

**'Muslim Voices' in the European Union:  
The Stranger Within**

**Community, Identity & Employment**

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**FINAL REPORT**

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## **THIS REPORT**

This is an administrative and executive summary of an extensive research Project that was simply compiled by the Project Coordinator. Thus I want to note and acknowledge that this is an abbreviated summary of extensive research conducted by several researchers in eight European countries, and several research and analytical reports\* written by several colleagues over the period of three years. I am indebted to their research and their reports, which have been used extensively throughout this report.

In particular, however, this summary has made extensive use of the work of **Emma Hughes, Laura Turney and Bobby Sayyid**. Emma and Laura produced extensive summaries of the research carried out in the two phases of this Project and Bobby contributed significantly in the formulation of the analytical framework for the research and the suggested alternative paradigm (see executive summary). Their work is used extensively throughout this report and I am particularly indebted to their contributions.

\* The very extensive collection of documents that were produced during this Project are located at the following web site and can be accessed for academic purposes, as long as full credit is given to the authors and the Project. **WEB SITE: <http://les.man.ac.uk/cgem>.**

At the Home Page select **“Projects”** and at the **“Muslim Voices”** page select **“Research Papers”**. This is password protected and you will need the following:

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## ABSTRACT

There is a paucity of academic and especially research-based academic accounts of Islam and Muslims in Europe. This is particularly so with respect to the dramatic changes, within the European Muslim communities, that have become increasingly visible during the last decade; “Muslim Voices”. Furthermore at a time when Europeans are increasingly concerned in extending and developing the European Union, the issue of the role and status of ethnic (religious) minorities achieves central significance. It is hoped that this project has made a contribution by reference to a detailed study of one European ethnic (religious) community, namely European Muslims in eight European countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Switzerland and UK.

The project has noted that greater diversified forms of social exclusion and the marginalisation of this significant European minority have accompanied the increased socio-political and economic visibility of the European Muslims. This in turn has raised serious concerns at the political and policy level with regard to its implications for the project of an extended and more unified Europe. This poses some complex policy questions especially as the forms of social exclusion and marginalisation both differ significantly from one country to another and simultaneously exemplify cross-European trends. The same applies to the manifestations of Muslim identity which both exemplify particularities and specificities, derived from the particular experiences in respective European states, as well as pan-European and even global trends.

The project also noted that *Islamophobia*, *hijabophobia* and the fear of Islamic Fundamentalism among Europeans have accentuated the deterioration of socio-political relations between the settler Muslim communities and their fellow citizens. This in turn has generated political manifestations, which are detrimental to any inter-faith or inter-community relations and in some cases threaten civil order and thus the very fabric of European civil society.

Thus the Project has concluded that it is imperative for the future of a harmonious Europe that European policy makers (at the European, National and Regional levels) confront and challenge *Islamophobia*, in its various manifestations and in the various areas of social, political and economic life. Furthermore, the project argues that it is imperative that European policy makers cooperate closely with European Muslim associations and organisations in order to reduce the social exclusion and marginalisation of this very significant section of the European population.

In this respect the Project has also made two central recommendations and various additional suggestions for policy formulation. The first recommendation operates at the epistemological level and argues that Western Social Science needs to reconsider its analytical and methodological approach to the study of European identities and this is highlighted in the executive summary. The second recommendation operates at the policy level and argues for the establishment of a *European Directorate for Muslim Affairs* as part of a wider *European Commission for the Future of a Multi-Ethnic Europe*.

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This Project started from the premiss that public discourse and policy-making have converged, so as to highlight some of the negative effects of the drive to enhance “*economic growth and competitiveness*”. In particular, this convergence has highlighted the manner in which this may have contributed to an increase of the “social exclusion and marginalisation” for different social groups and communities within the European Union. The Project also considered the need to produce new knowledge on both the forms and processes of “*social exclusion*”, which can contribute to the initiation of policies that will enhance “*social cohesion*” and effective processes of “*social re-integration*”, and thus contribute to “*sustainable economic development*”. Thus, we engaged in these debates with the intention to make a contribution, by presenting an analytical and comparative account, of a particularly important and increasingly “visible” European ethno-religious community, which exemplifies many of the “characteristics” of social exclusion and marginalisation, namely the European Muslims. This was done in eight European States: Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Greece, Holland, Italy and Switzerland.

The issues researched in this project are relatively new and innovative. This derives primarily from the fact that for more than a century Western social science had accepted that the assimilation of cultural and religious identities into a national society was a necessary precondition for socio-economic and political development. In fact, diverse and competing ethnic and religious communal identities were seen as a primary factor in dividing post-colonial societies and hindering development. European scholars perceived ethnic and religious identities as inimical to rational social planning and economic development, and instead highlighted the classical European model where, it was assumed, modernity had eroded communal identities in favour of citizenship and loyalty to the state.

Furthermore, conventional European social sciences also assume that communities of immigrants, settlers and/or ethnic origin will invariably follow a course characterised by the privatisation of religion, which it is also assumed is the case in the “host” societies. Nevertheless, and as this Project has already noted through its fieldwork research, a sizable section of the European Muslim population has refused to adhere to this model and has instead chosen to exemplify in an increasingly visible manner their Islamic identity. This exemplification of a visible religious/ethnic identity, however, in turn generated many

misconceptions about these European Muslim citizens and of Islam itself. Such European Muslim citizens have been characterised as the “Muslim Threat” within Europe, and as such the media, for example, have inadvertently contributed to an accentuation of the “social exclusion” and “marginalisation” of this section of European society.

This project has also noted how Political Islam in Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East, since the 1970s, has continued to furnish evidence for the salience of ethnicity as an organising principle for political action, and is forcing a number of scholars in different areas of the social sciences to re-think the long-standing theoretical and conceptual models regarding the relationship between the "new" ethnic (religious) identities and citizenship/nationhood. This academic concern to theorise and account for the "new" socio-cultural and political phenomena has recently (in the 1990s) gained a degree of urgency.

*By the late 1980s. Islam was the chief vehicle of political opposition in North Africa and the Middle East, regardless of official state ideology, political system or leadership...Elsewhere, in states as diverse as Turkey, India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Trinidad, Islamic groups strained the relationship between governments and governed....In addition, Islam was the leitmotif of rebellions in Burma, Chad, Ethiopia, Thailand and the Philippines...In the context of international relations, Islamic issues helped to justify and fuel conflicts between Iran and Iraq, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, Iran and Saudi Arabia, Israel and the Arab states collectively, and Pakistan and India over the status of Kashmir. (Jeff Haynes, 1993: 64)*

The need to account for this phenomenon intensified with the break-up of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new nation-states which legitimated Islam as the state ideology (e.g. Uzbekistan), the events in ex-Yugoslavia (e.g., Bosnia and Macedonia), the implications of thousands of Albanian-Muslim refugees in Greece, and the newly empowered "Muslim Voices" at the heart of the European Community (e.g. the Salman Rushdie affair and Muslim Parliament. in Britain, the "head scarves" affair in France, Turkish “Islamic Fundamentalism” in Germany, etc.). This was particularly the case in 1989 and after the fall of the Berlin Wall. For as Gilles Kepel has noted

*With the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, an entire way of conceptualising the twentieth century world disappeared. At a stroke not only the confrontation between east and west, but also conflicts between social*

*classes expressed politically in the left-right opposition became obsolete...However, along with the end of the old order symbolised by the wall, 1989 also brought events which signalled new dimensions reflecting some of the contradictions of the world to come...in Britain's rundown inner cities working-class Pakistanis burnt copies of **The Satanic Verses** [and] in France, instead of uniting in celebration of the bicentenary of the 1789 Revolution and the values it proclaimed, was rent by divisions as it had not been since the Dreyfus affair, over an apparently trifling incident: could French society allow three Muslim girls (living in an underprivileged city suburb) to wear an Islamic veil to attend state school ? (Kepel, 1997:1)*

Nevertheless, this project has also noted that there is still a paucity of analytical and critical research which can account for the manner in which Islam as a global ethnic/religious identity motivates and structures political action, and thus postulates a new relationship between ethnic (religious) identity and the nation-state project. Instead, there is a plethora of often contradictory and in some cases polemic accounts of the "disruptive" potential of "Islamic Fundamentalism". In fact, it could be argued that the media and a certain type of scholarly research has already defined "Resurgent Islam" as primarily responsible for the sharpening "cultural" confrontation between Europe and the Islamic world. Thus, it is not surprising that Islam in Europe is currently seen as the dangerous and threatening "**OTHER**". Especially as scholarly work has yet to present satisfactory accounts of the background and manner in which a variety of forms of political activism ("Muslim Voices"), have contributed to the emergence of new social, cultural, political and religious (cultural identity) fault-lines at the heart of post-industrial European societies.

This, of course has been the primary concern and focus of this research Project, whose significance is enhanced when we consider the fact that that these new socio-political and cultural movements have established themselves outside the 'space' where Islam has traditionally been presented as a socio-political ideology and force. This is due to the fact that it has also blurred the long-standing '*us and them*' view held by most Europeans, as they have had to accept within Europe the existence of substantial settler communities of Muslims: four million in France, two million in Germany and just under two million in Britain (using conservative estimates). Western scholarship, of course, has addressed the issue of 'Political Islam' and its role in reshaping political space in the Middle East, Asia and other parts of the non-European world (see Ayubi, 1991). What it has failed to do, however, is to consider the extent to which it can also constitute an alternative basis for the mobilization of global political order, and thus its ability to affect political organization *within* Europe. In other words, can Islam and especially contemporary 'Political Islam'

exemplify a non- Western way in which political space can be organised and thus challenge the 'European' state system, which emerged during centuries of socio-political and cultural struggles that were grounded in a Judeo-Christian tradition (Allen1995; Beeley, 1995).

A consideration of the failure of Western scholarship to seriously consider the possibility of any other socio-cultural tradition as being capable of influencing changes on a global scale was of course beyond the specific focus of this Project. Nevertheless, it is important to quote Peter Worsley's comment on this matter. Following an extensive analysis of various theoretical and conceptual models of the nation-state, Worsley notes that

*none of the models so far discussed take culture into account. All of them are variants of one kind or another of political economy, though without cultural dimension is impossible to make sense of a modern world in which nationalism religion and inter-ethnic hostility have been far more important than internationalism and secularism. Models based on political economy alone, therefore, are quite incapable of explaining such phenomena as the rise of a modern version of Islam, which is wrongly labelled 'Fundamentalism' ...the modern world has been shaped by cultural communities, From the Catholic Church and Islam to secular ideologies and movements like communism which transcend the boundaries of even the largest and most centralised state (Worsley, 1990, pp.92, 94).*

The failure of Western social science to account for the possibility of culture (Islam) as a force that can shape political space has also been compounded by the high degree of ignorance about the various Muslim communities that reside in different parts of the European Union. It is for this reason that this Project has taken on board the presentation of both descriptive and analytical data based on extensive research in eight European countries. This is because much of contemporary European social science exemplifies a great paucity of studies, which address themselves to the various settler (ethnic) communities for whom Islam is *more* than just a privatised religion. Indeed, as Jorgen Nielsen points out

*so dominated by the secular assumptions of academic sociology was the field, that well into the 1970s there seemed to be an expectation that communities of immigrant origin would quickly follow a course characterised by the privatisation of religion...It was partly due to the refusal of a substantial proportion of the Muslim immigrants and their children to adhere to this model that the attitude of parts of the academic community began to alter during the mid-1980s. (Jorgen Nielsen, 1992: vii)*

This academic realisation was to some extent related to events in the Middle East, where Islam was becoming a potent political force with some "disruptive" potential, as perceived from a Eurocentric sociological discourse. It was the politics of the Muslim Communities in Europe, however, that challenged the existing status quo, and in particular the "Rushdie

Affair" in Britain and the "head scarves" in France. These events quickly moved the Muslim Communities in Europe to the top of the political and media agendas. As a consequence the second half of the 1980s saw an increase in academic research and publications that dealt specifically with the Muslim Communities in Europe. In Britain, for example, there is now a noticeable increase of studies, which attempt to account for the perplexing phenomenon of what is referred to as the "revival" of Islamic tradition, culture and religion.

Nevertheless, as the events leading to the Gulf War and its repercussions, emphasised once again the centrality of the politics of Muslim Communities in Europe, they also compounded the misconceptions and ignorance, especially in the field of popular European culture. (Searle, 1992; Bresheeth & Yuval-Davis, 1992) In part, this is due to the fact that as Europe witnessed the emergence of a newly empowered "Muslim Voice", the field of academic research *"...remains a largely unexplored one, and the production of research and publication continues to depend on relatively specialised interests and limited funding."* (Nielsen, 1992: viii) Instead, it is the media which has continued to play the leading role in forming European perceptions of Islam and Muslim Communities in Europe.

Thus, it is not surprising that the emergence of "Muslim Voices" across Europe, which have been making demands for equal access to social, economic and cultural resources within the different states in the European Community, have already been stereotyped as the "Muslim Threat", and thus contribute to the further marginalisation and social exclusion of those immigrant and settler populations which aspire to nothing more than the basic citizenship rights of tolerance, justice, employment, education, etc.. Such misconceptions and ignorance, of course, combine to prevent European Muslim populations from access to equal opportunities, and in many respects undermine government policies such as the various Race Relations Acts in the different member states of the European Union.

It is for the above reasons that this Project took on the task of confronting such misconceptions and has attempted to present a preliminary analytical framework within which we can account for the phenomenon of Political Islam in general and the newly empowered "Muslim Voices" within the European Union in particular. In this sense the primary objective of this Project can be restated as being that of placing on the European social research, intellectual and political agenda issues which are relatively submerged at

the present time. This was accomplished by locating the study of Political Islam and the “Muslim Voices” within the European Union in an analytical framework which distanced itself from the commonly held assumption that the Western European narrative has an overriding importance in the analysis of modernity. (Asad, 1993) Instead, this Project argues that the study of European Muslims and the manner in which they express their socio-political and cultural identities should be located in an analytical framework where they are “agents of their own history”, albeit within a broader global socio-political and economic structure.

Thus, in the first instance the Project highlights the broader canvass on which the varieties of European “Muslim Voices” have made their mark. For although European Muslims should not be subsumed analytically into the Western and European narrative, the analysis of Political Islam cannot be located outside the path of the modern juggernaut of global capitalism. (Asad, 1993: 5) In other words, we need to highlight the economic, social and political structures within which European Muslims have adopted the vocabulary of Political Islam as a means of expressing their identities and bring attention to their narratives. The Project also considered in a schematic form the prevailing intellectual paradigm(s) that have contributed to the current analytical framework within which we receive accounts of Political Islam and the European “Muslim Voices”.

The Project approached the above stated policy objectives by reference to two contemporary debates within the social sciences: the *sociology of employment and work* and the *politics of identity*. In particular we used recent work in both these areas of social knowledge in order to construct the analytical framework within which qualitative and quantitative data from the European Muslim communities is discussed. Furthermore, and given the particular focus of this project, the research and analysis highlights the significance of the spatial (New Europe) and chronological (post-1989) context within which the European Muslim communities have been studied.

## **1. THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL CONSIDERATIONS**

Europe suddenly seems to have made the uncomfortable discovery that it is full of Muslims, although it is hard not to think of “European Muslims” as an oxymoron. Historically, the identity of Europe was constructed through the exclusion of Islam, and clearly elements of that construction still circulate in popular as well as elite discourses. For “Europeans”, the

effect of Muslim settlement in Europe is disturbing for three main reasons: firstly, one of the main exclusions around which the identity of Europe was constructed was that of Islam (Herrin, 1989), thus the Muslim presence impacts on the nature of modern European identity in that it challenges the very idea of Europe. Secondly, the Muslim presence seems to problematise the Westphalian order. Thus, policy makers expect Muslims to abide by Westphalian conventions and accept no higher loyalty than that of the state, even if the state is not inclined to reciprocate that loyalty. Furthermore, even such liberal institutions as universities explicitly state that Muslims need to be taught tolerance, the hallmark of secularism. (Halliday, 1996). Thirdly, it presents academics with a major challenge, namely how to conceptualise ethnic identities.

During the nineteenth century, European writing found it convenient to use measures of race, language and culture to define ethnic identity. Ethnicity was seen in essentialist terms, membership of an ethnic community was imparted from birth and immutable for the rest of one's life. It is difficult, however, to see how European Muslims can be contained in such classical notions of ethnicity. This is particularly the case as Muslim identity within the European Union directly challenges positivist ethnography by pointing towards its socially constructed rather than its biologically given nature. In this respect the emergence of 'Muslim Voices' within the European Union coincides with the recent explosion of interest in the subject of 'identity'.

This interest has been manifested in a variety of academic disciplines and traditions (see, for example, Hall, 1988; Connolly, 1991). What is common to these approaches is an appreciation of the centrality of the question of identity for any understanding of political, cultural and socio-economic phenomena. At the outset I should make clear that it is important to make the distinction between identity politics and politics as identification. Identity politics arises from somebody declaring themselves to have a particular identity option. This is different from the idea that ultimately all politics is about identification. What politics does is to try and make people connect with collectives or projects. Politics refers to an ensemble of discourses (both linguistic and extra-linguistic) the aim of which is to establish a social order in context, which is inherently contested. The formation of a social order entails the articulation of subject positions, and their antagonistic organisation. Thus, the act of politics is an act of identification: without subject positions a social order cannot be formed. What does not follow from this is that every single subject position, every identity option, must have a considered political option. It does mean, however, that

a political project with no linked identity is unthinkable. That is, from mundane administrative policies to statements of grand politics, the process of identification is central to politics.

The 'Muslim Voices' project remit to explore the relationship between "economic growth and competitiveness" and "social exclusion, marginalisation, economic deprivation and cultural disadvantage" in the context of the largest ethnicised minorities in the European Union (Muslims) hinges upon the question of identity. Identity refers to process by which subjects are formed. The process of formation is not a superstructural moment, it is not restricted merely to the cultural aspects, but, rather, subjects are formed through a dense network of social relations. Thus the sounds of 'Muslim Voices' are not a cacophony of identity politics - another group demanding recognition and respect - but rather the emergence of a significant, political subject position.

The idea of a Muslim identity is constantly put under erasure (Sayyid, 1997). Analysts have tended to treat "Muslimness" as an epiphenomenon of other more sturdy bases of identity formations (class, kinship, caste, ethnicity...). To some extent, this derives from the way in which post-war studies of settlers in Europe have for some time been dominated by an 'Immigrant Studies Model' (ISM) (Sayyid, 1997). This model is based on there being a sharp distinction between the host society and immigrants. Accordingly migration can be attributed to socio-economic imbalances between distinct areas - which push people (for example, demographic growth, strife, etc), and areas that pull people towards them (for example, labour scarcity, economic and political freedoms). The ISM studies model has overlaid these socio-economic imbalances with cultural signifiers, which establish a "super hard" difference between host and immigrant. This difference is marked in a variety of ways: for example, whereas the host society has networks, immigrants have kinship; whereas the host society has modernity, the immigrants are bound by tradition. Second, the model proposes that with the passage of time this distinction will be eroded as the host society consumes the immigrants and they adapt to the host culture. Third, the form of this adaptation can be represented in discrete and successive stages called generations. A generation is one of the key units of analysis for this type of narrative. Generations are considered to be permanent units by which the immigration experience can be measured. Generational differences are articulated as the crystallization of social, political and cultural changes. In other words, time is *spatialised* through the notion of generation and each generation marks the progress towards full assimilation into the host community. The

immigrant studies model has wide circulation both in academic and popular culture. It is against the backdrop of the ISM that the usual stories about Muslims in Europe are written and disseminated. Issues of cultural schizophrenia in the form of generational conflict, the notion of dual allegiance (problems of being “Muslim and Western”), arranged marriages, cruelty to animals, domestic violence and, of course, illegal immigration provide newspaper columnists, policy-makers and many academics with their staple diet.

This analytical tendency to deny the political nature of Muslim identity is not only the product of the ISM (and its associations with Orientalism), but also of the way in which nationalist discourses within Muslim communities have also served to undermine the idea of a distinct Muslim identity. As a consequence, there are Turks and Kurds in Germany, North Africans in France and South Asians in Britain. The question then arises - at which point do diverse communities become identified as Muslims? The idea of Muslim communities being internally divided along ethnic or sectarian lines is found in many of the member country studies. For example, it is remarked that Muslims in the Netherlands include differences in terms of countries of origin, but also ethnic, political and sectarian differences (the Arabs and Berbers from Morocco, the Turks and Kurds from Turkey, and so on...). One consequence of such differences is to suggest to public authorities that really there is no meaningful entity called “Muslim”, and the outward forms that these seem to take are merely the work of “self-appointed community leaders” and other partisan activists. This line of thinking is not specific to the Dutch case, but underlines much of official and semi-official attitude to Islam in the European community. The emphasis on Muslim unity seems to neglect that any community will be internally divided. These internal divisions while being administratively confusing do not by themselves mean that a specific community lacks cohesion. Rather, it suggests that we should view communities not as organic entities, but rather as political projects that coalesce around particular issues and themes. In this case, the internal division of Muslims should not belie their agreement over specific issues. For example, the Muslim community in Britain is as heterogeneous as many other Muslim communities – this, however, did not prevent them from establishing a kind of consensus on the need for grant-maintained Muslim schools. In this way, it may be more helpful to see Muslim communities as civil societies, where a variety of organisations and individuals contend for some kind of hegemony.

## **Imagining Europe**

The eight member countries have very different historical relations with world of Islam. Countries such as Greece and parts of Italy were under direct Muslim rule; others have controlled large Muslim populations as part of their colonial will-to-power (for example, Britain and France). There are other countries which, until post-war migration, had little direct contact with the Muslim world (for example, Germany and Belgium). These different histories have had important effects on the way various member states have dealt with their Muslim populations. There is, however, a more general sense in which relations between the Muslim populations of these various countries is linked by nature of the fact that these countries consider themselves to be part of Europe and Europe has had a particular historical relationship with the world of Islam.

Despite the history of the last 300 years, the identity of Europe remains contested and somewhat uncertain. According to Agnes Heller, a European identity was a dispersed affair. It was the discourse of modernity that aggregated the various disparate elements (the various successor states to the Roman empire) into a consolidated form under the name of Europe as she declares: 'Modernity the creation of Europe, itself created Europe...'. What Heller seems to be suggesting is that European identity is not structured around a geographical or ethnic complex, but is, rather, an ideological construction of a very special kind. Europe is an ideological formation centered on the discourse of modernity. There was no European identity outside the project of modernity. As a consequence, Muslim settlement challenges the notion of "Europeanness" at three distinct levels:

- Ø firstly, it problematises the historical conventions governing the identity of Europe;
- Ø secondly, it problematises European identity by contextualising the project of modernity;  
and
- Ø thirdly, Muslim settlement problematises the state-civil society relations which are said to be characteristic of Europe.

As Judith Herrin writes, the term *Europa* is first used in the Eighth and Ninth centuries to designate the area over which Charlemagne exercised jurisdiction, that is, the lands outside the control of the Caliph and the Emperor in Constantinople. It was the inability of the Emperors of the Second Rome and the Caliphs to lay claim to the old boundaries of the Roman Empire that allowed Charlemagne to forge a distinctive identity (Herrin, 1989: 477).

This identity was formulated as Latin Christians began to articulate a discourse of blood and soil during the period following the Eleventh Century as a means of differentiating themselves from those who were “enemies of the Christian name” (Baertlett, 1994: 252). Thus, “Christian” came to connote not only a “racial” but also a territorial category. Hence, Christendom emerged as racialised formation locked in mortal combat with other cultural formations - which rejected Latin Christendom (*ibid.* 250-255). Thus, there is way in which the “unEuropeaness” of Muslims is not reducible to social exclusion due to socio-economic factors, but, rather, that social exclusion is manifestation of a primary, earlier conceptual exclusion. Europe was explicitly the area of the world that excluded the territories under Muslim jurisdiction. What is Europe if it is the case that recent attention has focused on how Muslims constitute the largest minority in the European Union? How can Europe accommodate Muslims and still remain Europe? In other words, by what means can Europe include in its embrace the exclusion of those that have constituted its own identity.

### **Modernity and Muslims in Europe**

As many of the member country reports make clear there is a great deal of ignorance about Islam and Muslims within member countries. Much of the ignorance is expressed in terms of the traditional or backwardness of Muslim cultural practices, (see, for example, the conclusion of the German report). If we consider that notions of modernity are tied in with notions of “Europeaness” than it follows that those who are considered “un European” will tend to be seen as “un modern”. Such a perspective negates the possibility that different cultural heritages may have different ways of being contemporary. For instance, the phenomenon of professional Muslim women wearing the veil is actually a fairly recent development (Fifteenth Century AH)- and not some practice lost in the mist of time. The assumption that secularisation is a component of modernity - puts into question people with religious affiliations - and Muslims are precisely defined in terms of religious affiliation. Muslim settlement interrupts the idea of the progressive nature of historical development and the universal nature of modernity, and because of the way in which notions of modernity are tied into notions of European identity, Muslim settlement becomes a signifier of Europe’s provincialisation.

### **Muslims and State-Civil Society**

The assertion of Muslim subjectivity presents a serious challenge to the idea of what Gramsci called the integrated state, that is, a union between the state and civil society. This

is due partly to the way in which a Muslim subject position remains a potentially transitional one. As Manuel Castells writes, '(F)or a Muslim, the fundamental attachment is not to the *watan* (homeland), but to the *Umma*, or community of believers, all made equal in their submission to Allah' (Castells, 1997: 15). While, it is the case that Castells' reading of Muslim subjectivity reproduces Orientalist and neo-Orientalist accounts of Islam, what is interesting is that in context of Muslim settlement in Europe, the potential transnationality of a Muslim subject position is enhanced, partly by the migrant and refugee origins of the majority of Muslim settlers in Europe, but also by the process of European integration which helps to produce a common Muslim identity among its various Muslim settlers. The effect of this transitionality is creating, at least in embryonic form, a Muslim civil society that overlaps national and European boundaries. Given that currently the main form of seepage across the boundaries embedded in the Westphalian system tend to involve Muslims, these Gaullist type demands of one state, one people, and one government are bound to become fudged. This project of the nationalisation of Islam creates a tension, for not only does it deny the transnationality of Muslim identity, but it also provides a mechanism for public authorities to re-enact colonial type relations with their Muslim settlers. It is in the interest of the various Muslim organisations to avoid becoming a branch of the state, for only in their autonomy from governments can they act as advocates of Muslim popular interests.

## **2. MUSLIMS IN EUROPE: SOCIAL EXCLUSION & MARGINALISATION**

The Muslim settler communities in the different project countries have originated in different parts of the ex-colonies and this has been documented in the *Statistical Representation of the Muslim Presence in Europe*. Furthermore, some project countries (for example, Greece and Italy) have only recently begun to experience migration and so their analysis differs from that of the other project countries in that it was not until the mid 1970s that migration *to* Greece and Italy became more important than migration *from* these regions. It is also important to note that project partners have stressed the heterogeneity of the Muslim settler communities living in Europe. Although the settler communities share a common faith (Islam) they often originate from very different regions (Africa, Eastern Europe, Middle East, South Asia, etc.).

It is clear, however, from the data collected by the project partners involved in this project that varying forms of discrimination affect Muslim settler communities precisely because of their 'Muslimness'. With the establishment of 'visible' communities, mosques, prayer halls,

settler infrastructures (schools, *halal* butchers, etc) came more concrete markers of 'difference', which have often, resulted in resentment, suspicion and mistrust from the host society. Furthermore, as well collating evidence relating to political exclusion in Europe, this project has been able to gather statistical evidence that indicates that Muslim communities are also materially deprived (high unemployment, poor working conditions, poor health and housing, low educational qualifications and poverty).

The problems encountered by Muslim settlers in Europe are diverse and complex and they have changed over time. If we look firstly to the issue of migration and settlement itself we can see from the reports that Muslims tended to migrate to Europe to find work and usually worked in poorly paid, semi or unskilled areas such as manufacturing, mining and construction. European countries, however, have encouraged or discouraged immigration depending on the economic and/or demographic needs of the country at any given time so the sense in which migrant labour has been welcome or unwelcome has ebbed and flowed over the past forty or so years. These differentials in approaches to migration have meant that policies and conditions have not been consistent and certainly the experiences of Muslim settlers in Europe has changed in that the original migrants were primarily male, we are then looking at family reunification and then moving into second and third generations who have very different experiences to those of their parents. Furthermore, the attitudes and policies of European states have changed considerably over the years as varying strategies have been forwarded and/or adopted to think about integration, assimilation and/or co-habitation with reference to settler communities. For France, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK, the general perception has been, in terms of immigration, that settlers would gradually adapt to and assimilate into the host society, although during the 1980s, there was more of an emphasis on the concept of integration. These terms have often lacked clear and precise definition and furthermore it has often been perceived that the individual settler has responsibility for his/her social integration or social exclusion. From this perspective it has often been the case that the legal or social obstacles to social, economic, and cultural integration have rarely been adequately examined as political questions.

In Germany and Switzerland Muslims (in conjunction with other 'foreigners') are unable to vote and are thus excluded from political participation. This is certainly a form of direct discrimination that when combined with the general perceptions of the 'Auslander', 'immigrant' and 'gastarbeiter', has profound consequences for Muslim communities.

Although many Turkish families in Germany have been settled for three generations they continue to be denied full participation in the political processes of the country. As the report for Switzerland makes clear, the operation of the ‘three-Circles’ policy determines the rights given to various groups of migrants, for example, the terms and conditions of employment permits, housing and property rights, etc. Muslim migrants in the ‘third circle’ are subject to severe restrictions with reference to working permits and residency and a further form of direct discrimination in Switzerland is a labour policy that prohibits access to certain jobs, for example, teaching in state schools, key positions in the medical sector, positions of responsibility at federal level, etc.

Although other European countries do not deny the majority of their Muslim population citizenship this does not mean that such groups subsequently do not experience exclusion or marginalisation. For many French Muslims, especially the youth living in the suburbs of large cities, there are increasing tensions as a result of economic and social deprivation coupled with negative treatment by the authorities, particularly the police. These kinds of tensions are also replicated in the UK, Germany and the Netherlands.

The secular state system in France has meant that visible signs of religious identity are perceived or regarded as disturbing. This perception has certainly manifested itself most clearly in what has been called the ‘headscarves’ affair wherein Muslim girls who wish to wear the headscarf have been excluded from school. This antipathy towards headscarves for Muslim women (*hijabophobia*) has been manifested in other countries apart from France and it would seem that a broad misunderstanding of headscarves and their symbolic nature has manifested itself widely across the countries involved in this project. Even if there are no distinct state policies pertaining to the headscarf, disapproval and misunderstanding has been generally observed in educational and employment sectors in all project countries. In Swiss and German schools, although there are no restrictions about students wearing the headscarf, teachers and principals encourage female students and their parents to remove it, the prevailing perception being that it symbolises the oppression or subordination of women. As a visible manifestation of an Islamic identity the *hijab*, for Muslim women, is often seen as representing patriarchal society and oppression, furthermore, state precepts are often rooted in the principles of secularism which in turn discriminates against those who wish to visibly express their faith identity. Interestingly in both France and Switzerland Catholic, Christian and Jewish educational practitioners are not required to remove their symbols of faith (crucifixes, kippas, etc) and they do not

appear elicit the same negative assumptions about the wearers identity.

In contrast, in the Netherlands the right to wear headscarves at work is covered by the General Act on Equal Treatment (1994) and there have been several cases on this matter that have all been won by the plaintiff. In terms of educational matters in the Netherlands the majority of cases where issues have been raised are related to female students with reference to the wearing of the *hijab*, mixed schooltrips and mixed physical education lessons. A prominent case from the Netherlands is the headscarf-affair in Alphen aan de Rijn where in 1985 the alderman of education decided to prohibit the wearing of the hijab at school although eventually, after much protest from the Muslim community the prohibition was withdrawn. There has, however, been no development of a clear policy regarding wearing the hijab as some schools permit it and others do not. The issue has subsequently been the source of conflict between parents and schools and employees and employers and has spilled into other areas of education such as physical education, particularly swimming lessons.

The issue of wearing the headscarf has elicited various levels of response in the project countries and with all other aspects of Muslim life the experiences of Muslims and the responses of the authorities differ from country to country. In Germany, Muslim women who cover their heads usually find themselves excluded from employment in the public sector unless they agree to remove it. Only those religious education teachers who teach elective classes in a native language are exempt from the prohibition, other teachers are not allowed to wear headscarves because the German State requires staff to dress in an 'ideologically neutral' fashion which means that although female students may wear headscarves, female Muslim teachers cannot.

Although in other project countries there are not necessarily official rules in place that bar the wearing of the hijab there continues to be discrimination against Muslim women who choose to wear it, in the UK, for example, in spite of the relatively high visibility of Muslim women working in chain stores, banks, supermarkets, etc, women still encounter hostility and negativity in less enlightened workplaces. There have recently been a number of cases in which Muslim women have had to take their employers to court or file a grievance against them for unfair dismissal rooted in the headscarf.

Furthermore, 7.5% of the complaints to the Equal Opportunities Centre in Belgium reports involved work and employment which included racist and anti-Muslim attitudes by

employers: for example, discrimination during the hiring process due to the headscarf or a 'foreign' sounding name, discrimination in promotions and transfers and regulations about time off that do not allow for Muslim holidays. In 1996 the Dutch Commission for Equal Treatment received 14 complaints about religious discrimination, some of these were from Muslims and most concerned 'women wearing headscarves during work' and praying during working hours.

Further issues pertinent to Muslim communities in particular involve issues such as Muslim cemeteries, halal butchers, mosque building and education. Throughout the project countries, concerns have been raised by Muslim communities about these matters with varying levels of response from the relevant state authorities. With reference to cemeteries the project has ascertained that provision for Muslim burial rites is at best patchy and at worst non-existent. In Belgium and Switzerland, for example, there are currently no Muslim cemeteries and there are insufficient Muslim plots provided in the limited number of public cemeteries, although in the Netherlands and the UK there are a number of Muslim cemeteries. Furthermore, host country public health regulations are often incompatible with the traditions of Muslim communities. *Halal* meat is also an issue that is approached differently by the project countries, in that some states allow the slaughter of animals according to Islamic rite and others, such as Germany and Switzerland, do not, thus necessitating the importation of *halal* meat from other countries.

With regards to state funded Muslim education, it has only been very recently in the UK that permission has been granted for the establishment of grant maintained Muslim schools (for further information on this topic, see Turney (1999) 'Muslim Voices' in the European Union: 'Multiculturalism' & 'Equal Opportunities' in Education). In other project countries, Muslim schools have also been established although the majority of them continue to be privately funded.

It would appear that the situation with regards to measures for practising Islam in schools, that is, prayer facilities, dress and dietary obligations, are not met by each member state equally. Britain has progressed some way by allowing Muslim girls to dress according to Islamic instructions, non-participation in certain activities (e.g. swimming), the celebration Islamic festivals and providing *halal* school meals, however, these kinds of provisions are usually at the discretion of the individual school and some Muslim students continue to encounter problems. Switzerland and Italy, especially as the latter is a fairly recent country

of immigration, have not quite reached the same level of advancement and there are still cases of confrontation between schools and parents. In order for Muslim children to concentrate on the objective of attending school, gaining an education, these issues certainly require further consideration.

The reports also indicate quite clearly that there is an anti-Muslim or Islamophobic discourse present in the media although it is often contradictory and there is often a distinct difference between portrayals of Muslims in the national media and coverage in local media. The mainstream media, at present, seems to constitute the most powerful medium for the propagation of anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim discourse, particularly in terms of engendering a conceptual link between ‘negativity’ and Islam.

Researchers in Belgium have argued that the category of ‘religion’ should be added to the list of factors to cover this form of discrimination as awareness of this limitation in the law, allows racist texts and commentaries to abuse ‘Muslims’ rather than ‘North Africans’ thus allowing writers to escape penal sanctions. In Britain, as in Belgium, Muslims who have been the victims of discrimination have had to take their cases to court on grounds of either racial or sexual discrimination, as the law does not recognise religious discrimination. Introducing appropriate legislation in these countries would end the need for individuals to tailor their grievances to fit current legal provisions. In its Second Review of the 1976 Race Relations Act the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) identified several areas where current legislation may need attention: firstly, there is no law in Britain that protects people from religious discrimination; secondly there is no law in Britain concerning incitement to religious hatred; thirdly, current blasphemy laws only protects the established Christian religion.

It is clear from the available evidence, that despite fairly comprehensive legislation in some regions that adequate application of the law is not easily accomplished. Further, in certain areas, such as housing, education and public services, discrimination continues, as these areas are not yet covered by the legal system. Whether this discrimination is a result of specific institutional structures or an inability (or unwillingness) on the part of authorities to enforce equal opportunity laws is an issue that requires further examination.

It is difficult to discern religious discrimination from racial discrimination and xenophobia. French, Italian and Swiss researchers, for example, felt that the anti-*immigrant* feeling was more prominent than a specific anti-Muslim discourse; many of the migrants in these

countries are also Muslims and thus anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim sentiments become intertwined as anti-immigrant rhetoric is expressed in an anti-Muslim fashion. This is aggravated by a perception (which is exacerbated by right-wing political groups) that immigrants deprive the host population of employment opportunities.

Addressing the issue of incitement to religious hatred is laborious and proving that such incitement has occurred is difficult. The Italians and Dutch point out that this is because the line between opinion and incitement is blurred and therefore recommend improvements in legislation against incitement.

Political representation varies at the level of the national and the local. In Britain, for example, Muslims are beginning to establish themselves in local politics, but with the exception of one Muslim Labour MP, they have not yet really achieved national status (in Italy and Greece, of course, political participation is moving at a slower pace because of comparatively recent nature of immigration). Belgium and Greece have also witnessed the emergence of Muslim political representation, however, in Switzerland and Germany for example, Muslims find themselves excluded from the political process and from representing Muslims in elections. Where they have been able to, however, leaders in local government have brought about changes to the running of institutions such as schools, hospitals, government offices (for example, *halal* food, modifying dress codes, prayer facilities) and are involved in consultation with service providers for a more culturally sensitive way of delivering services.

Overall, this project has identified and begun a broad examination of the need to study Muslim communities as Muslims rather than as 'ethnic minorities'. Certainly any attempt on the part of local and national authorities to deal with issues relating to equal opportunities, integration, etc, must consider that any attempt to by-pass this identity will probably not result in any great success. Although the ethnicity of Muslim communities in Europe may vary from region to region, their concerns and their articulation of their concerns, needs and requirements are fairly standard and in keeping with the basic tenets of their religious identity. Certainly it would not be valid to assert that Muslim communities are the only communities in Europe that are experiencing discrimination, exclusion and marginalisation as other settler communities also suffer from social, economic and political exclusion. This project and the reports written by the various project partners make clear that the importance of examining a discourse that negatively impacts upon Muslim

communities lies in its intersection with other forms of discrimination that are rooted in xenophobia, race, ethnicity, gender and class. What these reports have revealed is that Muslim communities are susceptible to discrimination in terms of employment, underachievement in education, infant mortality, or ghettoisation, exclusion (in some countries) from public schools partly because of their religious convictions or the refusal to acknowledge their cultural and religious identity. Thus, these accounts provide some analysis of the ways in which the 'Muslim Voices' have become politicised and also highlight those areas for which policy needs to be re-evaluated and those areas in which inequalities and double standards need to be addressed.

## **SCIENTIFIC DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT RESULTS AND METHODOLOGY**

Any attempt to try and summarise the findings of a large Project such as this is bound to produce an account, which is truncated and in many respects misrepresents the social reality of the populations and communities that were researched. This is particularly so in a research project, which has relied extensively on qualitative, approaches and studied a section of European society, which exemplifies simultaneously diversity and particularism (in each country studied), and a “communal identity” which cuts across these European political boundaries (an Islamic identity). It is for this reason that this section presents a brief summary of the research findings, but also presents short accounts of the specificity of each Muslim population in its respective country (as an appendix). This it is hoped will allow the reader to appreciate both the general issues, which constituted the basis from which we derived our policy recommendations (presented in the following section) and the particular characteristics and concerns of each population in its own country of residence.

Furthermore, the previous section noted at some length that the issues under consideration and especially the analytical and methodological approach adopted by this Project are to some degree quite new and innovative within the scope of contemporary European social science. In this respect, therefore, it is necessary to present in some detail some of the analytical and conceptual issues which both informed the research and emerged as a the components of what we would like to suggest is a “*new analytical paradigm*” for the study of European Muslims. The analytical and methodological issues concerned, of course, also reflected the two different phases of the Project:

- Ø a broad characterisation of the Muslim population in each country (including a demographic account) with a particular focus on the “*politics of identity*”; and
- Ø a specific and focussed discussion of issues pertaining to the employment of Muslim women with a particular focus on the “*sociology of employment and work*”.

Thus, this section of the report is divided into two parts. Parts one and two represent the two phases of the Project, with Part Two also incorporating the specific analytical issues as it is targeting gender issues and work.

# **PHASE ONE**

## **GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EUROPEAN MUSLIM POPULATIONS**

Although there has been a Muslim presence in Europe for several centuries it has not been until recently that Muslim communities in Europe have found themselves the focus of social, economic and cultural research. The reasons for this are many, and are rooted in a diversity of factors such as, the immigration policies of the European Union, and the gradual change from within the settler communities themselves; from a sense of transience to one of permanence. With this residential permanence we have thus witnessed the emergence of empowered and politicised Muslim voices that are articulating their needs and fighting for their rights as Muslims living and working in Europe. For these reasons, and in light of growing evidence of widespread exclusion and marginality this project began in February 1997 in order to identify the various pathways and forms of exclusion that affect Muslim communities, to assess the impact of these pathways and suggest possible strategies that would aid in the process of integration into the social, economic and political life of Europe.

Throughout Europe, settlers who had been identified as ‘black’ or ‘foreigners’ have now been recognised as Muslims and although until recently religious identities were somewhat “invisible” to the various “host societies”, Muslims are today increasingly attempting to assert their rights and are articulating their interests through the construction of mosques, the building of Muslim cemeteries and the celebration of religious holidays, etc. With the emergence of this identity as an assertion of ‘self’ and community there has also emerged a number of other issues in the context of examining ‘Muslim Voices’ particularly in terms of how we can account for the emergence of a specific Muslim identity and the specific forms of exclusion and marginality that pertain to that identity.

This project is contextualised in the general social, economic and political trends and in previous studies of Muslim communities (of which there have been few in number). The debates about whether or not Muslim communities should be identified by their faith or by their ethnicity have also informed the overall analysis. Recently Fred Halliday (1998), for example, has argued that it is more constructive and accurate to talk about national identities and ethnicity than it is to talk about ‘Islamophobia’ or anti-Muslimism. Research

undertaken for this project however, indicates quite clearly that it is precisely because individuals, groups and communities are articulating their identities and needs as Muslims rather than as ‘Pakistanis’, ‘Turks’, ‘Algerians’, etc, that they are encountering problems as Muslims and that these issues intersect with forms of exclusion and marginalisation linked with issues of xenophobia, ethnicity, gender, class and poverty.

While the debates and discussions about ‘European’ identity, nation states and citizenship continue to rage it is clear that Muslims in Europe occupy an interesting yet uneasy space in the idea of ‘Europe’ and it is a space that certainly requires further consideration. The project consultation paper ‘What is Europe?’ (Richards, 1997) points out that the European Union has centralised the notion of citizenship in recent years in an attempt to build a sense of community that is analogous to that of the nation state. This idea of identity, of encouraging a solidarity that transgresses national borders is of particular interest when we think about the position of those communities who identify themselves as ‘Muslim’ first, and as ‘British Pakistani’ or ‘French Moroccan’ second. This is important not only in terms of personal/group narrations of self and notions of society and place, but also in terms of how communities might find themselves marginalised, experiencing social exclusion precisely because their identity does not conform with Western assumptions about citizenship and loyalty to a nation state or federation of nation states. Muslim communities, articulating their identity primarily in terms of their faith thus find themselves occupying a precarious space in terms of the construction and maintenance of identity of the West.

In any examination of Muslim communities it is clear that a myriad of factors contribute to their experiences of living in Europe. These are often rooted in ethnicity, gender and class as well as their Muslim identity. This synopsis however, will highlight those spheres of social and economic life that pertain directly to communities as Muslims and will hopefully make clear the importance of analysing ‘Muslim voices’ in this context. The term ‘Islamophobia’ is relatively new, although it has been in use now for approximately ten years. It has been in use since the late 1980s and the term encapsulates what this project has concurred is an identifiable phenomena in Europe, namely that of a fear or hatred of Muslim peoples and Islam which manifests itself in various forms of discrimination. In the United Kingdom, the Runnymede Trust adopted the term when it published a consultation paper in 1997 asking organisations, groups and individuals to comment on the phenomenon. The Commission that was established to look into ‘Islamophobia’ identified a number of issues that it held to be areas in need of analysis and perhaps policy intervention. Islamophobia is manifested in many

different forms and in many different areas. The core aspects of this phenomenon have been identified by the Trust and provide a useful starting point for any investigation into Islamophobia and its consequences. It must be recognised however, that Islamophobia differs from other forms of discrimination, in that the discourse that has developed about Islam and Muslims is *highly politicised in an international arena* in a way that social and political discourses about other religions and peoples is not.

Over recent years the notion of Islamic fundamentalism has increasingly gained prominence, particularly in the media, so much so that often to be a Muslim is to be an Muslim Fundamentalist. Muslims become constructed as religious fanatics, oppressive and primitive, peoples who oppress and abuse women, who are intolerant and who marginalise themselves by insisting on outdated religious doctrines that are out of synch with the workings of the modern world. In this way, Muslim communities (and other settler communities) are constructed as ‘outsiders’ and ‘strangers’ who occupy a space in Europe that is often viewed with suspicion, fear and mistrust.

The Runnymede Trust Commission’s report on Islamophobia, published in 1997 highlighted many of the important reasons as to why a study of social exclusion and marginalisation is important for Muslim peoples and certainly brought the notion of anti-Muslim sentiments to the fore in the UK. Areas such as employment, education, the media, housing, public services, healthcare, etc, have been highlighted as spheres in which Muslim men and women experience varying forms of discrimination that centres primarily around their ‘Muslim’ identity as well as factors such as ethnicity, gender, class and poverty. Although the Runnymede investigation concentrated on the UK, this project has collated a large amount of data that indicates that the social exclusion and marginalisation of Muslim communities is not confined to the UK but also manifests itself in a number of different forms throughout Europe.

When this project began in February 1997 it aimed to provide ‘an analytical, descriptive and comparative account ... of the different forms and processes by which European Muslims (citizens, residents and immigrants) have been socially excluded and marginalised. It proposed to do this by examining the different national forms and processes by which European Muslims have been socially excluded. Furthermore, it proposed to map those mechanisms that have generated the socio-economic and cultural conditions within which Muslims in Europe have experienced ‘a progressive process of marginalisation leading to economic deprivation and various forms of social and cultural disadvantage’. Each of the eight

countries involved in this project were thus asked to examine the position and experiences of Muslim following a specific format. It has been necessary to formulate a common format in order to facilitate the comparative nature of the project. The reports that constitute the main ‘spine’ of this report provide some responses to the issues and queries that were raised in the format report structure. It was hoped that by constructing a common format with a common set of questions to respond to that this would help researchers and the co-ordinator to compile standardised national reports for comparative purposes. The responses that project partners have provided to these questions will hopefully provide a comprehensive summary of Muslim Voices and of the experiences of settler/migrant communities in the various project countries.

Project partners were asked to address a series of questions under various headings (for example, historical context, contemporary debates, legislation, social, political and cultural organisations, education, media, notions of discrimination, employment ...). By following a format and addressing the issues in sequence it has been possible to produce a rounded account of the varying forms of exclusion and marginalisation that affect settler communities as Muslims, ethnicised minorities, etc.

The varying levels of social exclusion and marginalisation experienced by settler communities (for this project Muslim settler communities) has been documented and explored by the eight partner countries involved in the ‘Muslim Voices’ project. This project has been aware from the outset that the circumstances, experiences, responses and recommendations would differ from project country to country and indeed, the project has encouraged and thrived on such differentiation that has added a great deal of dynamism and intellectual debate to the entire process. The migration process to the project countries has taken different forms and has occurred during different historical periods. As such, the processes of exclusion and marginalisation that this project has been able to document are certainly quite complex and intersect at a number of different levels and identifying those processes has not always been straightforward – for example how are we able to differentiate between xenophobia, Islamophobia, racism, etc, to arrive at a coherent narrative of that links social exclusion and Muslim identity?

In its second phase the project aimed to look at the expansion of new forms of informal and formal employment particularly “home-working” in which Muslim women workers constitute a significant proportion of the work force. Furthermore this project aimed to examine the types of employment available to Muslim settlers (legal and illegal) in each partner country,

its location (geographically and economically) and the problems faced by Muslim settlers when seeking employment. In examining the employment practices of both employer and worker the project hoped to contribute to debates about the extent to which Muslims in Europe are socially excluded; what constitutes the forms and processes of this social exclusion; to analyse the role of informal employment practices in accentuating social exclusion; to evaluate the role of new Muslim immigrants in accentuating social exclusion; to account for their response to social exclusion and marginalisation; and to formulate some recommendations for policies regional and Europe-wide policies that would aid integration.

This part will concentrate on the data collected from the first phase of the project and in doing so will introduce some of those more general areas in which Muslim communities experience varying forms of exclusion and marginalisation.

### **Social Exclusion and Marginalisation**

The settler communities in the different project countries have tended to come from quite specific areas and in this way this project thus links to issues relating to colonial and post-colonial encounters (for further information on the ethnicity of Muslim settlers in each project country, see Brown (1997), 'Statistical Representation of the Muslim Presence in Europe'). Furthermore, some project countries (for example, Greece and Italy) have only recently begun to experience migration and so their analysis differs from that of the other project countries in that it was not until the mid 1970s that migration *to* Greece and Italy became more important than migration *from* these regions. It is also important to note that project partners have stressed the heterogeneity of the Muslim settler communities living in Europe. Although the settler communities share a common faith (Islam) they often originate from very different regions (Africa, Eastern Europe, Middle East, South Asia, etc.).

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that have all been won by the plaintiff. In terms of educational matters in the Netherlands the majority of cases where issues have been raised are related to female students with reference to the wearing of the *hijab*, mixed schooltrips and mixed physical education lessons. A prominent case from the Netherlands is the headscarf-affair in Alphen aan de Rijn where in 1985 the alderman of education decided to prohibit the wearing of the hijab at school although eventually, after much protest from the Muslim community the prohibition was withdrawn. There has, however, been no development of a clear policy regarding wearing the hijab as some schools permit it and others do not. The issue has subsequently been the source of conflict between parents and schools and employees and employers and has spilled into other areas of education such as physical education, particularly swimming lessons.

The issue of wearing the headscarf has elicited various levels of response in the project countries and with all other aspects of Muslim life the experiences of Muslims and the responses of the authorities differ from country to country. In Germany, Muslim women who cover their heads usually find themselves excluded from employment in the public sector unless they agree to remove it. Only those religious education teachers who teach elective classes in a native language are exempt from the prohibition, other teachers are not allowed to wear headscarves because the German State requires staff to dress in an 'ideologically neutral' fashion which means that although female students may wear headscarves, female Muslim teachers cannot.

Although in other project countries there are not necessarily official rules in place that bar the wearing of the hijab there continues to be discrimination against Muslim women who choose to wear it, in the UK, for example, in spite of the relatively high visibility of Muslim women working in chain stores, banks, supermarkets, etc, women still encounter hostility and negativity in less enlightened workplaces. There have recently been a number of cases in which Muslim women have had to take their employers to court or file a grievance against them for unfair dismissal rooted in the headscarf.

Furthermore, 7.5% of the complaints to the Equal Opportunities Centre in Belgium reports involved work and employment which included racist and anti-Muslim attitudes by employers: for example, discrimination during the hiring process due to the headscarf or a 'foreign' sounding name, discrimination in promotions and transfers and regulations about time off that do not allow for Muslim holidays. In 1996 the Dutch Commission for Equal

Treatment received 14 complaints about religious discrimination, some of these were from Muslims and most concerned 'women wearing headscarves during work' and praying during working hours.

Further issues pertinent to Muslim communities in particular involve issues such as Muslim cemeteries, halal butchers, mosque building and education. Throughout the project countries, concerns have been raised by Muslim communities about these matters with varying levels of response from the relevant state authorities. With reference to cemeteries the project has ascertained that provision for Muslim burial rites is at best patchy and at worst non-existent. In Belgium and Switzerland, for example, there are currently no Muslim cemeteries and there are insufficient Muslim plots provided in the limited number of public cemeteries, although in the Netherlands and the UK there are a number of Muslim cemeteries. Furthermore, host country public health regulations are often incompatible with the traditions of Muslim communities. *Halal* meat is also an issue that is approached differently by the project countries, in that some states allow the slaughter of animals according to Islamic rite and others, such as Germany and Switzerland, do not, thus necessitating the importation of *halal* meat from other countries.

With regards to state funded Muslim education, it has only been very recently in the UK that permission has been granted for the establishment of grant maintained Muslim schools (for further information on this topic, see Turney (1999) 'Muslim Voices' in the European Union: 'Multiculturalism' & 'Equal Opportunities' in Education). In other project countries, Muslim schools have also been established although the majority of them continue to be privately funded.

It would appear that the situation with regards to measures for practising Islam in schools, that is, prayer facilities, dress and dietary obligations, are not met by each member state equally. Britain has progressed some way by allowing Muslim girls to dress according to Islamic instructions, non-participation in certain activities (e.g. swimming), the celebration Islamic festivals and providing *halal* school meals, however, these kinds of provisions are usually at the discretion of the individual school and some Muslim students continue to encounter problems. Switzerland and Italy, especially as the latter is a fairly recent country of immigration, have not quite reached the same level of advancement and there are still cases of confrontation between schools and parents. In order for Muslim children to

concentrate on the objective of attending school, gaining an education, these issues certainly require further consideration.

The reports also indicate quite clearly that there is an anti-Muslim or Islamophobic discourse present in the media although it is often contradictory and there is often a distinct difference between portrayals of Muslims in the national media and coverage in local media. The mainstream media, at present, seems to constitute the most powerful medium for the propagation of anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim discourse, particularly in terms of engendering a conceptual link between ‘negativity’ and Islam.

Researchers in Belgium have argued that the category of ‘religion’ should be added to the list of factors to cover this form of discrimination as awareness of this limitation in the law, allows racist texts and commentaries to abuse ‘Muslims’ rather than ‘North Africans’ thus allowing writers to escape penal sanctions. In Britain, as in Belgium, Muslims who have been the victims of discrimination have had to take their cases to court on grounds of either racial or sexual discrimination as the law does not recognise religious discrimination. Introducing appropriate legislation in these countries would end the need for individuals to tailor their grievances to fit current legal provisions. In its Second Review of the 1976 Race Relations Act the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) identified several areas where current legislation may need attention: firstly, there is no law in Britain that protects people from religious discrimination; secondly there is no law in Britain concerning incitement to religious hatred; thirdly, current blasphemy laws only protects the established Christian religion.

It is clear from the available evidence, that despite fairly comprehensive legislation in some regions that adequate application of the law is not easily accomplished. Further, in certain areas, such as housing, education and public services, discrimination continues as these areas are not yet covered by the legal system. Whether this discrimination is a result of specific institutional structures or an inability (or unwillingness) on the part of authorities to enforce equal opportunity laws is an issue that requires further examination.

It is difficult to discern religious discrimination from racial discrimination and xenophobia. French, Italian and Swiss researchers, for example, felt that the anti-*immigrant* feeling was more prominent than a specific anti-Muslim discourse; many of the migrants in these countries are also Muslims and thus anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim sentiments become intertwined as anti-immigrant rhetoric is expressed in an anti-Muslim fashion. This is

aggravated by a perception (which is exacerbated by right-wing political groups) that immigrants deprive the host population of employment opportunities.

Addressing the issue of incitement to religious hatred is laborious and proving that such incitement has occurred is difficult. The Italians and Dutch point out that this is because the line between opinion and incitement is blurred and therefore recommend improvements in legislation against incitement.

Political representation varies at the level of the national and the local. In Britain, for example, Muslims are beginning to establish themselves in local politics, but with the exception of one Muslim Labour MP, they have not yet really achieved national status (in Italy and Greece, of course, political participation is moving at a slower pace because of comparatively recent nature of immigration). Belgium and Greece have also witnessed the emergence of Muslim political representation, however, in Switzerland and Germany for example, Muslims find themselves excluded from the political process and from representing Muslims in elections. Where they have been able to, however, leaders in local government have brought about changes to the running of institutions such as schools, hospitals, government offices (for example, *halal* food, modifying dress codes, prayer facilities) and are involved in consultation with service providers for a more culturally sensitive way of delivering services.

Overall, this project has identified and begun a broad examination of the need to study Muslim communities as Muslims rather than as 'ethnic minorities'. Certainly any attempt on the part of local and national authorities to deal with issues relating to equal opportunities, integration, etc, must consider that any attempt to by-pass this identity will probably not result in any great success. Although the ethnicity of Muslim communities in Europe may vary from region to region, their concerns and their articulation of their concerns, needs and requirements are fairly standard and in keeping with the basic tenets of their religious identity. Certainly it would not be valid to assert that Muslim communities are the only communities in Europe that are experiencing discrimination, exclusion and marginalisation as other settler communities also suffer from social, economic and political exclusion. This project and the reports written by the various project partners make clear that the importance of examining a discourse that negatively impacts upon Muslim communities lies in its intersection with other forms of discrimination that are rooted in xenophobia, race, ethnicity, gender and class. What these reports have revealed is that

Muslim communities are susceptible to discrimination in terms of employment, underachievement in education, infant mortality, or ghettoisation, exclusion (in some countries) from public schools partly because of their religious convictions or the refusal to acknowledge their cultural and religious identity.

These reports have presented a descriptive and analytical account of Muslims in Europe and a number of conceptual and methodological issues have been examined. These reports have also examined the socio-historical mechanisms by which marginalisation and exclusion have occurred and within which identity is constructed have been established as the context within which a politicised 'Muslim Voice' has emerged. These accounts provide some analysis of the ways in which the 'Muslim Voice' has become politicised and also highlight those areas for which policy needs to be re-evaluated and those areas in which inequalities and double standards need to be addressed.

## **PHASE TWO**

### **THE EMPLOYMENT OF MUSLIMS WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO ISSUES OF GENDER**

The second phase of the project was both shorter and targeted at employment with a particular reference to gender issues. In this sense it was more of a micro-sociology and the empirical research concentrated on a few qualitative case studies. Thus, this phase of the project also relied upon a more specific and focussed set of analytical issues and methodological concerns. It is, therefore, necessary to present some of these issues as an introduction to the substantive part, which follows.

#### **ANALYTICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS**

In the past, literature concerning race, gender and class has focused almost exclusively on each area individually, as discrete categories that can be separated and analysed apart, without reference to the intersections between these, or other issues at the root of exclusion and marginalisation, such as religion, age, sexuality, nationality. With the emergence of the movements of 'third world' and black feminists, these issues have begun to be taken into consideration jointly, and there is a slowly growing body of literature dedicated to exploring the interconnections between different forms of marginalisation and discrimination and how these impact on identities, social structures and the position of individuals in the labour market.

Ethnic minority women in Europe find themselves at the convergence of combined forms of discrimination due to their specific position in society. Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1992) note that ethnic minority women suffer on the following counts:

- Ø as migrants, disadvantaged legally, politically and economically;
- Ø through racist attitudes and practices in society;
- Ø as women, affected by sexist attitudes and practices;
- Ø as members of particular classes, which then dictates the type of employment available to them.

The stereotypes that surround ethnic minority women in Britain, for example as passive victims, only serve to justify and perpetuate these attitudes and forms of discrimination. Until relatively recently, feminist theories had consistently failed to address the different facets of oppression experienced by women. Beginning from the premise that a given unity exists between all women, they failed to acknowledge differences in nationality, race, religion, culture and class. Even when theories were mediated by the recognition of the extent of the impact of class differences, differences in ethnicity and culture were not incorporated. Westwood (1984) emphasises the need to explore the links between race, class and gender, in order to be sensitive to the specificities of the position of ethnic minority women.

*We cannot use a simple unity 'woman' as the basis of our understanding; instead, we have to posit real women, human beings formed and sustained materially in a specific social formation who may, nevertheless, have come from other cultures and another part of the global economic system (Westwood, 1984; p9).*

Lutz et al (1995) describe the divisions in the feminist movement represented by the assertion that 'the personal is political', in its own socio-economic context a radical statement forging acceptance of the relevance of the private, female, sphere to the public, male, domain and the interconnectedness of the worlds of production and reproduction, which nevertheless makes assumptions about the nature of the 'personal' as an objective reality. This does not take into account the different experiences and constructions of the 'personal' in the ways that women position themselves in relation to others, affected by specific social relations within different communities. This effectively essentialises gender differences and marginalises the experiences of women who were not white, middle class and failed to tackle discrimination on the basis of different forms of oppression. Women will not always prioritise the effects of gender discrimination because of the shared experience of being female, when oppression on the basis of race, for example, may result in significantly more adverse effects on a daily basis.

The understanding of the necessity to treat different forms of discrimination on the basis of race, gender and class as highly interconnected has given rise to alternative theories surrounding the position of ethnic minority women in British society today. I focus here particularly on the literature examining the position of ethnic minority women in the labour market.

In assessing labour market participation, the first obstacle is the lack of satisfactory data regarding the employment of ethnic minorities (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992; Phizacklea, 1994). Official statistics, from Labour Force Surveys for example, fail to show true rates of economic activity, as this obscures activity in the informal sector, family labour and home-working. Neither do they present an accurate picture of the distribution within sectors of ethnic minority employment, of which the majority tends to be in the lowest level jobs, or ghettoised within certain industries (see for example Phizacklea, 1994; Westwood, 1984 & 1988; Brah, 1994).

### **1. Culturalist and Structuralist approaches**

Approaches to the assessment of the position of ethnic minorities in society can be broadly divided into the 'culturalist' approach and 'structural' approach. Culturalist theories focus on the cultural differences between communities and the advantages or disadvantages these may present in terms of work opportunities, for example hard work and risk taking, the ability to exploit an 'ethnic niche' in the economy, or the limitations placed on women's participation in public life. This approach has been heavily criticised (Phizacklea, 1988; Westwood and Bhachu, 1988; Brah, 1994) as it presents minority women as passive victims and fails to see culture as dynamic and affected by the social and economic context.

*To start with the lived experience of black and minority women in British society and generate explanations within the structure of that society is itself a critique of common-sense accounts in which ethnic and cultural elements were abstracted from the whole structure of relations of which they were a part. Cultures were dissected and pieces of them offered as a means of understanding minority peoples and their lives...Once we dispense with this and present a material and dynamic account of cultures and ethnicities we can see the ways in which cultures and ideologies, and cultures and economics, are embedded within one another. (Westwood and Bhachu, 1988; p11).*

Phizacklea (1988) asserts that, aside from being a racist explanation for the disadvantages minority groups face, culturalist theories which claim that ethnic minorities are best placed to become successful 'ethnic entrepreneurs' give no explanation for changes in employment over generations, nor do they take into account the racial discrimination, harassment and violence that reduce the alternatives. Rationalising the use of women's labour at home and their 'natural skills' as stemming from cultural limitations on alternative employment, overlooks the necessity of unpaid labour to make an enterprise economically viable and in effect justifies exploitation.

In addition to culture, Brah (1994) highlights the importance of structure and agency to the lives of the young Muslim women in her study, and posits that any explanation of the position of Muslim women in the labour market must account for the following: the history of colonialism and imperialism and the timing of migration, the recent restructuring of national and global economies and the concurrent changing structure of labour markets, state policies, particularly immigration control, racial discrimination in the labour market and the segmentation of labour markets by gender, class, age and ethnic background.

The structural approach, which takes into account these historical and material dimensions, is able to analyse the distinctive position of ethnic minority women in the labour market, particularly of Muslim women who are concentrated in some of the lowest-paid, low-skill work in manufacturing and the service industry with lower average earnings than white women. This, the structural approach suggests, is not due to cultural factors, but rather a combination of the factors listed above, which together force Muslim women into a particularly unfavourable position in the labour market. This approach examines empirical and historical evidence to address how labour is socially constructed and framed within personal narratives and collective histories (Brah, 1994). It is essential when examining culture that it is seen within the structures of power in which it exists.

## **2. Historical setting**

The situation of ethnic minorities and employment today is framed within the context of colonialism where men and women from Africa, Asia and the Caribbean came to Europe to take on the lowest paid jobs, which the indigenous population were unwilling to accept. From this colonial background originates the forms of gendered racism ethnic minority women face in the labour market today. The subordinate class position in which many ethnic minorities still find themselves is also affected by their concentration in declining industries, such as manufacturing, and consequently a higher representation among the unemployed. Many Muslim women joining their husbands arrived to a recession and their employment options were thus immediately limited. In this climate, home-working or supporting a family business through unpaid labour were among the few options open to them. Those who did not arrive as dependents, but for economic reasons, themselves faced a similarly constricted range of options. The image of ethnic minority men as a threat to men's employment and of their wives as dependents has continued to shape the views of teachers, careers officers and employers, negatively affecting women's employment

prospects today (Brah, 1994). Lutz et al (1995) suggest that women from minority cultures are often accorded a symbolic role as representatives of their nation and its honour, and with respect to Muslims, this is symbolised powerfully by the veil, a stereotype that perpetuates images of passivity and has the effect of silencing women and assuming vulnerability. The reality, however, as empirical evidence from Brah's research (1994) shows is that the majority of Muslim women regard paid work for women as a high priority and their earnings are indispensable to the household budget. Those who do not work due to cultural constraints are few, and they may still envisage a different future for their daughters, yet the cultural stereotype of the dependent and oppressed Muslim woman persists.

### **3. Recent political and economic changes**

Over the past two decades, recession, along with the growth of multi-national companies and the rapid emergence of new technology, has led to a radical restructuring of work on a global level. This has resulted in a casualisation of employment, deskilling and downsizing, the adoption of 'flexible' labour practices, a deterioration in working conditions generally and, with the power of trade unions also diminishing, the worker has ever less control over the production process and increasing insecurity at work. As the production process searches out the cheapest production costs and lowest overheads in order to maximise profit, a high proportion of jobs available are temporary or casual with short-term contracts and a lack of associated benefits such as holiday or sick pay. The workers who are most susceptible to exploitation by these kinds of working conditions are the low qualified or low skilled, and particularly those working in declining industries. Since there is a high concentration of ethnic minorities and migrants in low-level, low-pay jobs, in manufacturing, the retail industry, the service and informal sectors, and a low concentration in growth industries, they suffer disproportionately. Ethnic minority women especially, are affected unfavourably by these changes as the segregation of the labour market has resulted in a concentration of women in the lowest paying jobs. Many women are forced to accept home-working as an option, through lack of other alternatives outside the home, or in order to combine work with caring responsibilities. (see Allen and Wolkowitz, 1987; Tate, 1994; Mitter, 1986).

Phizacklea (1994) questions the benefits of the Single European Market for ethnic minority residents. Although there are 15 million minority citizens in Europe, they do not enjoy the same freedom of movement as white Europeans. Immigration and settlement policies place

restrictions on 'third country' residents, which means they are unable to move around to improve their situation in terms of work or living conditions. She also identifies an increase in racism, but a lack of political will to tackle it through legal protection. Labour markets remain racialised and gendered, and a single market is likely only to further polarise this situation. Lutz et al (1995) also point to the growth in nationalism in Europe, which rather than generating a sense of belonging and unification as Anderson (1983) had suggested, particularly in relation to independence struggles, delineates powerful boundaries of inclusion and exclusion. The creation of 'Fortress Europe' employs a new nationalism to maintain internal cohesion by marginalising all but the dominant ethnic group. Minority women are not only more likely to be marginalised in employment but are also adversely affected by strict immigration and settlement laws which often class women as dependents, thus becoming central to the nationalist project:

*It is clear that although women are differentiated by 'race' and nation, they are centrally positioned within the exclusions and inclusions of nationalism and racism (Lutz et al, 1995; p13).*

#### **4. Gender, race and class discrimination in the labour market**

The labour market is not only racialised, but gendered also, and ethnic minority women are thus doubly disadvantaged in this respect. The employment opportunities of both white and ethnic minority women are restricted due to domestic responsibilities, lack of child care facilities and the segmentation of the labour market. Class disadvantage comes into play here, as women working for low wages cannot afford to pay for domestic help or child care. As Westwood (1984) illustrates graphically with her study of women working on the factory floor of a hosiery department, there is still a strong link between what is seen as 'women's work' and domestically-based skills. What are conceived of as 'natural' skills of dexterity, sewing, mending and so on are done by women, whilst control over the labour process and technological skills and expertise are predominantly concentrated in the hands of men, also according them power over women's earnings and time. In the case of home-workers, the connection with the home is physical, reinforcing this association. All of the women involved worked a double shift, undertaking domestic responsibilities in addition to their day at the factory. Westwood defines this exploitation of women's labour as the material basis for patriarchal power, maintaining women in a position subordinate to men. The intersection of discrimination on the basis of sex and race means that ethnic minority women are most likely

to hold the lowest level and lowest paid jobs. Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1992) demonstrate how racial and sexist exclusion become most apparent in family labour within ethnic businesses. Unskilled, repetitive machining work is reserved for women, whereas the entrepreneurial skill and control of the enterprise is monopolised by men. Anthias and Yuval-Davis emphasise the fine intersection between gender, race and class in this situation: class and race disadvantage in the labour market may be overcome through self-employment, but at the expense of increased patriarchal gender relations. Particularly significant to the feminist debate however, is that in the face of extensive racial discrimination in the labour market, they highlight the fact that the women involved do not necessarily see this coping strategy as exploitation; the family may in this situation become a site of resistance rather than oppression. Similarly, Phizacklea (1988) stresses that although in focusing on ethnic ties as a resource has the positive effect of moving away from an emphasis on ethnic minorities as passive victims, it simultaneously obscures the patriarchal gender relations inherent in this situation. Businesses such as textiles, catering and retail are labour-intensive and can only survive on unpaid family labour, which may explain why there is a higher proportion of Asian self-employment than Afro-Caribbean for example; the family structure and availability of unpaid labour becomes a prerequisite for the success of the business. Women in the ethnic economy are therefore not 'free labourers' in the capitalist system; they do not receive financial reward for their labour, and do not share an identical class situation, but are working under patriarchal relations of production. In encouraging ethnic business as the creation of alternative employment in the face of recession, the state therefore supports a gender specific and ethnically segregated low pay labour market for women.

## **5. Women and the state**

Ethnic minority women's position in the labour market cannot therefore be explained solely on the basis of a lack of qualifications and language skills or by cultural restrictions; this is clearly not the case for second and third generation immigrants above all. Phizacklea (1994) claims that the state plays a significant role in shaping job status through immigration policy. It is not only work permit allocations and recruitment policies that limit opportunities for ethnic minority women, but family reunion policies. The necessity to prove availability of funds to support one's spouse entering the country without recourse to state benefits is likely to force people into informal sector work, particularly as access to the labour market is not always granted immediately. Successive immigration acts have imposed rigorous restrictions on the entry to Britain of commonwealth citizens and their spouses, so that although the

ideology of the nuclear family is firmly supported by the state, this does not appear to extend to migrant families (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992). Across Europe, migrant families find themselves in a similar position making citizenship, argue Anthias and Yuval-Davis, a racialised and gendered concept.

Ethnic minorities already established in Britain may also see the state in predatory terms, according to Westwood (1984). The lack of facilities for child care or care of the sick and elderly restricts women's employment options, yet women can be reluctant to devolve the caring responsibilities to the state and thus a measure of control. The state can all too often be seen as anti-family, especially for women who have experienced racism at the hands of social services, police, education and health authorities.

## **6. Theorising exclusion and marginality**

Allen (1994) argues that simple dichotomous categorising of, for example, black and white, ethnic and non-ethnic, leads to the exclusion and marginalisation of all who do not exactly fit these categories. It is equally important to take into consideration how people perceive themselves, in addition to how they are perceived and treated by others. It becomes clear that with regard to gender, class and race, it is difficult to construct discrete categories to explain people's experiences. As Allen comments,

*In Europe many people have mixed affiliations and origins. Social scientists need to explore the conditions under which these are productive and creative and those which promote them as destructive and alien (Allen, 1994; p100).*

The complexities of the interaction of subordinate positions based on race, class and gender relations need to be explored within the broader social context. Questions of identity with regard to gender, ethnicity, race, nationality and religion have too often been considered irrelevant to the economic situation and having little effect on the market and production relations. While it is apparent that the social, economic and political structure affects the position of individuals in the labour market, and therefore their agency, it is also true that individual identities, and social relations impact on societal structure and consequently social change. Allen asserts the importance of considering identity as '*a social product located in time and space. It is not a fixed static entity, but has to be seen as a dynamic process*' (1994; p90). When analysing issues of race, class and gender it is impossible to separate different forms of subordination and establish a hierarchy. Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1992) likewise underline the importance of recognising how different forms of oppression interact and relate. Although analytically, discourses can be separated, the reality of experience is not

easily divisible into categories as each level of discrimination due to race, class or gender is practiced in the context of the others.

*[s]exism and racism have to be analytically separated, but...the issue of equal opportunities has to connect together the different ways in which gender, race and class are intertwined in the concrete experience and practice of disadvantage and exclusion (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992; p128).*

## **SUBSTANTIVE ACCOUNT**

The second phase of the project looks at the position of Muslims in Europe regarding employment. This phase expands on the preliminary accounts given in phase one, analysing the employment situation in greater detail and the involvement of Muslims in, or exclusion from, the labour market, in both the formal and informal sectors, legal and illegal work. Each partner country gives an overview of the types of work Muslims are employed in, the work available to Muslims, and possible reasons for unemployment, examining why the position of Muslims in the labour market may be weak and problems faced by Muslims while seeking employment. The research examines the distribution of Muslims in employment in terms of geographical location in rural and urban sectors, in terms of vocation, and in terms of income levels. It also addresses educational and generational differences within the Muslim communities and their impact on employment choices or barriers. Evidence of the existence of discrimination in the labour market is explored and the restrictions this imposes on Muslim employment choices. The extent of the involvement of Muslims in Trade Union activities and Muslim organisations gives some indication of the effectiveness of the mechanisms available to combat discriminatory practices. In addition, the proportion of Muslims who are self-employed, or involved in 'ethnic enterprises' charts employment choices and employment opportunities open to Muslims.

This phase focuses in particular on the situation of Muslim women in Europe in the labour market, using case studies and life histories to illustrate the specific experiences and obstacles encountered by Muslim women relating to their work trajectories. Micro-level studies investigate the levels and forms of participation in paid work through examining entry into the labour market, the types of work undertaken, working conditions experienced, expectations and attitudes of the worker, her family and her employer, and the choices or lack of choices available to Muslim women. The reports also explore identity formation; how factors of religion, nationality, gender and age converge, and how self-perceptions are

affected by the position of the women in society, in the labour market, in the community and in the family.

This exploration of the participation of Muslims in the labour market and the levels of representation of Muslims in certain areas of the economy is intended to contribute to the analysis of the presence of a 'Muslim Voice' in Europe and the extent of the inclusion or marginalisation of Muslims in each of the partner countries. The reports give descriptive and analytical accounts of issues pertinent to the Muslim communities concerning employment, and how discriminatory employment practices on the basis of religion intersect with those of gender, race and class, resulting in economic, social, political and cultural marginalisation. The responses of the Muslim communities, of the host societies and of the state to social exclusion, are used to formulate policy recommendations to improve the integration and participation of Muslims in Europe.

### **1. Recent developments in the labour market**

An analysis of Muslims and employment must necessarily be framed in the context of the profound socio-economic changes that have occurred on a global level over the last two decades. Globalisation and the changes in the nature of work and employment patterns have transformed labour market participation in Europe. Deregulation of the labour market and the necessity to reduce labour costs have resulted in production becoming increasingly decentralised, forcing companies to employ a cheap and flexible workforce employed on a casual basis in order to remain competitive. As multinationals gain more power, companies move to where the production costs are lower, forcing workers to settle for lower wages and unfavourable options such as outsourcing, subcontracting, home-working and part-time, temporary contracts. When the terms of employment are casualised, the employer has no obligations or legal responsibilities to the worker, rendering the worker vulnerable to the whims of the employer and the market, thus leading a precarious, insecure existence, and more likely to experience poverty. In smaller companies, effective unions are less likely to function; where the worker is not formally employed there are no channels open to protest against unfair employment practices. Casual workers can find themselves exploited in terms of low pay, absence of benefits (for example sick pay or holiday pay), long, anti-social hours, a heavy workload, and a lack of work security. Workers prepared to accept such conditions are those with no other alternative: throughout Europe there is an abnormally high

concentration of immigrants (both legal and illegal) working in the informal sector and in low-paid jobs. Furthermore, the working population is now growing in size, with a much higher proportion of women in the labour market. An increase in the number of non-manual jobs and a decline in manufacturing, along with a growth in the service sector and the number of part-time jobs, has resulted in an increase in unemployment and underemployment (particularly male), and an increase in the number of low-paid, part-time service sector jobs, mainly filled by women, bringing about the ‘feminisation’ of the immigrant working population. In all the partner countries those at the bottom end of the employment scale in insecure, temporary, part-time and low-paid jobs are disproportionately from immigrant or settler communities.

In such a climate of insecurity in the labour market, immigrant communities can come to be seen as a threat in the competition for scarce employment, housing and public services, exacerbating existing prejudices in society against immigrants in general, and manifested as racist or religious discrimination. Thus, even established settler communities can be negatively affected by discrimination in the labour market, intensified by recent socio-economic change. As the Belgian report notes, this phenomenon “*is rooted in both the social effects of the economy’s structural transformations and society’s endemic ethnic discrimination*” (p170). The reports show these employment patterns to be replicated across Europe, albeit with some regional differences. The German economy, for example, faces particular problems due to a rise in unemployment resulting from German reunification and increased competition arising from the opening up of East European markets. Differing immigration histories (detailed in phase I) and geographical location mean that the settler communities in each partner country are distinct from each other in terms of nationalities, time of arrival, establishment of communities and support organisations etc. Immigration policies also vary widely, affecting the status and opportunities for settler communities. The immigrant communities are constantly changing, either through the different socialisation processes of second and third generation Muslims, or through new immigrant communities made up of refugees and asylum seekers currently establishing themselves, notably from Former Yugoslavia. In addition, each report also emphasises the fact that the Muslim communities *within* each country are not a monolithic bloc, but are heterogeneous, and composed of different sub groups. The diversity of Muslims in Europe becomes apparent. Muslims may be recently arrived or temporary immigrants, refugees or asylum seekers, or settlers granted EU citizenship who represent an established minority group. They may also

be second or third generation Muslim immigrants, or those native to the partner country who have converted to Islam. The purpose of focusing on *Muslims* in the European Union in this project is to investigate how a group in society with a common social characteristic, namely religious affiliation, has been affected by socio-economic change and the extent to which they suffer from social exclusion as a result.

## **2. Muslim workers**

Evidence from all the partner countries suggests that atypical working patterns, in conjunction with low wages and labour market immobility are responsible for an atypical social life and conditions of poverty for many Muslims in Europe, resulting in marginalisation or exclusion from society. Although Muslims across Europe occupy a wide variety of positions and levels in most sectors of the economy, there is a high concentration to be found at the lowest end of the job market. Many hold part-time, flexible, temporary jobs and are invisible in statistics. Recent immigrants are often employed as unskilled or semi-skilled workers due to a lack of language skills and/or qualifications, or due to the intention of returning home. In Germany for example, migrants are largely employed in mining, manufacturing, commerce, hotels, restaurants and construction. As heavy industry and manufacturing have been particularly affected by the restructuring of the economy, migrants are also most adversely affected by job losses. Seasonal workers employed in the agricultural sector, hotel and building trades in Switzerland are recognised to have the lowest status, living without their families on low wages and in poor housing conditions. In Greece and Italy, migrants find seasonal work as builders and unskilled industrial and agricultural workers, or work in the retail industry. Amongst the migrant Gypsy populations in Greece, work is found as street vendors, cleaners and conveyor's assistants. In the UK, different minority groups tend to be concentrated in different industries; South Asian Muslims for example, are concentrated in the textiles and clothing industry and, more generally, in transport and communications. There are also a large number of Muslims, particularly women, employed in the service sector in many European countries, as hotel and restaurant workers, domestic help, cleaners and porters. These workers often do not have contracts, health insurance or holiday entitlement and are forced to work long hours for low wages. There is a low representation of Muslims in senior positions and management levels in most European countries. In the UK, where there are a considerable number of Muslims employed in the medical profession, these statistics mask the fact that they are often employed in inner city areas with a lack of resources. The perception of Muslims in Belgium as a problem-

generating social category, plus the division of society into ethnic classes maintains the low-status of Muslim workers. Furthermore, increased restrictions are placed on immigrants due to immigration policies and employment regulations. In Switzerland for example, only Swiss nationals can be employed in the public sector. In Greece, undocumented Albanian migrants are unable to receive welfare benefits despite making social security contributions through labour market activity.

Muslims in Europe are also more strongly represented amongst the unemployed. Research has shown that when the economy contracts, the unemployment rate of minorities rises faster (see Modood, 1997). In the UK, even in cities with relatively small minority populations, they account for a disproportionately large number of the unemployed. The proportion of young unemployed men from ethnic minorities is considerably higher than for young white men, even with the same levels of education and qualifications. These statistics are similar in the other partner countries, for example in Germany the sectors with the highest levels of unemployment are those with the highest proportions of Muslim immigrants. A high level of unemployment is therefore common amongst immigrants, despite the fact that the majority of the immigrant population is of employable age. In Switzerland, permanent resident migrants are three times more likely to be unemployed than Swiss nationals. In Italy, although long-term unemployment is not a common problem for Muslim workers, the majority change or lose jobs frequently, leading to precarious employment.

Faced with discrimination and marginalisation, the relationship to the host society invariably alters, and with it the participation of Muslims in public life. The Belgian report posits two models of Muslim immigrant participation, as *communitarians*, and *assimilationists*. The communitarians demonstrate a strong ethnic or community presence and an adherence to their cultural background. A strong attachment to Islam is not viewed as a barrier to participation in society, but should infer honesty, and mental stability. Representation through Muslim associations and groups is used as a means to facilitate their acceptance by Belgian society. The assimilationists on the other hand, participate as citizens in the host country's political structures and associations as a way of combating racism, discrimination and exclusion. They associate the negative image of Islam created in Europe with their exclusion from society and therefore aim to keep their faith private, whilst working to eliminate discrimination on religious grounds by entering "*the fora of democracy where power is wielded*" (p166). Muslims interviewed in Belgium were found to occupy a range of positions between these two poles; comparisons can be drawn with responses from

interviewees in other partner countries also. The two models depict key mechanisms for coping with exclusion from the host society. Specific survival strategies may include accessing family or community networks to find work in the informal sector, setting up small businesses, or resorting to illegal activities.

As a consequence of the difficulties for minority groups in securing employment in the formal sector, they become over-represented in the informal economy. The informal economy covers a wide range of activities, some legal and others illegal, including tax evasion, unpaid economic activities undertaken for the household or friends, the criminal economy or any profitable activity undertaken outside of legal obligations. Employers exploit the lack of alternatives available to immigrants by using clandestine workers who are cheaper and more flexible than legal labour. Illegal labour often corresponds to illegal residence and this is also reflected in the crime statistics: the number of resident immigrants sentenced in Switzerland is 1.3 times higher than among Swiss citizens of the same age and 8 times higher among asylum seekers, the differential here mainly due to infractions of the Federal Law on the Stay and the Establishment of Immigrants. Asylum seekers and refugees in Germany cannot work without a work permit; in Switzerland they must wait for three months from filing the application, and in both cases they therefore often become hidden, illegal labour. Immigrants from outside the EU, for example Turks in Germany have limited conditions of residence in the EU and can easily become illegal workers due to pressure to engage in atypical employment. Homeworking is increasingly common, but often crosses borders into illegality with respect to safety conditions and rates of pay or because the income is undeclared. The Netherlands emphasises the vague distinction between the informal and formal sectors, which means that legislation can be difficult or unfavourable to enforce, but it appears that those who profit most from the informal economy are young and well-skilled, rather than illegal workers with little education, who are also forced to the lower end of the informal economy.

A rise in immigrant entrepreneurship is evident in virtually all of the partner countries. Faced with a lack of employment options, self-employment can be interpreted as a way to avoid exclusion in the labour market; the fact that the levels of self-employment, especially amongst minority groups, increases with a rise in unemployment would appear to illustrate this. Immigrant communities and minority groups are able to take advantage of social networks (e.g. family labour) and ethnic niches in the economy (e.g. *halal* food), although many have expanded considerably beyond the 'ethnic economy'. This implies that although

ethnic enterprises may become established through exploiting an ethnic niche, they are not a marginal segment and can “*play an important bridge function between sending and receiving countries in economic, political, social and cultural terms*”. (Germany, p40). The French report suggests that discrimination comes into play particularly at the *threshold* of the world of business and immigrants therefore retreat into sectors such as shop keeping and restaurants to cope with exclusion. Small firms are favoured by the rise of the service sector and the growth of the financial sector and immigrants are able to take advantage of opportunities in self-employment in small businesses which can meet unstable demand, and necessitate only a small amount of capital, in addition to using family labour resources. The development of ethnic enterprises in Italy is credited to gaps left by native Italians in, for example, productive craftsmanship and services. The Dutch report, however, also highlights similarities between migrant and non-migrant entrepreneurs based on age, education levels and (low) participation of female entrepreneurs. They suggest that cultural background is only one aspect pertinent to small enterprises, concluding that the high percentage of ethnic enterprises is due rather to long-term unemployment of minorities. The main impetus for self-employment among minorities in the UK was found to be unemployment, underemployment, job dissatisfaction and blocked opportunities, with racism being seen as a significant factor.

Activities of first generation or recent immigrants are most often confined to the types of employment enumerated above. Career paths of subsequent generations and of younger immigrants with higher levels of education tend to be more diverse and more evenly spread across different sectors of the labour market. It is apparent, however, that even with native language skills and educational qualifications, difficulties are still experienced by Muslims in Europe in terms of employment. The micro level studies of the career paths of Muslim women illustrate some of the problems experienced and issues of importance to Muslim women and employment.

### **3. Muslim women and employment**

In focusing on Muslim women and employment, the project explores connections between gender, marginality, Islam and work. In general, the research concludes that Muslim women are more marginalised in society than men, due to a combination of different factors, but sees increasing participation in the labour market despite obstacles. Many of the difficulties Muslim women face in the labour market are the same as for Muslim men, comprising racism and religious discrimination, the lack of secure, full-time positions available, lack of

language skills and qualifications in some cases, high levels of unemployment, restrictions of immigration policies etc. The growth of the service sector has resulted in lower unemployment levels for Muslim women than men due to increased opportunities in this sector, albeit in very low-paid and insecure employment. However, there is a much higher concentration of women, both Muslim and non-Muslim, in part-time employment, work associated with lower pay, lower status and fewer possibilities for promotion. In addition they face the sexual division of work and gender discrimination in the labour market. As the French report highlights, *“Being a working woman, who is also an immigrant and a Muslim, provides three possibilities for discrimination in the labour market and three areas of vulnerability in such a market”* (p 4). The specific employment choices, career paths, types of work undertaken and work preferences of the women interviewed for this project are shown to be extremely diverse and varied depending on levels of education, qualifications, length of time spent in the partner country, nationality, age, culture, generation, family responsibilities and relationship with Islam. The life histories that make up part of this project illustrate the extent of the marginalisation of Muslim women in Europe and describe their different ways of coping with social exclusion due to their ‘Muslimness’. A wide variety of women participated in the interviews, of different ages, nationalities and levels of education; some who were born in the partner country and others who were recent immigrants, in order to gain a more complete picture of the lives of Muslim women in Europe.

Inequality and segregation in the labour market is often based on nationality (those women with citizenship of the host country have access to a greater number and variety of jobs), education (qualifications from the country of residence lead to a greater possibility of professional integration), language skills (native language skills also grant access to a higher status jobs) and relationship to Islam (headscarf wearing women find themselves discriminated against in secular states). A combination of all these factors is more likely to lead to reduced opportunities, lower incomes and marginalisation from the labour market and society.

As a consequence of the type of employment engaged in, the women interviewed had varying relationships to their work, ranging from a way to provide financially for the household, or a means of earning extra income, to a means of attaining fulfilment, opportunity and independence. Those in the latter category, unsurprisingly, are younger, more educated and with the most stable employment.

The part-time, 'flexible', temporary, casualised labour described above, seems to be more common amongst Muslim women. In France, Muslim women frequently hold jobs in the 'mobile tertiary sector', comprising work such as private or domestic service and shop-keeping; only 16% are salaried employees in the public sector with its associated benefits. When difficulties are encountered in seeking employment, for example racism or religious discrimination due to names or wearing headscarves, women from several countries described how they must resort to informal networks and contacts in order to secure work. This requires a high degree of initiative, determination and flexibility. Some women reported that they did not wear a headscarf due to fear of discrimination or inability to find work; others searched for alternative types of employment, for example homeworking, self-employment, social or youth work (France, Germany, UK). Policies to create opportunities for Muslim women have failed due to assumptions that have been made and a lack of consultation. In the Netherlands for example special employment projects for immigrant women focused on domestic care and service industries, eliciting little response. Once in work, some women reported anti-Muslim sentiments or racist attitudes of their employers or colleagues. Most, though not all, are able to take time off for religious holidays, although this is either negotiated or taken as annual leave, rather than taken for granted.

The responses of the Muslim women interviewees to discrimination are varied. In Belgium for example, some of the women, on discovering that their position as immigrants would always determine the limits to their achievements, make a significant personal effort to move outside the immigrant community in order to be treated as Belgian women. They refuse to be restricted to the ethnic labour market and strive to be recognised as professionals, even though they realise it is easier for them to find work in these sectors. Others, however, struggle to neutralise the effects of this categorisation by acting as spokespeople for their communities. They publicly condemn the discrimination shown to them and their families and fight for equal treatment. Younger, headscarf wearing women aim to be accepted by society as Belgian Muslims and stress their right to practise their faith and participate fully in society.

Muslim women often find themselves in a position particularly vulnerable to discrimination due to their visibility if they wear a headscarf. A common sentiment was expressed in several reports that "*women wearing a headscarf are regarded as champions of an ideology that is incompatible with the basic principles of democracy*" (Germany, p49). The headscarf in the west is seen as a reactionary symbol of tradition and oppression, of sexual inequality

rather than an identity marker of their faith that they freely adopt. This can provoke a variety of reactions to the women concerned from hostility, to a desire to ‘emancipate’ (Germany, Switzerland) or ‘save’ the women from their patriarchal communities (Belgium), to discrimination on this basis in employment. The ‘neutrality’ of values in secular states causes the paradoxical discrimination by employers against women wearing headscarves, particularly in education or occupations involving substantial contact with the public. This conditions to a large extent the types of employment available to Muslim women, or the types of employment they will themselves consider. For example, it is for this reason that some Muslim women choose to be self-employed (for example a young Muslim woman in Germany who, after countless attempts to secure employment where she was always asked to remove her scarf, eventually started a community newspaper) or to work from home (for example many Muslim women of Pakistani origin in the UK who work at home sewing garments for the textile industry). Whereas non-practising Arab women working in Switzerland felt the labour market was open to all, women wearing headscarves have found the headscarf to be ‘incompatible’ with the labour market. Similarly, some Pakistani Muslim women in the UK held the belief that with adequate skills and qualifications, Muslims will not face discrimination in the labour market, but women wearing headscarves who have more contact with the community all condemn racist attitudes and comments towards them. Muslim women of Turkish origin living in Germany face the additional challenge to their choice to wear headscarves, as the issue is also fiercely debated in Turkey. Headscarves have become a self-conscious decision, particularly for women from the younger generation. Where for the older generation the headscarf is traditional, for younger women it represents greater freedom. They feel constantly challenged to defend their choice and justify their views, which has led them to acquire an in-depth knowledge of Islam and the Koran and a new self-understanding (Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands). In Germany, women known as ‘veiled feminists’ demand positions in political parties, criticise male interpretations of Sunna and patriarchal structures and deem gender-specific spatial segregation unnecessary. Ironically, protests have led to increased participation of pro-Islamic women in society and politics. Muslim women in the Netherlands have protested at the pressure on them to become ‘emancipated’, stressing that “‘*modernisation*’/*emancipation is not the same as westernisation or ‘Dutchification’*” (Netherlands, p20). In Belgium, the young headscarf wearers feel that their identity is challenged and their own responsibility goes unrecognised. They also feel that they are seen as a collective by Belgian society rather than as individuals

and are more likely to be considered 'fundamentalists'. On the contrary, their status as Belgian citizens, they believe, gives them the right to express their faith publicly and to be accepted as Belgians along with their faith, signalling "*the transition from politeness to politics*" (Belgium, p?). Headscarves thus, in certain situations, become a political attribute, "*instruments of reaction to mechanisms of domination, of mobilisation in public, and of claiming the right to equality*" (Belgium, p?). Similarly, the older generation of Muslim women interviewed in Germany see themselves as 'guests' in Germany who therefore ought to adapt to the host society, whereas the younger generation see the headscarf as compatible with German society: they have a constitutional right to practice their faith, they feel 'at home' in Germany, and therefore have the right to assert their interests.

The position of Muslim women in society appears to be quite distinct for different generations of immigrants. The first-generation working woman generally works out of necessity, with a very limited choice of insecure, low-paid work, such as manual work and cleaning. Women who arrived in the host country to reunite with their families felt isolated due to the absence of relatives and social contacts and the lack of language skills, thus becoming dependent on their husbands and children. Women who immigrated as children and were educated in the host country may also experience social instability and low status in the labour market. These women all stress the importance of education for their children in order to benefit from opportunities in society.

Women born in the host country, and having citizenship are the most likely to enjoy a sense of stability, socialisation and permanence and they hold the greatest variety of occupations in society. Work, rather than being a financial necessity is a symbol of fulfilment and opportunities in society. This group of women are also more likely to be critical of the labour market situation, holding the lack of acceptance of a different culture accountable for inequalities, rather than assuming that the lack of qualifications or language skills is responsible. Their identity is most often expressed in terms of their faith and the nationality of the host country, for example Muslim British women, whereas for their parents their identity is based on their nationality, Pakistani Muslim. The German report likewise suggests that self-definition for the younger generation is expressed via culture and religion: although links to the country of origin are weaker, links to Islam become stronger in order to "*achieve a new cultural justification of their minority status*" (p76). Even non-practising Muslims who have a greater attachment to their culture of origin assert that Islam plays an important role in their lives (Switzerland). However, there are also young Muslim women who prefer to be

discreet in their religious practices (France) or reject an Islamic identity altogether (Belgium). Belgium and France both draw on the work of Goffman (1975, 1984), to explain how the realisation of their stigmatisation in society affects the identity formation of young Muslim women and causes feelings of alienation and marginalisation. According to a Dutch study (Van der Zwaard, 1995), second generation immigrants have a different frame of reference: they have a sense of permanence and are more willing to “*discuss issues such as gender segregation, paternal authority and freedom of action*” (Netherlands, p20). The attitudes of the host society to second and third generation Muslim women is ambiguous: they are either regarded as doubly discriminated against because they face resistance both from within their community and from outside it, or conversely they are seen as having a privileged position due to their insights into the western *and* the migrant/Muslim culture.

Organisational membership also varies between the different generations. The younger women show a much higher degree of organisation and involvement with unions or Islamic organisations, whilst the older women maintain that due to language problems and a lack of time this is the responsibility of the younger generations. However, there was also considerable uncertainty among many of the women, young and old about the effectiveness of such organisations and their ability to reflect their interests.

Muslim women also face discrimination on the basis of their gender. As with many non-Muslim women, they must cope with a ‘double day’ of work plus domestic and family responsibilities. Paid work is often the subject of negotiation within the family, particularly concerning the type of work that can be undertaken and the hours worked. First-generation Muslim women of Turkish origin in Germany complain that the negative attitude of Turkish men towards their work limits their choice of occupation. These differing cultural norms also affect the type of work Muslim women are occupied in, for example it is more common for a woman to work in Turkey than in Morocco, and correspondingly, there are more Muslims of Turkish origin working in the Netherlands, than those of Moroccan origin. Muslim women in both the UK and in the Netherlands assert that Islam is no barrier to women working. Dutch research has determined two ‘emancipation models’: an orientation towards work and an orientation towards care. Rather than being dependent on nationality, religion or immigrant status, socio-economic position was found to be a major determinant. Dutch women with young children from low socio-economic backgrounds also fit into the model ‘orientation towards care’. Low wages do not pay for childcare, and women in this position are therefore unable to take paid work. Muslim women of Pakistani origin working as home-

workers in the UK cite disadvantages inherent in home-working very similar to those experienced by white British women home-workers: long hours for low pay, with no benefits or security and the stress of combining work with child care and domestic tasks. The reasons for undertaking this type of work are also replicated, in terms of child care and the responsibility for taking care of the household, in addition to the reluctance on the part of their husbands for them to take paid work outside the home. Pakistani Muslim women however, particularly first-generation, face the additional disadvantages of a lack of language skills and educational qualifications, and they tend to be concentrated in the lowest-paid jobs. Yet younger, second- and third-generation Muslim women with the advantages of language skills and qualifications, still experience racism in the labour market, leading to their effective exclusion from many sectors of the economy.

## **Conclusions**

Muslim women thus face discrimination on three counts: on the basis of religion, gender and nationality, which combined cause marginalisation and social exclusion. The increased insecurity and flexibility of the job market has only served to amplify existing inequalities. The different responses and coping strategies of the Muslim populations in Europe are diverse; the emergence of Muslim voices in Europe therefore will also reflect a variety of interests and agendas, dependent on itinerary, social position (Belgium) and cultural background (Netherlands). An acceptance of the diversity of cultures in Europe is strongly advocated by the partner countries, which rather than merely tolerating the presence of Muslims in Europe, could provide opportunities for the most vulnerable sectors and enable society to benefit from their presence. Project recommendations address social, religious and institutional representation of Europe's Muslims.

The reduced social role of the state has adversely affected the levels of security of the poorest members of society, disproportionately affecting Muslim and immigrant populations. However, the expansion of the 'new Muslim middle class', composed of young, working Muslims could move towards ensuring the cohesion and momentum of the Muslim community (France). Also essential, particularly concerning Muslim women, is to ensure increased employment alternatives, for example by child care provision, or relevant and accessible women-only training courses and to provide legal protection in the workplace to minimise exploitation by employers (UK) and eliminate discriminatory hiring practices and reform labour laws (Belgium). This may involve the dissemination of appropriate

information, or creation of advice centres with suitably qualified support workers who are able to access and gain the confidence of the Muslim community. In respect to this, public awareness is also important, as the Belgian report highlights. There is a need to distinguish racism from Islamophobia in order to reduce *religious* as well as race discrimination. Across Europe, the media is repeatedly charged with inciting religious discrimination through negative portrayals of Islam. Greater knowledge and sensitivity to different faiths and cultures would enhance the possibilities for integration of ethnic minorities into society and particularly affect Muslim women who often suffer greatest through the visible sign of the headscarf.

Muslim leaders in Switzerland are primarily concerned with the need for: the education of Muslim children in the Islamic tradition; the creation of Islamic cemeteries and mosques; and official state recognition of Islam. The Federal Commission against Racism (Switzerland) proposes new forms of legislation to facilitate the integration of Muslims in Switzerland including, a law against discrimination, a law for integration, a law to facilitate naturalisation and voting rights for immigrants. Belgium also recognises the urgency for official recognition of the Islamic faith through the creation of a representative body of Muslims, and the outlawing of discrimination founded on the wearing of headscarves. It also advocates a broader education in schools, based on immigrant pupils' cultures of origin and the history of international population movements, religions and civilisations.

The necessity for institutional representation of the Muslim community is evident, as Muslims are under-represented in the structures that govern societal interests (Germany). A "*comprehensive, holistic migration, integration and minority policy*" (Germany, p?) is recommended in order to enable steering of migration, support for the integration of immigrants and the participation of minorities in political, legal, social and cultural life. The right to vote and stand for office in at least local elections is advocated in the Belgian report, in order to recognise the permanence of the Muslim populations in Europe and facilitate political participation. In conjunction with this, simplifying the process of naturalisation, abrogating the laws and orders that allow the expulsion of foreign offenders and improving the relationship of the law with the country's Muslim immigrants would work towards the elimination of discrimination in the country's institutions.

Although a lack of data and existing studies in this field prevent any wider conclusions from being drawn, concrete policy recommendations can be made on the basis of the results of this

research in order to reduce marginalisation and facilitate integration. It is imperative, however, that further projects and research be carried out to illustrate the full extent of the participation, and the changing nature, of Muslim communities in Europe.

## CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

### INTRODUCTION

The primary concern and focus of this Project was the production of an analytical, descriptive and comparative account of the different forms and processes by which European Muslims (citizens, residents and immigrants) have been socially excluded and marginalised. in eight European countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Switzerland, The Netherlands and UK). Thus the research was carried out with reference to:

- Ø identifying the different national forms and processes by which European Muslims have been socially excluded in each of the eight countries;
- Ø producing a 'European' social map of the complex and diverse mechanism which have generated socio-economic and cultural conditions within which European Muslims have experienced a progressive process of marginalisation leading to economic deprivation and various forms of social and cultural disadvantage;
- Ø identifying those trans-national, European 'pathways' which have contributed to these forms of social exclusion; and
- Ø identifying both national and European policies that aim to combat social exclusion in general and with regard to European Muslims in particular.

A compilation of the scientific findings can be subdivided into two main categories:

1. trans-national characteristics; and
2. particular specificities identified in some of the countries under investigation.

The trans-national characteristics can be summarised under five major headings, and will constitute the focus of this introductory section.

**First, *demographics - the quantification of Muslims in Europe:*** The primary problem here was the identification of the Muslim population in many of the countries, which do not have census material that highlights “religion” as a category. Thus, the research sought to review the extent to which the Muslim presence in Europe can be quantified from a variety of statistical sources, available in the public domain, which do highlight country of origin,


ethnic fertility rates, immigration figures, etc. The scientific findings therefore consist of the *'best estimates'* of the Muslim population for individual countries in Europe and provide a general picture of their size, composition and geography. The demographic quantification was been carried out for 17 countries in Europe<sup>1</sup>, in order to highlight the variety of mechanisms that do exist within the EU in measuring ethnic and religious populations. The findings did highlight the inconsistencies arising from such an inter-European survey and noted the absence of a single methodological approach. In particular the research highlighted the need to develop a method by which individuals (Muslims) within the immigrant and settler communities (first and subsequent generations) can be identified. This part of the research concluded by producing a demographic 'model', which we believe can be used on a European level to continue to quantify Muslims, irrespective of the absence of statistics on religious self-identification. As to the actual figures we can note that they vary from the largest population in Germany (2,589,071) to the smallest population in Switzerland (156,000). For further details see Appendix Two.

**Second, identification - how do we define 'Muslims'?** The scientific findings above were partially influenced by qualitative research, especially among Muslim organisations and associations, which provided alternative accounts of the Muslim population that derive from socio-cultural accounts of this population. This research highlighted the contested meanings of identifying Muslims and provides possible answers to such questions as whether Muslim identity is attached to a cultural or geographical place of origin (as much of sociology has assumed) or whether it presumes the profession and practice of the faith of Islam. The research findings suggest that **if** it is the former, then many of the spatial boundaries can be dismissed through European Muslims belonging to the *Ummah* (trans-national Islamic religious community). If, on the other hand, it were the latter, it would be very difficult to quantify religious observance, as the question of how to measure the practice of a religion is problematic. As there is no question (except in Switzerland) regarding religious affiliation in the various censuses, it is difficult to accurately assess who Muslims 'are' except by geographical association. Thus the research findings highlight methodological centrality of both the 'self-ascription'/'self-identification', as a starting point which gives space to the expression of a Muslim identity by Muslims themselves, as well

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<sup>1</sup> Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and UK.

as the more generic ‘political’ identification which derives from the presence and visibility of “Muslim Voices” (active associations, organisations, etc.) in different countries. This qualitative research in the eight countries has constituted the basis from which we developed the dynamic simulation model (mentioned above), as a possible way of estimating the Muslim populations and to make constructive projections concerning the rate of growth and different flux variations - death rate, birth rate, reversions, immigration, emigration, etc.



**Third, the identification of patterns and forms of social exclusion at a national, trans-national and European level:** Research findings indicate that European Muslims experience different forms and degrees of exclusion and marginalisation in the eight countries, which in some respects is also the case with other immigrant and settler populations (irrespective of ethnicity, or religion). Nevertheless, the research has also found that it is also possible to identify certain common categories, in all eight countries, in which Muslims (immigrants and settlers) experience particular forms of exclusion: Education, Elections and the Political process, Employment, Gender, General legislation, Immigration & Asylum, Media, Police harassment, Racial/Religious violence (Islamophobia), and Social Welfare. It is in this context that this report will make a policy

recommendation for the establishment of a **Directorate for European Muslim Affairs** as part of a broader **Commission for the Future of Multi-Ethnic Europe**. (see recommendations below)

***Fourth, the identification of the network of 'social' organisations that represent Muslims in each country, including interviews with social leaders.*** During the research we identified a variety of socio-cultural, educational, religious and other types of ‘Muslim’ associations and organisations as well as socio-political and religious leaders with whom we engaged in discussing the problems of the exclusion of European Muslims. The research showed that these organisations have complex structures and it is difficult to differentiate between social, cultural, religious and political groups since there is a high degree of polyvalence. None of the organisations identified in the eight European countries can be seen as exclusively representative of Muslims in those countries and in many cases they are too numerous to include in the research agenda (so only a representative sample has been investigated). The research also indicated that the proliferation and broad spectrum of these organisations highlights four significant findings:

1. the increasing institutional completeness and settlement of Muslim communities in the EU;
2. evidence of their increasing visibility in various areas of public life and discourse (media, politics, culture, education, social welfare, legislation, etc.);
3. the problems of representation within the communities (competing and contested patterns of representation); and
4. the different responses by the various States to these organisations (legitimising some but not others).

Furthermore, the interviews with the social leaders (from all levels of organisation) have provided access to the internal debates (within the Muslim communities) and have allowed us to produce accounts, which do incorporate the different “Muslim Voices”. Data from this research has been compiled to form the start of a pan-European data base of several hundred Muslim associations and organisations. The maintenance of such a database may well constitute one of the first tasks of the Directorate of European Muslim Affairs (if it were to be established).

**Fifth, *the production of case studies and ethnographies*:** As a way of deepening our understanding of the patterns of social exclusion and especially the processes of re-integration (or survival strategies) a number of ethnographies and case studies have been carried out. For example, we have ethnographies of geographically delineated Muslim communities in each country (Albanians in Athens for Greece, Muslims in Milan for Italy, South Asians in Manchester for the UK, etc.), as well as detailed research in the same localities of particular concerns (e.g. art education in primary and secondary education in Manchester). These ethnographies and case studies have allowed us to extend our understanding of the complex relationship between identity-formation (Muslim Voice) and economic, socio-cultural, and political patterns of exclusion and marginalisation.

Based on these research findings we are able to make certain policy recommendations, which we would hope, can influence policy making at both the National and European level. It goes without saying, of course, that the policy recommendations listed below are of a schematic and tentative nature and we welcome the opportunity to discuss them at greater length with policy makers (National and European).

#### **AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL**

1. The organisation of publicly funded training courses, conferences and meetings on Islamic culture and religion for all those who have a direct or indirect relationship with Muslims in the workplace (for example, teachers, etc.);
2. The establishment of a national commission to carry out the revision of school textbooks in order to eliminate to stereotyped use of words and images referring to Muslims and Islam;
3. The revision of curricula in schools which exclude or denigrate the histories, religion and cultures of Muslim peoples;
4. The encouragement of fairer representation in State organisations (for example, the judicial system, policing, etc.).
5. The establishment of a national watchdog commission, in each EU country, to monitor the media in order to eliminate to stereotyped use of words and images referring to Muslims and Islam;
6. To facilitate access to national and local broadcast media by Muslim organisations;

7. The recognition and inclusion of Islamic religious observance in all areas of public life (the workplace, education, etc);
8. The development of socio-economic ties between Muslim communities and the varying national authorities to create better links with those communities' country of origin;
9. The promotion of financial support for Muslim socio-cultural and religious associations (for example, Mosques);
10. The recognition of religious discrimination as an integral factor in the application of equal opportunities legislation.
11. The development of awareness within State funded organisations of the specific needs and requirements of Muslim communities.

#### **AT THE EUROPEAN LEVEL**

1. The establishment of a Commission for Religions in order to undertake cultural and information campaigns on religious matters in Europe;
2. The consultation with Islamic socio-cultural organisations by the EU representatives in order to create increased awareness of their concerns.

It is possible at this stage to group these diverse recommendations and to make a single policy proposal for further discussion. This is the focus of the following section, which will discuss in some detail the basis for the proposal to establish a **Directorate for European Muslim Affairs** as part of a broader **Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Europe**.

Research undertaken by the 'Muslim Voices' research team has identified a number of areas in which the European Union is advised to take action. For the purposes of this research project report we would like to propose that these recommendations be approached under the umbrella heading of: establishing a *Directorate for European Muslim Affairs* as part of a broader *Commission for the future of Multi-Ethnic Europe*.

**COMMISSION FOR THE FUTURE OF A  
MULTI-ETHNIC EUROPE**



Thus, our specific policy recommendation is that the European Union take adequate steps to establish a Commission and within it a Directorates whose purpose will be twofold:

- Ø to continue to collect data, update existing databases and record the various ways in which European Muslims are socially excluded and marginalised (e.g. *Islamophobia*); and
- Ø to work closely with policy makers at the European, national and regional levels in order to initiate strategies and policies to combat exclusion, discrimination and especially *Islamophobia*.

It is particularly important to note that our specific policy recommendation, although focusing on the European Muslims who are the object of this research project, envisages that it be established as part of a broader Commission whose object will be to monitor all forms of exclusion and discrimination experienced by the variety of ethnic, cultural and religious social groups in Europe. The establishment of a Commission and its various Directorates at a broad European level would serve, primarily, to acknowledge that the problem of *Islamophobia*, among others, is one that affects Europe as a whole and not one or two individual nations or states. This approach is important as it would ensure that the European Union itself co-ordinates and establishes policy in this area. Such an investigation, however, would be more effective if it adopted a 'trickle-down' approach, by which the particularities of each member state and the regions within those states were

acknowledged and accommodated by the application of a structured investigation. This would ensure that regional findings feed into state findings, which in turn would feed into EU policy. In this way, any recommendations that the EU makes would be extensively informed and would be able to acknowledge and address the specificities and generalities that exist in EU member states and regions. This would produce a broad policy that is constructively applicable to 'Europe' as well as individual nations.

This Commission would work most effectively if it structured its activities and its investigations at three levels:

1. European Union;
2. European Union Member States; and
3. European Union Regions

This suggestion for a policy initiative is presented in a schematic form in the diagram that follows. This also completes the introductory part of this section.

The substantive part of the section then proceeds to rely upon research findings in order to consolidate the argument that supports our policy recommendation. Furthermore, the substantive section that follows also provides additional information, which can be used to refine and develop specific and targeted policies at either the national or, the European level. Finally, the substantive section starts with a brief and schematic discussion of *Islamophobia*, which we also feel is a term that needs to enter the policy vocabulary.

**EUROPEAN UNION**  
**Commission and Directorates**

↑ ↑ ê ↑ ↑

**EUROPEAN UNION MEMBER STATES**  
**Sub-Commissions and Sub-Directorates**

↑ ↑ ê ↑ ↑

**REGIONS**  
**Regional Commissions and Directorates**

ê ê ê

**AREAS**

<b>Education</b>	<b>Employment</b>	<b>Social Policy - Health, etc</b>	<b>Media</b>	<b>Politics</b>
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**Consider Policies & Legislation**

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<b>Religious Discrimination</b>	<b>Exclusion &amp; Marginalisation</b>	<b>Incitement to Religious Hatred</b>
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Physical Assault/Verbal  
Abuse/Vandalism of Property

**AIMS**

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<b>Combat Discrimination</b>	<b>Foster Inter-Faith &amp; Cross-Community Respect</b>	<b>Combat Social Exclusion</b>	<b>Confidence Building</b>
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## ***Islamophobia***

Islamophobia is manifested in many different forms and in many different areas. The core aspects of this phenomenon have been identified by an organisation in the United Kingdom called ***The Runnymede Trust*** (hereafter referred to as 'The Trust') and they provide a useful starting point for any investigation into Islamophobia and its consequences.<sup>2</sup>

The term 'Islamophobia' is relatively new, although it has been in use now for approximately ten years. The term encapsulates an identifiable phenomena in Europe, namely that of a fear or hatred of Muslim peoples and Islam which manifests itself in various forms of discrimination. In the United Kingdom, The Trust adopted the term when it published a consultation paper in 1997 asking organisations, groups and individuals to comment on the phenomenon, which it perceived to be on the rise. The Commission established to evaluate 'Islamophobia' identified a number of issues that it held to be areas in need of analysis and perhaps policy intervention.<sup>3</sup> The 'Muslim Voices' project team, in formulating the following recommendations under the broader rubric of Islamophobia, draws upon the work of The Trust but felt that there were areas and issues (both theoretically and structurally) that needed further attention and elaboration.

It must be stressed from the outset, however, that Islamophobia differs from other forms of discrimination, in that the discourse that has developed about Islam and Muslims is ***highly politicised in an international arena*** in a way that social and political discourses about

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<sup>2</sup> ***Islamophobia: A Challenge For Us All***, Report of the Runnymede Trust Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, was published in 1997.

<sup>3</sup> The questions circulated by the Runnymede Trust and about which organisations were invited to submit responses were as follows: 1. Legislation on Discrimination - Should there be new legislation to make discrimination on religious grounds unlawful in Britain? 2. Legislation on incitement to religious hatred - Should there also be new legislation to make incitement to religious hatred unlawful in Britain? 3. Participation and inclusion - What measures should be undertaken to ensure that British Muslim people can and do play a full part in political, intellectual, economic and cultural affairs? 4. Education - Are new policies and approaches required in the education system? 5. The media - Should guidance be provided for the media on the presentation and discussion of sensitive issues such as Islamophobia? If so, what should the guidance contain, and by whom would it be issued? 6. Employment - Should guidance be provided for employers on confronting and reducing Islamophobia? If so, what should the guidance contain, and by whom would it be issued? 7. Responsibilities in non-Muslim faith communities - What are the distinctive roles and responsibilities, in relation to addressing Islamophobia, of opinion-leaders in non-Muslim faith communities? 8. Responsibilities in Muslim communities - Do opinion-leaders within Muslim communities have distinctive roles and responsibilities in relation to addressing Islamophobia? 9. Confidence-building - What practical confidence-building measures are required, both within Britain and in British foreign policy?

other religions and peoples has not. Thus, it must be emphasised that Islamophobia has been identified as a form of discrimination that is *distinct* from racism, sexism, xenophobia, etc.

The main identifying features of Islamophobia can be summarised as follows:

- Ø **the perceived emergence of an 'Islamic threat', nationally & internationally**
- Ø **an extension of xenophobia and racism to religious hatred**
- Ø **the perception of 'otherness' for Muslim peoples, communities & nations**
- Ø **the exclusion of Muslim viewpoints from 'mainstream' debates**

1. In recent political debates we can identify the emergence of a so-called 'Islamic threat'. It can be argued that Islam has replaced the threat of communism to Western societies, and Islam (specifically manifested in Islamic 'fundamentalism') is now perceived to be the 'enemy' both without and within. Numerous articles have been devoted identifying the impending Islamic threat of being either 'swamped' by Muslims, with an inevitable 'clash of civilisations' (see, for example, Samuel Huntington's paper in Foreign Affairs, 1993) or conversely that Westerners will be killed in terrorist attacks perpetrated by Islamic militants.
2. Islamophobia in Britain is undoubtedly often combined with racism and xenophobia as many Muslims come from non-white communities and are perceived to have an 'alien' culture. Existing laws to combat racial discrimination, however, are often proving inadequate in combating religious discrimination and incitement to religious hatred.
3. Muslim communities are often perceived to be completely different from other communities, they thus typify a sense of 'otherness'. Consequently, stereotypical perceptions of Muslim peoples, communities and nations have developed which place Muslims and non-Muslims on a binary table of opposites. For example, Muslims, it is argued, mistreat and discriminate against women, whereas other religions and cultures have outgrown patriarchy and misogyny; Islam is perceived as a monolithic faith that does not tolerate debate or discussion, whereas other religions and communities supposedly have healthy internal debates and encourage diversity.

4. Islamophobia is also present in the dismissal of criticisms made by Muslims of Western cultures and societies. Such contributions to general cultural, social and political debates, which have been put forward by Muslims, are rarely taken seriously. This exclusion and non-recognition of the works of Muslim scholars' ideas results in the exclusion and marginalisation of a Muslim perspective.

There is evidence that anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic sentiments are accepted as being 'natural' and 'unproblematic'. Similar to 'common sense' racist attitudes, anti-Muslim views are expressed as though they were normal and writers continue to demonise Islam in both tabloid and 'quality' press and other literature. Further, developments or events in countries such as Afghanistan or Iraq are seen as being representative of Islam and Muslims in ways that developments in Christian countries would not be interpreted as representative of Christianity.

The consequences of these various manifestations of Islamophobia are wide ranging and affect Muslims at both the level of the individual and at the level of community. The following sections will address various areas that a Commission and Directorate may wish to consider

### **Problems and Criticisms**

The purpose of these recommendations is to encourage the European Union to consider establishing a Commission to investigate the causes and effects of among other matters, *Islamophobia* in Europe and to formulate the ways by which this form of discrimination can be tackled. There are, however, problems and dangers that should be avoided when attempting to formulate a balanced account of the nature of *Islamophobia* in Europe.

The establishment of a Commission to deal with *Islamophobia* elicited very positive responses and immense support in the United Kingdom, especially from Muslim organisations and individuals. Many organisations welcomed the initiative to investigate the extent of anti-Muslim feeling in Britain, however, if the disturbing rise in anti-Muslim activities is to be tackled it must be acknowledged that Islamophobia is a *European-wide* problem and not particular to the UK.

The issue of *representation* must be carefully assessed, as inadequate consideration of *whose* interests are being addressed is crucial to the success and applicability of any findings and subsequent policies. The membership, therefore, of the various panels and

sub-panels of a European Commission and its various Directorates is of paramount importance. Although the panel for The Trust's Commission represented various religions and organisations, the Muslim members were not seen to be representative of Muslim communities from a 'grassroots' perspective. It is important, therefore, that any Commission and Directorate should not be seen to simply support the 'establishment' or the status quo. Any *Directorate for European Muslim Affairs* should be able to engage in constructive dialogue with a variety of organisations and should draw extensively from the many *Muslim* academics, activists, etc., who live and work in Europe as well as non-Muslims who have relevant expertise and contributions to make in this area.

The Commission in the UK was perceived by many people to be displaced from the everyday, commonplace experiences of British Muslims. It is therefore crucial that any attempt to investigate *Islamophobia* in Europe does not reproduce that perception. The inclusion of people from a *wide spectrum of experiences and backgrounds* would help to foster the appropriate confidence within Muslim and non-Muslim communities - that this Enterprise is committed to addressing the needs and concerns of Muslims at a practical and not simply an abstract or theoretical level.

A further consideration is that any Directorate should attempt to make its investigations and its findings *accessible*. The Runnymede Report, as an academic document, had a limited distribution and readership. Although, as a consultation paper, the Trust invited responses from any individual or organisation that was interested or had a contribution to make to the research, the dissemination of the Paper was not broad enough to obtain a comprehensive representation of the Muslim communities. As such, the establishment of a European Commission and specialist Directorates should ensure that it encourages participation and contribution from a wide spectrum of organisations and groups. Further, the consultation period should be sufficient to allow organisations adequate time to formulate their responses.

For the failure to do this in the case of the UK, for example, created a situation where although one of the main concerns of the Report was to highlight the ways by which Muslims are stereotypically perceived, it actually *reproduced* those stereotypes in its report by referring to events allegedly undertaken by Muslims abroad and making reference to attempts made by Muslims in the UK to dispel inter-faith conflict generated by those events. These kinds of debates and issues, however, are not raised about events in non-

Muslim countries and areas and the image of Muslims as members of a monolithic, intolerant, global faith is reproduced.

Finally, although it should be recognised that international events have a profound effect on community relations on a national and European-wide basis, the domestic politics of Muslim states should *not* be highlighted as a potential reason for the denial of rights to Muslims living in Europe. Religious and cultural tolerance should be perceived as a *global project* designed to improve relations and foster equality regionally, nationally, in Europe and throughout other regions of the world. Obstructive reference to the Middle East does not negate the issue that *Islamophobia* is a strong and growing force in Europe and that individuals, families and communities are suffering because of it.

The rest of this substantive part is devoted to presenting additional information and arguments, which may be used in the formulation of specific and targeted policies. Thus it covers the areas highlighted in the introduction to this section. Furthermore the details provided below also highlight particularities in some of the different member states; when if necessary.

## LEGISLATION

*"In a multi-faith community such as Europe, people should not be disadvantaged because of their faith."*

The formulation of legislation to outlaw religious discrimination and make incitement to religious hatred an offence is a complex and much debated issue. There is, however, a strong argument from Muslim and non-Muslim organisations that legislation to outlaw religious discrimination and incitement to religious hatred is necessary. Many organisations in the United Kingdom have been arguing for such legislation for some time and many have been in consultation with the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) in order to argue for changes in legislation.

The difficulty of investigating this issue with regards to Muslims is that it is often argued that it is difficult to differentiate between racism/anti-immigrant sentiments and discrimination grounded in Islamophobia. The Board of Deputies of British Jews, for example, believes that anti-Islamic sentiments are more accurately racist in nature and that there is insufficient evidence to indicate conclusively that Muslims are *frequently*

discriminated against as Muslims, rather than suffering racial discrimination. It gave a similar response for the extension of legislation to cover incitement to religious hatred.

The National Secular Society in the UK was also strongly opposed to legislation on religious discrimination, but their view was applied to all religions. They felt current laws were adequate or that the law should be extended to cover all groups hence curbing discrimination on any grounds of belief, including secularism.

An important point to note is that the failure to take adequate steps to combat religious discrimination does contravene Article 26 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights which states that 'the law shall prohibit any discrimination on any grounds such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status'.

Muslims within the various member states of the European Union are calling for reforms in legislation and under international conventions and treaties; Europe should establish adequate protection against discrimination on the grounds of religion in *all* its member states.

Further areas which should be addressed under the broad rubric of preventing religious discrimination are those of freedom of worship, funding for Muslim schools, paid religious holidays and application of Muslim Family Law through legislation.

The laws covering incitement to religious hatred should also offer protection for all faiths against blasphemy in line with those that exist for Christianity.

For the eight European countries involved in the 'Muslim Voices' project, the current situation is varied. Although there are laws that make discrimination on religious grounds illegal in some (not all) countries (see Table 1), the implementation of these laws is not always effective.

**Table 1. Legislation Against Religious Discrimination in Project Countries:**

Country	Law Against Religious Discrimination	Law Against Incitement to Religious Hatred
Belgium	-	-
Britain	-	-
France	Yes	Yes
Germany	Yes	-
Greece	-	-
Italy	Yes	Yes
Netherlands	Yes	Yes

Switzerland	Yes	Yes
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Researchers in Belgium believe that the category of 'religion' should be added to the list of factors to cover this form of discrimination as awareness of this limitation in the law, allows racist texts and commentaries to abuse 'Muslims' rather than 'North Africans' thus allowing writers to escape penal sanctions.

In Britain, as in Belgium, Muslims who have been the victims of discrimination have had to take their cases to court on grounds of either racial or sexual discrimination, as the law does not recognise religious discrimination. Introducing appropriate legislation in these countries would end the need for individuals to tailor their grievances to fit current legal provisions.

In its Second Review of the 1976 Race Relations Act the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) identified several areas where current legislation may need attention: firstly, there is no law in Britain that protects people from religious discrimination; secondly there is no law in Britain concerning incitement to religious hatred; thirdly, current blasphemy laws only protects the established Christian religion.

It is clear from the available evidence, that despite fairly comprehensive legislation in some regions that adequate application of the law is not easily accomplished. Further, in certain areas, such as housing, education and public services, discrimination continues as these areas are not yet covered by the legal system. Clearly, discrimination in these areas should be addressed and the Italian parliament, for example, has been discussing a new law to address this as well as taking action against 'indirect discrimination'. Whether this discrimination is a result of specific institutional structures or an inability (or unwillingness) on the part of authorities to enforce equal opportunity laws is an issue in need of examination.

It is difficult to discern religious discrimination from racial discrimination and xenophobia. French, Italian and Swiss researchers, for example, felt that the *anti-immigrant* feeling was more prominent than specific anti-Muslim feeling; many of the immigrants in these countries are also Muslims and thus anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim sentiments become intertwined as anti-immigrant rhetoric is expressed in an anti-Muslim or *Islamophobic* fashion. This is aggravated by a perception (which is exacerbated by right-wing political groups) that immigrants deprive the host population of employment opportunities.

Chaaban [France] argues that this kind of disguised religious discrimination should be highlighted and that the laws that restrict or prohibit 'strangers' from gaining access to national and private societies must be abolished.

Many of the problems that manifest themselves in *'Islamophobia'* and discrimination have their roots in general misinformation about Muslims and Islam. When legislation is in the process being formed we would like to suggest that a more concerted effort be made (educationally, culturally and intellectually) to raise public awareness about the reasons for changes in legislation. The establishment of practical measures by the EU to outlaw religious discrimination, as prescribed in its General Act on Equal Treatment (1994), would be a positive step towards tackling misinformation and discrimination.

Addressing the issue of incitement to religious hatred is laborious, as proving that such incitement has occurred is difficult. The Italians and Dutch point out that this is because the line between opinion and incitement is blurred and therefore recommend improvements in legislation against incitement. For both religious discrimination and incitement to religious hatred a stricter definition of what this means require thorough and concerted investigation.

To ensure that the objectives of any legislation are achievable and that non-discriminatory behaviour is practised on a day-to-day basis, however, a broad campaign designed to raise awareness, both for the general public and those in authority, is vital for the production of any policy changes. Italian researchers emphasise that alongside any changes to legislation, there should be a parallel campaign designed to encourage people to be more sensitive to issues surrounding discrimination against Muslims. Without this, laws will not be enforced effectively.

## **POLITICAL EXCLUSION**

As well as considering legislation to combat religious discrimination and incitement to religious hatred it should also be noted that in certain countries such as Germany and Switzerland Muslims and other 'foreigners' are unable to vote and are thus excluded from participation in the political arena. This form of direct discrimination has profound consequences for Muslim communities. Although many Turkish families in Germany have been there for three generations (with the second and third generations having been born in

Germany), they have still not been given citizenship. The difficulties that many ethnic groups experience as a result of this has been documented in the first report by the Ad Hoc Committee to Investigate Discrimination Against Religious and Ethnic Minorities in Germany (McNair et al, 1997). The authors also hope to produce another report concentrating specifically on the position of Muslims in Germany.

Switzerland operates a 'three-Circles' policy by which it classifies the rights given to each group of people; different permits for employment, housing and property rights, are given to each group accordingly. The first circle, with the highest priority, consists of European Union states, the second circle is for non-EU persons from the USA and Canada and the third is for non-EU persons from 'far away' countries and thus includes most Muslims. People in this third circle are subject to severe restrictions with respect to working permits and residency. A further form of direct discrimination in Switzerland is a labour policy that forbids foreigners from taking certain jobs, for example, teaching in state schools, key positions in the medical sector, positions of responsibility at federal level, etc. There is clearly a need to reform this policy if Muslims are to be able to integrate into Swiss society at social, political and economic levels.

Although other European countries do not deny the majority of their Muslim population citizenship this does not indicate that such groups do not experience exclusion or marginalisation.

For many French Muslims, especially the youth living in the suburbs of large cities, there are increasing tensions as a result of economic and social deprivation coupled with negative treatment by the authorities, particularly the police. Second and third generation immigrants from mainly North African countries (e.g. Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia) are experiencing increasing levels of discrimination which have intensified following the state's crackdown on political Islamic activity linked with bombings in Paris. Police, trained to search out 'Muslim terrorists', are monitoring activities within Muslim communities, which includes observing general trends in mosque attendance, rounding up and arresting those suspected of political activities linked to Algeria and generally applying 'anti-terrorist' strategies whenever they feel it is appropriate or necessary.

The secular state system which resulted from France's historical development of Enlightenment and its related conviction to the common ground of rationality has meant that "[v]ery visible signs of religious identity are ... almost invariably regarded as

disturbing" (Nonneman, et al, 1996: 10). This was borne out strikingly by the 'headscarves' affair. Activities, groups and political parties that are based on religion are prohibited in France as it considers itself as a laic state that does not favour religions or prefer one religion to another.

Political representation for Muslims varies at the level of the national and the local. In Britain and Italy, for example, Muslims are establishing themselves in local politics, but have not yet achieved the national status (Italy, of course, is moving at a slower pace in this area because of comparatively recent immigration). The leaders in local government have brought about changes to the running of institutions such as schools, hospitals, government offices (for example, *halal* food, modifying dress codes, prayer facilities) and are involved in consultation with service providers for a more culturally sensitive way of delivering services.

Muslim representation by one organisation may increase the lobbying power of Muslim communities and may require governments to listen to concerns voiced through a diverse yet united body of groups. Muslim communities should establish forums to discuss and debate matters relating to the community, further, government bodies (both national and local) should recognise the presence of these forums and consult with them for information and advice about national and local issues.

Political parties in European countries should be encouraged to use their status to increase the representation of Muslims in their own organisations as well as other public bodies. Where possible, particularly in areas with high numbers of Muslim residents, political parties should encourage Muslims to stand for office in local and general elections.

Greek authorities are taking a step towards incorporating a large number of Muslims living in Metropolitan Urban Areas into society by legalising the status of various immigrant groups within the border of Greece. This should increase their inclusion and improve their access to most public services such as health and education and should allow them better social and cultural organisation and representation. However, this legislation must ensure that there is no direct or indirect exclusion of certain national or religious groups and as such is not a move targeting Muslims directly but indirectly. Until the authorities recognise that Muslims as a group are distinct from 'ethnic minorities' any changes in policy may not actually improve their circumstances greatly. As the majority of Muslims in Greece are from Turkey their experiences are strongly influenced by international relations, that is,

Greek-Turkish historical and contemporary relations and foreign policy. It is essential that this issue is separated from the internal problems of the minority group in Greece and that their problems are discussed and solved within the relevant context.

Finally, the recognition of Islamic family law (*shar'ia*) would also constitute a constructive step towards allowing Muslims to participate fully within the host communities and ensuring the respect for civil rights. Islamic legal requirements for marriage, divorce and inheritance at present are secondary to those prescribed by the state, and ceremonies have to be conducted according to state laws before they are officially recognised. According Islamic laws the same status as national laws, that is, once a marriage ceremony has been conducted according to Islamic law (*nikaah*) it is recognised as a legal contract and does not have to be confirmed at a Registry Office, will endorse equity for Muslim citizens. Indeed this should be extended to *all* marriage ceremonies in all religions.

## EDUCATION

### Key Points:

- Ø non-discriminatory curriculum;
- Ø dress (tolerance of headscarves & trousers for girls);
- Ø dietary considerations - *halal* school meals;
- Ø facilities for prayer;
- Ø respect for non-participation (e.g. swimming);
- Ø respect & observance of Islamic festivals
- Ø -state funded schools (in line with other denominations).

Schools and education provide an important focus for change in terms of combating Islamophobia. There is a strong case to be made, not only for a re-evaluation of educational practices for the benefit of Muslim children but also for children of other faiths and other minority communities.

The curricula in most schools is grounded in a very Eurocentric or 'Western' perspective which excludes and marginalises the cultures, world-views and faiths of (for want of better descriptive terms) non-'Western'/non-Christian or non-'secular' pupils. All pupils should be offered the opportunity to study a curriculum that does not exclude or trivialise their faith. Both Muslim and non-Muslim pupils would benefit from a more objective study of Islam's

historical, theological, scientific, social, cultural and economic teachings as it may work towards fostering interfaith and intercultural dialogue and understanding.

The formulation of books and classroom materials that do not contain stereotypical depictions of Islam and Muslims (as well as other religions) is one initiative that education authorities should be encouraged to take. In this way, misperceptions of Islam can be countered and children (and teachers) can learn in an environment that is considerably more tolerant of other religions and cultures. Further, such developments would foster self-confidence for Muslim pupils.

Courses in Islam should be available at all levels of education for those students who require them. This can be extended to supporting outreach work by Muslim organisations who visit institutions such as colleges, universities, public and private sector organisations and other large employers, to deliver short courses or talks about Islam. This would increase awareness of the experiences and problems faced by Muslims and make colleagues more sensitive to their needs.

Provision making for the practise Islam in schools, that is, prayer facilities, dress and dietary obligations, are not met by each member state equally. Britain has progressed some way by allowing Muslim girls to dress according to Islamic instructions, non-participation in certain activities (e.g. swimming), the celebration Islamic festivals and providing *halal* school meals.

Switzerland and Italy, especially as the latter is a fairly recent country of immigration, have not quite reached the same level of advancement and there are still cases of confrontation between schools and parents. In order for Muslim children to concentrate on gaining an education, these issues have to be resolved.

Various initiatives have been launched in Belgium to foster integration of vulnerable populations. Some are aimed directly at young immigrants, especially in high risk localities, to try and combat early school leaving. An Equal Opportunities Centre has been set up to deal with complaints of discriminatory attitudes and behaviour of teachers and other school personnel. Prevention policies to combat social exclusion and insecurity are being devised in partnership with various local preventive entities. The purpose of these is fluctuating between helping the young people and keeping potential delinquents under surveillance.

Confidence building can result from encouraging Muslim pupils to participate in their religious practices by welcoming them into the school system.

One of the main issues that Muslims are concerned about in education is the acceptance of *state aided* Muslim schools, which have not as yet obtained the same status and funding as other denominational schools. It must be acknowledged, however, that whilst this provision should be made, the rate at which such schools could be established means that in the meantime mainstream education has to be able to provide a non-discriminatory and progressive system in which all non-Christians can thrive. At present, (in the UK) there are no State funded Muslim schools. There are, however, State funded Roman Catholic, Church of England and Jewish schools which continue to obtain funding for new denominational schools.

## EMPLOYMENT

### KEY POINTS:

- Ø unemployment;
- Ø pay;
- Ø respect for religious festivals;
- Ø respect for religious observance;
- Ø dress;
- Ø - career advancement.

Before considering suggestions for guidance for employers to confront and reduce Islamophobia, the general situation of Muslims in the labour market should be outlined, for example, the patterns and levels of unemployment, types of employment and position in various employment sectors occupied by European Muslims.

Although statistics relating directly to Muslims are unavailable in most countries, using ethnic background enables us to gain some idea of overall patterns. In Britain, for example, the recently published report by the Policy Studies Institute (PSI) highlights the high levels of unemployment among Pakistani and Bangladeshi people (38 percent and 42 percent respectively), the majority of whom are Muslims. Of those in employment, two-thirds of Pakistani and Bangladeshi men were in manual work. The report concludes that,

for both sexes, in relation to whites, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis suffer from 'severe disadvantage' in the labour market.

The problem of high unemployment amongst Muslims is one that is need of consideration. The recruitment of representative numbers of Muslims, especially in areas such as Race Relations, local authorities, public service sectors as well as private organisations, must be implemented and enforced.

Once again guidance, training and raising awareness of issues affecting Muslims in the work sphere are needed. There is also need for monitoring of numbers of Muslims employed and at what level. This will necessitate a code of practice with enforcement at a legal level similar to the Equal Opportunity laws.

A survey conducted by the Child Poverty Action Group (CPAG) showed that average earnings of Pakistani and Bangladeshi males was 68% those of white males and amongst people with higher qualifications, the unemployment rate for Pakistanis and Bangladeshis is 10 percent, compared with 4 percent for white people with the same qualifications.

In the Netherlands unemployment rates among different ethnic groups are still markedly higher than the indigenous labour force. In 1995, unemployment among the four main minority ethnic groups (Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans) was three times higher than that of the indigenous population (Abell, et al 1997). As well as having lower rates of employment, ethnic minority employees find themselves suffering from job insecurity and lower wages.

The evidence from Switzerland would seem to confirm this; immigrant communities have a lower than average income compared to Swiss nationals and Muslims (Turks, Bosnians, Albanians, Tunisians, Moroccans, Somalis) are more likely to have low salaries, poor working conditions, poor insurance and lower educational qualifications. Unemployment among these groups is 8% (40.6% of the total number of unemployed persons in Switzerland) in comparison to 3.4% of the Swiss population (Abell, et al, 1997).

Further, Swiss labour policy strictly forbids foreigners from taking certain jobs, therefore Muslims are unable to teach in state schools, hold key positions in the medical profession and positions of responsibility at the federal level. This direct discrimination, combined with various forms of indirect discrimination (jobs advertised for Swiss citizens only, therefore penalising foreigners who have not yet been granted full citizenship) and certain

unlawful practices (for example, not employing women because they choose to wear Islamic dress, especially the headscarf) have weakened the position of Muslims in the Swiss labour market. 'Quotas' are also in force whereby employers can only employ a certain number of people from the 'third circle'. With high rates of unemployment and where work permits can only be obtained after finding a job.

The Equal Opportunities Centre in Belgium reports that 7.5 % of the complaints they received about work and employment, included racist attitudes of employers, discrimination during the hiring process (for example at the sight of headscarf or sound of foreign name), discrimination in promotions and transfers and regulations about time off that do not allow for Muslims holidays.

One important point, which needs to be highlighted, and which is not limited to employment, is that of discrimination against women who choose to wear the *hijab* or veil. In Britain there have been several recent cases of what is now termed '*hijabophobia*' where women have been dismissed from employment after adopting the *hijab*. Because of the lack of specific legislation that could protect people against this sort of discrimination, women have taken their employers to court on grounds of either racial or sexual discrimination. In 1996 the Dutch Commission for Equal Treatment received 14 complaints of discrimination rooted in religious grievances, some of these were from Muslims and of these most were concerning 'women wearing headscarves during work' and one related to 'praying' during work.

The ease with which employers can make provisions should be emphasised. For example, only about ten minutes are needed to perform prayer during the working day, probably less time than most tea-breaks and this can be facilitated quite simply by allocating a small clean room within the work space or office. This kind of recognition of religious needs by employers will encourage other employees to respect their fellow Muslim workers and Muslims will not feel apprehensive about carrying out their religious duties.

There is clearly a need to eliminate these kinds of discriminatory practices throughout Europe, not only for Muslims but also for other religions.

Any Commission examining Islamophobia in employment should consider the establishment of a legal framework from which to challenge religious discrimination and also a broad campaign to generate awareness among employers. Community projects already undertake to raise awareness among local employers of Islam and the needs of

Muslims, whilst highlighting that Muslims are an asset to organisations and will develop a more positive relationship if their needs are met and their faith is respected.

A few practical measures that can be taken to ensure equity for Muslim employees and integrate the workforce and management at all levels are suggested here:

- Ø greater awareness & provision for religious needs particularly flexibility to allow for prayers;
- Ø understanding & adaptability for religious holidays, especially as the precise dates are often not known until a few days prior to the occasion (the Muslim community must make an effort to reach a unanimous decision on which days these holidays should be);
- Ø employers must encourage inter-faith and intercultural awareness amongst employees in order to engender mutual respect and knowledge;
- Ø strict regulations backed by disciplinary action for to combat the abuse and ridicule of Muslim employees in order to avoid events such a those that took place at the time of the Gulf War in 1991 (for example, a Muslim factory worker in Leeds was urinated on whilst in the shower, had pigs blood thrown on him while at work and was subject to verbal abuse).
- Ø guidance should be sought from a nationally recognised body as to how to welcome and integrate Muslim workers into the working environment;
- Ø - monitoring of religious group representation similar to that of ethnic minorities within local councils and similarly this should be extended to employers in the private sector.

## MEDIA

### KEY CRITICISMS:

- Ø **stigmatisation of Muslims as mainly problematic;**
- Ø **generalisation of particular incidents to Muslims;**
- Ø **irresponsible use of charged and negative terms;**
- Ø **depersonalisation of Muslims;**
- Ø **perpetuation of the negative images of Islam and Muslims.**

Although not all media outlets can be described as hostile about issues relating to Muslims and Islam, the national media, and in particular the print media, can often be seen to reproduce and reinforce negative images of Muslims and Islam. The local media, however, is seen to more positively reflect Muslims and issues in Muslim communities.

The media is an area *vital* in helping combat *Islamophobic* sentiment across Europe. The mainstream media, at present, constitutes the most powerful medium for the propagation of anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim discourse. Although all aspects of European life in terms of politics, culture, religion, etc. should be open to discussion, debate and criticism, representations of Islam and Muslims in the media have been markedly negative. They have focused on issues such as wars, extreme political group's activities, 'oppressed' women, etc, thus engendering a conceptual link between 'negativity' and Islam.

The media needs to be evaluated in terms of its approach to Muslims and Islam and encouraged to be much more objective and informed. Muslims should be allowed a voice within the mainstream media in order to provide an alternative account that challenges stereotypical impressions and assumptions. The propagation of negative images and accounts of events that simply support these stereotypes can be identified as a major problem. Issues relating to, for example, immigration are often conflated by the national media and foster an impression that Muslim immigrants, among others, are 'flooding' into Europe. The media should be encouraged to contextualise its statements about such issues and not simply feed into pre-existing misconceptions about immigration, i.e. there are numerous migrants from other EU states and the USA and Canada for example, which is an issue rarely raised and further, the issue of *emigration* is also sidelined.

Experience in certain European countries has indicated that journalists should be trained in cultural awareness for religions and cultures outside their sphere of experience. Guidelines relating to this issue should be formulated in order to dispel negative, culturally insensitive and ill-informed work. This is not to discourage debate about issues and events, but, rather, to ensure that any debate is not misinformed or unfairly biased - contributing further to negative images and perceptions of Muslims and Islam.

## **INTER-FAITH DIALOGUE AND CONFIDENCE BUILDING**

Inter-faith and inter-community dialogue should be encouraged and supported in order to investigate the ways by which progress can be made and relationships improved. There are already many projects underway throughout Europe that involve the participation of religious and non-religious groups (Muslims, Christians, Jews, etc) in actively promoting understanding and good relationships between all sections of society.

The acceptance of Islam as an official religion, the second largest in some countries, will help to formally establish its presence. Muslim communities, and especially community leaders, have an important role to play in reducing Islamophobia and supporting inter-faith communication.

Responsible and positive attitudes from politicians and other official spokespersons from non-Muslim communities should encourage members of the public to question the stereotypes that they are so often confronted with.

Muslim spokespersons have the responsibility of collecting broad and representative views and opinions from their communities and they must attempt to be as representative as possible.

These advancements should be made in the context of an acknowledgement of international rights as the rights of non-Muslims and nominal Muslims in 'Islamic' states should be considered. The situation beyond Europe, however, should not detract from the very real discrimination that Muslims within Europe experience.

As ignorance is the main cause of *Islamophobic* sentiment, it is vital that Muslims take the first initiative to reach out to the society around them to dispel the myths and misunderstandings. It is also the responsibility of every Muslim to ensure that they are behaving in an Islamic way so that people are able to see Islam and not individual cultural or social habits.

Open criticism by Muslims of the un-Islamic conduct of people both here and abroad is seen as a way of helping to decrease *Islamophobic* ideas.

- Ø The encouragement of meetings and conferences with Muslim representatives and promotion of the rights of Muslims to express themselves in the media and discussions with the national and European authorities.
- Ø The organisation of exchange programs in schools and universities with Arab and Islamic countries.
- Ø The promotion of cultural Associations and provision of financial support and human resources for such institutions.
- Ø The promotion of cultural tourism to Arab and Islamic countries and the encouragement and support of trade Associations.

The social, political and economic models of any society are constantly debated and contested in many arenas. The contribution that Muslims and Islam have to make to this discourse should not be dismissed or considered threatening, but, rather, viewed as contributing to ongoing debates on an equal footing with the views and opinions of other social, political, economic and religious, bodies.

### **FOREIGN POLICY**

It was noted in several responses that the international events very much influence the situation of Muslims in Europe. The Gulf War is probably the best example that illustrates this point. Although the events were taking place thousands of miles away, Muslims in Europe were facing the negative fall out of the War.

Governments should consider that Muslims have the right to articulate their opinions with respect to national and European foreign policy objectives. More importantly this articulation should not be interpreted as necessarily anti-European or anti-Western.

**N.B. All the country coordinators and the Project coordinator would welcome the opportunity to discuss these recommendations for policy formulation at greater length with the Commission. It is hoped that an appropriate meeting can be arranged in order to do so.**

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## APPENDIX ONE: CASE STUDIES

### ***BELGIUM***

The presence of immigrant workers in Belgium throughout the century has depended on the country's immediate economic interests. Over the past fifty years the total number of foreigners established in Belgium rose steadily to total 910,000 (9% of the total population) in 1996. More than a quarter of the foreigners are of Muslim culture. Belgian immigration policy has constantly stratified the labour market between nationals and foreigners. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty has rendered this labour market segmentation even more complex. It is now necessary to make distinctions between the unequal political, economic and legal situations of Belgian nationals, European citizens, and non-EU nationals.

First making up for the repeated shortfalls in manpower by importing cheap, docile labour, then boosting population growth in an ageing society, were the major aims of the successive waves of post-war immigration. With the closing of the country's borders in 1974 came the multifaceted problem of integrating of cultural minorities: cohabitation, racism, recognising the Islamic religion, the education of children, the emergence of a population of naturalised Belgians, and political participation. Public opinion and political circles had called for the rapid digestion of the immigrant population by Belgian society as early as the 1930s. In the 1960s and 1970s public opinion was in favour of the gradual assimilation of immigrants. The term integration came on the scene in the 1980s. Clear definitions of these ideologically loaded terms were often lacking, but presenting the individual immigrant as being solely responsible for her/his integration or social exclusion was a constant. The structural barriers to economic and cultural integration were but rarely considered. The xenophobic attitudes exhibited by the Belgian population since the start of the century have always targeted the latest arrivals. While the earliest arrivals were gradually improving their social integration and standard of living, the newcomers' abilities to "integrate" and the "unsuitability" of their customs invariably triggered the same worried questions. Even today, Belgium commemorates the long-standing presence of Italian immigrants on its territory but the presence of Muslim groups continues to spark controversy. These groups continue to be discriminated against with regard to many aspects of social life, the freedom to worship being foremost amongst them.

Islam became more visible with the development of Muslim immigrant neighbourhoods. The second generation's advent was followed by problems of health, schooling, and the transmission of the home culture. The decade of Islam's increased visibility (1975-84) was also that of economic recession. Unlike their Italian counterparts, Muslim immigrants thus enjoyed only a single decade of full employment. By the late 1970s they were already encountering a certain amount of hostility from "native" Belgian public opinion. Starting in 1985 great energies were mobilised to build positive identities for a second generation destabilised by a chaotic youth. Delinquency, recurrent 'riots' in Brussels' blue-collar neighbourhoods and the rise of Islamic discourse and practices were the resulting social phenomena that received the most media attention. Beyond the law-breaking on which the press reported and misunderstood (by the Belgian public) Islamic practices, the second generation immigrants sought - not without difficulty - to improve their social integration in the host country. Consequently, they were also more vociferously demanding than their predecessors.

Belgium's Muslim communities are starting to reach a certain degree of sociological complexity, notably with the creation of association networks. However embryonic they may be, the institutions spawned by the recognition of the Islamic religion and development of the press and audio-visual media have likewise increased the complexity of the Islamic population's social structure. The same goes for the recent emergence of elected officials of Muslim origin. An ideologically pluralistic elite stratum of people from different Muslim communities that is participating in public affairs, Belgian

political parties, and/or associations and trade unions seems to have started taking shape recently.

We must stress the ethnic, socio-economic, cultural, and ideological diversity of Belgium's Muslim communities. The two major components of the Muslim population - the Moroccans and Turks - in particular have rather different histories of migration. Belgium's Turkish communities are close-knit and active. The social control that the community traditionally exercises over its members, respect for rural traditions, and choosing spouses from one's parents' villages are still the rule. The Turks also worship together more assiduously, whereas the North African communities appear to have embarked on the path of secularisation. On the other hand, the Turks master the country's languages less well than the Moroccans. Consequently, the Moroccans do better in school. This difference carries over to "mixed marriages" with Belgians as well. Thus, Belgium's Moroccans are further along as regards social, cultural, cultural, political, and economic integration than its Turks. Yet their greater visibility, due to their greater number, subjects them to stigmatisation that the Turks are spared.

### **Overview of Current Political, Economic and Social Developments in Belgium (1993-1998)**

Despite its small size and population (10.1 million), Belgium is ethno-culturally and politically rather complex.<sup>4</sup> The population in Flanders, the northern part of the country, is Dutch speaking and remains strongly Roman Catholic in nature. Politics and social policies in Flanders are under a certain hegemony of the conservative Flemish Christian Democrats (CVP) and a constellation of associations, newspapers, pressure groups, and social, professional and trade union organisations that are linked to this party. Flems constitute 60% of the country's total population.

The language of Wallonia, in the southern part of the country, is French. Wallonia is the first region in continental Europe to have been industrialised. Its population, which accounts for 30% of the national population, has a long history of industrial struggle. The majority of the population identifies with secularised, cultural ideas and social and labour practices. Politics in Wallonia are characterised by the dominance of the French-speaking Socialist Party (PS) and a host of socio-political, economic, cultural, and trade union organisations that are close to the socialists and that profess a secular philosophy.<sup>5</sup> Belgium's capital, Brussels, is situated in the centre of the country. It is a French-speaking enclave (more than 85% French-speaking) in Flemish territory, but the rights of its Flemish minority are recognised. The Brussels-Capital Region is the only region of the country to have maintained its bilingual organisation and administration. Its population of some one million is both bourgeois and working class and is the most secular in the country. The third traditional group in Belgian politics, the Liberal Reform Party (PRL) is also predominant in Brussels. Finally, Belgium also has an official German-speaking minority of some 60,000 people who live in the country's eastern fringes, along the border with Germany. This very Catholic and conservative German-speaking minority has its own autonomous political institutions, just as its Flemish and French-speaking counterparts.

The creation of Belgium as a State in 1830 was encouraged by its powerful neighbours (for example, England), with a view to creating a neutral buffer state in a coveted centrally located area of Western Europe. The result was an artificial patchwork of ethnic units with different histories and cultures. In its first century of existence the country was dominated by an alliance of French-speaking bourgeois, Catholic and liberal forces from both north and south. Linguistic and cultural antinomies soon surfaced, however, just a few decades after the country's independence. The inter-community conflicts heightened after World War II and became the main driving force behind the country's political and socio-economic development. The Flems complained that they were treated as second-class citizens in a country in which French remained the almost uncontested language of administration and education. The Wallonians, however, feared that they would become a minority

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<sup>4</sup> For further general information about Belgian society, its history, political system and particularly its institutions, see Fitzmaurice, 1996; Mabile, 1997 and Martiniello and Swyngedouw, 1998.

<sup>5</sup> The 'political families', composed of the traditional parties (Socialist, Christian Democratic, and Liberal) and numerous social, trade and cultural organisations that are close to them, *e.g.*, associations, trade unions, co-operatives and mutual insurance companies, are called the 'pillars' of Belgian society (for more details on the country's political sociology see the references listed in footnote 1).

and subject to discrimination in the context of the rising population and rapid economic growth of Flanders. It is true that Wallonia's industries, many of which dated back to the Industrial Revolution, were beginning to show signs of obsolescence from the 1950s and the ageing of the Wallonian population was already noticeable from the early 1960s. As a consequence, more and more voices were heard in both the North and the South in the 1960s in favour of federalising the State. The three traditional political parties, that controlled almost all of the seats in both houses of Parliament (Chamber of Deputies and Senate) since universal suffrage (1919 for men, 1948 for women), namely, the Christian-Democratic, Socialist and Liberal Parties, were unable to prevent the emergence of various regionalist parties. These three political families were gradually forced to include ethno-linguistic demands in their campaigns and platforms in what appeared to be a rush forward to stay out in front whilst clinging to their privileges and pork-barrel politics. This led to the split of each party into Flemish and French-speaking parties, thereby doubling the number of parties fielding candidates in the elections. This did not lead, however, to the disappearance of regionalist or nationalistic parties.

This fragmentation of Belgian politics<sup>6</sup> multiplied the number of conflicts and prevented the compromise that had hitherto been the norm. The Franco-Flemish disputes masked and/or contaminated all other political discussions and problems for decades. They engendered chronic governmental instability and a large public debt, as each linguistic community demanded equitable treatment, sometimes at unnecessary financial cost.<sup>7</sup>

Consequently, since 1970 Belgium has undergone a slow but steady string of institutional reforms that have turned the country into a federal kingdom that contrasts with its erstwhile undivided political and administrative systems. A series of constitutional reforms (in 1970, 1980, 1988 and 1993) gradually created 'community' executive and legislative bodies, the main powers of which are in cultural affairs and education, and their regional counterparts, which have more specific infrastructural and socio-economic powers.<sup>8</sup> This metamorphosis of the Belgian State, which was driven by increasingly serious conflicts between the various ethno-linguistic segments of the population, coincided with an international economic crisis that affected the country extensively.

At the dawn of the 21st century, Belgium is continuing to search for institutional, political and economic equilibrium. The progress that has been made in terms of consolidating the European Union, improving the general economic situation and improving public finances, however, has provided little reason for optimism. This progress has been achieved largely through social deregulation, which has had devastating effects on the most vulnerable social groups and these effects are becoming more and more visible. For example, the various State bodies in charge of areas such as social security, justice, the maintenance of law and order, education, etc, are finding it increasingly difficult to do their jobs. In the 1960s many people believed that a crisis in the administration could be overcome by the enhanced federalisation of the political system. The independence that each of the federated components (the Flemish, Walloon and Brussels Regions and the Flemish, French-speaking and German-speaking Communities - each of which can now legislate through binding decrees) finally obtained, however, has not necessarily served to improve the general population's circumstances. Since the early 1990s, this situation has fostered a general

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<sup>6</sup> For example, voters had to choose from no fewer than 60 party tickets in the general elections of May 1995. Nationally, the six traditional parties (Flemish and French-speaking Christian Democrats, Socialists and Liberals) garnered 75% of the votes.

<sup>7</sup> Belgium has proportionately the highest public debt in the European Union. In 1997 it stood at 127% of GDP.

<sup>8</sup> In addition to the national/federal, regional and community levels of power, there are two other levels with specific powers, namely Belgium's ten provinces and 589 communes. Each province has its own government and parliamentary council. The communes likewise each have their own councils in addition to their burgomasters (mayors) and aldermen. All in all, a potential 14,150 political offices must be filled by universal suffrage (this is a theoretical ratio of one elected official per 500 voters). However, a considerable number of the elected representatives combine several mandates simultaneously. The Arbitration Court (created in 1980) and the State Council are responsible for ruling on the conflicts of jurisdiction that indubitably arise amongst these various levels of executive and legislative power. Since 1993 the Federal Senate also serves as a 'think tank' and watchdog over 'federal loyalty'.

feeling of bitterness that is manifested by an ever more clearly perceptible divorce between politicians and the people, who are now openly voicing their mistrust of Belgium's numerous executive, legislative and legal institutions on either side of the language divide. Many observers predict that Belgium's days, even as a federal state, are uncertain.

The constitutional reform of 14 July 1993 'reduced' the powers of the Federal State, which manages 60% of the country's public resources, to foreign policy, national defence, public security, social protection, justice (including the official recognition of religions), and the establishment of general economic policy guidelines. Other powers have been devolved to the regional and/or community federated entities. They embrace areas such as regional development, the environment, housing, foreign trade, transport, employment and vocational training, agricultural policy and scientific policy for the Flemish, Walloon and Brussels Regions' Executives. Further, they also include cultural policy, audio-visual media, education and social action and assistance (including the integration of settlers and their descendants) in the case of the Flemish, French-speaking and German-speaking Communities' Executives.

In addition to the institutional reforms, other major concerns in the 1990s for the federal government have included balancing public finances (with the aim of cutting the budget deficit to less than 3% of the country's GDP and significantly easing the burden of the State's debt); revitalising the economy (by restoring the international competitiveness of Belgian enterprises) and modernising the social security system and how it is financed. The criteria for economic and budgetary convergence, imposed on Belgium by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty (if it was to participate in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as of 1997 and be accepted for the single European currency as of 1999), have been the constant leitmotifs of government policies over recent years. To this end, the government has had no qualms about risking the trade unions' wrath on a number of occasions. For example, during the winter of 1993 Belgium experienced its first general strike since 1936. Further, the government also pushed three framework laws through Parliament in July 1996 that gave it free rein to implement drastic public spending cuts and tax increases without having to answer to the parliamentary opposition. We must acknowledge the government's success in this area, since the European Summit held in Brussels on 2 May 1998 - it is common knowledge that Belgium will be part of the 'hard core' of eleven countries that will switch to the Euro in 1999. It is also true that public opinion, which is traditionally in favour of a united Europe, concurs with the government on this point. It is no less true, however, that the government's successes in the areas of finance and economic recovery, which are rooted in social deregulation and the reduction of employers' contributions, have *not* dealt effectively with the continued rise of unemployment in the country.<sup>9</sup>

The cuts in entitlements and public services that have been made in the name of increased competitiveness and balancing the State budget have not failed to inflame Belgian public opinion, already inflamed by calls for independence issued by a segment of the Flemish political spectrum and by a series of political and financial scandals linked to illegal party financing that affected almost all traditional political formations in the 1990s. Despite their declared intentions, the country's political circles do not seem to have abandoned their party-cratic culture and pork-barrel, even nepotistic, practices, especially when it comes to the political appointment of civil servants. Over the last decade, people have expressed their concern about these practices and the country's future on a number of occasions and by the utilisation of novel methods. Students and teachers, from both the north and south of the country, repeatedly protested about their working conditions and above all against the decline in the quality of education. This led to some lengthy school strikes. A further example of mobilisation of the citizenry was the petition to automatically grant Belgian nationality to foreigners who had resided in the country for more than five years. This petition was launched following the general elections in 1991 (which had also been marked by the

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<sup>9</sup> According to the various methods of calculation used, 12-14% of the working-age population was unemployed in 1997. This percentage rises to over 20% for the under-25s. The regional breakdown shows that almost 23.5% of the working population in Wallonia and Brussels was unemployed, versus 10% in Flanders.

first major breakthrough of racist, far-right parties) and obtained approximately one million signatures.

King Baudouin I's death on 31 July 1993, just a few days after the completion of constitutional reform that turned Belgium into a federal state, triggered a huge, spontaneous movement of sympathy. This movement was unanimously interpreted as an expression of social exasperation in the face of an uncertain future. No fewer than 500,000 people went to the palace to pay the king their last respects. This grass-roots fervour indicates how strongly the monarchy continued to be viewed as an antidote to political wrangling and separatism, despite the monarchy's role as a symbolic institution. The strongest expression made by the Belgian population and civil society against Belgium's institutions and political system, however, was yet to come.

The arrest in August 1996 of Marc Dutroux (an ex-offender who had been imprisoned for paedophilia but released on parole), for the kidnap, torture, rape and murder of several young girls and the discovery of the bodies of four of his victims' initiated an as yet unequalled social reaction. Public anger was further exacerbated by the fact that the arrest of this repeat offender revealed, once again, numerous examples of incompetence, deficiencies and ineptitude that have hampered the country's law enforcement forces and courts for many years. In order to displace the responsibility for these institutionalised inefficiencies, these central state bodies had no qualms about making their internal quarrels public. This only served, however, to present a negative picture of Belgium and considerably damaged the authority of the State. The situation worsened to such a state that King Albert II, in an unusual move, addressed the country on 10 September 1996 calling for an investigation into these matters.

The process of solving the problems that undermine the functioning of the State, especially with reference to the courts and the police force, will doubtless take many years. The conclusions of the high profile parliamentary inquest committee on the Dutroux case that completed its work at the end of 1997 have not, as yet, been followed by action, whether in terms of disciplinary measures or reforms of judicial procedures and law enforcement. Recently, in May 1998, when the reform process seemed to have come to a standstill, the government invited opposition parties to sit down at the negotiating table in order to get as broad a consensus as possible on the police and judicial reforms that it appears to be determined to finalise before the autumn.

So-called 'white committees' have been established nationwide (particularly in Wallonia), in order to support the campaign for truth that is being fought by the parents of Dutroux's victims and other victims of paedophilia; these committees are also supported by the parents of other victims of crime who are, as yet, unaccounted for. A petition that was circulated at the end of 1996, calling for non-reducible sentences to be applied to the perpetrators of particular heinous crimes, collected 2.7 million signatures in the space of just a few weeks. Finally, on 20 October 1996 the white committees organised a mass silent march in Brussels calling for the protection of children. Some 315,000-325,000 marchers participated in this 'white march', in order to draw attention to the deficiencies of a political elite that ignored the people's needs. Behind their denunciation of the courts, police force, and political circles, the 'white marchers' also criticised the erosion of human values in a money-dominated world. A large number of other 'white marches', both large and small, followed all over the country.

We would like to end this overview of Belgium in the 1990s, however, on a note of hope. In the midst of the 'white movement', Nabela Benaissa, the elder sister of Loubna Benaissa, a victim of a paedophile, made a high profile appearance that made headlines across the country. This young, headscarf wearing, Moroccan woman exhibited unusual charisma and maturity as her family's spokeswoman.<sup>10</sup> Her exemplary dignity won widespread admiration and induced a definite change in Belgians' attitudes and perceptions of the country's Muslim inhabitants. Indeed, Nabela Benaissa was awarded the prize of the Belgian Human Rights League in December 1996.

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<sup>10</sup> The Benaissa family wanted to bury Loubna's body in Belgium, but the lack of Muslim cemeteries prevented this wish being fulfilled. A funeral service was finally held at the great mosque in Brussels before Loubna's body was 'repatriated' to Morocco, although this was not her country of birth. The ceremony was broadcast live on television.

## **FRANCE**

Socio-economic and politico-cultural conditions are of great importance in any interesting study of the forms of discrimination and the processes of exclusion.

In the last decade, major changes are in process following major events occurring in France and generally in Europe. These changes have occurred at the political level (the fall of the Berlin wall, the fall of the communist block, the Gulf war, etc.); the economic level (the Gatt agreements, European economic unification, etc.) and also the issue of globalisation, the effects of which are present at many levels: political, economic, social and cultural. As for the Muslim community, we would like to highlight an evolution of the immigration model. The foreign labourers who were only temporarily working in France are now a population which is being settled through its integration into French society. This has socio-economic and politico-cultural consequences for the community as well as for the French State.

### **Immigration History:**

Our report examines the migration phenomena in France from the middle of the last century, when the number of 'foreigners' was estimated to be 379,289 persons in 1851, that is 1.05% of the general population; the major part of these migrants was originated from Belgium and Italy (Schor, 1996).

The situation has after the First and the Second World War. France suffered heavy loss of life (particularly men) and the destruction of a part of its territory. Therefore the French state widely opened its territory to migration, and a number of migrants arrived in France from Africa, particularly from the Maghreb (in 1954, European migrants constituted 79% of the foreign population and Africans constituted 13% including North-Africans). Moreover, in neighbouring countries, such as Italy and Spain, an important demographic expansion resulted in overpopulation and contributed to the economic crisis. The political problems and the different situations (for example, conflict) in many places in the world have constrained some population to migrate towards other countries with more political and economic stability.

Hence, the first migrants arrived from Poland (from 45,000 in 1921 i.e. 2.9% of the foreign population to 507,000 in 1931 i.e. 17.5%) (Schor, 1996) and also from South Asia in less significant numbers.

The economic crisis of 1975 significantly restrained immigration to France, other ways, however, were opened, for example, family reunification and the migration of students.

The Islamic (or Muslim) presence in France dates from the first days of Islam (about 615): From 713 to the end of the 10th century, the military conquest of Muslims in Europe towards Spain and France. In the 11th century, after their military defeat, Muslims returned to the region to trade. In the 17th century, the Mauresques Muslims were deported from Spain and the King of France allowed them to settle in France. From the 1950s, economic and political reasons lay at the roots of migration to France. Before 1975, Muslim migrants originated primarily from rural areas. After this date, migration increased from the more urban areas as people travelled to find work in industry and the BTP (Building and Public Services).

With the birth of the second and the third generation, the Muslim presence has opened a new chapter in its history as well as in the French one: The transition from immigration to citizenship.

These changes introduce new politico-economic and socio-cultural factors, and particularly a significant progression in the attachment to Islam with the visibility of many cultural activities (Mosques, Muslim squares in the cemeteries, veils, halal meat, etc.). This presence has resulted in some reactions and an exclusion of the French Muslim community from many domains: economic, social, political and educational, etc.

### **Socio-Economic Situations and Demographic Data:**

Some indicators such as accommodations, health, employment, and unemployment are useful to

study this situation.

In the census of the population by Insee (1990), 'foreigners' numbered 6.4%. This proportion increased to 18.39% in the underprivileged districts and 80.8% of these foreigners are of Muslim origin. This numbers illustrates the extent of the social problems experienced by Muslims and the repercussions of these problems extend to the other domains: health, education, security, etc. Moreover, if we look over the type and the status of housing/accommodation, it is possible to note a discernible difference in terms of 'standards' between the population of European origin and the population of Muslim origin. (55.7% of Maghrebians live in overcrowded accommodation, in comparison to just 0.5% of Italians, 5% of the Spanish and 11.5% of the Portuguese) [Insee, Enquête sur le Logement, 1988].

In terms of insurance cover and medical consultation, 78% of French people have complementary insurance, compared to just 57% among the migrants. For that reason, French people are more likely to consult a doctor in comparison to the other populations: 6 times per year against 3 times for the Maghrebians and no more that 2 for the Francophone Muslim Africans. One of the consequences of this is a high infant mortality rate: 12 per1000 for the children of Maghrebian mothers, in comparison to 9.3 per 1000 for the children of French mothers.

In terms of employment, the number of jobs held by foreigners has decreased from 1,346,000 to 1,304,000, that is to say that 42,000 people have lost their jobs, while the total number of posts in France has increased of 4.2%. Moreover, Muslims are to be found working more and more in the service sector (cleaning, security, etc) than in the BTP. In this way it is possible to assert that they have moved from a position of relative stability to one of precariousness. We should also note that the numbers of unqualified workers stands at 15% for French people and 32% for foreign. Furthermore, half of the young active Maghrebians (15 to 20 years) were seeking employment in 1992, against 20.1% of the French native youth.

Concerning the numbers of Muslims, we have used an original technique based on the dynamic model and inspired from a systemic approach. We consider the population volume in the form of a "stock" with entrance (annual migration, births, conversion to Islam) and exit flows (return home, mortality). Thus, our estimation of the Muslim population number is about 3,700,000 persons; not far from the scientific estimations (Lochon 1996) that evaluate this number at 4,000,000 Muslims.

### **Official Immigration Legislation:**

The modern laws relating to foreigners in France date from the 19th century. The immigration laws have been variable with respect to the economic and political situation. The law of 9 August 1893 introduced the foreigners immatriculation register. With the rise of xenophobia and the 1929 crisis, many laws have limited the entrance of foreigners and forbidden "undesirable publications". However, France encouraged immigration following the two World Wars: Firstly, to reduce the demographic deficit, and secondly, to provide solid and docile labourers for the reconstruction of the country. Between 1945 and 1980; many residence permits were introduced with respect to this and French nationality was obtained much more easily. After 1981, immigration was restrained in spite of the power alternations between the right and the left and the acquisition of French nationality became more difficult; however, the law of 17 July 1984 issued a resident permit of ten years (automatically renewable (with full right) even if the job changes) to those permanent and regular residents who showed their conditions improved.

### **Political and Cultural Muslim Organisations:**

The laws for the establishment of associations in France date from 1901 for the French people and from 1981 for foreigners. For French Muslims, associative activities started with trade unionism defending the Muslim workers' rights in factories. From the middle of the 1970s, the French youth originated from the Maghreb took over by creating musical, theatrical and sportive associations. The cultural and religious Muslim associations only began to appear from 1981: today there are many thousands of associations of immigrants or their children of French citizenship (Cesari J. 1994).

Many important associations are now active in many different domains: social, cultural, cultural,

humanitarian, etc. They are all competing to win recognition in terms of the representativeness of the Muslim community. However, a co-ordination of all the great associations would seem to be the best solution to defend the Muslim rights.

Prior to the present period, immigrant labourers were primarily concerned with the idea of returning to their country of origin, and for this reason their cultural practices and religious premises remained as discrete possible. From the 1980s, however, and the birth of the second generation and the renunciation to the return contributed to draw the attention of the Muslims to the construction and the claim of cultural premises. Today, Loncon (S cretariat de Recherche sur L'Islam SRI mars 1996) estimates the number of cultural premises to 1128 (1996) with 8 architectural mosques with a capacity of 1000 places.

### **Processes of Exclusion and Forms of Discrimination:**

To study the discrimination phenomena, in all the forms that it generates, one should observe globally the causes and the different origins of exclusion. We are interested to the expression of exclusion in many domains: employment, politics, education and religious practices, etc.

In the employment domain, many activities are forbidden for foreigners, such as in the public sector, national companies, and also some posts like Doctors (Medical activities) (with the exception of "deficient" regions and the "difficult" districts. In the private sector, some liberal professions (tobacconist's shops, bar, etc) are forbidden to foreigners. As such, the number of illegal jobs has increased, and many foreigners show themselves obliged to accept these positions and so find themselves slipping into difficult, humiliating and precarious situations.

Some sections of the social security cover called "non-contributives" are exclusively reserved to French citizens. Furthermore, those workers who leave France to permanently return to their countries lose their retirement pension, etc.

In the religious domain, the Home Office (Minist re de L'Int rieur) manages the Muslim cult. This means that Islam and the Muslims, suspected of integristism, can potentially cause a breach to the peace. And hence the police should keep an eye on their activities. Furthermore, the Department of Education circulars prohibit Muslim girls from wearing the hijab in schools. Some Muslim erudites and thinkers forbidden of entrance to France. Some publications of Islamic books are not an exception to the rule.

In the political sphere, the secular nature of the State does not allow the foundation of religious oriented parties. While all the other religions are organised and well represented by their respective institutions, the Muslim community suffers of the politicisation of Islam; and this is at the origin of the dissension between on the one hand, the French state and some Muslim organisations (particularly La mosqu e de Paris: The Mosque of Paris) and the other important organisations on the other hand (UOIF, Tablighi, FNMF, etc). The last claim that the representatives should be independent of any interior or exterior political influence.

In terms of law, the period of detention pending trial stands at 63.9% for foreigners in comparison to 40.1% for French citizens for the same offence. Furthermore, a French citizen is more likely to be set free before a foreigner in terms of committing similar or same offences.

In terms of education, immigrant children (even with French nationality), face many more difficulties than their compatriots. While, 27.4% of those who are French by birth and more than 15 years of age declare that they are without diplomas, the percentage of those of Maghrebien origin without diplomas stands at 68% and 72.2% among the Turks. The social and economic conditions are frequently the reasons why children do badly at school. The educational policy has added to these problems. The programmes and policies undertaken (ZEP, remedial class, etc) to solve this problem remain inefficient.

### **Conclusion:**

We have shown, in this study, that the exclusion phenomenon is not inherent to a particular category of persons. It can affect all the social classes, but with different consequences. Since the majority of Muslims are of working and especially poorer classes, they are more likely to suffer the

effects of exclusion more than other communities. On the one hand, the attitudes towards and the representation of Islam increase this exclusion and intensify the levels of discrimination. On the other hand, however, the recent visibility of Islam in the public domain has given rise to many “wears”. This religion considered as the enemy in the past, is now co-existing with other religions, and its impact on the society does not pass unnoticed in social and cultural spaces (particularly in terms of culture and clothing).

## ***GERMANY***

The presence of a larger number of Muslims in Germany is the result of labour migration from the recruitment countries as well as refugees migrating from countries with a Muslim majority. Owing to this migration, Islam has become the third largest denomination after the two Christian denominations in terms of its membership. Currently, there are 2.8 million Muslims in Germany. The 2.1 million Turks form the largest group of Muslim immigrants, which is the reason for Islam tending to be more “Turkish” both in its outward appearance and in the way it is perceived in the host society. In addition to the Turkish Muslims, there are larger numbers of Bosnian, Iranian, Maghreb and Afghan Muslims. Also, there are Muslims of German origin.

In the first few years following the signing of the recruitment agreement with Turkey, Yugoslavia, Morocco and Tunisia, Islam was a peripheral phenomenon in Germany owing to the structure of labour migration in this phase. In the sixties, it was mostly single, usually male labour migrants who came to Germany and whose life planning was oriented on a return to their home country. For this reason, there were hardly any attempts among these people to establish an infrastructure of their own in this phase. A change came about in the seventies, when Muslim labour immigrants increasingly made efforts to get their families over to the Federal Republic. Owing to changes in the composition of the Muslim immigrant groups and a gradual trend towards more permanent residence, there were more intensive attempts to create offers catering for these people’s own requirements.

### **The Legal Situation of Muslims in Germany:**

The majority of the Muslims living in Germany have so far not acquired German citizenship, leaving them in a legally insecure position. Owing to economic developments over the last three decades, the legal regulations regarding foreigners have become more and more restricted. Following the onset of the oil crisis at the beginning of the seventies and the recession it triggered, a recruitment ban was implemented in 1973 to stop any further immigration of workers. When, in spite of the recruitment ban, the number of immigrants continued to grow over the following years owing to re-uniting of families, it was stipulated in 1981 that it was only children below the age of 16 who were eligible for this type of immigration. Owing to the high unemployment rate, the then government attempted to motivate labour migrants to return to their home countries by introducing appropriate measures. These included capitalisation or payment of contributions to the pension fund on return to their home country as well as payment of a one-off bonus as a measure promoting return. Although the number of non-Germans did decline as a result of these measures between 1983 and 1985, it became stable again and has since then shown continuous growth. Thus the prevention of further migration established itself as the prime objective of so-called aliens policy. The reform of the Aliens Law in 1991 resulted in re-uniting of families becoming more complicated owing to the introduction of more stringent conditions for granting family members such as spouses a visa. For example, proof had to be provided of an established residential status, sufficient housing accommodation and sufficient income for the person living in Germany in order that a family member could move to Germany to join her or him. Both these legal requirements and the restrictive practice of diplomatic and consular agencies aimed at preventing immigration whenever it was possible. The reform of the law on political asylum constituted a further measure designed to check immigration. It was introduced in 1993, following approval among the then opposition parties of a compromise solution to the issue. The latest amendment concerned the introduction of

also making visas compulsory for children under the age of 16, which was introduced early in 1997. In economic life, Muslims, who come almost exclusively from non-EU countries, are legally discriminated against in job placements on the labour market in comparison to native Germans and EU citizens. In 1992, a relative improvement was achieved with the introduction of regulations making it easier for migrants growing up in Germany who are between 16 and 23 years of age to successfully apply for naturalisation. However, the conditions required for a naturalisation of adults have not been changed so far. The principle of avoiding dual nationality used to be an obstacle to many migrants, and in particular to those from Turkey, to apply for naturalisation. The trend to apply for German citizenship nevertheless increased following relevant amendments in Turkey concerning conscription or property law and law of succession. Surveys demonstrate that the readiness to become naturalised has since increased even though the naturalisation rates have remained at a low level.

### **The Economic Situation of Muslims in Germany:**

With respect to the employment situation of Muslim immigrants in Germany, the special circumstances under which they are living here have to be taken into account. The overwhelming majority of Muslim immigrants came to the Federal Republic in the framework of recruitment contracts. Since these cases concern non-EU states, the migrants are given second-class treatment in comparison to native Germans and EU citizens regarding job placements on the labour market. In addition to this technical discrimination special difficulties in gaining access to the labour market among the various generations need to be noted that also explain the disproportionately high unemployment rate among Muslim immigrants. With Turkish immigrants, it was at 22.5 percent, double that among Germans, in 1996. Since the school and vocational qualifications among the labour migrants of the first generation tend to be low and owing to many not making use of vocational further training offers because of their original intention of returning home, they have greater difficulties in finding a new job in the event of unemployment. This applies in particular to industrial branches (coal, iron and steel industry) that have been phased out over the last few years. General difficulties people encounter at a greater age constitute a further factor.

Muslim immigrants of the second generation also have to struggle with the problem of insufficient school and vocational qualifications in gaining access to the labour market. As children of families that themselves have had only poor access to educational facilities, they often lack the objective opportunity to promote school and vocational education of their children sufficiently, and in some cases, they also lack appropriate awareness. Linguistic competence is the key to later success in occupational life and ought to be appropriately promoted. Language problems in Germany are often the reason for children being sent by teachers to special schools, which additionally restricts their prospects in their later occupational life. Moreover, both the first and the successive generations are faced with the problem of discrimination on the labour market. As empirical surveys demonstrate, Muslim youths also experience greater problems in seeking a job even if language skills and school education levels are the same. Special problems are encountered in particular in the case of women Muslims wearing a headscarf. In the case of the Muslim youths, these are the crucial factors for the high unemployment rate among them, which is at 25 percent for Turkish youths (1996).

### **The Legal Status of Islam in Germany:**

In spite of the freedom of faith, which is guaranteed in principle in Germany, there are mechanisms that frequently prevent the religious life of Muslims from being on a par with other established denominations. One area in which a lack or a low level of acceptance in society has created problems is the construction of mosques. Again and again, there are cases of residents of an urban district attempting to prevent the construction of a mosque. As long as the mosques were accommodated in other premises and for this reason could usually not be identified as such, the existence of the mosque associations caused hardly any problems. It was only when they became visible that corresponding mechanisms were triggered. The issue of the acceptance of the Moslem's places of worship becomes even more apparent if the mosques wish to utter the prayer call (Ezan) in public. A consensus can be reached in such conflict situations if the parties concerned show appropriate willingness to solve the problem.

Recognising corporate rights is an important aspect in according equal status. So far, they have been granted to none of the existing Islamic national federations, although several of them have filed applications to this end. Denying corporate status is often justified by claiming that the respective federation only represents a section of the religious group and that there is no official body the state can approach. This constitutes unequal treatment since various different liaison bodies are accepted among the other religious groups. Corporate rights would, for example, give the Islamic federations the right to have a say in Islamic religious instruction at public schools. They would be represented in institutions under public law, and they would be legally entitled to religious public holidays. The setting up of cemeteries of their own is a further right that would also require corporate status. The issue of burial is currently usually settled by graveyards being made available for Muslims in existing cemeteries. Often, the funeral can only proceed partly in observance of Islamic funeral regulations.

The ban on slaughter according to religious rites is also a restriction of the freedom of faith. In the Federal Republic, it is forbidden to slaughter animals that have not been anaesthetised since this would clash with the Animal Welfare Law. This constitutes unequal treatment since people of Jewish faith have been granted the right to slaughter according to religious rights. An Islamic federation has lodged an appeal against the ban, which has been confirmed by a Supreme Court ruling.

## **GREECE**

The Greek analysis focuses, firstly, on the Muslim minority in Thrace and smaller Muslim groups in the Dodecanese Islands and secondly on the problems experienced by Muslim refugees and immigrants living in the Metropolitan Area of Athens.

The Muslim minority in Greece has two different aspects. The first relates to the indigenous populations in Thrace, Northern Greece (between 100-120,000 according to Greek data, most of which are of Turkish origin, Pomaki and Gypsies living mainly in Rodopi and Xanthi), while the latter refers to the relatively recent entry of refugees and immigrants from the Middle East, Turkey and the Balkans. The latter converges mainly in the large urban centres, namely, the Metropolitan Areas of Athens, Salonica, Patras and Heraklion in Crete. There is also a secondary convergence of immigrants, less important though, to rural areas in Greece.

The process of social integration is difficult and complex. This is due to a number of factors. Firstly, Greece has not traditionally been a host country for immigrants and has therefore never felt obliged to develop a suitable social and administrative structure. Secondly, the majority of immigrants living in Greece today are not legal residents and have in fact entered the country illegally.

No serious empirical work has been undertaken concerning migrants. According to unofficial estimates, Greece has the largest number of undocumented migrants from Albania, Bulgaria and Poland. Concurrently, there has been a noticeable increase in the undocumented workers from the Maghreb and central African countries. The undocumented work force is estimated to number 500,000, with almost 200-250,000 workers coming from Albania. In Greece the number of documented migrants (with valid permits, expired or awaiting recognition) was, during 1996, around 300,000 people. The majority, however, are considered to be either of Greek origin (i.e. from other regions in Greece or second generation Greeks from Bulgaria and Rumania) or have refugee status (i.e. Kurdish, Iranian, Iraqi).

### **Official Legislation:**

To protect religious minorities against any form of racial and/or religious discrimination, the Greek State enacted law 927/1979. According to this law, all practices that directly or indirectly may result in discrimination, hatred or violence against members of a religious community is prohibited. In relation to citizenship, however, Greece has been condemned by the European Court of Human Rights, Amnesty International and the US Human Rights Report (1991), due to the enforcement of

article 19 of the Greek Nationality Law (according to which ‘a person of non-Greek origin who leaves Greece with the intention of not returning, may be declared as having lost Greek Nationality’).

In relation to the issue of religious/cultural rights, the most serious legislative discrimination concerns the right of self-administration concerning the religious organisation of the community, and the free practice of religious duties. The first relates to the prohibition addressed to the free election of the Mufti. However, because the Mufti is both the spiritual leader and the local Judge, (according to Law 2345/1920, Mekos, 1995), the Greek administration considers it its right to officially appoint him. The second issue relates to law 1363/1938, which was replaced by law 1672/1932 and the Royal Decree (20.5 - 2.6.1939). It stipulates that the functioning or establishment of places of worship requires the permission of the officially recognised Church (law 590/1977) and of the Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs. This Law applies to all Greek territory, except the Western Thrace region.

### **Socio-Political & Cultural Organisations:**

Minority and immigrant organisations are principally organisations for solidarity and are of a cultural and educational nature. The maintenance of basic national characteristics and customs, especially the language, constitute the basic aims of those communities, which have significant numbers of members. As some representatives state, the children of immigrants who have the right to education go to Greek schools, where they are in danger of losing their national and linguistic identity. Social solidarity and the maintenance of cultural characteristics, and in some circumstances educational activities, are generally the objectives of these organisations. In those cases in which there is no official body for the representation of the country in Greece, the organisation may act in part as a substitute for that body. Only in a few cases are these organisations of an official religious nature.

### **Discrimination:**

The Muslim minorities in Greece face a complex landscape of social discrimination and processes of social and cultural exclusion in Greece. The historical formation of the Greek nation, the subsequent antagonism between those of Turkish origin (relating to the Ottoman Empire) and the contemporary state of affairs (that is, the continual strained relationship between Greece and Turkey and the constant fear of military conflict between the two states), maintains and intensifies this climate of mistrust for most Greeks. The results are a range of direct discrimination and exclusion against all Muslims, especially those of Turkish ancestry (**Interview 1997**). It is well known that most state services, the police and job centres, as well as local social services approach Muslims with distrust, and there is often a clear intention to impede their settlement in Greece.

Institutional Discrimination against members of the Muslim minority takes many forms: limiting of the possibilities for preservation and creation of religious areas; control of the religious leadership of the Muslims through the state administration, (i.e. appointment of the Mufti). For Turkish Muslims the name “Turk” is prohibited in official letters and names of societies etc; loss of citizenship for Turks who leave Greece and “state” that they will not return; limited recognition of the studies of members of the minority who have Turkish university degrees; and, non-recognition of societies and organisations that represent the Turkish minority.

### **Employment:**

In order to analyse the employment situation of the Muslim minority in Greece, we have to differentiate among Muslims living in the traditionally rural areas of Thrace and the newly established migrants from the Balkans and migrant Gypsy populations.

Muslim men in rural areas often make up the numbers of seasonal workers who come to the Metropolitan Area of Athens for short-term employment. The majority of documented workers in Athens are employed in construction (Polish, Albanian and mainly Turkish refugees), tourism (Albanian, Polish and Thai female workers), heavy industry (Egyptians, Pakistanis), domestic labour (Albanian, Polish, Bulgarian, Filipino women) and the leisure industry (Albanian, Thai, African female workers). Those immigrants without work permits are also involved in similar jobs.

Undocumented Albanians suffer low wages, poorer working conditions, longer working hours, unfair dismissals, no worker rights and receive no welfare benefits. The Undocumented Migrants experience a “continuous-temporary” situation, where there exist hardships, a lack of housing and arbitrary behaviour by the authorities.

Gypsies may be classified in three broad groups: First, there are the blacksmiths who tend to be more permanently established and identify more with the Turkish ethnic group. The second group of Gypsies consists mainly of vendors who frequently move around Thrace and all over Greece alone or with their families. The third group of Gypsies consists mainly of unskilled workers without any kind of stable employment. They tend to live at the outskirts of the city, where they have their own settlements (Alan Kouyou in Komotini, for example). This group of Gypsies is usually employed in transport as assistants; they also work as cleaners, etc.

### **Education:**

Although in accordance to the International Convention of Rome (1950) Greece should assure the right to education based on personal religious and philosophical beliefs, there has been a wide practice of institutionalised discrimination. Although this situation was largely improved after 1993, Christidis (1996) refers to two kinds of discrimination: Firstly discrimination that results from a poor or inadequate infrastructure and secondly discrimination that results from social mobility and stratification. For example, delays in the distribution of school textbooks and manuals, or the withholding of permission to teach at community schools for qualified teachers (who have graduated from Turkish Universities and colleges). Furthermore, legislative protective measures against illiteracy seem to arbitrarily, insofar as the Muslim community is concerned.

In Thrace, where the Muslim minority is officially recognised by the state, there are provisions to create educational structures for the children of minorities. This obligation does not however apply to areas. Here the children are placed in regular classes and are not taught their mother tongue, although there is a high demand for this.

### **Conclusions:**

A basic precondition for dealing with the problems faced by the Muslim Minorities in Greece is that the Greek State and public bodies should recognise their basic rights concerning education, housing and social and political participation.

In the educational sector it appears absolutely vital to modernise the educational programmes and for bilingual education to be applied substantially and effectively. In addition, attendance at Secondary Schools by minority children should be supported, and ‘dropping out’ dealt with. Moreover, it is necessary to encourage or oblige parents to send their children to school. Concurrently, child labour must be controlled, as well as the coercion of children to undertake heavy agricultural work or work on the streets.

Housing: a specific policy must be developed that establishes homes, or subsidises rented accommodation for minority families with many children, for whom it is difficult to find adequate habitation, or to pay rent.

In the area of employment, an important role in the incorporation of the Muslim minority can be played by being trained in the work which they have already chosen, and perform occasionally (selling of second-hand goods, collection of material for recycling etc), and the support of the creation of small businesses with the aim of increasing self-employment and the employment of other members of the family. As regards the employment of Undocumented Migrants, it seems that legislation regarding their residence in Greece is absolutely vital, as is ensuring that they are granted the appropriate work permit for the period they remain in the country. In this area a significant role can be played by reducing the cost of insurance for employers for seasonal work, so that they are able to legally incorporate immigrants into their businesses.

A significant European policy that might be developed is that concerning minority groups living in border areas. One way to tackle the problems faced by the minority might be the creation of

observatories for the recording and analysis of the minority problems in these border regions. Here, scientists and specialists from various sides could co-operate, so that their reports would be reliable and generally accepted. Such an action would be an important step in understanding minority problems, and in the creation of appropriate policies, which would improve the social position of the minorities in border regions.

## ***ITALY***

The study moves from a multi-disciplinary framework (political, institutional, economic, socio-cultural) grounded especially on the work of Antony Giddens (1990)<sup>11</sup> and Anthias and Yuval Davis (1992)<sup>12</sup>. This theoretical paradigm rejects the hypothesis that dominated sociology for long time, i.e. the classification of society in terms of modernity and religion. Many events of the recent decades, both at the national and international level, demonstrated that religion resides within modernity. And above all religion has come to represent one of the major factor of exclusion of specific ethnic-religious groups - such as that of Muslims - in contemporary society. Religious and cultural exclusion is reinforced by economic exclusion, which, in its turn, is intertwined with that introduced by legislation, and national and local policy.

The study makes use of different techniques and supports (qualitative interviews, bibliographical, documentary and newspaper analysis, quantitative data) to build up a case study on the Muslim community in Milan. However, the focus of the study is twofold.

In the first place the it considers the development of Muslim communities at the national level by identifying specific (Muslim) immigration cycles, within which different paths for different ethnic groups have been also highlighted. At the same time, the study tries to identify the main effects of the immigration laws on migrant communities and, above all, Muslim communities.

Legislation comes to the fore also when the question of the official recognition of Islam and Muslim organisations is examined. On this respect whilst the agreement between Muslim organisations and the Italian State has not been drawn yet, the pressure of Muslim communities, at the local level, aimed at obtaining the recognition of their rights, has increased more and more. However, the responses given by local authorities varied from place to place. The case of Milan is here taken as an example.

In the second place - i.e. at the local level - a case study of the Muslim communities in Milan have been carried out mainly with the purpose of unravelling the power structure among Muslim organisations, their main concerns, political affiliation, sources of funding, etc.. A description of Muslim communities in terms of ethnic origin and life conditions has also been produced.

On this respect, because of the role and weight of Milan in the Muslim “universe” of Italy, taking Milan is almost equivalent to considering Italy as a whole. The study have especially pointed to the lack of union that characterises Muslim communities and organisations - especially between Italian converts, many of which attend a Sufi organisation, and foreign immigrants - and highlighted the reasons of this. Notwithstanding this situation a sort of “division of labour” for what concerns requests to local authorities among Muslim organisations have taken place, sometimes as a strategy pursued to achieve more rights through negotiations.

The main common concern of Muslim organisations is that of obtaining more public space for Muslims in Milan (more mosques, madrasas, space in radio and television, etc.), i.e. increasing their visibility in the public arena.

Exclusion - which is introduced essentially by legislation, state and local policy and media (all

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<sup>11</sup> Giddens, A. (1990), *The consequences of Modernity*, Cambridge, Polity Press.

<sup>12</sup> Anthias, F., Yuval-Davis, N. (1992), *Racialized Boundaries*, London and New York, Routledge.

themes analysed and developed by the Report) - takes place particularly in everyday life. For this reason special attention is given to the question of discrimination and the use of it by specific political parties.

Discrimination against Muslims can be found in different spheres of life in the Italian society, especially in the form of “cultural racialism” (Balbo and Manconi, 1992: 74). “Cultural racialism” refers to the fact that religious difference based on everyone’s own belief is not recognised and respected by non-Muslims but considered as based on cultural differences only.

Discrimination in Italy can be found also in the form of criminalisation of Muslim communities which follows the main international terrorist events. This latter phenomenon has led Muslim people not to put themselves at risk by participating actively to the life of Muslim organisations.

The study makes here the point that conflation between “Political Islam” and “religious-cultural Islam” has been the main result of the current use of media in Italy on matter related to Muslim people.

Then the study goes in depth with the question of education which seems to be the second main concern of Muslims (after that of mosques) in Italy and Milan in particular. Whilst national legislation is not yet very sensible to religious issues, at the local level there are many examples of schools, especially in big cities with bigger Muslim communities that teach Arabic languages and offer alternative diets to Muslim people. However, the fact that no courses of Koran are available in schools is taking part of Muslim communities to the decision of opening private Muslim schools alternative to the Italian ones.

A preliminary account on the employment conditions of Muslims has also been drawn with particular attention to the aspects that put immigrants, coming especially from Islamic countries, in a weak position compared to that of autochtones. No kind of discriminating treatment based on religion seems to emerge here in the sense that it is not true that because immigrant are Muslims they are employed in the most menial jobs. However, it is true that some Muslim ethnic groups are quite unstable communities and thus manage to find only badly paid and precarious jobs.

As to the quantitative level the study utilises data on the presence of Muslims in Italy and Milan in particular, by ethnic groups too. These data are estimated through the methodology developed by the Cathy Marsh Centre for Census and Survey Research of Manchester (CCSR), i.e. by applying the rate of incidence of Muslims in the population of each country of origin.

Data on the trend of the Muslim presence in Italy, its distribution among Italian regional areas, the incidence of family reunions per each ethnic group, unemployment, ethnic business and education have been also included, where possible with reference to both Italy and Milan.

The main data source used in the study is that of Ministry of Interior due to the lack of a recent Census (the last one dates back to 1991). However, even the aforementioned source is not able to give a complete picture of the Muslim presence in Italy, especially as a result of the high rate of non-registered immigrants that characterises this country. People without resident permit are, in fact, not captured by Ministry of Interior data.

Finally, the study gives precise suggestions in terms of both national and European policy. Recommendations refer to both Islamic matters and social exclusion.

In so doing specific attention has been paid to the concerns Muslim communities in Italy and Milan feel as most important (more space in the public arena, Islamic education for Muslim children, more rules to prevent discrimination based on religion, more participation to the Italian political life at the local level) and on the restraints that influence the chance of (Muslim) immigrants to access the labour market.

## ***THE NETHERLANDS***

The focus in this phase of the research project was the extent to which Muslims are socially excluded and marginalised. We have concentrated on the three largest Muslim groups in the Netherlands: the Turks, the Moroccans and the Surinamese. Attention was paid to their immigration history, to legislation and Minorities policy in the Netherlands, to socio-political and cultural Muslim organisations, to their discrimination, employment, and education and to their (portrayal in the) media. Within all these subjects the main themes have been discussed. In the Netherlands there are no quantitative data available on discrimination. The 'informal economy among migrants' will be discussed in our next report.

### **Summary:**

In the following phase of the research project we will focus on the Turks and / or Moroccans, as they are the largest Muslim populations in the Netherlands. Part of the Surinamese, and Indonesians, and most of the Pakistani, Egyptians, Tunisians and other migrant groups living in Holland are Muslim too, but compared to the Turks and the Moroccans this concerns only limited groups. Among the total Muslim population in the Netherlands, about 46% is Turkish, 38% is Moroccan and 6% is Surinamese by origin: together they count for 90% of the 'Dutch' Muslims (CBS, 1989).

Since the beginning of the seventies the number of Muslims increased from about 54,300 in 1971 to 432,000 in 1990 mainly as a result of immigration from Turkey, Morocco and the former Dutch colony the Surinam. In the same period the number of Muslim organisations has grown from less than 10 to about 600. So the presence (visibility) of Muslim people in the Netherlands is a more recent phenomenon.

The figures presented in our report need to be approached with some caution if they are to be compared with figures from other countries that register their migrants on nationality. In the Netherlands after 1988 every person, either born in- or outside the Netherlands, with at least one parent born in a foreign country is classified as belonging to one of the above mentioned ethnic groups.

### **Migration History:**

After World War II the rapid economic growth produced structural shortages on the Labour market. The expansion of the service industries and a flow of employees from the industrial sector to the service industries caused structural shortages in the industrial sector. The labour force increase in this sector was over 600,000 persons between 1960 -1970. Consequently a shortage of lower skilled jobs in the industrial sector arose. During this period lower skilled employees were recruited from the Mediterranean countries - Portugal, Spain, Italy, Yugoslavia and Greece, and also Morocco and Turkey.

Most people from Morocco and Turkey came from agricultural regions. In 1973 the number of these so-called guest-workers ('gastarbeiders') amounted to about 100,000 (the entire population of the Netherlands in 1973 was about 13.5 million). Initially not only Dutch government, but also most Turks and Moroccans regarded their stay as temporarily. As economic prospects in their home countries were rather bad, most Turks and Moroccans decided to prolong their stay. Some decided to stay here permanently, other still wanted to return but first wanted to improve their economic circumstances.

From 1968 migration policy became more restrictive. Migrants were only allowed to come to the Netherlands if everything was arranged beforehand, and once migrants had left the Netherlands they lost their rights to return. Recruitment from the Mediterranean countries halted abruptly after the 1973 oil crisis, because of an economic decline that lasted until 1984. Though the recruitment stopped, the number of persons of Mediterranean origin increased due to family-reunification.

The Turks and Moroccans of the first generation didn't speak the Dutch language as they came to the Netherlands. Most of them were lower educated adults, who often faced great difficulties to learn and to understand the Dutch language. Furthermore both migrant groups regarded their stay

as temporarily, so in the beginning they made less efforts to learn the Dutch language and to participate (fully) in Dutch society.

### **Minorities Policy:**

The report entitled "Etnische minderheden" ('Ethnic minorities', WRR, 1979) marked the first stage in a re-thinking of government policy. For the first time it was assumed that ethnic minorities would be staying for good. The Ministry of the Interior was appointed to co-ordinate policy on minorities in 1979. By implication, minorities were no longer regarded as an isolated issue in, but as a central matter for government as a whole. Because the Ministry of the Interior was responsible for local government, it was also possible to influence policy on minorities at a lower level (Abell et al., 1985). Policy on minorities was given form and substance in 1983 in the Policy Document on Minorities.

As Dutch government formalised minorities policy and the separation of church and state became a fact (both in 1983), the discussions about the relationship between Islam and state changed. In the policy document of 1983 Islam was first mentioned as part of the minorities policy. Since then a new dimension was added to the discussion about the relationship between Islam and state, because the majority of Muslims is a member of an ethnic minority group and as such Muslim organisations could play a role in the integration of Muslims in Dutch society. Officially the activities of Muslim organisations are only financially supported by Dutch Government if their objectives are 'non - religious' and their activities contribute to the integration of Muslims in Dutch society. According to the Dutch Government integration and participation in society and people's willingness to integrate and participate are the principal preconditions of citizenship (Minderhedenbeleid, 1997).

At this moment there is a vivid (public) discussion about the financing of mosques. The different Muslim communities state that mosques also contribute to the integration of Muslims, because in Dutch mosques also various social and cultural activities are organised. Although Dutch Government doubts the extent to which these activities have a non religious character, some local authorities have started to seek contacts with mosques because this sometimes seems the only way they can reach the Muslim community, especially the people of the first generation.

Provisions for mosques are made at a local level. Local authorities are authorised / obliged to develop their own policies on mosques as a part of national legislation. As a result local policies on mosques vary. Building permissions should fit in local zoning schemes, and local authorities can decide to what extent they want to finance the building of mosques, tolerate mosque shops without a license; allow the public call for prayers and grant subsidy to social and cultural activities organised in a mosque.

The exact number of mosques in the Netherlands is unknown. Judging by the information of the Dutch Muslim organisations the number of places for worship and mosques is estimated on 380 in 1997 (Handboek Minderheden, 1997).

### **Legislation:**

Racism and xenophobia are outlawed, but till now there are no sections in Dutch legal system that directly are addressed to Islam or other non-Christian religions (Ekdom, 1997). The principle of non-discrimination (and equal treatment) is laid down in the Constitution and several articles in the Dutch Criminal Code. In addition several codes of practice exist. The first article of the Dutch Constitution reads as follows: 'all persons in the Netherlands shall be treated equally, in equal circumstances. Discrimination on the grounds of religion, belief, political opinion, race or sex, or any ground whatsoever, shall not be permitted'.

Discrimination is defined (article 90 quarter) as any form of distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference, aimed at or leading to nullifying or impairing fundamental freedoms on political, economical, social, cultural or any other field of social life. This means that also indirect discrimination is liable to penance.

Further, the principle of non-discrimination is not only applicable to Dutch nationals, but also to

persons living in the Netherlands who do not have the Dutch Nationality.

Though anti-discrimination legislation is quite elaborate, this does not imply that combating discrimination by law is not problematic. Only five per cent of all complaints reach the state of court proceedings (Kartaram, in Gras et al, 1995); there is little readiness to report discrimination because of lack of support in submitting the complaint, and because of ignorance of the procedure (Gras et al, 1995). Gras and Bovenkerk (1995) conclude that 'The accessibility of legal procedures is insufficient, there is no specific victimisation legislation, an active prosecution policy is usually lacking, the onus of proof is usually with the alleged victim, the sanctions are too light, and the maximum penance is seldom being imposed'.

A national system of registration of discrimination in general has only recently been set up by the National Bureau for Combating Racial Discrimination (Landelijk Bureau ter Bestrijding van Rassendiscriminatie, LBR). A systematic overview of quantitative data is not available yet.

During the end of the seventies adjustments in legal regulations were made that up till then had interfered with the perception of Islam, like ritual slaughter (3i) and disposal of the dead. Currently there are several Islamic institutions in the Netherlands. Some of them were easily accepted, like the 'disposal of the dead' and the 'oath sworn on the Koran', because no major changes were required from Dutch society or legislation. Other Islamic institutions are still subject of discussion, like for instance the acknowledgement of Muslim feast days, Muslim dietary prescriptions, the wearing of headscarves, and the call for prayer (Rath et al, 1995).

Although in the beginning of eighties ministers and civil servants first entered into consultation with Muslim organisations, it lasted till the beginning of the nineties before a broad public discussion about the position of Islam in Dutch society started. Because of external events like the Salmon Rushdie affair and the Gulf War, broad layers of Dutch society realised that Muslim community in the Netherlands had grown.

### **Labour Market:**

Within labour organisations, minorities, when compared to indigenous employees, find themselves in a weak position. The division of employees from the various ethnic groups over job levels shows a distorted image. Minorities, on average, are appointed to lower positions and their position is often less secure than those of autochthonous employees with a comparable education. Minorities, for example, are relatively more often appointed on a temporary employment contract (Veen and Riemersma, 1990). Turkish and Moroccan employees in particular perform simple tasks - with all the resulting inconveniences - that require little or no education (Tesser, 1993). Research by Ankersmit et al (1989) shows that 50% of Turkish employees with an education level varying from MBO (intermediate vocational education) to VWO (pre-university education) perform only simple tasks, as opposed to 7% of the autochthonous employees with a comparable education.

In 1995, unemployment among the four main groups of ethnic minorities was three times that of the indigenous population (Jaaroverzicht Integratiebeleid Etnische Groepen 1997, 1996). This increases the risk of 'ethnicisation' at the lower end of the labour market, especially in major cities. Long-term unemployment has increased sharply among the young ethnic population, yet fallen dramatically among the young indigenous population.

### **Education:**

Though the viewpoint of freedom of education is subscribed by many, the actual foundation of Muslim schools often leads to discussions about the desirability of such schools. Opponents are of the opinion that Muslim schools hinder integration of Muslim pupils and lead to isolation while others believe that Muslim schools enhance the self-confidence of the pupils and consequently improve their school results (Rath et al., 1996). Critics also fear that Muslim schools will stimulate 'fundamentalism' amongst their pupils. Not only Dutch politicians discussed the matter, migrant organisations also had strong opinions about the schools.

In 1988 the first Muslim primary schools opened. By 1994, 29 Muslim primary schools were registered, on a total number of 8,139 schools. Most of these schools are founded by local organisations with various backgrounds. In 1993 only 4% of the children with a Muslim background went to a Muslim school. In the period 1993-1994 the total number of children in Muslim schools (4,360), is negligible compared to the total number of primary school children, 1,426,533. As far as known, there are no non-Muslim pupils attending Muslim schools, the majority of the teachers are however still non-Muslim due to the shortage of Muslim teachers.

### **Media:**

The NMO (Nederlandse Moslim Omroep) is the only broadcasting organisation that is run by Muslims and directed exclusively at Muslims. Other national and local broadcasting organisations transmit radio programmes for migrants in their own language, but do not transmit programmes exclusively for Muslims. The quantity of broadcasting time for the NMO, in relation to representativeness, is still subject of discussions.

In granting broadcasting time not only representativeness matters, but the Dutch Directorate of the Media (Commissariaat van de Media) also interferes with program content: one of the main purposes of NMO is to educate Dutch society about Islam in the Netherlands.

In 1994 a research on the representation of the Islam and Muslims in de media (newspapers) has been carried out by order of the SMT (Nijhoff et al. (1994). In 1995 the NMR together with the NMO initiated a research project that focused on newspaper articles on Muslims and Islam, collected during a period of one year (Abdus Sattar, 1995). Both studies concluded that the representation of Muslims is mostly negative and made recommendations to improve this situation. Nevertheless there are also journalists who are aware of the danger of discrimination being furthered by the media. The Dutch Association of Journalists initiated a 'Migrants and Media' working group in 1984. Goals of the working group are to promote the critical discussion on coverage of minorities in the media and to stimulate the intake of migrant journalists in the media.

### **Conclusions:**

In general all Muslims, as well as other migrant groups in the Netherlands like the Surinamese and the Antillians, have arrears on the above mentioned fields and especially in the fields of education and employment. We would like to stress that we are not able to draw any conclusions on the question whether or not Muslims - as an 'ethno-religious group' - have more socio-economic backlogs than other migrant groups. The aim of this research project is just to direct attention to the position of Muslims in the different European countries.

With regard to the process of institutionalisation of Islam in Dutch society substantial progress has been made. By now there are many mosques, Muslim organisations, Muslim schools, shops and a Muslim broadcasting station. The institutionalisation of Islam does however encounter resistance of the Dutch population and administrators.

'Dutch Muslims' are a very heterogeneous group. This heterogeneity is not only caused by differences in countries of origin, but also by ethnic differences (the Arabs and Berbers from Morocco, the Turks and Kurds from Turkey, and the Hindustans and Javanese from Surinam); and by varieties in religious and political affiliations. As a result of these varieties there is no such thing as *one* Muslim community in the Netherlands.

Every Muslim organisation strives for recognition of Dutch government, not only to be eligible for subsidy, but also to have a say in Dutch minorities' policy. Because the various Muslim organisations do not succeed in combining their forces, the internal differences of opinion are reinforced, and new organisations are still founded. Dutch Muslim organisations are eligible for subsidy as long as their objectives are 'non -religious' and their activities contribute to the integration of Muslims in Dutch society. Up till now none of the Muslim organisations is recognised as a representative organisation of all Dutch Muslims.

## **SWITZERLAND**

Switzerland is well known for its political neutrality as demonstrated by its attitude during armed conflicts and international crises. Traditionally open to the world and adopting secularism, Switzerland has always offered refugees a land of asylum and an understanding of their differences.

There has been a Muslim presence in Switzerland since the last century. Islam however remained alien to Switzerland until the late 1960s. Swiss law has no provision for the presence of Muslims. In some Swiss cantons with large number of Muslims some “Muslim voices” claim that Islam should be recognised as one of the religions of the population in Switzerland. Because Islam and a Muslim presence are recent phenomena in Switzerland, few studies on the subject have been made in Swiss academic institutions. This study is based on quantitative and qualitative data collected from the official registers of statistics at the federal and cantonal level. Additionally, we have contacted the embassies of several Muslim countries with significant Muslim population in Switzerland, and collected information and data relative to those populations.

### **Synopsis of Muslim Presence:**

The first flow of Muslims into Switzerland began in the early 1960s with the expansion of labour migration from Turkey, due to its geographical proximity. Despite the fact that they were more attached to their nationality than to their Islamic identity, first generation Muslims had Islam as the central common link with their culture of origin. The Swiss official census is the main source of statistics concerning the population in Switzerland. This census has included, since 1970, a question on religion; but as the period between censuses is ten years, the usefulness of such data is limited.

### **Contemporary Focus- General Data:**

The two largest Muslim groups settled in Switzerland are those from the Former-Yugoslavia and Albania followed by the Turks, with a high percentage of Kurds. Although the Muslim population is characterised by its diversity, we can roughly classify it into five groups: Balkanic and Turkish, Arab, South-Asian, Iranian and Black African. Each group has its own culture, language and ethnic characteristics but all groups have Islam as a common religious identity. At the end of 1996, the number of Turks living in Switzerland was 80,177, Bosnians numbered 18,408 and Albanians numbered 150,000 (non-Muslims are included in these two groups). Muslim groups from other origins are smaller. According to the last Swiss annual year book of Statistics 1998, Moroccans formed the third largest Muslim community in the country after the Turks and the Balkanic group, with 4,447, followed in number by Tunisians (3,528), Iranians (3,417) and Algerians (2,931). At present, the number Muslims in Switzerland is approximately 250,000 persons. Islam emerged as the third largest religion in Switzerland after Catholicism and Protestantism and before Judaism.

### **Official Legislation:**

Islam is not recognised as an official religion in Switzerland. The Federal State adopts a special secularism, recognising Catholicism and Protestantism as the two religions of the resident population. Discrimination against foreigners is still found in Switzerland, particularly against foreigners from ‘far afield’ countries including Muslims. These foreigners ‘*do not share the European ideology, in general, and may introduce a cultural tangling up in Switzerland*’ as argued by the Swiss Government in its report relating to the application of its policy on foreigners called “the three circles policy” in force since 1991. This Swiss policy divides foreigners into three categories according to their country of origin. The foreigners of non-European ideology (third circle of foreigners) are those originally from distant countries and most of them are Muslims. In addition, foreign residents in Switzerland do not have the right to vote and are thus unable to participate in political life.

Although Muslims are not allowed to participate, they are still used as “objects” for electoral purposes (Article 72 of the Swiss Federal Constitution). The Muslim resident population is counted in order to allow eligible Swiss citizens to gain seats in the Parliament. This kind of distinction

between the residents in Switzerland for political purposes constitutes a discrimination against Muslim residents on religious grounds and a kind of “instrumentalisation” owing to the fact that they are not considered “full subjects”.

In juridical areas, Muslims are obliged to abide by Swiss laws regarding civil matters such as marriage, divorce, inheritance etc. (Article 46 of the Swiss Federal Constitution). Thus, Muslims in Switzerland, citizens and residents with permanent permits (C) or annual permits (B), must abide by Swiss laws and not by Islamic laws (sharīʿa). Also, acts of violence and harassment against foreigners in general are common, especially against Turkish, Bosnian and Albanian refugees or asylum seekers in German-speaking cantons. Further, the official policy of repatriation of refugees adopted by the Swiss Federal Office of Foreigners towards Albanians, Kosovans and Bosnians represents a form of Islamophobia. The results of our research allow us to assert that discrimination against Muslims has increased over the last few years and that Muslims in Switzerland are discriminated against in the political, social and juridical spheres.

### **Socio-Political and Cultural Organisations:**

The Muslim community in Switzerland is not well structured, so there is no single organisation that can claim to be the representative of Muslims in the country. The majority of Islamic organisations are only *de facto* Muslim organisations not recognised by the Swiss authorities as representative of Muslims. They number about 140. The most important Islamic organisations are:

**Vereinigung der Islamischen Organisationen in Zuerich (VIOZ)-Zurich** (Union of Islamic Organisations in Zurich) founded in 1994. **La Fondation Culturelle Islamique de Genève-Geneva** (Islamic Cultural Foundation in Geneva) founded in 1978 by the Rabita and financed by Saudi Arabia. The large Mosque of this Foundation is the only distinctive Mosque in Switzerland that has a minaret and a dome. **Le Centre Islamique de Genève- Geneva** (the Islamic Centre of Geneva) which is the oldest Islamic centre founded in 1961.

The four main concerns of Muslims in Switzerland are: firstly, the establishment of mosques and the teaching of basic Islamic values. The second is the protection of Islamic identity, including the specificities of Islam as a religion and as a culture of origin. The third is the Islamic education of Muslim children to ensure that they remain attached to their roots and the facilitation of their integration into Swiss society. The fourth issue is the establishment of Islamic cemeteries to guarantee the right of Muslims to be buried according to Islamic rite. The Federal and Cantonal authorities have tried to develop a structural framework to integrate young Muslims into public life. They now grant Muslims relative freedom of expression in the local media and freedom to celebrate religious rituals in public at special occasions.

### **Discrimination Against Muslims:**

Xenophobia against Muslims (or Islamophobia) is no more explicit in Switzerland than it is in other European countries. At the social level, Swiss labour policy strictly forbids foreigners from taking certain jobs. For example Muslims residents are not allowed to teach in state schools, to hold key positions in the medical sector or to hold positions of responsibility. In the labour sector, the policy of the “three circles”, encourages discrimination and xenophobia amongst the Swiss population. Further, it increases the rate of unemployment amongst those in the third circle who are mainly Muslims. Another kind of discrimination is the two-tiered Swiss system of tax collection: the first is applied to Swiss citizens and permanent residents, and is advantageous to them, and the second, called “impôt à la source” (pay as you earn), is a direct taxation which is applied to all non permanent resident foreigners. Further, Swiss housing policy should be considered as discriminatory against foreigners because they cannot profit from housing with moderate or low rent. These types of housing are only allocated to Swiss citizens.

At the economic level, Swiss policy prevents the inclusion of foreigners in the economic sector. Foreigners from the third circle do not have the right to own land or buildings under the “Lex Friedrich” (Swiss law which prevents foreigners from buying land or buildings in Switzerland, unless they are in possession of a permanent residency permit). At the juridical level, there are many cases of

discrimination against Muslims that have reached the cantonal and the federal courts of Justice. Also, acts of violence and harassment against foreigners and especially against refugees or asylum seekers in German-speaking cantons are common.

#### **Employment:**

It is certainly true that foreigners particularly those in the third circle have a lower average income than Swiss nationals and that they can only obtain certain forms of employment that require fewer qualifications. The results of our inquiries leads us to conclude that Muslims suffer more than other foreigners from low salaries, poor working conditions, poor health insurance and low educational qualifications. Further, statistics show that unemployment amongst permanent resident foreigners at the end of December 1997 was 10.4 % whereas it was only 5% among the Swiss population. This project does not believe, however, that one can describe Swiss employers as being specifically Islamophobic.

#### **Education:**

The majority of Muslim children in Switzerland attend state schools that follow secular principles in their teaching. As yet (1997), no Muslim schools have been established in Switzerland. Whereas in France wearing a headscarf in public schools is prohibited, there are no such rules in Switzerland. Nevertheless, there have been cases of discrimination against Muslim pupils. Theoretically, "foreign" pupils do not suffer from discrimination as long as their parents are legally established in Switzerland. Pupils whose parents are illegally established, however, do not have the right to be registered at any school (except in Geneva Canton). This constitutes a violation of the International Convention on the Rights of the Child, which states that each child has the right to receive an education and go to school regardless of the status of his parents.

#### **Studies and Research on Muslims in Switzerland:**

The position of Muslims settled in Switzerland has been a neglected field of study in Swiss universities. The most important studies and research in the field are mentioned in our bibliography.

#### **The Media:**

Islamophobia is not so obvious in the Swiss media, although right wing newspapers have a tendency to report in a xenophobic manner. In general, articles referring to Muslims or to Islam are prejudiced with antagonistic criticism that is sometimes ironic. Some local newspaper coverage of Islamic issues has increased xenophobia against Muslims because they argue that Islam is an obstacle to Muslim integration. Some social "Affairs" have been highlighted by the local media. The most recent one is the "Lucia headscarf Affair" which began in July 1996 against a young convert Muslim Swiss teacher who wore a veil while teaching in a primary school in Geneva. She has been suspended (Decision of the Federal Court of Justice) from her duties because she refused to remove the veil..

There is a need for more understanding and objectivity in the media regarding some of the issues concerning Islam and Muslims and of their portrayal. The media must take care not to associate all Muslims with fundamentalists or terrorists, and should also moderate their expressions when using Islamic terms and concepts.

#### **Conclusion:**

The Muslim community of Switzerland is characterised by its heterogeneity, but all Muslims have a common Islamic identity based on Qur'anic education. Despite the fact that Islam is the third faith in Switzerland, it is not recognised officially by the State as one of the religions of its population. The second generation of young Muslims, born and raised in Switzerland, continue to voice their claims for obtaining an official recognition of Islam and try to participate in political life.

#### **Recommendations:**

There is an urgent need for both the Swiss authorities and Muslim leaders to take effective

measures to avoid the growth of manifestations of hatred or xenophobia against Muslims (Islamophobia) in Switzerland. Muslim leaders should be more flexible, more understanding and open-minded with the Swiss authorities and non-Muslim communities. Switzerland should face up to a new challenge, which is the challenge of the recognition of Islam as one of the religions of its resident population and should take some measures aiming at the institutionalisation of Islam within the framework of the Swiss legislation. One suggestion is the creation of a unified Federation of Muslims that will act as the official representative of the Muslims to the Swiss authorities.

## ***UNITED KINGDOM***

This summary presents a breakdown of the main issues, descriptive and analytical, of the report of Muslims in Britain which addressed the conceptual and methodological issues, when discussing the 'Muslim Voice' with particular reference to defining the 'Muslim Voice', the socio-historical mechanisms by which marginalisation and exclusion have taken place and within which identity is constructed. It presents the context within which a politicised 'Muslim Voice' has emerged in Britain. Reference is made to the forms and processes of discrimination leading to marginalisation and exclusion within official legislation, employment, education and the media as way of highlighting the diverse ways in which Muslims in Britain have been socially, politically, economically, culturally marginalised and excluded at a local and national level. These accounts provide some analysis of the ways in which the 'Muslim Voice' has become politicised and also highlight those areas for which policy needs to be re-evaluated.

### **Background:**

The Muslim presence in Britain has a long history but also until very recently a largely invisible one. Though the first mosques built in Britain are over 100 years old (e.g. the mosques built in Cardiff by Yemeni Muslims and in Woking by Indian Muslim) the idea that there are Muslims in Britain is almost less than ten years old. It could be argued that it is only between 1989 and 1992, that is, from the Rushdie Affair to the Gulf War, that a public Muslim identity was formed. Settlers who had previously been categorised and conceptualised as being 'blacks' or later as 'Asians' were suddenly discovered to be Muslims. In other words, any investigation of Muslim Voices has to confront two difficulties: how to understand this identity in the context post-war immigration and settlement in Europe and how to account for emergence of a specific Muslim identity.

### **How many Muslims?**

Muslims remains inadequately captured in statistical representations. There is little consensus even concerning basic numbers. Muslims in Britain are currently referenced as being the second largest religious group. There are however discrepancies as to the actual size of the Muslim population in Britain. Therefore there is an urgent need for a fuller descriptive knowledge of the macro-demography and social geography of the Muslim presence. This is important in it's own right but also a necessary prerequisite for the better understanding of the micro-level sociological processes that form the key concerns of the 'Muslim Voices' project.

Reasons for variations in estimates on Muslims in Britain lie in the fact that Census data does not include questions on religious affiliation. Consequently religion has been assumed to be based on ethnic origin. This method presumes that ethnicity is a viable indicator of religious faith. This methodological issue surrounding the collection of data has meant that statistics on 'Muslims' can not be obtained directly. The most accurate estimates for Muslims in Britain are made by studying data on Pakistani and Bangladeshi people, a large proportion of whom are Muslim.

Consequently Muslims in Britain have been ascribed identities and measured by place of birth through statistics provided by the Census and The Labour Force Survey which has reflected the

selectivity of the migration process highlighting that the majority of Britons Muslims are of South Asian origin and more specifically Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Indian. Thus there remains a serious gap in accurate representation of Muslims in Britain. Representation is particularly significant in determining a central issue for this research for surely to determine 'Muslim Voices' it is first necessary to delineate who are the Muslims in Britain?

### **Who are the Muslims in Britain?**

Pakistanis and Indians make up the majority of the Muslim population. Britain was also the main receiving country following the mass expulsion of Asians from East Africa in the late 1960s and early 1970s, while more recently, Bangladeshis have added a further major Asian component to the British Muslim population. Smaller Muslim groups have limited representation in the literature.

### **Historical Overview:**

A specific Muslim identity in Britain has emerged in the context of migration and settlement. The migration and settlement of Muslim communities in Britain have to all intent and purpose been policy driven, a policy derivative of imperial agenda which was sanctioned by notions of 'race' from its origins as biological categorisation to a concept constructed and reconstructed as a line of demarcation and justification for hierarchical promotions of colonialist and neo-colonialist practices. The South Asian Sub-continent as the most populous areas of the empire was often the main source of labour exports to Britain and other parts of the empire. Migration and settlement of 'black' people is therefore inextricably linked with colonialism.

Muslim migrants have different trajectories that have developed in different historical contexts. There have been four different components to Muslim migration to Britain.

Firstly, labour migrations of Muslims from the South Asian Sub-Continent resulting from the aforementioned colonial links, economic 'push' and 'pull' leading to chain migration and political factors. The main areas of migration include Azad Kashmir, Punjab and the North West Frontier. Economic reasons for migration have often been overemphasised and the political dimensions to migration under represented in the literature. Gujarati Muslims from India migrated primarily from Baroda, Surat and Bharuch. These migrants were generally professionals and traders. The majority of Bangladeshi Muslims in Britain have migrated from Sylhet.

The Second phase of Muslim migration to Britain was witnessed in the late 1960s and during the 1970s as East African migrants arrived in Britain and refugees fleeing nationalist regimes in Kenya from 1965 and Uganda from 1969, culminating in Amin's expulsions in 1972. Middle Eastern Muslims were also represented in Britain at this time. These were primarily the metropolitan seasonal migrations of wealthy Arabs who migrated during the oil boom years. They continue to reside in Britain on a seasonal basis but their main place of work and residence remains the Middle East

Refugee migration from the Middle East formed the third phase of Muslim migration to Britain. Middle Eastern Muslims are less represented in Britain and their presence felt most notably by the arrival of political refugees mainly from Iran in 1978-9. Approximately one hundred to one hundred and fifty thousand Iranian exiles arrived in Britain fleeing the Islamic Revolution.

The fourth and most recent phase of Muslim migration is also refugee migration most notably of Yemeni, Kurdish, Iraqi, Bosnian and Somali refugees.

### **British Immigration Legislation:**

British policy on immigration has experienced significant changes over the last forty years from encouragement and incentives for migration to increasing restrictions. Legislative changes have to be discussed with reference to two factors:

Firstly, economic changes. This came about due to labour shortages after WWII.

Secondly the 'race' issue which came about in response to increasing public and parliamentary debates centring on the 'black problem' in inner city areas. For example overcrowding, crime and

drugs.

The response to these events was the 'racialisation' of immigration policy. Immigration controls were implemented to prevent the entry of immigrants into Britain. To varying degrees these acts circumvented the rights of 'black' Commonwealth citizens with the legal right to enter Britain and to construct the question of nationality along racial lines (for example the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962, the 1968 Immigration Act, the Immigration Act of 1971) In essence these acts created the category of British overseas citizens effectively excluding British citizens of Asian origin from the right of abode in Britain. More recently restrictions have been in the form of visa controls (for example the 1990 abandonment of rights to appeal which have restricted family reunification). Government policy on refugee immigration remains unclear.

The language of categorisation began to shift from 'race' towards the use of ethnicity during the 1970s as a delineator of identity. However this led to the homogenisation of Asian identity. By early 1980s demands that a specific Asian identity and experience be recognised with specific problems of social exclusion and deprivation were coming to the fore and it is within these contexts that the demand from large sections of the Muslim communities to be recognised not as Pakistanis or Bangladeshis but as Muslims gained ground and the 'Muslim Voice' emerged as an empowered alternative to the 'Black Power' movement. The challenge from Muslims came most clearly with responses to the events surrounding the publication of the 'Satanic Verses', the campaigns for the provision of halal meat and the demands for Muslim grant-maintained schools.

As a consequence of the development of global Islamic revivalism it is possible to argue that in Britain currently there are three main categories by which the non white settler population is marked out: black, Asian, Muslim. The idea of a Muslim settler population however, is not just another way of saying Pakistani or Bangladeshi, but increasingly it is a way of including other minorities (Iraqi and Kurdish refugees) as well as those born in this country and those who have little contact with the country of their parents birth. A 'Muslim Voice' includes other minorities as well as excluding non-Muslim South Asians. Thus the task of identifying a Muslim voice remains pressing.

### **Settlement and Community:**

National settlement patterns for most of the South Asian migrants to Britain are reflected in the economically driven aspects of migration and consequently largest settlements are found in the old industrial centres of Britain, the West Midlands, West Yorkshire, Lancashire, Central Clydeside, and selected areas of Scotland. The old industrial cities such as Manchester, Bolton, Bradford based on textile industries, Birmingham based on the coal industries, Coventry based on vehicle manufacture, Luton and London on light engineering and Glasgow on ship building have been some of the net recipients of Muslim labour migrants. Small settlements of Arabs, Egyptians, Iraqis, Moroccans, Palestinians and Yemenis can be found in service industries in and around London.

In the early years of migration and settlement a response to challenge of cultural diversity was encapsulated in ideas on assimilation, acculturation and more recently multiculturalism. All gave little space for the assertion of identity. The assertion of identity by minorities in Britain has undermined assimilationist and multicultural policy in favour of positive self-ascriptions of identity. As well as demographic factors the salience of Muslim identity is witnessed by increasing Muslim 'visibility' through economic, social and political activity. 'Visibility' has also intensified as Britons Muslims politically mobilise around Islam. Whether on international issues such as the Gulf War or more local issues such as the provision of halal meat in schools, appropriate dress for women students and employees or the recognition of Islamic schools by central and local government it is clear that there is a newly empowered 'Muslim Voice' demanding that their 'narratives' be heard.

### **The 'Enemy Within' and the Crisis of 'British' Identity:**

As a result of 'race' politics immigrant and settler populations started to define their collectivity and identity in juxtaposition to British nationality and identity.

As Muslim communities established and found the means to articulate a 'Muslim Voice' they have increasingly been perceived by the majority population as the 'enemy within'. The emergence of the 'Muslim Voice' is seen as a threat to the majority culture and national identity. In the formation of national identity then a Muslim presence therefore brings into question notions of what is 'Great Britain' and 'Britishness'? This is evidenced at all levels. Most prominently in salient anti Islamic elements increasingly summarised as Islamophobia.

### **Official Legislation:**

Muslims in Britain face significant dilemmas with reference to the recognition of Islam as an official religion by the State. Overall a review of State Legislation on Muslims shows that the attitude varies from hostile to ambivalent. For instance British foreign policy on the Kashmir Crisis, the Gulf War and the Palestine issue highlight British hostilities at the national and international level. At a local level British attitudes to the Rushdie Affair, Muslims in education, Muslim schools and Muslim women all highlight hostilities. Also at a local level attitudes to demands for Mosques, cemeteries, halal meat, in short the acknowledgement of the requirements of religion has been one of ambivalence.

At a national level there have been moves to outlaw discrimination. However this is based on discrimination on the basis of colour, race and nationality and on the grounds of ethnic or national origins is not regarded as satisfactory for Muslims since these categories exclude Muslims because they do not regard Muslims as an Ethnic group and do not include discrimination on the grounds of religion.

### **Social, Cultural, Religious, and Political Organisations:**

It is very difficult to distinguish between social, cultural, religious and political organisations of the Muslim community in Britain since there is a high degree of polyvalence. In addition the demarcation between the different domains are not necessarily the same as those that circulate in Eurocentric discourses.

Muslim organisations in Britain have emerged along several lines and at several levels. They have developed along particular religious schools of thought, linguistic and regional identities and political affiliations and range from social welfare, economic and cultural religious and political institutions. All deal with, albeit from differing perspectives with problems of migration and settlement, family reunification and educational needs of the community and the maintenance of social, cultural and religious identity. In 1986 it was estimated that there were more than four thousand Muslim community organisation concerned largely dealing with welfare (see Muslim Organisation Database). The plethora of Muslim organisations in Britain and community infrastructure, not only Mosques and umbrella organisations but also the easily accessible shops, services and meeting places contributes to the increasing awareness of the existence of the Muslim community by members of the majority population which increases their visibility.

### **Discrimination:**

In the last twenty years that discrimination of Muslims has become explicit and extreme. Records of religious discrimination are few and far between. The dearth of information on religious discrimination stems largely from the fact that discrimination in Britain has historically been based on skin colour. Islam and Muslims are increasingly becoming the focus of discrimination. For example the recently published report on Islamophobia by the Runnymede Trust is one acknowledgement of this. Significant ways in which Muslims feel discriminated against is in:

State/City Legislation- For example the lack of protection they receive from the law as a religious group. There have been campaigns to change legislation in order to outlaw religious discrimination. Discrimination also takes place in employment, education and the media. These are discussed in more detail below.

### **Employment:**

The Runnymede Trusts Islamophobia Report (1997) highlights that long term unemployment is one of the most serious kinds of social exclusion, since it is likely to lead to low income low standard of

living, poor housing and poor health. Accounts of marginalisation and exclusion in the employment market are to provide the focus for stage two of the research. For the purposes of this summary it is suffice to say that Muslims in Britain suffer disproportionately within the labour economy. Statistics show that Muslims, as opposed to any other ethnic or religious group, suffer from the highest levels of unemployment. Pakistani and Bangladeshi men and women have much higher levels of unemployment as compared to other ethnic minority groups and the white population.

### **Education:**

One of the most pressing issues for Muslims in Britain is the educational needs of the community. Education may be approached from two different perspectives:

Firstly the curriculum within the state school system. At the heart of this is Eurocentric teachings. Concerns range from the teaching of religious education, sex education, the study of Art, Music and Dance.

Secondly the situation of Muslims schools. There are running battles between Muslim communities and the British government with regards state funding for Muslim schools.

### **The Media:**

The concern here is largely in relation to mainstream media portrayal of Islam and Muslims. The traditional Orientalist stereotypes of Muslims as political anarchists and as tyrants at home subjugating their women have been disseminated in the media as caricatures and stereotypes. Very often the news that is shown about Muslims centres on negative imagery. Events both in Britain and abroad are analysed and presented within a certain framework, one in which only Western capitalist democracy is a viable ideology and in which there is no room for any other contender, especially not Islam. The growth of Muslim media in Britain and globally is counterbalancing this bias through well informed, accurate and intelligent reporting.

### **Conclusion:**

Muslim identity confronts assimilationist policies central to which have been notions that cultural and religious identities will merge into the national identity. It has been assumed that communal identities will be eroded with time and the favourable option would be citizenship and loyalty to the state. Within this scenario there was no space for a 'Muslim Voice'. It has been argued that the emergence of a newly empowered 'Muslim Voice' and increased Muslim 'visibility' are a direct challenge to this 'European project'.

## APPENDIX TWO:

### STATISTICAL REPRESENTATION OF MUSLIMS IN EUROPE

#### A summary of findings

This investigation has sought to review the extent to which the Muslim presence in Europe can be quantified from statistical sources available in the public domain. Table 2.18 presents best estimates of the Muslim population for individual countries in Europe.

**Table 2.18 Summary of ‘best estimates’ of Muslim populations in Europe**

(estimates in bold form basis of Figure 2.18)

Country	Estimate	Year of Estimate	Source
United Kingdom	<b>965,369</b>	1991	Peach (1997)
	1,250,000 - 1,500,000	1991	Nielson (1995)
France	<b>2,669,000</b>	1990	Peach and Glebe (1995)
	2,054,271	1991	Nationality data*
	3,000,000	1995	Neilson (1995)
Germany	1,650,952	1987	Religious affiliation data (1987 Census)
	<b>2,589,071</b>	1995	Nationality data*
Netherlands	<b>566,300</b>	1993	Prins (1994)
	505,639 - 632,216	1996	Country of birth data (1996)*
Belgium	260,000	1989	Dassetto and Nonneman (1996)
	<b>323,567</b>	1996	Nationality data*
Switzerland	156,000	1990	Religious affiliation (1990 Census)
	<b>200,000</b>	1996	Union of Islamic Organisations
Italy	280,000	1992	Alievi (1996)
	<b>301,780</b>	1995	Caritas (1996)
	279,956	1995	Nationality data*
Greece	(100,000-500,000)		based on Christidis (1996)
Sweden	130,000	1993	Neilson (1995)
	<b>200,000</b>	1996	Sanders (1996)
Norway	36,000	1990	Neilson (1995)
	<b>50,849</b>	1995	Citizenship data*
	35,029	1995	Country of birth data*
	40,550	1995	Members of Islamic congregations (Statistical Yearbook, 1996)
Finland	14,937	1995	Country of birth data*
	<b>946</b>	1995	Religious affiliation
	6,958	1995	Arabic speaking
	few hundred		Neilson (1995)
Denmark	55-60,000	1991	Neilson (1995)
	<b>69,170</b>	1997	Country of birth data*
Austria	<b>87,000</b>	1981	Religious affiliation (1981 Census)
Spain	<b>250,000</b>	1990	Nielson (1995)
	125-190,000	not stated	Vicen (1996)

<b>Portugal</b>	<b>25,000</b>	1991	Nationality data
	some thousands		Nielson (1995)
<b>Ireland</b>	<b>3,875</b>	1991	Religious affiliation (1991 census)
<b>Luxembourg</b>	<b>1,167</b>	1991	Nationality data*

\* derived by PROJECT using indirect method from raw data

Conceptual difficulties over who constitutes the Muslim population and severe inadequacies in the data available to measure it mean that the estimates presented all fall within wide margins of error. In some cases (most notably for Greece) they must be little more than informed guesses. However, while the inability to derive precise counts of the Muslim population is a key finding of this report, the analysis does allow us to draw out some important general observations about the nature of its growth and distribution.

1. While Islam in Europe is generally associated with immigrant communities of relatively recent origin, it is important to emphasise the presence of substantial indigenous Muslim populations at Europe's periphery, notably in Albania (with over 2 million Muslims) and the former Yugoslavia (Bosnia). These have not been the focus of this study but clearly their presence needs to be recognised in any discussion of Muslims in the wider Europe. This may ultimately need to include other substantial Muslim populations, such as in Turkey (seeking membership of the European Union) and some of the former Soviet republics to the East.
2. Whilst all countries reviewed in this report contain Muslim populations, the majority are concentrated in a relatively small group of countries in North West Europe, with the largest communities in Germany, France (both with Muslim populations over 2 million) and the UK (about 1 million). These populations do have their origins in relatively recent immigration flows, essentially from outside Europe, though Turkey and more recently the former Yugoslavia, have been major sources from Europe's periphery.
3. Muslim communities in Europe have diverse ethnic origins. While a wide range of source countries are represented, the contribution of a relatively small group stands out. The Magrhebian countries of North Africa, and Turkey account for the majority of European Muslims, with South Asia, the Middle East and more recently Sub-Saharan Africa and Bosnia, making up most of the rest. Generally, Maghrebians appear to dominate the Muslim presence in the southern part of the study area, Turks and Bosnians being more evident in the North. However, between countries (even neighbouring ones) the composition of Muslims by origin shows striking differences. Colonial histories are an obvious influence on this, notably accounting for the substantial Algerian presence in France and the predominantly South Asian Muslim population of the United Kingdom), while the effect of geographical proximity is evident in a number of cases (e.g. Turks in Germany, Albanians in Greece).
4. Although Muslim populations have grown rapidly over a relatively short period, they continue to make up only a small proportion of national populations (even in Germany and France it remains under five percent). However it is important to stress that the national summaries represented in the maps obscure a highly skewed geographical distribution within countries. The Muslim community is essentially an urban population in Europe, and generally concentrated in the major cities, where Muslims have been estimated to account for as many as one in ten in certain cases (e.g. Brussels). A detailed analysis of internal distributions has been beyond the scope of this study. It is important to stress that the constraints here are not only ones of time and resources. In many cases the indirect methods relied upon to derive Muslim identity from country of origin would become increasingly unsafe at the local level.

5. While emphasising the diversity of Muslim populations in terms of size and origins, their development has certain common features. While accurate quantification of the processes involved is often impossible, Europe's Muslim population has expanded from an almost negligible presence at the time of the Second World War, through a series of fairly distinct phases. The first was a period of massive and sustained labour immigration, increasingly involving Muslim source countries, and peaking in the early 1970s. Temporary enclaves of male labour then began to develop as permanent settlements, as policies of family reunification established a second wave of immigration in the form of wives and children. In the current phase, natural increase is increasingly taking over from immigration as the main component driving the expansion of Muslim communities, though refugee flows have been responsible for some major influxes in recent years (notably the mass movement of Bosnian Muslims into Germany). Finally, religious conversions from among the 'host' society, mainly associated with mixed marriages, represent a further source of increase. Although their numerical impact is still probably very small (around 50,000 in France), their relative importance is likely to increase as Islam becomes a more established religion in Europe.

### **Constraints on the analysis of Muslim populations: Issues of data**

Despite evidence of common features in the growth and development of Muslim populations in Europe, a single methodological approach to their quantification has proved impossible. At the most fundamental level, there are clear differences in the way governments have integrated immigrant communities, with implications for the way the identity of individuals is represented in official statistics (the French and German constitutions represent extremes). These differences have an obvious bearing on the method by which, and extent to which, individuals within the immigrant community (first and subsequent generations) can be identified.

Governments differ not only in the way they represent individual and group identities in statistics, but in the frequency and manner by which they collect data on their populations. Early initiatives by the European Parliament to standardise the practice of a decennial census, including the topics included type form of information collected, have not been successful, with some countries moving permanently towards register based statistics. The extent to which statistical systems capture the resident population also differs widely - Greece and Italy, for example, have large unregistered foreign populations who by definition are missed in official statistical output.

There are also differences in the extent to which relevant data can be accessed. Even within the EU, and despite the efforts of Eurostat, there is little standardisation across countries in the dissemination of statistics collected on population, either in format or detail. Reliance on published tables (designed for other purposes) meant that potentially useful information was often omitted (e.g. many tables used abbreviated classifications of country of birth or citizenship, grouping together countries with different religious profiles). Such extra information might be obtained through specially commissioned tables, but these always entailed extremely high costs.

Although this study does not represent an exhaustive search of all relevant data, it is evident that the official population statistics available for most countries are unable to inform an accurate reconstruction of the emergence and growth of the Muslim population. Few countries collect information directly on the religious affiliation of their citizens. Even where they do, the conceptual subjectivity surrounding the definition of Muslim identity means that the numbers remain highly subjective and difficult to compare. For most countries, the task relies on indirect methods using data on country of birth and/or citizenship. It is argued that estimates derived in this way incur a number of errors and omissions, the magnitude of which, crucially, varies according to the particular history of settlement, its geographical origins, and the subsequent experience of political, social and demographic integration. The study demonstrates how certain sections of the Muslim population are much harder to identify statistically than others. These include a huge

clandestine population particularly in Southern Europe (probably forming the largest component of the Muslim community in Greece).

Even where it can be assumed that the great majority of the target population are legal residents, processes of political and demographic assimilation are steadily reducing that part whose origins (and religion) can be inferred from official population statistics. In France, for example, a large part of the Muslim community were born in France and also hold French nationality, and consequently are indistinguishable from the non-Muslim majority in standard tables based on citizenship or country of birth. In some cases the task of identifying sub-groups by origin is made harder by the suppression of detail in these tables (e.g. in country of birth classifications). Without changes in the form of data collected and made available by governments, it is clear that future estimations of the size of Muslim populations based on the indirect measures used here will become less and less accurate. Unless there is a general move towards the collection of data on religion, it seems likely that estimates will have to rely on some form of demographic projection. This would be extremely problematic, since change in the European Muslim population can not simply be modelled as a function of net migration and natural increase (both extremely difficult to foresee); models would also have to include assumptions about movement between non-Muslim and Muslim populations in the form of inter-marriages and conversions (or loss of faith), and about the religious faith of the offspring of those unions. Given the number of uncertainties involved, it seems certain that that estimates derived in this way would fall within very wide margins of error.

Finally, it is important to stress that the task here has been to present an overview of what can be gleaned about the Muslim population across Europe using data that is relatively freely accessible in the public domain. Individual country estimates can almost certainly be improved upon by a more exhaustive search of sources in the countries concerned. Official population statistics can inform the quantitative study of Muslims, but any precision, particularly at the sub-national level almost certainly requires the additional input of in-depth local survey work.