

**THE EUROPEAN DILEMMA:  
INSTITUTIONAL PATTERNS AND THE  
POLITICS OF “RACIAL” DISCRIMINATION**

**WORKPACKAGE 1  
MAPPING DISCRIMINATORY LANDSCAPES ?? CYPRUS:  
ETHNIC DISCRIMINATION IN THE LABOUR MARKET  
AND EDUCATION**

Nicos Trimikliniotis\* & Panayiotis Pantelides\*

\*Research Fellows, Intercollege, Nicosia

(e-mail: inekcy@cytanet.com.cy)

## INTRODUCTION

In this report we map the discriminatory landscapes of Cyprus. Our focus is on ethnic discrimination in the labour market and in schooling and education. In spite of the various policy declarations, legal provisions and legislation affirming equal treatment for all irrespective of ethnic, 'racial' or other background, there is significant evidence that suggests that in both these fields, as well as in other areas, there are significant variations in the treatment of groups of migrants and of persons from specific ethnic backgrounds. It must be stated that few studies of discrimination as such exist for Cyprus; however, from the little evidence that does exist (official reports and independent research) discriminatory practices are abundant. What emerges is a strong case for investigating further the underlying discourses and structural forces at play, that give rise to discrimination.

As things stand today, following the de facto division of Cyprus since 1974, the main recipients of racial abuse, violence and discrimination, in other words the victims of racism, are what we call 'subaltern migrants' (i.e. migrant workers from south east Asia, the middle east and eastern Europe). Additionally, the Turkish-Cypriots residing in the territory controlled by the Republic of Cyprus (i.e. Greek-Cypriot controlled) as well as the Greek-Cypriots residing in the occupied north of the island (i.e. Turkish-Cypriot controlled) are discriminated against, even though they are all Cypriots. For the purposes of this study, we will concentrate on the territory controlled by the Republic of Cyprus, as there is little access to the north and hence difficulty in collecting the relevant data.

The report will be divided into two major parts, the first dealing with the labour market and the second dealing with schools and the educational system. Before turning to these chapters, however, we provide a short historical background of immigration to Cyprus and a longer section on the institutional and legal framework of immigration policy relating to the employment of migrant workers.

Migration of labour to Cyprus is a relatively recent phenomenon by international standards. Cyprus, during the 1960s and early 1970s was a net source of migrant labour, mostly to the UK and to a lesser extent to other destinations. After the events of 1974 emigration from Cyprus continued and it was only during the 1980s and mostly during the 1990s that significant flows of migrant labour to Cyprus gathered pace. The recent increase in the movement of migrant workers to Cyprus is associated with the economic development and economic restructuring that took place in Cyprus during recent years creating conditions for additional labour demand in the productive spheres of the economy and for the provision of services such as the case of domestic workers. An important factor, which has contributed to the inflow of migrant workers to Cyprus, was the breakdown of the economies and societies of Central and Eastern Europe and particularly the Balkans in the early 1990s thus creating conditions of abundant labour supply. Therefore, during the 1990s there was a steady increase in the number of migrant workers in Cyprus, working on a temporary basis through fixed period work permits. During this period there was also an increase in the number of migrant workers not holding the required permit ("illegal workers").

During the 1990s there was also an inflow of migrant workers from the Black Sea area of Russia with Greek origin: the Pontians. This category of migrant workers is different from the temporary workers mentioned above since there is no requirement for a work permit in their case. They are Greek citizens and are thus entitled to permanent residence and employment permit through a bilateral agreement with the government of Greece. A third category of

migrants in Cyprus, which is numerically less significant, refers to self-employed workers. An even smaller number of migrants in Cyprus are those who have acquired the Cypriot citizenship mostly through marriage.

We analyse these categories of migrant workers in Cyprus statistically and we also describe the institutional context of the employment policy for migrant workers. We also critically discuss this institutional context to bring forward inherent discriminatory features of the current system. A brief reference will also be made to the divergence of the existing rules and regulations in Cyprus in relation to the evolving EU framework for the employment of third country nationals.

## **STATISTICAL BACKGROUND**

Cyprus is a small country with a population of less than a million and with significant political problems arising mainly due to the ethnic relations and the division of the island since 1974. Nevertheless, Cyprus has achieved significant economic growth in recent years and has also gone through the EU harmonisation process successfully so that its accession to the EU is expected to be ratified at the European Council in Athens on 16<sup>th</sup> April 2003. Of course, the recent economic development does not imply that economic and social imbalances do not exist. For instance, in the economic field Cyprus has exhibited an undue reliance on the services sector and especially tourism thus creating a vulnerable and unstable framework of future economic growth. The issue of migrant workers in Cyprus has both economic and social aspects and it is an area that Cyprus has had to adapt in, within a very short period of time due to the rapid increase in the number of migrant workers in recent years. In this report we examine the institutional and legal framework as regards the inclusion and treatment of migrant workers in the labour market and educational system.

In an area of 9,251 sq. km, the total population of Cyprus is around 754,800, of whom 666,800 are Greek-Cypriots (living in the Greek-Cypriot controlled area). In 1960 Turkish-Cypriots constituted 18% of the population, whilst the smaller 'religious groups', as referred to in the Constitution, consisting of Armenians, Latins, Maronites and 'others' constituted 3,2% of the population<sup>1</sup>.

---

<sup>1</sup> From *Cyprus in figures*, 2000 edition, Statistical Service of the Republic of Cyprus.

**Table 1. Population and Ethnic Groups in Cyprus**

Community	1960		1992		2000	
	Thousands	%	Thousands	%	Thousands	%
Greek Cypriot community	448	78,2	599	83,9	647	85,2
Turkish Cypriot community	104	18,1	952	13,3	88*	11,6
Others	21	3,7	20	2,8	24	3,2
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>573</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>714</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>759</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Source: <http://www.pio.gov.cy/cyprus/people.htm>

First, we set out some basic statistical information regarding the migrant population in Cyprus. This information is provided in **table 2** where a broad outline of basic statistical information is given. Note that the total migrant population given refers to the workers possessing work permit. Additional categories of migrant workers will be analysed and discussed in a separate section.

**Table 2 Statistical Data: An overview**

YEAR	1998	1999	2000	2001
Total population (thousands)	748.8	753.2	757.0	762.3
Potential working population (thousands)	431.5	436.6	442.2	447.5
GDP per capita (constant prices/euro)	12,300	13,100	14,300	15,100
Migrant workers (possessing work permits)	19,000	21,368	23,701	29,730

From the above table it can be seen that the total number of migrant workers in possession of work permits is close to thirty thousand or 6.7% of the potential working population. However, there are additional categories of migrant workers that are not included in the above figures. A more detailed analysis of the migrant workers possessing work permits will be attempted in the labour market section below. However, in order to substantiate the submission above, that labour migration in Cyprus is a recent phenomenon, the challenges of which have not been responded to by the social and political forces in Cyprus, we can briefly consider the change in the total number of migrant workers during the past decade.

In 1990 the total number of migrant workers (excluding domestic workers) was 545. By 1996, this number had increased to 10,370 and by 2002 to 30,225. In other words, there has been a threefold increase in the total number of migrant workers employed legally and in full possession of all the necessary papers within the last eight years. However, the total number of migrants in Cyprus is significantly more than those possessing a work permit.

2 Estimated number of Turkish Cypriots living in the occupied area of Cyprus (since 1974). The population does not include a number of Turkish settlers exceeding 115.000 illegally residing in the Turkish-occupied part of Cyprus. As previously mentioned, the figure of the Greek-Cypriot population includes the 8.000 Maronites, Armenians and Latins who opted to join the Greek Cypriot community. Under the 1960 Constitution they had to choose to belong either to the Greek Cypriot or the Turkish Cypriot community.

Recent estimates given by the Immigrant Support Action Group<sup>3</sup> indicate that the total number of migrants in Cyprus is around 72,000 which corresponds to around 16% of the potential working population in Cyprus. **Table 3** provides an estimated breakdown of the total number of migrants in Cyprus into different constituent categories:

**Table 3 Categories of migrant workers in Cyprus**

Migrant workers possessing work permits	30,000
Migrant workers of Russian-Greek origin (Pontians)	10,000-12,000 (approx.)
Greek citizens	10,000
Migrant workers employed in offshore companies	5,000
Refugees and asylum seekers	2,000
Migrant workers without papers	5,000-15,000 (estimated)
Total	62,000-74,000 (estimated)

*Source: Dept. of Labour and Dept. of Statistics, Republic of Cyprus*

As shown in the above table, migrants in Cyprus consist of different categories. Regarding the geographical spread of migrant workers in Cyprus, unfortunately there is no available data. Obviously, there are some regional concentrations such as the Russian-Greek migrants, who are mostly living and working in the Paphos area. Also, many workers in offshore companies live in Limassol. Further work on this subject will be done at some future stage through local studies.

With regard to the country of origin of migrant workers, as already mentioned above, there are two groups who are holders of Greek passports: migrant workers from mainland Greece and Russian-Greeks (or Pontians) who have immigrated to Cyprus from the Black Sea area. Through a bilateral agreement with the Greek government, Greek citizens have permanent residence rights as well as the right of employment in Cyprus. In the offshore business sector, the majority of non-Cypriot employees of offshore companies originate from Central and Eastern Europe and especially Russia and the former Yugoslav Republics.

Certain observations can be made regarding the countries of origin of the largest category of migrant workers in possession of a work permit, connected to the sector in which they are employed. Most domestic workers originate from Asia and especially the Philippines and Sri Lanka. Other main sector categories in which migrant workers are employed, are: agriculture, manufacturing, construction, hotels, restaurants and trade. In the last three of these sectors, the majority of migrant workers originate from Central and Eastern Europe and particularly the Balkans. In the first three of the sectors mentioned, which are low skill and hard working environments a significant number of Asian migrant workers are being employed.

From the above broad statistical overview of migrant workers in Cyprus we can discern some significant features. First, there has been a large increase in the total number of migrant workers in the last ten to twelve years. Secondly, the majority of these workers are being employed in low skill / low wage sectors and their countries of origin are mainly Central and Eastern Europe and in certain cases from Asia.

---

<sup>3</sup> Cyprus based NGO set up in 1997 to support rights of migrant workers.

## IMMIGRATION POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL/LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF MIGRANT WORKERS

In this section we present a brief summary of the existing legal and institutional framework regarding the entry into Cyprus and employment conditions of migrant workers and we discuss some of the main problems and challenges relating to the discriminatory effects of the existing system. The objective of this section is to highlight those elements of the *institutional* structure having adverse consequences on the terms of employment of migrant workers. In fact, as presented below, the Government immigration policy is not only self-contradictory and ineffective, but it also distorts the labour market by producing and reproducing inherently discriminated categories in the labour market, hence the more extensive treatment of the subject attempted here.

The legal framework<sup>4</sup> as regards immigration is fragmentary and has developed very rapidly over the past decade, following the change of policy that allowed the entry of migrant labour in Cyprus, after years of a highly restrictive policy on migration. At the same time, the Government policy on migration included a set of measures to curtail and repress what they termed as ‘illegal immigrants’. The net result was the failure to control the flow of migration and the facilitation of the super exploitation of migrant workers by their employers as a result of the purge of clandestine migrants. The flows and inconsistencies of this policy become evident in the government’s efforts on the one hand to curtail immigration by being tough on overstayers and on ‘illegal’ immigrants and on the other hand to ‘protect’ migrant and Cypriots alike from any attempt to use the vulnerable position of migrants to undercut wages and exploit them. This was partly reflected on judicial decisions on migration cases.

All ‘aliens’, i.e. non-natives of the Republic, are subject to immigration control. There is a wide margin of discretion afforded to Immigration Officers regarding the entry into Cyprus of ‘aliens’ that may well lead to arbitrary decisions. Such discretion, combined with the lack of proper guidelines and training may result in discrimination:

“Concern is also expressed at reports of discriminatory checks on the part of immigration officers of non-whites coming to Cyprus. Again, ECRI feels that further training aimed at preventing the occurrence of discrimination and discriminatory attitudes should be provided to immigration officers.” (*ECRI Report*)

In brief, the system currently functions in the following way: the Ministry of Interior issues work permits, temporary or permanent. Permanent permits are issued to persons wishing to reside in Cyprus as self-employed professionals or to persons with long-term employment contracts. Temporary work permits are issued for a certain period (up to 4 years with a possibility for extension up to 6, according to a recent Ministerial decision) and for specific positions/jobs in sectors where labour shortages are observed and no suitable Cypriots are available. The procedure is that an employer applies for a permit to employ a foreign worker for a specific job prior to the worker’s entry into Cyprus. If there is a change of job or of the employer, a fresh application must be filed. The Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance examines the applications by employers and makes appropriate recommendations according

---

<sup>4</sup> Cap 105 and the relevant regulations.

to the labour market situation. The terms of temporary employment of foreign workers (with the exception of domestic workers) was agreed by the social partners in the early 1990s and have not been altered since that date.

The analysis appearing below is based largely on the research work done in the context of the study for the review of the employment policy for migrant workers in Cyprus (see Pantelides and Trimikliniotis, forthcoming). The main objectives of the criteria agreed were set as follows:

Firstly, the need to ascertain that work permits would only be granted in cases where it was clearly demonstrated that no suitable Cypriot workers were available for a given job vacancy. Secondly, migrant workers would enjoy equivalent terms and conditions as Cypriot workers. Thirdly, work permits would only be granted on a short-term basis, for one year in the first instance and renewable, by following the necessary procedures, on an annual basis for a maximum of 4 years.

Even though the policy assumption for the employment of migrant workers formulated in 1990s was that their stay was to be short-term, temporary and restricted to specific sectors, the developments of the past decade changed this scenario. In other words, if the original objective was that of granting work permits for a limited period in order to meet temporary labour market needs, which in time would be eliminated so that Cyprus would return to zero labour migration, the picture which emerges twelve years after the policy was initiated is completely different. In 1990 the total number of migrant workers in Cyprus was about 500 while in April 2002 the total rose to more than 30,000, not counting the non-registered 'illegal' workers whose number cannot be ascertained but may range between 5.000 and 15.000 (Intercollege Report 2002).

Most European countries have benefited significantly from the employment of migrant workers during the post-war period and have created the setting for cultural interaction and social cohesiveness between communities. In Cyprus, where this phenomenon appeared fairly recently, the institutional structures are completely inappropriate and in certain respects anachronistic. The main shortcomings of the existing model of employment of migrant workers in Cyprus are the following:

(a) The fallacy of short-term and temporary basis of employment of migrant workers; (b) The condition that migrant workers must be attached to a specific employer; and (c) The criteria and institutional aspects for the provision of work permits and terms of employment of migrant workers.

#### **(a) The fallacy of Short-term and temporary basis employment of migrant workers**

As already indicated work permits are granted on an annual basis for a maximum of four years (six years in the case of domestic workers) and only after demonstrating the non-availability of Cypriot workers for the specific labour market position. If the rationale for this policy is that labour needs in Cyprus are only temporary and labour migration would eventually be eliminated, it has demonstrably failed. Also the maximum ceiling for the provision of work permits has the intention of prohibiting migrant workers from working legally in Cyprus for the statutorily required period in order to be eligible for permanent residence and eventually citizenship. However, the outcome is not different in terms of the presence of migrant workers in Cyprus. If out of the current migrant labour a certain proportion are long term residents rather than holders of short-term work permits, this does

not affect the total number of migrant workers present in Cyprus at any particular point in time. If it is assumed that upon the expiry of the work permit period most of these migrant workers would return to their countries and by following a restrictive policy on new work permit applications the total number of migrant workers would be reduced, experience has so far proved that such assumptions do not materialise. From studies carried out as early as 1993 it was apparent that migrant workers are likely to be a permanent features of Cypriot society (Matsis and Charalambous 1993). It must be accepted that the labour market in Cyprus has been permanently transformed, as has been the case in most European countries and the first and most basic precondition for adjusting to this phenomenon is to evaluate and appreciate its benefits. Only then will it be possible to create the preconditions for improving the institutional and social structure to the advantage of both economic efficiency and social and cultural diversity and enrichment.

In recent years there has been an increase in the total number of migrant workers in Cyprus, both 'legal' and 'illegal', despite the imposition of a 'moratorium' regarding the granting of work permits with exceptions for certain cases. Therefore, we can reach the preliminary conclusion that a restrictive policy for controlling and excluding migrant workers from Cyprus does not have the effect of diminishing their numbers, deriving from reasons of demand and supply: employers find it preferable to employ migrant rather than local workers and Cyprus is an attractive destination for migrant workers.

It has to be stressed that migration flow to Cyprus has been beneficial to the economy and society: migrant workers contribute to economic growth, as they carry out tasks undesirable to Cypriots, they bring into the economy new skills and they contribute to the cultural diversity of the island. The real issue is whether the institutional framework and the policy regime, which determine the composition, the terms of employment of migrant workers and their level of social integration in Cyprus follows the most preferred course of action.

The policy of limiting the duration of work permits issued to migrant workers has not only failed to control their number but it has changed the composition of migrant labour in a very undesirable manner, as it has led to a proportionate increase in the numbers of 'illegal' workers. The creation of this illegal pool of migrant workers in Cyprus is overwhelmingly due to the violation of the short-term work permit system rather than due to illegal entry that is minimal as a consequence of the physical barriers of an island. If this policy regime continues into the future, the proportion of the so-called 'illegal' migrants will keep increasing with very undesirable consequences for the economy and social fabric of Cyprus, when in fact these persons are as a rule mere 'over-stayers' (i.e. persons who entered legally and have remained once the visa has expired).

There are additional adverse consequences of the short term/ temporary element of the current employment policy for migrant workers. It discourages investment in training by the employers as there is every risk that such investment will be recuperated, since it is known that each specific employee will only remain in Cyprus ('legally' at least) for a limited amount of time. This policy discourages skilled and professional workers from coming to Cyprus since they cannot expect a secure and long-term career structure. Finally, this policy regime creates serious social consequences since it does not provide migrant workers with the time, space and means for their social integration. It is a policy that constantly gives the wrong signals to the migrant workers, who are made to feel basically unwelcome but essential for economic reasons. It is a policy of social exclusion, which prohibits the development of a



feeling of belonging to the economic and social structure of Cyprus and from which potentially there would flow a series of positive consequences.

**(b) The condition that migrant workers must be attached to a specific employer**

The requirement that migrant workers cannot change employer or be employed for a different task during their work permit period is particularly problematic, as it can lead to abuse, contract violation and super-exploitation of migrant workers. The problems regarding contract enforcement are already quite severe and the relevant authorities declare their inability to make the necessary checks and ensure that the terms agreed between the government, trade unions and employers are adhered to (Pantelides and Trimikliniotis forthcoming). The inability to change employer creates serious inefficiencies in the labour market and is against the notion of flexibility and competitive behaviour, which are declared objectives of the European Union. This policy has more serious adverse consequences for those segments of migrant workers who are in a particularly vulnerable position such as the “entertainers/artists” and domestic workers.

Migrant workers are left with no alternative but to accept the terms imposed by the employer. If a migrant worker files a complaint with the Complaints Commission, then deportation becomes a real possibility. The migrant workers under this system have no real possibilities for an alternative course of action. This aspect of the employment policy reinforces the previous arguments regarding the shortcomings of the short term/temporary model for the employment of migrant workers.

All these consequences are directly at odds with declared EU policies, as indicated in the Joint Assessment of Employment Priorities in Cyprus compiled by the Ministry of Labour and the EU Commissioner for Employment and Social Affairs:

“ It seems certain that Cyprus will continue to have a relatively large foreign workforce in the future. The pattern to date has been one mainly of temporary employment of foreign workers. Even so, continued inflows of foreign workers over a long period inevitably involves an increase in the number of such workers with a deeper attachment to the Cypriot labour market. Parallel developments in other European countries are giving rise to widespread review of policies on foreign workers. A similar review would provide a useful basis for the formulation of future policy in Cyprus.”

The need to question the current model for the temporary employment of migrant workers is being highlighted by EU officials.

As for the link between employer-migrant worker, this has been criticised by the ECRI Report (2001) and the Ombudsman (2001) and NGOs have advocated the de-linking of migrant workers from particular employees (e.g. the Immigrants Support Action Group). The Second ECRI report notes:

In line with the approach strongly linking immigration with employment, one of the main immigration issues faced by the Cypriot authorities has been the need to ensure that migrant workers and their families enjoy equal treatment with that offered to nationals in matters of employment. However, the practical application of this principle appears not to have been uniform.

### **(c) Criteria and institutional aspects for the provision of work permits and terms of employment of migrant workers**

There are provisions in the criteria for the employment of 'foreign' workers, such as the one providing that in case of redundancies migrant workers would be the first to be dismissed, which constitute direct discrimination against migrant workers and are incompatible with EU regulations. Also elements such as the structures of dependency on the employer, whereby the requirement that accommodation and food be provided by the employer operates as additional pressure on migrant workers in cases where the employer violates the contracts terms.

### **SPECIFIC CATEGORIES OF MIGRANT WORKERS: 'ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS', ENTERTAINERS, DOMESTIC WORKERS**

#### **'Illegal immigrants'**

The issue of 'illegal immigrants' represents one of the most difficult and controversial areas in which very little research has been conducted in Cyprus. The employment of Illegal workers is highly beneficial to employers since they don't have to adhere to any officially agreed terms of employment and they don't have to pay social security contributions or indeed a salary. It imparts on the economy the characteristics of a "cheap-labour" model and perpetuates a 'primitive' approach as to how the economy ought to be organised, creating the basis for an informal/black market.

#### **Domestic workers**

Domestic workers are amongst the most vulnerable groups as they are not unionised and generally reside with the employer. Among their many disadvantages is that until this year they had not had any increase in their stipulated salary as agreed between the government, trade unions and employers for the last 11 years (see relevant section in Part I below).

#### **Entertainers**

'*Entertainment workers*' (cabaret dancers) drawn from poorer eastern European countries, are the victims of the sex industry without any action being taken against the implicated parties. If cabaret dancers are granted work permits in the first place, they ought to be treated as legitimate workers, but they are not. Many of them are brought to Cyprus upon false pretenses and without their knowledge that they will be working in the sex industry. This sector forms an illegal network that requires special attention and strict regulation. Cabaret dancers are not officially allowed to engage in prostitution, but this does happen on a routine basis. There is hesitation in legalizing such practices as prostitution in cabarets due to social conservatism, however the failure to do so results in the non-implementation and the inability to monitor compliance of the law. The net result is that many of these women are caught in the margins of illegality and their dependence on their employer-pimp increases.

The dilemma for policy-makers is that as they attempt to make regulation and control 'tighter' (through reducing their stay; more scrutiny upon entry; repressive measures by police etc.) the cabaret dancers' position becomes ever more marginal and their dependence on their employer increases. The laws on prostitution must be applied to all irrespective of ethnic origin, including of course the tight control of those who muster wealth on immoral earnings. There are currently no social policies of encouraging and supporting women who are willing to exit the sex industry, neither is there any policy of attempting to improve working conditions of women wishing to continue without the exploitation, violence and humiliation by their employers.

## **PART ONE: THE LABOUR MARKET**

### **The economy of Cyprus: A brief overview**

The economy of Cyprus has experienced significant economic growth in recent years and has managed to achieve a GDP per capita higher than the EU average. Also, a very satisfactory feature of the economy of Cyprus, in contrast with the European experience, has been the consistently low levels of unemployment.

**Table 4: The Cyprus economy: An overview**

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
GDP growth (%)	2.4	5.0	4.6	3.7	3.9
GDP per capita (euro)	11,500	12,300	13,000	14,300	15,100
Unemployment (%)	3.4	3.4	5.9	4.9	4.0
Current account (million euro)	298.5	540.9	203.9	495.0	457.0
Structure of production (% GDP)					
Agriculture	4.3	4.4	4.2	3.7	3.9
Industry	14.2	13.8	13.2	13.1	12.4
Construction	8.4	8.0	7.7	7.1	7.1
Services	73.1	73.8	74.9	76.1	76.6

The economic indicators show that Cyprus has a thriving economy and with the discipline to be imposed by EU accession the appropriate framework has been set for future economic and social development. However, this is far from the whole picture and although some positive steps have been taken for economic and social advancement, serious structural imbalances can potentially hamper the prospects for future growth. The high degree of dependence of the economy on the tourist industry, a highly variable and vulnerable form of economic activity, does not provide the appropriate incentives for the development of the productive sectors of the economy through agricultural and industrial development. Thus, in recent years both the primary and secondary sectors of the economy have been in relative decline. This tendency of faltering competitiveness has also given rise to additional problems such as high import penetration and stagnant exports. In general, the unsatisfactory performance of the agricultural and industrial sectors of the economy have created a framework where the economy depends more and more on low skill, low productivity and low wage labour, in particular migrant labour.

### **Migrant workers in Cyprus: Labour market issues**

The above characteristics of the economy have created a framework where low wage migrant workers can be utilised, rather than high skill, professional workers. These features can be seen from the distribution of migrant workers in various sectors of the economy of Cyprus. The decomposition of total migrant workers in Cyprus possessing work permits is shown in Table 5 and it is obvious that there is a concentration in low wage-low skill sectors such as the tourist sector (hotels and restaurants), construction, agriculture and manufacturing. It is also very notable that about one third of 'legal' migrant workers are occupied as domestic workers.

**Table 5 Distribution of migrant workers in sectors of the economy**

Year/ Sector	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Agriculture	2903	1557	1607	1862	2088	2520	2901
Manufacturing	2153	1975	2078	2252	2146	2524	2735
Construction	1226	1383	1531	1694	1484	2137	2535
Tourism	2909	3149	3917	3518	5337	7232	4853
Trade	n.a	1255	1425	1558	1629	2189	2441
Transport	108	-	-	-	-	-	-
Banking	157	-	-	-	-	-	-
Services	908	-	-	-	-	-	-
Domestics	n.a.	5594	6179	6745	8243	9716	10164
Entertainment	-	-	-	1493	-	-	1212
Other	6	2111	2263	2346	2774	3412	3384
Total	10370	17024	19000	21368	23701	29730	30225

The ‘illegal’ migrant workers are employed in sectors of the economy with extremely hard working conditions such as construction, agriculture, manufacturing and the “entertainment” business. Obviously, such workers are paid minimal wages, far below the official minimum wage, long hours of work, unhealthy conditions of work and not uncommonly they are being harassed, not to mention the common practise of employers to simply withhold their wages, particularly in the case of seasonal workers. Migrant workers without papers are considered ‘criminals’ and the authorities have adopted a policy of persecution. However, even this approach is hesitantly pursued since ‘illegal’ migrant workers represent a valuable source of ‘cheap labour’ to employers. Further research in this area is required preferably in a comparative context with other Mediterranean countries.

As regards the other categories of migrant workers (apart from those possessing official work permit papers), the Greek-Russian (Pontians) migrant workers constitute another group which is highly exploited often under similar circumstances as those migrant workers without papers. They have no trade union protection and their terms of employment are not prescribed by any regulations. Also, it is a group with high levels of unemployment or irregular work patterns. Even though in principle racial relations for this group should have been smoother because of the Greek origin connection, in practice the opposite is the case with frequent incidents of violence being reported (often in a misleading way by the Cypriot media).

In contrast to migrant workers of Greek-Russian origin, mainland Greek citizens working in Cyprus do not suffer serious cases of discrimination. They are on the whole skilled or well educated and they come to Cyprus due to the high rate of unemployment in Greece. Also, professional workers in offshore companies are a distinct case with favourable treatment since the government has a declared policy of attracting offshore companies to Cyprus.

Regarding the case of migrant workers with official work permits, more can be said about their terms of employment and the potential grounds for discrimination since their employment is supposed to be accompanied by certain rules and regulations. These terms of employment and the criteria which allow them to be employed in the first place have been agreed between the government, trade unions and employers’ organisations since the early 1990s and have remained in existence ever since without any alterations at all, despite the criticisms and the problems which have arisen. In this section we concentrate on issues relating directly to the labour market.

This section considers the extent to which migrant workers (in possession of official papers) are discriminated against in terms of wages, working conditions, opportunities of employment and career advancement. The problem of data availability is also relevant in this case but we will attempt to draw some conclusions from the inherent imbalances of the regulations of employment of migrant workers, from qualitative analysis including interviews with migrant workers, from a study performed by the University of Cyprus on the impact of migrant workers on the labour market (Christophides and Pashiardis 2001) and from other sources.

### **Specific Aspects of Discrimination: Gendered and Racialised Labour Markets and the Racialisation of Domestic Workers**

The different categories of migrant workers (according to the sector in which they are employed) obviously do not face the same problems and are not subjected to the same forms of discrimination; accordingly, the appropriate policy responses have to differ. There are some principles and lines of action, which are common to all migrant workers, but we have to distinguish between the common elements and the peculiarities of the different migrant groups.

Domestic workers have been employed in Cyprus since the early 1990s and currently form the largest group within the category of migrant workers in possession of work permits. The total number of domestic workers exceeds 10,000, which is over a third of the total. These migrant workers mostly originate from countries in S.E. Asia and are almost exclusively women.

The demand for the services of domestic workers is associated with the rising standard of living of some of the Cypriot families. In some cases domestic workers are employed by old or sick people, reflecting the fact that social services for the elderly and the disabled in Cyprus are undeveloped. Also in some cases, the employment of domestic workers provides the opportunity for Cypriot women to enter the labour market but there is no evidence regarding relative proportions. In general, domestic workers are provided accommodation within the household in which they are employed which creates a high degree of dependence with their employer and provides the opportunity for pressurizing them to work at irregular and long hours. There is a lot of evidence of contract violation and even abuse of these workers but very few cases are being reported from fear of expulsion or even deportation. The wages of migrant domestic workers are below the national minimum wage applicable for Cypriots and has not increased at all since the initial terms of employment were agreed in the early 1990s. The wages of migrant domestic workers are roughly one quarter of the wages of Cypriot women doing similar type of work. The level and forms of discrimination in this case are quite obvious and so is the unwillingness of the authorities and the trade unions to respond accordingly.

Some research has been undertaken on the working conditions of domestic workers, who suffer from such treatment and the ECRI Report referred to them as the most vulnerable group:

“As noted by ECRI in its first report, a particularly vulnerable group appears to be constituted by domestic workers, who comprise almost one third of all legal immigrants working in Cyprus. There have been reports that the terms of contract of these workers are often breached by employers, who may for instance force the women to work much longer hours or during their days off,

assign them to duties not provided for by the contract, or dismiss them in an unjustified manner. There have also been reports of inhuman treatment and sexual harassment of these women.”

A study involving 71 interviews of Asian female workers in the island’s capital (Lefkosia) revealed that these workers’ right and terms of contract are routinely violated: Only a small fraction of those interviewed worked the required 8 hours per day, whilst the rest were forced to work unpaid overtime, some up to 16 hours a day. Almost half of them are not entitled to rest time, whilst more than half had a ‘curfew’ imposed on them, had no paid vacation and the vast majority had paid agents to secure a job and a work permit for them in Cyprus, some of them extortionate amounts (Kadir 2001).

Asian women have become the stereotype of domestic workers/servants and seen as a ‘necessity’ for every household that can afford them. In fact the term *Asian woman* (In Greek: ?s??t?ssa)? is used in many instances interchangeably with *Filipino woman* (In Greek: F??pp??a)? or *Sri Lankan woman* (In Greek: S??a??a)?). A common phrase used in popular discourse is: “*What do you think I am? Your Asian/Filipino woman?*” The expression “*I work like a ‘black’*” (In Greek: μα????), with its racist connotation, was used before the wave of new migration, but has now reached wider application in popular discourse and found in casual talk among Cypriots. It is also used as a term of abuse against migrant workers.<sup>5</sup>

Colour is only one of the signifiers of racism, not exclusively or necessarily the most important. It has been suggested that darker people are more *likely* to be the target of racism. Regarding Cyprus one may crudely suggest that people from different geographical areas are concentrated in different occupations, with ‘whites’ (northern/ central Europeans/ Americans) concentrated in more office type works, with a very large number as managers. ‘Black’ people (northern Africa/Arabs, and south east Asians, with the exception of Lebanese and Jordanians), on the other hand, are more likely to be concentrated in manual jobs. However this is a crude and at times misleading picture: there is an anomaly with east Europeans who, depending on their class position of course, generally occupy jobs at the lower end of the market. This is also the case for the Lebanese and, to a lesser extent, Jordanian migrants. Therefore, we can argue that racism cannot be reduced to a phenotypic prejudice solely based on colour, without wanting in any way to underestimate the historical and systematic racism faced by black people (Gilroy 1987; Miles 1989; Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992: 132-140).

As for the gender dimension, there is a gender division of labour based on racial background: eastern European (white) women are the first preference for the sex industry (prostitution and ‘artists’/ ‘dancers’), by and large replacing the traditional stereotypes of the ‘exotic’ Asian women working in cabarets, as was the case before the collapse of eastern European regimes. Asian women are preferred for home care and ‘caring jobs’, perhaps linked to some stereotype notion of the ‘black (or dark) maid’. The cultural basis for the position of the Asian maid was found in the category the “kori” (???? in traditional society, where the

---

<sup>5</sup> An extract from a letter to a Cypriot newspaper written by a migrant reads: “I have been in Cyprus for one and a half years and what has happened is too much for a person like me, when I cannot sit on my own balcony without getting verbal abuse from Cypriot people, who call me “mavro” or shout other bad words...”. Lanitis, in the same paper the following week suggests that he has received many letters by migrant workers complaining about their plight (The Cyprus Weekly 7-13.10.97)

woman, daughter and wife, 'served' the man. This operated together with class, as lower class women were the cleaners and maids in the houses of the rich (a????t???)?? One must consider the connection between gender and 'race', and racism and sexism, if one is to understand the position of migrant women labour and the kind of racialisation they face. We are reminded that "*racialized and ethnic minority women are concentrated in the most arduous and poorly paid work*" (Anthias and Yuval-Davies 1992: 117) and the experience in Cyprus clearly shows this, if one looks at domestic workers and the way the media portrays them.<sup>6</sup>

### **Migrant workers: Wages, Unemployment and Trade Unions**

A general characteristic of the rest of the groups within the category of migrant worker in possession of work permits is the fact that they are being employed in low wage-low productivity- low skill jobs often under difficult working conditions. Even though the terms of employment stipulate that migrant workers shall have the same rights and contract terms as Cypriot workers, contract violation is a common phenomenon even though very few cases are being reported (PEO 2002). The level of unionisation of migrant workers is very low and the authorities do not carry out the appropriate checks on employers as a matter of conscious decision and also by using the excuse of staff shortage.

Detailed empirical evidence on this issue is not available; however some inferences pointing towards this outcome can be deduced from the study by Pashiardis and Christophidis of the University of Cyprus (Christophidis and Pashiardis 2001). In the study on the labour market in Cyprus, the authors set out to examine the impact of the presence of migrant workers in Cyprus on the wages and chances of employment of Cypriot workers. Note that the authors do not examine whether there is discrimination against migrant workers, but concentrate on whether or not the employment of migrant workers has a 'negative' impact on native workers. Regarding the issue of employment opportunities the authors conclude that the employment of migrant workers does not create unemployment for the locals since migrant workers take up jobs that Cypriots are not prepared to accept. In general, migrant workers in Cyprus do not face the problem of unemployment, since the right of entry to Cyprus is conditional upon a secure job offer. In case a work contract is terminated, migrant workers face the possibility of deportation. The only category of migrant workers where a small level of unemployment is observed is that of the Russian-Greek migrant workers, since their right of entry and residence in Cyprus does not require prior arrangements regarding their employment.

Studies in other countries, such as in Greece<sup>7</sup> (Sarris and Zagafakis 1999) and other European countries (Simon 1989, Harris 1995, 1999; Dale 1999a, 1999b) generally show that immigrants do not compete directly with native workers; there are several cases illustrating that employers in some occasions may well make use of a strategic recruitment of migrant labour as a deliberate means to undermine labour combativity (Senseng-Dabbous 1999,

---

<sup>6</sup> As Anthias and Yuval-Davies illustrate, the discourses of racism and sexism can be separated, even though there is close interconnection between the two discourses, in practice "*as experienced by the groups of subjects [they] are intermeshed*". (1992:131)

<sup>7</sup> In the case of Greece, migrant workers occupy the lower skilled jobs and Greeks have moved upwards, as the study by Sarris and Zagafakis (1999) shows. The same is now happening in Cyprus as Cypriots, though education and training, have improved massively in terms of their skills and are thus moving upwards in the hierarchy.

Petrillo 1999, Dale 1999c). One response, of course, is the tightening of immigration and repression of illegal immigration. As correctly pointed out by Dale:

“...labour organisations themselves become wedded to the divisive logic of racism” (Dale 1999: 12).

What many policy-makers and those who are not well acquainted with the issues may find paradoxical is that, in the case of ‘illegal’ migrants, as the repressive measures increase, so do the numbers of ‘illegal’ immigrants. The tighter and more regulated the immigration policy is, the greater the numbers of clandestine labour. As Gubbay (1999: 59) points out:

“Other things being equal, restrictions on legal migration lead to an increase in illegal migration”

In a prosperous country like Cyprus where it is possible for everyone, both Cypriots and migrants alike, to have a job and lead a secure life of employment, the generation of new jobs in the economy is greatly connected to overall economic policy and planning: the extent to which employment is a policy priority is a matter of political choice.

Regarding the issue of the impact of the employment of migrant workers on the wages of Cypriot workers, the authors (Christophidis and Pashiardis 2001) through econometric estimations conclude that there is a negative influence in some sectors. From this it can be deduced that there is wage discrimination against migrant workers, which acts as a downward influence on the wages and salaries of Cypriot workers. The trade unions acknowledge that discrimination against migrant workers has a negative impact on the terms of employment of Cypriot workers. However, even though they protest against such discrimination of migrant workers they argue that the government should adopt a more restrictive approach towards the granting of work permits for migrant workers. The employers’ associations on the other hand, support a liberal policy towards the employment of migrant workers as long as their cost remains low.

On the whole, trade unions have failed to take action to support or demonstrate their solidarity to migrant workers (see Trimikliniotis 1999). In spite of the ideological differences and the differences in emphasis between the trade unions<sup>8</sup>, there is a consensus in their opposition to the presence of migrant workers, who are regularly blamed for rising unemployment. There has even been common action by trade unions taken against migrant workers in the hotel industry in Paphos<sup>9</sup>.

In the 1990s trade unions adopted a defensive approach towards migrant workers, and made regular xenophobic remarks. It was common for trade unionists, particularly those on the right of the political spectrum, to claim that “*they* [‘migrant workers’] *are stealing our bread*”<sup>10</sup>. There are allegations that migrant workers ‘contaminate our culture’, or are to be blamed for

---

<sup>8</sup> One must distinguish between the Left-wing and the Right-wing trade unions, as there are differences in emphasis and ideological leanings. PEO has to be considered in conjunction with AKEL and the broad Left. SEK (Confederation of Labour of Cyprus) is ideologically and organically tied to the Right-wing party DESY (Democratic Rally).

<sup>9</sup> See the reports in the daily newspapers *Haravyi* 12.12.96 and *O Phileleftheros* 13.12.96.

<sup>10</sup> SEK spokesman is quoted stating in *O Phileleftheros* 2.12.97 (Trimikliniotis 1999).



rising criminality and other 'social problems'. Interestingly, even the super-exploitation and human rights violations of migrant workers have been invoked as justification for their deportation<sup>11</sup>. The trade unions of the Left are more cautious and adopt a more sympathetic approach towards migrants reflecting the internationalist traditions of the Left<sup>12</sup>, but they have done little to organise migrant workers in their ranks. Recently, there was a shift towards a generally more sympathetic approach towards migrant workers, even criticising their own previously 'defensive' stance (see Pantelides and Trimikliniotis, forthcoming), yet it is not clear whether this is the result of a more 'enlightened approach' or a pragmatic recognition that migrant workers are here to stay.

Recently, there has been a change of policy, with PEO arguing that there is no such thing as an 'illegal worker', only 'illegal employers', showing the shifting away of the blame from the migrant workers towards employers (PEO Theses on the employment of migrant workers 16.9.2002). PEO has recently strongly advocated the need to take measures to combat the widespread discrimination against migrant workers, especially in sectors where collective agreements are not in existence (Pantelides and Trimikliniotis, forthcoming). It has suggested that a major overhaul of the institutional structure for the employment of migrant workers is required as well as a more determined effort to identify cases of contract violation.

There are sectors of the labour market that have traditionally been trade unions strongholds (e.g. the construction industry), where migrant workers are also working. In such sectors trade unions have eventually started to recruit migrant workers as members; however in sector which have not been unionised, such as the agricultural workers (predominantly made up by migrant workers), trade unions have failed to unionise them, due partly to employer's hostility and partly to the difficulty of unionising seasonal labour, but also due to an absence of a sense of priority by the unions. The second ECRI report notes:

While there are sectors, notably in unionised and construction industry, where foreign workers appear to enjoy in practice the same conditions as their Cypriot counterparts, in others the practical application of the principle of equality of treatment of migrant workers in respect of their terms and conditions of employment has been less successful.

---

<sup>11</sup> Interview with Assistant General Secretary of SEK, Demetris Kittenis, *Ergatiki Foni* 30.10.96).

<sup>12</sup> AKEL, at its' 18th Congress, pledges that it "will work so that foreign workers employed in Cyprus get the same treatment as their Cypriot colleagues and will decisively fight against possible phenomena of racism and xenophobia" (AKEL 1995:40). This clearly sets AKEL against racism; however the reference to "possible phenomena" and not "actual phenomena" implies that racism and xenophobia are something to guard against in some distant future. Also AKEL does not refer to the ways in which it will fight racism and little initiative has been taken by the Party to support migrant workers. Furthermore, "illegal foreign workers" are referred to as a problem and AKEL calls upon the Government to take "drastic measures to put an end to the illegal employment of foreign workers" (AKEL 1995:40). The phrase "drastic measures" may well mean in practice violation of the fundamental human rights of undocumented workers, as well as other migrant workers, who may come under any heavy handed Police action. However, initiatives by some of AKEL's MPs, such as those in the Human Rights Parliamentary Commission (House of Representatives 1997b) illustrate that AKEL is taking up the issue of racism more seriously and that the debates over racism in Europe are beginning to influence AKEL policy makers.

In any case, it is apparent that there are structural barriers to the proper representation, organising and articulating the case for migrant workers by the trade unions.

No research has been carried out as to the characteristics of the working conditions of migrant workers in Cyprus, with the exceptions of specific studies: one on the process of racialisation of migrant workers (Trimikliniotis 1999), another on the policy framework governing migrant workers (Intercollege 2002) and one on domestic workers (Kadir 2001). As for the institutional framework, it was noted by the Planning Bureau of Cyprus since 1989 that “there are no effective mechanisms to monitor” the agreed policy framework for the employment of migrant workers (Planning Bureau 1989) and there was reported “*administrative laxity*” on the part of the administrators. However, very little research has taken place on the issue of enforcement of the agreement in controlling employment and protecting wages (Matsis and Charalambous 1993). In fact this raises questions as to whether the state bureaucracy, prone to clientelist tendencies and to arbitrary discretion in the enforcement of rules, is enforcing an *unofficial* policy, as alleged in the case of Greece. In that case it is argued that there is a specific informal or unofficial policy of flexibilisation of working conditions, informal jobs and the black economy, which is only possible via “the toleration by the state of the violation of labour and social legislation (Karamesini 1999). These are structural issues that are certain to produce discriminatory effects on the labour market, but no study so far has been carried out.

### **Conclusion and Further Research**

Research in the area of discrimination against migrant workers in Cyprus is rather limited and at a very early stage. A first attempt in this direction was made through the study for the employment policy of migrant workers at Intercollege (2002), which documents inherent discriminatory features in the institutional structure for the employment of migrant workers. The study by Christophides and Pashiardis (2001) does not directly address the issue of discrimination against migrant workers but it considers instead the possible negative impact from the presence of migrant workers on the wages and employment opportunities of native workers. This reflects the current prevailing attitude, which assumes that the presence of migrant workers is problematic and detrimental to Cypriot society, assumptions, which are yet to be demonstrated empirically. Qualitative evidence regarding discrimination of migrant workers in its various forms is provided both by the trade union movement and the NGO Immigrants Support Action Group.

Further research is necessary in order to document empirically the extent and various forms of labour market discrimination of migrant workers in Cyprus. There is currently no study on the role of employers or trade unions in the processes of negotiations on the working conditions and pay of migrant workers, in order to locate the source of structural discrimination in the institutional processes. Statistical evidence ought to be complemented by qualitative evidence through focus groups, from the views of non-governmental organisations and the trade unions. This analysis will take place at later stages of this project.

## PART TWO: THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

### Introduction to the Cypriot Educational System: ‘Communal’ Education, Ethnocentrism and the ‘National problem’

Given the importance of education in the production, and particularly reproduction in the shaping and the reshaping of ‘national’ sentiments, prejudice, racial stereotypes, myths, discourses and attitudes about ethnic minorities, migrants and the ‘other’, whatever shape such education takes, it is remarkable that so little empirical and theoretical research has taken place in Cyprus. Recently however some important initiatives have been made and research has been conducted as a result of the growth in influence of the peace and bi-communal movement in Cyprus,<sup>13</sup> the presence of migrant workers for a decade now and the processes of accession to the EU. Nonetheless, the material available is still fragmentary and research is at a very early stage. The importance of the ‘historical’ context of education in Cyprus is that it is ever-present: the structure of the educational system determines the current basis of educational policy, the content of education (through the syllabi) and the structural links between religion, national belonging, racial exclusion and structural discrimination.

According to the Cyprus constitution educational matters are matters that classified as ‘personal laws’ and are thus left to each of the communities to regulate under the Communal Chambers. In fact education had been divided under the British colonial rule, continuing from the Ottoman *millet* system, which allowed separate education on the basis of religion, under the leadership of the Orthodox Church. The Church or the ‘*Ethnarchy*’ was a traditional political leader, whose head, the Archbishop, led the flock under the millet system. During British colonialism, ‘liberal’ educational policies on the one hand and ultimate authoritarianism entailed in the colonial system on the other, created the conditions for the growth and evolution of nationalism and the subsequent clash of Greek and Turkish nationalisms in Cyprus, the conflicting national projects of *Enosis* and *Taksim* (Attalides 1979). In any case it is well documented that the educational system was crucial in the spreading of nationalism (Anthias and Ayres 1983; Grecos 1991), due to the segregated schooling as well as the fact that personnel and school literature were imported from the ‘mother-countries’, i.e. mainland Greece and Turkey (Anthias 1992: 43).

The term ‘Community’ is rigidly defined in Article 2 of the Cyprus Constitution, leaving little room for ambiguity and choice for that matter. There are two *communities* in Cyprus the Greek and the Turkish communities. Art. 2(1) provides:

“The Greek community comprises of all citizens of the Republic who are of Greek origin and whose mother tongue is Greek or who share the Greek cultural traditions or who are members of the Greek-orthodox Church.”

---

<sup>13</sup> The development, the prospects and problems of the peace movement in Cyprus has been analysed in Trimikliniotis, N. (2000) *The Role of State Processes in the Production and Resolution of ‘Ethnic’ and ‘National’ Conflict: The Case of Cyprus*, Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation in Sociology, University of Greenwich, Chapter 3 and “Conflict Resolution or Rapprochement: Alternative or Complementary Models for Citizens Action in Peacemaking”, Conference titled: *Cypriot Society: Continuity and Change*, organised by the Cyprus Association of Sociologists, Intercollege, Nicosia, 17-19 April 2000.

Article 2(2) defines the Turkish Cypriot community:

“The Turkish community comprises of all citizens of the Republic who are of Turkish origin and whose mother tongue is Turkish or who share the Turkish cultural traditions or who are Moslems.”

The rigidity of the Constitution fixes ethnic identity in such a way that the two communities must be kept apart. Anyone not belonging to either of the two categories, such as members of smaller “religious groups”, falls under the category defined by Art. 2(3) and includes Maronites, Latins and Armenians, who must opt to belong to either of the two main communities<sup>14</sup> and be subject to the ‘Communal Chamber’.<sup>15</sup> The term ‘community’ is rare in constitutional texts but it is not unique in the Cyprus constitution.<sup>16</sup> From the other minorities in Cyprus, who enjoyed certain minority rights, particularly religious rights, but were forced in 1960 to choose with which of the two main communities they would want to be part of. Maronites, Armenians<sup>17</sup> and Latins chose to be part of the Greek-Cypriot community, although still retaining their religious representatives in the House of Parliament, albeit with a mere observer and consultancy status (see Grecos 1990: 390-396). The few Cypriot Jews are said to have also chosen to be part of the Greek-Cypriot community (Dickstein 2001). The Rroma population of Cyprus, which is said to have been over a thousand, have chosen in 1960 to be part of Turkish-Cypriot community due to their Muslim faith (Williams 2000; Kyrris 1969, 1985). A future federal arrangement can accommodate for different ethnic groups, women and ‘minorities within minorities’ by utilising the experiences and regimes developed elsewhere, without of course dogmatically ‘importing’ regimes that do not account for the conditions of the island<sup>18</sup>. The problem of ethno-centric education,

---

<sup>14</sup> This requires a written Statement and approval of the Communal Chamber of such other community, as provided by Art. 2(3). A Greek or a Turkish citizen who wishes to cease to be a member of the community to which he is a member by birth must write and sign a declaration submitted to the officers of the Republic and the Presidents of the Greek and Turkish chamber [Art. 2(5)(a)].

<sup>15</sup> The Communal Chamber of the Community, which he wishes to belong, must approve this [Art. 2(5)(b)]. Article 7, contrary to any consideration for gender equality, provides that a married woman shall belong to the Community her husband belongs [Art. 2(7)(a)]. Children are automatically members of their father’s community, unless the father is unknown or he/she has been adopted to the community of his/her mother [Art. 2(7)(b)].

<sup>16</sup> Whereas a ‘minority’ is a numerically smaller group of people in comparison to a majority in a State, who retain certain rights relating to identity, religion, schooling, language, a community is endowed with more rights. A ‘community’ in the sense employed by the Cyprus Constitution is the intermediary between a ‘minority’ and a ‘people’. A community is not a ‘people’. The people of Cyprus as set out in the Cyprus Constitution consist of both communities and the other religious minorities. The problem of defining what is community and what rights should be endowed with each community is amongst the most bitterly contested issues in the Cyprus problem.

<sup>17</sup> For more about the Armenians in Cyprus, see Ashdjian (2001).

<sup>18</sup> Critiques of communitarian nationalism in Cyprus started from the 1970s (Kyriakides 1968, Loizos 1972, 1976; Attalides 1977, 1979; Kitromilides 1977; 1979, Pollis 1979, Anthias and Ayres 1979, 1983), very recently there has been a serious intellectual questioning of “the rigid communitarian norms and conventions that define

particularly of the communal type as the one opted for in the case of Cyprus, becomes even more complicated with the introduction of the migrant communities, who themselves are entitled to their own cultural rights.

The turbulent political history inevitably shaped the social life of Cyprus and as such the question of ethnic/ racial discrimination during the period of independence up until 1974 is best viewed in this light. It is not surprising that the political question and widespread ethnic violence has overwhelmed the research agenda leaving little research interest for such issues such as racial discrimination. When it comes to racism, racial discrimination, structural or ideological, the case of Cyprus is a peculiar one, as the problem of racism must be somehow linked to one of a long-drawn conflict, which took the form of 'ethnic conflict' since the 1950s, what Azar (1986) termed as "protracted social conflict". The 'Cyprus problem' must be connected to the attitudes, practices and discourses in the daily life of ordinary persons, not just today, but also viewed in a historical perspective. It does not take a genius to realise that underlying the historical so-called 'ethnic conflict' lays the politics of ethno-racial segregation. It is experienced in the 'everyday life' of individuals of the two communities who happen to 'cross over' in their daily exchanges as some form of discrimination, ranging from prejudice to abuse, even to violence and murder by extremists of both sides. However, there is strong evidence illustrating chronic discriminatory practices from the early days of the Republic (see Plaza 1965/19). The difficulty is that the 'Cyprus problem' is primarily a problem of nationalism and state/ethnic conflict and one ought not conflate 'racism' into

---

the parameters of constitutional discourse within which claims to identity are asserted" from the vantage point of a diasporic and post-colonial perspective, utilising the poetics of Cavafy (Constantinou 1998). Such critiques are extremely useful in the debates over nationhood, racism and identity, as diasporic perspectives that de-essentialise ethnic identity utilising the poetics of the class and the subaltern can open up stale debates and provide for alternatives imaginings and futures.

19 The Report of the UN special envoy Mr Galo Plaza in the years 1960-65 provides an illuminating insight into this period. The Plaza Report refers to the underlying ethnic divisions and the failure to properly protect individual human rights, such as the right not be discriminated against. Under the heading "The protection of individual and minority rights", Mr. Plaza notes the difficulty in applying the principle of equality of treatment and human rights without discrimination due to "the fact that the population of the island continues to consist of two principal ethnic communities, the further fact that they are unequal in numbers and finally the gravity of the conflict which has developed between them". The same Report noted the difficulty of the task of rebuilding a "progressive re-birth of confidence and the re-establishment of social peace", as the obstacles "are no less psychological than political" 19. The way forward, according to the Report, is "the establishment of the most rigorous guarantees of human rights and safeguards against discrimination", which goes to illustrate, if in an indirect manner, the prevalence of discriminatory practices that inevitably go hand-in-hand with the ethnic conflict and turbulence that existed, particularly during the period 1963-67, throughout the short life of the Cyprus Republic. One can expect to see widespread discriminatory practices, even if there is no study that illustrates this given the collapse of the Republic that was brought about by the Zurich –London accords (see Trimikliniotis 2003).

'nationalism' and vice-a-versa, retaining the analytical categories that describe connected but separate phenomena<sup>20</sup>.

As one observer noted, the history of the Greek-Cypriot education is a strong case of "using education for political ends", in other words the legitimisation of Helleno-centric education (Persianis 1996: 26). Turkish-Cypriot education mirrored this. The Ministry of Education and Culture came about only after the constitutional crisis of 1963; even today its existence is based on the "doctrine of necessity", due to the withdrawal of the Turkish-Cypriots from the administration, in 1963, as required by the Constitution (see Persianis 1996). At the heart of Cypriot education lies the ethnocentric model, a major structural problem and a barrier in properly tackling discrimination in education particularly against migrants and minority groups. The second major structural barrier is the social position of (subaltern) migrants and other marginalized groups, as noted in one study (Trimikliniotis 2001a: 17-50). *Social position* refers to the combined effect of the way these groups are being stratified in society (economic, class, 'racial', cultural and legal status), all of which are matters of this study.

In the territory under the control of the Cyprus Republic (south) there are no schools, even though there are a couple of hundred Turkish-Cypriots living there (see Kyle 1997; ECRI 2001). However, there are Turkish-Cypriot children in the south, particularly in the Turkish sector of Lemesos, some of whom are attending Greek schools; other Turkish-Cypriot children, who arrived very recently from the occupied territories in the north and do not speak Greek do not attend the school. Apparently for the last year there has been an approved budget of about 11.000 euros for elementary schooling of Turkish-Cypriots in the south but this is yet to materialise.

### **Structural Racism and Schooling in Cyprus**

The second ECRI Report on Cyprus (2001) makes a number of recommendations that derive from an assessment of the current situation in Cyprus in the area of education, which provide a good starting point of analysis, not only in the direction of policy-making to remedy the situation, but in order to properly analyse the current state of affairs. The ECRI Report, under the heading *G. Education and awareness raising* recommends that the Cypriot authorities promote human rights awareness in schools and devote particular attention to the fight against racial prejudice, respect for difference and promotion of tolerance as well as to extending the curricula of all school children to include education in human rights. Furthermore, considering the increasingly multicultural composition of the student population in Cypriot schools, ECRI urges the Cypriot authorities first, to ensure that all teachers are properly trained to teach in a multicultural environment and secondly, to react to any manifestations of racism or discriminatory attitudes in schools. Moreover, ECRI stresses the importance of initiatives in the field of education specifically aimed at facilitating better understanding between the Greek-Cypriot and the Turkish-Cypriot communities and supporting bi-communal events involving both students and adults.

---

<sup>20</sup> Nonetheless, it is extremely valuable to attempt to view racism in Cyprus *within* the nationalist/ethnic conflict in a historical perspective in order to examine: (a) the links in the discourse of racism and nationalism, and particularly to view how these are articulated in the political arena; (b) the way in which the discourses and ideologies of nationalism develop over time, particularly how continuities and ruptures of belonging and exclusion materialise in specific contexts; and (c) whether there is process of 'transformation' of nationalism into racism and vice-a-versa.

Under the heading “*I. Access to public services- Access to education*” ECRI “encourages the authorities to ensure that the provision of Greek as a second language meets the demands of the immigrant community and that teachers are properly trained in this respect”, considering “the increasing numbers of immigrant children in Cypriot schools”. Furthermore, it urges the authorities to consider introducing “teaching in languages other than Greek for students of non-Greek mother tongue in parallel with education in Greek to facilitate the process of learning for these students” (see point 27 ECRI Report 2001).

The following tables are indicative of the numbers of minority, non-Greek. They do not cover *ethnic background* as such but do provide a good basis for analysis.

**Table 6 Primary Schools by Town where children whose native language is not Greek, year 2001-2002**

Lefkosia	235
Lemesos	Over 50
Larnaca-Ammohostos	92
Pafos	568
Total	Over 935

*Source: Ministry of Education, collected by Maria Rousou. Total no. of students 63.800*

**Table 7 List of Elementary Education Schools with foreign language speaking children**

	Name of School	No. of Children
--	----------------	-----------------

**A. NICOSIA**

1.	Phaneromeni	80
2.	Ayios Dhometios B? (KA? + KB?)	42
3.	Ayios Dhometios G?	20
4.	Pallouriotissa A?(KA?+ KB?)	30
5.	Pallouriotissa B?(KA?+ KB?)	15
6.	Pallouriotissa G?	7
7.	Kaimakli A?+ ??	15
8.	Engomi A?(KA?+ KB?)	25

**B. LIMASSOL**

1.	B? Elementary School	More than 10 foreign
2.	St? Elementary School	language speaking
3.	?G? Elementary School	children go to each of
4.	?? Elementary School	these schools
5.	?? Elementary School	

**C. LARNACA - FAMAGUSTA**

	Kalogeras Elementary School (KA? + KB?)	47
	Ayia Napa	15
	Paralimni ??	30

**D. PAFOS**

1.	Pafos A?	10
2.	Pafos ??	20
3.	Pafos G?	51
4.	Pafos ??	112
5.	Pafos E?	47
6.	Pafos S??	131
7.	Pafos ??	69
8.	Pafos H?	14
9.	Pafos T?	47
10.	Pafos ??	25
11.	Pafos ?A?	42

*\* Source: Data collected by Dr. Maria Roussou. These tables and data demonstrate the size of the minority groups of the various communities in Cyprus.*



**Table 8 Children from the Religious Groups, by level and public/private schooling for year 2000-2001**

Level	Primary		Secondary	
	Public	Private	Public	Private
Latins		23		24
Maronites	338	44	123	80
Armenians	129		2	100

Total number of pupils: 63.800.

Source: Framework Convention for the Protection of national Minorities pursuant to Article 25, January 2000.

The Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (2001) considers that the method of recording national minorities is inadequate as “there is a possibility that the census data do not reflect the number of persons belonging to national minorities” (point 27). The insistence that groups such as the Maronites and the Latins be considered as a religious group and nothing more, rather than a national minority, has been criticized by the Opinion of the Committee. The Advisory Committee is not convinced by the governmental submissions that a set of legal provisions would be superfluous, as there appears to be no cases of discrimination. The Committee encourages the government to make such legislation, enforcement structures and procedures that would protect all persons from discrimination on the grounds of language, culture, ethnicity and religion.

### **Multiculturalism Or Institutional Racism?**

Even before the ECRI Report, Cypriot authorities responded to the presence of non-Greek speakers at schools by developing a ‘bi-cultural’ educational program (In Greek: *d?a-p???t?su??? e?pa?de?t??? p????αμμια*) for those schools where a high number of non-Greek speaking children appeared. Instead of opting for a comprehensive plan for multicultural education, the plan is for a kind of ‘ad hoc multiculturalism from below’.

In one study (Trimikliniotis 2001a: 27) an expert involved in the design and teacher training of ‘bi-cultural’ educational program noted that the schooling structure is not conducive to a genuine response from below, but nonetheless does provide for “action research”. A deputy head-masters involved in the development of a ‘bi-cultural’ educational program at local level noted, “there is no planning from the Ministry... it is based on the private initiatives of the teachers to find the teaching material and read on their own” (see *ibid*: 26-28). The idea of the program however is not a genuine multicultural approach that recognises and values all cultures, but a practical allocation of teaching time for the non-Greek native speaking children to learn Greek. The presumption is that these children have a language or cultural deficiency and require ‘special assistance’ in language learning. This teaching is seen as mere extra curricula activities with no special weight or significance. The Minister of Education insists that there is a very clear educational policy on the matter, however most teachers interviewed in that study stated that if there is such a policy they have never been notified of it (*ibid*: 26-31).

Ultimately, there is a conflict between the notions of ‘bi-cultural education’ with the ethnocentric core of the educational system. In fact the former Education Minister, although quite adamant about the need for ‘bi-cultural education’, rejected vehemently any move to

create a genuine multicultural system that treated all cultures as equal and valuable stating that he would never even consider taking steps to “discolour Cypriot education”, since Greek children of Cyprus need to know who they are and where they must go” (quoted in Trimikliniotis 2001a: 30-31).

Even with the knowledge that education is not a mechanistic model of reproduction and instruction, with pupils and students acting as passive recipients, but a negotiated, contested and active process (Willis 1977), Helleno-centricism and nationalism at schools certainly influences the production and reproduction of stereotypes and ideas. Education is indeed ideologically and nationally ‘coloured’ very strongly indeed and as Spyrou (2000) vividly illustrates the essentialisation of identity occurs through a process of discursive construction, which mythologize the past and construct the ‘other’ in a demeaning and derogatory manner. In his research, Spyrou cites numerous examples where teachers, in the course of a history lesson, identify ‘Us’ with the ‘glorious’ Byzantine empire, and contrast us, who are ‘peace-loving’ to ‘Them’ (i.e. the Turks), who are ‘barbarians’, ‘wild’ and war-like’. In such a context the idea of respecting other cultures and valuing other identities as equal disappears into thin air.

The educational system of Cyprus may declare on the one hand that it is based on humanistic, liberal and universal principles such as ‘freedom, democracy, equality, justice and international understanding’ as set out by UNESCO, but at the same time it aspires to transmit, conserve and enhance the ‘Helleno-Christian’ or ‘Helleno-orthodox’ values. The latter leave little, if any, scope for other religions or indeed any questioning of these value-systems. Children from the recognised ‘religious groups’ are exempted from the lessons of religious education, and parents of other sects or even keen parents who object to the religious teaching may seek permission to have their children exempted from this lesson. Nonetheless there is little scope for pupils and children themselves questioning or challenging the fundamental value system that is the cement of the educational ideology of the Greek-Cypriots.

Discrimination, therefore, based on religious belief (or cultural practice) is inherent in the system, as the exemption practice does not resolve the problem, though it may alleviate from some daily pressures. The ‘Helleno-Christian’ ideals spill over and are dispersed throughout the educational environment. The practice of Morning Prayer is a systematic feature and those students of a different belief or background may, and often are singled out. Other lessons, one can say key lessons, which aim at developing the critical mind, knowledge, understanding and judgement, such as Modern Greek (language and literature) as well as History and other lessons have curricula loaded with ethno-religious biases. National celebrations and anniversaries have also a religious bias many times: The most important school celebration is the 25<sup>th</sup> March, the day of Virgin Mary and the anniversary of the 1821 Greek revolution. However, this day is the national day of the school parades, where the top pupil gets to be the ‘flag-carrier’ (*σ?μα??f???*), the Greek and the Cyprus flag. However, what happens if the top student happens to be non-Greek, non-Christian? Does he or she get to carry the Greek flag with the cross on it? If the teachers interviewed (Trimikliniotis 2001a) are correct and the non-Greek students are of the caliber to make them top students, we should soon have this possibility. Such an incident occurred in a Greek village recently and sparked a bitter debate in that community: The parents were divided, as some teachers and parents strongly objected to a Muslim flag carrier. The matter may appear quite simple for the European ‘civic nations’ that have tolerance and multi-ethnicity, but such tolerance is not always abundant in Cyprus. In any case why should a child be faced with such dilemmas in the first place? It is

discriminatory to single out and possibly stigmatize persons of a different ethnic, religious or cultural background. Given that in Cyprus education is communally organized such problems are inherent: discrimination goes to the heart of the system. However, even secular societies such as France may well impose a kind of authoritarian republicanism as the recent cases with the girls who wished to wear the hijab to school indicate.

### **Structural Racism at Elementary Schools**

A study on the primary education of the children of Pontian migrants examined the kind of issues facing them and has found serious and systematic processes that discriminate against them (Trimikliniotis 2001a). It is ironic that the terms of reference of this study were *loaded* with the kind of racial prejudice that the findings eventually strongly criticise. From the Minutes of the meeting of the Parents Association that requested and sponsored the Association of Cypriot Sociologists to conduct the above-mentioned study, apparent are a number of racial stereotypes and attitudes of hostility and mistrust towards the Pontian migrants and their children: In areas with a high concentration of Pontians, the Parents Associations complain that the promise by the Minister of Education to disperse Pontian children among the different classrooms so that they are only a maximum of 5 in each class was not kept, resulting, as they allege, in an inability to cover the syllabus due to language difficulties of these children. As a consequence 'Cypriot children's educational attainment suffers'. Secondly, they allege that due to these problems, Cypriot parents enrol their children in other schools, leaving certain schools in a state of 'imbalance' (i.e. high number of non-Cypriots). Thirdly, apparently Pontians concentrate in poorer areas with affordable rent and so they are ghettozised in the neighbourhoods and at school. Also, there is, they allege, a tendency to criminal behaviour in children of the Pontians, who due to their problems at school drop out of school and resort to criminal acts (see *ibid* 2001a: 54-55). However, such behaviour is not attributed only to migrant workers, but to young 'ghettozised' Cypriots residing in blocks of flats designed as camps for the Greek-Cypriot displaced persons from the 1974 war (Frederic College Report 2002). Apparently these groups of youngsters are seen with suspicion and prejudice from the wider society, as are poor migrants who also reside in poor estates at different locations (see report *Phileleftheros* 27.3.01; Frederic College Report 2002).

The Study on the Pontian elementary education (Trimikliniotis 2001a) involved three schools with a high concentration of Pontian children: in Lemesos, Lefkosia and Pafos. The study found that the manner in which this community migrated and settled in Cyprus is indicative of the absence of Government policy with regard to the concentration of these groups in specific areas, lack of planning and lack of relevant in-depth research of how to offer a support infrastructure and how to combat racism.

The educational problems raised as regards the non-Cypriot children are the result of both the lack of a comprehensive and systematic policy on the question of multi-culturalism as well as the lack of the necessary infrastructure. Teachers do not seem to have the necessary training and teaching material to offer a genuine multi-cultural education even when they are keen to do so.

The following issues have been raised by the teachers as regards the elementary education of Pontians, which may well be generalized to include other migrant communities: it seems that the knowledge and experiences (linguistic, cultural etc) of migrant children in particular are not considered to be of any value and to be built upon, a matter which clearly shows the institutional discrimination of the teachers of the hegemonic culture to recognize and

therefore build upon those cultural experiences for educational purposes. There seems to be a social segregation of the children themselves who “naturally choose” to socialize with peers of a similar linguistic and cultural background. Parents of migrant children, particularly Pontian parents, do not seem to trust the education authorities and therefore do not have the necessary contact with the teachers on the progress of their children.

It was found in the study referred to above that in the classroom there are problems with the quality of education even where the numbers of non-native Greek speakers were relatively ‘high’. The only difficulties faced by migrant children in the early classes are with the Greek language and arithmetic lessons, which in any case are taught separately. However, wherever there was a rise in the numbers of non-native Greek speakers in a particular class, Greek-Cypriot parents requested that their children be moved to another class or even to another school.

According to the evidence provided by the teachers, school attainment of Greek-Cypriot students does not seem to be affected negatively from being in the same classes with non-native speakers. In any case, teachers noticed that despite the difficulties and prejudices that certainly exist, the attainment of migrant children is not lower than that of Greek speakers. A point noted by teachers was that the only difficulty that migrants may have is related to the fact that the current learning environment may not be properly related to their previous knowledge and interests. Of course this is the impression of teachers interviewed and not the result of a systematic and comparative analysis of figures, grades and other relevant material.

There appeared to be some problems of discrimination and racism between children and by certain teachers but there is no system of properly monitoring the extent of the problem. The head-teachers of the schools assured that there is no such problem, however a number of specific incidents of racial abuse and some minor allegations of discriminatory practices were mentioned. In any case, it would have been rather unnatural to expect that the attitudes prevalent in society at large would not be reflected in the school environment and given that there is no anti-racist program at the school nor is there special training for teachers, one would expect discrimination of different sorts to take place. From the three schools studied, the school in Pafos faced most difficulties due to the fact that there exists a climate of antipathy and xenophobia towards Pontians in particular by the local community, something that is reflected in the school.

A clear example of the way in which the communities treat the Pontian migrants is the fact that they are many times referred to as ‘*Russian-Pontians*’ (In Greek: *??ss?p??t???*), something the Pontians find quite offensive. Teachers interviewed in that study many times use the terms “Russian-Pontians” and some of them went as far as saying that for all they knew those persons are from Russia and they claim to be Pontians in order to gain entry into Cyprus but there is no way of checking, which illustrates a suspicion that they are in Cyprus perhaps illegally<sup>21</sup>(Trimikliniotis 2001a).

As far as the question of violence at elementary schools is concerned, teachers and headmasters concurred that there is no such problem and that, if anything, it is the Cypriot children who are more violent. Finally it was found that one of the major problems facing

---

<sup>21</sup> The Pontians were given permit to come to Cyprus as Greek citizens and therefore do not count in the statistics of “foreign or alien workers”

Pontian children was the fact that their living conditions are poor, they are living in ghettoized communities and generally their contact with the Cypriot community is minimum.

However, attitudes of teachers as regards migrants vary considerably across the board. In the study by Frederic College it was found that teachers and head teachers, were more xenophobic than their students. The findings surprised the researchers, who if anything were more biased in favour of teachers and head teachers as they were for years in those posts. In a survey conducted as part of this study, where they were asked '*if discrimination was ever justified*' it was found 67% and 68% respectively said it is '*sometimes*' justified, whilst a significant number of teachers and head teachers considered that the causes of discrimination are due to the behaviour of the minority groups themselves. However, these findings are only based on the impression of teachers interviewed; it does not reflect a wider survey of teachers or any comparative examination of the educational attainment, therefore they need to be considered with caution. Nonetheless, the study deliberately collected data from schools with a high percentage of children of migrant workers.

### **Education: Further Research**

So far we have no access to data on the extent to which there are differential patterns of access to higher education of children of migrants, who have been naturalised as Cypriot citizens. The reason for this is firstly that the presence of migrants is a very recent phenomenon and secondly that the vast majority of migrant workers are in Cyprus on a short-term basis. A research on this question would be extremely valuable. Educational policy on the question of minority and migrant persons requires closer analysis, particularly if one examines the attitudes of migrant parents and children themselves. Research on the question of ethnic and social background and educational attainment is also another subject needing further research. No research has been carried out at secondary level, or college and university level on the issue of migration, discrimination and attainment; such studies would be extremely valuable. Furthermore, an interesting study would be a comparative study of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot education as regards the policies and practices to minority and migrant communities (Christophides and Pashiardis 2001).

### **Conclusion: Cyprus and Institutional Racism**

If one is to understand "racial" discrimination in Cyprus, one must appreciate the fine linguistic and cultural issues relating to the meaning of the key terms and the extent to which they are considered to be morally, politically and socially deplorable or repugnant. The concept of *φύση* (Greek for "race") is not redundant in public discourses not even of the politically correct media world. In any case, in Cyprus there is little sense of political correctness in the media language and society at large. The term "race" can be and is being used without the inverted commas in spite of the fact that Cyprus has signed and ratified all the UN and other international instruments which totally reject the pseudo-scientific theories of race and consider the term itself to be totally discredited and therefore abandoned (see National Report of the Republic of Cyprus on the Conclusions of the European and World Conference against Racism 2002). Racism, in Greek *φασισμός* or *φασιστική*, is certainly deplorable and unacceptable as a phenomenon for Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots alike and it would be fair to say that for the vast majority of Cypriots racism is considered to be a serious offence and morally reprehensible. Nonetheless, the dominant view, as shown in a variety of surveys as well as public discourses (as it will be shown further down) is that this "bad" practice either happens elsewhere or if it is brought home it is Cypriots who are the victims of racism: Cypriots have suffered in the hands of colonialism; Cypriot migrants have

suffered from the racism of the indigenous populations (eg. in the UK, USA and Australia). More importantly the slogans of the nationalists in Cyprus who oppose a federal solution of the Cyprus problem are that any federal system that relies on the notion of ethnicity is inherently racist, as were the London Zurich Accords in Cyprus. Racist was considered to be the Turkish policy in Cyprus as the continued occupation of the Northern part of Cyprus expelled and excludes 200.000 Greek Cypriot refugees from their homes and, following Yugoslavia where the term “ethnic cleansing” was discovered by the media, Turkey is accused of having followed a racist policy that ethnically “cleansed” the north of Cyprus from the Greek-Cypriots and has demographically altered the population by bringing settlers to replace them.

Whilst there is no doubt that the Greek-Cypriots expelled from the occupied territories by the Turkish army in 1974 were victims of a policy that racially discriminated against them, unable to return to and enjoy their homes, this argument is by and large used to undervalue and underestimate the historical context and nationalist politics of both communities, the role of Greece and Turkey and international politics. Nationalist discourse which has been generalized as a state ideology through schooling and media coverage of national anniversary celebrations and national heroes, ignores the fact that between 1964-1974 Turkish-Cypriots had also been the victims of violence, sectarian massacres in the hands of army and paramilitary groups, of generalized ethno-racial discrimination and were forced to withdraw into enclaves. There is literature examining the politics of memory, memorials and museums from ethnographic and anthropological perspectives; hardly surprising in a conflict-ridden island such as Cyprus, where historiography essentially mirrored the nationalist perceptions of history by both communities (see Papadakis 1993).

The issue of racism against migrant workers was up until very recently dismissed as ‘isolated incidents’ by the authorities, a matter that attracted serious criticisms of institutional racism or at least government inaction. The racism debate with migrants at the receiving end and Greek-Cypriots as the perpetrators did not ‘fit in’ the national story of victimisation of Greek-Cypriots. Of course not all Greek-Cypriots are perpetrators and not all migrants are victims, but the power structure puts migrants at the receiving end.

A careful reading of the *Second Report on Cyprus of ECRI* may lead to the conclusion that what we have is *institutional* racism, underlying the whole legal and administrative system, that is responsible for the employment and general implementation of the framework of entry and stay in Cyprus. The Report falls short of using the term ‘institutional racism’, but a careful reading reveals a resemblance with the kind of structural practices associated with the what Lord Macpherson called ‘institutional racism’ (Macpherson 1999). As defined in his Report, point 6.17:

“Unwitting racism can arise because of lack of understanding, ignorance or mistaken beliefs. It can arise from well intentioned but patronising words or actions. It can arise from unfamiliarity with the behaviour or cultural traditions of people or families from minority ethnic communities. It can arise from racist stereotyping of black people as potential criminals or troublemakers. Often this arises out of uncritical self-understanding born out of an inflexible police ethos of the “traditional” way of doing things. Furthermore such attitudes can thrive in a tightly knit community, so that there can be a collective failure to detect and to outlaw this breed of racism.”

For Cyprus then in all but name the picture painted by the report is particularly gloomy, the underlying policy effect that are indeed discriminatory as the ECRI report note with concern. The inadequacy of remedies in some situations is mentioned in the executive summary:

Problems of racism, xenophobia and discrimination persist, however, and immigrants appear to be in a particularly vulnerable position in this respect. The rights of immigrant workers, notably domestic employees, are often not respected and the remedies available in these cases are not always effective”

In fact the issue of ‘excessive violence by the police’ is noted in the executive summary:

Of serious concern are reports of use of excessive force by the police against aliens who enter or stay in Cyprus illegally and the detention of this category of persons for long periods of time pending deportation.”

The report refers to immigration officers who require training on human rights; to public figures, whose remarks may lead to a xenophobic climate all of which cause the ‘vulnerable position of migrants’. Also ECRI notes that “foreigners account for almost 30% of the total prison population of Cyprus” and that in most cases, they are detained for offences linked to their right to stay in the country and very rarely for violent crimes. ECRI encourages the Cypriot authorities to carry out research on the causes of the disproportionate representation of foreigners in Cypriot prisons.

The Immigrant Support Action Group has regular complaints about the police and other authorities, such as social workers, for mistreatment and racial discrimination, citing also the Reports by the Ombudsman. The most effective means of screening has proved to be the Commissioner for Administration or Ombudsman<sup>22</sup>, as noted also by the ECRI Report. As with the previous year most complaints about human rights violations came from migrant workers: Out of 1999 complaints 156 were from migrants, mostly migrant workers (Ombudsman Annual Report 2002: 35) and the tendency is for the complaints to rise every

---

<sup>22</sup> The Ombudsman, vested with power to investigate complaints against the public service and its public officers, including the Police, expressly covers investigation into complaints that acts or omissions violate human rights, and covers thus complaints as to racial or other related forms of discrimination and intolerance.

year<sup>23</sup>. For the years 2000 and 2001 most complaints by migrant workers were against the Immigration Office and Police (Immigration Section). The Report notes that the sharp rise of 52,94% in comparison to the year 2000, is the result of the tougher line of the administration to exercise control on immigration; the increase in the cases of violent abuse or violation of human rights against migrants and the creation of support institutions to inform them and assist migrants.

The Ombudsman Annual Report (2002) for the year 2001 is illuminating on the kind of practices by the administration ranging from failure to remedy situations of maltreatment to policies without due process to extreme harshness. Characteristically the Report (2002: 41) notes the “the administration exhausts all the reserves of strictness” when it comes to implementing legal provisions as regards deportation of any migrant worker who loses their job, which is the polite way of saying that the authorities are harsh. Furthermore, the Report refer to the prejudicial situation migrant workers are, in a very unequal employment relationship with their employers, and the Report is critical of the practice whereby the employers use the Police to get rid of their former migrant employee so that they can obtain permit to bring a new one, leaving no opportunity for migrant employee to complain or put his/her case. “The possibility of recourse to the Labour Tribunal the Supreme Court is in most cases a theoretical one”, the Report notes (2002: 41).

It is on this basis that a reading of the ECRI report on Cyprus, by taking all the information available that leads to the conclusion that institutional racism is structurally embedded in the legal and administrative system that racialises migrant workers. However, a great deal needs to be researched in the different areas of policy formulation so that any underlying patterns of structural discrimination is revealed and tackled.

---

23 Table of Complaints to the Ombudsman

YEAR	Total Human Rights Complaints	Complaints on Immigration Matters
1996	40	21
1997	97	41
1998		31
1999		84
2000	146	102
2001	199	156

*Source: Ombudsman Annual Report 2002: 35*



## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### Reports and Authorities

- Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (2001) *Opinion*, adopted on 6<sup>th</sup> April 2001.
- Commission of the European Communities, *2002 Regular Report on Cyprus's Progress Towards Accession*, Brussels, 2.10.2002, SEC(2002) 1401.
- Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (2001) Concluding Observations of the Committee in Consideration of the Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 9 of the Convention, CERD/C/59/Misc. 15/Rev.2, 8 August 2001.
- ECRI (2000) *Report on Cyprus*, European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 9 Nov 1999.
- ECRI (2001) *Second Report on Cyprus*, European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 3 July 2001.
- House of Representatives (1997a) *Report of the Parliamentary Commission on Employment and Social Insurance*, 1) The Uncontrolled Presence of foreign Workers in Cyprus and the problems that are created as a result of the absence of a relevant legal framework which must regulate their presence in our country; 2) "The cultural and social needs of foreigners, men and women, who are working in Cyprus" and 3) "Foreign workers".
- House of Representatives (1997b) *Report of the Parliamentary Commission on Human Rights* titled: "The Observing of the Human Rights of Aliens who Arrive Illegally to Cyprus to seek Employment or with the intention of Seeking Political Asylum".
- Ministry of Justice and Public Order (2002), National Report of the Republic of Cyprus on the Implementation of the Conclusions of the European and World Conferences against Racism, Republic of Cyprus, Nicosia, Cyprus.
- Ombudsman Annual Report (2002), [?p?t??p?? ??????se??], ?t?s?a ???es? 2001, October 2002.
- PEO (2002), Trade Union Theses on the employment of migrant workers in Cyprus, September 2002.
- Plaza Report on Cyprus (1965), Report of the United Nations Mediator on Cyprus to the Secretary-General.

### Books, Articles and Papers

- Ashdjian, A. (2001) "The Armenian Community of Cyprus - Its Structures" (in Greek), <http://www.hayem.org/articles>.
- Anthias, F. (1989) "Women and Nationalism in Cyprus", Yuval-Davis, N. and Anthias, F. (ed.) *Woman, Nation-State*, Macmillan, London.
- Anthias, F. (1987) "Cyprus", Clarke, C and Payne, T. (ed.) *Politics, Security and Development in Small States*, Allen and Unwin, London.
- Anthias, F. and Ayres, R. (1983) "Ethnicity and Class in Cyprus", *Race and Class*, Vol. XXV, I.
- Anthias, F. and Yuval-Davies, N. (1992) *Racialised Boundaries*, Routledge, London.
- Attalides, M. (1979) *Cyprus, Nationalism and International Politics*, Q Press, Edinburgh.
- Azar, E. E. (1986) "Protracted Social Conflicts: An Analytical Framework", Azar, E. E. and Burton, J. W., *International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice*, Wheatsheaf Books, pp. 5-17.
- Christophi, Chr. (2000) "Labour Law", Campbell (ed.) *Introduction to Cyprus Law*, (Andreas Neocleous & Co.), Yorkhill Law Publishing, pp. 773-806.

- Christophidis, L. and Pashiardis, P. (2001) *The Labour Market in Cyprus, Migrant workers and structural problems*, University of Cyprus, December 2001.
- [?stf?d?, ?. ?a? ?as?a?d?, ?. (2001) «?p?d??se?? t?? ????? e??at?? st?? ??p??a?? ????? e??as?a?», ??e??a (pa??s??st??e 28/6/01, ?a?ep?st?μ?? ??p???) ? F??e?e??e??? 1/7/2001.
- Constantinou, M. (1998) “The Cavafian Poetic of diasporic Constitutionalism: Toward a Neo-Hellenic Decentering of Kyp(riot)tic Experience”, Calotychos, V. (ed.) *Cyprus and Its People, Nation, Identity, and Experience in an Unimaginable Community, 1995-1997*, Westview Press, Oxford.
- Dale, G. (1999a) “Introduction”, Dale, G. and Cole, M. (ed.) (1999) *The European Union and Migrant Labour*, Berg, Oxford, pp.1-14.
- Dale, G. (1999b) “Germany: Nation and Immigration”, Dale, G. and Cole, M. (ed.) (1999) *The European Union and Migrant Labour*, Berg, Oxford, pp.1-14.
- Dickstein, J. (2001) “Portrait of a Jew: ethnic identity and national belong in Cyprus”, *The Cyprus Review*, Vol. 13, Autumn 2001, pp.83-94.
- Frederic College Report (2001) Anti-social Behaviour of Cypriot Youth - Racist Tendencies [??t?????????? s?μpe??f?? t?? ???? – ?ats?st???? ??se??], 3 Vol. study, edited by Christis Harakis, forthcoming publication.
- Harris, N. (1999) “The Freedom to Move”, Dale, G. and Cole, M. (ed.) (1999) *The European Union and Migrant Labour*, Berg, Oxford, pp.265-280.
- Intercollege Report (2002) *Strategy Formulation with regard to employment of Foreign Workers*, Report for Ministry of Labour, by the research team consisting of Trimikliniotis, N., Theophanous, A., Pantelides, P., Christodoulides, G., Aristidou, I
- Kadir, N. (2001) A Preliminary Report: Labour Conditions of Asian Domestic Workers, Fullbright, unpublished).
- Karamesini, M. (1999) “Informal employment and the role of the state in the Greek labour market”, [Ka?ames??, ? . (1999) «?t?p? apas????s? ?a? ? ????? t?? ??t?? st?? ??????? a???? e??as?a?», ?p??e????s? ??????????? ??e????, 100, 1999, se?. 3-32.
- Kitromilides (1979) “The Dialectic of Intolerance: Ideological Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict”, Worsley, P. and Kitromilides, P. (ed.) *Small States in the Modern World: Conditions for their Survival*, Revised Edition, New Cyprus Association and Cyprus Geographical Association, Nicosia, Cyprus.
- Kyle, K. (1997) “Cyprus: In Search for Peace”, *Minority Rights Group International Report*, Minority Rights Group, UK.
- Kyriakides, S. (1969) *Cyprus: Constitutionalism and Crisis Government*, University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Kyrris, C. (1996) *History of Cyprus*, Lampousa Publications, Lefkosia, Cyprus.
- Kyrris, C. (1985) “The Mantides of Larnaca” [«? ????t?de? t?? ?????a?a?», Rousounides, A. (ed.), ??a?t?? t?? ????t?? S?μp?s??? ?a???af?a? (Limassol 20-25 May 1978), Lefkosia, Cyprus.
- Kyrris, C. (1977) Peaceful coexistence in Cyprus under the British rule (1879-1979) and after independence, Public information Office, Lefkosia, Cyprus.
- Kyrris, C. (1969) *The Gypsies of Cyprus* [? ?ts???a???e? ??p??], ???f?s??, September-October-November 1969.
- Lefkis, G. (1984) *Roots* [???e?], Limassol, Cyprus.
- Loizos, P. (1972) ‘Aspects of Pluralism in Cyprus’, Loizos, P. (2001) *Unofficial Views, Cyprus: Society and Politics*, Intercollege Press, Cyprus.
- Loizos, P. (1976) ‘Cyprus: Part Two: An alternative analysis’, *Minority Rights Group, Report No. 30*, 1976.

- Loizou, A. N. (2001) *The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus* (Σύνταγμα της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας), Nicosia, Cyprus.
- Matsis, S. and Charalambous, A. (1993) "The Demand and Supply Dimensions of the Labour Market: The Issue of Foreign Labour" in Demetriades, E. I., Khoury, N. F., Matsis, S. (1993) *Labour Utilization and Income Distribution in Cyprus*, Department of Statistics and Research, Ministry of Finance, Nicosia, Cyprus, pp 23-54.
- Pantelides, P. and Trimikliniotis, N. (forthcoming), *A New Strategy For the Employment of Migrant Workers in Cyprus*, Intercollege, Nicosia, Cyprus.
- Papadakis, Y. (1993) Perceptions of History and Collective: a Study of Contemporary Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Nationalism, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis.
- Peristianis, K. I. (1910) General History of Cyprus [Γενική Ιστορία της Κύπρου], Lefkosia, Cyprus.
- Persianis (1996) Education in Cyprus in the Light of EU Accession [Εκπαίδευση στην Κύπρο στο Φως της Προσέγγισης της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης], Lefkosia, Cyprus.
- Petrillo, ? . (1999) "Farewell to 'Bel Paese'?", Dale, G. and Cole, M. (ed.) (1999) *The European Union and Migrant Labour*, Berg, Oxford.
- Pollis, A. (1979) "Colonialism and Neo-colonialism: Determinants of Ethnic Conflict in Cyprus", Worsley, P. and Kitromilides, P. (ed.) *Small States in the Modern World: Conditions for their Survival*, Revised Edition, New Cyprus Association and Cyprus Geographical Association, Nicosia, Cyprus.
- Senseng-Dabbous, E. (1999) "Social Democracy in One Country: Immigration and Minority Policy in Austria", Dale, G. and Cole, M. (ed.) (1999) *The European Union and Migrant Labour*, Berg, Oxford.
- Simon, J. (1989) *The Economic Consequences of Immigration*, Blackwell, Oxford.
- Spyrou, S. (2000) "Education, Ideology and the National Self: the Social Practice of Identity Construction in the Classroom", *The Cyprus Review*, vol. 12:1, Spring 2000, pp. 61-81.
- Trimikliniotis, N. (2003) Report on Measures to Combat Discrimination in the 13 Candidate Countries: A Comparison between council Directives and national legislation on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin, gender, sexual orientation, disabilities, age, religion or belief – Report on Cyprus, author on Cyprus Report for EU Commission report on behalf of MEDE Consultancies and the Migration Policy Group.
- Trimikliniotis, N. (2001a) *The Educational Problems of the Pontians in Cyprus: Preliminary Research and Report*, Report on behalf of the Cyprus Association of Sociologists submitted to the Ministry of Education 2001 (forthcoming, Intercollege Press).
- Trimikliniotis, N. (2001b) "The Role of Media in the Production of Racialised Subjects: the case of the Domestic Workers in Cyprus", *Κυπριακή Κοινωνία*, Jan. 2001.
- Trimikliniotis, N. (2001c) "Europeanisation and Modernisation: Locating Cyprus in the Southern European Context", *The Cyprus Review*, vol. 13:2, Fall 2001, pp. 47-74.
- Trimikliniotis, N. (2000a) The Role of State Processes in the Production and Resolution of 'Ethnic' and 'National' Conflict: The Case of Cyprus, Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation in Sociology, University of Greenwich.
- Trimikliniotis, N. (2000b) "Conflict Resolution or Rapprochement: Alternative or Complementary Models for Citizens Action in Peacemaking", Conference titled: *Cypriot Society: Continuity and Change*, organised by the Cyprus Association of Sociologists, Intercollege, Nicosia, 17-19 April 2000.
- Trimikliniotis, N. (1999) "New Migration and Racism in Cyprus: The Racialisation of Migrant Workers", Anthias, F. and Lazarides, (ed.) *Into the Margins: Exclusion and Migration in Southern Europe*, Avebury.

- Williams, G. A. (2000) "The Gypsies of Cyprus: A *DRC* Update", *Kurri*, March Vol. 1 No 2  
Spring/Summer 2000, Dom Research Centre.
- Willis, P. (1997) *Learning to Labour*, Fanbourg Saxon House.

The European Dilemma:  
Institutional Patterns and Politics of 'Racial' Discrimination

*EU Fifth Framework Programme  
Improving Human Research Potential and the Socio-Economic Knowledge Base  
Key Action: Socio-Economic Research  
Cluster: Migrants, Ethnic Minorities and Social Exclusion/Integration  
(Project Acronym: 'XENOPHOB', Contract No. HPSE-CT-2002-00135)*

**Report on Discriminatory Landscape  
in the Institutional Areas in France**

by

**Dr. Birgitte Beauzamy**

Ecole des Hautes en Sciences Sociales, Paris

Email: [birgitte\\_beauzamy@club-internet.fr](mailto:birgitte_beauzamy@club-internet.fr)

Dr. Saad Tazi

Ecole des Hautes en Sciences Sociales, Paris

Email: [saad@tazi.net](mailto:saad@tazi.net)

**Scientific coordinator: Professor Jonathan Friedman**

# **PART I: NOTES ON IMMIGRANTS, ALIENS AND MINORITIES IN FRANCE AND THEIR LEGAL STATUS: WHO IS WHO?**

## **1. TYPES OF RESIDENCE STATUS FOR ALIENS**

### **A. European and national levels of immigration policies**

- **Paradoxes between policy levels**

In France, as in other EU countries, the right to immigrate seems to be in decline [Wihtol de Wenden 1997] which is mirrored in increasingly restrictive immigration policies and legal constraints : the “Pasqua-Méhaignerie laws” in 1993 and the “Debré laws” have created a system of visas and deportation of illegal immigrants. Immigration policies relating to the entrance and stay of foreigners in French territory are part of intergovernmental decisions taken at the European level. But they are also deeply rooted in national traditions including the colonial past, republicanism and the current perception of a migratory risk in public opinion.

According to the Schengen convention, the definition of exterior borders in the EU accompanied the gradual suppression of the interior ones between member States in order to facilitate the crossing of national borders inside the Union. This objective of free circulation in the EU resulted in the shaping of a European policy of border control : creation of a single visa for short-term stays in EU countries ( less than 3 months), free circulation of EU nationals, increasing cooperation between polices and legal administration materialized in the creation of a single automatized file system for police data (Schengen Information System, SIS). Uniform controls of exterior borders aim at an increasing security ; uniform processes in obtaining visas create a common responsibility in asylum policies, a file of foreigners who are not admissible to the EU, and increasing practices of mutual help between political and legal administration, particularly in the field of illegal drug traffic. Nowadays, travelers are no longer submitted to passport controls at borders inside the Schengen area. But this increasing freedom of circulation for Europeans draws another line with non-Europeans who are regular residents in the EU territory and who must have a visa to re-enter the Schengen area if they visit their home country following the expiration of their residence permits. This is a discriminatory situation for nationalities that have become dispersed in several European countries in the course of their migration, like Turkish and Moroccan immigrants, who may have relatives living in various Schengen states.

- **Admission policies**

After 1991, France, among other EU states, has tried to define common orientations regarding the admission and status of foreigners residing in the national territory for longer periods of time. The goal has been threefold : first, to harmonize admission policies in order to avoid the fact that differences in policies might render some countries more attractive to potential immigrants than others, creating either a major geographical concentration of immigration or a “weak point”, a source of manipulation within the territorial space of the EU. Second, to harmonize the advantages which benefit foreigners eligible for a longer stay in the EU ; last, to foster the building of the Union and make this evolution somehow benefit foreign residents. Therefore, from 1993 to 1996 were adopted a series of resolutions harmonizing the policies of family grouping for legal foreigners in EU, so that they could have a perspective of long-term residence. Another resolution limited the admitting of immigrants who came to Europe for working purposes or studies, while another one granted them permission under certain conditions to exert lucrative activities in France. It ended up with the creation of a single type

of title of stay in the EU in 1996. But even if these legal texts cover the most part of the objectives defined by the European Commission, national policies remain for an important part idiosyncratic : EU policies are limited to the establishment of a common framework regarding such issues as family reunion or student migration, but France, like each national state within the Union, remains free of the interpretation provided for such legal texts.

- **Increased control**

The orientations of EU policies regarding immigration also had an impact on how the topic of illegal immigration was perceived and treated by the French state. The European efforts in research on illegal immigration and the ways of fighting it – with the creation of both the CIREA and the CIREFI – resulted in an increasing distinction between illegal immigration itself which is prohibited, and illegal work, for which the employer is considered to be committing a crime, not the employee. Cooperation between EU states also concerns deportation policies for which the obtaining of travel papers necessary for the return to the state of origin, transit on the territory of other EU states and common operations of deportation have been facilitated. However, this common will to harmonize policies remains too weak to ensure the disappearing of national idiosyncrasies in the practices. This disconnection can be explained through the paradox of how public opinions deal with the issues of immigration : in France, those who promote the idea of protecting national borders most vociferously are also quite hostile to the idea of a general European policy to control migration flows, such as the Schengen apparatus. The trend toward increasing security encourages or at least reinforces in public opinion the notion that national sovereignty is being threatened by the EU, reinforcing national feelings and withdrawal with respect to issues of national concern and their solutions. The same trend, however, among European states, leads to a higher level of cooperation between police in ways that escape democratic supervision and therefore substitute themselves for national policies. Internal and external topics are therefore conflicting. Even though European treaties such as the Amsterdam treaty of 1997 tend to regroup immigration topics in integrated policies, the application of such conventions remains for the most part a matter of national policies.

## **B. National policies regarding immigration in France**

French immigration policy is influenced by two very strong contemporary trends. First, migration policies are clearly influenced by public opinion which favors restrictive measures and blocks proposals for other types of policy or the building of an integrated European policy on immigration. Second, the effects of restrictive policies are quite clear: in France, as in many Western European countries, especially those with a long history of immigration, there has been a drop in arrivals of legal immigrants and asylum seekers since 1992-93.

“To get migration flows under control” has been a major preoccupation of migration policy makers since 1974, but even more for the past dozen years. This preoccupation mirrors a public opinion in which the feeling of being threatened is clearly marked and where there is a tendency to doubt the efficiency of the control measures instituted by the government. People entering French territory may be classified in different analytical categories. Economic immigration is exceptional for migrants originating from outside the EU. In contrast to the latter “internal” European migrants who are free to circulate, reside and work wherever they want in the EU territory, the only non-European migrants who are allowed to work in France are seasonal employees, or highly qualified people who escape from the limitations of work due to their specialization and the absence of national competition in the same area of work, which legally would have prohibited the issuing of immigrant work permits. Migrants who

enter the French territory therefore either do so inside family regrouping patterns, or belong to specific categories, such as “visitors” who have enough income not to work, researchers, etc.. The other two categories are temporary visitors such as students or seasonal workers or statutory refugees (see below). A drop in entrances of migrants intending to reside permanently in France can be witnessed between 1993 and 1995 (116 000 in 1993, 83 000 in 1994, 68 000 in 1995), then a slight rise (74 000, including 48 410 migrants originating from states outside the UE, Sweden or Liechtenstein) One must add temporary immigration to these figures, which has remained stable over the past few years: 40 442 in 1995, 38 707 in 1996. Finally, the number of people who acquired the French nationality has been relatively stable (see below): 126 337 in 1994, 92 410 in 1995 and 109 623 in 1996.

In spite of what one may interpret from the public debate on uncontrolled immigration in France, the alien population is stable, and migration flows have tend to decline slightly since the mid-80s: this is true for the alien population, legal immigration and asylum seeking. The French system does not permit one to measure how many people leave France for good, except by deportation, escort to the border or return aid: an estimated 40 000 people have left France definitely each year for the past ten years. Comparisons between how many foreigners came to France and how many left shows that the “immigration zero” dogma is but a delusion.

However, the topic of immigration has been a major subject for producing laws in the 90s: the Pasqua laws of 1993 emphasized the idea of placing migratory flows under strict control, fighting against false marriages and a limitation of the right to family reunification, which should as a rule be done in a single act for the whole family with very strict conditions regarding housing and income. The whole of the dispositions from the draft which were finally voted meant to dissuade aliens from cheating and ended up creating an atmosphere of defiance against all foreigners. Besides that, the law was very complex in some respects, a situation that became even more complicated with the Debré laws of 1997: the articulation of different legal texts which may seem contradictory in relation to one another ended up creating byzantine individual situations which rendered legal simplifications necessary.

A report to the Prime Minister on this problem was written by Patrick Weil. He concluded, in a chapter entitled “For a just and efficient immigration policy”, against the abandonment of the Pasqua/Debré laws – laws that were vociferously opposed by many anti-racist associations are– but argued for an administrative reorganization. Most of his proposals were aimed at the elimination of inefficient control procedures, and better guarantees for access to health care for certain types of foreigners(students and researchers mostly). He also suggested that fighting against illegal immigration should target primarily the illegal labour market and that escorting and deportation should be made more efficient via a system of aid for return to the country of origin. His suggestions were put into effect for the most part in the Chevènement law of 1998.



## **C. Types of residence permits for immigrants**

### **1. Resident cards**

Every alien over 18 years old and resident in France for more than three months must have a legal permit allowing him/her to stay in France. Since the law of 07/17/1984 there are only two types of permits in France to stay and work in French territory : a temporary resident card of variable length inferior to one year ; and a permanent resident card valid for ten years. This permit allowing the alien to reside in France is normally equivalent to an authorization to work in France, but there are some exceptions to this rule. For instance, seasonal workers or people whose independent profession is submitted to special authorization such as craftspeople, shopkeepers or farmers, must have an extra certificate to work in France.

When an alien first asks for a certificate allowing him/her to stay in France, s/he receives a temporary resident card except when s/he has full rights to benefit from permanent resident status. The permanent resident card may be granted to him/her after a three year delay if s/he can prove that s/he lived regularly in France for at least three years without interruptions.

People who have full rights to benefit from a permanent resident card are, under certain conditions, spouses of French people, foreign children of a French person under 21 years of age, or live with him/her, children living with ascendent kin who are French citizens, foreign parents of French children, people coming to France for family reunification with someone who has a permanent resident card, and the family members of statutory refugees. The resident card is then renewable with full rights.

As a rule, entry into French territory can be refused to any alien whose presence may be considered to be a threat to public order. Foreigners coming from EU countries do not abide by the same common law and are free to enter and circulate freely inside the French territory : no previous authorization is there required.

### **2. French nationality**

The nationality laws were modified by the law of 07/22/1993, which changed both how French nationality was attributed and acquired. Attribution of French nationality concerns people who were born French : every person who has at least one French parent (by filiation), every person who was born in France and who has at least one of his/her parents born in France : this is called the “double right of soil”. However, the 1993 law withdraws the benefit of the double right of soil to children who were born in France from Algerian parents who were born before 1962 when neither of them had been living in France for at least five years, and to all children born in France from parents born in ex-TOM (*territoires d’outre-mer*) and colonies.

The law defines the conditions under which people who were by birth of a foreign nationality can acquire the French nationality. Every alien born in France from foreign parents can acquire French nationality when attaining the age of legal majority if s/he has been residing regularly in France for five years. Since 1993, a declaration of intention is required to become French in this way : it may be initiated between the ages of 16 and 21. Every foreigner over 18 years can ask for naturalization or re-naturalization if s/he has been residing in France for at least five years and can be considered assimilated according to certain criteria such as use of the French language and certain moral criteria. The government possesses a sovereign right of appreciation in this matter and decides by decree.

Every person who marries someone with French nationality can acquire French nationality with a single declaration after a period of living with this person for at least two years according to the 1993 law. Last, children under 18 can become French by a collective action if one of his/her parents does so and if they are mentioned in the decree or in the declaration of this parent and if they live with him/her.

#### **D. Asylum seekers**

In France, every person who filed an application at the OFPRA may be considered an asylum seeker. When the petitioner files this form in French territory, whether s/he entered the territory legally or not, s/he must withdraw this form in a *prefecture* and send it to the OFPRA. When the asylum seeker files this form in border areas, most times in airports, s/he can be held in a waiting area while his/her form is being examined. Filing the form can be prohibited in three situations : if the demand is answerable by another country, if it is visibly without grounds or if public order is endangered. When s/he receives the refugee status, the petitioner can obtain a permanent resident card and benefit from the principle of family unity for his/her spouse and children.

## **2. MINORITIES OF RECENT IMMIGRANT ORIGIN: GUEST WORKERS AND THEIR DESCENDANTS**

### **A. Definition**

The INSEE results were obtained using the population census which was made in March 1999. Data come from the examination of individual census forms which were filled out by the people themselves. The collected data are therefore declarative. Nationality – especially those of children who were born in France – is not always declared in the census form as it is legally defined. In 1990, about 130 000 people were wrongly counted as foreigners by the census administration. However, there were also about 130 000 minor children wrongly declared to be French. The mistakes roughly compensate for one other on a national level. The data which were used in the INSEE studies we are quoting deal with people residing in metropolitan France. People of French nationality are distinguished from foreigners by the nationality declared on the individual census form. The foreign population is composed of all individuals who declared having a nationality other than French. The composition of the foreign population varies with time because its definition refers to a situation which can change over time. According to legal procedures, a foreigner can obtain French nationality : s/he therefore becomes French and is not counted as part of the foreign population anymore. In the population of all individuals who have the French nationality, French people who acquired it are distinguished statistically from French people “by birth” who were born with it.

The notion of immigrant is based on declarations about the place of birth and nationality. An immigrant is a person who was born in a foreign country but did not possess French nationality at birth. After his/her arrival in France, s/he can obtain French nationality (French immigrant) or keep his/her own nationality (foreign immigrant). Persons who were born French outside French territory are therefore excluded from this definition. In March 1999, 4 310 000 immigrants were living in France, which amounts to 7.4% of the total population. Between 1990 and 1999, the number of immigrants increased by 145 000 (+ 3.4%), following the same rate as the rest of the French population. This ratio has remained stable since 1975. In 1999, there were 1.56 French immigrants : their number has increased by 250 000 (+19 %)

since 1990. On the contrary, the number of foreign immigrants dropped by 105 000 (- 4 %) to reach a level of 2.75 million. More than one out of three immigrants is of French nationality (36 %).

## **B. Geographic origin**

The geographic origin of immigrants is in general increasingly diverse and geographically distant. The number of European immigrants is decreasing and that from the Maghreb is rising slightly. In 1999, there were 1.6 million immigrants from the 15 countries of the EU, which represents 9.3 % less than in 1990. This decrease reflects the migration trends among ethnic groups who are traditionally the most numerous immigrant groups and issue from an old migration. For instance, the number of people originating from Spain, Italy or Portugal decreased by 210 000 since the last census. On the other hand, the number of people originating from a European country outside of the EU is rising, with 300 000 immigrants being natives of a European country outside of the EU. The share of immigrants coming from the whole of Europe has been constantly decreasing (57 % in 1975, 49 % in 1990, 45 % in 1999). There are 1.3 million immigrants of Magrebian origin, which represents a rise of 6 % compared to 1990. This rise is due for the most part (75 %) to the natives of Morocco.

A rise in number and in the share of people coming from the rest of the world is clearly observable. There were 1.1 million in 1999, compared to 850 000 in 1990. Their share increased from 15 % in 1982 to 20 % in 1990 and to 25 % in 1999. 16 % of them were born in Turkey, 35 % in other Asian countries and 37 % in sub-Saharan Africa. 400 000 immigrants come from a sub-Saharan country, which represents a rise by 43 % compared to 1990. Among all immigrant groups from the rest of the world, Turkish are the only category representing more than 2 % of the immigrant population in France.

## **C. Geographic distribution in France**

Immigrants live for the most part in major cities, specially around Paris where 37 % of the immigrant population was living in 1999 – a slight increase since the last census. The two other administrative regions which receive the most part of immigrants are Rhône-Alpes around Lyon (11 %) and Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur around Marseilles (10 %). The three most densely populated regions account therefore for almost 60 % of the immigrant population in France. Between 1990 and 1999, the share of immigrants in the total population rose in Ile-de-France (i.e. Paris and its suburbs) and in Alsace around Strasbourg up to a level of respectively 14.7 % and 8.6 %. On the contrary, it decreased in four regions, Languedoc-Roussillon, Midi-Pyrénées, Rhône-Alpes and Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur while remaining superior to the national mean ( 8 % up to 10 % compared to 7.4 %). In sixteen French departments, the percentage of immigrants is less than 2.5 which is the third of the national mean : they are situated in Bretagne, Pays de la Loire, Basse-Normandie, Creuse, Cantal, Deux-Sèvres and Charentes Maritimes. The rate of immigrants is superior to 10 % in all Ile-de-France departments, and in the departments of Alpes-Maritimes, Pyrénées Orientales and Corse-du-Sud. In Paris, more than one habitant out of six is an immigrant, one out of five in Seine-Saint-Denis.

The immigrant population is urban and very concentrated to the major cities. Almost two immigrants out of three live in an urban zone populated with more than 200 000 inhabitants, including Paris. There are few of them living in rural areas ( 3%). Besides that, the share of

immigrants rises geometrically in relation to the number of inhabitants of the urban unit. Their share is 8 % in cities of 200 000 or more inhabitants and 16 % in Greater Paris.

#### **D. Gender and age distribution**

The rise in the immigrant population is entirely due to the rise in the number of women (+ 7.2 %). The increased share of women started in the middle of the 1970s with the development of measures facilitating the regrouping of family members. The number of male immigrants is stable. The male/female balance is nowadays increasingly equalized compared to the earlier period when the immigrant population was to be predominantly male.

Compared to 1990, the immigrant population is older, yet it accounts for more young adults than the rest of the population of France. The age structure of the immigrant population is different from that of the French population as a whole. Young people are few since, by definition, immigrants were not born in France. People under 20 represent one fourth of the whole population and only 8 % of the immigrant population. Half of the immigrants are aged 30 to 55 years old compared to one third of the whole resident population. One fourth of the immigrant population is older than 60 years : this proportion is only of one fifth in the whole population. The age group in which men are most numerous is between 47 and 52 years old, and between 40 and 45 years old for women. There are an equal number of women and men below 20 years of age. Women are the majority at young adult ages (between 20 and 45 years old). Then the share of men becomes increasingly preponderant until 75 years old.

Between 1990 and 1999, the immigrant population became visibly older. The number of people under 20 years dropped (- 22 %). The share of people aged 40 years or more is rising more than other categories (+ 15 %). This increase is clearly visible for immigrant men aged 60 years old or more (+ 17 %) who came to work in France in the 1950s and the 1960s. It is even more significant for women aged 40 to 59 years old (+ 32 %) which indicates that the age group of immigrant women who came to France after 1975 to join their spouses is becoming older, as well as an increase in the rate of women entering the French territory.

#### **E. Becoming French**

In 1999, 1.5 million immigrants had French nationality which amounts to 36 % of the whole population. The ratio of immigrants who became French varies according to the native country. Female immigrants tend to become French more often. This imbalance becomes more visible in older groups : while there are an equal number of French immigrant men and women younger than 20 years old, women account for 59 % of the French immigrant population aged 60 years old or more. Since acquiring French nationality requires a stay of at least five years of residence in France, it is logical that the percentage of French immigrants increases according to age. Besides that, foreign immigrants more often tend to leave the metropolitan territory. One fourth of immigrants under 40 are French, one third between 40 and 59 years old, one half over 60. Between 1990 and 1999, the number of French immigrants aged 40 to 55 years old sharply increased (+ 51 %), but decreased for people over 60 (- 2.4 %).

Immigrants who acquired French nationality are mostly women and are older than the ones who remained foreign. The ratio of French immigrants in the whole population increases by age. They account for 2.7 % of the whole population but for 4.2 % of the population over 60. Foreign immigrants tend to be younger ; 4.7 % of the whole population but 6.3 % of the

population aged 20 to 59 years old and 4.1 % of the population over 60. The number of male and female foreign immigrants remains the same whatever their age group until 45 years old. For older populations, the majority of foreign immigrants is male, with a peak for people between 50 and 60 years old (62 % of them being male). 53 % of the whole foreign immigrant population are male. The number of foreign immigrants has decreased by 4 % since 1990, but rose for people over 60 (+29 %), specially for men (35 %). The number of women aged 40 to 55 years old also increased sharply, which illustrates the increasing rate of women in migrant flows as a whole.

## **F. Immigrants and foreigners in census data**

3.2 million foreign people live in France. The immigrant population is not equal to the foreign population. The concept of foreign population is based on the sole legal criterion of nationality : each person residing in France who declared a nationality other than French in the census is considered to be foreign. The composition of this population varies with trends in acquiring French nationality. In 1999, 3 260 000 foreigners were living in France, that is 5.6 % of the whole population ; 85 % of them were born outside France, and were therefore counted as immigrants whose number was 2 750 000. 510 000 foreign people were born in France. Between 1990 and 1999, the foreign population dropped by 9 %. This drop was more visible for men (- 12.6 %) than for women (- 5.6 %). Therefore, the difference in number between men and women is also decreasing. Even if the foreign population still shows a majority of men, the trend towards balance which started after 1975 is still in progress: the share of women in this population is 47 % in 1999 compared to 45 % in 1990 and 40 % in 1975.

Between 1990 and 1999, the number of foreigners living in France but who were born outside of France dropped by 110 000. This reduction in the size of a population of about 740 000 people is due to the number of people obtaining French nationality and to mortality : (550 000 people became French and 190 000 died). It is supposed that about 630 000 people of the total number of foreigners entering France did not leave.

An immigrant is a person who was born in a foreign country with a foreign nationality. After some years of living in France some immigrants can obtain the French nationality while others maintain their foreign nationality. Since the definition of the immigrant population refers to an invariable characteristic, namely place of birth, an individual who was born foreign in a foreign country remains part of the immigrant population even if his/her nationality changes over time. In other words, the immigrant population refers to individuals who were born in a foreign country and declared themselves either French by acquisition or remained foreign, and the number of people acquiring the French nationality does not affect the overall figure.

Therefore the foreign and immigrant populations do not completely overlap since all immigrants are not necessarily foreigners and reciprocally immigrants can become French by acquisition as well as foreign people were born in France. Both groups have some people in common : those who were born outside of France with a foreign nationality.

## **4. ALIENS WITHOUT (VALID) PAPERS (ILLEGALS)**

### **I. Asylum seekers**

#### **A. Who they are**

In France, in 1997, 21 416 people asked for political asylum, and 4 112 actually did acquire refugee status according to the Geneva Convention of 1951. In 1998, an estimated 121 340 statutory refugees were living in France, accounting for 4 % of the overall number of foreign residents in France. They come from various countries, each of which accounting for a small part of the legally documented foreign population : Turkish and Asian refugees are exceptions to this rule : three quarters of the foreigners from Cambodia, Vietnam, Sri-Lanka or Laos are refugees. The numerous East-Asian refugees are the product of the former system of family reunification that dates to the 70's and which has permitted immigration to continue: following "organized procedures" from the 1980s, such as the Global Action Plan in 1989 they were granted legal status almost automatically. Two third of statutory refugees come from the Asian continent : 19% from Cambodia, 15 % from Vietnam, 13% from Sri-Lanka, 12 % from Laos. Among European refugees, more than a half come from Turkey, the rest coming mostly from the former Yougoslavian state. Only 11% of refugees come from an African country, most them from Zaire.

Out of the total number of 121 340 refugees whom France is hosting, three quarters are younger than 40 years old. 41.4% of this population are women and they are mostly young. The number of refugees aged 20 or younger has risen from 4.5% in 1996 to nearly 8% in 1997, this trend being the result of the increase of the number of children of refugees reaching the age of legal majority and being therefore granted the same refugee status.

## **B. Asylum seeking trends in France**

Over the past twenty-five years, asylum seeking increased sharply until 1989 before dropping dramatically. Asylum rights are an ancient tradition in France but the will to curb the number of immigrants has significantly modified the way in which they are enforced. The first rise in asylum seeking between 1974 and 1976 came in a moment when labour immigration had been suspended : it reflected political events such as violent changes in the government of Chile or Vietnam in 1975. In 1979 a policy of quotas was enforced by the French government to organize the arrival of refugees from Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos who were nearly automatically granted a refugee status. Between 1984 and 1989 the number of requests multiplied by three due to numerous sub-national conflicts in Africa (Angola, Zaire, Ghana and Mali), in Sri Lanka or Haiti in which civil populations were threatened. Request forms have become more and more complex and delays in treating have amounted to much more than several years.

In the meantime, the number of status grantings declined after a sharp rise at the beginning of the 1970s: since 1990, about 20 % of requests were answered in the positive. After a rise in 1989, the number of requests sharply declined to 17 405 in 1996, equivalent to the level at the end of the 1970s. 1997 showed a slight increase in requests, with 21 416 people filing a first form.

In an international context in which the total number of refugees is increasing, the drop in requests since 1989 can be explained because of a multi-faceted policy. Between 1988 and 1990, the shortening of the delays aimed at discouraging requests that were not motivated by risks of prosecution. Besides that, since the end of 1991, filing a form does not automatically entail the right to work in France. Last, migrants who request refugee status experience more difficulties reaching French territory because of the criminalization of the transportation of illegal migrants. Asylum seekers may have chosen other European states to file a request.

### **C. Legal constraints in asylum granting**

European policies have had an important influence upon French laws : according to the Schengen convention which was enforced in France in March 1995, *préfectures* can locate the state responsible for the refugee status of a particular individual if it appears that the applicant went *through* another country that is signatory to the convention. Therefore the figures of failures in obtaining the refugee status do not take into account all people who intended to file a request but were not allowed to do so.

The rise in the number of applications and the decrease in grantings resulted in a drop in the percentage of successful asylum seekers: while it used to be almost 90% in the 1970s, it declined to about 20% since 1989. This drop is not only due to the misuse of the asylum procedures by economic migrants : it also reflects a more restrictive interpretation of the Schengen convention criteria. These restrictions affect on the one hand people for whom economic misery and persecution are intertwined, on the other hand for people invoking a threat which does not originate in their native State (particularly for Algerians). From 1991 to 1997 the annual number of grants of refugee status dropped from 15 467 down to 4 112. The annual number of refugees currently amounts to less than 10% of all migrants legally staying more than one year. There is no direct correlation, perhaps, but there is a temporal shift linking political crisis and the evolution of requests. Within current procedures of jurisprudence there is a reluctance to acknowledge acts of persecution coming from perpetrators other than the State, a fact that should be taken into account, for instance, to explain the small number of Algerians that have been granted refugee status.

The evolution of asylum seeking in France and of the refugee population has to be understood within the European context. Due to such evolutions, European states have developed alternative legal statuses besides those defined by the Geneva Convention. The increasing flow of asylum seekers in Europe was met with a diversity of responses from host countries, but seems to be organized around two main goals : limiting the arrival of asylum seekers and substituting temporary protection for that of refugee status. These new formulas may grant permits from 3 months up to ten years a take a variety of legal forms. This new trend is also visible on the international level with only two thirds of people qualified for refugee status being counted as such in 1996. In order to prevent the misuse of asylum seeking, laws in European Union have become more and more restrictive, resulting in the development of informal forms of refugee status which may be granted by states on a purely national level : this “conventional asylum” or “territorial asylum” grants a status which does not abide by the

Geneva Convention but in France via the “Loi Chevènement” such new legal statuses have been created.

## **II. Illegal immigrants : “*Sans Papiers*”**

The complexity and sometimes contradictions that inhere in the different laws on immigration have created inextricable individual situations and multiplied the number of immigrants who have been living illegally in France for a longer period of time, the “sans-papiers” (undocumented aliens). Since 1996, this problem has been exemplary of the difficulties of a restrictive policy aimed at controlling migration flows in a context of continuous migratory pressure and simultaneously of a popularization of the demand for security (linked with the foreign population through representations of criminally active aliens). Different policies for the regularization of this population have led to the encouragement to file a form with the promise that each case will be examined individually - contrary to the demands of militants who asked for collective regularization. Eleven categories of “sans-papiers” were eligible for the re-examining of their cases : primarily those who are family heads, students, and some categories of asylum seekers who did not obtain the refugee status. Bachelors, even though they may be living in France for numerous years, are for most part excluded from this regularization. Among the estimated (by the Home Office) 300 000 people who reside illegally in France, 145 673 filed a form for the regularization of their situation in 1997 : at the end of 1999, 79 700 of them received resident cards. As for the others, the 66 000 who did not obtain their regularization, they will probably stay in France illegally for the most part, since they are not eligible for a resident card and are not likely to be expelled due to their large number. Besides that, some aspects of the Chevènement law, such as the fact that any person who resided in France for ten years even illegally is eligible for a temporary one-year resident card or an increased facility for aliens with family ties in France to get a resident card, has ended up in the regularization of 1500 untried cases.



## **PART II: RESEARCH ON IMMIGRANTS AND MINORITIES IN FRANCE: THE STATE OF THE ART**

### **I. THE PREMISES OF RESEARCH ON IMMIGRANTS AND MINORITIES**

Michel Wieviorka, in *Le Racisme, une introduction* raises the question of the unity of the phenomenon: the expressions of racism have dramatically changed overtime. They abandoned a representation of racism as the result of scientific observations to choose the theme of “difference” and the “incompatibility of cultures” to ground racist behavior. In this case, is it possible to rely on a single approach for its study? He also underlines the fact that quantitative data on discrimination may be dubious: for instance, reports on discriminatory practices at the workplace are much more numerous in Great Britain than in France. This situation does not directly reflect the fact that discrimination may be a bigger issue in the UK than in France, but the existence of public policies against discrimination in the UK which lead to a higher rate of reports concerning this type of crime. It also points to different attitudes toward the judiciary system in both countries. [Wieviorka, 1998]

Racism in the field of the labor market: Philippe Bataille in *Le Racisme au travail*<sup>1</sup> states that the economic crisis and the rise of unemployment in France in the 80s and the 90s cannot account for the success of the racist political agendas. The theme of “national preference”, introduced by the *Front National*, has evidently met with increasing support in the field of labor relations, specially among trade unionists. It can be explained by the evolution of the ideological content of labor relations, its influence upon work organization. Discourses on immigration interfere constantly with how immigrant workers – or people perceived as such – are treated at the workplace. What is defined and described in the political field therefore grounds how co-workers may be treated: what seemed to be two very different places – the work experience itself and the political debate – starts to become unified under a single ideological and practical banner which the *Front National* clearly tries to shape by besieging the trade union field.

### **II. THE FIELDS OF INTEREST**

#### **1. The labour market**

##### **A. General figures of labour market in France**

At the end of 2002, there were 2 306 800 job seekers in France. The number of job seekers has increased by 0.8% in December 2002 (+ 17 700). The situation in the job market in France is particularly unfavourable to young people (+ 1.9 %) when the number of job seekers over 50 decreases (- 0.4 %). Men are more subject to unemployment than women. The year-end statistics of 2002 indicates an increase of job seekers by 100 000 compared to the end of 2001, which amounts to a rise by 4.8 % : + 8.2 % for men and + 1.3 % for women. Long-term unemployment has decreased in December 2002 (- 0.8 %) after a two-month rise. Particularly the number of job seekers registered at the ANPE (National Employment Agency) for more than 3 years continues to decrease (- 1.8 %). The unemployment rate is 9.1 % at the end of 2002.

---

<sup>1</sup> Philippe Bataille, *Le Racisme au travail*, Paris, La Découverte 1997.

## **B. Immigrants and the labour market in 2000**

In January 1999 there was an immigrant working population of 2.1 million people, namely 8.1 % of the total working population in France. First of all, in order to understand the situation of immigrants in the labour market in France, one should remember that 3.8 million people are considered to be immigrants aged 15 years or more according to the official status definition (an immigrant is a person who is living in France, was born in a foreign country and declares either a foreign nationality or having obtained the French nationality), and that 30 % of them took French nationality.

Policies aimed at reducing migration flows resulted in an older immigrant population in France. Since 1995, the share of people under 30 has decreased slightly while the proportion over 45 has increased, particularly among males : the ratio of women aged 25 to 50 years old is far superior to the national average.

Differences in behavior towards the labour market among men and women have been steadily attenuated for years but remain pronounced among immigrants. If the activity rate among immigrants – 54.7 % - equals that of the rest of the population, the activity rate of male immigrants supersedes the national rate by 3.7 points while that of female immigrants is 4.5 points less than the national rate of female active population. Between 25 and 29 years old, the activity rate of male immigrants is comparatively low due to the number of them who came to France to study. The activity rate of female immigrants remains very much below that of women whatever the age group. At the age when the rate of working women is at its peak about 60 % of female immigrants are part of the labour market when the national average is close to 80 %. In 1999 there are 2.1 million active immigrants, slightly less than 40 % of them being women. This population represents 8.1 % of the total number of working population, namely 9 % of working men and 7 % of working women.

## **C. Distribution by economic field: unqualified jobs**

Immigrants tend more often to belong to unqualified socioprofessional categories than other working people. Immigrant men are a numerous group in the building and automobile industries, when women tend to be found in services aimed at private persons. Most of the working immigrants came to France to work or to join their families. They are more prone to work in blue-collar positions than the overall working population: 44 % of immigrants are industrial workers when this group represents only 26 % of the total working population. Factory work has decreased since 1995 among qualified male workers but it has risen significantly for women, especially qualified women: immigrants represent 15.1 % of all female unqualified industrial workers and 11.2 % of qualified industrial workers. The share of immigrants among employees is coming closer to the average share of immigrants in the overall working population, specially for women: 7.1 % of female employees are immigrants. In this category, employees in private person services count large numbers of immigrants who account for 16.6 % of male and 14.4 % of female employees. When adding unqualified socioprofessional categories of factory workers and employees, we find that 40 % of all working immigrants are part of this category compared to 26 % of the total working population. More than half of the female immigrants belong to this category compared to one third of the total female working population.

Most of the immigrants originating from Turkey are factory workers, along with more than one half of immigrants from Portugal and Morocco, almost half of Algerians and Tunisians. A significant share of immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa, Portugal, Spain and South-East Asia are employees. The freedom of circulating inside the EU makes it easier for intermediate

professions and executives to move to another member country. 14.2 % of immigrants originating from Italy belong to the category of craftspeople, shopkeepers or business owners compared to 6.9 % of the total working population.

Since 71 % of immigrants keep their nationality of origin, when it is outside the EU, public service positions are closed to them for the most part except teaching in universities or research positions. Therefore in 1999 78 % of immigrants working in permanent positions were employed in the private sector compared to only 63 % of the total working population. 18 % of immigrants who obtained the French nationality are employed by the French State or by local collectivities: a total number of 9 % of immigrants work in the public field in long-term or short-term contracts. Immigrants tend to be more often employed with an independent status different from wage-earning, specially among women.

Some fields count a high proportion of immigrant employees: for instance, the construction industry employs 17.4 % of male immigrants and the automobile industry 12.8 % compared to the 8 % of male immigrants in the working population of France. These two fields account for 45 % of all working male immigrants. 19.2 % of the female immigrants – which represents 13 points more than the average - work in the sector of the real estate industry, mostly in cleaning services. 13.7 % of all employees in the services related to private persons and households are immigrants. On the contrary, only 3 % of immigrants can be found in sectors such as energy, finance and administration. Two out of three immigrants work in the tertiary industries compared to three out of four of the total working population. 84 % of women are employed in these industries. When most women tend to work in the fields of education, health care or social welfare, more than one female immigrant out of four works in the services aimed at private persons which group in particular personal services and domestic services, hotels and restaurants.

#### **D. Temporary or part-time job status**

Immigrants are more frequently employed temporarily or part-time. They tend to work more on a temporary basis, especially in interim jobs or with work contracts of limited length: 13 % of all male immigrants work in one of these categories, and 11 % of them are employed through the medium of temporary employment agencies, a situation that is shared by only 8 % of the total male working population. They therefore appear to be more vulnerable in the labour market. Female immigrants are slightly less concerned than their male counterparts by temporary work.

Immigrants are also more frequently employed part-time, especially women: 31.7 % of all working women are employed part-time, compared to 42.3 % of female immigrants. Among those who have a foreign nationality, 46.1 % work part-time. They also tend to work fewer hours than the total part-time working population: female immigrants work an average of 3.4 hours less than others per week, when this figures is of 4.1 hours for foreign immigrants.

## **E. Salary distribution: lower incomes**

The level of salaries is therefore low, but the fact that they are immigrants does not have a negative impact upon the monthly salary for similar jobs. The concentration of immigrants in the categories of factory workers and employees reflects back on their salary level. When they work full-time, immigrants usually hold low-paid positions : 10 % of the immigrants belong to the category of the 20 % of people receiving the lowest salaries, when only 4.7 % of immigrants belong to the 20 % with the largest salaries. The mean salary of full-time working immigrant men is about 89.9 % of the national average for men ; for women, this proportion is of 87.3 %. The mean salary of part-time working female immigrants is only 76 % of the average of part-time working women since they tend to work fewer hours.

*However, these differences in salary reflect the fact than more immigrants are employed in low-paying positions than illustrating the suggestion that immigrants might receive a lower salary for the same job as people who were born French.*

Among the largest ethnic groups, full-time working immigrants from Algeria, Morocco and Portugal receive the lowest salaries. Better salaries are earned by immigrants originating from Spain, Italy and other EU countries.

## **F. Unemployment**

All characteristics of age, gender and diploma-level being equal, the risk of being unemployed is higher for immigrants. The concentration of immigrants at the bottom of the social ladder induces a higher job insecurity. Employees and factory workers are socio-professional categories which are most subject to unemployment. In 1999, unemployment rates for these categories were superior to 14 % and 21 % for immigrants. For instance, male immigrants represent 13 % of factory workers but 20 % of those seeking jobs. Whatever the socio-professional category or the gender, immigrants tend to be more exposed to unemployment. In 1999, rough data showed that 441 000 immigrants were on the dole. Immigrants represent 8.1 % of the total working population but 14.4 % of unemployed people. Whatever the age category, the unemployment rate of immigrant men - 19.7 % - is superior by 9.5 points to the overall male unemployment level. The same discrepancy can be observed for women, where we find an unemployment rate of 23.1 % for immigrants.

Unemployed immigrants, specially women, tend to remain jobless for a longer period of time. The average duration of unemployment for female immigrants is close to 18 months which represents 3.5 months more than for the total female working population. The average unemployment period for immigrant men – 17.3 months - is slightly shorter than that for women. A high proportion of immigrants stay unemployed for longer periods of time: 47.1 % of female immigrants and 45.1 % of male immigrants have been unemployed for more than one year.

As the labour market has improved in France, immigrants have also benefited from: their unemployment rates were lower in 1999 than in 1998 and were the lowest since 1996. The average unemployment duration was shortened by 1.5 months between March 1998 and January 1999.

For the entire labour market, the main reason for job-seeking remains the end of a short-term contract and its share in the total number of job-seeking motives has increased since March

1998 from 34.4 % up to 40.5 % for male immigrants in January 1999. Among men who suffered from a collective lay-off, 23 % of them are immigrants.

If diplomas remain the best protection against unemployment, they tend to protect immigrants less for they have difficulties in getting their foreign diplomas recognized: 6.3 % of people who graduated from a university are unemployed, but this rate is 13.5 % for immigrants. For holders of a bachelors degree, the equivalent rates are 7.1 % for the general population and 21.4 % for immigrants.

The lowest unemployment rates can be observed among people originating from EU countries; they are below the national average for Italians. On the other hand unemployment rates are high for immigrants originating from Morocco, Algeria, sub-Saharan Africa and Turkey. More than one out of three working women originating from these countries are unemployed.

Within the immigrant population, unemployment affects those who kept their nationality of origin a great deal more than those who became French : 21.3 % of male foreign immigrants and 25.4 % of females were unemployed in 1999 compared to 14.7 % of French male immigrants and 18 % of females. Obtaining French nationality requires a certain duration of stay in French territory as well as demonstrating an certain integration into French society. Moreover, a certain number of jobs forbidden to foreigners become accessible to newly French people. All variables of age, gender and diploma being equal, immigrants are at significantly higher risk of being unemployed than the rest of the population, and this risk is still higher for those who remained foreigners.

Longer term unemployment is also a more difficult situation for immigrants. In 1999, for men who had been unemployed for 10 months or more, one out of three had found a job, but only one out of four immigrant men.

### **G. Specific issues related to women**

The insertion of women in the workforce remains a difficult issue. Female immigrants lag seriously behind the French model for the female working population. Since they tend to have more children, their employment rate remains very low : it is less than 20 % for women originating from Morocco, Italy and Turkey. Among unemployed women, 25 % of immigrants compared to only 12 % of the total number of women have never worked or have terminated their employment at least three years ago. More precisely, 17 % of immigrant women who are in search of a job have never worked in France before. When they are unemployed, finding a job is even more difficult for them than for men : almost half (47.1 %) of unemployed women are in search of job for at least one year, and some of them abandon their search ; 7 % of the total number of unemployed women in 1998 declared themselves to be housewives in 1999, but 12 % of immigrant women did the same. This relative distance to the labour market explains the fact that among unqualified categories of employees or factory workers women tend to have lower unemployment rates than men.

## **2. The educational system**

Until now, it has not been possible to locate a quantitative study which deals with the issue of immigrant experiences in the educational system. Official institutes and public administrations seem to be less prone to study this question than topics such as the labour market or housing for immigrants (see below). This lack of large-scale quantitative data does not mean that there is no interest in France for research on how immigrants (or people perceived as such ) deal with the educational system : The evidence for this is to be found in numerous specific studies that have appeared, not least, in a specific scientific review, *Migrants-Formation*, but also in other reviews dealing with issues linked with immigration and ethnic relations in France, such as *Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales*, *Migrations-Etudes* or *Hommes et Migrations*. However, as in other topics, some data are available concerning aliens residing in France

### **A. Foreign children in elementary schools**

At the beginning of the 90s, foreign children accounted for 9.4 % of all children in elementary school in France, compared to 7.7 % in the mid-70s. The rise in the rate of foreign children at school until the mid-80s resulted from the policy of “family reunification”. The stagnation and slight decrease which followed mirrors the stabilization of the number of foreigners residing in France and of the births of children from foreign parents. The nationalities which are most represented are Moroccan (one fourth of all foreign children in elementary schools), Algerians and Portuguese. 97 % of all foreign children study in ordinary classes which is not surprising since according to the 1990 census, 80 % of foreign children under 10 years old were born in France. 1 % attend specific classes aimed at initiation or adaptation, 2 % are in “special” classes a significant category which represents 20 % of all students. An increasing number of Moroccan, Tunisian, Turkish or African children are to found in these classes, namely children of recent immigrant origin. The same can be noticed in adaptation classes where Tunisians are however represented to a lesser degree.

Almost the totality of foreign children attend public schools : they tend to be a lot less students in private schools than French children : not quite 3 % of foreigners compared to 15 % of French children. This can be explained by the fact that immigrant families tend to have a smaller income ; besides that, adaptation classes for children who do not speak French well are for most part opened in public schools.

### **B. High school foreign students**

The number of foreign students in high schools has been steadily rising since 1975. The proportion of foreign students in the whole high school population has therefore risen from 5.1 % in the mid-70s up to 7.5 % at the beginning of the 90s. This increase results from the lengthening of studies, apart from the consequences of family reunion, but it is now almost stabilized. Again, the most represented nationalities are Moroccan, Algerian and Portuguese.

Foreign students are clearly overrepresented in adaptation classes for people who do not finish the first cycle of high school and are oriented in professional classes. In the second cycle of high school, they are also more likely to attend professional classes than general or technical classes where they account for respectively 8.8 % and 4.7 % of the children. Finally, 18.3 % of children in classes of special education aimed at children with learning difficulties are foreign.

### **C. University students**

There were 137 000 foreign students registered in French universities at the beginning of the 90s, which amounts to 11.2 % of the total student population. This share has decreased slightly since 1985, when the number of African students dropped. They still remain, however, the most numerous among foreign students of which they represent 55 %, two thirds of them coming from the Maghreb. Slightly less than one out of five foreign students originated from the European Union.

The distribution of foreigners among the various disciplines differs according to levels of education: during the first four years of university, foreign students tend to study more sciences and literature. Graduate foreign students also attend medical school, for which it is easier to gain entry than for nationals, i.e. at the level of specialization, than during the first cycle of general medical education. The choice of topics that are studied also varies according to the geographic origin of the student. If Africans are clearly the majority of foreign students in French universities and are dispersed in various disciplines, certain topics are preferred by some student originating from other continents. Europeans tend to choose literature more often, along with Asians who also show a preference for medical school.

The proportion of different geographic origins also varies according to the cycle of university studies considered: Asian and African students are the most numerous in graduate studies (third cycle). Americans are for the most part present in the first and third cycle. Europeans tend to have the same behavior as French students: they are most numerous in the first cycle and their number decreases in the second and third cycles.

#### **D. Diplomas**

Foreigners living in France tend to have far fewer diplomas than French people: in 1990, 60 % of all foreigners declared that they did not have any diploma, compared to only 27 % of French citizens by birth. French citizens by naturalization are in an intermediate situation: 40 % of them do not have any diploma. The proportion of males having at most a first-degree professional certificate (CAP) is less than 9 % for foreigners, compared to almost 16 % for French by acquisition and 19 % for French by birth.

Among foreigners, Turkish and Maghrebians are less likely to have diplomas; on the other hand, the category of foreigners which accounts for the most diplomas is "Other nationalities" which groups foreigners installed in France for scientific purposes, including Americans or Japanese, and foreigners who came to France to study. Foreigners originating from sub-Saharan Africa also account for a significant proportion of students with diplomas. 29 % among them have a high school diploma or an equivalent professional certificate, compared to only 23 % of French citizens by birth. Foreigners originating from the European Union appear to have fewer diplomas: 12 % of them declare having a high school diploma or a professional certificate when three out of four of them finished elementary schooled at most.

Women, be they French or foreign, tend to have fewer diplomas than men (a tendency that has been reversed for the past few years among students). They tend more often than men to declare not having any diploma, or when they have one, it is more likely to be of a lower rank than their male counterparts. However, differences between French and foreigners are more visible than between men and women of the same nationality.

### **3. Housing**

Foreign households in France tend to live in smaller apartments than the French. Since they use less room for more people they experience relative overcrowding. Acquiring larger accommodations is, therefore, the primary reason why foreigners move. Becoming owners comes only second: less than one third of foreigners own their house compared to more than half of French households. Since they tend to concentrate in larger cities and receive lower salaries, they live twice as often in state housing units (HLM). Even if health and other conveniences have improved over the past fifteen years, only half of the foreign households declare that they are satisfied with their housing conditions compared to three quarters of French households.

### **A. Housing for foreign households**

According to the Housing census of 1996, there were 1.3 million foreign households at this date, which represents 5.7 % of all households in France. This ratio has decreased slightly since the last census. Among foreign households, 44 % come from EU countries and 35 % from the Maghreb (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia).

Between 1992 and 1996, foreign households moved more often than French ones. First of all, they want to improve the convenience or size of their housing. Secondly they want to own their dwellings ; the same reasons for moving are shared by French households who also move more often than foreign ones for professional reasons or to improve their living environment.

Among the 400 000 foreign households who moved between 1992 and 1996, two out of five explained that they wanted a bigger house. However, this motive was less dominant in 1996 than in 1992, while it simultaneously grew among French households, who also move primarily to get more space.

The average living space of foreign households rose by one square meter per year from 1984 but, in 1996 it was still inferior to the that of French households by 13 m<sup>2</sup>. On the one hand, foreign households tend to live in houses whose surface is an average of 3 m<sup>2</sup> smaller than French households. On the other hand, where there is no inequality in size between the two types of household for individual houses, only 31 % of foreign households live in such houses compared to 58 % of French households. In urban areas where they generally tend to live, foreigners are more numerous than French among people living in less than 40 m<sup>2</sup>. But it is in terms of populating that foreigners are most underprivileged. They occupy an average of 3.6 rooms for 3.3 inhabitants compared to 4.0 rooms for French households of 2.4 inhabitants. In 1996, 30 % of foreign households lived were overpopulated, in which the number of rooms is too small considering the size and shape of the household. 23 % of foreign households live in a condition of moderate overpopulation – one room is lacking – and 7 % live in a condition of severe overpopulation – at least two rooms are lacking. 29% of East-Asian foreign households experience this situation of severe overpopulation. Overpopulation is comparatively rare for individual houses where only one house out of ten has less rooms than the norm. In apartment buildings, however, four foreign households out of ten live in an overcrowded apartment, which is two times more than French households.

### **B. Poorer living conditions for aliens in France**

In 1996, among the reasons which led foreign households to move during the four previous years, owning their own house was the wish expressed by 11 % of all foreigners who recently moved in, representing the second most common reason given for moving. In 1992, only 4 %



gave the same reason. Nearly one half of foreigners from the EU own the dwelling in which they live, compared to only one out of five Maghrebans. This rise can be linked with the fact that the foreign population in France is becoming older. In 1984, among all foreigners living in ordinary houses, 33 % were older than 49 ; they are 44 % in 1996. Suspending the policy of immigration for working purposes in 1974 not only decreased the number of young foreigners entering the French territory to work there, it also encouraged older immigrants to stay in France to install, even though they may not have had such project originally.

However, foreigners suffer more from the crisis of industrial growth and the rise of unemployment. They tend to have lower incomes: as a whole, half of the foreign households has an annual income per consumption unit smaller than 7280 euros, compared to one French household out of four. Besides that, foreign households tend to concentrate in bigger cities and may consider their staying in France as a temporary situation. All these factors influence upon their housing choices. In 1996, 53 % of foreign households rent an apartment, compared to only 28 % of French households. The collective system seems better suited to their income: if 13 % of French households who moved did so to move in a house, only 8 % of foreigners did the same, which is slightly less than in 1992. The increase of rents between 1988 and 1996 has had effects upon all households, particularly upon foreign ones who live in privately owned apartments : without the housing benefit they receive, the share of their total income dedicated to paying the rent would have almost doubled in this period, growing from 17 % up to 33 %. Even when one includes public benefits in their income, they still have to dedicate 20 % of their income to paying for housing expenses.

- **Overrepresentation in public housing**

Therefore they often choose to live in apartments belonging to the public sector which receive higher housing benefits, therefore costing a lot less. In 1996, in this sector, the share of income dedicated to housing expenses drops from 21 % down to 6% thanks to these public benefits: this rate of 6 % is slightly beyond the one of French households.

Therefore, foreign households tend more often to live in state-owned, state housing (HLM, low-rent housing). In 1996, twice as many households among all foreign ones live in an HLM than French households. Among those who move to rent an apartment, 41 % asked for an HLM apartment to live. The access to this social housing is however more difficult for foreigners than it is for French people : 27 % of foreign requests are older than 3 years compared to 11 % of French requests. 31 % of foreign households were discouraged to file such a request either because the answer was negative or because they think they have little chances to obtain an apartment or were told so when they tried to file a request. French households are twice as less in this situation.

Among all foreign households living in an HLM apartment, 56 % come from a Maghrebian origin. They tend to live more frequently in HLM than other foreign households in similar situations as far as income, housing and family types are concerned. They generally do not wish to leave the social sector.

- **Sanitary installations still an issue**

The degree of comfort in housing has increased. In 1984, one out of four foreign households did not have access to basic sanitary installations inside the accommodation. In 1996, 7 % of accommodations of foreign households remained without sanitary installations, compared to 4 % of French households. 86 % of apartments in collective buildings occupied by French households have both sanitary installations and heating. Only 78 % of foreign households have access to the same comfort. Since 1984, households tend more often to declare that they are satisfied with the place where they live, but there is an important gap between French and foreign households : in 1996, only 51 % of foreign household are satisfied, compared to 74 % of French households. 73 % of real estate owners are satisfied and only 40 % of those who rent their apartment. Foreign households are much more numerous in finding their housing conditions only “acceptable” : among all households who rent an apartment in the social sector, where one out of three foreign households live, more than 40 % classify their apartment as such. The satisfaction rate is decreasing compared to 1992, especially for households who own their residence or rent from the private sector where the level of rent is not regulated by the state. Dissatisfaction is higher for older accommbuildingolder than 1949 where the rent level is deregulated.

The level of satisfaction, for French households, is clearly linked with the income and the size of the accommodation. This correlation is not so obvious for foreign households : in similar conditions of income and accommodation, foreign households, including those originating from EU countries, tend to be less satisfied than their French counterparts. If one classifies households only according to their income per consumption unit, the share of satisfied households seems to be smaller among foreigners in all income categories, specially for lower incomes.

## **4. Health care**

### **A. Health care and access to medical facilities**

Foreigners tend to have poorer health care than French. People who only benefit from free medical aid or who do not have any health care are few in France. Among other people, who therefore at least benefit from the Social Security system, the proportion of people benefitting for the double coverage of both the Social Security and a private health insurance was of 78 % for French people compared to 56 % for foreigners at the beginning of the 90s. However, foreigners originating from Southern Europe – namely Italians, Greeks, Spanish, Portuguese and Yugoslavian – have a better health care than Maghrebans and foreigners originating from other countries of Africa and Asia.

Foreigners go less often to see a doctor : among men, French people consult an average of four times a year compared to three times a year for foreigners. Maghrebans are the ones who consult the least.

Women, who tend to visit doctors more often than men, do so a lot more when they are French despite the fact that their relatively low fecundity renders mandatory maternity visits

less numerous. Among children, the number of consultations is also higher among French by birth. Among elderly people, only people originating from the South of Europe go see a doctor almost as often as French people.

Foreigners go to physicians less than French people, but when they do so, the doctor is more likely to be a specialist, however, the total number of specialist consultations is inferior to the that of the French; they also tend to see dentists less often than the French.

### **B. Foreigners in hospitals**

In the mid-80s, foreigners accounted for 6.5 % of patients hospitalized for a short period of time, apart from normal childbirths (general medicine, specialties, general and specialized surgery, gynecology and obstetrics). This proportion is roughly similar to their proportion in the overall population and their general rate of hospitalization is equivalent to the metropolitan French (respectively 16.6 % and 16.7 % ). But the foreign population in hospitals tends to be younger and the proportion less female than among the French, and if all gender and age variables held constant, the rate of hospitalization of foreigners is 18 %.

Foreigners in hospitals are younger than the French with an average age respectively of 39 years and 46 years, and the proportion of active men working in factories is considerably higher (34 % compared to 16 % for French people). The proportion of women outside the working population other than retired is 62 % compared to 43 % for French women.

Foreign patients tend to attend public medical facilities more often than the French: about three quarters of them do so, compared to two thirds of the French. For foreign women, normal childbirth is by far the first cause to stay in a hospital, followed by pregnancy complications, diseases of the digestive system, traumas and gynecological diseases. Among foreign men, traumas are the most frequent cause of hospitalization, followed by diseases of the digestive system, of the respiratory apparatus, of the circulatory apparatus and cancer.

Several factors explain the differences in pathologies treated in the two “groups”. First of all, the younger foreign population is less concerned by tumors and diseases of the respiratory system. Besides that, since non-European foreigners tend to consume less alcohol than natives, pathologies linked with alcohol are less frequent. On the other hand, a higher number of foreigners are hospitalized due to vertebral problems or cranial traumas which can be partially explained by accidents at the workplace, especially in high risk professions. Besides that, pathologies affecting children younger than one year tend to be treated more often in hospitals. Last, foreigners seem to be more susceptible to certain diseases such as tuberculosis or certain chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases.

### **C. Accidents at the workplace**

The share of foreigners in the total working population was 6.8 % at the beginning of the 90s but of 13.1 % among victims of accidents at the workplace. Among victims of accidents who suffer from a permanent disability, 17.6 % are foreigners.

An important share of foreign labourers work in metallurgy and the construction industry, where a lot of positions are associated with serious risks, especially those occupied by unqualified workers. The working foreign population is therefore particularly exposed to the risks of accidents at the workplace. In the metallurgy industry where foreigners account for 6.1 % of the total number of all employees, 11.4 % of people suffering from an accident

related to work are foreigners. They also tend to be exposed to more severe accidents: 14.8 % of accidents leading to a permanent disability involve foreigners.

Similarly, in the construction industry where nearly one employee out of five is foreign, the frequency of accidents at the workplace is higher for the latter than for the French: the proportion of foreigners who are victims of accidents leading to a permanent disability is 30.2 %.

## **I. SOME “BLIND SPOTS”**

The use of statistics and quantitative data leads to numerous problems in France, because they are only partially available as far as immigration and ethnic relations are concerned. It should be noted that official statistics do not use the category immigrant for the second generation as in some other countries.

## **BIBLIOGRAPHY**

### **Quantitative data and reports on racism**

WITHOL de WENDEN C., *L'Immigration en Europe*, Paris, La Documentation Française

INSEE, *Les étrangers en France*, 1994

Commission nationale consultative des droits de l'homme, 1998. *La lutte contre le racisme et la xénophobie : exclusion et droits de l'homme, 7<sup>ème</sup> rapport présenté à monsieur le Premier Ministre*, Paris, Documentation Française 1999. (this is the 7<sup>th</sup> version of an annual report, the first one published in 1992)

Colloque sur la lutte contre le racisme et la xénophobie en Europe, *Ce racisme qui menace l'Europe : la lutte contre le racisme et la xénophobie , priorités et moyens d'une harmonisation européenne*, Paris, La Documentation française, 1996

### **Migrations and ethnicity**

LAULAN Yves-Marie, MASSENET Michel, *Les nations suicidaires*, Paris, F.-X. de Guibert, 1998

TARRIUS Alain, *Les nouveaux cosmopolitismes*, La Tour d'Aigues (Vaucluse), Ed. de l'Aube, 2000

RUPNIK J., *Le déchirement des nations*, Paris, Seuil 1995.

FOURIER Martine, VERMES Geneviève (dir.), *Ethnicisation des rapports sociaux*, Paris L'Harmattan 1994.

### **General studies on racism and xenophobia**

TAGUIEFF Pierre-André, *La force du préjugé, essai sur le racisme et ses doubles*, Paris, La Découverte 1988

TAGUIEFF Pierre-André, *Face au racisme*, Paris, La Découverte, 1991 (2 vol)

TAGUIEFF Pierre-André, *Le Racisme*, Paris, Flammarion 1997

TAGUIEFF Pierre-André, *Les fins de l'antiracisme*, Paris, Michalon 1995

TAGUIEFF Pierre-André, *La couleur et le sang : doctrines racistes à la française*, Paris, Mille et une nuits, 2002

WIEVIORKA Michel, *L'Espace du racisme*, Paris, Seuil 1991.

WIEVIORKA Michel, *La France raciste*, Paris, Seuil 1992.

WIEVIORKA Michel (dir.), *Racisme et modernité*, Paris, La Découverte 1994

MASCHINO Maurice Tarik ,*Etes-vous un vrai français ?*, Paris, Grasset 1988

- LE COUR GRANDMAISON Olivier, *Faut-il avoir la haine ?*, Paris, L'Harmattan 2001.
- BULIN-XAVIER Gérard, *L'Humanité reconquise : essai sur la transculturalité et la transethnicité*, Petit-Bourg (Guadeloupe), Ed. Ibis Rouge, 2000.
- KRISTEVA Julia, *Lettre ouverte à Harlem Désir*, Paris, Rivages 1990 ( 2<sup>ème</sup> éd.)
- FOUGEYROLLAS Pierre, *Toutes les cultures se valent-elles ?*, Saint-Sébastien-sur-Loire, Plein Feux, 1997.
- TODOROV Tzvetan, *Nous et les autres : la réflexion française sur la diversité humaine*, Paris, Seuil 1989.
- SCHNAPPER Dominique, *La relation à l'autre*, Paris, Gallimard 1998.
- SCHNAPPER Dominique, *Questionner le racisme : essai et anthologie*, Paris, Gallimard 2000.
- MEMMI Albert : *Le racisme : description, définition, traitement*, Paris Gallimard 1994.
- BONNAFOUS Simone, HERZBERG Bernard, ISRAEL Jean-Jacques, *Sans distinction de..race*, Paris, Presses de la Fondation Nationale de Sciences Politiques, 1992.
- DAVID Alain, *Racisme et anti-sémitisme, essai de philosophie sur l'envers des concepts*, Paris, Ellipses 2001.
- MAYER, *Ces Français qui votent Le Pen*, Paris Flammarion 1999.
- BALIBAR Etienne, *Les frontières de la démocratie*, Paris, La Découverte 1992.
- COSTA-LASCOUX Jacqueline et WEIL Patrick (dir.), *Logiques d'Etat et immigration*, Paris, Kimé 1992.
- LAPEYRONNIE Didier, *L'Individu et les minorités. La France et la Grande-Bretagne face à leurs immigrés*, Paris PUF 1993.
- LE COUR GRANDMAISON Olivier, WITHOL de WENDEN Catherine (dir.), *Les Etrangers dans la cité. Expériences européennes*, Paris, La Découverte, 1993.
- NOIRIEL Gérard, *Le Creuset français. Histoire de l'immigration*, Paris, Seuil, 1988.
- NOIRIEL Gérard, *La Tyrannie du national. Le droit d'asile en Europe*, Paris Calmann-Lévy 1991.
- NOIRIEL Gérard, *Population, immigration et identité nationale*, Paris, Hachette 1992.
- AMSELLE Jean-Loup, *Vers un multiculturalisme français*, Paris, Aubier 1996.
- HAEGEL Florence, REY Henri et SINTOMER Yves, *La Xénophobie en banlieue, effets et expressions*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 2000.

## **Specific studies on various aspects of racism and discrimination**

### **Legal aspects of migration policies:**

JULIEN-LAFERRIERE F., “La loi Debré sur l’immigration”, in Regards sur l’actualité, Paris, La Documentation Française, 1997, n°232

JULIEN-LAFERRIERE F., “La loi Chevènement sur l’entrée et le séjour des étrangers et sur le droit d’asile”, in Regards sur l’actualité, Paris, La Documentation Française, 1998, n°242

WEIL Patrick, *Mission d’étude des législations de la nationalité et de l’immigration*, Paris, La Documentation Française, 1997

MINISTERE DE LA JUSTICE, *La Nationalité française*, Paris, Textes et Documents 1996

COSTA-LASCOUX Jacqueline, “Le racisme et le droit”, dossier *Racisme et xénophobie*, in Migrations et Sociétés, vol.IX n°49, jan.-feb. 1997. (legal aspects of anti-discrimination policies)

### **Racism at the workplace and in the educational system:**

BATAILLE Philippe, *Le Racisme au travail*, Paris

TRIBALAT Michèle, *Dreux, voyage au cœur du malaise français*, Paris, Syros 1999.

### **Immigration and integration:**

TRIBALAT Michèle, *De l’immigration à l’assimilation*, Paris, La Découverte/INED, 1996

TRIBALAT Michèle, *Faire France*, Paris, La Découverte, 1995

### **Second-generation immigration and youth in suburban areas:**

LACOSTE-DUJARDIN C., *Yasmina et les autres de Nanterre et d’ailleurs : filles de parents maghrébins en France*, Paris La Découverte 1992.

Didier Lapeyronnie et François Dubet, *Les quartiers d’exil*, Paris Seuil 1992.

## **Militant theories on racism**

### **Anti-racist movements:**

Mouvement contre le racisme et pour l’amitié entre les peuples Paris, *Chronique du flagrant racisme*, Paris La Découverte 1984

Mouvement contre le racisme et pour l’amitié entre les peuples Paris, *Victime ou témoin du racisme : comment agir*, Rodez, Editions du Rouergue, 2001.

LEVY Albert, *Chroniques d’un combat inachevé*, Paris, Le Temps des Cerises, 1999.

MUZARD Paul et GAILLOT Jacques, *En finir avec la guerre contre les pauvres*, Pantin, Le temps des Cerises, 2001.

**On the construction of ethnic categories in institutional statistics:**

SIMON Patrick, “La preuve par les statistiques” in Hommes et Libertés, Revue de la Ligue des Droits de l’Homme, n°103, feb-march 1999.

BERTAUX Sandrine, “Une pratique dangereuse” in Hommes et Libertés, Revue de la Ligue des Droits de l’Homme, n°103, feb-march 1999.

**Extreme-right:**

De LESQUEN Henry, Club de l’Horloge, *Penser l’antiracisme*, Paris, Godefroy de Bouillon 1999.