences into actions is not uniform but differs among the individuals within a country and between countries, because of the interference of cultural orientations.

Thirdly, if orientations are not simply subjective reflections of objective situations, they must be learned. Thus, a postulate of cultural socialization must hold if the prior assumptions hold. This socialization process takes a long time. Early learning conditions later learning, so that culture can change only slowly. Culture is characterized by inertia and durability. Therefore, if new institutions are introduced, a gap between the new institutional order and the previously internalized cultural orientations inevitably emerges.

Fourthly, if early learning conditions later learning, the internalized cognitive, affective, and evaluative orientations tend to form a coherent whole. In order to reduce uncertainty of action, orientations have to be consistent. Ill-formed orientations will produce anomic

and random actions and can therefore not be relied on. Coherence of orientations is necessary for the certainty and reliability of behaviour.

2. Hypothesis of the situation of life: Should, however, the hypothesis of the situation of life apply, the political regime will mainly be evaluated according to the individuals' situation of life and the experiences made (individual and collective) with the transformation process. The socialization within the system of a communist society is, according to this hypothesis, more or less insignificant, since the people were already oriented towards the successful (judged by wealth and the guarantee of individual freedom) Western social systems before 1989, or at least 'the official state cult with its demonstrative self-presentation and the real political culture, more characterized by scepticism, rejection and withdrawal than anything else, sharply stood in opposition to one another' (Pollack 1998: 308). In this case, the political elites could basically reckon with the population's sympathy during the transformation of the political order, and the short-term support from large sections of the population could be won for the political system through positive economic effects and efficient political institutions. Sceptical attitudes would then rather be a result of current negative experiences and not a socialist inheritance. The hypothesis of the situation of life also means, however, that the political culture approach is not significant for the process of democratic consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe, because either political culture is meaningless, or it can change fast, or, finally, an adequate political culture is already existent from the beginning of consolidation.

Indeed, this hypothesis rests upon a critical view of the culturalist approach. Many anthropologists stress the fact that cultural continuity is not a matter of course but has to be accomplished by social actors who define and negotiate what norms, values, and symbols are to be renewed and confirmed as being binding. It is not cultural change that has to be explained but cultural continuity. Furthermore, if we look at the development of political culture in some Central and East European countries after 1989, proponents of political culture research are irritated by some irregularities, which should not occur according to their approach. Immediately after the breakdown of communism, support of democratic values in many Central and East European countries was astonishingly high. Jeffrey W. Hahn (1991), for example, made the discovery that the Russian political culture might not be so different from that found in Western industrial democracies in support of democratic values and institutions. Or to take East Germany as a case in point: in 1990 democratic ideas and norms were accepted, and support for the political system's performance was as high as never again. In East Berlin, Fuchs, Klingemann and Schöbel (1991) did not find any evidence for a subject culture in 1991. On the contrary, the political competence found in East Berlin was as high as it was in West Berlin. And as

Gabriel (1997), Gluchowski and Zelle (1992) report, among the east Germans there was only a weak identification with the former regime. According to the political culture approach, this empirical evidence should be quite different. East Germans should have held on to socialist ideals and refused "Western" democratic values, since they were not used to them, and people should have become more open to democratic ideals in the course of the years after 1989, once they had accustomed themselves to the new order.

Taking a preliminary look at empirical findings obtained from analyses from the early 1990s, the situation appears to be different to what the culturalist approach suggests: it seems that cultural orientations do not change slowly, that the process of socialization does not determine later learning, if social, economic, legal, and political circumstances vary fast, and that the values, norms, institutions and expectations regarding the behaviour of the political regime were not so deeply anchored in the belief system of the people. But the postulate of cultural inertia might be strengthened again by introducing some new explanations of "value diffusion", as Frederick Weil (1993) and Robert Rohrschneider (1999) did. This concept can be used as a means of explaining the high democratic orientation immediately after the breakdown of communism in the former GDR. In any case, there is still a discrepancy between a good thought and thin evidence. We should not automatically preclude the possibility of rapid change and the malleability of cultural traits depending on changing social and political conditions or on the efforts of political actors. We should, however, also not preclude the possibility that there is a certain autonomy inherent in culture which can exert a considerable independent influence on economic, political, and social circumstances. In any case is it an empirical task to find a balance between the two positions.


2. Methodology

2.1. Methodological framework

In order to investigate the social and cultural bases of democratization and its impact on EU enlargement, we use the *political culture approach*. Starting from a theoretical concept, in which systems of attitudes are hierarchically structured, due to the limited cognitive capacities of individuals, and in which attitudes on individual aspects are derived from central attitudes (which in themselves are distinguished through their remarkable stability), the framework model is presented in the graph below. The object of the analysis will not be structures of attitude in themselves, but the predominant attitudes referring to the political systems as well as possible determinants of these attitudes.

A complete model on the analysis of the peoples' attitudes on political systems must take determinants of different qualities and their interrelation into consideration. Following Easton's theory, two complexes of attitude objects are examined as dependent variables: diffuse support (legitimacy of the political system) and specific support (performance evaluation) which merely refers to the output.

Value Orientations and Support of the Political
Model of Associations



Although socialization is reckoned to be an essential reason for the existence of value orientations, it cannot be examined in more detail, since no standardized empirical information about socialization exists. It can, however, be integrated into the analysis via the consideration of generational effects as an expression of the social-structural feature of age.

Features of social structure are fairly unchangeable "objective" signs of individuals and their situations. For the process of transition the social structure is highly relevant, as the adaptability of individuals to a new situation is fundamentally dependent on how these features manifest themselves: women and the elderly, for example, are seen as losers of the transition, whereas many of the young and unmarried are considered to be the winners to a more than average extent. On the other hand, in turbulent times, intact families could offer a possibility of retreat and support in the case of economic difficulties, for which reason the marital status of the questioned could indicate a social-structural element for the overcoming of crises. Since the difference between town and country has become established in research as a central cleavage, the size of the community is considered to be a further structural element. Thus it is reckoned that the urban population has a larger potential for supporting and coming to terms with the change of systems.

The individual's awareness of his situation and the attitudinal coming to terms with collected experiences of the transition should convey attitudes towards the political system. Should the hypothesis of the situation of life apply, then the political system would immediately lose the support of the people the moment the individual situation worsened and negative experiences were made. From that it directly follows that one can, in exaggerated terms, in no way speak of a legitimized order in the sense of Easton.

Value orientations are the central feature of the model. In the sense of Converse, value orientations are understood as central attitudes, which are characterized through their uncommonly high stability, reached during socialization and shaping opinions on other attitudinal objects. For the further process of democratic consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe it is thus of central significance whether the broad majority of the people predominantly have value orientations that are compatible with the principles of democracy, market economy and the functional requirements of both. At the same time, the interdependence between social, economic and political value orientations must not be ignored.

2.2. Data base

One main data base we could rely on from the very beginning of the project is the survey ***Political Culture in Central and Eastern Europe (PCE 2000)*** that has been carried out in autumn 2000.¹ The survey was carried out in eleven countries (ten Eastern European countries and Eastern Germany). In the course of the Democratic Values project, we were able to extend the survey by comparative data from Spain, Greece, and West Germany. The data were collected in ***Political Culture in New Democracies (PCND 2002)***. Generally, there are about 1,000 representatively chosen respondents per country (Russia: 1,500) available. The surveys contain an extensive amount of questions concerning political and economical opinions and have a separate block, where the attitudes toward joining the European Union and the self-assessment concerning a European identity are included.²

¹ The PCE 2000 survey was conducted within the projects *Socio-Economic Values and Democratization in South East Europe* (Sozio-ökonomische Wertorientierungen und Demokratisierung in Südosteuropa; funded by VolkswagenStiftung) and *Political Attitudes and Values in Post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe* (Politische Einstellungen und Wertorientierungen in den postkommunistischen Ländern Mittel- und Osteuropas; funded by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft).

² For further technical information, questionnaire, frequencies for most questions, etc. see the cumulated codebook ***PCEND 2000-02***, which is available for downloading at <http://www.democraticvalues.eu.tf>; see also separated annex.

2.3. Country selection

When it came to selecting the research design, considerations from a ***most different system design*** (countries from economically and historically different regions) as well as a ***most similar system design*** (countries from regions of quite similar transformation conditions) were of importance (Collier 1993: 111ff.; Landman 2000: 27ff.). Due to financially and labour-economically induced necessities concerning the selection and concentration on single European nations, both modes of action were finally combined. Thus countries that contrast concerning their regional and socio-economical development were chosen for the analysis. Yet the exemplary cases were not limited to only one country per group. In particular, we will be dealing with

- **Albania, Romania and Bulgaria** for Southern Eastern Europe,
- **Slovenia, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia** for Central Eastern Europe,
- **Estonia** as a selected Baltic state,
- **Russia**, representing the post-socialist countries not involved into the EU integration negotiations.

Furthermore,

- **East Germany** (due to the administrative unit with West Germany to be treated as a special case)
- and three established member states of the European Union, which mastered the transformation from an authoritarian rule in the 70s (**Greece, Spain**) and forty years ago (**West Germany**), were selected.

The selection seemed to be best fit to provide both a contrasting and within the groups comparative research design.

3. Results

3.1. Peculiarities and common grounds of democratization: Country studies³

3.1.1. Bulgaria

As confirmed by many other sociological and statistical studies on Bulgaria, considerable clusters of negative evaluations of the current economic situation of households reveal that the material conditions are prevalently unsatisfactory for a large part of the Bulgarian population. Bulgarians are the most negative about the unfavorable living conditions (of nowadays and in relation to the past) when compared to all other post-communist countries (thus we can speak of the "exceptionality" of Bulgaria). This has been turned into a central political question and real political actions.

The subjective appraisal of people's socio-economic situation has a complex, multilayered structure, which corresponds to their actual differentiation. Between two thirds and three quarters of the adult population declare a strong or very strong dissatisfaction with the economic situation of their households. The negative attitudes predominate among people with a low income, the elderly, those living in small towns and villages.

Apart from these, there are several positions, altogether comprising between one fifth and a quarter of the respondents, in which people claim to have a relatively good or very good material position (in the context of the present crisis). These respondents are not important on the grounds of their number but by the fact that they are representatives of the middle stratum of society (professionals or intelligentsia, employees, entrepreneurs), also including students. They have the potential of forming the actual middle classes, which is a precondition for a sustainable society, due to which these people are likely to support reforms. The survey has confirmed a clear tendency to division into two cultural models of political-economic mentality, stereotypes, evaluations, already established in 1997 (Tilkidjiev 1998 2002). Other authors have reached similar conclusions (cf. Hafner-Fink 1999; Hanhinen 2001).

But the ratio can be changed between these two basic blocks of social groups, according to the material micro-situation and the role of governments. General trust in the status quo dropped quite low. Corruption and clientelism, opposed by total wretchedness, caused a readiness to change the actual government, even the system of government,

³ Due to the lack of financial support for our Albanian co-operation partner, Albania could not be analyzed as a distinct case study but only in comparative analyses. Also, the consolidated democracies West Germany, Spain and Greece were not analyzed as single cases.

clearly demonstrated during the last parliamentary elections of June 2001, when the people chose the previous monarch Simeon II. Thus, there was hope of a "new alternative". It was then that Simeon's time had come. This result was well predicted also by the data of the PCEND 2000-02 survey.

Disappointment in the little progress that was achieved in the transition, the material conditions of people and corruption among politicians is a strong factor of erosion, a factor that increases the "secondary positive legitimization" of the former society and enlarges the contingent of nostalgic people (the "retrospective type") who remember a time of having been more secure, a time that was cheaper and economically calmer. This resulted in increasingly reserved attitudes toward democratic values and the democratic consolidation of Bulgarian society.

The results of the presidential elections in Bulgaria in November 2001 strictly confirmed the comments and analysis of this paper. The winner only won by a small fraction. What was more spectacular was the circumstance that the winner was Georgi Parvanov, the leader of the Bulgarian Socialist Party. This result was mainly due to the "royal games" played by the king-Prime Minister, and also to the fact that a part of the votes were the continuation of a penalty negative vote against the UDF's corruption and policy (not geared towards social equality); partly also because the main electorate were pensioners (there are 2.5 million in the country); among them there are traditional supporters of the socialist party and the "losers" of the economic reforms.

The Bulgarian case during the period of transformation is, however, even more peculiar, since the country became a king for prime minister and a communist as a president. In conclusion, these votes are clear emblematic signs showing a secondary legitimization of the past and the emergence of the retrospective type, who has appeared in a contradictory way – with different stratified faces.

3.1.2. Czech Republic

The Czech Republic has experienced a relatively successful transformation from post-totalitarianism to democracy, from a fully nationalized and centrally planned economy to an economy in which the majority of productive assets are private and the market is the dominant regulatory mechanism. This success is reflected in the attitudes of the people, who are more satisfied with today's system of government and economy than with those existing previously, and who can feel an improvement in their family income. On the other hand, their perceptions reveal a prevailing distrust of the majority of (examined) institutions, a suspicion of large inequalities, and a not very positive evaluation of the country's economic situation.

The results of various surveys in the social sciences that were conducted during the 1990s show that Czechs' attitudes have evolved from a sense of euphoria towards disillusion, and from disillusion towards realism. The initial widespread support for the transformation from post-totalitarianism to democracy, and from an economy governed by the state to one in which the free market holds sway, was founded more on a rejection of the past than on any decisions about the future. It was based more on general values than on subjective preferences. Later, as people's interests became clearer, support for certain changes (especially economic) declined among those who had not benefited from the reforms. Looking back we can see that the proponents of the "shock therapy" were right. They warned that the "appropriate" time for reform – the time when politicians have the political capital to implement reforms – was brief, and that it was necessary to accomplish most of the reforms while people were willing to "tighten their belts".

One of the important outcomes of the transformation was the visible crystallization of interests and ideologies. Transformation produces both "winners" and "losers" (actual or potential). While the "winners" now see the economic order as being fairer in principle and in "reality", the "losers" have moved in the opposite direction. The outcome of that shift was the turn to the left in the elections of 1998, when the social democrats won the elections to the Chamber of Deputies of Parliament. This relative victory of the "socialists" does not imply a return to the old "real socialism", but only a slightly higher regulation of the market and more social protection.

With regard to democracy as the form of government, Czech democracy satisfies all formal criteria – sovereignty of the people, democratic institutions, constitutionalism and rule of law, limited state power and a division of powers, regular, general, free and secret elections, majority rule and the protection of minorities, the protection of human and civil rights, and political pluralism. There are some phenomena, however, that signalize that the renewed democracy is not yet as consolidated as the established democracies of Western Europe, e.g. with regard to the lower satisfaction with the development of democracy and the higher distrust in democratic institutions.

3.1.3. Estonia

Concerning Estonia, it can be said that the transition to the institutional structure of democracy has been successfully completed, but the process of transition to the mechanisms inherent in a mature democracy, based on the ideals of social coherence and justice, has been slower and is still underway. Analyses of the data from the research project *Democratic Values* indicate that the major problems regarding a democratic consolidation in Estonia are related to ethnic and social stratification issues.

The model of a rapid economic development, adopted in Estonia at the beginning of the 1990s has been instrumental in accomplishing market reforms and achieving economic growth. At the same time, this model has brought about negative social consequences, which have substantially decreased the quality of human and social capital in Estonia (Vetik/Ruutsoo 1999). As these forms of capital are the main developmental resource for the future, the promotion of human and social capital is fundamental to a further successful development and, in particular, a consolidation of democracy in Estonia. For the next phase it is important that new mechanisms supporting not only economic growth and competitiveness but also coherence and a proper balance of different sectors of society will replace the specific mechanisms of the first period of development.

The political attitudes of the non-Estonians and Estonians are still very different, expressed in evaluations of the functioning of different political systems, alternatives to the current mode of government and trust in political institutions that form the core elements of political culture. Since non-Estonians are more discontent with the current system than Estonians, preferring instead to support systemic alternatives, it would be logical to assume that their trust in state institutions is lower. The survey demonstrated that this is not the case. Therefore we can say that political attitudes are caused not only by the necessity to adapt to the surrounding environment but also by other factors – first and foremost by the type of political culture.

The analyses of trust render the conclusion that non-Estonians are essentially more state-centered than Estonians. This even applies to the present situation and in this country where they do not feel at home and find that their rights are being unfairly curtailed. This controversy could be explained by the fact that the Russians have a stronger communal tradition (based on their history) and their type of social relations. In the case of the Estonians, attitudes towards the state have always been rather cautious. A possible reason for this could be the historical experience – the Estonian state has only existed for a few decades and therefore the state as such is associated by the Estonians with being governed by strangers who are not be trusted.

In conclusion it can be said that the political attitudes of Estonians and non-Estonians have remained rather different. On the one hand, this is caused by the difficulties of the non-Estonians to adapt to the new state. On the other hand, these differences are caused by several other factors, e.g. by the different type of political culture based on a different relationship between state and individual.

3.1.4. East Germany

According to the theoretical framework of the project, we could only speak of a successful democratic consolidation in East Germany, if democratic structures are implemented, and if they are at the same time accompanied by a democratic political culture of the population. There should be no doubts with regard to the first precondition. With the accession of the former GDR to the Federal Republic, the structural transition towards democracy has been more or less completed.

The building up of an appropriate political culture, however, seems to require more time. The attitudes of the East Germans toward the new system can neither be simply generalized as *pro*, or *contra*. Disenchantment with politicians and political parties is quite widespread. The majority of East Germans does not see market economy as an appropriate economic order for the Eastern part of Germany. A considerable number of East Germans expresses feelings of relative deprivation, claiming to be treated unfair (particularly in comparison with West Germans). Ten years after unification, the collective syndrome to be a "second-class citizen" seemed to be deeply rooted in their minds.

However, that does not mean that East Germans are anti-democratic in their majority. Although there is some evidence that East Germans wish for a political system, which works slightly different from the one they experience today, they do not see serious alternatives to democracy. From a "statistical" point of view, the number of those who are generally rejecting democracy gives no cause for concern. Democracy is by no means built on sand in East Germany. However, democratic consolidation should never be understood as an irreversible process. If the gap between East and West will become wider (at least in the perceptions of the East Germans), serious problems could emerge again. But, it is not simply the material well-being that has to be improved. Only if the East Germans consider themselves as an equal part of the society, they will eventually accept this new society without serious reservations.

3.1.5. Hungary

In Hungary, satisfaction with life today, with one's own economic situation and with the economic situation in the country and the feeling that the present social fabric is just, cause a certain degree of satisfaction with democracy. It is mainly the economic situation and especially a feeling of satisfaction with life as a whole that is responsible for a positive evaluation of the present democracy in Hungary in general.

The acceptance of the idea of democracy seems to rely on ideological factors like a socialization devoid of socialist principles, experiences with socialism and special images of democracy (e.g., the opinion that one should be allowed to found political parties and the rights of minorities should be guaranteed). In Hungary, a positive sentiment towards democratic values and ideas also depends on experiences of dissatisfaction with Hungarian socialism, and a positive impression of the economic development since 1990. Especially those in their twenties who are well-educated seem to favor democracy. The idea of socialism obviously does not contradict support of the idea of democracy. Moreover, both of them can be recombined to a socially just social democratic political system. In consequence, people who evaluate the experience of Hungarian socialism negatively and regard it as a failed political experiment prefer democracy with a particular touch of social fairness.

All in all, Hungarian people do support the basics of democracy – its idea and structure, but they are not at all satisfied with its everyday performance. What they seem to miss above all is social justice. Social inequality is assessed to be unjust; too many people really suffer from deficiencies, and poverty is a real problem in Hungary. It is apt to slowly but steadily undermine the basis of democratic legitimacy: Bad economic experiences over a long period of time, social inequality and injustice, dissatisfaction with one's living standard and distrust in important political institutions may endanger the attitudes of the Hungarian citizens towards democracy as the only game to be played in town. The political transformation process has been successful until today as far as the institutionalization of democracy and the strengthening of the positive attitudes towards democracy as such is concerned. The transition of economy is still on the way – integration into the EU will serve one of its purposes: simultaneous to the implementation of the *aquis communautaire* Hungary will have to implement all principles of a Western market economy. Whether this development will be able to reduce the gap between rich and poor or to lessen social inequality and to enable Hungary to implement an extensive system of social welfare, which by the way, seems to be congruent to the people's idea of a democracy suitable to Hungarian society, can not

be predicted. The course some of the Southern European countries took after their integration into the European Community/Union point to this direction.

3.1.6. Russia

The general specific features of today's political culture in Russia are enumerated in the following; this culture constitutes the frame of reference, making it possible to describe and explain the reasons for the precipitate strengthening of conservative attitudes and mechanisms of partial restoration of the former government system: 1. prevalence of government-paternalistic views among the majority of the population and bureaucracy; 2. values of the great-power patriotism, heroic asceticism justifying the one-sided, militarized development of the country; 3. mass disillusionment caused by the half-way reforms, which even as such have not been completed, and discredit of politicians and parties responsible for the course of these reforms, which became especially obvious after the 1998 financial-economic crisis; 4. ambivalent attitude to the West, sporadic growth of anti-Americanism, xenophobia, tendency to isolationism and declaration of a "specific way for the development of Russia"; 5. weakness of the intellectual elite (which actually lost its rationalizing role of a cultural and moral authority, of the group setting the reference-points and goals for the development of society).

In this situation of social splitting, the growing vagueness of the common significant reference points, with no institutional authorities or groups responsible for events and their interpretation, and the compensatory defense myth of the "specific way" of Russia becomes the basis of a very amorphous (and therefore absolutely unreliable) consensus in society – very wide, practically impossible to rationalize and, consequently, not "political" in the strict sense of the word. This is the key point in discussions about the character of possible reforms, since it is the basis of solidarity, which is the foundation of the society.

In this situation the potential of the most advanced and self-sufficient groups (those which are especially interested in working out a public consensus with the people in power) is very limited and suppressed by the groups that are traditionally tied to the Soviet system and who will lose their status and opportunities if the transition to a market economy is allowed to progress. In the last months of the year 2000, for the first time since the beginning of the mass public opinion surveys in Russia, the number of those who think that they and their families have adapted to the changes exceeded the number of those who cannot adapt to the new conditions. To conclude optimistic: it seems that a social stratification based on personal achievements and qualification is

very slowly beginning to emerge, which in itself is a most important sign of social "normalization".

3.1.7. Romania

Several studies undertaken in Romania have demonstrated that there is widespread social support for democracy as a political system (Marginean 1999). As the results from the *Democratic Values* project have shown, the attitudes towards democracy developed from an undifferentiated one ("democracy can solve every problem in society") to a more realistic one, closer to its political nature. A noticeable attitude among Romanian respondents is the wide attachment to the democratic type of social organization: three quarters of the respondents agree that "the idea of democracy is always good". Rejection of the idea of socialism is prevalent for the majority of the population. Socialism as a form of government is considered appropriate by slightly more than 20% of the interviewees.

Although commitment to the principle of democracy is stronger than adherence to the principle of socialism, there is a pretty high proportion of those that are satisfied with the way socialism worked (about 40%). The relative "atomization" of society and weakening of social solidarity after the 1989 revolution (accompanying the legitimate quest for more individual freedom) and harsh economic conditions could be explanations for this circumstance.

Thus, if in the political area Romania has reached a level that allows us to assess the democracy favorably, as far as the economy is concerned, transition has proven to be more difficult, more time-consuming and involving higher social costs than foreseen by specialists and, particularly, by the population's expectations. The lack of measures taken to develop a market economy, previous to the fall of communism, the low economic standard of the population and the strong dependence on everything being state-run, ignoring the fact that economic changes should take place as quickly as possible, the lack of capital investments and the low financing of the restructuring process formed a complex of unfavorable factors for development in Romanian society. Other adverse factors were added, concerning the manner of action and the management of problems during the time of transition. The singular emphasis on a macroeconomic stabilization did not yield the expected results.

At the same time, it must be noted that after two early years that were more turbulent, a rather high level of social stability was reached. Despite several critical moments, the relations between the majority of the Romanian population and various ethnic groups do not raise specific conflicting problems.

The Romanian population is still in a difficult social situation, which is characterized by the circumstance that there are families with many children, poor social and economic integration due to a low level of education, a lack of professional training and a very low occupational level. Solving these problems takes time and considerable material resources. The pressure of social problems requires a change in priorities in spending public money by increasing the degree to which social programs are covered and the amount of benefits.

3.1.8. Slovakia

Because of a historical lack of political experience and continuity in terms of pluralistic political values and norms, Slovak political culture could be characterized by a search for national identity (Broderick 2000: 97ff.). The long-standing Hungarian dominance over, and suppression of the Slovaks, and later on the insufficient consideration of Slovak issues by the Czech political forces during the times of the Czechoslovak Federation, caused a distinct underdevelopment in these areas. The years between 1994 and 1998 witnessed an authoritarian rule, during which government interventions were used more as a resource for developing clientelistic networks and government cohesion than as an instrument for implementing real reform (Abby 2001: 245). Thus, Slovakia has experienced a relatively short democratic history and should be considered a country still in the process of developing and consolidating democracy.

The data on mass support for state institutions in Slovakia show that the population has become sensitive and critical towards economic and political performance. Data from surveys carried out over several years demonstrate that the institutions enjoying the greatest confidence are the military and the church, whereas other institutions are quite critically evaluated. Our survey further reflects distinctly negative public views on politics, politicians, and political parties. This general public mistrust in institutions may be largely attributed to the instability in government and the political landscape, the country's weak economic performance, notably high unemployment, and the like.

The empirical results confirmed that objective political and economic performance has a direct impact on people's attitudes towards current politics, confidence in institutions, and overall life satisfaction. Microeconomic developments play a substantial role in shaping views on the current governing system and on free-market principles.

Although political, as well as economic reforms and performances have had strong negative impacts on people's living standard and quality of life, this does not automatically imply mass support for authoritarianism. Despite the particularly drastic political and economic problems in Slovakia, which have caused disillusionment and dissatisfaction with the systemic reforms, we can find relatively high support for

democratic values and democracy as such. Thus, there are no grounds on which to assume that an authoritarian regime could find mass support in Slovakia in the near future or could return under certain circumstances. Furthermore, the democratic regime in Slovakia can be seen as largely consolidated on the attitudinal level, since a decisive part of the population (in spite of deep dissatisfaction with some of its consequences) holds the belief that democracy and democratic procedures are the most appropriate way of governing. Support for authoritarian alternatives is rather small.

All in all, the *PCEND 2000-02* survey, combined with the findings of other opinion polls, points out that the population in Slovakia has become very sensitive towards economic, social, and political conditions, and is at the same time committed to democracy. In addition, political culture is undergoing a process of transition and consolidation. After 1989, Slovakia faced a variety of previously unseen challenges: parallel to nation- and state-building processes, the country had to establish a political nation under multiethnic conditions. Long-term surveys regarding developments in Slovakia reveal the complexity of public commitment to the project of democratization and consolidation. However, data from these past years has revealed that out of the various social, economic, political, and cultural changes Slovakia has witnessed, especially expanding education and socialization measures have contributed enormously to the successful implementation of reforms and consolidation of democratic values.

3.1.9. Slovenia

The transition process in Slovenia has often been described as gradual and in many respects consensual (see Bukowski 1999). Some longitudinal studies have shown that changes in attitudes have largely developed accordingly. Moreover, these studies demonstrated that to a great degree, attitude change set in even before the decisive changes in the political and economic systems (see Bernik/Malnar 2003).

If we interpret the results of our survey as an “interim balance” of the attitude transformation process, it can be argued that there has not been any broad lag between political and economical reforms on the one hand, and cultural change in Slovenia on the other. The overwhelming majority of the population has accepted democratic ideals and also – although with some reservations – the principles of the free-market economy. The free-market economy is accepted only on the condition that its disturbing side effects are controlled by government policies.

Despite reservations towards some aspects of the free-market economy, the opinion prevails in Slovenia that the existing social order is more just than its socialist predecessor. Nonetheless, popular attitudes towards the socialist order and its political

and economic performance cannot be reduced to the belief that it was less just than the existing society. A rather favorable evaluation of the post-socialist regime and its performance coexists with a positive evaluation of almost all aspects of the former regime. In other words, although most respondents (especially those belonging to older generations) retain positive memories of socialist principles and their reality, this does not prevent them from accepting the new order as legitimate. This paradox can be explained primarily by the fact that the slow pace of transition in Slovenia has been a learning process, in the course of which individuals and groups acquired various value orientations, normative standards, and attitudes.

All in all, it seems that the new regime in Slovenia can be labeled as "semi-consolidated" at least. There can be no doubt that the broad majority of the population has "adapted" to the freedoms brought about by democracy, but at the same time their acceptance of the free-market economy and its consequences is much more hesitant. However, the Slovenian population is nostalgic about the omnipotent socialist state. Rather, it believes that the state should play an important role in securing social justice by redressing some of the effects of the free-market economy that are perceived as negative. Therefore, the acceptance of the free-market system in Slovenia does not depend merely on its successful performance, but also on the broad perception that its repercussions are not in conflict with the majority's standards of social justice.

3.2. Political support in new democracies: the comparative view

3.2.1. Overview

In how far could an appealing political legitimacy of the new democratic system be established? Two groups of indicators prove to be helpful to determine the level of legitimacy. First, there is the attitude of the citizens toward democracy, which is measured with a relatively simple valuation of its levels of efficacy (normative level, structural level, performance level). The second is the width of rejection toward antidemocratic system alternatives.

A first glance on the assessment of democracy on three levels (support for the idea of democracy, valuation of democracy as a form of government and the contentment with the democracy in the country) shows, that very few citizens in Eastern Europe are satisfied with their (current) democratic system (see table 1; VII..1.). With the exception of East Germany, Estonia and the Czech Republic, there is no country, where more than one third of the citizens positively evaluate the performance of the present democracy. The most adverse conditions are to be found in Romania, Bulgaria and Russia, where corruption, the lack of political influence of the citizens and the massive economic

problems respectively show democracy in an unfavourable light. Considering temporally comparable results, Russia can be seen as a country facing a permanent political crisis (Pickel 2001: 304ff.; Jacobs et. al. 2000: 29).

When we focus on the comparison of the different levels of the assessment of democracy, the data for autumn 2000 indicate a thoroughly good assessment of the main democratic principles, i.e. its value foundation and its general acceptance as a good form of government. Almost all citizens of the new transition countries think that these general elements of the democratic legitimacy are on principal good and worth to be supported. Alone in Russia and, with some restrictions, in Bulgaria, the population values the idea of democracy and "democracy as best form of government" somewhat more unfavourable.

The central causes of the clearly lower level of satisfaction with the present democracy in the own country (democratic performance) are the actual political events and the acute economical situation (Pickel 2001: 321)

For this indicator both of these causes contribute to blending the influences of the legitimacy of democracy and of the generalized evaluation of political efficacy. Generally, it has to be assumed, that there is a tight connection between the performance of the political system and economic aspects. Since these assessments turn out rather negative (Delhey/Tobsch 2000: 56ff.; Jacobs 2001: 230ff.), they have a predominantly unfavourable influence on the evaluation of democracy in the Eastern European populations. None of the Eastern European countries achieve a rate of agreement exceeding 50%. The citizens of East Germany, the Czech Republic and Estonia are most satisfied with the current situation of democracy. Meanwhile, the assessment of the democratic performance is especially unfavourable in Romania, followed by Russia, Bulgaria, Slovakia and Poland.

Concerning the support for antidemocratic system alternatives, the situation appears similar. Especially the citizens of Russia, Bulgaria and Romania (as well as the Russian part of the Estonian population) prove to be more open toward antidemocratic system alternatives than the citizens of other transition countries. The majority still disapproves of them, there are, however, considerable parts of the population that would allow the shift to a more authoritarian system.

Among populations of the countries that appreciate democracy as idea and form of government, the wish for (authoritarian) alternatives is weaker (Rose 2001: 99; Rose et. Al. 1998: 111ff).

To sum it up: it can be said that there is a limited threat to democracy in Eastern Europe, which turns out differently concerning the respective regions. Most states of Central Eastern and Southern Eastern Europe do relatively well concerning their political-democratic legitimacy. Yet, their democratic leaders do not reach a level of efficacy that convinces their populations. Assuming that the inefficiency, as perceived by the citizens, has long-term consequences on the still rather high legitimacy, clear potentials of danger for the democratic legitimacy can be foreseen. It rather appears to be the question, why, in spite of the rather unfavourable assessments of performance, there is such a high extent of democratic legitimacy. Possibly, the hope for a rising welfare within the European Union contributes to this advance of democratic legitimacy.

3.2.2. Anti-system attitudes and rejection of democracy

The result that was found through the evaluation of the normative principles is also revealed in the acceptance of alternatives to a democratic order (Rose et al. 1998; Rose 2001; Jacobs 2002, 2004; Pickel 2005). There is no country where non-democratic forms of government are approved of by a majority. Only an (autocratic) government of experts is considered to be desirable by majorities of all countries. Most certainly, the wish for security in times of upheaval and the learning of a democracy of concurrence of the new elites adds to this attitude. Besides, a government of experts cannot per se be considered as contrary to a democratic system since in democratic political systems, experts are involved in decisions also (Hearings, Commissions of experts). However, this takes place within the framework of counsel and under the free selection of the democratically elected politicians. This delicate theoretical distinction from the democratic ideals of the rule of the people is only seldomly taken into account by the citizens.

Interestingly, in most of the transition countries, the return to socialism attracts support of only 20%, in Slovakia of 24% of the respondents (see table 2; VII. .1.). The return to socialism, the abolition of the parliament or the possibility to establish a dictatorship is supported most in Russia, Bulgaria and Romania. Particularly in Russia between one third (Return to socialism) and 54% (abolition of parliament and strong leaders) advocate a non-democratic form of government. In Bulgaria and Romania, there are noteworthy minorities that champion the wish for turning away from the existing form of government, whereas behind the wish for a government of experts – which is somewhat unclear in its meaning – again lies the call for a strong leader.

A potential for resistance to the democratic order can also be detected in the answers in Poland (20% for a strong leader, 40% for a single party system), Albania (one third would prefer dictatorship and Estonia (29% for a strong leader). Here, more hope is set for a "strong hand" and a central leadership of the country than on the return to socialist rule. The relatively high approval for stimuli that aim for the abolition of the parliament in Poland, seem to express the dissatisfaction with the performance of the parliament since

1990. Only since 1995 there is a certain stability of governments (after the introduction of a 5-percent-hurdle). At the same time the right wing parties that developed from the Solidarność experienced a discord, so that meanwhile, the post communists are the strongest party.

The citizens of Eastern Germany, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovenia to more than 20% see in none of the given antidemocratic system alternatives an advantage to a democratic form of government. Especially conspicuous is the strong rejection of a return to socialism in Albania. There, the very rigid *ancien regime* obviously left such a negative impression on many people that it now positively influences the people's support for the new democratic system. According to the presented survey data, this support turns out much better than one could have expected basing on the actual democracy indices for the Albanian democracy.

Generally, one can thus not proceed from an acute endangerment of the existing orders in post communist Europe. This also shows when the results are compared with those from the existing democracies: At most, the call for a strong leader is more pronounced in some countries in Eastern Europe than it is the case with Western Europe but here also, it seems more like this expresses the wish for a competent and professional single person rather than for a dictator.

However, sometimes there can be found considerable potentials of rejection, whose insistence or change can also influence the persistence of the existing regime. Comparatively negative are the attitudes in those states that have not yet joined the European Union (with Albania as exception). A possible interpretation was, that the European Union holds as a hope for security and order as well as the overcoming of economic crises, which is only insufficiently accomplished by the actual governments. This would be a situative/situational explanation as for why the wish for an imaginary strong leader who solves the problems is relatively widespread in Russia, Romania and Bulgaria.

The situation in Russia is especially difficult since subjective and objective indicators suggest a regression in autocratic structures. One exception is constituted by Albania. Yet here, the initial situation of the transformation process has to be taken into account, which was worse than in any other Eastern European country. Seen from this extremely unfavourable initial situation, the relatively good values of political support are no more a big surprise. Additionally, as questions concerning the economic development show, a fundamental improvement could be made out there as well. This shows clearly, however,

that especially also comparing relations to other states or former circumstances have a fundamental relevance for the attitudes – also towards democracy.

3.2.3. Trust in institutions

A second indicator that provides information about the evaluation of the consolidation of democracy is the trust in the political institutions of the countries. Here, we need to distinguish between the classical political institutions of the legislative (parliament, parties), the executive (police, military) and judicative (courts). As has been shown in works on the trust in political institutions (Gabriel 1999; Pickel/Walz 1995; Newton 1999), this distinction can be backed up empirically. It can be shown, that the political institutions of the judicative and executive enjoy a considerably higher trust than the core institutions of the legislative (see table 3; VII.1.). Particularly, political parties and politicians that are in the spotlight of everyday politics do not get really good trust-values – a fact that also affects the important democratic institution of the parliament (cp. Pickel 2002). Especially remarkable is the merely moderate trust in the courts that turns out considerably lower, especially in the South Eastern European countries and Russia (the same holds true for Slovakia).

A short comparison with three Western European systems that can also look back on transformational changes, although in bigger temporal distance, bears interesting results. The trust in institutions in Eastern Europe is not at all everywhere lower than in the established democracies. Trust in the courts e.g. is lowest in Spain where only one third report to have confidence. Moreover, it seems, as if trust in politicians and parties would be eroding in Western Europe. In autumn 2000, the evaluations are even trailing behind the Eastern European rates. The values for trust in parliament and the trust in the person of the president for instance, are as a rule slightly higher than in Western Europe. The less connected to the main characters of politics the institutions are conceived to be, the more trust the citizens place in them.

3.2.4. Attitudes towards the reactivity of the political system and to the personal role within the political sphere

A central issue of the relation between individuals and politics lies in the relationship between the citizen and its representative. In this relationship the evaluation of the performance of the political system manifests itself: the extent to which the citizens are content with the realization of their interests as well as the willingness to put themselves out for the local community (Vetter 1997). The results of these questions are also discussed for Western Europe under the aspect of voter apathy (Pickel/Pickel 2000). The reactivity of a political system to individual preferences and the feeling of being able to

intervene in political events are two empirical markings of these considerations. The first concept is known in literature as External Political Efficacy, the second one as Internal Political Efficacy (Balch 1974; Vetter 1997). Furthermore, the evaluation of the own political competence and the general distrust towards politicians appear to be appropriate indicators to cover the active and passive participation of the individual in the political life (see table 4; VII. 1).

There is a relatively large proportion of the population that evaluates the reactivity of the political system as low. About 65 to 80% of the respondents do not believe that politicians still hold their promises after the elections. Apart from the slightly better evaluation in Hungary, the differences between the examined countries are rather small.

If the External Political Efficacy is accepted as an indicator for the evaluation of a political system's reactivity then more than 15% of the respondents from transformation countries doubt the capability of the political system and thereby violate the Diamond criterion, which requires that the proportion of anti-system-forces does not exceed this margin in consolidated democracies. There is a general doubt that the political system can fulfil its function. Also, the prevailing majority of respondents express scepticism towards the "caste of the politicians" as bearer of authority. Solely in Hungary "only" 48% of the respondents state that they distrust politicians.

While External Political Efficacy rather describes the performance side of the political system, Internal Political Efficacy reflects the perception of the individual's commitment to the political system. Here, most of the post-communist countries show rather weak values, although there are also remarkable deviations. The majority of the populations of Estonia, the Czech Republic and Russia find that there is the possibility of individual influence on political decisions.

The own political competence, compared to the other three indicators, is also evaluated relatively good. In Eastern Germany, only a little more than one third of the respondents claim to have no competence in political questions, in all other countries these figures rank around 50%. Viewing this discrepancy between the self-assessment of competence and the attitudes to the reactivity of the political system, it becomes clear that an improvement of political knowledge will probably not suffice for correcting the negative attitudes of the citizens towards the rulers in Central and Eastern Europe.

This brief description of the relation of politics and individual already allows the conclusion that the embedding of democratic norms in the political order cannot be taken for granted for a not negligible part of the population. Referring to Eckstein, one could rather proceed from a support for the democratic order and its rulers without an internal

commitment: "Ritual conformity is compliance without commitment." (Eckstein 1988: 797) Accordingly, it is not to expect that the attitudes towards the political elites have a sustaining effect on democracy. On the contrary, it is almost astounding that there are positive attitudes towards the democratic order at all, in spite of the strength of the sceptic statements in the transformation countries. Conversely, the detected distance to the rulers could be a decisive source of difference in the evaluation of democratic legitimacy and democratic performance – even more so as the evaluation of the economic performance is relatively negative as well (Delhey 2001; Müller 2005).

3.2.5. The role of the political elites

When dealing with the transitions to democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, one has to examine the role of the elites (either ruling or oppositional) and the masses in the course of the transition. The varying degree of importance and influence of these political actors before, during and after the transition differentiates the path that each country followed, bearing consequences for its level of democratization. A useful typology, that has been applied in order to classify the different models of transition and the resulted political outcome (Schmitter/Karl 1992), combines the role of the actors (either elites or masses) and the strategy used (compromise or force). This classification produces four possible outcomes: a pacted transition, where the elites initiate the transition through compromise, a reformed transition, where the masses initiate the transition through compromise, an imposition, where the elites initiate the transition through force, and finally a revolution, where the masses initiate the transition through force. Although this typology is an ideal type, it provides helpful insight regarding the form that newly established democracies will take. In those cases where the new state emerges from a pacted transition, chances are that democratic consolidation will advance more effectively. There seems to be general consensus in the literature, that by the late 1990s Poland, Hungary, Slovenia and the Czech Republic had advanced more in their paths towards democratic consolidation, Slovakia was in the process of overcoming some serious barriers, whilst Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Russia lagged behind (Ágh 1999).

Nevertheless, the information provided by the above typology is still insufficient. When examining the course of the transition one has to take a more detailed look at the nature of the party competition and the electoral outcomes. We must note here that during the initial stages of the transition, political parties played a minor role (see Lewis 2001). The leading players were large social movements that in many cases took the form of unified national fronts (such as *Solidarity*, the *Hungarian Democratic Forum*, *Civic Forum*, *Public Against Violence*, etc.). In the majority of the cases, these fronts won the first (or founding) elections that marked the regime transformation, or at least had a significant

electoral appeal. At the same time, they maintained a rather anti-political stance, claiming to represent "the people" in their struggle against the communist rule. In the words of one researcher, they "bore more resemblance to umbrella groups than to orthodox political parties" (Bogdanor 1990). Indeed, in the first, or founding, elections, the main issue was the rejection of the communist rule, giving them a rather plebiscitary nature (Innes 2002). The institutional issues that dominated the transition – democratic reform and free markets – became the primary cleavages distinguishing parties and shaping voters' party preferences (Nagle/Mahr 1999: 151). As Kitschelt has argued in an early work on the emerging party systems, at the first stages of the transition, in many post-communist nations the main axis of party competition could be placed along a single authoritarian/non-market and libertarian/pro-market continuum (Kitschelt 1995).

However, a clear break from the past did not occur in all countries. In Albania, Bulgaria and Romania the successor post-communist parties managed to win the first elections, for reasons mostly related to the absence of an organized opposition at the time of the regime change. In some countries, the "reformed" communists remained in power unchallenged for years, as in the case of Romania (see table 5, VII. 1.).

At the same time, it became evident that the much anticipated collapse of the ex-communist parties at the founding elections was only temporary, if occurred at all. In the second round of elections, despite their initial defeat – or exactly because of it – the majority of them made an impressive return, by increasing their share of the vote, as a result of their transformation and adaptation to the new political environment. Instantly their performance and electoral appeal attracted much of the interest of the literature. As it was emphasized elsewhere, their comeback played a positive role on the issue of democratization, since they managed to re-socialize their followers into accepting and respecting the new rules of the game, whilst at the same time "provide[d] 'voice' to populations which [were] more negatively affected by the political and economic transformation" (Ishiyama 1999: 69). In addition, they played a pivotal role by channelling away discontent from extreme right-wing parties, stabilizing further the newly emerged democracies (Mahr/Nagle 1995: 407).

Emphasizing the significance of the performance and adaptability of the post-communist successor parties does not give the full picture. We must at the same time consider the presence or absence of an opposition to communism. According to Vachudova, four broad patterns of party competition emerged in the Central and East European countries: "where opposition groups were sufficiently strong to seize power from the communist party in 1989, moderate and (relative) cohesive right-wing parties subsequently emerged from this opposition – and dominated the right. In countries where the communist party

undertook internal reform already in the 1980's, it rapidly transformed itself into a moderate and strong democratic party – and dominated the left." However, in cases where we only had weak opposition movements, two were the possible outcomes: the right became so fragmented that the unreconstructed communist party remained in power, or the right was captured by a nationalistic party (Vachudova 2002: 2-3).

Either way, the development of a dominant nationalistic party (either of the left or of the right) that governs unchallenged, poses a threat to the successful consolidation of democracy. That was the case for Bulgaria and Romania in our sample, and possibly Slovakia and the Czech Republic. The *Bulgarian Socialist Party* (BSP) and the *National Salvation Front* (NSF) in Romania, and later *the Party for Social Democracy in Romania* (PDSR) governed uninterrupted for large part of the 1990's, using nationalistic elements in their discourse and showing signs of corruption. In Slovakia right-wing nationalism prevailed, since the communist successor party (*Slovak Party of the Democratic Left*), did not manage to attract a broad popular support. Vladimir Meciar's *Movement for Democratic Slovakia* emerged as a hegemonic force, implementing populist and nationalistic elements (until 1998, when Mesciar was ousted from power). In the Czech Republic, the communist party (KSCM) remained unreformed (the only one, together with the *Communist Party of the Russia Federation* – KPRF – that retained the word "communist" in its title). Its low electoral appeal and the fragmentation of the left meant that "the alternation of government and opposition has become for all practical purposes impossible in the Czech Republic" (Toka 1997). As a result, the dominant party of the right, the ODS, did not have to compete with a reformed left-wing party that would serve as a control vehicle in its policy implementation.

Two other cases deserve special attention and will be mentioned briefly. First, the role played by the KPRF in Russia in the consolidation of democracy. For some observers of Russian politics, KPRF is an "anti-loyal" opposition party (Hashim 1999). Although it does participate in elections, it does not legitimate the new regime, its ideology being rather "anti-system", claiming that the basic schism of Russian politics is between "forces of state patriotism and destroyers of Russian statehood" (Hashim 1999: 85). This, combined with its high electoral appeal, presents a unique pattern among the countries of our sample, presenting a plausible explanation for the low spread of democratic support amongst its citizens. The East German post-communist party (*Party of Democratic Socialism*, PDS) presents another interesting case (Ziblatt 1998). As the party fell from power and was forced to adapt to the new political environment, it was marginalized and retreated to a leftist position, positioning itself as the representative of the East German interests in the new unified Germany. However, its low electoral appeal does not seem to place any threat to the fully consolidated political system.

A final line of evidence, related to the above, is made available by Toka, who displayed the increasing percentage of votes attained between 1991 and 1994 by SLD in Poland, KSCM in the Czech Republic, SDL in Slovakia and MSZP in Hungary from former members of the (pre-democratic) Communist parties (Toka 1997: 114-115). In this phase, if we except the attempted coup of 1991 in Russia, the political competition in Central and Eastern Europe respected the basic democratic rules and, we believe, reshaped the preferences of those citizens who were better-off under the previous non-democratic regime.

In summing up, the inclusion of post-communist parties in the electoral competition of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe contributed to the consolidation of democracy, provided that the following conditions were met: the party underwent an internal transformation that enabled it to commit to the democratic rule *and* had a significant electoral appeal. In those countries where one of these conditions was lacking, the transmission of democratic values by the communist successor parties could not, and did not, occur.

3.3. Social and cultural bases of democratization

3.3.1. Social inequality and justice: the problem of exaggerated expectations

Concerning the policymakers in the Eastern European transformation countries, the problem of growing social independence is connected with a special dilemma, since it possesses only a small scope of resources for the balancing of social inequality while at the same time being subject to great public pressure to act in the matter. Expectations on the side of the population could, on the one hand, result from the real market-economic development in the Eastern European countries that can cause relatively uninhibited inequality. On the other hand, they could feed off the claims on the state that originated in socialist times and their socialized ideals of equality. In any case, this is a factor that requires attention regarding its implications for the political support of the democratic systems as well. The more different layers of the populations drift apart regarding their social conditions, the more likely it becomes that especially the losers of this process develop sceptic attitudes toward the "Western" democracy, the market economy or even towards the political entity "Europe". Increasing social inequality can thus lead to a split within the transformation countries, which will durably derogate the consolidation of the European Union.

To which extend – regardless of the actual development – do the people accept certain functional principles of social inequality (as for example related to the incentive to act on

one's own authority and initiative)? Which background factors (of economic, social as well as cultural kind) can be used to explain the attitudes and valuation concerning social inequality respectively the degree justice in a given society?

Social scientific attitude research continually found that individual assessments of societal facts like those of social inequality bear an at best mediate relation to the actual situation (Zapf 1984; Noll/Schuster 1992). Apart from objective realities, primarily three aspects are supposed to influence the kind of perception: the relational assessment using certain comparative groups (in the sense of the phenomenon of relative deprivation), the framing by the principal political position (in the case of the Eastern European citizens mainly the degree of affiliation with the former system) as well as the inclusion of different ideological attitudes that were acquired with socialization (Liebig/Wegener 1999). Especially the third aspect, the so called socialist legacies, are repeatedly referred to in scientific literature when it comes to acceptance- and adjustment problems within the transformation processes in Eastern Europe (Jowitt 1992; Kitschelt et al. 1999). Since this term has been at the center of the discussions for years, we, too, will at first address these cultural aspects. Then, towards the end of this section, we will try to compare which of the afore-noted factors can best explain the valuation of social inequality.

According to the notion of socialist legacies, it are mainly the manifest (institutional) and idealistic (value-based) heritages of the socialist system, that still have a lasting effect on the present situation and development in the transforming societies in Middle and Eastern Europe and that hinder the process of democratization. Rather than on the institutional legacy of socialism (Kitschelt et al. 1999), this article focuses on the potential persistence of the former system in the structure of values and attitudes of the elites and populations. The advocates of the legacy-approach assume that respective orientations prove to be especially durable, that they survive the political upheaval and exert a substantial (predominantly negative) influence on current political assessments. Empirically, this should have primarily two consequences: On the one hand, relics of these socialist value orientations should still be vital in a sufficiently relevant part of the population. Also, these Orientations should stand in verifiable relation with weighty political attitudes. If only one of these two assumptions is not true, the thesis of a profound influence of socialistic legacies (at least in an idealistic form) would have to be seriously doubted.

The verification of such idealistic legacies builds on the acquisition of the citizen's conceptions of a desirable (resp. achievable) society. That the degree of social inequality is judged critically and as a whole as too high by the people in Central and Eastern

Europe could repeatedly be detected (Kluegel et al. 1995; Delhey 2001; Jacobs 2004; Pickel et al. 2005). The on hand survey results thus at first seem to suggest the effectiveness of such legacies. This kind of continuingly negative assessments, however, could also be traced back to a deeply rooted egalitarianism, that already conceives small levels of social inequalities as undesired, threatening and unjust.

Now it is true that in the Eastern European populations, there are respective preferences that can be detected independently from the assessment of the situation on this more general value level. One example would be the question about a performance-unrelated levelling of social inequalities (see table 6, VII. 1.). Yet, such orientations that are in fundamental opposition to the principals of a market-economical democracy are by no means so widespread, as to prove a general liability of the Eastern Europeans to egalitarianism. Except for Bulgaria, Poland and, concerning the regulation of incomes, also in Slovakia, there are no countries where a clear majority of the population opts for a complete levelling of incomes.

By all appearances, the people in most countries of Eastern Europe thus do not cherish an ideology of complete equality. Yet they can probably neither be described as strong advocates of a market-economic liberalism. Though the principle of the equality of opportunities, which is generally preferred by adherents of a market economy, is in all countries accepted by a majority, there are conversely also people that favor the equality of resources. Generally, the results remain a little contradictory so that one could conclude that there is a certain "reluctant arrangement" with the principles of market economy: Social differences are perceived as just, if equally available opportunities were not utilized (see table 7; VII. 1.).

Nevertheless, this (anyhow reluctant) decision for an equality of opportunities and an ideology of performance does not mean, that differences in income are unrestrainedly seen as a necessary evil that cannot be avoided. Here the people expect of the state, that it provides for balance – without falling back into the egalitarian patterns of the old days. The objection (as in the sense of the structural-functionalistic theory of inequality) that certain differences are vital for the progress of the country is rather not accepted. Even though the possibility to make profit is to a certain extend conceived to be beneficial for the general societal welfare, such a statement does not reflect the unison opinion of the population. In Hungary and Poland, the prevailing mood is even aimed against this statement.

Overall, the perception and acceptance of social inequality obviously cannot be explained merely by the persistence of ideological legacies but needs to be understood as reaction

to the own economic and social situation. Maybe the "rational", that is those attitudes concerning social inequality that are independent of the social conditions, are determined by general ideological factors (liberal-market-economic orientations versus egalitarian-etatist attitudes) varying from country to country.

As became apparent in our study, the fact that a society is perceived as just or unjust does neither solely depend on the ideological orientation nor solely on the individual social conditions of a person. Yet it seems as if the situationally determined factors collectively carry more weight. Here, however, it is not so much the "objective" situation that is of relevance, but rather how it is perceived by the individual. It is consequently those people that associate with the higher social classes and those who report an improvement of their living conditions that value the society as a whole as more or less just. Regarding the influence of certain ideological orientations and values, it does not seem to be the socialist principle that exerts a (negative) influence. It rather holds, that a liberal-market-economic attitude has lasting positive effects on the conception of the society (see table 8; VII. 1.).

In all, the people in the transformation countries of Central and Eastern Europe are not completely opposed to a certain social differentiation in their societies. Nevertheless, the Eastern European citizens release their political system only reluctantly and unwillingly from its social responsibility. More than a decade after the societal upheaval, a vast majority of the citizens call for a strong and fond of intervening government that above all should balance and compensate the "injustices" of the market economy in the social sector. To us, the notion that this attitude shall predominantly be the expression of an ideological legacy of the extinct societal system seems rather doubtful. There are quite some indications that such attitudes have to do with the real experiences of the new era. In the first place, it is then the perception of unequal opportunities that arouses criticism. It seems as if the citizens do not dare the new economic system to guarantee a just distribution of wages, employments and an at least tolerable standard of living. In the view of the population, the market economy per se is arranged on social inequality and reproduces respectively enforces them. The general demand, accordingly, is that state and government shall adopt the role of a social regulator.

Resumed, to our mind, there are some implications that the state- and equality-oriented attitude structures are not to be understood as specific post socialist legacies that take effect in the young democracies of Central and Eastern Europe only. At least with regard to the spreading of etatist orientations, the differences seem to be much less enormous than generally assumed. Moreover, the people have a lot of demands on their political systems everywhere. Many of these tasks, that are assigned to the state, do not even

belong to its "classical" sphere of responsibility, others, given the changed demographic and global economic conditions, are almost unaccomplishable. As far as the problematic in the transformation states in Central and Eastern Europe are concerned, we consider the thesis of a lasting and ubiquitous effect of social legacies in Eastern Europe, as well as the claim of a regional specific of this kind of orientation pattern generally, doubtful.

However, the contemplations in this work clearly point out one of the main problems of the young democracies in Central and Eastern Europe – the excessive demands especially on their economic efficiency and on the performance of the political elites. While the principle of democracy itself, despite all "everyday" insufficiencies all along and presently enjoys a basic acceptance, the market economy has from the start been measured rather by its efficiency than by its ideal and is in many places only limitedly agreed on (Pickel et al. 2005). That a durable stagnation or degradation (if only in the perception of the population) in the economic sector at some point effects the general legitimacy of the political system as well, can certainly not be ruled out completely.

3.3.2. Political support in new democracies: socialization vs. situation of life hypotheses

Connections between attitudes towards the democratic principle and the assessment of the economic situation

According to the situation of life hypothesis, attitudes towards the political system should be correlated with the socio-economic circumstances of the East European people. Thus, one of the central aspects to be investigated is the economy. An examination of the economic situation makes it clear that, as a rule, the personal situation is judged to be better than the general situation (Pollack 2000). A very drastic example for this finding is East Germany, where nearly 70% judge their personal economic situation as good, but only 22% believe the economic situation of the region (i.e. East Germany) is good (see PCEND 2000-02: F05, F06; separated annex). The share of those noticing an improvement in their own economic status since the eighties is conspicuously low; in Bulgaria, Russia and Slovakia it is much lower even than that (PCEND 2000-02: F18_1, F18_3; separated annex).

However, as multivariate analyses have shown that in most countries the change in status either exerts no influence or only a very slight degree of influence over the affirmation of the democratic principle. This implies that the acceptance of the idea of democracy in most countries is largely independent of personally experienced material changes over the last years. Thus one must assume that, in many countries of Eastern

and Central Europe, a clear distinction was made between the level of legitimation and that of economic performance only a few years after the political and social upheaval.

More influence is exerted over the acceptance of democracy as an idea and form of government by the value orientations included in the analysis, of which the degree of importance attributed to political and civil rights, the value of equality of opportunities, a liberal understanding of the economy (personal incentives are necessary for the well-being of the nation) as well as the rejection of the economy's nationalization are the most influential. As far as the topic of social justice is concerned, the comparison of the present system with the past (which turns out rather badly for the present system; see PCEND 2000-02: F12, F13; separated annex) seems to effect the attitude towards the idea of democracy only slightly and in some countries.

Resuming our analyses, one can state that attitudes towards democracy as an idea are determined more strongly by value orientations than by the assessment of the political system's functionality or even the economic situation. All in all, therefore, it can be said that neither the performance of the political system nor the efficiency of the economy represents a crucial factor in the affirmation of the democratic principle. Affirming this principle, then, is much more, and mainly, dependent upon internalized convictions that are possibly more closely interlinked with each other.

Satisfaction with the functioning of the democracy

If we examine satisfaction among the populations of the Central and Eastern European countries with how the democracy in each respective case functions, then the conclusion that the level of legitimation is relatively independent of the level of performance is further substantiated. The populations of the countries investigated, even though they agree to democracy as an idea and norm, are still extremely dissatisfied with how the democracy is developing in their own respective countries. Generally, satisfaction with the democracy's performance is much lower in the transformation countries than in established democracies (see table 1; VII.1.; see also Jacobs/Müller/Pickel 2002; Pickel/Pickel 2000: 12). Obviously the political institutions in Central and Eastern Europe do not yet work the way the populations expect. This becomes evident, if we remind the the low level of trust in the government and the impression that the political authorities show a lack of response (see 3.1.3. and 3.1.4.). If, however, the efficiency of the democracy's political institutions is judged to be unsatisfactory, it is all the more astonishing that there is still such a high level of agreement with the idea of democracy in itself, as can be detected in most countries examined, and it again points to the

already stated independence of a belief in the legitimacy of a democracy (diffuse support) from its performance (specific support).

This conclusion is confirmed even more if satisfaction with the democracy is used as a dependent variable in a multivariate regression analysis. There are hardly any connections worth mentioning to the value orientations of the population, but a very strong and significant relationship to the economic situation and the attitudes towards the capacity of the political regime. This means that the assessment whether the democracy works or not is by no means independent of the current achievements of the political and economic system. And even though these achievements are judged negatively, the majority of the population in most of the countries examined hold on to the ideal of democracy. Hence, we are compelled to interpret this as expressing relative stability regarding the agreement to democracy as an idea.

At the same time, however, it is necessary to point out again that the degrees of consolidation reached in each of the countries differ strongly from each other. In most countries the principle of democracy is accepted by the majority and the level of legitimation and that of performance are clearly separated from each other, whereas in Russia there is no definite majority that approves of democracy as an idea, even though the two levels are also clearly distinguished.

3.3.3. Third Wave and Forth Wave democracies in comparison

A comparison between two democracies of the Third Wave, and 11 post-communist new democracies hatches the following picture: in Spain and Greece democratic supporters are the large majority. By 2002 in each of the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe more than 50% of the respondents believe that democracy is the most appropriate form of government. A large percentage of the same respondents also declared to be satisfied with the way dictatorship worked in their own country. Nostalgia for the past regime is not a new phenomenon: similar percentages could be registered in Spain and Greece during the mid-1980s which decreased in the following years.

If we nonetheless take into consideration, thirteen years after the fall of communism, the subgroup of citizens who currently do not support democracy, in some countries their number deserves attention. The spread of democratic attitudes seems to have proceeded at a slower pace in Bulgaria and Russia and one plausible explanation is that the deterioration of living standards exacted its toll from those citizens who were most affected by the consequences of a sinking economy.

Democratization in Central and Eastern Europe implied a transformation toward market economy. A peculiarity which leads the researcher to consider and evaluate at the same time two different aspects: first, the change in values and ideology which a replacement of a whole social philosophy brings about and, second, the way each individual coped with the economic drawbacks which followed thereafter.

The scenery at the time of the democratic transitions in Southern Europe was different. In Greece, after 1974, democracy succeeded because the post-authoritarian political parties expressed an essentially de-ideologized and de-politicized discourse. The Greek Right softened its anti-communist rhetoric of political exclusion and the ideological equilibrium shifted moderately to the left. Democracy was initially proposed in mere procedural terms and a key role was assigned to the political parties. ND and PASOK adopted new organizational principles and secured the process of consolidation (Spourdakalis 1996: 170-175). In Spain ideology retained its predictive power in relation to democratic support and it took almost twenty years for democratic support not to be any longer a prerogative of leftists. During this time the 'transition effect', which hinged upon an initial elite settlement and the convergence of all the political actors toward democratic principles, determined an attitudinal change which reinforced and secured democratic legitimacy much earlier than what the generational replacement would have ever allowed (Torcal 2001).

Differently from what had happened in Southern Europe, ideology was not the only dimension along which democratization occurred in Central and Eastern Europe. Perhaps not even the most important. In contrast to Spain and Greece, and without overlooking important inter-country differences within the Soviet bloc, the impact of the worsened economic conditions of the early 1990s had on the attitudes toward the new regime can hardly be downplayed. Every rational individual experiencing a sudden drop in living standards while a radical change from authoritarianism to democracy is taking place, will inevitably be tempted, right or wrong, to see an association or even a relationship of cause-effect between the two events.

The fact that in each and every national sample a relevant percentage of citizens who supports the new regime also have, at the same time, a positive memory of authoritarianism suggests that microeconomic calculus may not exhaust the reasons behind democratic support. If a positive memory of authoritarianism is based on better past economic conditions it follows that support for the new regime of the 'neo-democrats' cannot be the consequence of regime performance.

This puzzle led us to another dimension: the instrumental redefinition of regime-preferences which accompanied the creation of a new party-system structured around the cleavage between Communists and supporters of liberal democracy. The degree of its success varied in accord with additional factors. Political culture, the legal and constitutional framework, issues of national independence, recent history and future expectations are among these. This dimension of the process of consolidation had also been essential in Southern Europe, where the ideological depolarization made its progress after the transition and contributed to its strengthening. Exclusionary political settings had to be replaced by new ones, inspired by the open confrontation with progressive forces. But no market transformation was needed.

On the contrary, in Central and Eastern Europe it was the whole economic structure which collapsed and its replacement with free market was not only a matter of moderate politics. High inflation, rising levels of poverty and unemployment were at the top of the agenda after the transition, while for many the arrival of "free market" represented a shock. Once this objective difference is acknowledged, it has also to be said that the acceptance of new liberal and democratic values by the majority was certainly accelerated by the participation of the parties closest to the authoritarian regime to free elections and to the open confrontation between government and opposition. The hasty introduction of liberal policies, especially when they were not assisted by growth, may not always have been beneficial to democratic legitimacy. In Bulgaria and Russia, where the drop in living standards was, for many, traumatic, democratic support is still weaker, while the potential role which political institutions can play as a driving force for democratic support may not have been fully exploited. While in Southern Europe the transition to democracy was *pactada* and politics ferried the whole polity toward the democratic bank, in Central and Eastern European new democracies many citizens, out of necessity, had to cross the sea themselves and, as it happens, some have not docked yet.

Though the percentage of citizens who do not support democracy in a few countries should not be ignored, in most post-communist new democracies our analyses paint a rosy picture for the future. Notwithstanding the fact that partly democratic support in the early phases of the transition may have been a second-best we conclude that: the consolidating effect resulting in the redefinition of regime preferences determined by inclusive party systems together with the impossibility of turning back and the perspective of future welfare associated with the progressive enlargement of the European Union can be seen as the key factors behind democratic support.

3.4. Democratization and EU enlargement

A merely superficial view at the situation on the eve of the joining of the first Eastern European transformation countries already showed, that the convictions in the populations of the countries were determined by big hopes but also great expectations and heavy demands on the EU membership. The people mainly expected economic prosperity and – in the case of new or reformed states – international recognition and acceptance. In the meantime, the citizens of some Eastern European countries became increasingly sceptic, as well. For many of them, the European Union is still an alien structure, which might bring unforeseeable dangers for the national identity. Thus, out of their perspective, their nation, which is currently consolidating itself, should neither get into new dependences on other nations or supranational organisations right away nor follow other countries as a – concerning their stage of development – inferior petitioner onto ways, that do not always seem to be the best solution for the own country.

In this context, our analyses dealt with the following question: Does support of democracy represent an obstacle or a motor of EU integration in the respective Eastern European countries? When combining these thoughts to initial hypotheses of the investigation, and with regard to our general theoretical framework (see 3.1.), three central **research hypotheses** were formulated:

- 1) There is a correlation between the support of democracy and the subjective affiliation to the European Union. The import of a Western image of democracy – which is considered to be successful – and the wish for its economic efficiency have to be regarded as the reasons for this phenomenon.
- 2) Socialist formed value orientations prove to be an obstructing factor for the affiliation to the European Union. The recourse to former value orientations and a positive image of the socialist system lead to resistance to Western, formerly hostile, ways of life that are suspected in the countries of the European Union.
- 3) The citizens' wish to join the EU is mostly triggered off by the perception of economical problems. The hope for economic prosperity and an upswing which will be experienced as an EU member state promote the willingness of the people to take this step.

3.4.1. Institutional and historical background

In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to bring the institutional and historical-cultural situation of the investigated countries back into mind. The status, which the respective country had at the time of research was undoubtedly important considering the attitudes toward the European Union and toward joining the European Union (Sedelmeier/Wallace 2000). The institutional regulations concerning the EU enlargement and the structural conditions in the respective countries appear to be of special interest.

Concerning the attachment to the European Union, mainly two criteria for distinction can be of importance: the general differentiation between candidate and non-candidate countries (at the time Albania and Russia) as well as the distinction between the negotiations of more and less advanced candidate countries. The proximity or distance to joining the European Union can be seen as a possible influence on the attitudes of the citizens toward taking this step as a country. Thus it also has to be assumed, that on the one hand, successes in the negotiations have/had a positive influence on the opinions of the population whereas on the other hand, the discrepancy between wish and reality triggers/triggered off concerning the population's willingness to join the European Union.

What was the status at the beginning of the new millennium? The negotiations with most of the countries have progressed relatively far. These countries have already been associated with the European Union for the last years. In 2002, Estonia and the Eastern European countries had as a rule completed at the least 23 of the 31 negotiation positions of the *acquis communautaire*. Bulgaria and Romania are somewhat behind in this respect (expected joining 2007 now), whereas Russia and Albania didn't negotiate at all.

On the structural level, there were substantial differences between the investigated nations. The countries in Southern Eastern Europe were not only in second place concerning their negotiation status as candidate countries, but their citizens also had to manage with considerably less financial means than other Eastern European populations. In comparison, the Czech Republic and Slovenia proved to be the leaders whereas Albania brought up the rear closely behind Bulgaria, Romania and Russia.

3.4.2. Attitudes towards the EU

First, let us take a view at the general decision of the Eastern European citizens if or if not their country should join the EU and let us also consider the hoped-for effects of benefit: If the Eastern European citizens were to vote on joining the European Union in a referendum, there would be little doubt about the joining. In all countries of Eastern Europe where this question was asked, the vast majority of the citizens would consent to join the EU (see table 9, VII. 1.). These findings have not changed much between 1996 and 2001, the two times when such data were collected in EU polls. As people do not decide on joining the EU, this resembles less a general rejection than a certain lack of interest for this matter. In the Baltic Countries, to name an example, the number of undecided people surpasses the other two groups – in Estonia in 1996 even more than half of the respondents refrained from taking up a clear position.

The indecision and latent scepticism in the Baltic populations is remarkable since there as well the citizens rather expect effects of benefit from joining the EU. This stands in contradiction to the Central Eastern European states (Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia), where at least in 1996 the positive returns of the joining were not any longer perceived to be on the nation's part but on the part of the European Union. Nevertheless, in all of these countries, there were clear majorities in favour of joining the EU. The results in Bulgaria and Romania appear to be more consistent, since the expectation of benefits and the willingness of the citizens to join the EU point in the same direction. The citizens of the latter nations want to join the EU – as soon as possible. This can be seen in the clear difference between the desired speed of negotiation and the perceived progress of the negotiation process. On average, the Eastern European people favoured a faster joining than that which is anticipated by them at the moment. This holds true especially for the citizens of the countries which in fact were a little behind in the negotiations, namely Bulgaria, Slovakia and Romania. In this aspect, again, it is the Estonian population that differs noticeably from the others. Here the negotiations were perceived to proceed rather too fast.

This first view on the attitudes of the citizens toward joining the EU in 1996 already shows, that the answers in the Eastern European populations to the respective questions were more differentiated than one could assume regarding the public discussion. How will thus the position of the citizens toward different dimensions of European policy be, if we include the timing of the joining ("fast joining") as well as the readiness to cope with transition problems ("adapt to European rules"), adding also aims of the future efforts ("follow the Western European way")? With regard to this, similarities but also some contradictions between the opinions of the citizens of different Eastern European

countries become visible (see table 10; VII. 1.). In 2000, there were a fundamental discrepancy between the clearly pro-European statements and the preference to first develop an own self confidence before associating with the European Union. This does not mean, that both convictions have to be diametrically opposed to each other. After all, the statement "develop more self confidence" relates directly to joining the EU and thus almost determinedly presupposes it. Thus, the agreement with that item does not indicate a rejection of the joining per se but rather some scepticism concerning the timing of it.

Nevertheless, there has to be some thinking invested on the fact, that only an infinitely small number of respondents came out against the option "to first develop an own self confidence". It seems quite a lot like the development of an independent national position is of fundamental importance to all citizens in Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, apart from the Russian citizens, the most respondents also wanted to follow the lead of the Western European countries. The prosperity that is observed there proves to be very attractive for the Eastern European people and not at all incompatible with an own, self determined way into the future.

This is clarified by a view on another indicator – the speed of the integration process. The majority in the populations of the new Eastern European democracies supported a fast joining of the European Union. Especially the citizens from states that are expected join on a later date or that have at the moment no perspective of being admitted to the EU (Albania) wish for joining the EU soon. This finding could already be made out in the difference between hoped-for and real speed of negotiation described above. The longer the way to Europe is, the more the citizens want to speed this dynamic up. The unanimous attitude of the Southern Eastern European citizens in this respect is noteworthy. They probably hope that joining the EU offers considerable economic improvements, which, from their point of view, are urgently needed for the development of their countries. Thus it is especially the Albanians – so far not even associated with the European Union – and the Romanian people that plead for adapting to the rules of the European Union, even if that causes temporary deteriorations at the labour market.

This result has substantial consequences for those countries that had already advanced further in the process of joining the European Union: under no circumstances did they want to be an (associated) junior partner within the European social and economic area but rather have had the same rights as all other EU member states. The statement of a "negotiation at the same eye level", as the Hungarian ambassador made it, describes this wish forcefully.

The strongest restrictions in the wish for joining the EU could be found in Estonia and Hungary with the Estonians being the only population which, in the autumn of 2000, as a majority opposed to join the European Union as quickly as possible. Their structure however deceives about the true impact of these results since it was mainly the Russian share of the population that supports joining the EU. The Russian minority possibly hoped that by joining the EU their rights will be better protected due to guaranteed minority protection.

In most of the investigated countries there was less agreement to the statement "one should join even it costs jobs in the short run" than to the more general statements without a negative touch. It was again the sceptical Estonian and the Russians (who are not yet concerned with a joining) that are on average especially distant to a "painful" adaptation. However, also in the Central Eastern European States there was a lot of scepticism in appreciable groups of the population if restrictions (for example on the labour market) were associated with the joining. Hungary and Slovenia with their negative proportion values should be specially emphasized here.

The item „more self confidence" refers to a point that is covered very often in the discussion of attitudes toward the European Union: the feeling of a European and/or national identity, in other words a collective (European) identity (Fuchs/Klingemann 2002: 20). The question is, in how far the national identity will prove to be an obstruction for an association with Europe.

Now how are the collective identities distributed, if directly asked about the loyalty of the citizens to community objects? Since the question was asked via rating scales, there is the chance to feel attached to several levels of political communities at the same time. Apparently, this opportunity is actually taken often. Most Eastern Europeans feel connected to several collectives and presumably do not see a fundamental conflict in doing so (Pollack 2001: 14). It is interesting to see, that there are groups that define themselves by dissociating themselves from a European identity. This seems to be the case in Russia (67%) and Bulgaria (68%) as well as with a considerable number of people in Albania (45%) and Estonia (31%) (see table 11; VII. 1.). Next to historical influences, especially regional aspects (geographic distance to the EU border, centre-periphery-constellation) seem to play an important part in developing – or not developing – a European identity. The closer a country is situated to the EU border, the more often its citizens define themselves as Europeans. It is thus rather surprising, that, despite their peripheral position in Europe, so many of the Romanian people feel themselves as Europeans.

It is hard to clearly define and differentiate a European identity based on descriptive empirical data since there is hardly any Eastern European nation that possesses obviously big groups which dissociate from their own nation. Alone the Hungarian and the Czech population have one third or more persons that, according to their own statement, do not identify themselves with their nation. Yet also these findings need to be analysed carefully.

The restriction applies, that this European identity can only give valuable information about the attachment to Europe and that it probably will not be applicable as an indicator for an affiliation to the European Union. Hypothetically seen, there are two possible effects of the identity on the willingness to join the EU: a strong European identity promotes the will to integrate into the European Union, or a strong national identity proves to obstruct the joining, since national interests are given priority over EU interests and a joining is made alone for reasons of benefit. Pollack (2001: 7) could, for example, just recently work out that nationalism only opposes a European identity if it takes on a very closed form in the nation as well as features of regionalism and if it aims at observing local traditions. Concerning the investigated countries, this holds only true for Russia and, to some extent, for Bulgaria.

3.4.3. Political orientations and EU enlargement

The interdependencies of the relations between the manifestations of political culture and the respective attitudes toward Europe and joining the European Union can only be reasonably established over context analyses. Two questions arise:

- 1) What are the reasons for supporting or rejecting to join the EU?
- 2) In which way are those reasons related with the support of democracy in the respective states?

As supposed, a European identity promotes an opening toward the West. The confession to the European identity (Pearson's $r=.20$) is at the same time also a "confession to Europe" (see table 12; VII. 1.). "Declared Europeans", furthermore, do not want to merely follow the Western European path of development, but also plead for a fast joining of the EU. This holds true even if it results in short-term deteriorations on the labour market. The bond to the nation, almost surprisingly, does not prove to be an obstructing factor for joining the EU here. It admittedly supports the wish for a delay of the joining – for example pleading for the aim of "gaining more self confidence first" – but the goal of joining the European Union is not diminished or lost sight of. It is rather aimed at more deliberately when it comes to speed and extent of the joining.

It is rather the (still) existing attachment to the socialist system or to socialist ideals that proves to be obstructing a positive attitude toward joining the EU. When such a relation can be found among the citizens, the wish to join the EU is also clearly weaker. Furthermore, those people do not really wish for the country to gain more self confidence first, they are rather inclined to dissociate themselves from the European Union and be sceptical about a sweeping European integration. At least, the negative correlations we found suggest to be interpreted this way.

Summarizing, this means: The attachment of the citizens to socialism is the only real obstruction factor of a subjective approach of the citizens to the European Union. Also, it seems as if it were not the citizens who are economically worse off, that push for joining the EU as soon as possible. Persons with a better economical position and a more favourable assessment of the economical situation perceive the joining as a desirable step toward more economic prosperity in the future. This goes along with a subjective connection of the acceptance of the principles of the free market economy and the wish for a soon joining.

Altogether, the main principles of a liberal democracy – implementation of institutional democratic rules, free market economy and constitutional state – seem to be main forces concerning the wish to join the EU. At least, they are attendant phenomena or results of it: If a person regards the principles of the constitutional state to be important or thinks that they are ensured of, they are more likely to favour the joining. From this point of view, the adaptation towards many European regulations that are based on the fundamental principles of liberal democracies is relatively unproblematic for Eastern European citizens. Additionally, the aims targeted by the EU which include the constitutional state, free market economy and the like as admission criteria for acceding countries prove to be sound policy.

The social structure only causes rather low variations of the opinions. Without exception, the effects of education level, size of town or other social structural indicators on the attitude toward joining the EU are insignificant. There is at best the slightly stronger tendency of younger citizens from all nations to be more open toward the European Union. They see their future within the EU rather than outside of it and count for example on freedom to move and integration into the community of the modern industrial countries.

The correlations between constitutional legality or free market economy and the indicators of the EU-joining already point to a positive relation (see table 13; VII. 1.). People who support the idea and structure of democracy are more inclined to support a

rapid way into the EU than critics of democracy. It is true that also the advocates of democracy wish for their nation to gain more self confidence (before joining the European Union) but they absolutely do not want the process to stagnate. Within this constellation, it is rather the acceptance of the liberal democratic principles than the current situation which is the decisive factor for the attitude toward the joining: compared to the indicators of political legitimacy, the interaction of the indicators for joining the EU with the democratic performance is weaker but still remains as a positive relation. At the moment, the question about joining the EU seems to be rather a long term value decision than an ad-hoc estimation which is based on short term opinions and mood changes.

When the connection between anti-system convictions and the attitudes toward joining the EU are analysed, the findings that were obtained using the indicators of the assessment of democracy are confirmed: the more people tend to permit antidemocratic alternatives as conceivable, the more they tend to turn away from joining the European Union or/and the benchmark Western Europe. It is remarkable though, that those people also do not want to gain more "self-confidence" but rather favour a path that is completely independent from the European Union. The return to socialism and the establishment of a single-party-system are, amongst the antidemocratic system opinions, the strongest obstructions for the joining. The wish for a strong leadership (might this be the possibility of dictatorship or the wish for a strong leader) also stands in opposition to an alignment with Europe. To sum up: the democratic legitimacy and the wish for integration into the European Union accompany and stabilize each other.

It is conceivable that those relations differ depending on the transformation paths of the respective countries and that the connections vary in the individual level within the countries. However as already stated, the individual correlations that were found through the pooled analysis can be reproduced for all the ten investigated countries. While the strength of the connections varies in the different countries within certain margins, these changes are by far not relevant enough to revise the interpretation that was made based on the pooled analysis. The opposite is the case, to all appearances it is a theoretically generalizable connection under variable basic conditions.

On a more aggregated level, we can state the following:

- 1) in countries with a higher democratic legitimacy a stronger alignment with the Western European way and generally with joining the European Union can be found. Additionally, the wish for a fast joining is also more distinct in these

countries. The respondents want to be accepted as equal members rather than as a petitioner;

- 2) in countries where bigger parts of the population sympathize with socialism, the attitudes toward the Western European way and toward joining the EU generally are more sceptical (see table 14; VII. 1.).

The evaluation of democratic performance and the assessment of the economic situation on the other hand do not show any linear variation with the positioning toward joining the EU and toward Western Europe. To all appearances, short term evaluations of the transformation do not always also lead to a change of these attitudes. The attitudes of the citizens in those countries that expected to join EU in the short run remain quite stable, and, despite changes in the short term opinions, positive. It is primarily connected to the extent of democratic legitimacy.

The relation between the political culture and the attitude toward joining the EU respectively toward the Western European model of Europe seems to be lasting on different levels (aggregate and individual). This means, that the democratic political culture interacts with the wish to be admitted into the structure of the European Union.

The only question left concerning the individual correlations is whether the found correlations continue to exist when a test of intervening (background) indicators is carried out. To put it more precisely: is there an independent relation between democratic legitimacy and the attitude toward the European Integration of the Eastern European countries, that cannot be explained by other factors from the background? A partial correlation analysis will provide further information about this question. Here, alternative factors (indicators: idea of free market economy, free market economy as best economical order, constitutional state – guarantee and importance, own economical situation and that of the country, evaluation of idea and performance of socialism, age, level of education, size of town) are controlled for and the correlations between democratic opinions and the support of joining are reduced to their pure explanation potential. From such a point of view, it seems true that a reduction of the relation between measures of democratic legitimacy (e.g. “democracy as the best form of government”) and attitudes toward Western Europe and toward joining the EU can be reached, if background factors are allowed to the analysis. In Hungary, Slovenia and especially in Estonia, there are still the lowest connections between indicators of democratic support and willingness to join the EU. Strong correlations can be found in Slovakia and Bulgaria. Yet, it generally holds true that the correlation values, when controlling for alternative explanation factors rather assimilate than drift apart.

Democratic legitimacy and the wish to join the EU are preserved in the changing constellations (see table 15; VII. 1.).

The probably most crucial obstruction factor for the advocacy of supporting the European Union is a positive attitude toward socialism or the wish to actually reintroduce it. Generally, the critics of the EU joining incline to support antidemocratic system alternatives more than advocates of it. Yet, the situational assessment, for example the own economical situation is only of minor or (even) no importance for the attitude toward joining the EU. It is thus not the case that the Eastern European citizens favour a "blind escape ahead" into a prosperous European Union because of adverse general economic conditions. Almost throughout, the decisive factors are basic principles of freedom and equality. Accordingly, the attitudes in the transformation countries toward joining the EU seem to be much more stable than it may have been expected.

These relations can be found on the aggregate as well as on the individual level and can be established in all of the investigated countries – albeit differing in strength. It holds true that there are differences between the countries regarding the evaluations of the EU-joining and their correspondences to the assessment of democracy. Yet, the relations on the individual level remain in all countries. To all appearances, there is a connection between the micro and the macro level concerning the correlations. According correlation patterns on the country level in the presented case result on a large scale in the relations that exist on the individual level.

Thus, we can resume: the support for a democratic political culture and the hopes for joining the European Union induce and strengthen each other. With regard to the main thesis can be said: the consolidation of the democracies in the Eastern European acceding countries proves to be a motor for the integration into the European Union – and is at the same time a beneficiary of this perspective. The lessons that the European Union could draw from the successes of the "Southern" enlargement (Greece, Spain, Portugal) could so far successfully be applied for the further "Eastern" enlargement process and lead the member states of the European Union toward the aim that they had visualized: market-economical, constitutional, liberal-democratic acceding states with populations that wish for a EU joining.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

1. Beyond institutional and economic integration: the relevance of attitudes and values for the EU enlargement process

The transformation of the Eastern European countries to liberal democracies that is taking place since 1989 has brought the present European institutions under an unexpected external pressure to act. The process of a deepening of the European Union that concentrated on the Western European countries, now had to be extended to thoughts of integrating the new Eastern European democracies into the existing "European House". With questions about an Eastern enlargement a new urgent subject entered the agenda of the European Union and its member states.

Soon, negotiations of membership were established and economic, security-political and political-institutional subjects dominated the discussions. The impact of the general political-cultural conditions in the Eastern European states only played a minor part in the debates, at least as far as points directly related to the institutional process of the enlargement were concerned.

On the one hand, with regard to the dramatic changes occurring in the transformation countries, the significance of the citizens for the development of democracy was repeatedly stressed. Also, cultural-historical connections within Europe were referred to or pragmatic ethnic questions about the treatment of minorities were asked. On the other hand, however, a profound consideration of the opinion structures and value orientations concerning the topic of European Integration and the strategies of an Eastern Enlargement was left out.

Under the impression of an establishment of a European social and value community which was propagated recently, this non-consideration of the citizens' attitudes could not last long. Especially, since the call for a common European social culture, which included strengthening the stocks of a European identity as well as the need to create references of a European communisation through institutions (Schmitter 2000: 23, 43ff.), in the last years grew louder within the European Union.

The results from the *Democratic Values* project give insights in this topic. The research offers better insight into the habits of the citizens of those nations that want(ed) to join the European Union. Since the political culture is strongly related to its objective environment as well, the project was designed as a multi-dimensional approach. This approach allowed to investigate how complex institutional, social and economic issues

determine the pattern of political orientations of a society and the attitudes of the members of a nation.

The *Democratic Values* project fits to more than one tasks of the 5th framework program. Main task was the analysis of the connection between individual and collective strategies in a changing community, with Central and Eastern Europe as an example. Furthermore, the project addressed questions of the enlargement of the European Union, questions of governance, citizenship and the dynamics of European integration as well as questions for the social cohesion in Europe, the consequences of inequality in the political realm.

The interaction of social inequality, democratization and political values gave insight into consequences of social inequality for political attitudes. By evaluating inequality in connection with pattern of political orientations we could show what consequences the social costs of transition have for attitudes towards the European Union.

Generally, the research was strongly related to challenges of the enlargement of the European Union. Regarding this question one focus was, what the masses think about their country joining the European Union. Additionally, analyses of the political culture gave empirical information about the national characteristics and told us something about the coherence of the cultural basis between member states of the European Union and countries that want(ed) to join the European Union.

Our investigations have been made under the presumption that the Eastern enlargement of the European Union will be of relevance for the socio-cultural and socio-economic development in the candidate countries, and that at the same time the situation in the countries will have its impact on the integrative power of the "new" Europe. Thus, the main conclusions from our analyses should be formulated with focus on the following points:

With regard to the situation in the transformation countries:

- 1) Do the citizens of the transformation countries actually really wish the integration of their country into the European Union?
- 2) What expectations are related to the integration process, and how should the integration process proceed according to the opinion of the East Europeans?
- 3) By which factors could the attitudes towards the integration process be explained?

With regard to the impact on the enlarged European Union:

- 4) Can we assume that the the fundamental social, political and economic principles the European Union is built on are shared by the population in the new accession/candidate countries?
- 5) Which problems and obstacles could result from the attitudinal basis to the process of European integration?

2. Main results and conclusions

- 1) Generally, it can be assumed that the wish to become part of the European community was widespread in Central and Eastern Europe at the turn of the millennium. Support for joining the European Union could be found in countries where the accession process was expected during the very next time (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, the Baltic states, Slovenia) as well as in countries where the accession process was not expected in the very near future (Bulgaria, Romania).

However, to speak of a general, undisputed consensus regarding this question among the population in the transformation countries would not fit the situation very well. E.g., it could be found a remarkable amount of sceptic positions in all countries, especially in Estonia and in Russia. The people in Central and Eastern Europe were aware of the fact that they would gain from the process mainly in the long run. During the first years, it was expected that the integration process would also require efforts of adaptation and re-structuring that would also cause temporarily problems and setbacks. Thus, in most of the investigated countries there was a lower agreement to statements such as "one should join even it costs jobs in the short run". It were again the sceptical Estonians and the Russians (who were not yet concerned with a joining) that are on average especially distant to a "painful" adaptation. Also in the Central Eastern European States there was a lot of scepticism in appreciable groups of the population if restrictions (for example on the labour market) were associated with the joining. Hungary and Slovenia with their negative proportion values should be specially emphasized here.

- 2) All in all, for the majority of the East Europeans there was never an alternative to the integration into the (so far Western) European community. For most of them, it was indisputalbe that "it would be best in the interest of our country to follow the path of other (West) European countries." (see codebook PCEND 2000-02, F39_1; separate annex). Of course, such an orientation might also be put down to expectations concerning a future economic improvement: whereas

the majority of those in favour of the integration process supported a fast joining of the European Union in all countries, it were especially the citizens from states that expected to join on a later date or that have at the moment no perspective of being admitted to the European Union that wished for joining the European Union soon. This finding can be made out in the difference between hoped-for and real speed of negotiation. As a rule one can say: the longer the way to Europe is, the more the citizens want to speed this dynamic up.

- 3) The unanimous attitude of the Southern Eastern European citizens in this respect gives reason to assume that they hoped that joining the European Union offers considerable economic improvements, which, from their point of view, are urgently needed for the development of their countries. Thus it were especially the Albanians – so far not even associated with the European Union – and the Romanian people that pleaded for adapting to the rules of the European Union, even if that causes temporary deteriorations at the labour market.

However, also here we get hints that it would not be appropriate to reduce expressions of an affiliation towards the European Union to a mere economically driven, instrumental orientation. As we have seen, the “Western” market economy is by no means seen as the ultimate way to go. Apart from economical aspects, there is a lot of evidence that East Europeans feel also affiliated to the European Union for cultural and political reasons (see below). There is a clear wish not just to gain passively from the economic prosperity of the West (as already stated, the current problems within the “Western community” are well perceived) but to contribute actively to the building of the “European House”. Especially those countries that had already advanced further in the process of joining the European Union, did under no circumstances want to be a “junior partner” within the European social and economic area but rather have the same rights as all other EU member states. Correspondingly, the development of more self-confidence at home is one of the most important challenges for the East Europeans.

- 4) According to article I-46 of the European Constitution, “the functioning of the Union shall be founded on representative democracy”, and “every citizen shall have the right to participate in the democratic life of the Union”. In the context of the Enlargement process, the question arises, whether the attitudinal basis of such a political constitution is also guaranteed in all new member states, accession and candidate countries. With regard to this, our results give cause for optimism. In the majority of the countries, democratic principles and ideas are widely accepted. The legitimacy of a democratic order differs not much from the situation in the established, Western countries. Nevertheless, with regard to

democratic consolidation, we have to distinguish between more and less successful societies. East Germany, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Estonia can be considered to be consolidated. However, especially in Russia the previously communist people in power have obviously not succeeded in broadly anchoring the idea of a democratic order; the same seems to hold true for Bulgaria.

As far as the influencing factors are concerned, one has to state that there is no single main cause for these different developments. As one important factor, which hinders the democratization process in the "problematic" countries, the socio-economic situation (e.g. bad economic and political performance, corruption, downward social mobility) could be observed. On the one hand, the commitment of the people to democratic changes and democratic values has to be distinctly differentiated according to the degree of success achieved in the transition process (East Germany/Slovenia/Czech Republic vs. Bulgaria/Russia). On the other hand, there is a significant differentiation of the opinions of the respondents in each of the countries observed, according to the social status (group status, occupational class, etc.) to which each person belongs. Yet, one has to keep in mind that the problem of the relatively low level of satisfaction with how the political and economic systems work is apparent in almost all of the transition countries. As our analyses have shown, attitudes towards the performance of the political system are relatively negative; mainly because of the failure of the political institutions and authorities to meet the population's high demands, the institutions' and elites' search for their role within a democratic order, and the only slow recovering from the economic crisis that has occurred in all countries after the collapse of the communist regime. The fact that, compared to the evaluation of the political system, the performance of the economy is assessed even more negatively, has to be considered as a particular challenge the European will be faced with during the next years. Since the new, market-oriented system is commonly seen as a "Western" import, there is a certain danger that not the national governments but rather "international organizations" (among them "the EU") will be made responsible for failures and setbacks. Our finding that it is mainly the acceptance of democracy as an idea, which is decisive for securing the attitudinal basis for the new political system, should not lead to the assumption that the performance does not matter at all: although the populations of Central Eastern Europe (still) distinguish between the principle of democracy and the realization of this principle, economic and political performance factors (still) exert only a slight influence or none at all over people's acceptance of the democratic principle, and even satisfaction with the working of democracy is only loosely connected to affirmations of the democratic principle, one has to keep in mind that the legitimacy of the political system has not

emerged on the basis of the actual experience that democracy works better than the system before but rather on the experience that socialism did not work. Thus, there are good reasons to take care that the trust in the new system to solve the current problems will not be betrayed permanently. As long as a population makes a clear distinction between dissatisfaction with the system's performance and the approval of democratic principles, one can reckon with reforms within the political system, not, however, with a reform of the political system. However, if this separation is no longer made and agreement to democratic principles decreases dramatically at the same time, can there also be ensuing consequences affecting the complete political order. Such a case can occur if the performance of the political and economic system is judged negatively over a longer period of time. The likelihood that people differentiate in their support between different levels of the political system would decrease and the perceived performance would effect the perceived legitimacy of a regime. Nevertheless, our analyses have shown that currently the legitimacy of democracy is mainly determined by the support for modern values in the transformation countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

- 5) As we could draw from our analyses, the probably most crucial obstruction factor for the advocacy of supporting the European Union is a positive attitude toward socialism or the wish to actually reintroduce it. Situational aspects, such as the assessment of the own economical situation, are only of minor or (even) no importance for attitudes towards joining the European Union. Eastern European citizens do not mainly favour the integration into the European Union because of mere material-instrumental reasons. The decisive factors are basic principles of freedom and equality. Although it can be concluded from our analyses (similar to the situation concerning the political consolidation of the political systems in the transition countries) that the attitudes towards the European Union seem to be much more stable that it may have been expected: also here, it seems to be necessary to stress the relevance of performance factors in the long run. Also the European Union is faced with certain expectations – in the absence of any social and economic prosperity, there is no guarantee that the European integration process will be perceived as the only possible way. The fact that the East Europeans in their majority have become realists during the transformation process and the recognition that the "old" Europe itself has to deal with huge economic problems may help to keep the level of expectations on an adequate level. Yet, the people in Central and Eastern Europe should get the feeling that the problems are shared and solved by the whole community, and (to learn from a lesson from the German unification) should be not get the perception to be seen and treated as the problem itself.

The motto of the European Union – “United in diversity” (Art. I-8 European Constitution) raises the question of how unity and diversity should be weighted. This leads to the problem in how far the national identities to be found in the new member states and candidate countries will prove to be a gift to bring in the EU (in the sense of an expression of the self-consciousness of their population), or an obstruction for the association with Europe. As we have seen, most Eastern Europeans feel connected to several collectives and presumably do not see a fundamental conflict in doing so. Nevertheless, feelings towards a European identity are widespread also in most of the Eastern transition countries (Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic). On the other hand, there are countries where a considerable part of the population defines themselves by dissociating themselves from a European identity (Russia, Bulgaria, Albania, Estonia). There are good reasons to assume that, next to historical influences, especially regional aspects such as geographic distance to the EU border or a centre-periphery constellation seem to play an important part in developing a European identity: the closer a country is situated to the EU border, the more often its citizens define themselves as Europeans. Thus, the enlargement process gives the chance to strengthen the consciousness to belong to Europe also in those countries that are still peripheral now.

However, such a European identity can only give information about a certain attachment to *Europe* but must not necessarily mean a strong affiliation to the *European Union*. The latter will develop only if the East Europeans become aware of the advantages of a political and economic union for themselves and their countries.

All in all, the attitudes towards Europe and the European Union seem to stand in an unambiguous and strong relation to the assessment of democracy in general, especially with those components of democracy that depict the democratic legitimacy. Of course, the direction (i.e. causality) of this relation cannot be determined clearly. However, there is much that speaks for a reciprocal strengthening of the integration into the European Union on the one and the rebuilding and preservation of democratic legitimacy on the other hand. An existing acceptance of democratic principles and of the democratic order fosters a favourable attitude toward the European Union – just as they are the result of the hopes for implementation of the principles and criteria of success of the Western European system, which serves as a model. The approval of the fundamental conditions of democracy such as a free market economy and a constitutional state has to be integrated into the interaction between EU orientation and consolidation. The Eastern European citizens consider the implementation of these principles to be crucial for the development of their country and their own situation. Furthermore, they regard them to be closely tied with a membership in the European Union. Thereby, they are in line with

the main demands of the Copenhagen criteria of 1998: stability of the institutions, guarantee of democracy, constitutional state and human rights.

3. Policy implications

From our analyses and the conclusions, the following policy recommendations can be derived:

- 1) The fact that democracy as an idea and principle is supported by the majority of the population in most Central and East European countries gives cause for optimism but should not lead to the conclusion that the democratic consolidation has come to its end. Rising social inequality has to be considered as an important topic the national governments as well as the European Union have to deal with. The problem of social inequality refers to the objective situation in some countries but also to its critical perception by the people. Keeping in mind that market economy is increasingly judged negatively (not only concerning its performance but also with regard to its general ideas and principles), European Union should pay attention to promote the chances resulting from its social/economic policy (i.e. with regard to its implications for the improvement of the social/economic situation in the countries). Concerning the legitimacy of the EU social policy, it would be advantageous to promote a steady dialogue between the policy makers and the national interest groups (unions).
- 2) To deal with the problem of exaggerated expectations concerning the state's capacity to regulate all sectors of society will be a general problem of all European governments. However, the need to transform the political, the social, the legal, and the economic system simultaneously, and the fact that for the majority of the East Europeans social inequality is a relatively new phenomenon, makes this problem particularly important in the transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The European Union should enforce programs that promote the understanding of complex interactions within the field of social and economic policy. Apart from the national political elites and interest groups, the media should be integrated in such a communication strategy.
- 3) It is exactly because of the fact that Eastern Europeans are by themselves aware of their own political and economic backwardnesses that they should always be treated as equal partners. Regardless of the mere formal-institutional process, the social-cultural integration into the European Union will be only successful if East Europeans feel to be welcome and accepted as contributors to the unification process. A European identity can only build on a well-balanced

conglomerat of self-conscious national identities. The perception of first- and second-class members has to be prevented in any case (this refers to the population of the countries as well as to the national elite). Appropriate strategies to reach this aim are the strengthening of the dialogue between the European Union and the national actors and interest groups in the preliminary stages of negotiations and political decisions and the promotion of programs that explicitly refer to co-operations and activities between the European Union/Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe (exchange programs, political and cultural events, etc.).

To sum up: programs to improve the political and economic development, to drive forward the professionalization of the reform elites and to promote political decisions via interest groups and the media will be the best investment in the future of a stable and prospering democratic European community.

4. Providing a basis for future research

The existing data set *PCEND 2000-02* (see 2.2. and annex) and the analytical concepts utilized in the course of the project should serve as an excellent reference point for future studies of the transition process. The most relevant concepts in this respect will be political transition, political culture, political behavior, state interventionism, market economy, social inequality, social capital, social trust and European identity.

The project did focus on developing new empirical indicators but also employed a strategy of utilizing an extensive collection of existing reliable attitudinal indicators. The analytical model was rather complex. Accordingly, the set of indicators the survey included is extensive, providing broad possibilities for further analysis in comparative perspective.

The cross-national dimension adds important analytical value to survey results. The choice of participating countries allowed insightful comparisons in the area under investigation. As the topic of democratic consolidation will remain relevant in all countries in question, it is expected cooperation will continue on bilateral and multilateral basis that will include joint analytical effort and publishing.

The now available comparative data set *PCEND 2000-02*, including a wide-range social, economic and political attitudes and values in ten transformation states and three consolidated democracies, is unique. No other survey has undertaken the task to identify the impact of political culture by comparing post-communist nations and member states of the European Union.

Our project provides facts and figures about the progress in the process of democratization in Central and Eastern Europe. This information can be used by decision makers within the European Union as a basis for a policy to promote this process and to support the democratic reform elites.

The data set *PCEND 2000-02* is a tool to get deeper reaching information about profiles of social and cultural values and specific attitudes in the political sector. It reveals a vital insight into the chances of the transformation countries to become integrated into the social culture of the European Union. Concerning this topic one focus of our activity will be to contribute to the discussion within the European social science research community. A second task is to develop a new data base and collect information about the research in progress in regard to our research topic within the European Union. The database is made available to the interested public at the project web site (<http://www.democraticvalues.eu.tf/>).

The design of the survey will allow a systematic interpretation of the political culture. The patterns of orientations give insight into the interaction between market economy, social equality and legitimation of the political system. This systematic interpretation can give decision makers hints, which kind of activities are the right instrument for a durable development. Initial results hint at the fact that programs to improve political development and political professionalization of the reform elites are the best investment.

The data set *PCEND 2000-02* provides information from the period 2000 to 2002. In the meantime, the European enlargement process went on with the joining of the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, and the Baltic states. With regard to the topic of our project, one task that should be fulfilled by future research should be to investigate, whether and how the inclusion into the European Union has influenced the attitudinal basis of democracy. Particularly, it has to asked

- 1) how the attitudes towards the political system and towards the market economy have changed in the meantime
- 2) what are the causes of the changing
- 3) how the EU enlargement process and its consequences are assessed now by the population of the countries joined
- 4) what are the hopes and expectation with regard to the future integration into the European community.

The latter point leads to a second complex of questions dealing with the situation in those countries that did not joined the European Union yet. What could be learned from the experiences of the first round of the eastward enlargement with regard to a successful integration of the countries that are to be included in the future? Especially, it should be investigated, what are the main problems or obstacles, which could hinder the integration into the European Union. Thus, it should be asked

- 5) how the enlargement process happened so far has been perceived in the countries that wish to join in the near future
- 6) how this perception and the fact that the time of accession comes closer influence the attitudes towards the European Union
- 7) what happens with regard to the process of democratic consolidation in the countries that wish to join
- 8) how these countries define their role within the larger European community (pure accession, negotiations "at the same eye level", etc.).

Although these questions can of course not be answered on the basis of the data that have been collected within the Democratic Values project, it is our hope that our analyses as well as the data set *PCEND 2000-02* can serve as a reference point, representing the situation during the years 2000-2002. Furthermore, the scientific community as well as the policy makers should benefit from the work done on the comparative research method in general. The comparative method promises to give a guideline how future research on European issues should be carried through.

V. DISSEMINATION AND EXPLOITATION OF RESULTS

1. Dissemination strategies

The results have been disseminated not only within the scientific community but also with regard to provide facts and figures for discussions of decision makers and the public. Mainly, there were three main dissemination strategies used:

1.1. Web site

In order to make the contents as well as the results of the project available for the interested public, a project homepage has been installed (<http://www.democraticvalues.eu.tf/>). The site offers general information about the project, contact addresses, list of relevant publications [partially for downloading], further links of interest. Recently, a new section *data* has been added. It contains the codebook of the surveys, including general technical information, list of variables, funding institutions, and frequencies of almost all variables. It is planned to make the data available for scientific use via the Central Archive in Cologne up from the summer 2005.

1.2. E-mail distribution list

As a second strategy for dissemination, an E-mail distribution list was used. It was addressed to policy makers and representatives of political institutions (from the European Union as well as from single countries), academics (from universities, research institutions, and related projects), and multipliers (particularly journalists). During the life-time of the project, a presentation document has been sent to potential end-users, including an introduction of the project, a short questionnaire in order to become familiar with the specific interests of potential users, and an announcement of the final conference. Furthermore, the policy bulletins (including a link to the project web site) have been distributed via the distribution list.

1.3. Publications

Results arising from the data analysis have been made available to the documentation centers of the European Union in form of project reports, policy papers, specific publications and short policy bulletins. For a complete list of publications related with the project see the annex (VII. 2.). Copies of all policy papers and bulletins as well as a copy of the first project book publication have been added to the separate annex.

1.4. Conferences and workshops

Of course, as a more conventional way, the integration in the discussions of the national scientific communities and the public sphere has also been used to make the results known (see VII. 3.). Furthermore, three project workshops have been held in Tallinn, Barcelona and Athens.

1.5. Media

Policy makers and the general public have also been informed through publishing in national newspapers and presentation in broadcasts (see VII. 2. and VII. 3.). These activities are expected to continue in the future in accordance with the progress of work on the data set.

2. International co-operation and follow-up projects

This project helped to continue and strengthen the cooperation between the members of the consortium that already started in 1999 with the projects *Socio-Economic Values and Democratization in South East Europe* (1999-2001; funded by Volkswagen Foundation) and *Political Attitudes and Values in Post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe* (1999-2001; funded by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft). In the meantime, a network has been established that includes researchers from different Central and Eastern European countries as well as researchers from member states of the European Union. The project brought together a wide range of European social science researchers, which are specialized in quantitative empirical inquiries, in transformation theories and research in public opinion. Since 1999 most of the partners of the consortium work together on the projects about modernization, democratization and social inequality in Central and Eastern Europe. We still pursue the idea to continue the co-operation and to extend the range of this permanent network of researchers in the area of political culture. Such a co-operation seems to be the only effective way to overcome superficial and ad-hoc analyses of societal changes. In the future, the cooperation should lead to a permanent improvement of the theoretical and methodological bases that are sufficient for the analysis of societal changes in Europe.

Apart from further co-operations, the participants of the project will use the material from the project for their future research and teaching activities:

partner	content	kind of activity
Ivan Bernik/Brina Malnar	political culture, social inequality, state interventionism	research teaching
Jörg Jacobs	European foreign policy	research (Habilitation) teaching
Manina Kakepaki	gender, nationalism, and migration using the data within Comparative National Elections Project (CNEP)	research (planned follow-up survey) research
Ioan Marginean/Iuliana Precupetu/Marius Precupetu	democratization and quality of life	research teaching
Olaf Müller	transformation and religion	research (Ph.D.) teaching
Detlef Pollack	religious individualization; nationalism and democracy	research teaching
Gert Pickel	democratization in Central and Eastern Europe	research (Habilitation) teaching
Nikolai Tilkidjiev	stratification	research teaching
Mariano Torcal/Irene Martín-Cortés/Lorenzo Brusattin	third and fourth wave democracies in comparison using the data within CONNEX project/Research Group 5 (Social Capital as Catalyst of Civic Engagement and Quality of Governance; Coordinator: Frane Adam)	research teaching research
Klára Vlachová	ethnos, demos, nation state, territorial identity and double allegiance	research

VI. REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abby, Innes (2001): *Czechoslovakia. The Short Goodbye*. New Haven.

Almond, Gabriel A./Verba, Sidney (1963): *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Princeton: University Press.

Almond, Gabriel/Verba, Sidney (eds.) (1980): *The Civic Culture Revisited*. Boston et al.

Almond, Gabriel/Verba, Sidney (1963): *The Civic Culture - Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Princeton.

Arzheimer/Klein (1997): Die friedliche und die stille Revolution. In: Gabriel, Oskar W. (ed.): *Politische Orientierungen und Verhaltensweisen im vereinigten Deutschland*. Opladen, 37-60.

Balcerowicz, Leszek (1995): *Socialism, Capitalism, Transformation*. Budapest et al.

Barnes, Samuel H./Simon, Janos (eds.) (1998): *The Postcommunist Citizen*. Budapest: Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

Bernik, Ivan/Malnar, Brina (2003): Political Culture in Post-Communist Europe: Radical Cultural Change or Adaptation on the Basis of Old Cultural Patterns. In: Pollack, Detlef/Jacobs, Jörg/Müller, Olaf/Pickel, Gert (eds.): *Political Culture in Post-Communist Europe*. Aldershot, 181-206.

Bogdanor, Vernon (1990): Founding Elections and Regime Change. *Electoral Studies* 9:4, 288 – 294.

Broderick, J. Kirstin (2000): *The Economy and Political Culture in New Democracies. An Analysis of Democratic Support in Central and Eastern Europe*. Aldershot.

Bukowski, Charles (1999): Slovenia's Transition to Democracy: Theory and Practice. *East European Quarterly* 23, 69-96.

Collier, David: The Comparative Method. In: Finifter, Ada W. (ed.) (1993): *Political Science: The State of the Discipline*. Washington, D.C.: American Political Science Association.

Conover, Pamela Johnston/Feldman, Stanley (1981): The Origins and Meaning of Liberal/Conservative Self-Identifications. *American Journal of Political Science* 25, 616-645.

- Dahl, Robert A. (1971): *Polyarchy, Participation and Opposition*. New Haven, London.
- Dahl, Robert A. (1989): *Democracy and its Critics*. New Haven.
- Delhey, Jan (2001): *Osteuropa zwischen Marx und Markt. Soziale Ungleichheit und soziales Bewusstsein nach dem Kommunismus*. Hamburg.
- Delhey, Jan/Tobsch, Verena (2000): Freiheit oder Wohlstand? Regimeperformanz oder Demokratiezufriedenheit in Ostdeutschland und Ungarn. *Berliner Debatte INITIAL 11: 5/6, 33-47*.
- Diamond, Larry (ed.) (1993): *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries*. Boulder.
- Diamond, Larry (1994): Toward Democratic Consolidation. *Journal of Democracy 5:3, 4-17*.
- Diamond, Larry (2002): Consolidating Democracies. In: LeDuc, Lawrence/Niemi, Richard G./Pippa, Norris (eds.): *Comparing Democracies 2 – New Challenges in the Study of Elections and Voting*. London, 210-227.
- Diamond, Larry (1999): *Developing Democracy. Toward Consolidation*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins.
- Easton, David (1975): A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support. *British Journal of Political Science 5, 453-457*.
- Easton, David (1979): *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*. New York.
- Easton, David (1979): *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*. New York et al.(new edition).
- Easton, David (1965): *A System Analysis of Political Live*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Elster, Jon (1990): The Necessity and Impossibility of Simultaneous Economic and Political Reform. In: Polzajski, Piotr (ed.): *Philosophy of Social Choice*. Warsaw, 309-316.
- European Commission (2002): Applicant Countries Barometer. *Results Summary 2001*. Brüssel.
- Evans, Geoffrey/Whitefield, Stephen (1995): The Politics and Economics of Democratic Commitment: Support for Democracy in Transition Societies. *British Journal of Political Science 25, 485-514*.

Fishbein, Martin/Ajzen, Icek (1972): Attitudes and Opinions. *Annual Review of Psychology* 23, 487-544.

Fishbein, Martin/Ajzen, Icek (1975): *Belief, Attitude, Intention and Behavior - An Introduction to Theory and Research*. Reading.

Fuchs, Dieter (1987): Trends politischer Unterstützung in der Bundesrepublik. In: Berg-Schlosser, Dirk/Schissler, Jakob (eds.): *Politische Kultur in Deutschland*, PVS-Sonderheft 18, Opladen, 357-377.

Fuchs, Dieter (1996): *Wohin geht der Wandel der demokratischen Institutionen in Deutschland? Die Entwicklung der Demokratievorstellungen der Deutschen seit ihrer Vereinigung*. Diskussionspapier FS III, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), 96-207.

Fuchs, Dieter (1997): Welche Demokratie wollen die Deutschen? Einstellungen zur Demokratie im vereinigten Deutschland. In: Gabriel, Oskar W.: *Politische Orientierungen und Verhaltensweisen im vereinigten Deutschland*. Opladen, 81-114.

Fuchs, Dieter (1998): *The Political Culture of Unified Germany*. Diskussionspapier FS III Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin, 98-105.

Fuchs, Dieter/Edeltraud Roller (1998): Cultural Conditions of Transition to Liberal Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. In: Barnes, Samuel H./Simon, János (eds.): *The Postcommunist Citizen*. Budapest, 35-78.

Fuchs, Dieter/Klingemann, Hans-Dieter (2002): Eastward Enlargement of the European Union and the Identity of Europe. In: Mair, Peter/Zielonka, Jan (eds.): *West European Politics. Special Issue on the Enlarged European Union*, 19-54.

Fuchs, Dieter (2002): Das Konzept der politischen Kultur: Die Fortsetzung einer Kontroverse in konstruktiver Absicht. In: Fuchs, Dieter/Roller, Edeltraut/Weßels, Bernhard (eds.): *Bürger und Demokratie in Ost und West. Studien zur politischen Kultur und zum politischen Prozess*. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 27-50.

Fuchs, Dieter (1989): *Die Unterstützung des politischen Systems der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.

Fuchs, Dieter (1997): Welche Demokratie wollen die Deutschen? Einstellungen zur Demokratie im vereinigten Deutschland. In: Gabriel, Oscar W. (ed.): *Politische Orientierungen und Verhaltensweisen im vereinigten Deutschland*. Opladen: Leske+Budrich, 81-113.

Fukuyama, Francis (1989): The End of History? *National Interest*, 3-18.

Greenwald, Anthony G. (1989): Why are Attitudes Important? In: Pratkanis, Anthony R. et al. (eds.): *Attitudes Structure and Function*. Hillsdale et al., 1-10.

Grzymala-Busse, Anna (2002): The Programmatic Turnaround of Communist Successor Parties in East Central Europe 1989–1998. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 35:1, 51-66.

Hafner-Fink, Mitja (1999): Social Inequality in the Process of Transformation from Socialism: Comparing Slovenia to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary and Poland. In: Toš, Niko/Peter Mohler/Malnar, Brina (eds.): *Modern Society and Values. A Comparative Analysis Based on ISSP Project*. Mannheim, 171-192.

Hanhinen, Sari (2001): Social Problems in Transition. *Perception of Influential Groups in Estonia, Russia and Finland*. Helsinki.

Hashim, Syed Moshim (1999): KPRF Ideology and its Implications for Democratization in Russia. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 32, 77-89

Held, David (1987): *Models of Democracy*. Stanford.

Higley, John/Gunther, Richard (eds.) (1992): *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*. New York.

Hirschman, Albert O. (1970): *Exit, Voice and Loyalty*. Cambridge.

Hirschman, Albert O. (1992): Abwanderung, Widerspruch und das Schicksal der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik. *Leviathan* 3, 330-358.

Huntington, Samuel (1991): *The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late 20th Century*. Norman.

Inglehart, Ronald (1989): *Kultureller Umbruch - Wertwandel in der westlichen Welt*. Frankfurt et al.

Inglehart, Ronald (1997): *Modernization and Postmodernization - Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies*. Princeton.

Inglehart, Ronald (1998): *Modernisierung und Postmodernisierung*. Frankfurt/Main: Campus Verlag.

Ipsos, Szonda (ohne Jahrgabe): *SOCO Project Phase B - Documentation Fieldwork and Financial Report*. Institut für die Wissenschaft vom Menschen, Wien.

Ishiyama, John (1995): Communist Parties in Transition: Structures, Leaders and Processes of Democratization in Eastern Europe. *Comparative Politics* 27, 146-77.

Ismayr, Wolfgang (2002): *Die politischen Systeme Osteuropas*. Opladen: Leske+Budrich.

Jachtenfuchs, Markus/Kohler-Koch, Beate (1996): *Europäische Integration*. Opladen: Leske + Budrich.

Jacobs, Jörg (2004): Tücken der Demokratie: *Antisystemeinstellungen und ihre Determinanten in sieben post-kommunistischen Transformationsländern*. Wiesbaden.

Jacobs, Jörg (1997): *Die Beurteilung der politischen und ökonomischen Performanz als Basis zur Legitimierung politischer Systeme: Wertorientierungen und Erfahrungen in Mittel- und Osteuropa im Wechselspiel*. Vortrag auf dem 2. Workshop des Frankfurter Instituts für Transformationsstudien 10.-11.04.1997 in Frankfurt (Oder), mimeo.

Jacobs, Jörg/Müller, Olaf/Pickel, Gert (2000): Demokratie auf dem Prüfstand – Konsolidierung und Widerstandspotential der Bevölkerung in Osteuropa im Vergleich. *Berliner Debatte INITIAL* 11: 5/6, 17-32.

Jacobs, Jörg/Müller, Olaf/Pickel, Gert (2002): Persistence of the democracies in Central and Eastern Europe – Consolidation, Stability and People's Power of Resisting. In: Pollack, Detlef et al. (eds.): *Political Culture in Post-Communist Europe*. Aldershot, 91-114.

Jacobs, Jörg (2001): Alltag oder Vergangenheit. Einstellungen zur herrschenden politischen Ordnung in den Neuen Bundesländern, Polen, Tschechien und Ungarn. *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, 223-246.

Jennings, Kent M. (1992): Ideological Thinking among Mass Publics and Political Elites. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 56, 419-441.

Jowitt, Ken (1992): *New World Disorder. The Leninist Extinction*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Juhász, Zoltan (1996): *Außenpolitische Denkbilder - Eine empirische Untersuchung außenpolitischer Einstellungen in der deutschen Bevölkerung nach der Wiedervereinigung*. Hamburg.

Jung, Helmut (1982): *Wirtschaftliche Einstellungen und Wahlverhalten in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Eine Quer- und Längsschnittanalyse von 1971 bis 1976*. Paderborn.

Kitschelt, Herbert (1995): Formation of Party Cleavages in Post-Communist Democracies: Theoretical Propositions. *Party Politics* 1:4, 447-72.

Kitschelt, Herbert/Mansfeldova, Zdenka/Markowski, Radoslaw/Toka, Gabor (1999): *Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation and Inter-Party Cooperation*, Cambridge.

Kitschelt, Herbert (2001): *Post-Communist Economic Reform. Causal Mechanisms and Concomitant Properties*. Paper presented at the annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in San Francisco 29.08. –2.09. 2001.

Klingemann, Hans-Dieter (1979): Ideological Conceptualization and Political Action. In: Barnes, Samuel/Kaase, Max (eds.): *Political Action: Mass Participation in five Western Democracies*. Beverly Hills.

Cluegel, James R./Mason, David S./Wegener, Bernd (eds.): *Social Justice and Political Change: Public Opinion in Capitalist and Post-Communist States*, Berlin/New York.

Cluegel, James, R./Mason, David S. (1995): *Social Justice and Political Change: Public Opinion in Capitalist and Post Communist States*. New York: de Gruyter.

Kovács, András (1998): *Voting For and Voting Against: Electoral Behavior and Political Culture in Post-Communist Hungary*. Paper presented at the FIT-conference „Postcommunist Transformation and the Social Sciences: Cross-Disciplinary Approaches“, 30-31.10. 1998 Berlin.

Landman, Todd (2000): *Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics*. London: Routledge.

Liebig, Stefan/Wegener, Bernd (1999): Protest und Verweigerung: Die Folgen sozialer Ungerechtigkeit in Deutschland. In: Schmitt, Manfred/Montada, Leo (eds.): *Gerechtigkeitserleben im wiedervereinigten Deutschland*. Opladen, 263-298.

Linz, Juan J. (1978): Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration. In: Linz, Juan J./Stepan, Alfred (eds.): *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*. London, 3-124.

Linz, Juan J. (1990): Transitions to Democracy. *Washington Quarterly* 13, 143-163.

Linz, Juan J./Stepan, Alfred (1996a): Towards Consolidated Democracies. *Journal of Democracy* 7:2, 14-33.

Linz, Juan J./Alfred Stepan (1996b): *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*. Baltimore, London.

Lipset, Seymour M. (1966): *Political Man*. 4. Aufl. London.

Lipset, Seymour M. (1981): *Political Man*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins.

Machiavelli, Niccolo (1986): *Der Fürst*. Stuttgart [org. 1532].

Mahr, Alison/Nagle, John (1995): Resurrection of the Successor Parties and Democratization in East-Central Europe. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 28:4, 393-409.

Marginean, Ioan (1999): Suportul social pentru democratie (Social Support for Democracy). *Sociologie Romaneasca* 2, 3-18.

Mateju, Petr (1996): Winners and Losers in the Post-Communist Transformation: the Czech Republic in Comparative Perspective. *Innovation* 9, 371-389.

Merkel, Wolfgang (1999): *Systemtransformation*. Opladen.

Meyer, Gerd (1997): Zwischen Haben und Sein - Psychische Aspekte des Transformationsprozesses in postkommunistischen Gesellschaften. *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* B 5, 17-28.

Miller, Arthur H./Hesli, Vicki L./Reisinger, William M. (1995): Comparing Citizen and Elite Belief Systems in Post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 59, 1-40.

Mishler, William/Rose, Richard (1993): Trajectories of Fear and Hope: The Dynamics of Support for Democracy in Eastern Europe. *Studies in Public Policy* 214. Glasgow.

Müller, Olaf (2005): Einstellungen zur Wirtschaftsordnung. In: Pickel, Gert/Pollack, Detlef/Jacobs, Jörg/Müller, Olaf (eds.): *Osteuropas Bevölkerung auf dem Weg in die Demokratie? Repräsentative Untersuchungen in Ostdeutschland und 10 weiteren osteuropäischen Transformationsstaaten*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften (im Erscheinen).

Noll, Heinz-Herbert/Schuster, Friedrich (1992): Soziale Schichtung und Wahrnehmung sozialer Ungleichheit im Ost-West-Vergleich. In: Glatzer, Wolfgang/Noll, Heinz-Herbert

(eds.): *Lebensverhältnisse in Deutschland: Ungleichheit und Angleichung*, Frankfurt a.M./New York, 209-230.

Norris, Pippa (1999): Introduction: The Growth of Critical Citizens. In: Norris, Pippa (ed.): *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance*. Oxford, 1-27.

O'Donnell, Guillermo (1996): Illusions about Consolidation. *Journal of Democracy* 7:6, 34-51.

O'Donnell, Guillermo/Schmitter, Philippe C. (1986): *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*. Baltimore.

Offe, Claus (1991): Das Dilemma der Gleichzeitigkeit: Demokratisierung und Marktwirtschaft in Osteuropa. *Merkur* 45:4, 279-292.

Offe, Claus (1994): *Der Tunnel am Ende des Lichts*. Frankfurt/M.

Parsons, Talcott (1971): *The System of Modern Societies*. Englewood Cliffs.

Lewis, Paul G. (2001): The 'Third Wave' of Democracy in Eastern Europe. *Party Politics* 7:5, 543 -565.

Pickel, Gert (1997): Tendenzen der Demokratisierung und politischen Unterstützung in Osteuropa. Makrosoziologische Überlegungen zu Demokratisierung und politischer Kultur in Osteuropa. In: Pickel, Gert/Pickel, Susanne/Jacobs, Jörg (eds.): *Demokratie - Entwicklungsformen und Erscheinungsbilder im interkulturellen Vergleich*. Frankfurt (Oder) et al.

Pickel, Gert/Jacobs, Jörg (1998): Soziale Ungleichheit in Osteuropa. In: Pickel, Gert/Pickel, Susanne (ed.): *Demokratie im interkulturellen Vergleich. Ergebnisse empirischer komparativer Analysen*. Frankfurt/Oder, Bamberg.

Pickel, Gert/Pickel, Susanne (1999): Neue Demokratien in Osteuropa? Politische Unterstützung und politische Partizipation als Determinanten der Demokratisierung. In: Lauth, Hans-Joachim/Liebert, Ulrike (eds.): *Im Schatten demokratischer Legitimität. Informelle Institutionen und politische Partizipation im interkulturellen Vergleich*. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 237-258.

Pickel, Gert/Pickel, Susanne (2002): *Vergleichende politische Kultur- und Demokratieforschung*. Opladen: Leske + Budrich.

Pickel, Gert/Pollack, Detlef/Jacobs, Jörg/Müller, Olaf (eds.) (2005): *Osteuropas Bevölkerung auf dem Weg in die Demokratie? Repräsentative Untersuchungen in Ostdeutschland und 10 weiteren osteuropäischen Transformationsstaaten*. Wiesbaden (im Erscheinen).

Pickel, Gert/Pickel, Susanne (2000): Politische Partizipation und politische Einstellungen der osteuropäischen Transformationsstaaten im Vergleich. *FIT-Discussion Paper 04*.

Pickel, Gert (2001): Legitimität von Demokratie und Rechtsstaat in den osteuropäischen Transformationsstaaten 10 Jahre nach dem Umbruch. In: Becker, Michael/Lauth, Hans-Joachim/Pickel, Gert (eds.): *Rechtsstaat und Demokratie. Theoretische und empirische Studien zum Recht in der Demokratie*. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 299-326.

Plasser, Fritz/Pribersky, Andreas (1996): *Political Culture in East Central Europe*. Aldershot.

Plasser, Fritz/Ulram, Peter A./Waldrach, Harald (1998): *Democratic Consolidation in East-Central Europe*. Basingstoke/London.

Plasser, Fritz/Ulram, Peter A./Waldrach, Harald (1997): *Politischer Kulturwandel in Ost-Mitteleuropa - Theorie und Empirie demokratischer Konsolidierung*. Opladen.

Pollack, Detlef (1996): Sozialstruktureller Wandel, Institutionentransfer und die Langsamkeit der Individuen. Untersuchungen zu den ostdeutschen Transformationsprozessen in der Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie und der Sozialen Welt. In: *Soziologische Revue* 19.Jg., 412-429.

Pollack, Detlef (1997): Das Bedürfnis nach sozialer Anerkennung - Der Wandel der Akzeptanz von Demokratie und Marktwirtschaft in Ostdeutschland. *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* B 13, 3-14.

Pollack, Detlef (1998): Ostdeutsche Identität - ein multidimensionales Phänomen. In: Meulemann, Heiner (ed.): *Werte und nationale Identität im vereinten Deutschland - Erklärungsansätze der Umfrageforschung*. Opladen, 301-318.

Pollack, Detlef (2000): Wirtschaftlicher, sozialer und mentaler Wandel in Ostdeutschland. *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* B 40, 13-21.

Pollack, Detlef/Jacobs, Jörg/Müller, Olaf/Pickel, Gert (eds.)(2003): *Political Culture in Central and Eastern Europe*. London: Ashgate.

Pollack, Detlef/Pickel, Gert (1998): Die ostdeutsche Identität - Erbe des DDR-Sozialismus oder Produkt der Wiedervereinigung? - Die Einstellung der Ostdeutschen zu sozialer Ungleichheit und Demokratie. *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* B41/42, 9-23.

Pridham, Geoffrey (1995): The International Context of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective. In: Gunther, Richard/Diamandouros, P. Nikiforos/Puhle, Hans-Jürgen (eds.): *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective*. Baltimore, 166-203.

Pridham, Geoffrey (1995): The International Context of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective. In: Gunther, Richard/Diamandouros, P. Nikiforos/Puhle, Hans-Jürgen (eds.): *Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective*. Baltimore, 166-203.

Pröhle, Gergely (2002): *Ungarn und der EU-Beitritt*. Vortrag an der Universität Greifswald 4.02.

Przeworski, Adam (1990): Spiel mit Einsatz - Demokratisierungsprozesse in Lateinamerika, Osteuropa und anderswo. *Transit* 1, 190-214.

Przeworski, Adam (1991): *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*. Cambridge et al.

Rattinger, Hans (1983): Arbeitslosigkeit, Apathie und Protestpotential: Zu den Auswirkungen der Arbeitsmarktlage auf das Wahlverhalten bei der Bundestagswahl 1980. In: Kaase, Max/Klingemann, Hans-Dieter (eds.): *Wahlen und politisches System - Analysen aus Anlaß der Bundestagswahl 1980*. Opladen, 257-318.

Rattinger, Hans/Heinlein, Petra (1986): *Sicherheitspolitik in der öffentlichen Meinung - Umfrageergebnisse für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland bis zum "heißen Herbst 1983"*. Berlin.

Rattinger, Hans/Maier, Jürgen (1998): Der Einfluß der Wirtschaftslage auf die Wahlentscheidung bei den Bundestagswahlen 1994 und 1998. *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* B52, 45-54.

ReiBig, Rolf (1998): Transformationsforschung: Gewinne, Desiderate und Perspektive. *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, 39. Jg., 301-328.

Rokeach, Milton (1973): *The Nature of Human Values*. New York.

- Ronis, David L./Yates, Frank/Kirscht, John P. (1989): Attitudes, Decisions, and Habits as Determinants of Repeated Behavior. In: Pratkanis, Anthony R. et al. (eds.): *Attitudes Structure and Function*. Hillsdale et al., 213-240.
- Rose, Amanda (1997): *The Patient Public in New Democracies: Modeling the „Honeymoon“ in Polish Politics*. Paper presented at the annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington D.C. 27-31.08. 1997.
- Rose, Amanda (1999): Extraordinary politics in the Polish transition. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 32, 195-210.
- Rose, Richard/Haerpfer, Christian (1992): New democracies between state and market. *Studies in Public Policy* 204. Glasgow: Strathclyde.
- Rose, Richard/Haerpfer, Christian (1995): New Democracies Barometer III: Learning from what is happening. *Studies in Public Policy* 230. Glasgow: Strathclyde.
- Rose, Richard/Mishler, William/Haerpfer, Christian (1998): *Democracy and its Alternatives: Understanding Post-Communist Societies*. Baltimore.
- Rose, Richard (2001): A Diverging Europe. *Journal of Democracy* 12:1, 93-106.
- Rush, Michael (1992): *Politics and Society - An Introduction to Political Sociology*. Hemel Hempstead.
- Sartori, Giovanni (1987): *The Theory of Democracy Revisited*. New Jersey.
- Schmitter, Philippe C. (2000): *How to democratize the european union... And why bother?* Oxford: Rowan & Littlefield.
- Schulze, Gerhard (without year): *Regressionsanalyse im Überblick*. Paper Methoden der empirischen Sozialforschung an der Universität Bamberg. Bamberg.
- Sedelmeier, Ulrich/Wallace, Helen (2000): Eastern Enlargement In: Wallace, Helen/Wallace, William (eds.): *Policy-Making in the European Union*. 4. Aufl. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 428-456.
- Singelis, Theodore M. et al. (1995): Horizontal and Vertical Dimensions of Individualism and Collectivism: A Theoretical and Measurement Refinement. *Cross-Cultural Research* 29, 240-275.
- Sniderman, Paul M. (1981): *A Question of Loyalty*. Berkeley.

Spéder, Zolt/Schultz, Annett/Habich, Roland (1997): Soziale Ungleichheit in der ostmitteleuropäischen Transformation. In: Glatzer, Wolfgang/Kleinhenz, Gerhard (eds.): *Wohlstand für alle?* Opladen, 335-408.

Stahlberg, Dieter/Frey, Dieter (1992): Einstellungen I: Struktur, Messung und Funktionen. In: Stroebe, Wolfgang et al. (eds.): *Sozialpsychologie - Eine Einführung*. Berlin, 144-170.

Tilkidjiev, Nikolai (ed.) (1998): *Social Stratification and Inequality*. Sofia, 140-141. (in Bulgarian)

Tilkidjiev, Nikolai (2002): *The Middle Class and Social Stratification*. Sofia (in Bulgarian)

Toka, Gabor (1997): Political Parties in East Central Europe. In: Diamond, Larry/Plattner, Marc F./Chu, Yun-han/Tien, Hung-mao (eds.): *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 93-134.

Vaduchova, Milada Anna (2002): *Integration, Security and Immigration. The European Agendas of Eastern Europe's Right Wing Parties*. Paper vorgestellt bei der Konferenz der Europabefürworter. Chicago, 14-16.03.02

Valenzuela, Samuel J. (1992): Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings: Notion, Process, and Facilitating Conditions. In: Mainwaring, S./O'Donnell, Guillermo/Valenzuela, Samuel J. (eds.): *Issues in Democratic Consolidation*. Notre Dame, 57-104.

Vetik, Raivo/Rein Ruutsoo (1999): The Estonian State and Society on the Threshold of the 21st Century. In: Vetik, Raivo (ed.): *Estonian Human Development Report 1999*. Tallinn.

Walz, Dieter/Brunner, Wolfram (1997): Das Sein bestimmt das Bewußtsein - Oder: Warum sich die Ostdeutschen als Bürger 2. Klasse fühlen. *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B 51, 13-19.

Wegener, Bernd/Liebig, Stefan (1995): Dominant Ideologies and the Variation of Distributive Justice Norms: A Comparison of East and West Germany, and the United States. In: Kluegel, James R./Mason, David S./Wegener, Bernd (eds.): *Social Justice and Political Change: Public Opinion in Capitalist and Post-Communist States*. Berlin, New York, 239-259.

Weil, Frederick D. (1993): The Development of Democratic Attitudes in Eastern and Western Germany in a Comparative Perspective. In: Weil, F.D. (eds.): *Research on*

Democracy and Society 1, Democratization in Eastern and Western Europe. Greenwich, 195-225.

Welzel, Christian (2002): *Fluchtpunkt Humanentwicklung. Über die Grundlagen der Demokratie und die Ursachen ihrer Ausbreitung*. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag.

Westle, Bettina (1989): *Politische Legitimität - Theorien, Konzepte, empirische Befunde*. Baden-Baden.

Westle, Bettina (1994): Demokratie und Sozialismus. Politische Ordnungsvorstellungen im vereinten Deutschland zwischen Ideologie, Protest und Nostalgie. In: *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 46. Jg., 571-596.

Wright, James D. (1976): *The Dissent of the Governed*. New York.

Zapf, Wolfgang (1984): Individuelle Wohlfahrt: Lebensbedingungen und wahrgenommene Lebensqualität. In: Glatzer, Wolfgang/Zapf, Wolfgang (eds.): *Lebensqualität in der Bundesrepublik. Objektive Lebensbedingungen und subjektives Wohlbefinden*, Frankfurt a.M., New York, 13-26.

Zapf, Wolfgang (1996): Modernisierungstheorien in der Transformationsforschung. In: Von Beyme, Klaus/Offe, Claus: *Politische Theorien in der Ära der Transformation*. Opladen, 169-181.

Zibblatt, Daniel F. (1998): The Adaptation of Ex-Communist Parties to Post-Communist East Central Europe: A Comparative Study of the East German and Hungarian Ex-Communist Parties. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 31:2, 119-137.

VII. ANNEXES

1. Tables

Table 1. Assessment of democracy and rejection of antidemocratic system alternatives 2000

	Assessment of democracy			Rejection of antidemocratic system alternatives			
	Demo perfo.	demo struct.	demo idea	social.	party	leader	dictat.
Estonia	44	87	73	92	77	71	85
- Estonian pop.	45	89	74	94	80	75	87
- Russian pop.	41	85	69	84	67	59	78
Poland	21	88	76	82	60	71	76
Hungary	31	88	71	80	75	80	91
Czech Republic	44	89	88	90	79	88	88
Slovakia	20	85	78	76	61	89	87
Slovenia	25	86	80	84	78	82	87
Bulgaria	19	75	63	67	63	56	65
Romania	11	87	81	79	68	64	75
Albania	35	92	91	96	82	84	67
Russia	21	71	53	67	51	46	57

Source: PCEND 2000-02; agreeing values on a scale of 4 points in %; demoperfo.: „Democracy, as it currently presents itself, works good“; demostruct.: „Democracy is the most appropriate form of government“; demo-idea: „The idea of democracy is in any case good“; rejection of antidemocratic system alternatives in%; social.: „We should go back to a Socialistic order“; party: „A multiparty is bound to create chaos. All we need is a one-party system“; leader: „The best thing would be to get rid off the parliament and to have a strong leader instead, who can decide things quickly “; dictat.: „Under some circumstances, a dictatorship would be the best form of government “

Table 2. Support for anti-democratic systemic alternatives

	comm. leader		dictatorship monarchy		experts	single party
Germany (East)	17	11	13	3	53	18
Poland	18	29	24	8	65	40
Hungary	20	20	9	5	68	24
Czech Republic	10	12	12	7	69	21
Slovakia	24	11	13	3	65	39
Slovenia	16	18	13	4	63	22
Estonia	8	29	15	10	62	23
Bulgaria	33	44	35	28	68	36
Romania	21	36	25	13	70	32
Albania	4	16	33	18	63	18
Russia	33	54	43	7	58	51
Germany (West)	15	7	7	-	42*	-
Spain	-	7	14**	-	22	-
Greece	-	13	19**	8	28	-

Source: PCEND 2000-02; disagreeing values on a scale of 4 points in %; agreeing to anti-democratic systematic alternatives in %; comm.: "We should return to communist rule."; leader: "Best to get rid of parliament and have a strong leader who can decide things quickly."; dictatorship: "Under certain circumstances dictatorship is the best form of government." (Spain and Greece: "We should return to dictatorship."); monarchy: „A return to monarchy would be better."; experts: „The most important decisions about the development of our country should be made by experts, and not the government and parliament." (Germany (West): "We should return to a more authoritarian system."); single party: "A multi-party system is designed to create chaos. All we need is a single-party system."

Table 3. Confidence in political institutions

	courts	police	military	president	parliament	political parties	politicians
Germany (East)	60	69	64	54	38	22	18
Poland	46	60	77	54	29	11	11
Hungary	53	40	48	55	30	19	16
Czech Rep.	47	51	55	48	18	19	18
Slovakia	33	41	69	55	21	16	15
Slovenia	50	54	59	63	24	17	15
Estonia	59	59	75	68	46	34	33
Bulgaria	30	44	64	58	18	15	14
Romania	36	46	86	27	17	11	9
Albania	33	69	72	62	47	23	21
Russia	38	28	75	66	26	17	17
Germany (West)	63	76	66	66	44	18	16
Spain	31	59	55	71	38	13	12
Greece	55	59	79	75	39	20	18

Source: PCEND 2000-02; values on a scale of 4 points in percentage; some confidence and a great deal of confidence.

Table 4. Politics and individual (negative attitudes in %)

	External Political Efficacy	Internal Political Efficacy	political competence	distrust in politicians
Germany (East)	80	68	37	64
Poland	84	83	56	73
Hungary	65	74	34	48
Czech Republic	81	32	46	67
Slovakia	85	67	46	82
Slovenia	78	77	45	65
Estonia	76	36	52	65
Bulgaria	86	83	54	85
Romania	87	73	42	88
Albania	74	71	56	86
Russia	80	42	44	84

Source: PCEND 2000-02; disagreeing values on a scale of 5 points in%; External Political Efficacy: percentage of those who do not feel presented by the political system; Internal Political Efficacy: percentage of those who do not think of a possibility to influence political decisions; Political Competence: percentage of those who think: "politics is so complicated that people like me do not understand what is going on."; distrust in politicians: percentage of people who think that most politicians are corrupt.

Table 5. Vote for communist successor parties in founding elections

Country	Party	Percentage
Albania	Albanian Worker's Party (SPA)	56.17
Bulgaria	Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP)	47.15
Czech Republic	Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (CPBM)	14.3
Germany (East)	Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS)	16.4
Estonia	Communist Party of Estonia	4.8
Hungary	Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (MSzMP)	10.89
Poland	Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)	11.98
Romania	National Salvation Front	66.31
Russia	Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF)	12.4
Slovakia	Party of the Democratic Left (PDL)	13.34
Slovenia	Party of Democratic Reform (PDR)	17.30

Table 6. Equal opportunity versus equal distribution

	Equal opportunity	Equal distribution	Income regulation
Germany (East)	87 vs. 3	28 vs. 47	38 vs. 39
Poland	85 vs. 5	47 vs. 34	50 vs. 29
Hungary	89 vs. 2	25 vs. 53	36 vs. 40
Czech Rep.	80 vs. 7	13 vs. 73	21 vs. 65
Slovakia	92 vs. 2	39 vs. 38	58 vs. 24
Slovenia	86 vs. 6	28 vs. 49	35 vs. 46
Estonia	81 vs. 8	23 vs. 65	13 vs. 78
Bulgaria	90 vs. 3	46 vs. 38	55 vs. 30
Romania	87 vs. 4	39 vs. 40	41 vs. 43
Albania	89 vs. 5	46 vs. 44	38 vs. 52
Russia	86 vs. 5	16 vs. 68	22 vs. 62

Source: PCND 2000/2002; 5 point-scale; percentage of those who agree strongly and somewhat versus percentage of those who disagree strongly and somewhat

Equal opportunities: „Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everybody has an equal opportunity to succeed.“ *Equal distribution:* „The fairest way for distributing wealth and income would be to give everyone equal shares.“ *Income regulation:* „There should be a mechanism in our country which regulates income in a way that no one earns much more than others.“

Table 7. Acceptance of social inequality

	Inequality fair	Differences necessary	Respons. at extra exp.	Profit beneficial
Germany (East)	54 vs. 18	21 vs. 46	70 vs. 13	36 vs. 37
Poland	52 vs. 21	27 vs. 48	75 vs. 10	27 vs. 50
Hungary	31 vs. 31	12 vs. 71	79 vs. 5	22 vs. 50
Czech Rep.	44 vs. 29	16 vs. 57	72 vs. 11	48 vs. 32
Slovakia	40 vs. 36	21 vs. 58	75 vs. 11	66 vs. 18
Slovenia	53 vs. 21	14 vs. 66	74 vs. 12	37 vs. 36
Estonia	69 vs. 13	27 vs. 54	76 vs. 13	45 vs. 36
Bulgaria	48 vs. 31	18 vs. 65	71 vs. 15	42 vs. 37
Romania	55 vs. 24	21 vs. 59	75 vs. 12	49 vs. 31
Albania	63 vs. 21	51 vs. 31	91 vs. 3	62 vs. 26
Russia	39 vs. 32	20 vs. 60	77 vs. 11	49 vs. 30

Source: PCND 2000/2002; 5 point-scale; percentage of those who agree strongly and somewhat vs. percentage of those who disagree strongly and somewhat

Inequality is fair: „Social differences between people are justified because they express what one has made of the given chances of life.“ *Differences are necessary:* „Large differences in income are necessary for (the country`s) development.“ *Responsibility at extra expenses:* „In our society would not want to take extra responsibility at work unless they were paid extra for it.“ *Profit is beneficial:* „Allowing businessmen to make good profits is the best way to improve everyone`s standard of living.“

Table 8. Legacies, social status and perception of fairness

	AL	BG	CZ	EST	D-O	H	PL	RO	RU	SK	SI
socialist ideology	-	-.12	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
satisfaction with socialism	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-.09	-
egalitarianism	-	-	.08	-	-	.09	-	-	-	-	-
service mentality	-.16	-.10	-	-.12	-.09	-.09	-	-	-	-.07	-
economic orientation of the state	-	.08	-.13	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
equal opportunity	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
liberal-market orientation	-	.13	.21	.14	.10	.08	-	-	.11	.12	-
social advancement	.13	.28	.09	-	.27	.19	.13	.16	.08	.15	.17
subjectiv level of social stratum	.14	.16	.22	.18	.08	.17	-	.12	.17	.17	.12
adj. R ²	.09	.29	.23	.13	.18	.16	.06	.10	.10	.15	.07
n	785	675	785	752	790	831	567	814	1046	941	782

Source: PCEND 2000/2002; OLS-regression, standardized Beta-coefficients, values significant with $p \leq 0.01$ (kursiv: $p \leq 0.05$; - = not significant), age, sex and education (in ages) controlled.

Table 9: Position of the Eastern European populations towards joining the EU

	Who profits most from a joining? (in %) 1996		At a referendum over the joining I would vote on... (in %) 2001 (1996)		difference timing
	nation	EU	yes	no	
Estonia	36	26	38 (32)	27 (16)	1,00
Latria	47	21	47 (44)	32 (13)	-0,13
Lithuania	44	19	50 (44)	20 (9)	-0,51
Poland	24	24	54 (77)	26 (8)	-1,10
Hungary	25	29	70 (54)	10 (18)	-1,02
Czech Republic	19	33	55 (50)	18 (12)	-0,63
Slovakia	19	28	65 (50)	11 (8)	-1,50
Slovenia	18	41	56 (54)	22 (18)	-0,23
Bulgaria	35	10	80 (65)	4 (5)	-1,76
Romania	26	8	85 (87)	3 (3)	-2,94
Albania	63	8	-	-	-
Russia	10	50	-	-	-

Source: Central and Eastern Eurobarometer 7 (1996; European Commission 2002: 10); other categories: both or none, would not vote or undecided; difference timing: hoped-for speed of negotiation minus estimated real speed of negotiation (respectively from 1 „standstill“ to 7 „as fast as possible“); -: means not investigated. A negative value stands for the assessment of the speed of negotiation as being too fast.

Table 10. Assessment of the European Dimension of politics/policy

	follow Western European way	fast joining	adapt to EU- rules	develop own self confidence
Estonia	+21	-3	-13	+80
- Estonian pop.	+20	-34	-13	+88
- Russian pop.	+31	+35	-13	+73
Poland	+40	+36	+5	+84
Hungary	+22	+47	-2	+65
Czech Republic	+70	+43	+15	+84
Slovakia	+48	+55	+3	+82
Slovenia	+70	+49	-3	+87
Bulgaria	+50	+63	+5	+84
Romania	+62	+65	+43	+85
Albania	+89	+90	+80	+93
Russia	-22	+41	-22	+72

Source: PCEND 2000-02; values are differences between agreement (agree strongly, agree somewhat) and disapproval (disagree somewhat, disagree strongly) on a scale of 4 points in %.

Follow Western European way= „It would be in the interest of our country to follow the path of other (West)European countries.“ Fast joining= „[country] should join the European Union as a full member as soon as possible.“ Adapt to EU-rules= „[country] should adapt to the rules of the European Union, even if it costs jobs in the short run, in the long run our country will profit from it.“ Develop more self confidence= „Before we join the European Union, our country should develop more self confidence.“

Table 11. Dimensions of identity in Eastern European Transformation countries (in %)

	"I see myself as a European."	"I see myself as [cultural region]."	"I see myself as [country]."	"I see myself obliged to a local, regional tradition."
Estonia	64	34	91	78
- Estonian pop.	64	25	98	99
- Russian pop.	64	55	75	28
Poland	92	88	89	99
Hungary	95	84	65	99
Czech Republic	89	87	58	99
Slovakia	94	92	88	95
Slovenia	80	52	78	97
Bulgaria	32	58	95	95
Romania	79	79	94	99
Albania	55	58	85	99
Russia	33	24	94	96

Source: PCEND 2000-02; agreeing values on a scale of 4 points in %; agreeing values for cultural region: Russia, Estonia – East-European; Albania, Bulgaria, Romania – South-East-European; other countries – Central-East-European.

Table 12. Position toward joining the EU and influence factors

influencing factors	follow Western European way	fast joining	adapt to EU rules	self confidence
<i>Identity</i>				
European identity	+ .20	+ .11	+ .13	n.s.
National identity	+ .07	+ .06	+ .05	+ .14
National pride	+ .03	+ .10	+ .07	+ .17
<i>Socialism</i>				
Idea of socialism is always good	- .21	- .19	- .20	- .12
I was satisfied with the way that socialism worked in [country]	- .25	- .15	- .22	- .07
<i>Economy</i>				
Idea of free market economy is always good	+ .24	+ .16	+ .25	+ .09
Free market economy is the most appropriate economic order	+ .16	+ .04	+ .19	n.s.
Economic situation of the country	+ .17	+ .12	+ .18	+ .05
Personal financial situation	+ .20	+ .09	+ .17	+ .06
<i>Constitutional state</i>				
Index: importance of principles of constitutional state	+ .19	+ .11	+ .17	+ .17
Index: guarantee of rule of law	+ .20	+ .07	+ .13	+ .09
<i>Social structure</i>				
Age (squared)	- .11	- .10	- .08	n.s.
Level of education	+ .04	+ .05	+ .05	n.s.

Source: PCEND 2000-02; bivariate correlation coefficient (Pearsons r), $p < .001$; n.s. = not significant; $n = 10,570$.

Table 13. Attitudes toward joining the EU and support of democracy

influencing factors	follow Western European way	fast joining	adapt to EU rules	self confidence
idea of democracy	+ .31	+ .18	+ .25	+ .12
structure of democracy	+ .29	+ .19	+ .25	+ .18
democratic performance	+ .14	+ .06	+ .14	n.s.
socialism	- .26	- .18	- .22	- .15
party	- .20	- .07	- .14	- .05
leader	- .18	- .05	- .10	n.s.
dictatorship	- .11	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.

Source: PCEND 2000-02; bivariate correlation coefficient (Pearsons r), $p < .001$; n.s. = not significant; $n = 10,570$.

Table 14. Attitudes toward EU-joining and political culture (aggregate level)

influencing factors	follow Western European way	fast joining	adapt to EU rules	self confidence
idea of democracy	+ .89	n.s.	+ .81	+ .67
structure of democracy	+ .86	n.s.	+ .77	+ .84
democratic performance	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
idea of socialism is good	- .63	n.s.	- .67	- .76
general economic sit.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
personal economic sit.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.

Source: PCEND 2000-02; bivariate correlation coefficients (Pearsons r), $p < .10$; n.s. = not significant; $n = 10$.

Table 15. Partial correlations between democratic legitimacy and EU-joining sorted by country

relation: assessment of democracy as best form of government and...	follow Western European way	fast joining	adapt to EU rules	self confidence
Estonia	+ .14 (+.13)	+ n.s. (+.09)	+ .12 (+.08)	+ .11 (+.12)
Poland	+ .10 (+.09)	+ .13 (+.10)	+ .14 (+.10)	+ .16 (+.14)
Hungary	+ .15 (+.16)	+ .22 (+.17)	+ .21 (+.12)	n.s. (n.s.)
Czech Republic	+ .33 (+.24)	+ .31 (+.18)	+ .30 (+.15)	+ .20 (+.17)
Slovakia	+ .30 (+.21)	+ .27 (+.24)	+ .24 (+.15)	+ .18 (+.20)
Slovenia	+ .18 (+.12)	+ .16 (+.13)	+ .11 (n.s.)	+ .18 (+.09)
Bulgaria	+ .35 (+.18)	+ .43 (+.26)	+ .32 (+.18)	+ .27 (+.22)
Romania	+ .27 (+.19)	+ .26 (+.16)	+ .26 (+.17)	+ .15 (+.15)
Albania	+ .32 (+.19)	+ .29 (+.19)	+ .27 (+.12)	+ .29 (+.20)
Russia	+ .24 (+.19)	+ .18 (+.09)	+ .14 (+.10)	+ .22 (+.12)

Source: PCEND 2000-02; first value: bivariate correlation coefficient without consideration of control variables (Pearsons r); value in brackets: partial correlation considering the indicators idea of free market economy, free market economy as best economical order, constitutional state – guarantee and importance, own economical situation and that of the country, evaluation of idea and performance of socialism, age, level of education, size of town; $p < .001$; n.s. = not significant.

2. Publications related to the project

2.1. Books

Becker, Michael/Lauth, Hans-Joachim/Pickel, Gert (eds)(2001): *Demokratie und Rechtsstaat*. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag.

Berg-Schlosser, Dirk/Vetik, Raivo (eds)(2001): *Perspectives on Democratic Consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Marginean, Ioan (2004): *Social Policy*. Bucuresti: Expert Publishing House.

Marginean, Ioan (2004): *Studies in Sociology, Quality of Life and Social Policy*. Pitesti: University of Pitesti Publishing House.

Pickel, Gert/Pickel, Susanne (2003): *Einführung in die vergleichende politische Kultur- und Demokratieforschung*. Opladen: UTB. (forthcoming)

Pickel, Susanne/Pickel, Gert/Lauth, Hans-Joachim/Jahn, Detlef (eds)(2003): *Vergleichende politikwissenschaftliche Methoden: Neue Entwicklungen und Diskussionen*. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag.

Pollack, Detlef/Jacobs, Jörg/Müller, Olaf/Pickel, Gert (eds)(2003): *Political Culture in Post-Communist Europe – Attitudes in New Democracies*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Pollack, Detlef (2004): *Säkularisierung – ein moderner Mythos?* Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.

Tilkidjiev, Nikolai (2002): *Sredna klasa i socialnaja stratifikazia (The middle Class and Social Stratification)*. Sofia: LIK.

Tilkidjiev, Nikolai/Dimov, Martin (2003): *Statusna osnova na demokratichnaja konsolidazia pri postkomunisma (Status Basis of Consolidation Under Post-Communism.)* Sofia: East-West.

Torcal, Mariano (2003): *Disaffected but Democrats. The Origin and Consequences of the Dimensions of Political Support in New Latin American and Southern European Democracies*. (forthcoming).

Vetik, Raivo (ed.)(2001): *EU and Estonian Public Opinion*. Tartu: Tartu University Press.

Additionally, the Frankfurt group could install a publication series ***Political Culture in the New Democracies*** (in German) which is published at Leske + Budrich, Opladen/VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden (Germany). Up to now, the series contains three volumes:

Volume 1: Pollack, Detlef/Pickel, Gert/Jacobs, Jörg/Müller, Olaf (2004): *Osteuropas Bevölkerung auf dem Weg in die Demokratie? Repräsentative Untersuchungen in Ostdeutschland und 10 weiteren osteuropäischen Transformationsstaaten (East Europeans On the Road to Democracy? Representative Surveys in East Germany and 10 East European Transition Countries)*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. (forthcoming)

Volume 2: Pickel, Gert (2002): *Jugend und Politikverdrossenheit. Zwei politische Kulturen im Deutschland nach der Vereinigung (Youth and Political Alienation: Two Political Cultures in Germany After Unification)*. Opladen: Leske + Budrich.

Volume 3: Jacobs, Jörg (2004): *Tücken der Demokratie: Alltagserfahrungen und Wertorientierungen als Determinanten von Antisystemeinstellungen in ausgewählten post-kommunistischen Transformationsländern (Perils of Democracy – Everyday Experiences)*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

Irene Martín Cortés defended her ***Ph.D. thesis***, based on results from the PCND 2000-02 survey, at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, on June 10, 2004:

Irene Martín Cortés (2004): *Origins and Meanings of Interest in Politics in Two New Democracies: the Cases of Spain and Greece*. Ph.D. Thesis, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid.

2.2. Journal articles

Bernik, Ivan/Trbanc, M. (2005): Avtoportret višjega srednjega sloja: izjemnost in konformnost. *Teorija in praksa* 42:1, 65-86.

Jacobs, Jörg (2001): Alltag oder Vergangenheit? Einstellungen zur herrschenden politischen Ordnung in den Neuen Bundesländern, Polen, Tschechien und Ungarn. *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 42:2, 223-246.

Jacobs, Jörg (2004): Gegen die bestehende Ordnung? Die Wähler der PDS in vergleichender Perspektive. *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen* 2.

Jacobs, Jörg/Müller, Olaf/Pickel, Gert (2000): Demokratie auf dem Prüfstand – Konsolidierung und Widerstandspotential der Bevölkerung in Osteuropa im Vergleich. *Berliner Debatte INITIAL* 11: 5/6, 17-32.

Jacobs, Jörg/Schwarz, Anna (2004): An der Oder spiegeln sich die Erwartungen zum erweiterten Europa. *Osteuropa* June.

Krassilnikova, Marina (2002): The Dynamics of Social Statuses During 20 Years. *Russian Public Opinion Monitor* 5:61.

Marginean, Ioan (2000): Social Support for Democracy. *Central European Political Science Review* 2.

Marginean, Ioan (2003): The Method of Open Coordination of Social Policy in EU Countries. *Quality of Life Review* 2.

Marginean, Ioan (2003): Quality of Life Research in EU and Accession Countries. *Quality of Life Review* 3-4.

Marginean, Ioan/Precupetu, Iuliana/Precupetu, Marius (2003): Romania in the third wave of democratization. *Romanian Journal of Sociology (english version)* 3.

Marginean, Ioan/Precupetu, Iuliana/Precupetu, Marius (2004): Sources of Support for Democracy in Post Communist Countries. *Romanian Sociology Review* 1.

Marginean, Ioan/Precupetu, Iuliana/Preoteasa, Ana Maria (2004): Elements of Support and Critical Points in the Evolution of Quality of Life in Romania. *Quality of Life Review* 1-2.

Pollack, Detlef (2003): Religiousness Inside and Outside the Church in Selected Post-communist Countries of Central and Eastern Europe. *Social Compass* 30, 321-334.

Pollack, Detlef (2003): The East-Enlargement of the European Union. *Europe NYC*, October, 1-2.

Pollack, Detlef (2004): Zivilgesellschaft und Staat in der Demokratie. *Forschungsjournal Neue Soziale Bewegungen* 16:2, 46-58.

Pollack, Detlef/Jacobs, Jörg (2002): Die Demokratie in den Augen der Bevölkerung Osteuropas. *Berliner Debatte INITIAL* 13:3, 38-52.

Pollack, Detlef/Wielgohs, Jan (2000): Politische Kultur und demokratische Konsolidierung. Kritische Anfragen an das Konzept der politischen Kulturforschung zu postsozialistischen Gesellschaften. *Berliner Debatte INITIAL* 11: 5/6, 65-75.

Precupetu, Iuliana/Precupetu, Marius (2002): Value Systems of the Citizens and Socio-economic Conditions. Challenges from Democratization for the EU Enlargement. *Romanian Sociology Review* 2.

Precupetu, Iuliana/Preoteasa, Ana Maria (2003): Social Capital, Participation, and Poverty. *Quality of Life Review* 3-4.

Marius Precupețu. 2001. Steps Toward the Democratisation of Political Science. *Romanian Sociology Review* 1:4.

Precupetu, Marius (2004): Relevance of Political Culture in Studying Democratization. *Romanian Sociology Review* 2.

Vetik, Raivo (2003): Elite vs. People? Eurosceptic Public Opinion in Estonia. *Cambridge Review of International Relations*.

Vlachová, Klara (2001): The Legitimacy of Democracy and Trust in Political Institutions in the Czech Republic. *Czech Sociological Review* 9:1, 13-33.

Vlachová, Klara (2001): Party identification in the Czech Republic: inter-party hostility and party preference. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 31, 479-499.

Vlachová, Klara (2001): Levice a pravice. Prázdné pojmy, se kterými se zbytečně "haraší", nebo něco víc? (Left and Right. Empty vessels, ..., or something more?). *Proglas* 7.

Vlachová, Klara (2003): Dynamika pozitivní a negativní stranické identifikace v České republice (Dynamics of Positive or Negative Party Identification in the Czech Republic). *Czech Sociological Review* 39:4, 487-508.

Vlachová, Klara (2004): State and Nation Identity. Special Focus on Czechia and Slovakia. *Sociologičeski Problemi* 34:1-2, 99-115.

Based on a selection of presentations given during the second workshop in Barcelona, Nikolai Tilkidjiev edited a special issue of the Bulgarian journal ***Sociologičeski Problemi (Sociological Problems)*** 1-2/2004, titled *Democratic Consolidation and Social*

Inequalities. The results from the project group are published in a section titled *Democratic Values and Post-Communism*:

Pollack, Detlef/Jacobs, Jörg/Müller, Olaf/Pickel, Gert (2004): Conditions for the Consolidation of Political Systems in Central and Eastern Europe. *Sociologičeski Problemi (Sociological Problems)* 1-2, 7-32.

Marginean, Ioan/Precupetu, Iuliana/Precupetu, Marius (2004): Support for Democracy in Post-communist Countries. *Sociologičeski Problemi (Sociological Problems)* 1-2, 33-54.

Bernik, Ivan/Malnar, Brina (2004): Beliefs in the State or in the Usefulness of the State? Attitudes Regarding the Role of State in eleven Post-Socialist Societies. *Sociologičeski Problemi (Sociological Problems)* 1-2, 55-75.

Tilkidjiev, Nikolai (2004): New Post-communist Hierarchies: "Blocks" Division and Status Order. *Sociologičeski Problemi (Sociological Problems)* 1-2, 76-98.

Vlachová, Klara (2004): State and Nation Identity: Special Focus on Czechia and Slovakia. *Sociologičeski Problemi (Sociological Problems)* 1-2, 99-114.

2.3. Book sections

Bernik, Ivan/Malnar, Brina (2002): Political Culture in Post-communist Europe: Radical Cultural Change or Adaption of Old Cultural Patterns. In: Pollack, Detlef/Jacobs, Jörg/Müller, Olaf/Pickel, Gert (eds.): *Political Culture in Post-Communist Europe – Attitudes in New Democracies*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 181-205.

Bernik, Ivan/Malnar, Brina (2004): Zaupanje v državo ali v koristnost države? Stališča o vlogi države v enajstih postsocialističnih družbah. In: Toš, Niko (ed.): *Paberkovanje po vrednotah Slovencev*. Ljubljana: FDV-IDV.

Bernik, Ivan/Malnar, Brina (2005): Beliefs in State or in the Usefulness of State? Attitudes Regarding the Role of State in Eleven Post-Socialist Societies. In: Toš, Niko/Müller, Klaus (eds.): *Political Faces of Slovenia*. Ljubljana/Vienna: FDV-IDV. (in print)

Bernik, Ivan/Malnar, Brina (2005): Barriers Of Democratic Consolidation. In: Toš, Niko/Müller, Klaus (eds.): *Political Faces of Slovenia*. FDV-IDV, Ljubljana, Vienna. (In print)

Bernik, Ivan/Malnar, Brina (2005): Zaupanje v državo ali v koristnost države. Stališča o vlogi države v enajstih postsocialističnih družbah. In: Toš, Niko (ed.): *Paberkovanje o vrednotah. Zbirka Dokumenti SJM 12*. Ljubljana: FDV-IDV. (in print)

Bernik, Ivan (2005): SJM povej, kdo srecen v deželi je tej! In: Malnar, Brina/Bernik, Ivan (eds.): *S Slovenci in Slovenkami na štiri oči*. Ljubljana: FDV-IDV (in print)

Jacobs, Jörg (2002): Core Values, Transformation Experiences and the People: Support for the Political System in Central and Eastern Europe in Comparative Perspective. In: Daniel Meyer-Dinkgräfe (ed.): *European Culture in a Changing World: Between Nationalism and Globalism*. Aberystwyth: ISSEI (CD-Rom).

Jacobs, Jörg (2004): Des Kaisers neue Kleider? Fuzzy-Sets und die Analyse von mittleren Ns. In: Susanne Pickel et al. (eds): *Vergleichende politikwissenschaftliche Methoden – Neue Entwicklungen und Diskussionen*. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 135-150.

Jacobs, Jörg/Müller, Olaf (2003): Bereichsrezension: "Transformation." *Soziologische Revue* 26:2, 297-306.

Jacobs, Jörg/Müller, Olaf/Pickel, Gert (2002): Persistence of Democracies in Central and Eastern Europe – Consolidation, Stability and People's Power of Resisting. In: Pollack, Detlef/Jacobs, Jörg/Müller, Olaf/Pickel, Gert (eds.): *Political Culture in Post-Communist Europe – Attitudes in New Democracies*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 91-114.

Jacobs, Jörg/Pickel, Gert (2002): „Subjektive Legitimität“, Rechtsstaat und Konsolidierung. In: Boulanger, Christian (ed.): *Recht in der Transformation*. Berlin: Berliner Debatte Wissenschaftsverlag, 125-148.

Marginean, Ioan (2003): Comparative Analysis of Social Policy Financing in Romania and EU Countries. In: Badescu, I./Mihailescu, I. (eds): *Geopolitics, Integration and Globalization*. Bucuresti: Mica Valahie.

Precupețu, Iuliana/Precupețu, Marius (2003) Value-Systems of the Citizens and Socio-Economic Conditions – Challenges from Democratisation for the EU-Enlargement. Presentation of the International Comparative Research. *Sociologie Romanească (Romanian Sociology Review)* 1: 1-2.

Martín Cortés, Irene (2002): Interest in Politics and the Political Culture Approach: The Case of the New Democracies of Southern and Eastern Europe. In: Pollack,

Detlef/Jacobs, Jörg/Müller, Olaf/Pickel, Gert (eds.): *Political Culture in Post-Communist Europe – Attitudes in New Democracies*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 71-90.

Müller, Olaf (2003): Glaube versus Atheismus? Individuelle religiöse Orientierungen in Mittel- und Osteuropa. In: Gärtner, Christel/Pollack, Detlef/Wohlrab-Sahr, Monika (eds.): *Atheismus und religiöse Indifferenz*. Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 171-197.

Müller, Olaf (2003): Bevölkerungseinstellungen zum Staatsinterventionismus in Ostmittel- und Osteuropa. In: Allmendinger, Jutta (ed.): *Entstaatlichung und soziale Sicherheit. Verhandlungen des 31. Kongresses der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Soziologie in Leipzig 2002*. 2 volumes + CD-ROM. Opladen: Leske + Budrich.

Müller, Olaf (2004): Religiosity in Central and Eastern Europe: Results from the PCE Study. In: Marinović Jerolimov, Dinka/Zrinščak, Siniša/Borowik, Irena (eds.): *Religion and Patterns of Social Transformation*. Zagreb: IDIZ, 61-77.

Müller, Olaf/Pickel, Gert/Pollack, Detlef (2003): Wandel religiös-kirchlicher Orientierungsmuster und Verhaltensweisen in Osteuropa. In: Brocker, Manfred/Behr, Hartmut/Hildebrandt, Mathias (eds.): *Religion – Staat – Politik. Zur Rolle der Religion in der nationalen und internationalen Politik*. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 99-124.

Pickel, Gert (2001): Moralische Vorstellungen und seine religiöse Fundierung im europäischen Vergleich. In: Pickel, Gert/Krüggeler, Michael (eds.): *Religion und Moral – Entkoppelt oder Verknüpft?* Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 105-134.

Pickel, Gert (2001): Legitimität von Demokratie und Rechtsstaat in den osteuropäischen Transformationsstaaten 10 Jahre nach dem Umbruch. In: Becker, Michael/Lauth, Hans-Joachim/Pickel, Gert (eds.): *Demokratie und Rechtsstaat*. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 299-326.

Pickel, Gert (2003): Die Osterweiterung der Europäischen Union als Konsolidierungsfaktor? Beurteilungen der Demokratie und Bereitschaft zum EU-Beitritt in den neuen Demokratien Osteuropas. In: Brettschneider, Frank/Van Deth, Jan/Roller., Edeltraud (eds.): *Europäische Integration in der öffentlichen Meinung*. Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 155-183.

Pickel, Gert (2003): Die Verwendung von Individualdaten zum Nationenvergleich. Anmerkungen und Beispiele aus der vergleichenden Forschung. In: Pickel, Susanne/Pickel, Gert/Lauth, Hans-Joachim/Jahn, Detlef (eds.): *Einführung in die*

Methoden der vergleichenden Politikwissenschaft. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 151-178.

Pickel, Gert (2003): Areligiosität, Antireligiosität, Religiosität – Ostdeutschland als Sonderfall niedriger Religiosität im osteuropäischen Rahmen. In: Gärtner, Christel/Pollack, Detlef/Wohlrab-Sahr, Monika (eds.): *Atheismus und religiöse Indifferenz.* Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 247-270.

Pickel, Gert (2004): Vergangenheitsbewältigung und demokratische Konsolidierung in Osteuropa. In: Schmidt, Siegmund/Pickel, Susanne/Pickel, Gert (eds.): *Amnesie, Amnestie oder Aufarbeitung? – Zum Umgang mit autoritären Vergangenheiten und Menschenrechtsverletzungen in der Demokratie im interkulturellen Vergleich.* Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag. (forthcoming)

Pickel, Gert/Müller, Olaf (2004): Ostdeutschland – entkirchlicht, entchristlicht oder säkularisiert? In: Ziebertz, Hans-Georg (ed.): *Erosion des christlichen Glaubens? Umfragen, Hintergründe und Stellungnahmen zum Kulturverlust des Religiösen.* Münster: LIT, 57-69.

Pickel, Gert/Pickel, Susanne (2003): Bestandaufnahme und Ausblick der vergleichenden Analyse In: Pickel, Susanne/Pickel, Gert/Lauth, Hans-Joachim/Jahn, Detlef (eds.): *Einführung in die Methoden der vergleichenden Politikwissenschaft.* Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 333-349.

Pickel, Gert/Pickel, Susanne (2003): Einige Notizen zu qualitativen Interviews als Verfahren der vergleichenden Methode der Politikwissenschaft. In: Pickel, Susanne/Pickel, Gert/Lauth, Hans-Joachim/Jahn, Detlef (eds.): *Einführung in die Methoden der vergleichenden Politikwissenschaft.* Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 289-316.

Pollack, Detlef (2003): Nationalismus und euroskeptische Einstellungen in postkommunistischen Staaten als Konfliktpotential einer erweiterten EU. Allmendinger, Jutta (ed.): *Entstaatlichung und soziale Sicherheit. Verhandlungen des 31. Kongresses der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Soziologie in Leipzig 2002.* 2 volumes + CD-ROM. Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 198-216.

Pollack, Detlef (2004): Zwischen Kulturalismus und Konstruktivismus: Die Transformation Ostdeutschlands als Prüfstein der Politische-Kultur-Forschung. In: Kittsteiner, Heinz-Dieter (ed.): *Was sind Kulturwissenschaften? 13 Antworten.* München: Fink, 213-238.

Pollack, Detlef (2004): Institutionalised and Subjective Religiosity in Former Communist Countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In: Marinović Jerolimov, Dinka/Zrinščak, Siniša/Borowik, Irena (eds): *Religion and Patterns of Social Transformation*. Zagreb: IDIZ, 79-88.

Pollack, Detlef/Mishler, William (2002): On Culture, Thick and Thin: Toward a Neo-Cultural Synthesis. In: Pollack, Detlef/Jacobs, Jörg/Müller, Olaf/Pickel, Gert (eds.): *Political Culture in Post-Communist Europe – Attitudes in New Democracies*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 237-256.

Pollack, Detlef/Müller, Olaf (2003): Die unvollendete Einheit –ein später Triumph der DDR? Theoretische Konsequenzen aus der Analyse der politischen Kultur Ostdeutschlands. In: Schwelling, Birgit (eds.): *Politikwissenschaft als Kulturwissenschaft*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 207-230.

2.4. Other

Bernik, Ivan (2003): Pragmatični Slovenci. *Večer*, June 21.

Bernik, Ivan (2003): Revščino so nam prodali v paketu. *Večer*, July 30.

Institute of International and Social Studies (IISS)(2001): *Political Trust in Estonia. Research Report*. Tallinn. 102 pp.

Novák, M./Vlachová, Klara (2001): *Linie štěpení v České republice a v Klatovech. Komparace národní úrovně s příkladem konkrétní lokality (Cross-cutting cleavages in the Czech Republic and Klatovy. A Comparison of the National Level with a Specific Regional Example*. Sociologické texty (Sociological Papers) 01:8. Prague: Institute of Sociology AS CR.

Pickel, Gert/Jacobs, Jörg (2001): *Einstellungen zur Demokratie und zur Gewährleistung von Rechten und Freiheiten in den jungen Demokratien Mittel- und Osteuropas*. FIT Discussion Paper 9/01. Frankfurt (Oder): Frankfurt Institute for Transformation Studies. 19 pp.

Pollack, Detlef (2004): *Support for Democracy in Eastern and Western Germany: an Attempt to Explain the Differences*. Working Paper 10. Washington D.C.: The BMW Center for German and European Studies, Edmund Walsh School for Foreign Service, Georgetown University.

Tilkidjiev, Nikolai (2001): *The King as a Prime-Minister: Peculiarity of the Bulgarian Case or a Lesson to Post-communist Transformations*. FIT Discussion Paper 12/01. Frankfurt (Oder): Frankfurt Institute for Transformation Studies. 44 pp.

Torcal, Mariano (2003): *Political Disaffection and Democratic History in New Democracies*. Kellogg Institute Working Paper Series # 308.

Torcal, Mariano (2003): *Support for Democracy and the 'Consolidating Effect' in New Democracies: a Rational-Culturalist Model of Democratization*. Kellogg Institute Working Paper Series.

Vetik, Raivo (2001): *Democratic Multiculturalism: a New Model of National Integration*. Aland Island Peace Institute. 26 pp.

Vetik, Raivo/Nimmerfeldt, Gerli/Taru, Marti/Kivimae, Mart (2004): *Discursive Identity and EU Integration*. Studies in Public Policy 391 (August). Glasgow: University of Strathclyde.

Vlachová, Klára/Řeháková, Blanka (2004): *Česká národní identita po zániku Československa a před vstupem do Evropské unie* (Czech National Identity after demise of Czechoslovakia and before entrance of the European Union). Sociologické Studie/Sociological Studies 04:9. Praha: Sociologický ústav AV ČR (Prague: Institute of Sociology AS CR).

2.5. Policy papers

[Paper 1:](#) Pollack, Detlef/Jacobs, Jörg/Müller, Olaf/Pickel, Gert (2001): *Political Culture in Post-Communist Europe Attitudes in New Democracies: State of the Art - Theoretical Thoughts and Ideas*. 39 pp.

[Paper 2:](#) Pickel, Gert/Jacobs, Jörg (2001): *Einstellungen zur Demokratie und zur Gewährleistung von Rechten und Freiheiten in den jungen Demokratien Mittel- und Osteuropas*. 18 pp.

[Paper 3:](#) Tilkidjiev, Nikolai (2001): *The King as a Prime-Minister: Peculiarity of the Bulgarian Case or a Lesson to Post-Communist Transformations*. 42 pp.

[Paper 4:](#) Pollack, Detlef (2002): *European and national Identity in Post-Communist Societies: Coexistence or Conflict?* 20 pp.

[Paper 5:](#) Pickel, Gert (2002): *Effekte politischer Kultur(en) auf die Bereitschaft zum EU-Beitritt in den neuen Demokratien Osteuropas*. 27 pp. (in German)

[Paper 6:](#) Jacobs, Jörg (2002): *Modernization, Core Values and the People: Consolidation of Political Democracy and Market Economy in Central and Eastern Europe in Comparative Perspective: Theoretical Framework of the Project*. 11 pp.

[Paper 7:](#) Tilkidjiev, Nikolai (2002): *The Emergence of the Secondary Legitimation of the Communist Past*. 21 pp.

[Paper 8:](#) Pollack, Detlef/Pickel, Gert (2002): *Interdependencies between Religion and Politics in European Comparison*. 20 pp.

[Paper 9:](#) Malnar, Brina/Bernik, Ivan (2002): *Barriers of Democratization in Slovenia*. 23 pp.

[Paper 10:](#) Müller, Olaf (2002): *East Germany: Democratization par Excellence?* 28 pp.

[Paper 11:](#) Susanne Pickel/Zsolt Spéder (2003): *Barriers to Democratization in Hungary*. 27 pp.

[Paper 12:](#) Martina Krassilnikova/Natalya Zorkaya (2003): *Establishing Democracy in Russia*. 17 pp.

[Paper 13:](#) Raivo Vetik (2003): *Barriers of Democratic Consolidation: The Estonian Case*. 15 pp.

[Paper 14:](#) Klára Plecítá-Vlachová (2003): *Democratic Development, The Legitimacy of Democracy, Social Inequality, and Social Justice: The Case of the Czech Republic 1989-2000*. 19 pp.

[Paper 15:](#) Ioan Marginean/Iuliana Precupetu/Marius Precupetu (2003): *Consolidating Democracy in Romania. Political Attitudes and Values*. 17 pp.

[Paper 16:](#) Detlef Pollack/Jörg Jacobs/Olaf Müller/Gert Pickel (2003): *Conditions for the Consolidation of Political Systems in Central Eastern Europe - A Comparative Analysis*. 22 pp.

[Paper 17:](#) L'uba Žaloudková (2003): *Barriers to Democratization: Slovakia*. 23 pp.

[Paper 18:](#) Mariano Torcal/Lorenzo Brusattin/Irene Martín/Manina Kakepaki (2005): *Democratic Support and the Consolidating Effect in New Democracies*. 19 pp.

[Paper 19](#): Mariano Torcal/Lorenzo Brusattin (2005): *A Four-Factor Model of Political Support*. 17 pp.

2.6. Policy bulletins

[PB 1](#): Klára Plecítá-Vlachová (2004): *Barriers of Democratization: Country Report Czech Republic*. 6 pp.

[PB 2](#): Klára Plecítá-Vlachová (2004): *National Identity in the Eleven CEE Nations: Where Do We Belong to?* 6 pp.

[PB 3](#): Ioan Marginean/Iuliana Precupetu/Marius Precupetu (2004): *Support for Democracy in Post-Communist Countries*. 7 pp.

[PB 4](#): Ioan Marginean/Iuliana Precupetu/Marius Precupetu (2004): *Barriers of Democratisation: Country Report Romania*. 9 pp.

[PB 5](#): Ivan Bernik, Brina Malnar (2004): *Beliefs in the State or in the Usefulness of State? Attitudes Regarding the Role of State in Eleven Post-Socialist Societies*. 4 pp.

[PB 6](#): Ivan Bernik, Brina Malnar (2004): *Barriers of Democratic Consolidation: The Case of Slovenia*. 3 pp.

[PB 7](#): Nikolaj Tilkidjiev (2004): *New Post-Communist Hierarchies: „Blocks“, Divisions and Status Order*. 3 pp.

[PB 8](#): Nikolaj Tilkidjiev (2004): *Barriers of Democratization: Country Report Bulgaria*. 4 pp.

[PB 9](#): Susanne Pickel/Zsólt Speder (2004): *Barriers of Democratization: Country Report Hungary*. 6 pp.

[PB 10](#): Olaf Müller (2004): *Barriers of Democratization: Country Report East Germany*. 4 pp.

[PB 11](#): L'uba Žaloudková (2004): *Barriers of Democratization: Country Report Slovakia*. 3 pp.

[PB 12](#): Mariano Torcal/Lorenzo Brusattin/Irene Martín/Manina Kakepaki (2005): *Democratic Support and the Consolidating Effect in New Democracies*. 3 pp.

[PB 13](#): Mariano Torcal/Lorenzo Brusattin (2005): *Political Support in Central and Eastern European New Democracies. A Four-Factor Model*. 3 pp.

[PB 14](#): Raivo Vetik (2005): *Barriers of Democratic Consolidation. The Case of Estonia*. 4 pp.

[PB 15](#): Raivo Vetik (2005): *Why is Estonian Public Opinion the Most Eurosceptic among the East European Countries?* 3 pp.

Additionally, the country reports have been published as a **research report** within the **FIT Discussion Paper Series** at Frankfurt Institute for Transformation Studies (F.I.T.), Frankfurt (Oder), Germany (<http://fit.euv-frankfurt-o.de/>; see selected annex [hardcopy]). The report also includes two comparative articles, which can be read as a introduction and summary of the project:

Pollack, Detlef/Jacobs, Jörg/Müller, Olaf/Pickel, Gert (eds)(2004): *Democratic Values in Central and Eastern Europe*. Research Report 2004. Frankfurt (Oder): Frankfurt Institute for Transformation Studies.

Contents:

Values Systems of the Citizens and Socio-Economic Conditions:

Challenges from Democratisation for the EU-Enlargement. Introduction

Detlef Pollack/Jörg Jacobs/Olaf Müller/Gert Pickel

Bulgaria: The Emergence of a Secondary Legitimization of the Communist Past

Nikolai Tilkidjiev

Democratic Development, the Legitimacy of Democracy, Social Inequality, and Social Justice: the Case of the Czech Republic 1989 - 2000

Klára Plecítá-Vlachová

Barriers of Democratic Consolidation: The Estonian Case

Raivo Vetik

East Germany: Democratization par excellence?

Olaf Müller

Barriers to Democratization: Slovakia

Ľuba Žaloudková

Barriers to Democratic Consolidation in Slovenia

Brina Malnar/Ivan Bernik

Consolidating Democracy in Romania: Political Attitudes and Values

Ioan Marginean/Iuliana Precupetu/Marius Precupetu

Establishing Democracy in Russia

Marina Krassilnikova/Natalia Zorkaya

Barriers to Democratisation in Hungary

Susanne Pickel/Zsolt Spéder

Conditions for the Consolidation of Political Systems in Central Eastern Europe – A Comparative Analysis

Jörg Jacobs/Detlef Pollack/Olaf Müller/Gert Pickel

3. Presentations

Ivan Bernik:

EU Enlargement and Public Opinion in Slovenia. Presentation at a conference organized by the Institute of Sociology, Free University of Brussels, April 2004. (with Samo Uhan)

Distributive Justice in Post-Socialist Societies Between Egalitarianism and Meritocracy. Presentation at the 36th World Congress of the International Institute of Sociology, Beijing, July, 2004. (with Brina Malnar)

Trends in Psychological Well-Being in Post-Socialist Societies. To be presented at the 7th ICCEES World Congress, Berlin, July 2005. (with S. Uhan)

Subjective Deprivation and Social Exclusion in Post-Socialist Transition in South-East European States. To be presented at the 7th Conference of European Association of Sociology, Torun, September 2005.

Jörg Jacobs:

The Emperors New Clothes? Fuzzy Sets and the Analysis of Midsized N's. Presentation at the Conference "Methods of Comparative Political Science – Procedure and Examples of International and Inter-Cultural Comparative Studies", Greifswald, July 4-7.

Core Values, Transformation Experiences and the People: Support for the Political System in Central and Eastern Europe in Comparative Perspective. Paper presented at the 7th Conference of the International Society for the Study of European Ideas (ISSEI) "European Culture in a Changing World", Aberystwyth, July 22-27, 2002.

Religion in German Society. Presentation at a conference of the Catholic Academy Saxonia/Karl Arnold Foundation, Görlitz, December 2-4, 2002.

Manina Kakepaki:

Presentation of the Survey results at a seminar conducted at the Post-Graduate Course of "Political Science & Sociology", Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Athens, May 2004.

Ioan Marginean:

Meeting on Quality of Life in the Candidate Countries, Vilnius, November 26-27, 2003.

Expert Network Meeting on Quality of Life in the Candidate Countries Dublin, April 21-22, 2004.

Expert Network Meeting on Quality of Life in the Candidate Countries, Warsaw, June 21-22, 2003.

Olaf Müller:

Religiousness in Central and Eastern Europe: Results from the PCE Survey. Presentation at the 6th ISORECEA Conference "Religion and Patterns of Social Transformation", Zagreb, December 13-16, 2001.

Between Secularization and Tradition: Religiousness in Central and Eastern Europe. Presentation at the 64th Annual Meeting of the Association for the Sociology of Religion, Chicago, August 15-17, 2002.

Religiousness in Central and Eastern Europe: Patterns of Development. Presentation at the 27th conference of the International Society for the Sociology of Religion (ISSR/SISR), Torino, July 21-25, 2003. (with Detlef Pollack).

Religion in Central and Eastern Europe: a phenomenon only to be found among the older generation? Presentation at the 5th conference of the International Study of Religion in Eastern and Central Europe Association (ISORECEA), L'viv, December 11-14, 2003.

Religion in Central and Eastern Europe: Was there a re-awakening after the breakdown of communism? Presentation at the Conference "New Perspectives on the Study of the Role of Religion in Modern Societies", New York, April 2-4, 2004.

Religiousness in Central and Eastern Europe. Presentation at a workshop of the Evangelical Academy of Thuringia, Neudietendorf, Germany, February 20, 2003.

Church Adherence in Central and Eastern Europe. Presentation at the European-american Young Scholars' Summer Institute "Secularization and Religion", Erfurt, Germany, July 6-19, 2003.

Gert Pickel:

Empirical Trends in Religious Belief and Behaviour: Continuities and Discontinuities in Eastern Europe. Presentation at the 27th conference of the International Society for the Sociology of Religion (ISSR/SISR), Torino, July 21-25, 2003.

Distribution and potential explanations for existing variations in religious orientations in Eastern Europe. Presentation at the Conference "New Perspectives on the Study of the Role of Religion in Modern Societies", New York, April 2-4, 2004.

Detlef Pollack:

Institutionalized and Subjective Religiousness in Former Communist Countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Presentation at the 6th ISORECEA Conference "Religion and Patterns of Social Transformation", Zagreb, December 13-16, 2001.

Religious Individualization in Eastern Europe. Presentation at the 64th Annual Meeting of the Association for the Sociology of Religion, Chicago, August 15-17, 2002.

Religiousness in Central and Eastern Europe: Patterns of Development. Presentation at the 27th conference of the International Society for the Sociology of Religion (ISSR/SISR), Torino, July 21-25, 2003. (with Olaf Müller)

Support for Democracy in Eastern Germany. Presentation at Georgetown University, Washington D.C., March 17, 2004 and at the DAAD lecturer conference "Democracy in the U.S. and Germany", Minneapolis, May 7, 2004.

Annual Meeting of the Association for the Sociology of Religion (ASR), San Francisco, August 12-15, 2004.

Conference of the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion (SSSR), Kansas City, October 21-24, 2004.

Modifications on the Religious Field in Eastern Europe. Presentation at Vanderbilt University, Nashville, February 3, 2005.

Factors of the Vitality of Religion. Presentation at New School University, New York, February 19, 2005.

Religion and Modernity. Roundtable discussion with José Casanova, New York University, March 1, 2005

Iuliana Precupetu:

Workshop on Poverty Alleviation and Promotion of Social Inclusion, Bucharest, July 22-23, 2003.

Marius Precupetu:

Citizenry of Bucharest: Social Values and Attitudes. National School of Political Science and Public Administration-Political Science Department and History Museum of Bucharest, November 2-3, 2004.

Annual Conference of the Romanian Political Science Association, Bucharest, September 25-26, 2003.

Nikolai Tilkidjiev:

The King as a Prime-Minister: Peculiarity of the Bulgarian Case or a Lesson to Post-communist Transformations. Presentation at the International Symposium of the Hans Boeckler Foundation "Economic and Social Developments in South-East Europe: Prospects for Stability", Potsdam, November 3-5, 2001.

Participation with a thesis on *Difficulties of Establishing a Middle Class in Bulgaria* at the National conference of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (Sofia office) "Freedom, Solidarity, Justice: Orientations of Economic and Social Policy in Europe under the Process of Unification", Sofia, February 19, 2002.

Joint presentation of current results from the *Democratic Values* study versus results by Ivan Szelenyi's (Yale University) study *Poverty under Post-Communism*. Euro-Bulgarian Cultural Center, Sofia.

Presentation of results from the *European Values* study, Alexanteri Institute, Helsinki, May 9, 2003.

Presentation of results from the *European Values* study, Radio Free Europe, June 17, 2003.

Discussion and official promotion of the publication of the book "*Status Basis of Democratic Consolidation under Post-Communism*". Club "Dialog", Sofia, December 23, 2004.

Discussion and presentation of results from the *Democratic Values Project* and the book "*Status Basis of Democratic Consolidation under Post-Communism*". Interview for TV Europe and Radio Free Europe, February 26, 2004.

Mariano Torcal:

Support for Democracy and the "Transition Effect" in New Democracies: a Rational-Culturalist Model of Democratization. Paper presented at the Kellogg Institute, University of Notre Dame, November 30, 2002.

Support for Democracy and the "Transition Effect" in New Democracies: a Rational-Culturalist Model of Democratization. Paper presented at the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies in Harvard University, December 4, 2002.

Raivo Vetik:

Semiotic Identity and EU Integration. Presentation at the ECPR Joint Sessions Conference, Uppsala, April 14-16, 2004.

Klára Vlachová:

National Identity in Europe. Seminar of the Institute of Sociology, AS CR, Prague, April 1, 2004. (with Blanka Řeháková)

Czech National Identity. Seminar of the Institute of Sociology, AS CR, Prague, November 18, 2004.

Czech National Identity after the Break Up Czechoslovakia and Before Accesion to the European Union. Gellner's seminars, New York University, Prague, Spring 2005.

Additionally, the Frankfurt (Oder) group organized panels at the 31st and 32nd Congresses of the German Sociological Association, which took place in Leipzig (October 7-11, 2002) and in Munich (October 4-8, 2004). Apart from the members of the Frankfurt (Oder) group, also other project partners presented new results from their project work. The panels were titled *Attitudes towards State Interventionism in Central and Eastern Europe and EU Enlargement, Perception of Inequality, and the Consequences for Political and Social Attitudes*.

Program of the Leipzig panel:

Chairs: Gert Pickel/Detlef Pollack, Europa-Universität Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder)

Detlef Pollack, Frankfurt (Oder): Introduction

Olaf Müller, Frankfurt (Oder): Individual Situation and Attitudes towards State Interventionism in Central and Eastern Europe

Gert Pickel, Frankfurt (Oder): *State and Citizen: Does the Demand for State Intervention Influence the Legitimacy of Democracy in Central Europe?*

Christian Welzel, Bremen: *Citizens and Democracies in International Comparison: Which Attitudes Make Democracies Functionable?*

Susanne Pickel, Greifswald: *Expectations to the State, Trust in Institutions, and Legitimacy in International Comparison*

Ulrich Rosar, Cologne: The Support for European Integration: A Comparative Analysis of the 15 EU Member States

Tatjana Mika, Berlin: *The „Right for Work“ – an International Demand?*

(Papers have been published in: Allmendinger, Jutta (ed.)(2003): *Entstaatlichung und soziale Sicherheit. Verhandlungen des 31. Kongresses der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Soziologie in Leipzig 2002*. 2 Volumes + CD-ROM. Opladen: Leske + Budrich.)

Program of the Munich panel:

Chairs: Gert Pickel/Olaf Müller, European University Viadrina/Frankfurt Institute for Transformation Studies (F.I.T.), Frankfurt (Oder)

Gert Pickel, Frankfurt (Oder): *Introduction*

Gert Pickel/Olaf Müller, Frankfurt (Oder): Social Inequality in the New Europe: Perception and Consequences for the European Integration Process

Ivan Bernik, Ljubljana: *Notions of Distributive Justice and Attitudes towards the Role of the State in Post-socialist Societies*

Susanne Pickel, Greifswald: *Cleavages as Social Determinants of Political Behavior in Eastern Europe*

Hilde Weiss, Vienna: Reactions on EU Enlargement in Austria

Susanne Rippl/Dirk Baier, Chemnitz: *EU Enlargement – Mobilization of Right-wing Attitudes?*

(Papers will be published in the conference proceedings, forthcoming.)

Detlef Pollack organized a conference titled "Toward the Union of Europe – Legal and Cultural Ramifications" at New York University, March 5, 2004.

Program of the New York conference:

Keynote Address – Gesine Schwan, European University Viadrina

A Common Political Culture in Europe – Challenges and Opportunities

Chair: Detlef Pollack, New York University

Panel One: European Political Culture

A Kidnapped Europe – The Odds of Rescue

Elzbieta Matynia, New School University

Europe's Multiple Diversities – An Obstacle to Identity Building?

Martin Schain, New York University

American and European Liberalism Versus the European Union

Dick Howard, State University of New York

Ancient Battles, New Prejudices and Future Perspectives – The EU and Turkey

Seyla Benhabib, Yale University

Chair: John Richardson, Ambassador of the European Union to the United Nations

Afternoon Session - New School University

Keynote Address: Dieter Grimm, Yale University

Integration by Constitution – Juridical and Symbolic Perspectives of the European Constitution

Chair: Sigrid Meuschel, New School University

Panel Two: Europe's Constitution in the Making

Types of Constitution Making and the European Constitutional Convention

Andrew Arato, New School University

France Between Self Interest and Self-Defeat – Designing European Institutions

Anne-Marie LeGloannec, Centre Marc Bloch

The Czech Republic in the Face of the European Constitution and European Integration

Jan Kavan, National Assembly of the Czech Republic

Democratic Procedures or Participatory Democracy? A View from Poland

Adam Michnik, Gazeta Wyborcza

Chair: Volker Berghahn, Columbia University

4. Status of the deliverables

(according to annex 1 to the contract)

Deliverable no.	Title	Status
D1	Challenges for Democratization – State of the Art	completed
D2	Working papers/policy papers I: country reports	completed
D3	Working papers/policy papers II: comparative analyses	completed (book publication planned)
D4	Working papers/policy papers III: continuing comparative analyses	completed (book publication planned)

5. List of project participants

Name	Postal address	Contact
Teuta Starova	Tirana University Faculty of Social Sciences Department of Philosophy and Sociology Dora Distria Str. Tirana ALBANIA	tstarova@xs4all.soros.al
Nikolai Tilkidjiev	Institute of Sociology Bulgarian Academy of Sciences Department „Communities and Social Stratification“ Moskovska str. 13A Sofia 1000 BULGARIA Association for Middle Class Development (AMCD) P.O. Box 42 1542 Sofia BULGARIA	niktilk@techno-link.com
Detlef Pollack (head) Jörg Jacobs Olaf Müller Gert Pickel	European University Viadrina/Chair for Comparative Sociology of Culture <i>and</i> Frankfurt Institute for Transformation Studies (F.I.T.) P.O.Box 1786 D-15207 Frankfurt (Oder) GERMANY phone: +49-335-5534- 2922/2617 fax: +49-335-5534- 2923/2807	pollack@euv-frankfurt-o.de jacobs@euv-frankfurt-o.de omueller@euv-frankfurt-o.de pickel@euv-frankfurt-o.de
Raivo Vetik	Institute for International and Social Studies (IISS) Estonia blv. 7 10143 Tallinn ESTONIA	vetik@iiss.ee
Klara Plecita-Vlachova	Institute of Sociology AS CR Jilska 1 110 00 Praha 1 CZECH REPUBLIC	Vlachova@soc.cas.cz

Luba Zaloudkova	Slovak Academy of Sciences Institute for Sociology Klemensova 19 813 64 Bratislava SLOVAKIA	luba@zaloudek.sk
Ioan Marginean Marius Precupetu Iuliana Precupetu	The Institute for Quality of Life Romanian Academy Calea 13 Septembrie nr 13, Sector 5 76117 Bucharest ROMANIA	imargin@iccv.ro precupetum@hotmail.com
Ivan Bernik Brina Malnar	University of Ljubljana Faculty of Social Sciences POB 2547 SI-1001 Ljubljana SLOVENIA	ivan.bernik@uni-lj.si ivan.bernik@guest.arnes.si brina.malnar@uni-lj.si
Natalya A. Zorkaya Marina Krasynnikova	VCIOM Kazakova Str. 16 Moscow RUSSIA	Zorkaya@vciom-a.ru Mkras@vciom-a.ru
Helias Nikolopoulos <i>contact person:</i> Manina Kakepaki	University of Athens Department of Political Science and Public Administration 19 Omirou Street 10672 Athens GREECE	Mkakep@cc.uoa.gr
Mariano Torcal Lorenzo Brusattin Irene Martín Cortés	Department of Political Science Universitat Pompeu Fabra C/Trias Fragas 25-27 Barcelona 08005 SPAIN Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales Instituto Juan March C/Castelló 77 Madrid 28006 SPAIN	mariano.torcal@cpis.upf.es lorenzo.brusattin@upf.edu irene@ceacs.march.es

European Commission

EUR 23121 — EU RESEARCH ON SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES — Values Systems of the Citizens and Socio-Economic Conditions – Challenges from Democratisation for the EU-Enlargement - Democratic Values

Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities

2007 — 142 pp. — 21,0 x 29,7 cm

ISBN 978-92-79-07570-4

How to obtain EU publications

Our priced publications are available from EU Bookshop (<http://bookshop.europa.eu/>), where you can place an order with the sales agent of your choice.

The Publications Office has a worldwide network of sales agents. You can obtain their contact details by sending a fax to (352) 29 29-42758.

