

Border Cities and Towns:

Causes of Social Exclusion in Peripheral Europe

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Cover photo : Greek refugees from Asia Minor in 1922, just arriving by train to Piraeus. Photo by P. Poulidis, Drapetsona. Coordinator's collection (first published in Leontidou 1989: 150).

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Preface

This Final Report summarizes the findings and results for the Research Project on Border Cities and Towns. For those interested in the more detailed material, we have prepared the volume *Border cities and towns: Comparative Historical Community Studies and Institutional Interviews in social exclusion*, which includes all field work results of our project, submitted to DG XII, EC for the TSER programme (Leontidou et al. 2000). The present Report draws on and refers to the pages of the aforementioned volume, which combines the first and second Annual Reports of the three-year research project.

We also have to mention that the First Annual Report of the project, *Border cities and towns I: Comparative Historical Community Studies in Social Exclusion*, was submitted to DG XII, EC in November 1998 as the, while the Second Annual Report, *Border cities and towns II: Institutional Interviews on Representations of Social Exclusion and the Border*, was submitted in November 1999. It is those reports, outlining the results of Work Packages 1, 2 and 3 for the period December 1997 to November 1999, that have been now combined into one (Leontidou et al. 2000). The present Final Report does not supersede them, but summarizes and draws from them, and also presents actions during the last twelve -month period (T24 -T36), extended by six months until May 2001. It actually summarizes the whole project and presents its conclusions and policy recommendations.

Authors responsible for each section of this Final Report are written in the Table of Contents (pp 5-6), as the **main authors** of each chapter and section, while interventions and editing have been done by the second authors also written there. We all wish to thank our research teams who gave shape to the field work and data collection, and certain colleagues who offered advice. We are especially grateful to Christis Konnaris, P. Vereni, Francesca Ceccaldi, F.N. Almeida, M. Ochoa, J.F. Troyano, F. Calderon and S .J. Zayas. We are also indebted to our Scientific Officer, Fadila Boughanemi, for her kindness, her valuable advice, her constant support in the face of all administrative obstacles, and her enthusiasm which kept us all going.

1. Background of the Project

1.1. Executive summary

The present Final Report, sharing the objectives of the previous ones, aims at showing that in order to identify the causes of social exclusion, it is analytically useful to address and investigate not just social, but also *spatial* peripherality. In its acutest form, this involves the external European border and islands around it, where changes are rapid, with migrations, tensions and wars. The comparison among European border areas is considered here as a case study in the insertion of cultural, spatial and individual/ intersubjective dimensions into the political -economy perspective which has dominated the discussion around the causes of social exclusion until recently. Turning away from the EU core, we are targeting six localities which experience *treble peripherality*: they are close to the external European border; in less favoured regions; and away from European development corridors.

In all previous reports of the project, partners were grouped by locality. For this Final Report, by contrast, **experts were re-grouped by discipline**, as detailed in section 1.2 below.

After the present **Chapter 1** which introduces the summary and structure of the Final Report, as well as the background of our partnership, **Chapter 2** presents the rationale for the project and the **objectives**, and summarizes the findings of the first two Annual Reports. Then it presents an overview of the notion of the **border**, the definitions adopted in this research project, and the development of EU borders. Finally, it expands on the **method** of the project, which is an iterative process of intensive and extensive research inspired by critical realism.

The presentation of the main corpus of the **project results** and findings about the border and social exclusion by a transversal reading of the 1st and the 2nd Annual Reports, as well as additional research, begins with **Chapter 3**. This presents a macroscopic view of **economic** developments in the localities under investigation, set in their broader national context, with a comparative focus. **Chapter 4** then presents our project results on socio -spatial exclusion, with an emphasis on the *community* level of **spatial** exclusion. This is immediately complemented with **social** exclusion experiences discussed in **Chapter 5** at the *target-group* level – on the level of individual and group exclusion, usually discussed in the relevant literature. These chapters realize the innovation of the project with respect to the insertion of cultural, political and spatial dimensions into the individual -oriented perspectives dominating the discussion around the causes of social exclusion until very recently. They introduce the *local society* or the *community* as a main axis in the socio -cultural *construction* of social exclusion (Chapter 4), besides the usual target-group focus (Chapter 5). These chapters also consolidate project results and findings into a set of typologies.

Chapter 6 highlights the advances of the project at the methodological and the pragmatological level, summarizing the most important project results that are relevant across Europe. It then discusses **policy** implications at length, with sections on economic, social and spatial policy. **Chapter 7** points to ways of dissemination and exploitation of results, in particular of developing the transnational applicability and relevance of the results. **Chapter 8** includes the material used as sources and references.

1.2. Background and Partnership of the Project

This partnership began its interaction since 1995, when a proposal was drafted while the present coordinator was based at King's College London. New partners joined in 1996, as the proposal for the present project was drafted, and our intensive collaboration started in 1997.

The background innovation of our research project is the concrete presentation of an **interdisciplinary** approach to social exclusion and the border. The scientific coordinators and senior researchers comprising the Border Cities network belong to *five disciplines*: sociology (3 partners), economics (2 partners), geography, social anthropology and political science (1 partner each). These disciplines do not articulate notions of the border into a single all-encompassing concept (Donnan & Wilson 1999), and also use differently the concept of social exclusion. In this project, after intensive interactions in a series of workshops for the project among different disciplines and different parts of Europe, we have attempted to incorporate this diversity into *unitary* typologies of notions of social exclusion and the border, which *differ* in the different Border Cities under study. These unitary notions are certainly not always feasible, and some controversy has erupted at times, which, however, finally had a productive impact in our research procedures.

This procedure has made our adoption of an *interdisciplinary approach* as concrete and specific as can be attained: each chapter or section of the present Final Report has been written by authors most relevant with the theme discussed, but authors influenced by the perspectives of other disciplines in the course of the three-year work. In the first two Annual Reports, partners were grouped by locality, and town-based case studies were completed (Leontidou et al. 2000). For this Final Report, by contrast, experts were re-grouped by discipline rather than locality, for a transversal reading and interpretation of locality-based work completed over the first two years of the project, as well as additional work according to their main disciplinary background as related to the theme. We have thus completed a set of chapters approaching our objectives and hypotheses from different angles. The names of authors specified in the Table of Contents, refer to the persons responsible for the synthesis in each section. The work is collective, however, because in each case the authors draw from the case studies in previous reports (collected in Leontidou et al. 2000), and all have discussed the various themes extensively. In the present volume, there are often interventions by other partners, in different disciplines, who expand on certain themes or correct and re-phrase the main authors' texts. The names of the experts who have intervened in this way, are also mentioned in the Table of Contents.

In conclusion, this final report highlights types of social exclusion and explores the notion of the "border" with a view to policy relevance, through the adoption of a concrete and specific *interdisciplinary approach*. Our distinction of spatial vs social exclusion can be now vigorously introduced, in chapters 4 and 5 respectively, from the perspectives of different disciplines and their conversation with each other. These lead on to the policy-relevant analysis presented in Chapter 6, where it is argued that border societies do not obey to known social-exclusion processes.

2. Objectives and Method of the Project

2.1. Objectives of the Border Cities Project

The rationale for the project and the original objectives were *not* re-orientated during the lifetime of the project. Findings, however, vary sharply between the beginning and the end of the project. Research has started in the late 1990s, a decade when European borders have been fluid and shifting, especially in the East; it was intercepted by dramatic events in former Yugoslavia which culminated in 1999; and it is now ending in the midst of expectations for EU enlargement which will increase the member states from 15 to 27, and will turn many of the external borders studied here, into internal borders of the EU.

We have started from a theoretical interest in the notion of the border, combined with the notion of exclusion. The general objective has been to address social tensions by placing the periphery firmly into the debate on social exclusion, empirically, theoretically, methodologically, but also politically, thereby throwing light on the causes of social exclusion in Europe *in general*. The introduction of Border Cities and Towns into a debate which focuses almost exclusively on the core of Europe, has been considered as a way of contributing innovative insights in social disadvantage in the European Union. Our chosen research field included six urban localities away from the EU core, which is the usual milieu of poverty and exclusion studies. We have targeted the *periphery* of Europe, and more specifically six territories and regions which experience *treble peripherality*: they are close to the external European border; in less favoured regions; and away from European development corridors. The more specific objectives have been:

- To understand the causes of social exclusion *not* highlighted in current research, which basically focuses on poverty and unemployment on/near the core of Europe;
- to examine differences/ similarities between regions and groups in peripheral Europe, and construct relevant typologies appropriate for such places;
- to identify alternative ways of investigating and measuring social exclusion;
- to develop new strategies for combatting social exclusion, with particular attention to grass-roots creativity rather than top-down policy;
- and to bring closer together research institutions involved in the investigation of social exclusion at the European periphery, with a view to extending the present network across the border in the future.

The general hypothesis has been that, despite all this concern for social exclusion in Europe, a very important section has been left out – *spatial* exclusion, combined and interacting with social exclusion. This hypothesis was proven very relevant with empirical realities encountered in the six Border Cities under investigation. Tradition, heritage and past realities have shaped different perceptions of socio-spatial exclusion and border representations in these six corners of Europe. In the *comparative historical community studies* completed during the first year of the research project (the 1st Annual Report), the six local experiences of border cities were compared: towns of Lesbos, Ireland, the cities of Lisbon, Malaga and Melilla, Corse, Gorizia and Nova Gorica. The processes discovered were systematized into two sets of concepts, which may interact mutually at times in different localities: four types of boundary conditions (*border, frontier, twin cities, insularity*), interlocking with four processes of social exclusion, which also constitute strategies of resistance and subsistence on the edges of the EU (*back-to-back economy, differentiated integration, insularity, transience*). These findings have made us depart from

standard social-exclusion research methodology of “target groups” towards an investigation of *local societies* as a whole.

The 2nd Annual Report concentrated on definitions of social exclusion in marginal localities along the European border. *Institutional interviews* have indicated that the concept of social exclusion presents us with a wide variety of definitions, even within each one of the localities studied. This variety is augmented by the diversity of notions of the “border”. It became evident in the course of institutional interviews, that new realities arise as internal EU borders have loosened up, formally “relaxed” or “demolished” with the Schengen agreement, while external borders have tightened. These new realities create a large diversity of strategies and adaptations in the six localities under investigation.

The present Final Report draws on these findings and additional research in EU policy to systematize understanding of causes of social exclusion through a conversation from five disciplinary perspectives, and to comment on the policy relevance of our findings.

2.2 States, borders and the EU : protection, exclusion and inclusion

2.2.1 Borders, Exclusion and Order

Borders matter. They are points of inclusion and exclusion. They may be fixed. But they may change.¹ (Mazower, 1998: 2000) Such change may be physical, or attitudinal. And either fixedness, or change, may create problems, or, be the solution to them. All of this is true of any kind of border – physical, political, personal and so on. Borders, of whatever kind, may define strength and weakness, health and infection or disease. As in other aspects of life, borders are essential to international relations – without them, there would be no ‘international.’ By definition, the border is the ‘inter -’ between ‘nations’ (with the words nation and state synonymous in this context). The international political system, translated in some part into international law, is predicated on the existence of states, each with the quality of sovereignty. The distinction between the national and international is presence of the political and legal border that separates one state from another. These are necessarily points of exclusion and inclusion – this means that which is within the jurisdiction and competence of a given state, and that which is within the domain of another state. It is within the rights of states, under this arrangement, to define the terms for inclusion and exclusion, including the basis on which the border may be crossed or negotiated – what has been termed the state’s ‘exclusive power.’ (Whelan, 1988: 4) The protection of those borders and of the rights of jurisdiction within them has been the key to the evolution of international relations for over three hundred years – as discussed below.

The importance of state borders and their protection remains, despite the appearance of bodies such as the EU, or a phenomenon such as globalisation. While they may present challenges, pose questions, present solutions, or alter emphasis, neither EU type integration, nor the spread of the catchall globalisation remove the salience of the border politically or conceptually. Often, they reinforce it. On at least three levels – security, administration and jurisdiction, and the status of individuals (and therefore groups of individuals) – borders are vital. Because the border is the point of inclusion for a political community such as the state, exclusion at the border might present a security question, or one of legitimacy, or one of rights and citizenship.

¹ The term border is assumed here and is intended to be read with a common sense interpretation. However, the final section of this chapter will consider more closely the meaning, significance and possibilities of the term ‘border.’ Classic discussions can be found in Prescott (1987), Anderson (1996), Donnan & Wilson (1999). Additional discussion was made in the first and second reports of the project. See Leontidou et al. 2000: 50-2 and 189-93; see also Theodoropoulos (1999).

In the context of the EU, exclusion of a social group at the borders of a state, which is itself at the borders of the Union, introduces a triple -decker cubed compound question. How far does the border between a group and wider society at the border of a state and at the border of the EU impact on issues of security, political community and status? Thus, there is reason to consider each of these last three dimensions in terms of the three levels of EU, state and community. Implicitly, while there could be problems of security, legitimacy or access to public goods, it is conceivable that there might be no real problem and so it is worth investigating how far exclusion actually matters and how far the border matters in terms of exclusion. Good understanding of these issues is necessary for the development of the EU, as well as for both EU and state initiatives regarding social and security policy.

Herein lies the relevance on studying social exclusion in EU border cities. The case studies in this project are concerned with the impact of the border on communities where there may be aspects of social exclusion – or, where there may be an assumption that social exclusion might be present in these cases – and on the way the border is seen by those communities.² The case studies also consider the way in which the border may be, or be perceived to be a line of exclusion, whether the exclusion concerns citizens, ethnic groups, economic actors, or some other aspect. To complement this, the purpose of the present chapter is to provide the international and policy context in which the border itself exists and can be understood. This will be done in three stages. First, the evolution of international order and the cardinal principle of protecting state borders will be presented. Secondly, the persistence and relevance of borders in international relations despite developments such as EU integration and enlargement – including the emergence of the Schengen Agreement on open borders among some countries, as well as globalisation, will be analysed. This will provide the platform for an investigation of the border conceptually.

2.2.2 The Protection of Borders and Rights: the Evolution of the State System

Beginning with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, international life has developed into a state system where limiting war and regulating the relationship between states has been based on the principles of domestic jurisdiction and non -interference from the outside, both derived from the notion of sovereignty. The purpose of the sovereignty arrangement was always to limit war, or put another way, to protect the order on which the state system depended. It was not because there was a desire to protect the state as such. Rather, protection of the state from external action to alter its internal structure, or to change its borders, was the mechanism for reducing the incidence of war. While this did not prevent wars, it provided a significant framework for encouraging stability in the international system. Order would be maintained by non -intervention within the boundaries of another sovereign. This was the basic rule upon which international society came into being and, after 1945, was substantially codified (even though in that period there were also other trends that led many to question the sovereignty regime – see the following section).

The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 established the principle of mutual respect between sovereign princes in the sphere of religion. What this meant was that religion, the reason for the Thirty Years War that agreement ended, would no longer be a *casus belli*. Non-interference within the dominion of another sovereign was the key: each prince would determine religious practice within his realm and others would not seek to change it. This was the starting point for

² As the study of borders has attracted increasing interest, across various disciplines, it is notable that historical work has moved from more traditional approaches to examining the way in which the border was seen and understood by contemporaries, setting the study of border wars and culture in a social context. (Goodman and Tuck: 1992: 8)

developments within the international system that would increasingly circumscribe the grounds for going to war and generally seek to limit the problem of war and disorder. The culmination of this came in the United Nations era, with the provisions of the UN Charter for limiting the scope for the use of force.

The UN Charter contractually reinforced this international system. The primary purpose of the UN was the maintenance of international peace and security, as identified in Article 1 of the Charter. This meant creating a framework to protect states and international order as a whole from the external mischief of any state, or states, that did not observe the key concepts of non-interference and domestic jurisdiction. This codification of the sovereignty regime could be identified in Articles 2 and 51 of the UN Charter. The latter confirms the right to self-defence, but Article 2 is the reference point for the non-interference and domestic jurisdiction duality. Paragraph (iv) of that article stipulates that states shall not use force or any other means 'inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations' to act against the 'territorial integrity or political independence of any state.' This is reinforced by paragraph (vii), which stresses the notion of domestic jurisdiction, even against the United Nations in normal circumstances.³ Other important international agreements of recent times, most notably the politically binding Helsinki Final Act of 1975, have explicitly repeated and recalled, as well as symbolically underscored the principles of non-interference in domestic affairs and no changes to borders resulting from the use of force. The general rule is that there shall be no attempt change the borders of a state using force, nor any attempt to act in anyway on its territory by other states without authorisation.

The state is a particular form of political community. It is an abstract notion representing the decision-making and administrative institutions and law-making capacities that are associated with a given political community attached to a particular territory. It is generally vested with ultimate rights in all areas – generally summarised as sovereignty – and most often characterised by a monopoly over the legitimate use of restrained, coercive violence. The territory might be challenged. The political community itself might be challenged – either directly, or by irrelevance. That is the essence of the problem.

For better or worse, we live in a world where the state qualified by sovereignty, is the cornerstone of international life. It is the basic element of international politics, of international relations, of the international system, of international society, of international law. The basic rule, which governs anything to do with international life, is the mutual respect between states qualified by the notion of sovereignty. Because that is the basic international rule, it is not going to go away. The contemporary world has many other layers of rules, some formal, some informal, which are layered over this basic rule, but the basic rule remains: statehood, qualified by sovereignty, resulting in domestic jurisdiction, external non-interference and the protection of borders.

This is a source of problems in two ways. The first is that because statehood is the basic currency of international life, there are many groups, perhaps associated with territories, not currently recognised as having statehood that wish to acquire statehood. They want to challenge the *status quo*, the existing set of boundaries of states qualified by sovereignty being given international status. They do this because they want equal status. If sovereign statehood is the basic currency of international life, these groups want a share of it. If it is good enough for others, it is good enough for them. They do not want to be denied a full and proper place in the world. If the basic rule is statehood and participation is only possible once there is recognition of having

³ There are exceptional cases where the UN Security Council has the right to authorise measures that override this principle when it acts under Chapter V II of the UN Charter, as happened several times during the 1990s. See Gow (1997) and Fifoot (1992).

full, qualifying sovereign status, there is every reason for some groups to aspire to getting a slice of the action, to having their share of the statehood cake.⁴

The second way in which statehood conflict is a problem is that all the existing states, especially those with open societies, have a vested interest obtaining and maintaining equilibrium in the international system, have a need to ensure that statehood works. If statehood is the basic element and mutual recognition between states is the foundation for all open, co-operative, trading activity, then there is a need for a state system that works. One of the problems associated with conflict is that there are many states that simply do not work. If those states were functional, the conflicts would not be present, in most cases, or would be minimized and at the margins. The challenges to existing states have two dimensions – to change the internal demographic structure to make a state more workable in the eyes of those who are at the top at any given moment (i.e., ethnic cleansing and similar, perhaps less violent, policies), or to change the borders of the state to create a new one. These challenges are not only probable, but⁵ even possible, where the existing state itself is challenged by its own weakness, where there is failing statehood. Statehood is the basic currency of international life and there are those who wish to challenge the *status quo* to acquire that status. And there are those who need to preserve, if not the *status quo*, then enough equilibrium in the system to make the statehood system work in their own and everybody's interest, thereby upholding the borders regime. The central need is for stable polities that will allow stability and equilibrium in the international system.⁶

The challenges to the existing state system often confirm that system because groups want to be a part of it. And they challenge the system in terms of validity, where states have failed and do not work. (Zartman, 1999) Many observers in the African context have begun to ask if the state is an appropriate model for that region, or if it is a valid way to think about getting something that works on that continent – or at least they judge that the state model often does not work there. (Herbst, 2001) The international system is predicated on the existence of states, qualified by sovereignty. What we need to do is to find a way to make that system work and at the same time remove the conditions for armed conflict over the question of statehood. Getting rid of the state system is unrealistic. There are nearly 190 member states of the UN, plus some others outside it. These states are not going to evaporate, or to disestablish themselves. Even if they were clearly to recognize statehood as a major factor defining armed conflict, these states

⁴ Because there is reason for some groups to aspire to achieving a slice of this cake, this does not mean that all groups necessarily have to seek a slice of it. For example, Gypsies and nomadic tribes appear to find no attraction in statehood with its element of fixed territoriality.

⁵ In the case of Northern Ireland, although the UK is not weak, there is a small group that challenges the validity of UK statehood. This is the crux of the problem, as in other cases. Those in the IRA challenge the existence of the UK by saying that Northern Ireland should not exist as part of the UK, that the island of Ireland should be united as a whole. It is a statehood conflict. The UK is not weak. It is relatively strong. One of the reasons why the prosecution of that campaign by the IRA is difficult to accept is precisely because it is in the nature of the UK that it leaves open the possibility to address the question with other means – those of argument and political persuasion to gather support within a liberal democratic framework. If we look at the current situation, it is possible to see how thinking about the problem in different ways can be a means to addressing the issue. Looking at the problem in different ways has produced new, multi-layered arrangements for governance in and around the province, involving power-sharing within, and joint arrangements involving the UK and the Republic of Ireland (in the context of the EU) outwith. The problems of challenged statehood are not, it seems, then, purely a problem of the developing world, or of the southern hemisphere, as is often assumed. (Zartman, 1999) Canada is another challenged state. As with the UK, however, it has relative strength and has means available for reasonable management of the questions posed. In dealing with these questions, the strength of the state makes a difference, but it does not mean that challenges can be entirely removed. See also the 2nd Annual Report.

⁶ The type of polity in question here is conventionally understood to be a state, defined by having a geographic, territorial and administrative structure.

would not decide to abolish themselves in the hope that this would bring armed conflict to an end. They would persist, It follows, therefore, that if the state system cannot realistically be ended, then borders will inevitably remain.

2.2.3 The Persistence of Borders: Globalisation, The EU and EU Enlargement

Despite the confirmation of the sovereign state system and the insistence on the preservation of state borders in the period since 1945, there have been two key developments that have been seen as challenges to that system, either superseding it, or making it irrelevant. One of these is the complex phenomenon known as globalisation; the other is the emergence of the EU. However, despite these apparent challenges, the salience of borders has remained, even if this has prompted some discussion of shifts in emphasis and interpretation. In face of these pressures, as will be seen in the present section, on at least three levels – security, political and administrative jurisdiction and individual status – states and their borders retain immense relevance.

Globalisation is the label used to describe the complex processes and interactions made possible by modern communications, which have ‘shrunk’ the world and, it is suggested, rendered borders irrelevant. While values, politics, security, culture and other dimensions of life are at various times posited to be part of, or subject to, processes of globalisation, the original and starkest versions of the globalisation thesis have appeared in the fields of economics and international political economy. An extreme example of the phenomenon, permitting clear definition, is offered by Kenichi Ohmae. (Ohmae, 1995) The sharp globalisation thesis posits that borders are increasingly irrelevant as trade interdependency and integration of investment affect the globe. All markets become in some old-fashioned sense international – except that term is judged to be out of date. In this world, transnational corporations based mainly in North America, Europe and Japan are the main actors in what has become a single worldwide economy, where the decisions of these companies are made on a global scale and interact with the choices of consumers, irrespective of where they may be located in the world. The most that can be achieved by governments, in terms of economic or industrial policy, is to distort the natural flow of these pure economic processes and thereby to create problems. In other fields, arguments are similar – global communications networks mean that ‘the CNN’ factor and the internet make it impossible for national broadcasters to shape their news and for governments to command their own policies.

While globalisation has been strongly posited and has wide currency as an image, the reality has remained a world in which borders count. The broad, diversified and sometimes contradictory use of the term has been criticised in favour of more rigorous and discrete use. (Hirst and Thompson, 1999) In the field of international political economy, the tenets of globalisation have been brought into question theoretically and in practice. (Hirst and Thompson, 1999; Thompson, 2000) Regarding the latter, the durability of borders, their relevance and impact, even where all conditions are otherwise favourable – free trade arrangements, a common border and a common language – has been demonstrated in the case of the US and Canada. In both cases, this has been with adverse comparison to trade internally between states, in the former case, and provinces, in the latter. (Helliwell, 1998) In terms of trade, investment and migration, the border remained centrally important. What is true of political economy is also true generally. While it is absolutely clear that modern conditions pose challenges for states and their borders, these trends do not obviate them. They might, in some cases, have altered the conditions in which borders are seen to operate, or, at least, to have created fuzziness where previously there was a sense of something absolute and distinct. But as Rosenau has noted, while sovereignty is deemed by some to have been eroded, it is still strongly asserted, and while governments may appear weaker in respect of some developments, they still ‘throw their weight around’. And while borders may have become more ‘pliable’ in some situations, they ‘still keep out intruders.’ (Rosenau, 1997) In the

international system generally, borders retain their essential importance. (Wilson and Donn an eds., 1998) Globalisation does not herald an end to borders, but the fact is that governments and their populations can no longer shelter behind them and ignore the outside world – if indeed they ever could.

The wider international trend has particular relevance in the EU context, as the EU is the paramount example of a body that has developed to accommodate, if not foster, some of the internationalising trends covered by the globalisation label. Moreover, it is the development of the EU that is most often held to manifest integration and the disappearance of borders. The case of the EU is also relevant to discussions of order and the removal of conditions for conflict in international society. For many observers, the Union's great value is that integration has created conditions in which the statehood and border wars that are the fabric of European history have been woven into a new cloth of peace. At its core, this notion builds on the idea that Germany and France no longer go to war to change the border around Alsace Lorraine. Nor do they make claims on behalf of, or respond to claims from, kin-populations on the other side of the border. The pain that was previously caused by the border has been dissipated by processes of integration that are deemed to have removed the border – and it is certainly the case that the border is no longer contested and that its significance has changed. It is no longer seen as a reason for war and insecurity. Instead, it is understood at large as providing peace and security. To some extent, a similar case can be made over other borders between member states of the EU, for example between Germany and Denmark, or between France and Spain. These are cases where the reduced importance of borders as a barrier, coupled with notions of regionalisation, have altered the conditions for nationalist cross-border communities, helping to reduce tension and support for groups prepared to use violence in the attempt to secure political goals.

The formation of the EU is rightfully credited with enhancing European security through the creation of a common economic space and some concomitant political developments. This has seen the importance of borders de-emphasised in some regards, while the exercise of sovereign rights in a number of areas has been transferred by individual states to the Union. In part, this is because of the inherent value attached by many to the idea of integration per se. But it also reflects the reality for all states that in contemporary circumstances, each of them has reached the limits of that which it can achieve and manage on its own – a limited form of the pressures encapsulated by the globalisation notion. However, it is wrong to make a leap from this to the judgement that the EU has either ended state sovereignty and borders, or removed the responsibility of the individual state for its own security. Security, in fact, continues to be one of the most precious areas of government responsibility. For this reason, no state is prepared to entrust its physical security to the armed forces of any other state or group of them. While the EU considers developing a security and defence capability (Gow, 2000), and while several members of the EU are also part of the Euro-Atlantic military-political alliance that is NATO (where there is a commitment to common defence in face of armed attack on a member state), not a single state among them could envisage entrusting its defence to another state. This is the case, even though there would be no way in which to provide defence of the homeland alone, should it be needed. Defence of the homeland and its borders, *in extremis*, and the protection of sovereign rights remains the prerogative of the individual EU state. In terms of security, although there have been developments of a positive nature regarding peace and the removal of armed challenges over borders, the borders themselves and their link to national security in each state persist.

Despite the development of the EU, borders have continued as important markers in other ways. In terms of political and administrative jurisdiction, it is the Member States that continue to have responsibility for their territory, not the broader EU. While in many cases (such as Spain, or more recently the United Kingdom), multi-layered government has been introduced, often facilitated by the reality of the Union and the reduced significance of some previously

problematic borders, the state level remains strong. This is where almost all policy is decided. It is where, at best, EU level policy is implemented in a more or less harmonious way. But in matters of taxation, representation, health, social security and so forth, it is the individual states that retain primacy – even if there are sometime calls within the EU for tax harmonisation (a misnomer used to recommend tax union – the former operates at different levels to create a rich texture, whereas the latter denotes unity on a single pitch).

This is nowhere more clearly to be seen than over the status of individuals and, where relevant, groups of individuals. To cross a border legally, an individual needs to belong to a state and be recognised by that state as having appropriate status. To reside, or work, within the borders of a state and to have rights on that territory (especially a full range of rights) requires appropriate status. The dispossessed and stateless persons of the world – refugees, displaced and stateless persons and others – are essentially non-people. (Breuilly 1993: 369) Everything depends on the state, territorially defined by its borders. For individuals and for human groups, to have a place at all and to make claims largely depends on having the primary qualification of having accepted status in a state – even if the individual or group actually wishes to alter the structure or boundaries of that state. Therefore, even within the EU, where there is formally freedom of movement of goods and labour, that movement is subject to appropriate status within one of the EU Member States, not within the EU. Without a passport or identity card issued by one of the states, it will not be possible legally to exercise the right to free movement and cross the borders of the issuing state, or any those of its partners in the Union. Nor is citizenship of an EU country something that can easily be traded for that of another one. On whatever terms status is achieved, it is not easily swapped.

2.2.4 Schengen, Hierarchy, Overlap and Cascading Borders in and Attached to the EU

While some developments within the EU have tried to emphasise the reduced importance of borders between Member States, they have not removed borders. In some ways, they have also created new layers of border. For example, the Euro currency zone, further facilitating the free flow of capital and payments, has created a subaltern border within the EU, which incorporates eleven of the now fifteen EU members. Similarly the Schengen regime on open borders, originally implemented between seven EU members parties to the agreement, while only shifting the perspective on the border and its importance by making it open, has also created a further subaltern border.

The Schengen Agreement, named after the town in Luxembourg in December 1998, where it was signed, originally included Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Austria, Portugal, Greece, Belgium, the Netherlands and, of course, the country in which it was signed (although not all countries implemented the agreement, initially, with seven deciding to move ahead, rather than wait for all the others). Since then, the Nordic countries of Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Norway and Iceland have acceded to the Agreement. One unusual element of this is that the last two are not EU member states, which raises travel and migration issues (these are touched on, below).

The adoption of Schengen reflects the ideal of a borderless Europe, embedded in the EU. However, this has effectively created a subaltern border, with sometimes ludicrous consequences. For example, at Schipol airport in the Netherlands, or at Vienna airport in Austria, the traveller, forced in any case to carry passport and identity cards, who may wish to visit a shop in one part of the airport, or an office, or a lounge, may have to pass through passport control and customs while moving from one part of the airport to another.

In another curious case, although Norway is not an EU member state (its population voted against membership in a referendum in 1999), Norway is party to Schengen. This creates a

bizarre situation in which one of the most radical of EU developments – the opening of borders, a measure to which several member states have not felt themselves able to commit – has a country that rejects EU integration as one of its members. Among other strange implications of this is the fact that any citizen of an EU member state travelling from a Schengen country may enter Norway without passing a border control. Even more strangely, given that Norway is not an EU member state, any Norwegian citizen can enter the EU without restriction, so long as the entry point is a Schengen party – and, yet more surprisingly, the same applies to non-Norwegian citizens, once they had been admitted to the country. The intended removal of borders has, in fact, created some curious new ones. Furthermore, Schengen arrangements have come to be doubted even by some of those states parties to the agreement, in respect of illegal immigration – that is the attempt to cross borders and enter a country without having the appropriate status in the eyes of the relevant authorities. Broadly, following significant tightening of immigration conditions and controls – such as visa regimes – at the borders of the EU (and, indeed, the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) countries, during the 1990s, illegal immigrants are generally considered to be a threat, with the implication the even illegal immigrants ‘represent the “outside” brought within’ and might be considered a ‘challenge to the communal integrity’ of the state, which – as noted, already, jealously regards citizenship and rights of entry and remain as intrinsically part of its sovereign rights. (Collinson, 1993: 3) Ethically and pragmatically, there are two sides to this argument, with some seeing difficulties, while others see benefits. (Whelan, 1988; Carens, 1988) The existence of the EU and Schengen modify this regarding some aspects of movement at the state level, but represent an attempt to reinforce it at the Union, or zone level.

The emergence of Foot and Mouth, first in the UK, then in other EU member states, was not only a crisis in its own right, but also generated a Schengen crisis. France, a Schengen country, introduced emergency measures to suspend (and thereby contravene) the terms of the Treaty of European Union and the common economic market to prevent the transportation of anything from the UK (admittedly a non-Schengen country), whether this was cattle, plants or chocolate. This meant the re-appearance of strong border controls, where there had been weaker ones. Not only this, but Schengen countries began to re-impose hard border controls. Norway, in particular, as a non-EU member, was both quick and strong in re-introducing border controls. Thus, even in the supposedly most ‘borderless’ of state environments, the authorities within particular borders, have shown that the importance of borders as the formal and practical markers of exclusion and inclusion remains.

This range of issues associated with what is, in practice, the emergence of a hierarchy of borders, as well as an overlapping of borders, will only be amplified by enlargement. EU enlargement, which has occurred already on several occasions, remains a significant prospect. Further enlargement will bring into the EU fold new states, each with its own preserves. While the external borders of the Union will change and the character of borders between new members and existing one will be altered, borders will remain important.

For example, there has been considerable attention by the European Commission to the border between Poland and both Lithuania and Belarus. The nature of this help has been to secure the Polish border in terms of illegal activities along and across that border, involving organised crime and both human and goods (including drugs) smuggling. The reason to assist in firming up this border is because there is the prospect that sometime in the next few years, as Poland’s borders with Germany to the west are made more open, its borders to the east will be those of the Union as whole. At this point, as well as being the point of inclusion and exclusion for Poland, the borders will be those of the EU, with its largely open border regime within its walls. However, when the Polish border becomes that of the EU, it may also become the frontier.

To introduce the notion of a frontier is to nuance the discussion of borders. It means that the border is relevant not only for that which it marks in terms of inclusion and exclusion, but that it

is also the point that can be crossed and can lead to other territories and to further expansion. It is this position that not only highlights the importance of borders of Member States that are borders of the EU in policy and security terms, but also requires understanding of the border conceptually. This is the subject of the final section to this chapter.

2.2.5 The Nature of Borders: Exclusion, Inclusion and Distinctions

Borders have many forms. A few of them are formed naturally. Where land meets water, or plateaus meet ravines, or rock formations meet plains, there are definite, natural borders. Aside from these, borders are social constructions. (Wood, 1992: 18 -19) At times, these natural phenomena may be constructed to form the borders of political communities. For example, the island of Great Britain has natural borders with the sea. The River Danube forms the border between Croatia and Serbia. Yet these natural phenomena are no more than convenient markers of the break point between political communities. The River Danube continues its flow within Serbia, no longer forming the boundary between political communities at the state level. The sea around the island of Great Britain does not completely form the boundary between one state and one or more others – there are smaller islands and there is the province of Northern Ireland that form part of the United Kingdom. At the same time, there are borders between England and both Scotland and Wales on the island, forged through political history and war, and often with specific political-military arrangements that reflect sensitivities of centuries old standing continuing late into the twentieth century. Monmouthshire, derived from one of historic English military frontier ‘Marches’ (taking the name of John de Monmouth, appointed as warden for the southern Marches in 1241), provides a quaint example. (Suppe, 1994:123) This region, in which both Welsh and English are used in public matters, was inventively treated as neither part of England or Wales on maps, but assumed special status, until local government reform in 1974, when the territory definitively became part of Wales. Natural boundaries have their place, but only become the borders between political communities through social construction – the attribution of meaning. All borders between political communities are constructed. Because of this, they are open to both interpretation and change. Borders may well be necessary, in general, as will be discussed below, but no particular border has that quality. The purpose of this final section is to consider different ways of understanding borders as points of delimitation and of inclusion-exclusion, as well as both the questions and possibilities that may arise from this.

State borders may appear in various forms. At their most benign, they may have no more than a sign and, at most, an empty building where one-time officials sat, as is the case with many of the borders of states parties to the Schengen Agreement within the EU. At the opposite extreme, they may share features with the Great Wall of China. In the modern world, even at the borders of the EU, there are state borders marked by an extensive no-man’s land, chain-mail fencing, heavy barbed-wire, gun-posts and watchtowers and obstreperous officials that might be found on a border such as that between Spain and Morocco.⁷ This is a clear and strongly felt border. The paraphernalia of power and control leave no doubt that this hard border is a problem – its physical delimitation may be contested, or its effect and an instrument and marker of inclusion and exclusion may be in question. In between these extremes, a variety of border-types may occur. They may be made ‘sensible’ by factors such as land use, the gauge of railway track, or by the shape or type of post boxes, or there may be nothing that makes it ‘sensible’ – there is no difference to be noted crossing from Bolivia to Brazil in the Rain Forest, or between Oman and

⁷ Heavy barbed-wire around Melilla, however, was constructed as a consequence of the Schengen Agreement – see also p. 54 below.

Saudi Arabia in the desert. (Wood, 1992: 8) Borders have different characteristics and serve different purposes.

The term 'border' has many close relatives. These include the terms 'boundary', 'frontier', 'margin', 'edge', 'periphery', 'and margin.' (Parker, 2000: 7) These terms may be treated as synonyms. Or there may be an attempt to make discrete definitions so as to give each its own space and nuance. Both approaches have merit and it is not necessary to seek to provide overriding, intellectually complete categorization. There have been, are and will be many different definitions of, and approaches to, the conceptualisation of 'the border.' (Donnan and Wilson, 1999: 15)

Aside from the understanding used to date in this study – referring to the territorial point of delimitation, there are other levels on which the term 'border' may be understood – the social and the cultural, either of which might or might be consonant with the other, or with the presence of state borders. In the case of social borders, the issue is patterns of organization and membership. In that of cultural borders, it concerns different 'worlds of meaning.' (Donnan and Wilson, 1999: 19) In some cases, at whatever level, the borders may be fairly easily negotiated, without endangering their presence or standing. At others, this may give rise to greater difficulties. Whether borders are political, social or cultural, the most important aspect of them is to delineate inclusion and exclusion. Where different types of borders overlap, or are proximate, there will be related questions of inclusion and exclusion, whether this creates trouble, presents no problem, or is beneficial.

While identification of political borders is relatively straightforward, whether between states in international society, or between other political units below that level, the same is not true of social and cultural boundaries. Determination of these can be sought from within an observed field – thus the border is identified as being at the edge of, say, a social group which has organizational characteristics, or patterns of activity, and a system of mutually recognized rules between the members of the group. These boundaries may well change as the social group adapts, changes, develops and incorporates new influences – and so forth. Because of this potential flux, identifying the boundary may be problematic. Similarly, the patterns of meaning and received communication that identify a cultural group may be subject to change of various kinds. The problem in identifying such boundaries is that they are in large part the result of subjective factors and lack the degree of objectivity provided by border posts and signboards.

Where there are points of social or cultural inclusion or exclusion close to the borders of the political community a number of possibilities are presented. There may be an assumption that there is a role for the centre to look after its borderlands, which may be assumed to be at a disadvantage because of their location. In terms of governance of the political community, the borderlands are often assumed to be the most unreliable points in the polity. (Pease, 1913) However, this may not be the case in practice. (Parker 2000: xiii) Indeed, on the contrary, in certain circumstances, the border zone might be the most important element for defining the character and quality of the whole.

This may be seen by consideration of the potential offered by the different elements in the border lexical set. Each of the cognate words can be used to suggest a different dimension to the border. The term 'border' clearly refers to that point at which one entity becomes another – whether it is the political border we have considered so far, the border of a garden, or the border formed by stitching on a garment. It is a meeting point. A 'boundary', as far as it may have a different connotation, marks the outer limit of an entity, or phenomenon, as it is, for the present, at least. Although there is something beyond the boundary, significance lies within it – so, for example, the boundary of a cricket field is important not because it marks the zone in which the game is played, not because of anything to do with life beyond that boundary. That which is

encompassed – or ‘bound’ together – is the essence. A ‘frontier’, on the other hand, may have significance because it connotes the limits reached up to a certain point, but the implication is that the (quite possibly undefined) world beyond is the significant dimension. ‘Frontier’ can also suggest the possibility of exploration and expansion – commonly repeated in the legend, ‘space – the final frontier’, known to millions of television viewers from the *Star Trek* science fiction work. In any case, it is the point where two entities come face to face – where two countries meet, or where the included and known confronts the outside and (at least, largely) unknown.⁸

‘Periphery’ tends more simply to mark the outside edge of something to which the main referent of the periphery is not the whole, as such, but some ‘core.’ Alongside the term ‘periphery’, there is also that of ‘the margin.’ While the term ‘marginalized’ has negative connotations, linked to core-periphery notions, of being pushed to the side and into a position of lesser significance, the term ‘margin’ may have a wider sense. The margin on a page or writing offers the space in which to embrace and enhance the writing through comment as much as it also offers the chance to reject and diminish. It is a neutral zone which can be left open, or which can be put to use. It is an ‘edge which may plausibly be incorporated as part of the whole, or not.’ (Parker 2000: 8)

Each of these possibilities suggests that borders should be understood in different ways. In every case, the border marks the edge of something – land, activity, symbolic resonance. It defines the difference between inside and outside. In some cases, the sense of this definition may come more extensively from within, in others there may be greater influence from outside. In every case, there is an interaction between inside and outside which in some way shapes the presence of the border, its potential and character, and its permeability and mutability. While borders are certainly points of inclusion and exclusion, they may also function as barriers or gateways.

This is what makes it important to analyse borders and border communities at the edge of states and simultaneously at the edge of the EU. Given the prospects of EU enlargement and of a multiple layer EU, with different clusters of states increasingly moving ahead in different areas of activity, understanding the border is vital. In part, this is because the multi-layered, multi-speed development of the Union will create more borders, of one kind or another, within the EU – this is already the case with matters such as monetary union, or the Schengen arrangements, and is set to be the case regarding security and defence policy. It is also because areas at the edge of the Union at one moment may become key in the transition to an enlarged Union. The border between France and Germany was pivotal to the origins of the EU – the early developments that would lead to the Union were driven by a desire to address the previously contested border between the two states, seeking to remove the sense in which German speakers in France, or French speakers under German dominion, would be alienated, or ‘excluded’ from the wider political community: gradually that wider community was understood to embrace both.

Because borders can be problematic does not necessarily mean that this has to be the case. Borders are essential. If the human body did not have physical borders – the skin that binds the whole together, there would be nothing. However, it is equally the case that if that skin were hermetically sealed and offered no compromise to permit the border to be crossed by food, water, air, and ideas, again, there would be nothing. Borders serve a purpose in making sense of a whole, where they operate successfully. And where they do not operate beneficially, there may be difficulty. The border marks the division between one area of activity, distinguished *inter alia* by degree of intensity and regularity, and all others, whether the others are of similar or diverse type.

This means that inclusion and exclusion are neither necessarily good, nor necessarily bad features, in and of themselves. Each pattern of exclusion creates some degree of inclusion. If an

⁸ The very term ‘confront’, at root, defines this – *con* = with, *front* = a front. Thus, to confront something is to meet it head on, face to face, the most forward aspect pushed to meet ‘the Other’ at the closest proximity.

individual is excluded from a group, it is by definition included in at least one other group by definition – those not included in the former. And *vice versa* – inclusion creates a separate ‘inclusive’ group of the excluded. There will be complementary, or conflicting, sets of borders in any situation. This is especially the case at the borders of the EU. There, patterns of inclusion and exclusion may have dynamics, which produce any one, or a number of, different outcomes. There may be little or no salience, or there may be social problems that could translate into political and even security problems. For example, the issue of ethnic Slovenes in the Trieste-Gorizia border region of Slovenia and of ethnic Italians and the property rights of Italians in Slovenia dogged EU negotiations with that latter on an association agreement over a number of years. (Gow and Carmichael, 2000). But, just as much as that issue could be divisive in terms of mixed border communities and the states that embraced them, the same problem could also be turned to advantage as Italy and Slovenia began to work more closely as acceptable arrangements were made. In this sense, the presence of social (ethnic) exclusion at the Italian and EU border with Slovenia demonstrated one way in which the phenomenon could have both negative and positive dimensions.

A second sense in which exclusion at the borders of states and the Union may have both negative and positive effects may involve economic and political dynamism. The presence of social exclusion at the margins may force the core (of either the state, or the Union, or both) to make arrangements that would give political, cultural or economic assistance to disadvantaged regions (social exclusion, especially with the political, cultural and economic levels compounded, commonly has a territorial, or spatial, dimension, with excluded groups at the physical periphery – and groups at the physical periphery becoming socially excluded (Madanipour, 1998: 78-9). This would then foster the competition on which open societies and the single EU economic space are intended to thrive. Whatever the effects, dynamics of this kind determine overall equilibrium and the success of the whole. While the borders of the political community may distinguish the inside from the outside and raise issues of inclusion and exclusion, this provides opportunities as well as imposing limits.

2.2.6 Conclusion

At times, the periphery defines the core. It is the margins, as much as the more obvious core, that will determine the success of an expanding EU. Borders are essential and inevitable. The state has evolved as the basic unit of international life, the protection and preservation of its borders has been the primary purpose of international society, and those borders have remained resolutely in face of pressures such as globalisation and integration – albeit flexibly modified and mediated, modifying and mediating. But, their interpretation and significance beyond this may change – indeed as may the borders themselves at certain times. Because it is the border, which marks the whole, it may serve as a fence and as an opening. It is one element in a complex of inclusion and exclusion.

In many cases, the seemingly disadvantaged and excluded at the frontiers of the Union may become pivotal in making the transition to enlargement and to new boundaries. The relatively hard borders between EU Member States and contiguous aspirant members will rapidly change status. Patterns of inclusion and exclusion may change with this – or may be reinforced. In either case, the future of the Union depends on understanding patterns of social inclusion and exclusion at those points where the Union and its Member States determine that which is inside and that which is outside the EU, and with it, perhaps, the meaning of the Union itself.

2.3. Method of the Project: Interdisciplinary research in problematizing social exclusion

Understanding social exclusion, is a perfect exercise in critical realist epistemology. Instead of the synthesis of *postmodernism* and *critical realism* in our epistemology, as outlined in our research proposal in 1997, we opted for methodological innovations within critical realism itself.

It is frequently thought that “how often” exclusionary (or even racist or xenophobic) attitudes appear, can be viewed by macro -surveys. However, the recent macro -survey by the Eurobarometer (2001) is evaluated in chapter 6, section 6.1.1. in various contexts, and it is pointed out that in the context of this project it is dubious: issues as sensitive as racism and xenophobia can not be targeted of this sort of opinion -poll approach to small samples, nor “explained” by multivariate regression analysis. Besides, the “national” focus of the Eurobarometer (see tables 18 and 19 below) is misplaced, and may give rise to false stereotyping and labelling, on the basis of a sample too small, of the “national character” of racism. Only certain issues allow the use of such macro -surveys of “how often” and their findings. Qualitative research, as chosen in our project, can research “why” and “how” certain attitudes appear, and in fact “where” they appear, which is not whole nations.

We have discovered diversified attitudes of various agents, institutions and social groups resident in particular spatial units, by qualitative research. The initial plan of questionnaires to individuals had to be abandoned after a 65% budget cut, but we did not fall into the trap of opting for a small sample and fall into the traps of the Eurobarometer. We opted for a qualitative solution : Institutional Interviews. Consequently, instead of focusing on exclusionary **prejudices**, which are, in any case, beyond the reach of policy makers, we focused on exclusionary **behaviour** and actual discrimination or tolerance **practiced** by Institutions which are acting upon local issues, exclusion and border policy. This leads us to policy recommendations in a smooth way in chapter 6. In a reflective way, also, our interviews can have already **influenced** the attitudes of the Institutions in question.

The chosen locale of our research, the external EU borders, has brought us face to face with an interesting relativisation of standard research practices. We have adopted the iterative process inspired by critical realism, where intensive research gives us some insight and conceptual innovations, and orients us toward the next, extensive, research phase. This may require a new round of qualitative research, followed again by quantitative analysis of a stratified sample. The iterative process of critical realism is thus set in motion. Though the iterative process of critical realism was incorporated in our Work Programme, it has not been completed, due to a change in the Work Programme brought about by a 65% budget cut. The “rounds” completed are as follows:

PHASE OF EXTENSIVE RESEARCH:

Collection of previous research on social exclusion and the border. Comparative analysis and Deconstruction of relevant studies.

PHASE OF INTENSIVE RESEARCH:

Grouping of experts by locality for sectoral studies and Institutional Interviews. Comparative collective work for evaluation of findings: interaction among cities, information exchange and comparative view by the team, typology of forms of social exclusion on the border and of types of problems beyond the border.

PHASE OF EXTENSIVE RESEARCH:

Collection of further material on social exclusion and the border and enrichment of locality findings.

PHASE OF INTENSIVE RESEARCH:

Regrouping of experts by subject/ expertise/ sector rather than locality, for analysis of findings and sectoral studies. Systematic comparison and re-conceptualisation, carried out by expertise (theme) rather than location of investigators: a) specification and content analysis of local agents' approaches, b) re-formulation of research agenda, c) new concepts, alternative approaches and solutions, d) evaluation: success/ failure interpreted with reference to causes of social exclusion and integration, both structural and local/ cultural. Collective work for evaluation of findings: interaction among cities, information exchange and comparative view by the team, typology of forms of social exclusion on the border and of types of problems beyond the border.

PHASE OF DISCUSSING STRATEGIC ASPECTS, POLICY PROPOSALS

Consideration of Scenarios of EU integration and policy recommendations by the coordinating team closely interacting with experts grouped by subject. Re-assessment of prevalent models for understanding causes of social exclusion and confrontation with alternative interpretations offered, on the basis of findings. These findings now guide comparative approach, theory construction and policy evaluation.

PHASE OF EXTENSIVE RESEARCH (not started):

New border cities analysed with the theoretical apparatus constructed above. Development of alternative scenarios of EU integration and change of the borderline around the cities investigated, will form a basis for the choice of other border areas.

Our project has started with a series of local field works and proceeded with a comparative research stage, where the disciplinary boundaries in the context of our research partnership have been trespassed. The present volume has reconstituted these boundaries on a new level, after interdisciplinary interaction. It presents an intensive research phase, structured into sections written by the experts who are the most familiar with each theme in our interdisciplinary research project. As interaction has been taking place in the context of our research meetings, each team of experts has introduced disciplinary perspectives other than their own into each section, while keeping their own particular perspectives as the axis of their analysis. Each section discusses findings with a theoretical and methodological perspective inspired by a specific discipline, enriched by other perspectives. The result is a series of *narratives*, unpacking our research questions. Though we have abandoned deconstruction in the course of the project, *unpacking* was followed by synthesis of the results within a comparative perspective (reconstruction) by the transversal reading of the locality case studies in our 1st and 2nd Annual Reports as re-grouped into one volume (Leontidou et al. 2000).

The following four chapters contain the analysis of the research carried out during the life-time of the project. They also describe the methodology used at each step, and include the description of results highlighting the innovative aspects with respect to the state of the art in research on borders and social exclusion.

3. A macroscopic view of labour markets and economic restructuring in the six case studies

This section systematizes project results and findings on local economies in comparison with national ones, and also compares the case studies by a transversal reading of the 1st and the 2nd Annual Reports. It also consolidates project results and findings into a set of concepts for social exclusion related with labour markets, employment, unemployment, and poverty.

3.1. Employment, unemployment and social exclusion indicators

The study of the phenomenon of exclusion from a specifically economic point of view faces a methodological difficulty. Exclusion does not correspond to any concepts of conventional economic theory (Gazier 1996) and it is impossible to correctly analyse it with considerations that are derived only from this discipline. Indeed, it is clear that the phenomenon considered extends beyond the field of economics to engulf social, psychological and political dimensions. In addition, if one can find many economic studies dealing with this topic, they are not unified around challenges facing the developed societies. In spite of these reservations, the economic approach, supplemented by those provided by other disciplines, is able to throw an interesting light to the phenomenon of exclusion observed in the various localities analysed in our research project.

The first two stages of research clearly revealed the multidimensional character of the phenomenon of exclusion. They also revealed problems of economic and social relations in the situation of the people who become victims of exclusion. However, as Schnapper (1996) says, in contemporary societies, social reality is organised from exchanges in economic life and the redistribution of wealth between the various categories of the population. More concretely, social relations result at the same time from the exchanges produced by professional activity and from exchanges organized by the whole spectrum of social life. Thus, the phenomenon of exclusion can be explained with reference to two groups of elements. The first one concerns the relation with *employment* (and with social protection). The second one concerns the organization of social relations in the *family* and in the various civil or political *institutions*.

From this double point of view, the peripheral location of our research sites bears within itself elements of social exclusion. In fact, they are associated to several peripheralities. First, they are victims of isolation or, at least, of long distances from the economic, political and technological centres. Secondly, our research sites are all situated at the extreme limit of the European area. Last, the combination of both previous peripheral situations generates a third type of peripherality. Border localities do not use the possibilities offered by connections between regions, because their position is at the end of the way and on the frontier, which reduces the opportunities to develop exchanges with all neighbours. So, in practice, the peripheral situation generates different processes of discrimination, disturbances, difficulties, impoverishment on the affected areas. The border areas of the European Union, particularly in the South, are experiencing simultaneously these three types of peripherality.

In this section, we would like to confirm this with the demonstration of figures, through the systematic investigation of our six EU border localities with respect to their socio-economic profile. In this way, we will understand how social exclusion works in these localities. In this respect, it is important to know some significant aspects relative to the European context, as the

first step in the way to look for the economic interpretation of social exclusion. So, we will begin with a brief outline of the socio-economic situation of EU countries, especially confronting the differences between the countries in the core and the countries in the periphery, which are the common references to our localities under research.

In the course of our case studies we have established that, in general, the labour situation of the research sites is worse than that of their national hinterlands. So, compared to the rest of Northern Ireland, localities on the Irish border evidence higher levels of unemployment (Table 2), larger numbers of dependent population (under fourteen or over sixty-five years of age), lower proportions in service sector employment and higher rates of employment in agriculture, forestry and fishing.

Table 2
Labour situation of Ireland

	Employed	Unemployed	Unemployment rate (%)
NI border	76,710	25,629	25
RoI border	116,557	21,674	16
Rest of NI	252,690	51,697	17
Rest of RoI	1190,679	205,054	15
Total NI	329,400	77,326	19
Total RoI	1307,236	226,728	15

Source: Census of Population 1991 (Northern Ireland, NI), 1996 (Republic of Ireland, RoI).
Shadowed figures belong to the Republic of Ireland.

With regard to Lesvos, situations are similar. Concretely, we can highlight four items. First, the reduced activity rate, lower than in total Greece. Second, a significant unemployment rate. Also, we can observe the worse situation of women with respect to men, in Lesvos and in all Greece, but the conditions are harder in our island. Finally, we observe the important weight of the primary sector, nine points above Greece, in Lesvos. The evolution seems to be positive. According to Eurostat (1998), the activity rate in Greece had increased since 1996 (61%, with men 77%, and women 46%). So, women's participation in the labour market has been growing. On the other hand, the service sector developed at higher rates⁹ (57%), while industry declined (23%). Likewise, agriculture has stayed at the same levels.

Table 3
Greece and Lesvos labour market

	Greece	Lesvos
Activity rate	54.15	48.37
Men	77.45	70.15
Women	32.90	23.02
Unemployment rate	8.08	8.28
Men	6.25	6.51
Women	11.99	14.53

⁹ Figures provided by Eurostat: Labour Force Survey (1996).

Employment by sector				
Agriculture, forest, etc.	671,476	19.63%	8,152	28.50%
Industry	873,926	25.54%	5,954	20.80%
Services	1,876,114	54.83%	14,504	50.70%
Not declared	296,225		1,771	

Source: NSSG Census of 1991.

The situation in Malaga and Melilla is comparable, though Greek figures, and those of Lesvos, look better in terms of participation and unemployment, while the distribution by sectors presents in Spain a more industry-oriented structure. With regard to the situation by gender, the divergence between men and women is comparable, in general terms. Activity and unemployment rates are better in Melilla than Malaga, except for female unemployment, with a very high rate in Melilla. The relation with respect to Andalusia (the region including Malaga) and Spain is ambiguous, depending on each factor. In general, Andalusia occupies an intermediate position.

Table 4

Activity and unemployment rates by gender in Spain, Andalusia, Malaga and Melilla

	Men		Women	
	Activity rate	Unemployment rate	Activity rate	Unemployment rate
Spain	63,06	13,94	37,72	26,65
Andalusia	63,12	23,92	34,68	39,41
Malaga (*)	65,42	23,02	36,19	32,67
Melilla	67,80	14,50	38,74	41,86

(*) Provincial figures.

Source: Active Population Survey, second quarter 1998, INE.

The analysis of the productive structure (Table 5), shows Malaga to be a city oriented toward services, demonstrated by the percentages of employed population by economic activity. Tourism and commerce are the most important activities of the tertiary sector. Similarly, the importance of services in Melilla is even higher, with activities such as commerce and public services. Tourism in Melilla was stressed by many agents as a future solution to the economic difficulties which began with the end of the Spanish Protectorate, and the creation of the border. Agriculture is important in Andalusia and not in Malaga or Melilla, but in this we must consider the small territory of Melilla, constricting the possibilities of agriculture and industry, and the inflation of the service sector linked with public administration and extraordinary commercial activity.

Table 5

Distribution of employment by sectors in Malaga and Melilla

Sector	Agriculture, etc.	Industry	Construction	Services
Spain	8.68%	20.17%	9.48%	61.66%
Andalusia	11.76%	12.58%	9.97%	65.70%
Malaga(*)	7.00%	9.10%	11.90%	71.80%
Melilla	2.50%	6.20%	5.20%	85.70%

(*) Provincial figures.

Source: Active Population Survey, 1996, INE.

Tertiary activities are very important in Corsica as well (Table 6). They represent 78% of the insular employment (70% in France). The decline of primary activities is very marked on the island. The number of agricultural workers is decreasing, and Corsica is dependent on imports for agricultural goods. Immigrant workers constitute 70% of the agricultural labour force. Secondary activities are also few in quantity and unbalanced. Only 16% of the employed population work in industry, and many are craftsmen or are employed in the building sector. Manufacturing industry is almost non-existent in Corsica. On the other hand, about 20% of the whole Corsican employment is due to State action.

Table 6
Distribution of employment by sectors in Corsica (1997)

Sector	Agriculture, etc.	Industry	Construction	Services
Corsica	6.1%	6.8%	9.1%	78%
France	4.5%	19.1%	6.3%	70.1%

Source: INSEE

One of the main handicaps of the Corsican society is unemployment (Table 7). For a period, the rate of unemployment was lower than the average French one, but recently it became higher. Today the gap between the two rates is over one percentage point. Our research has also detected that the insular situation seems to be closely related to the French one, in that trends are similar, but distances are maintained through time. The participation of women in the labour market is lower than in France (46.4), representing only 34,8%, thirteen points below the national rate. However, women constitute an increasing section of the unemployed population. One job seeker out of two is female. The long-term unemployed are increasing in Corsica (4,758 in 1997). Young people are hit by unemployment, since two job seekers out of ten are younger than 25 years of age (2,915 in 1997). Persons without any professional qualification are more affected by unemployment than qualified persons. Seven requests for a job out of ten come from unskilled job seekers.

Table 7
Activity and unemployment rates in Corsica

	Total activity rate 1990	Female activity rate 1990	Unemployment rate 2000	Long-term unempl.rate 1996
Corsica	47.7%	34.8%	11.1%	6.3%
France	55.1%	46.4%	10.0%	4.7%

Source: INSEE

The rate of unemployment is also significant in Gorizia (18% in 1996), with high rates of young, female, and intellectual unemployment, and a negative trend (Table 8). But the situation is worse in Nova Gorica, the twin city of Gorizia in Slovenia. Nova Gorica has changed from a socialist system into a market economy in a short time, after the dissolution of the Yugoslav Republic, and it suffers from an increase in unemployment. In Slovenia, both people over 40 and young people are seriously affected by unemployment. Young people find work for short periods without any security, and there are many people aged 50 or over, who have lost their jobs. We have found the same problems in the labour market in other border localities.

Table 8
People registered in unemployment lists in area of Gorizia

	1990		1993		1996	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Agriculture, etc.	58	0.2	96	0.4	88	0.3
Industry	416	1.5	625	2.4	793	3.1
Other activities	407	1.5	412	1.6	875	3.4
Unclassifiable	1,123	4.2	2,581	9.9	2,864	11.2
Total	2,004	7.4	3,714	14.3	4,620	18.0

With regard to Lisbon, we can observe an activity rate very close to that of Portugal as a whole (50% and 51%, respectively). Unemployment rates are higher in Lisbon, above all among women (6.2% and 5.3% respectively). But, once more, the situation changes dramatically if we observe the productive structure of employment. It is natural that Portugal has a high rate of agricultural employment, but Lisbon has a reduced rate, because of its urban character. But the lower importance of industry in Lisbon is worth pointing out, with the service sector very strong in Lisbon, 14 percentage points higher than in Portugal.

Table 9
Portugal and Lisbon labour market

	Portugal	Lisbon
Activity rate	51%	50%
Unemployment rate	4.5%	5.0%
Men	3.7%	3.8%
Women	5.3%	6.2%
Employment sectors		
Primary	12.3%	3.9%
Secondary	34.9%	29.2%
Tertiary	52.8%	66.9%

In any case, unemployment is not the most urgent problem of Lisbon. It is the development of industry and services and the stimulation of productivity. Labour instability and immigration also appear as two key issues in understanding the Portuguese labour market. Increasing precariousness of employment arose in the mid-1970s, with the reform of labour legislation. The introduction of flexible forms of employment, like temporary work, etc., was considered as exceptional, but finally the exception has become the rule, particularly to newcomers to labour market. "Flexible" and "atypical" employment forms affect mostly immigrants. In fact, the insertion of immigrants into the labour market seems to be a very important point in understanding the structure of the labour market in Portugal. Most of the immigrants work under someone's orders (Costa and Pimenta 1991, Freitas and Castro, undated). The figures of self-employed people mainly regard gypsies and Indians, particularly in trade businesses. Architectural works and construction have gained a structural dependence on immigrant manual work, employing significant numbers of male African populations. Services employ the majority of the female migrant population, mainly in personal and domestic services (Costa and Pimenta 1991, Freitas and Castro, undated).

3.2. The level of poverty

We have proposed to think about exclusion and poverty separately, but a lot of times poverty is actually the door to the exclusion, and exclusion stimulates the possibilities to fall into poverty. Poverty induces migration. Frequently, immigrants suffer social exclusion as they arrive. This generates difficulties in searching for better conditions of employment. So, the immigrant remains poor in the promised land. Obviously, poor people are not exclusively immigrants. In each place there are poor populations in history. However, the face of poverty changes. For example, social welfare policy has contributed to a decline of poverty among the elderly, although they remain a vulnerable group. On the other hand, there are certain aspects of economic and social change that constitute new poverty factors, such as the increase in unemployment, insecure forms of employment (especially among immigrant, young and female workforce), and the increase in the number of single-parent families, particularly with a female head.

3.2.1. The main statistical observations

The concept of poverty has changed as well. It is not just a shortage of money. It has many different dimensions, including shortcomings in aspects such as training, work capacity, health, housing and isolation. It has been very difficult to find comparable, let alone homogeneous, poverty figures about our border localities in the most cases. We have constructed a picture of poverty through different statistical sources and the study of different poverty aspects, and have thus not detected the same poverty pattern in border localities under research.

If we consider as a poverty threshold an average income per household under 50% of the national average income, Malaga and Melilla have high poverty rates in accordance with data provided by the Spanish household budget survey (EPF), both in 1980-81 and in 1990-91 (Table 10). Large numbers of immigrants in Melilla, mainly from Morocco, constitute the key factor in understanding such an important poverty rate, but not the only one.

Table 10
Poverty rate in Spain, Andalusia, Malaga and Melilla

	1980-81	1990-91	Gap
Spain	20,9	19,4	1,5
Andalusia	32,2	27,1	5,1
Malaga province	24,0	23,9	0,1
Melilla	-	31,8	-

Source: EDIS/ECB, 1996.

The situation in Gorizia (belonging to the relatively affluent Italian North) must be very different, according to the figures of Table 11, which shows the distribution of poverty in Italy in 1999, by three regions.

Table 11
Poverty rate in Gorizia

Poverty	North	Centre	South	Italy
% households	5.0	8.8	23.9	11.9
% population	5.0	9.3	25.1	13.1

Source: ISTAT, 2000.

In Corsica, according to the INSEE figures to 1996, 14.9 per 100 inhabitants are in a difficult economic situation, but in France, only 9.1 per 100. The existence of public transfers permits to alleviate the problem. In fact, public transfers (age pension, social subsidies) are very important in the insular economy (46% of the regional income against 34% as a national average). Corsica is the French region where social transfers are the highest.

Table 12
Poverty rate in Corsica

	Corsica	France
People covered by the National Fund of Solidarity	8,8	3,2
People who received the Minimum Income of Insertion	4,8	3,1
People in difficult economic situation	14,9	9,1

Rates are expressed per one hundred persons - Source: INSEE, 1996.

One of the most important problems linked with urban poverty is the existence of slums, with inappropriate housing and deficient infrastructure. This is most marked in Lisbon and its suburbs, where 250,000 people live in such degraded quarters, from whom 50,000 (20%) belong to ethnic communities of Africans, Indians, Timorese and Gypsies. As far as housing is concerned, conditions in the Lisbon metropolitan area have deteriorated during the last 30 years, especially for populations with lower resources. Lisbon, as a privileged development centre of Portugal, has attracted since the 1960s large numbers of immigrant workers, growing with decolonisation since the mid-1970s.

However, poverty has other expressions, including the absolute absence of dwellings. The figures about homelessness across the Irish border are indicative and interesting in this context. We have to highlight the astonishing differences in the radically differing approaches to "count" the homeless people in Northern Ireland and in the Republic of Ireland. This has had important consequences, as we will see in the following section.

Table 13
Official estimates of homelessness by geographical areas (Irish border)

County	Population	Numbers of homeless households
RoI, Border Region Total	257,507	26
NI, Border Region Total	335,225	1,983
Irish Border Area Total	592,732	2,009

Source: Simon Community, 1998: 36.

3.2.2. Poverty on the border

We have to express our reservations about the heterogeneity of poverty figures among localities again. However, the influence of the border on poverty in local societies has been targeted adequately in our research project. In this way, we have identified an Irish cross-border movement of homeless people, mostly from the South to Northern Ireland. Institutional interviews suggested that the main reason for the direction of movement is because it is easier to obtain state welfare benefits in Northern Ireland. People also move North in order to claim unemployment benefits and welfare support on both sides of the border simultaneously. However, this situation has changed since we started our research, thanks to a higher level of co-ordination

between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland in the field of social policy, inside the need of a single European social policy.

The border involves a gap between two sides. In fact, the accelerated process of integration in the EU is linked to the abolition of its internal borders and the reinforcement of the external borders, stimulating the perception of inequalities and contradictions. Another similar case, and very useful in the deeper investigation of this problem, is the Gorizia border. Poverty in Nova Gorica is a serious social problem, but border permeability after the rupture of old Yugoslavia creates this problem in Gorizia as well. We have here an interesting opportunity to learn about the role of the border in social dynamics, resulting from an important change in the recent past, and more new effects will be evident when the eventual integration of Slovenia in the E.U. shifts the border from external to internal. Yet we can use some elements in order to improve our knowledge now. The expectation of accession to the E.U. actually stimulates a wider relationship between Gorizia and Nova Gorica, less border control, relaxed communications, etc. Common history, cultural proximity, and an economic gap which is not excessive, contribute to those circumstances. The situation of Melilla and Nador (the Moroccan “twin city” of Melilla) is very different. There is no expectation to integrate into the E.U., there are evident differences in culture and religion, there is an economic abyss between the two towns. As a result, border controls are very strict, difficulties disrupt communications, exchanges are very asymmetric...

Poverty in Melilla has been often pointed out. The border around this first or last European City, depending on point of view, seems to be one of the main reasons to explain it. An agent approached there said a sentence that summarises how the border is seen in that locality: “On the border, there is not a wire fence, there is an abyss”. He was speaking about the gap between Melilla as a European city and the Rif area, the poorest one of Morocco. In fact, we can say that Melilla imports poverty in a literal sense. The ethnic homogeneity of newcomers distracts the attention and covers up the existence of older members of the same community who are more privileged; it also covers up the presence of people of similar conditions belonging to other communities. This suggests a generalised model of collective exclusion. With some reservations, we can point to a similar situation in Lisbon, where the immigration of sub-Saharan people generates a similar panorama. That is not so extensive, in relative terms, in a large city such as Lisbon, and the migrant population is heterogeneous. The case of Lesvos offers a third intermediate model to be considered.

3.3. Labour market “distortions” by peripherality

As already pointed out, social exclusion depends simultaneously on employment situation and the characteristics of social relations. It is consequently linked with types and levels of economic activity. In a given area, it is economic activity which directly influences the extent and the nature of employment supply. In a complementary and undoubtedly vaguer way, conditions of economic activity also influence to some extent the demand for jobs. This stems from labour mobility. When economic activity is booming in a given area, there are a lot of chances that labour power will move towards this area. Social relations are conditioned both by the capacity of a society to integrate the less favoured people and by its capacity to sustain economic dynamism which can create employment.

In the particular case of peripheral and border areas, we propose to analyse socio-economic conditions of exclusion on the basis of four types of considerations, which are linked with the treble peripherality previously noted. The first aspect of peripherality, the distance from the European development corridors, carries with it a limited potentiality of activity. In our research sites, that weakness of activity results mainly from the existence of the border that limits the extent of the surface of market. The second aspect of peripherality, the geographical position

close to the external European border, induces a strong influx of immigration and produces a supply of labour which does not automatically adapt to the labour market. The third aspect of peripherality is related to the weak level of development. This induces a socio-economic context that can not support economic dynamism. From this point of view, the nature of social relations on the one hand and the characteristics of economic regulation on the other, constitute two barriers to economic activity.

3.3.1. Constraints on economic exchange

The extent of the zone of exchange constitutes a decisive element of economic activity. It conditions at the same time the potential of demand and the conditions of cost of productive activity. The wider the zone is, the stronger the potential demand and the more important the quantities produced. The determination of the quantities, by the means of economies of scale, influences the unit costs of production. The more important the volume of production, the lower the average cost of production. Often, this fundamental economic law conditions the level of development of localities, affecting, as already pointed out, the third dimension of peripherality.

Obviously, barriers to exchanges characterize border areas. Tax or administrative constraints imposed on the movements of products logically reduce the potential width of the zone of exchange and thus degrade the conditions of profitability of economic activity. Besides, liberal economic logic considers that any obstacle to the free action of the economic agents, acts against economic growth. Within the framework of our research, it clearly appears that a negative border effect is exerted on the majority of the localities. However, according to the rigour of the checking points on the border, the restrictive effect is more or less strong. Only Corsica and Lisbon do not seem directly penalized by a border effect, but the existence of the sea can have an effect in terms of isolation. In any case, the cosmopolitanism of Lisbon and its political conditions counteract this possibility.

In the case of Lesbos, it has been pointed out that the creation of the border in 1922 cut the island off the coast of Minor Asia and isolated it from its traditional hinterland. All things being equal, the linkages of Lesbos with the Ottoman Empire historically coincided with the highest level of development of the island. The institution of a new hinterland corresponding to Greek space does not appear to offer the same opportunities. The interviews carried out on the island clearly showed that agents are positively oriented towards the idea of a larger economic opening towards Turkey. Such an opening could make of Lesbos a door towards the East, supporting exchanges of agricultural and light industrial products.

In the case of Ireland, we have noted that in the tumultuous history of this area, the existence of the border between the North and the South has involved control and limitation of the exchanges between the two zones following the partition of the island. The economic effects have been all the stronger since the border is long (340 km) and cuts many roads. However, we should recall that these effects have varied historically: weak at the beginning (1920s), they became stronger in the 1970s with the militarization of the border, and have weakened again in the 1990s with moves towards European integration and attempts to end the conflict.

In the case of Gorizia, the border effect can be also observed even if it has tended to attenuate and finally act in an almost positive way. Indeed, whereas during the cold war, the border between Italy and Yugoslavia was particularly hermetic, now, this border which separates Italy from the new Slovene State is more permeable. The volume of exchanges has become more important for quite a few trades between the two parts of the border. The disparity of development which characterizes the two border areas, a fruit of their own past, supports complementarity and economic dynamism.

In the case of Malaga and Melilla, especially the latter, the border effect is very marked. In Melilla, the presence of the border and controls, which it induces, limit the volume of the exchanges between the South of Spain and the African continent. From the point of view of the economic activity of Malaga and Melilla, the border thus produces a negative effect, partially limited in the case of Malaga by its condition as the capital of “Costa del Sol”. It does not generate a lot of movements to other parts of the world, more or less in the same way as in Lisbon. The border effect must be relativized by the fact that the countries of the African continent know relatively low levels of development. It is unclear whether the absence of a border would produce a dense flow of trade between the South of Spain and Africa and sustain additional economic activity in Malaga and Melilla. However, we can point to the negative incidence – particularly for Melilla – of the hardening of the border after the independence of Morocco, and, recently, by the reinforcement of controls and physical barriers after the integration of Spain into the E.U. The prospect for a free trade area in the Mediterranean in 2010 constitutes, from this point of view, an interesting source for thought for the two Spanish localities.

Finally, let us note that when the border areas show the characteristics of insularity, the economic handicap is doubled. Obstacles produced by the geographical context are added to the obstacles resulting from the control of exchanges. The islands suffer from a physical rupture with the continental zones and flows of exchanges between those and the big economic (continental) areas are necessarily more difficult. The constraint which weighs on the exchanges is due as much to the discontinuity of flows as to the high costs of transport. Corsica and Lesvos are obviously concerned with this physical limitation of the zone of the exchanges. In the case of Corsica, a system of territorial continuity was set up to limit the effects of insularity on the organization of transport with the French continent, but the effects of the maritime rupture are always felt. In the case of Lesvos, a lack of infrastructures for transport (both air and boat transport) makes the handicap of insularity more important.

It is noteworthy, that the case of Melilla presents some similarities with the previous ones. In fact, we can qualify its situation as “semi -insularity”, separated from the European continent by the sea, but located on land, in the African continent. The consequence is the physical separation from the EU mainland, but also the political and cultural separation from the African world, not only by the reinforced European frontier with it, but also by the existence of an economic “abyss” to the other side of border, as an interviewee said. In fact, the feeling of Melillian people is very similar to Corsican and Lesvian ones, and the economic disturbances of isolation with respect to the European continent are also similar.

3.3.2. Informal economy and illegal activity

There is a widespread informal economy along border localities under research. Economic interaction across borders reflects a need of local populations to continue their lives, and so, in spite of political decisions to settle borders, inhabitants cross them over for economic reasons, as well as social and cultural reasons.

Melilla is an indicative case of how the labour market takes a different shape thanks to the existence of a border. There is an avalanche of uncontrolled immigration towards the city. They are transient people who often wish to go to the core of Europe, seeking any kind of job. On the other hand, our fieldwork found out that each day between 35,000 and 60,000 people cross the border to earn a living through commerce and domestic services – the latter by women, mainly. But there is a third group settled in Melilla in a permanent way, increasing in different ethnic communities, particularly the so-called Muslim one.

Another border locality, Lesbos, shows clearly the influence of the border over the labour market. In the 19th century, there was seasonal migration both from and to Lesbos, a movement which took place mainly in order to support agricultural needs which varied in time and in terms of the labour required. So, for instance, there was a seasonal migration towards the mainland after the end of agricultural activities on the island (May -October), and another one towards Lesbos at the beginning and during the high season. This seasonal migration, which played a critical role in sustaining local economies, ceases to exist with the creation of the Turkish nation-state in 1923, the expulsion of the Christian communities from the lands of Asia Minor, and the constitution of a border between Greece and Turkey.

Commerce is a key element of the local economy in most of our research sites. The border often provides opportunities for profit from the interchange of goods and services, sometimes illegally. At the Irish border, and elsewhere, commerce has for decades taken the shape of smuggling. Besides smuggling, the public services sector and the army offer opportunities for commerce, due to the particular conditions of this area. The result is an increase in the tertiary sector, leading to economic growth that does not correspond to the classic pattern of economic development, which involved the transfer of people from agriculture to industry to meet the needs of modern industrial activity.

In brief, we have to highlight that labour markets on border localities suffer changes from both the supply and the demand side. Immigration, the high importance of services and the informal economy are clearly in the background if we want to provide any explanation. But it is not clear that unemployment was the result of the border, because each locality has a different level, connected in fact with the general condition of their national immediate hinterland. We can assume that the position in the edge gives some additional opportunities in this respect, if we recognize that figures show a little better situation. The case of Malaga in relation with Andalusia is indicative.

Within this context, it is easy to think about the consequences of labour market functioning in terms of exclusion. For example, with the necessary reservations, we can observe the restriction of economic prosperity and the present structural problems stimulating an increase and reproduction of important levels of long-term unemployment. On the other hand, we could consider that immigration provides an increasing workforce with low skills, though the local economies can not include it among the local workforce. These migrants stay “outside” of the regular labour market and society, as really excluded people. It is obvious that the high incidence of moonlighting in the majority of our research sites can be explained partly by the will of the employers to reduce the wage cost which they must bear. This extent is also related to the structure of the productive activity, since the underground economy expands especially from activities requiring a significant part of unqualified labourers. A strong presence in the local productive system of tourist activities (Malaga, Corsica), of agricultural activities (Malaga, Lesbos) or of activity of the building sector or infrastructural works (Lisbon, Corsica) supports the practice of moonlighting. One can also think that the practice of moonlighting is more important among immigrants than among local labourers.

3.3.3. Family, community and solidarity

In the analysis of the phenomenon of exclusion, the socio-economic context of the studied sites seems to constitute a negative factor. Indeed, for several reasons, this context does not seem able to support high economic activity and satisfactory integration of the populations on the labour market. More exactly, in the various studied sites, the socio-economic context is interesting according to two points of view: the nature of social relations and the nature of economic regulation. The nature of social relations produces a double effect on the phenomenon of social

exclusion. First, it conditions the way in which persons, and particularly those in material need, can be integrated in the overall organization of society. Thus, the social bond conditions the degree of loneliness of the most underprivileged populations. From this point of view, it was observed that the processes of exclusion are often more limited in the countries of Southern Europe, where the traditional forms of solidarity rest especially on the *family* and the *community* (Leontidou 1993, Oberti, 1996). To explain this fact, one can agree with Lagrée (1989), that when a person leaves school without qualifications, when (s)he is without work and without any real prospect for stabilization, the family is the last rampart to resist the growing threat of a durable exclusion. The character and attitudes of population permit different degrees of interaction and connections, ways of communication and support between peoples, etc. Not only the family, but also the community in general plays a positive role in this respect. In the opinion of some interviewees in Malaga and Melilla, exclusion is more limited in the South; but not poverty, of course.

The nature of social relations also conditions economic activity. Before resulting in a circulation of products or services, this activity is the result of a multitude of contacts and interpersonal relations. For this reason, commercial exchange has an undeniable social content. Even Adam Smith, who is considered as the father of liberalism, insisted on the capacity that the human beings have to show sympathy to one another; sympathy which is not reducible to pure altruism or to a disguised form of selfishness. From this idea, the nature of social relations prevailing within a society fashions the nature of the economic relations that it produces. A good illustration of this can be found in the analysis of regional economic disparities. One can thus notice that the most economically advanced areas show more participation in community activities than those which are poorer. In a more precise way, the work carried out by Putnam (1993) showed that the civic community is more developed in the prosperous North than in the relatively poor South. This work also shows that in the North the civic community is characterized by social structures which overlap: persons belong typically to several associations, and inside each one of them the interpersonal relations tend to being weak. Conversely, civic engagement is more limited in the South, where co-operation is generally founded on strong personal relations. One can consider that individualism promotes growth, not by questioning the social relations but rather, by weakening them and by diversifying them. Strong relations founded on blood ties support the co-operation within small groups, whereas weak relations which connect persons with any biological relations between them allow broader co-operation and encourage greater social complexity.

As regards the phenomenon of social exclusion in border areas, this question of social relations must be tackled by distinguishing two angles of approach. It is advisable to examine the nature of these relations as they relate to populations located on the same side of the border, and as they relate to populations located on different sides.

Social relations across the border

A border often limits relations between the populations which it separates. However, this is in itself ambivalent, as for example, in the Irish case. The conflict between the Catholic and Protestant communities in the North is an additional dimension that has to be negotiated when seeking to develop cross-border commercial ties. This constrains the potential for trade and exchange but does not necessarily reduce the level of economic activity, as there are many instances of Catholic-Protestant collaboration in trade across the border.

In the case of Gorizia, the border did not always have a negative effect on the relations between the separate communities. Especially during the recent period, the border checkpoints were relaxed. In addition, as clearly revealed in the interviews carried out within the border area,

the cohabitation between the majority Italian and the minority Slovene population is characterized by a high degree of collaboration and respect. This good agreement between the communities is likely to facilitate the initiatives over the border. An obvious cultural affinity also exists between Corsica and Italy. However, this seems insufficient, compared to the factors of economic disparity (organization of the systems of distribution and transport, productive structures) and inadequate institutional structures to support numerous exchanges between the island and Italy.

Melilla and Lesvos offer another case to consider. Borders divide two different cultural, political and economic worlds with a shared past, but now often in conflictual situations. Communities on both sides of the border need to communicate for different reasons, but physical, political and psychological barriers create difficulties. These circumstances produce tensions, which are resolved in different ways, according to the particular conditions in each instance, ranging from co-operation and stimulating friendship to hostility, passing through reciprocal ignorance. Obviously, economic activity, commercial exchanges, etc., affect the development possibilities in this contradictory situation. In addition, the characteristics of the hinterland stimulate the access of people belonging in communities external to the area – for example, in the case of Melilla, people from Algeria and sub-Saharan Africa crossing Morocco to arrive to the E.U. via Melilla. However, this could be an opportunity to organize modern policies of common development, if social and political agents discover the best way to work on both sides of the border.

Social relations on the one side of the border

As regards the social relations existing on only one side of the border, it should be noted that, overall, the case studies do not show characteristics compatible with the emergence of a dynamic economic environment. Two complementary comments can be stated in support of this assessment.

First of all, in the majority of areas that we studied, social relations within the local populations seem strongly marked by family or friendship relations, especially since all of these areas, except Ireland, are located at the south of Europe. These types of relationships are not conducive to opening and supporting a dynamic economic environment. In the Irish case, the situation north of the border is marked by the coexistence of two communities which refuse to interweave (two-community system). In the south, in general, social conditions are not marked by this community dichotomy, and so seem more open and receptive to rational economic requirements (single community system). In the case of Malaga and Melilla, the scattering of families between the two sites, far from constituting a factor of social impoverishment, could constitute a favourable element to sustaining exchange networks. However, the particular social organization of Melilla involves several ethnic communities (Christian, Hebrew, Hindi, Muslim, Gypsy) which usually interact without difficulty, but not without prejudices. The arrival of migrants from Morocco increases the Muslim community, creates problems of accommodation and, particularly, of legal regulation. The migrants from Algeria and Sub-Saharan Africa (as well as other origins) present different adaptations.

Secondly, relations between the local populations and the immigrants often lack cohesion and sometimes show a strong antagonism or even racism underneath an apparently tolerant treatment. Thus, in Lesvos, it was noted in interviews that, even if relations between the local population and the immigrant population are perceived as generally very good, certain reservations are expressed, as seasonal workers are often treated with suspicion. We found a historical cleavage between the parts North and South of the island, inhabited, respectively, by populations of Turkish origin and populations of Greek origin. In the past, a cultural border between the two populations slowed down the economic exchanges between the two parts of the

island. Also in the case of Corsica, populations of foreign origin are not well integrated in the cities and are often cut off from the Corsican society.

Here, the diversity of origin of the populations and the permanent or temporary character of their presence compose populations with different cultural characteristics, which make social relations among them complex and marked by conflict. The great heterogeneity of the immigrant population in Lisbon, Lesvos, Malaga, Melilla and Gorizia, is not conducive to a social environment favourable for economic activity without adequate political measures. A similar assessment can be expressed by considering the importance of the populations which stay for short periods in the cities considered. Let us recall that border towns are often doors of entry to Europe, and numerous immigrants plan to continue their route inside the country or towards the European continent.

4. Project Results at the “Community” level: Comparison of experiences of spatial exclusion

This chapter systematizes project results and findings about the border and social exclusion by a transversal reading of the 1st and the 2nd Annual Reports, with an emphasis on the *community* / spatial / local level rather than the *target-group* level. We expand on the level of spatial exclusion, which complements social exclusion experiences discussed in the following Chapter 5. It is shown that not all border localities, but in fact all the islands stress, to varying degrees of intensity, social exclusion at the *community* level, a sort of *spatial* exclusion. This is related to culture and politics (Ireland), or to the reproduction of core -periphery dependence or internal -colonial relations with the national centre (Corse), which can be masked in ambiguity (Lesvos). These are discussed comparatively in this chapter, and consolidated into a set of typologies.

4.1. Culture and politics -related dimensions

In this section we offer a general comparative perspective on how ethnicity, religion and community impact representations of social exclusion in the six localities. As in the rest of the project, our comparative framework here recognises that multiple local narratives cannot easily be brought together into a single, grand, over -arching account. In our comparative approach, differences, discrepancies and disjunctures within and between the six localities are considered to be as relevant and as meaningful as similarities.

Another point is worth stressing before we discuss the case material. As an analytical tool social exclusion assumes the existence of at least two categories of people: the excluded and the non-excluded. Social exclusion thus implies a definition of membership in and belonging to a group. Any analysis of representations of social *exclusion* should recognise the spatial metaphor implicit in the term. Being socially excluded or included presumes being without or within some social construction, which we can refer to as “community”. A community is more a self -willed subjective process than a substantive sociological “object”, and it exists insofar as its members maintain it through the manipulation and negotiation of meanings and symbols which mark its boundaries (Cohen 1982, 1986). Thus, if the concept of social exclusion presupposes that of community, the concept of community entails that of boundary. The boundary between the excluded and non -excluded may be seen as more or less permeable, depending on how easy it is to cross it. The degree of permeability of a boundary depends on the way it is constructed, namely on the markers employed to define it. For analytical purposes, we suggest that boundary markers can be arranged on a continuum, with those that are easy to cross at one end, and those difficult to cross or ignore at the other. The most permeable pole can be referred to as a “boundary doorway” and the least permeable as a “boundary fence”, as illustrated in Figure 1.




Figure 1: Boundary markers of community belonging

To the left of the continuum in Figure 1, the markers set a limit which can easily be lowered or raised, or passed over by individuals. For instance, to become a member of certain clubs, a minimum income may be required (e.g. certain credit cards). Thus people may or may not be entitled to membership because of their earnings. Such 'doorway markers' of belonging may either be changed (in order to include / exclude people), or met by individuals whose income has increased. Moreover, individuals may be arranged according to their relative "distance" from the boundary: once the boundary of the community has been set, it is relatively easy to assess how far individuals are from it. In contrast, the markers to the right of the continuum are more difficult to change or to cross. These markers clearly distinguish between members and non-members, and allow for little further differentiation within these categories: you are either a member or you are not. From the viewpoint of those who identify with them (those 'within the fence'), fence markers tend to override all other forms of identification. They are seen as absolute, and systematically underestimate internal differences (among members) while overestimating external ones (between members and non members).

Data gathered on representations of social exclusion in the six localities suggest that these two poles of permeability and impermeability broadly map on to a distinction that we make throughout this chapter between *social* and *cultural* markers of community boundaries. Social markers reflect the internal complexity and diversity of a community: to define people with a less-than-average income, or those affected by unemployment, poverty, handicap or gender discrimination as socially excluded usually implies that these people should be part of the community but have not yet been fully integrated into it. Their 'distance' from the community boundary can be determined, and the marker sets what we have called a "boundary doorway": people may slip through it, thereby becoming socially excluded, but they may also re-enter and be re-integrated back into the community. In these cases, policies to tackle social exclusion follow more or less directly from the definition: people on low income should receive financial assistance and welfare benefits, drug addicts should be rehabilitated and so on. In contrast, cultural markers of social exclusion are less likely to translate into pragmatic or efficient policies: this is because they establish a boundary fence, which clearly delineates 'us' from 'them' with little possibility of movement between these categories. This culturally -marked type of social exclusion rests on differences between people that cannot easily be tackled by social policies that work on the basis of graded difference. In other words, while social differences (when seen as forms of social exclusion) are set on a gradient and thus have different levels of intensity (one can be more or less poor, more or less discriminated against by age or gender, even more or less addicted), cultural differences are mostly conceived of as absolute. To be Christian or Muslim, an Italian or Slovenian speaker, Protestant or Catholic, Greek or Kurd are generally seen as on-off categories which allow for nothing "in between". It is hard to formulate an appropriate policy to tackle social exclusion if it has been defined in terms of, say, religious belonging. If one is perceived as socially excluded because one is a Muslim or Protestant or ethnically non-Italian, what really can be done about it?

While social exclusion defined in terms of social characteristics (such as age, gender, and income) may leave some space for solutions, when it is perceived in strictly cultural terms it may become a barrier between people and groups which is difficult or impossible to remove other than by advocating multiculturalism and accepting the cultural complexity of the locality. In peripheral and border localities, where cultural difference is commonly seen as an everyday marker of identity, and where it is frequently charged with political implications in addition to any association it might have with social exclusion, the room for a multiculturalist framework for society may be limited. Indeed, in border areas cultural diversity may be loaded with additional political meaning: within the national discourse the very presence of the cultural Other in such settings may be seen as a threat to the integrity of nation and state. Hence ethnic, cultural or religious differences have been looked at with great suspicion in these areas. From the viewpoint

of 'centres', cultural and ethnic homogeneity at the border has been perceived as a national objective in order to create a 'sound' sense of national belonging. In this section of the report we want to draw attention to the emphasis given by many of our interviewees to these cultural and ethnic dimensions of social exclusion, since they clearly identify these aspects of social exclusion as the most problematic.

In this chapter, then, we suggest that it is crucial to distinguish between social and cultural markers of social exclusion: while the former are perceived as gradual and more or less responsive to policies designed to address them, the latter are frequently seen as absolute and unchangeable.

4.2. The border as limit and locale: Exclusion and difference

We begin by noting that the six study localities can be divided into two main categories according to the nature of the research that was undertaken there. The first category includes the fieldwork localities which *straddle* a political or physical border – Northern Ireland / Republic of Ireland, Gorizia / Nova Gorica and Malaga / Melilla, in a different sense, because here the Alboran sea is not the political border; while the second one consists of the localities *bounded* by a political or physical border (Lesvos, Lisbon, and Corsica). Thus, while fieldwork in Ireland was routinely concerned with different perceptions and representations of the border on both of its sides, fieldwork on Lesvos was primarily concerned with the situation on the island itself and not with the views of people living and working further afield. Similarly, while different views on social exclusion between people from Malaga and Melilla were documented, for Corsica we concentrated mainly on the perceptions of Corsicans themselves (about themselves, about others, and about what they feel or imagine to be others' perception of them). In these latter cases the border frames the limits of the investigation, whereas in the former it is by default a variable whose relevance has to be assessed through investigation since it may vary from locale to locale. It is in context of this difference between 'transborder' and 'bounded' field sites that we outline the role of culture, ethnicity and religious difference in perceiving social exclusion.

In this section we address two related but separate questions in an effort to determine across the six localities what people take to be the relationship between, and the relative significance of, the different factors which they say result in social exclusion:

- a) Who is said to be excluded within each locality?
- b) Does the locality under scrutiny feel itself *excluded as a locality*?

The discussion suggests that it is useful to distinguish between three types of exclusion:

1. Individual exclusion acknowledged on the basis of social markers
2. Community exclusion acknowledged on the basis of cultural and / or ethnic markers
3. Regional exclusion acknowledged on the basis of social and / or cultural markers.

We begin by considering how individual and community exclusion are represented in terms of social and cultural markers respectively.

4.2.1. Social and cultural markers

Ethnic and cultural differences play a major role in the representation of social exclusion throughout the six localities, as we shall see below. It seems that on Lesvos the processes which generate exclusion are not particular to the island. On Lesvos exclusion operates according to rules which apply more generally in Greece, something in striking contrast to the situation in Ireland and Malaga / Melilla, where locality is not just the setting for social exclusion, but acts as

a determining factor of the way in which social exclusion is perceived and lived. On Lesbos, cultural differences and ethnicity are key factors in assessing who is excluded. All the interviewees agree that the excluded groups fall into six categories (Leontidou et al. 2000: 32). While the last four of these categories (pensioners, handicapped, unemployed and drug addicts) are directly related to specific social conditions rather than to differences of culture, the first two categories associate exclusion with cultural difference: thus Albanian immigrants and 'Gypsies' are deemed to be excluded insofar as they are 'different'. This interpretation of social exclusion in cultural terms is apparent in the 'ambiguity' locals feel towards these migrants. Locals usually express sympathy towards migrants, although this feeling is tempered by a fear that they will settle permanently on Lesbos. As long as the island is just a stepping stone on the way to mainland Greece, locals can be sympathetic to migrants because they do not see them as rivals. In this respect, the categorisation of immigrants as socially excluded is the best way to ensure their transient status. Should they not be seen as socially excluded, the local population would face the dilemma of having to do something to better integrate them into the local social fabric. Since they are excluded, they are not dangerous, and locals can even pity and feel sorry for them. We suggest that this is a common attitude in allegedly marginal areas. Sympathy for marginalised people reinforces self-confidence and prestige within the local community (we are better than those who live at the centre, since we do not hate foreigners), as well as offering a safeguard against the blurring of cultural differences (since they are just transient, and will not settle here). Compassion and understanding towards the Other is thus the best way to maintain them as such. The role of so-called Gypsies seems to confirm this point. Although thought of as excluded, the local Lesbos Chamber of Commerce made a big issue out of the creation of a clearly marked site for Gypsies to sell their goods. At the same time, exclusion of the Other is a confirmation of community cohesion and unity. To a certain extent, exclusion as difference is required to mark sameness within the local community.

In Lisbon the decisive role of cultural markers of social exclusion is explicitly stated. Among different causes of social exclusion, the first to be listed is cultural and ethnic difference (Leontidou et al. 2000: 76). In the words of one interviewee: "anything other than the normal pattern leads to social exclusion". In Lisbon, the list of excluded groups (Leontidou et al. 2000: 78) is led by emigrants from the former Portuguese colonies, followed by the gypsy minority (exactly as in Lesbos). Not surprisingly, these groups seem to play the very same role as their counterparts play on Lesbos, namely confirmation of the community boundary. The same 'ambiguous' attitude towards migrants is also evident in interviewee statements in both places. Yet while in Lesbos sympathy for migrants is directly linked to their being in transit, Portugal is not a temporary stop-over on the way to other countries. Hence cultural difference is associated with poverty, and there seems to be almost a necessary link between cultural difference, poverty and social exclusion, in which social exclusion is a dependent variable of poverty, which in turn is mainly dependent on cultural or ethnic difference. In this case the relation between cultural or ethnic difference and social exclusion is mediated by poverty. Thus while on Lesbos social exclusion may be a direct function of cultural diversity, in Lisbon poverty acts as the linking factor between diversity and exclusion. Formalising this relation, we could say that if

- a) Social exclusion = f (poverty) and
- b) poverty = f (ethnicity), then by replacing 'poverty' in a) according to the definition in b), we could say that in Lisbon
- c) social exclusion = f (f (ethnicity)).

This formula means that social exclusion in Lisbon is not a direct function of ethnicity, rather it is an indirect one, i.e. a function of a function.

In Corsica the situation is somewhat different. Cultural difference seems to play less of a role in determining social exclusion, though we cannot rule out the possibility that this may depend on

the particular perspective of those interviewed. Of fourteen people, only two (the representative of STC [Sindacatu di i Travagliadori Corsi] and a local nationalist politician) stressed the cultural specificity of Corsica in relation to French national culture. However, interviewees were generally agreed about one characteristic that is directly associated with a sense of social exclusion of the whole island, namely cultural stereotypes Frenchmen still hold about Corsicans, stereotypes with which most Corsicans do not identify. We shall discuss this point in more detail in the next section, which deals with the spatial dimension of social exclusion.

According to our data, the excluded on Corsica are perceived mostly in social terms (lack of education or financial support), although we should add that one interviewee mentioned a possible source of social exclusion directly related to cultural difference. This cultural form of social exclusion concerns people living in areas with an identity not accepted by the State, namely areas where many elderly people are relatively unfamiliar with the official national language (French) and who, as a result of their cultural difference, experience isolation. The cultural dimension of social exclusion is thus not entirely absent on Corsica and might have been given greater emphasis by a different set of interviewees.

The remaining three localities are best analysed separately, because unlike the field sites considered above, these three each straddle a border. In the discussion below we consider to what extent the presence of the border inflects perceptions of ethnic and cultural exclusion on each of its sides. Gorizia / Nova Gorica seems to be the most straightforward case, in so far as the border between Slovenia and Italy establishes a distinct divide between two very different representations of social exclusion. On the Slovenian side, exclusion from the mainstream is mostly conceived in social terms. The large-scale social reorganisation of the Slovenian economy has brought about a brand-new phenomenon, unemployment, which is generally considered to be the main source of social exclusion. On the Italian side, although social factors may be referred to by interviewees, they are nonetheless mostly interpreted in cultural or ethnic terms:

People coming from elsewhere are often accepted reluctantly, for reasons connected to work or housing. Locals believe they take resources away from them. For this reason *fighting social exclusion means stopping to consider people who are not from Gorizia as strangers*, guests, and not full citizens. *The presence of different cultures is a serious problem that schools cannot tackle, owing to the many prejudices of the population* (Leontidou et al. 2000: 162, emphasis added).

This quotation reveals a feature shared by many of the localities where cultural difference is stressed: cultural difference is regarded as a source of social exclusion irrespective of the actual social conditions of those marked by that difference. In this respect, the presence of different cultures is seen less as a resource than a problem. It is worth noting that out of 4077 foreigners staying in Gorizia in 1998, 1699 (41.6%) came from Slovenia or Croatia and almost two thirds, that is 2514 people (61.66%), came from the area of the Former Yugoslav Confederation, i.e. an area historically connected to the easternmost Italian region (these figures draw on data presented in Leontidou et al. 2000: 176-7). Although nothing new, cultural difference – once read in the light of social exclusion – is seen as something that must be dealt with.

In Malaga / Melilla we see again how the two sides of the border define social exclusion in distinctive ways. In both cases, answers to the question “who is socially excluded?” focus on a few categories, mainly immigrants. Yet in Malaga interviewees identify a very long sequence of other groups in social terms (homeless, unemployed people, homosexuals and so on), while in Melilla people seem to stick to the cultural dimension of exclusion, stressing the religious divide between immigrants (mostly Muslim) and the others (Leontidou et al. 2000: 113). If we take into consideration the factors which interviewees identified as leading to exclusion, the difference between Malaga and Melilla becomes even clearer. While in Malaga there are many possibilities, most of them connected to economic conditions, in Melilla the number of factors deemed

responsible for social exclusion is not only shorter, but revolve around two sets of features. The first is still economic, but the second one is clearly cultural and political: with the border as a source of exclusion, Melilla is seen as a wall regulating access to the EU. Thus while in Malaga any person might be excluded because of specific features (for instance, by being a homosexual or a drug addict) independently of other dimensions of their social identity, in Melilla the concept of social exclusion always points to the Muslim community, invoking precisely the sense of unalterability we mentioned earlier. The main difference between the two localities lies in the fact that in Malaga social exclusion is understood as a heterogeneous phenomenon, which can affect anyone, while in Melilla social exclusion is chiefly an attribute of the Muslim community. In Melilla there is thus a cultural (religious) determinant of social exclusion, as the following passage illustrates:

This difference in the social exclusion model is the reflection of two different models of society, namely the individualistic one and the dual one. In an individualistic society such as Malaga, the social status is understood as an outcome of personal circumstances, because there is not enough equality of opportunities for everyone. This social exclusion could be described as probabilistic. On the other hand, in a dual society like Melilla, this social exclusion could be described as “quasi -deterministic”: only one attribute common among a lot of people makes exclusion very probable between them, in this case, *inequality and difference are confused* (Leontidou et al. 2000: 134).

This distinction between an individualistic and a dual society maps onto the contrast we have been making here between social and cultural markers of exclusion. Social markers are “heterogeneous” in the sense that they are apparently unrelated to one another, they reflect different forms of social exclusion: lack of education, unemployment, gender discrimination, or low income. Cultural markers like language or religion are variously evaluated according to context: in some contexts they may be seen as an asset, in other contexts as a stigma or liability. In the sense that they may readily be used as *labels* to classify people as socially excluded, cultural markers are “quasi -deterministic” features of social exclusion. Indeed, cultural difference may be enough by itself to identify one as socially excluded, irrespective of the presence or absence of other factors, as if difference automatically implied inequality. We will consider later if and how cultural and social markers may be ranked in assessing social exclusion. The question we want to raise at this point is whether or not the presence of some markers automatically entails the presence of others. Cultural markers of exclusion may be so effectively emphasised that they subsume all other excluding factors (such as unemployment, disability, etc).

The distinction between an individualistic and a dual model of society can be applied to our other study localities. In Ireland, for example, the northern side of the border is predominantly seen in terms of a dual society model, while along the southern part of the border an individualistic model prevails:

The opinion prevailing among social workers and ordinary people alike is that the Protestants and Catholics along the border's northern edge are far from being integral elements of one community; though dwelling side -by-side, the lives they live are largely back -to-back. In contrast, the 'community' south of the border is conceived of as being generally homogeneous, faced with the problems of exclusion familiar in other European societies, in which religious or sectarian separation are rarely an issue (2nd Annual Report, section 3.3, p. 20). (Leontidou et al. 2000: 51).

The Irish border is possibly the clearest case of how cultural and religious differences may be emphasised or played down in relation to the border and social exclusion. Among the three transborder field sites, the Irish borderland is in many respects the most homogeneous, and many structural features can easily be identified to show that the border areas of Northern Ireland and the Republic share more with one another than they do with the hinterlands of their respective states. This structural homogeneity sets the Irish borderland apart from the other two transborder

localities, namely Gorizia / Nova Gorica and Malaga / Melilla, which display wider social, political and geographical differences within themselves.

Notwithstanding their similarities, the border areas of Ireland are very different when it comes to the significance that they attribute to ethnic and cultural difference. In other words, though Irish interviewees mention similar social and cultural features when talking about social exclusion, the emphasis they give to these differs depending on which side of the border they live. What is stressed on one side may be underplayed on the other, although the real difference between the two sides may be minimal. We can offer an example of this point: in Northern Ireland Protestants are a majority, yet they are a minority along the border itself, and their numbers are decreasing. In the Republic, Catholics are now the overwhelming majority, but for decades Protestants were present in large numbers along the border counties where, immediately after partition of the island in the 1920s, they accounted for more than 20 per cent of the local population. Thus along the border areas on both sides the Protestant population has been gradually dwindling, yet this demographic decline has been interpreted in opposite ways on each side. In the south nobody seems to have been concerned with what is regarded as almost a 'natural' event, while in the north it is considered a possible source of social exclusion. The different relevance given to religious difference north and south is evident once we examine what social workers and the general population identify as the causes of social exclusion. In the south religion is rarely an issue, and people generally emphasise what we have called the social markers of social exclusion (unemployment, drug-addiction, homelessness and so on), while in the north religious difference is always the overriding concern. Consequently, as far as social exclusion is concerned, being north or south of the border implies a distinctive overall approach: in the south 'social' categories and models of social exclusion (based on the individualistic model of society) dominate, while in the north social exclusion is readily assimilated and subsumed under the category of 'cross-community relations' (i.e. relations between Catholics and Protestants), and is generally conceived of as the marginalisation or isolation of people from *one of two* communities (the dualistic model). In short, it is a categorical rather than a personal exclusion.

In the next section we shall deal with the complex way in which the 'dual society' interacts with the spatial dimension of exclusion, but first something must be said about how religious difference in the north sets up a political paradox in relation to the representation of who is excluded. The dual society model encourages people in Northern Ireland to think of the Other as socially excluded insofar as the Other is of a different religion. At the same time, the recognition of the exclusion of the Other helps to uphold the religious divide. Exclusion of the Other and the Other's religious difference are mutually reinforcing. There seems to be a positive feedback between perception of religious difference, representations of social exclusion and policies to tackle exclusion: the more social exclusion is defined in terms of religious difference (you are excluded *because* you belong to a different religious community), the more social policies strive to implement specific services for the people excluded in this way, by providing them with separate schools, hospitals, counselling agencies and so on. Yet the provision of segregated assistance to Catholics and Protestants reinforces the sense of mutual exclusion based on religious difference. For instance, specifically Catholic services may be introduced if local agencies believe that Catholics cannot take advantage of existing services because of their religion. Protestants in their turn may then feel excluded from these 'new' Catholic services. This positive loop linking religious difference to social exclusion and intensified by social policy is illustrated in Figure 2.




Figure 2. Feedback between religion and social exclusion in Northern Ireland

As one social worker noted:

When you speak about social exclusion, then you have to say from what society. If we talk about Northern Ireland officially in some way, then we can say that nationalist people have been excluded from Northern Ireland. If, however, we look at what I believe are the two societies here, the two communities in here, or two communities in one society, I don't mind how you want to call it, then it will seem to me that the Catholic nationalist ethos, culture, history, identity, is excluded from the Protestant, unionist, community. But equally well the other way round, and this is important... (Leontidou et al. 2000: 58).

We have quoted this passage because by opposing 'official Northern Ireland' to 'the two societies' the social worker seems to be making an explicit reference to our opposition between individualistic and dual communities. He also seems aware of the paradox this opposition raises in relation to social exclusion. If the two communities are mutually exclusive because of a religious divide which cannot be mediated (there is nothing 'in between' being Catholic or Protestant), how can they possibly cope with social exclusion?

In the Republic, as we have already noted, religious or political difference is usually underplayed as a source of social exclusion. The Others in this case (the homeless or unemployed, ex-offenders, the less able) still lie within the margins of the community, and need 'only' be fully reintegrated into it. Protestants there are not regarded as socially excluded because of their religion. In the following section we examine the relationship between social exclusion and the locality as a whole.

4.2.2. Spatial dimension

Having considered representations of exclusion within the six localities, we now consider to what extent the localities themselves are regarded as excluded by virtue of their geographical location. As we shall see, not all localities evince clear signs of this 'regional' form of social exclusion.

When stressing the peripherality of the island, interviewees from Corsica refer to the distance between Corsica and the centres of decision-making in Paris. While this isolation may lead to the exclusion of Corsica because of economic reasons connected to the increasing integration of the EU, this economic border is often translated into a cultural one. Corsicans define themselves and their way of life in contrast to the big towns of northern France. The Corsican way of life is regarded locally as more pleasant, yet how it is seen externally, particularly by the French press, is a source of misunderstanding. According to many interviewees, the media choose to show what the 'mainland' French think about the island. They tend to show the more stereotypical features of Corsican culture, like violence and lack of public spiritedness, systematically overlooking

those Corsican people who want to create and develop the island economy. This image 'from the centre' may seriously harm the development of the island, further contributing to the economic isolation of Corsica. Thus in this case economic isolation risks being reinforced by a metropolitan prejudice related to cultural difference, and may lead to the exclusion of the whole island.

Irish border counties are faced with a more complex situation in terms of culturally -related forms of isolation and exclusion. In the south the research did not record instances of perceived exclusion, isolation or marginalisation of the border counties or the whole Republic from any 'centre', be it within the island or elsewhere (European Union). In contrast, in the north the perceived exclusion of the whole area was stressed by many interviewees. It is important to note that both Protestants and Catholics, although from thoroughly divergent viewpoints, share a common image of Northern Ireland *in its entirety* as an area of exclusion and marginalisation. In Northern Ireland the centre is represented by the capital city of the state or, more broadly, by England. What really sets Northern Ireland apart as a place of exclusion is a double border, with Great Britain on the one hand, and with the Republic of Ireland on the other. Protestants and Catholics hold contrasting interpretations of which is the 'natural' and which the 'artificial' border (Leontidou et al. 2000: 67-8), yet for both communities the isolation generated by these borders entails social exclusion of the whole region.

A sense of 'regional exclusion' also characterises Malaga/Melilla. People from Malaga, though they share memories of the geographical isolation of the city in the past, have now no perception of their locale as isolated or marginalised. In contrast, interviewees in Melilla often make reference to a widespread feeling of isolation and distance from the Spanish centre. Although some would distinguish between the geographical isolation of Melilla and its alleged exclusion (as in Lesbos, see below), others talk of the connection between these two dimensions: Melilla is geographically isolated *and* excluded from the Spanish welfare society. As one interviewee commented: "Living in Melilla is like living on an island". In the other localities things are, in this respect, less clear. In some cases a feeling of isolation is sharply distinguished from social exclusion, while in others this spatial dimension is barely apparent.

In Lesbos, interviewees make an important distinction between isolation and exclusion:

At no point was it considered that the *local community itself* may be subject to exclusion from the mainland. In other words, it was never suggested that the island's exclusion may run parallel to group exclusion at local level. *Isolation* is deemed different from social *exclusion*, this subtlety is worth retaining for further research (Leontidou et al. 2000: 38).

People in Lesbos may feel they are isolated because of the marginal position of the island, and because the border with Turkey does not encourage relations to the east, thus further hindering the economic development of the island. Although some interviewees suggest that things may be worse in other areas of Greece, distance from the mainland and especially from Athens, combined with the collapse of economic exchange with Turkey since the 1920s, generate a sense of isolation and the perception that more could be done about that. Yet no direct connection whatsoever is made by the islanders between this isolation and social exclusion, something which bears direct comparison to the other localities. Corsica and Ireland offer a useful test of the correlation between isolation and exclusion, since the former displays both isolation and (a perceived risk of) exclusion, while the latter suggests another combination, where – at least to a certain extent – isolation and exclusion are merged.

In Lisbon, this spatial dimension of exclusion is not much stressed and refers only to the opposition between Portugal and other European countries. That is, there is no evidence that Lisbon feels excluded in relation to other areas of Portugal, yet the uneven development between northern and southern Europe may suggest that Portugal is a peripheral area opposed to a European centre. As one interviewee said: "The centre of Europe is more and more far away from

Portugal [...] we are in the periphery of an empire [...] increasingly further away from the centre” (Leontidou et al. 2000: 89). However, in this case this centre/periphery opposition is apparently conceived in economic rather than in spatial terms.

In Gorizia/ Nova Gorica the situation is different a gain. Neither the Italian nor the Slovenian side of the border shows any evidence of feeling excluded in their entirety. People in Gorizia do not think of themselves as marginalised or isolated from Italian society and culture, and mostly see the local border as an opportunity. The same is true for Nova Gorica. People there consider their proximity to Italy as a chance to find a better job and a suitable way out of the unemployment endemic to the region.

4.3. Ethnicity, religion, conflictual cultures and the diverse perceptions of social exclusion

4.3.1. General remarks

Although the relationship between culture, ethnicity and social exclusion in the six localities is complex, in this section we endeavour to sketch out some tentative generalisations. Table 14 summarises our findings in relation to the three forms of exclusion distinguished earlier, namely those based on social, cultural and spatial factors.

In the column ‘social and cultural factors’, Table 14 indicates the relative relevance of cultural (C) compared to social (S) factors. Thus “ $C > S$ ” should be understood as ‘cultural factors are given prominence in assessing who is excluded’, while “ $C < S$ ” refers to a situation where ‘prominence is given to social factors’. This column can also be read as an answer to the question we raised earlier, about who is socially excluded within each locality, since it distinguishes those localities which represent exclusion in individual terms ($C < S$) from those where community exclusion predominates ($C > S$).

Table 14: Social, cultural and spatial dimensions of social exclusion

LOCALITY	SOCIAL AND CULTURAL FACTORS	SPATIAL FACTORS
Lesvos	$C > S$	$I > E$
Lisbon	$C > S$	$I < E$
Corsica	$C < S$	$I < E$
R.of Ireland	$C < S$	—
N.Ireland	$C > S$	$I + E$
Malaga	$C < S$	—
Melilla	$C > S$	$I < E$
Gorizia	$C > S$	—
N. Gorica	$C < S$	—

The third column ('spatial factors') refers to the spatial dimension of exclusion: does the locality feel excluded in its entirety from other places? In this case, a perception of geographical isolation (I) may be present without any feeling of social or cultural exclusion (E) of the whole locality, or the two may combine together, or be absent. Thus in this column "I > E" indicates a locality with a sense of geographical isolation, but one where there is no sense of exclusion of the whole community; "I < E" represents those localities which feel socially and culturally excluded but not necessarily geographically isolated; and "I+E" refers to a situation where isolation and exclusion merge to reinforce each other. Localities which perceive themselves to be neither geographically isolated nor socially or culturally excluded are indicated by a dash in this column.

Generally, we may say that cultural difference and ethnicity are prominent factors for determining social exclusion, i.e. for establishing who is excluded within each locality. Wherever present, cultural diversity was repeatedly mentioned by interviewees as a central factor leading to social exclusion, irrespective of the presence of any other considerations. Thus immigrants were always regarded as excluded if they were seen as culturally distinct from the indigenous population. This holds true for all six localities with the exception of Corsica, where immigration (mostly from the Maghreb) still retains its rural characteristics (Leontidou et al. 2000: 139) and where the institutional interviews did not probe this issue. Nonetheless, cultural difference is relevant on Corsica too, although in a distinctive manner. While other localities make use of cultural differences to pinpoint who is excluded within the locality, Corsicans appear to relate cultural factors of exclusion to the spatial dimension: 'we' on the island feel excluded because 'they' (Frenchmen) present a stereotypical image of us. In this case (stereotypical) cultural differences play a role in creating a sense of exclusion of the whole locality. Thus in one way or another, in all localities culture is seen as a cardinal factor in determining social exclusion.

Yet for our transborder field sites the situation is more complex. In each of these cases there is a clear contrast between the way cultural and ethnic differences are played out on one side of the border compared to the other. The general pattern sees one side of the border stressing ethno-cultural diversity as a source of exclusion, with the other side underplaying this factor. Thus in Malaga, Nova Gorica and the Republic of Ireland social exclusion is thought of mainly in social terms, affecting mostly individuals according to an 'individualistic' model, while in Melilla, Gorizia and Northern Ireland social exclusion is readily linked to cultural diversity, following a 'dual society' model.

Something more should now be said about the 'third column' of Table 14, i.e. the spatial dimension of social exclusion. The six localities offer a wide range of perspectives along the axis isolation/exclusion of the whole local community, though in considering them it is still useful to maintain the distinction between our transborder field sites and those bounded by a border. In what we called the 'bounded' communities (Lesvos, Lisbon, Corsica) isolation and exclusion are likely to be kept separate. In Lesvos the feeling of geographical isolation of the whole community does not lead to any perception of exclusion from the national centre, while in Lisbon the opposite seems to apply: although generally not isolated, people in Lisbon feel a sense of exclusion from the centre, when the 'centre' is defined as the EU. Only in Corsica does geographical insularity, when combined with cultural stereotypes, generate a sense of social exclusion in relation to the national centre, .

The transborder localities present a more consistent pattern of how people perceive their possible exclusion vis-à-vis the 'centre'. In two of these localities we again find that there are opposite viewpoints on each side of the border. Thus in the Republic of Ireland locals do not see themselves as either isolated or excluded, while in Northern Ireland both Catholic and Protestant interviewees emphasise that there is a strong link between their marginality vis-à-vis the political centre (London and/or England) and social exclusion of the whole region. With minor differences, this pattern is replicated in Malaga/Melilla. While our data for Malaga do not record

any feelings of being excluded or isolated from the main national centres, in Melilla the geographical isolation of the locality is often stressed, and in some cases readily related to social exclusion of the whole town. It is worth noting that in both Ireland and Malaga/Melilla there appears to be a close connection between the emphasis on cultural and ethnic difference as sources of social exclusion and the perception of the exclusion of the whole locality. That is, the more culture and ethnicity are regarded as a source or indicator of social exclusion, the more the whole locality is likely to be perceived as socially excluded in its entirety. Gorizia/Nova Gorica would seem to be an exception to this generalisation.

Gorizia/Nova Gorica is the only one of the six localities which does not show any evidence of feeling excluded and/or isolated *as a locality*. In fact, on both sides of this border the locality's peripherality is seen as an opportunity for economic development. One possible explanation for this is the political particularity of the Italian/Slovenian border. Of the six localities, Gorizia/Nova Gorica is the only one with a border that has undergone a dramatic shift in meaning over the last decade. Once the divide between the two Europes -- western capitalist and eastern socialist -- the Italian/Slovenian border has been conceived for decades as a barrier which not only separated two sovereign states and their related nations, but also two divergent economic systems and even two 'mentalities'. With independence, Slovenia eagerly entered the 'free market' economy, and looked to the border as a gateway to development. On the Italian side of the border, the collapse of the 'iron curtain' revealed unexpected perspectives: what was once the limit of western Europe quickly became a doorway to a world striving for economic development. The point is that although cultural difference may still be regarded as important in determining social exclusion within this locality, the prospect of social and economic development following the change in status of the border has inhibited the growth of any widespread sense of marginality, isolation or exclusion.

On a more general level, Table 14 summarises the comparative relevance for each locality of the three types of exclusion we have considered, social, cultural and spatial, but does not allow for a proper understanding of their reciprocal interaction. Social factors of exclusion single out individuals, cultural factors tend to create categorical exclusion of specific communities, and the spatial dimension circumscribes the whole locality, with its possible multi-faceted social and cultural complexity. These three types can be arranged into a series of nesting segments of ever-increasing inclusiveness: from the narrowest (individual exclusion based on social factors) to the widest (regional exclusion based on spatial factors) through the community exclusion based on culture/ethnicity. Yet individuals in their everyday lives can experience exclusion as a result of any one of these three types, because of their particular social characteristics, because of their culture/ethnicity, and because of where they live. For instance, the unemployed Protestant in South Armagh might experience threefold exclusion: as an unemployed person, as a Protestant in a County with a Catholic majority, or as someone living in a very marginal area of the United Kingdom. Others might experience only a twofold exclusion: social and spatial (as seems to be the case on Corsica) or cultural and spatial (as in Melilla, for instance). These three types of exclusion, which we have distinguished for analytical purposes and because they work according to different variables and gradients, may converge at the level of the individual, as indicated on Figure 3.




Figure 3. Factors of exclusion

In Figure 3 the dotted lines represent the possible influence by social and/or cultural and/or spatial factors on the individual perception and representation of social exclusion, while the continuous lines represent interaction among factors. Each cluster of factors corresponds to a specific level of inclusiveness: single persons, communities, the whole locality. It might be better to refer to the first level not as ‘individual exclusion’ but as ‘individuated exclusion’, because ‘individuals’ may feel excluded on each level, as we noted above. In our concluding remarks we consider to what extent the research in the six localities corresponds to this schematic representation of factors of social exclusion.

4.3.2. Conclusion

Our analysis confirms that in the six localities cultural difference is a key dimension of social exclusion. While social exclusion is obviously also based on sociological variables such as income, age, and gender, where cultural and ethnic complexity exists -- whether due to historical conditions or recent changes -- those marked as being culturally different are almost invariably regarded as socially excluded. However, what is more difficult to determine is exactly how these different types of exclusion interact. If people can be excluded because of social factors, cultural factors, and where they live, do any of these ‘identities’ supersede the others and, if so, why? What are the relationships between them?

In our data, there is no clear correlation between cultural, social and spatial factors. In some cases (Republic of Ireland, Nova Gorica) prominence given to social factors goes together with a lack of spatial isolation or exclusion, but in other cases (Corsica) the same preponderance of social factors is associated with a distinct sense of isolation of the whole locality. While in Lesvos, Malaga, and Gorizia the irrelevance of the spatial dimension is combined with a stress on cultural or ethnic factors, in Northern Ireland, Melilla and Lisbon the same concern for ethnic or cultural difference goes together with a sharp sense of spatial isolation (albeit in relation to different levels of social organisation: in Lisbon the sense of exclusion is felt in relation to the European Union, while in Northern Ireland and Melilla it is in relation to the nation-state). Table 15 arranges each locality along the two variables: a) relevance of social or cultural factors and b) presence or absence of perceived regional exclusion (spatial factor):

Table 15. Correlation between social and cultural factors and spatial dimension

	Regional Exclusion	
	Absent	present
Social factors	Republic of Ireland / Nova Gorica	Corsica
Cultural factors	Lesvos / Malaga / Gorizia	Northern Ireland / Melilla / Lisbon

Thus according to our analysis it is impossible to state if spatial isolation depends on or is influenced by social or cultural variables. The two questions we raised earlier -- who is excluded within the locality, and is the locality excluded in its entirety? -- should probably be answered separately, as independent variables.

Setting the spatial dimension to one side for the moment, and focusing directly on the relationship between social and cultural factors, the relevance of cultural and ethnic difference in representations of social exclusion seems obvious. In our study, the three locales most characterised by ethnic diversity (Northern Ireland, Melilla and Lisbon) were the ones which most readily connected social exclusion to difference. In one sense, we could talk of *culturalism* in relation to social exclusion. ‘Culturalism’ can be defined as the “deliberate, strategic, and populist mobilisation of cultural material” (Appadurai 1996: 15). The more culturalism is present and well developed as a strategic political tool in a locality, the more people also tend to see social exclusion in terms of cultural and ethnic difference. Because culturalism conflates social inequality and cultural difference, it sharply modifies the perception of social exclusion, making it virtually impervious to policies which try to combat it. As we noted earlier, while social markers of inequality are gradual, and entail a boundary permeability, cultural markers often operate as on-off fence categories which cannot easily be crossed, thus strengthening the awareness of the symbolic boundary between the excluded and non-excluded. To read social exclusion in the light of cultural difference means to widen the social gap between people on the basis of culture.

We conclude this section by identifying some questions for future research. Although our analysis confirms that exclusion depends on different clusters of factors, it is unclear precisely how they interact. If people in some localities experience a twofold or even threefold exclusion, which one (if any) is felt to be most relevant, and which is most likely to affect everyday life and social interaction? Do unemployed Protestants in South Armagh prioritise or rank the different ways in which they feel excluded (for instance, do they see them as being differentially debilitating), or do they consider them to be equivalents? Anthropological research has emphasised how multiple identities are contextually manipulated. Is it feasible to translate this notion of ‘multiple’ identities into a discourse of ‘multiple’ contextual exclusions? In other words, if people experience different forms of social exclusion, how are these played out in practice and presented from context to context? Is this multilayering of exclusion acknowledged or recognised by anti-exclusion agencies in different locales and, if so, how do they deal with it? Do anti-exclusion agencies see one type of exclusion as more in need of attention than another on the basis of their priorities, or do they take into consideration the way people affected by social exclusion rank the different layers? Such questions require answers if the challenges of combating exclusion are to be effectively and adequately met.

4.4. New centralities of the diverse border areas

“Just as the protection of the home is the most vital care of the private citizen, so the integrity of her borders is the condition of existence of the State.” (1907 Romanes Lecture on the subject of frontiers by Lord Curzon of Kedleston, Viceroy of India (1898 -1905) and British Foreign Secretary 1919 -24).

“Borders and frontiers are cultural constructs that can take on many different meanings.” (Eva 1999: 34).

4.4.1. The importance and multi -dimensionality of borders

During the period of “high modernity” (mid -19th to mid -20th centuries) borders clearly represented and/or epitomised the central role of the state as the main hegemonic instrument of political, social and above all economic organisation. In addition they indicated the solidly hierarchical nature of the global system with a few nation -states continually in dispute of territories and locations.

Over the last few years, especially since the fall of the bi -polar system, border issues have re -emerged with an alternative twist. Essentially the theme of sovereignty which was the hallmark of nation -state legitimisation over a certain territory(ies), retreated and what has come into the forefront is a mix of overlapping notions about identity, border permeability, contested exercise of authority between various governments, organisations and agencies and “borderless” economic flows.

At the same time, much of the significance of “the border” has not, however, changed: it still remains a sort of container of particular varieties of “national culture” and it enforces elements of separation between the “outside” and the “inside”, between “them” and “us”. Border crossings are still regarded as illegal acts of violation and in this sense ideas about the border seem to exist in a paradox. On the one hand it is widely accepted that in the contemporary environment of globalisation, new technologies and the internet, borders are (or ought to be) more translucent, and on the other, border protection and control has become one of the major issues of concern especially since, in the EU for example, economic “boundaries” with the poor eastern Europe and with the less developed countries of Africa and Asia have gained a renewed momentum.

Much of the above was quite clearly exposed in the six research sites of this project. One of the main themes which has become apparent is related to the multi -dimensional nature of the sites researched. Although they are all situated on the “periphery” of Europe, it is very difficult initially to distinguish which specific characteristics are common to them beyond their “locational” similarities with respect to the European “core”. On a more theoretical level, what has been uncovered is that it is important to look at and analyse the relationships between such locations *through the consideration of the perceptions and meanings that groups of people have of these locations*. In addition, on a more practical level, research has clearly shown that borders are *temporary* arrangements, and that nation -states are not really capable in the mid to long -run to control flows of people, irrespective of the strength of agreements such as the Shengen or Dublin treaties. It suffices that the border instead of being a marginal element in the structuring of the wider socio-economic and cultural environment, is in fact a major barometer of the (re)construction of identity and the (re)affirmation of culture with larger repercussions on economies and politics.

The last point was indicated early in the First Annual Report when it was mentioned that there seemed to be a link between marginalization on the border and exclusion in the centre (Leontidou et al. 2000: chapter 2). A point of convergence between the different research sites is the similar characteristics of the various socially excluded groups. However, this does not by

itself tell us anything about the nature of these localities or indeed those groups. At one level it is of course important to know who and how many the excluded are, but much more importantly, perceptions and narratives of social exclusion at the border are paramount in presenting us with different and alternative ideas about how these communities understand and conceive themselves in their social space. Thus, it may be argued that the collective orientations and the overall nature of the uni-dimensional social and economic policies adhered to by many central and local organisations, run opposite to the multi-dimensional nature of reality as experienced by the recipients of such policies.

4.4.2. The border as a central constituent of negotiating identity and exclusion/inclusion

The construction of borders transforms whole sets of existing meanings into new and different categories which represent notions related to culture, identity and ultimately power, be it political or economic. Consider this following extract on how borders are demarcated by the great powers - in this case Britain - written in 1907:

“...local surveys or reconnaissances, where one or the other has been found possible, precede the discussions of statesmen. Small Committees of officials are frequently appointed in advance to consider the geographical, topographical, and ethnological evidence that is forthcoming, and to construct a tentative line for their respective Governments; this, after much debate, is embodied in a treaty, which provides for the appointment of Commissioners to demarcate the line upon the spot and submit it for ratification by the principals. Geographical knowledge thus precedes or is made the foundation of the labours of statesmen, instead of supervening at a later date to cover them with ridicule or reduce their findings to a nullity. I do not say that absurd mistakes and blunders are not still committed. I could, if I had the leisure, construct a notable and melancholy list. But the tendency is unquestionably in the direction of greater precision both of knowledge and of language. Lastly, when the Commissioners reach the locality of demarcation, a reasonable latitude is commonly conceded to them in carrying out their responsible task. Provision is made for necessary departures from the Treaty line, usually 'on the basis of mutual concession'; tribes or villages are allowed to use watering places or grazing grounds across the Frontier, or to choose on which side of the border they will elect to dwell. Some Treaties (for instance that between the United States and Mexico) allow for the pursuit of raiders across the common Frontier without the creation of a *casus belli*. When the Commissioners have discharged their duty, not as a rule without heated moments, but amid a flow of copious hospitality and much champagne, beacons or pillars or posts are set up along the Frontier, duly numbered and recorded on a map. The process of demarcation has in fact become one of expert labour and painstaking exactitude.” (1907 Romanes Lecture on the subject of frontiers by Lord Curzon).

Clearly in the above narrative and irrespective of anything else that we may say about the historicity which transcends it, borders are seen primarily as objective and rational expressions of nation-state decision making power over close but usually far away lands, where a specific rule of law with all the implied norms and values, had to be applied and enforced. Arguably, some of this rhetoric is still with us in the 21st century. However, as it is seen through the work done on the six research sites and elsewhere, it is at least understood by many contemporary analysts, that the so-called “objective world” is in fact a peculiar construct mediated through culture and inter-subjective realities through which physical borders are constructed and human boundaries of social exclusion are (re)negotiated.

In *Lesvos*, for example, the framing of the eastern border after 1922, which isolated the area from its traditional hinterland, generated conditions which shifted the locality from an indigenous type of development to one based on state funding and subsidies. The island became both a pathway of illegal entry and an insular economy and this shift started to occur with the formation of the border which cut off the area from the Asia Minor coast. In general, the intake of

refugees coupled by the setting up of very strict borders between Greece and Turkey and the subsequent inter and 2nd World War periods, marked complete and pivotal changes, within a very short time period, in the area's development. The local community having conceded most, if not all, of its recent historical link with its immediate surroundings has re-emerged weakened, isolated and marginalised. Such concessions mean much more than the loss of territory. They are in fact concessions on control of resources and they mean a loss over formal or informal social, cultural and economic networks built over much longer periods of time. This combination of a closed border existing alongside relative isolation from the mainland of Greece, reinforced and strengthened perceptions of marginalisation. This is coupled by specific types or examples of parochialism, provincialism and particularism (Lasch 1991) which in fact strengthen a sense of identity.

From a different starting point, the settlement of the *Irish* border generated conditions where people living on either side gradually also became spatially and socially marginalised. Research on this site indicates that very early on the border became a source of social exclusion.

“People who were supposed to be involved in the settlement of the border, people who afterwards found themselves on the border, were neglected and marginalised. Their freedom of choice was frustrated precisely at that historical moment when ‘self-determination’ became a key word of modern democracies. Whatever their political, religious and national allegiances, people found themselves on one side or the other of the border with little possibility of having their voices heard. In this respect, the border arguably diminished people's self-confidence as social agents and contributed not only to their spatial, but also to their social marginalisation.” (Leontidou et al. 2000: 43).

In *Lisbon*, the impact of shifting frontiers was felt during the period from the early 1970s onwards. In this particular case the city has gone through a completely new experience which stems from processes and movements resulting from decolonization. According to various estimates Portugal received between 500 and 800,000 retornados in the short period between 1974 and 1979 with the bulk of them settling in the outskirts of Lisbon, generating marginalised enclaves and exacerbating patterns of social exclusion.

The *Malaga-Melilla* couplet typifies in a more striking manner many of the economic, political and cultural dimensions that are contested at or near the border. Melilla, relatively isolated from Spain due to a natural frontier, is in itself a kind of enclave which also acts as a buffer zone (borrowing the term from classic international relations theories – enlarged versions include “buffer” or “pseudo” states) both with regard to Malaga and Spain and Morocco. The particular position of this small city stimulates a variety of legal and illegal activities but the continuous daily crossings of people across the border from Morocco dominates the picture shaping everyday reality in the city. Ironically, one of the most well-guarded European borders is at the same time one of the most permeable.¹⁰

In *Corsica* the border attains a strong symbolic connotation. The location of the island separates it from mainland France in more ways than the mere presence of a physical boundary. Cultural difference is a strong determinant of exclusion coupled by differentiated economic organization. People on the island often spoke about the existence of both economic and cultural borders: “economic competition seems to favour already developed areas and... sectors of activity such as public services risk to lose jobs. The EU is often negatively viewed because it is

¹⁰ Heavy barbed-wire around Melilla (p. 18 above) was constructed as a consequence of the Schengen Agreement, as a wall to contain immigration to the EU, but the relation between Moroccan neighbours and Melillan people was not avoided. This explains the paradox frequently underlined here, that “ironically, one of the most well guarded European borders is at the same time one of the most permeable”. For example, public health services in Melilla usually attend to Moroccan people from the surrounding area.

associated with the idea of economic competition and the process of deregulation.” (Leontidou et al. 2000: 154). From the cultural point of view, the border is associated with “lack of understanding, contempt and indifference by the mainland French authorities. Centralisation and difficulty to accept diversity alongside presentation of Corsica by the national mass media makes more difficult relationships with the continent.” (Leontidou et al. 2000 : 154).

Finally in *Gorizia* – a city belonging to a wider area which historically was at the core of social and economic developments – the border has been seen by local social agents as a means to generate integration and socio-economic inclusion. In this case border permeability, or the “openness/closeness” character of the border, acts as platform on which cooperation and dialogue has evolved between this city and its neighbour on the Slovenian side, Nova Gorica. The border here is viewed as an instrument initially assisting in the exploration of collaborative schemes between various organisations (primarily local authorities and similar institutions) in resolving a variety of common problems. In this particular case, certain “structural” characteristics of the population along both sides coupled by concrete regional policies, have constituted the basis for the development of a specific model of cooperation.

From the above short depiction of the various perspectives on the borders of the six research sites, it is possible to see a variety of different meanings and practices attached to each location. In general, for the member-countries of the EU, recent (post -1992) developments “signify a new phase” with respect to the restructuring of the Community’s *internal* interplay between economies, cultures and a system(s) of decision-making (Brah 1996:152). A significant part of this process has been related to the different EU policies and initiatives, whose main aim is to “maintain the momentum of integration renewed by the internal market and the Maastricht Treaty” (Middlemas 1995: 667). It is this issue of harmonization which has raised questions about the *nature* of Europe in the near future. As internal borders are formally loosening up, external borders seem to be tightening with the debate on “Fortress Europe” having intensified over the past few years (King ed 1993, Blacksell et al eds 1994, Hudson & Williams eds 1999). However, as we have seen, the formal “relaxation” or “demolition” of internal borders may *not* necessarily signify the informal construction of alternative meanings about political identity on the part of the various populations involved (Leontidou & Afouxenidis 1999).

The various shades of cultural causes of social exclusion are located within *intersubjective* realities, which emerge *historically*. The latter are also reflected in *representations of social exclusion* by the local populations and the broader society, where they are (dis)embedded (e.g. TV, media, art, fiction, film), and not only in economic investment or political institutions, as posited in conventional current research. Collective innovations and creativity must be sought in the past, however remote, a different past in each historical community case study, within a pre-existing comparative framework. The importance of the socio-spatial milieu and local histories is crucial in understanding subsequent social mobilisation or immobility, and hence exclusion. The processes by which the borders in the six research sites were established, through wars, authoritarian regimes and mobilisations for overthrowing them, and/or periods of hostilities with neighbours, are familiar examples in southern Europe and elsewhere, which support the method of looking at *localities-as-narratives*. The phase of Institutional Interviews indicated that: (a) “social exclusion” is intersubjectively constructed in the perceptions and practice of the agencies which deal with it; and (b) there are place-specific types of relationships between the border and perceptions of social exclusion.

Subsequently, research findings emanating from such a theoretical and methodological framework, have made us depart from standard social-exclusion research methodology of “target groups” towards an investigation of *local societies* as a whole. Social exclusion target groups in the family and the community have been well explored in several publications. These are valuable in understanding “disembedded” agents and groups, and “un-learning” regions such as

“disintegrated” localities. Current usages of the theory usually lay the stress on economics, however, whereas this research relates the social with the economic, as well as the cultural and the political, with a study of institutions and social groups for the investigation of the dynamics of disintegration and re-integration. The importance of the local society in understanding social exclusion must be strongly distinguished from the modernist classifications and assumptions about the “eclipse of community” and the weakening of the nation-state on the one hand, and globalisation on the other. It has been argued that, in border societies, the local and the global interact in such ways as to necessitate the reorientation of our understanding of “the border” in a way that accounts for the variety of meanings associated with it.

4.5. Towards a typology of EU borders and islands

Besides cities on the external EU border, which were the starting point of our research project, we have investigated other spaces, and an extended set of categories of border experiences. The matrix presented on Table 16, elaborates and expands that of the concluding chapter of our 1st Annual Report (Leontidou et al. 2000: 194 -5), and consolidates it into a typology (as in Leontidou 1999). It is a four -by-six-dimensional matrix based on two dimensions, which cross -tabulate the four sets of *border experiences* (the External EU Border, the Internal EU Border, the Frontier, and Insularity) with five sets of *border representations and cross -border relations* (Back-to-back economy, Differentiated integration, Twin Cities, Networking, Transience - nomadism-commuting, Core -periphery dependence and rivalry). Taken together, these five different adaptations and orientations towards the border also constitute *survival strategies* (Leontidou 1999).

Table 16: Border experiences and representations and cross -border relations

BORDER EXPERIENCES:				
CROSS-BORDER RELATIONS:	<i>External EU Border</i>	<i>Internal EU Border</i>	<i>Frontier</i>	<i>Insularity</i>
<i>Back-to-back economies</i>	e.g. Lesvos	e.g. Armagh, Monaghan		e.g. Lesvos
<i>Differentiated Integration</i>	e.g. Gorizia - Nova Gorica			
<i>Twin Cities</i>	e.g. Gorizia - Nova Gorica e.g. Malaga - Melilla			
<i>Networking</i>			e.g. Lisbon	
<i>Transience, nomadism, commuting</i>				
<i>Internal core -periphery dependence & colonialism</i>	e.g. Lesvos	e.g. Corse		e.g. Corse

On Table 16 we indicate, in a way of examples, where some of our study localities fit into the matrix. We should stress that the boxes of the matrix are not always mutually exclusive, and that in some cases a particular locality might be positioned in more than one box. Like all such typologies, Table 16 over -emphasises the differences between entries in different columns, while exaggerating the similarities between entries in the same column. Nevertheless, Table 16 is useful, we believe, for highlighting the particular border experiences which predominate in the

specific study areas. In our comparative analysis, it emphasises the *differences* between our six field sites. Subsequent sections of the Report will endeavour to tease out some similarities.

Along the horizontal axis, the four sets of border experiences are as follows:

1. The *External EU Border*. Although we began the project by distinguishing between actual borders and symbolic boundaries, we have ended up in finding that in reality the two often merge. However, definitions are often particular and strict, as the much -quoted paragraph by Prescott (1987) demands (Anderson 1996: 10; Donnan & Wilson 1999: 48). The definition of “border” given in previous section 2.2 differentiates among synonyms without drawing any strict lines.
2. The *Internal EU Border*. Changes and hierarchies along the international boundary line , especially after the Schengen agreement, have been discussed above, in section 2.2.
3. The *Frontier* is a zone of cultural and inter -ethnic mixing, a zone at the edge, although it is not always a border line. It is a zone in -between or, alternatively, an area at the edge of settlement, beyond which there is unsettled territory, or the ocean (Lisbon). At times, there can be “the other” – an enemy nation, a different ethnic group, a different religious community – beyond the frontier. Lisbon, Lesvos, Corse and Ireland are in some sense frontiers in the EU context, and tend to crystallize identities on this basis.
4. *Insularity*. The phenomenology of insularity is very close to that of social exclusion, in the sense of lack of active participation in the broader, hegemonic, or dominant social and economic context. Findings in our three island case studies (Lesvos, Ireland and Corse), however, drew a subtle distinction between exclusion and *isolation*, discussed in section 4.3. Islanders underline the importance of local societies, on top of the classic target groups, for the study of social exclusion. The complexity of defining exclusion, both socially and spatially, comes to the foreground.

Along the vertical axis of the matrix the six sets of cross -border relations are as follows:

1. *Back-to-back economy*. This refers to places cut by the border, and oriented towards their respective national economies thus “excluding” each other. The concept was introduced in the Irish case study (Leontidou et al. 2000: chapter 3), but can also be used for other cases. Lesvos, for example, was cut off from the Turkish coast after 1922, but is also cut off from the core of Greece – and of Europe (Leontidou et al. 2000: chapter 2). The main towns of Lesvos overlook the Turkish coast and turn their back to Greece, in a back -to-back economy which lasted until the 19th century. In the early 20th century, when exchanges with Turkey have been interrupted, Lesvos became more isolated from Turkey than from Greece. The Aegean sea is an automatic barrier from both ends, in the sense of frequently -interrupted transport systems by sea and by air. In similar ways in Ireland, infrastructure is created or interrupted on the basis of this sort of back-to-back communication.
2. *Differentiated integration*. There is a multiplicity of forms of integration in each locality: people experience close community -cooperation in some respects or domains (economic, cultural), while they may experience minimal or even no co -operation in other domains (institutional, political). The civil society on each side of the border functions in relation to the local nation-states in question, and cooperation on the one level may coincide with fragmentation on the other. This concept has been elaborated for the Gorizia case study (Leontidou et al. 2000: chapter 7), but again it can be applied to other localities. In the case of lack of co-operation, we may have social exclusion, or a situation where the nation -state maintains some connections and influences through its institutions, which therefore may prohibit co-operation at the local or grass -roots level. In Italy, differentiated integration has been attributed to the Austro -Hungarian past which the bordering localities share. This

contrasts with the Ottoman past on the eastern border, which has brought about the back-to-back economy in Lesvos. Ireland can be seen as a case incorporating both types of cross-border relations and strategies at different levels.

3. *Twin Cities*. We have different sets of twin cities in the project, and it is noteworthy that all of them appear at the external EU border. Malaga and Melilla are not “twins” but relate with each other as Spanish cities communicating by air and boat, but divided by the fact that they are located in Europe and Africa respectively. Gorizia and Nova Gorica form a classic “twin city” complex, divided by the border between Italy and Slovenia, a border which in these two cities takes the form of a fence. Such obvious twin cities are also found elsewhere in Europe and the Middle East: examples include Berlin East and West, now gradually merging into a single city; Nicosia North and South; Jerusalem; and some cities in former Yugoslavia. This actually makes this research into social exclusion in twin cities of broader importance. Finally, in the Irish back-to-back twin cities, Armagh and Monaghan, we encounter representations of social exclusion and the border of a two-dimensional diversity: on the basis of the Protestant / Catholic communities on the one hand, and on the basis of the north of the border / south of the border divide, on the other.
4. *Networking*. In the information society, the younger inhabitants of remote localities tend to become computer literate and active in networking, while older inhabitants stick to more traditional communication technology (TV and radio), installed in private but also in public places (taverns, cafes). The local society thus turns increasingly towards the virtual world as they are (often voluntarily) excluded from the actual one. Besides this one-way communication, however, they may network with communities across the border, or their national centres, or European nodes. The Universities of Corse and Lesvos are cases in point.
5. *Transience-nomadism-commuting*. Illegal trespassing of borders especially by peripatetic populations and semi-nomadic ethnic groups such as Kurds or Albanians, by refugees and by gypsies, has escalated on the Eastern region of our research area, but is also a tradition in its Western regions. In Spain we have encountered nomadic populations and groups such as gypsies and/or vagrants. In fact, the presence of gypsies in most localities (from Lesvos to Malaga and N. Ireland) exemplifies the relationship between borders and nomadic life, which gives us a socially excluded “target group” to consider all over the border zone. Everyday commuting for work between the two sides of the border is found between Gorizia and Nova Gorica, between Armagh and Monaghan, and between the Moroccan hinterland and Melilla.
6. *Internal core-periphery dependence, colonialism and rivalry*. The phenomenology of insularity outlined above is quite close to voluntary withdrawal from Europeanization, globalization, domination and their corollaries, which is not exclusive to the islands. This withdrawal may reach the point of mistrust or even aggression towards the core, contrasted with the dignity of islanders – a version of the classic sociological model of “us” vs “them”. But “us” may be ridden by divisions, as amply demonstrated in Ireland, Corse, often in Lesvos, and also in the Balkans.

On the basis of the above typology, notions guiding the relationship between the present chapter and the following one, can be introduced here. In our initial proposal we have distinguished between the *social* and the *spatial*. In addition, the Irish case study has proposed a distinction between *individual/ social type* exclusion on the one hand, and *community/ locality* exclusion on the other (Leontidou et al. 2000: chapter 3). There is a further distinction to be made between the latter two concepts: community may be *social* or *spatial*, but its main characteristic is cohesion; the concept of locality is looser, and spatially defined. These distinctions have been made in this chapter, while the next one expands on the individual or target-group level of analysis.

5. Project Results at the Social /“Individual” /Target-group level: Comparative perceptions and realities of social exclusion

This chapter systematizes the project results and findings about the border and social exclusion, emphasizing the *target-group* level, and complementing the spatial exclusion experiences and exclusion at the community level, as discussed in chapter 4.

5.1. Employment-related dimensions

The six research sites are located on the border, at the European periphery and in regions where economic development levels are lagging behind those of other European countries. Although unemployment takes different forms and affects various groups, it seems to be a strong enough component in all the cases studied. The (un)employment issue took two main forms: firstly, in some areas the labour market was shaped and influenced by factors such as immigration which influence patterns of employment for specific target groups (Lisbon, Lesvos, Melilla); secondly, in other areas unemployment appeared more generic due to shifts and changes in the local economy (Gorizia, Ireland).

In addition, territorial insularity generates a variety of problems. For example, the islands of Lesvos and Corsica experience a pronounced withdrawal from their own centres, as the result of their geographic location and their relationship with those central areas. In this way, a pronounced separation from European development takes form, in conditions one can refer to as treble peripherality, as shown before. Ireland, which has been for many decades a divided island, experiences a social division between two distinct communities, mutually excluded. We referred to them as back-to-back economy, with the state playing the leading role in the management of the island's economic life, although without encouraging the development of other parallel initiatives. In this case study, the particularity of some types of marginality is directly connected with the border: unemployment, homelessness and vacant buildings appear clearly interconnected with intimidating actions and political violence. Thus, the border condition constitutes a crucial element in the dynamics of the social exclusion process. On the other hand, a deeply conflictual culture in Northern Ireland has determined some particularities, one of these being the unemployment of ex-prisoners. Also, the problem of homelessness, although not belonging exclusively to Northern Ireland, is expressly referred to in this local study as being a specific case, closely connected with the border. Social workers pointed out the difficulty of obtaining reliable statistics on homelessness and identified issues such as political intimidation, the economy and family relations in so far as some individuals cross the border and try to be classified as 'homeless'. In Northern Ireland, both territorial segregation and political intimidation are central social problems, without parallel in other social realities included in the project. Thus, the vulnerability of the Irish communities to the employment question is necessarily part of that context of violent conflict, and the border represents the polarization of those political conflicts.

Social exclusion in Gorizia is related to changes within the “communist system” on an international scale, especially in former Yugoslavia. As for employment, these changes unchained important processes of political and economic restructuring, and made way for a new vulnerability formerly unknown. Social exclusion in Gorizia primarily stems from acute unemployment being suffered in particular by the middle classes

accustomed to medium-high living standards. The individuals in question are mostly mature adults, but younger adults are also involved. With a higher incidence in some groups – women and young people – the high level of unemployment in Gorizia is due, in some measure, to those social changes. For those who seek work, jobs are unstable, although this was also true for those who worked under the former social-political system. In this context, Gorizia is an example of pronounced social precariousness: long term unemployment, precarious work, insecurity and poverty as the result of high cost of living, etc. But if Gorizia has a significant number of unemployed, it is even worse in Nova Gorica. In Slovenia, as a consequence of the socio-political changes, unemployment is, in some measure, the result of the closure of the big factories and the economic restructuring process that followed. The dynamic of the social classes has been deeply altered. In this context, the border also assumes a socially dynamic role one could refer to as “social transition”, mainly in its impact in relation to Nova Gorica in Slovenia. The Nova Gorica area perceives the border and relations with Gorizia as an undisputed source of benefits. All of these benefits have the effect of cushioning social exclusion caused by changes in the social system and consequently:

- a) unemployed Slovenes can do the jobs for which there are few takers locally (home helps, building labourers, etc);
- b) Slovenes still have many friendship and kinship relations with the Slovene minority there;
- c) a number of elderly Slovenes draw Italian pensions, which improve family finances;
- d) the Slovenes see the centre of Italian Gorizia as their own town centre. In other words, Slovene residents see the border as a cushion for the types of social exclusion experienced in their country, and in this respect they are better off than the rest of their compatriots.

The case of Melilla raises problems connected with the border and with the interactions between Africa and Europe. Like Lisbon, Melilla is also an inter-ethnic territory and so a cultural “cross-roads”. Significantly, in both cities, the immigrants (including the legal ones), are the most socially excluded, in consequence of their nearly always precarious jobs. In Lisbon those immigrant communities come mainly from the Portuguese speaking african countries (Cape Verdeans, Angolan, Guinean and S.Tomé), but also from Brazil and Mozambique; but one has to acknowledge the differences about the brazilian immigrants, who are much more linked to the third sector labour activities, informal and low-paid services in urban areas.

In Melilla the immigrant communities come from north Africa, most of them from the Muslim community. Studies about living conditions among the African communities in Lisbon show that there are particular types of relationships between employment conditions and migratory processes. As already mentioned, the individuals who belong to the ethnic minorities of the African countries are the most vulnerable to social exclusion. The difficulty of integration on the part of these populations is due to a number of factors, among which are the poor levels of professional qualification and education, the composition and behaviour of the domestic group, in accordance with their cultural roots, and also difficulties over the Portuguese language.

In terms of economic activity these ethnic communities are accepted in the public works sector (men), and the domestic sector (women). Their employment in unqualified and badly remunerated labour promotes and intensifies social exclusion. The educational level of these populations is usually low, which affects the kind of professional occupation they might perform. Also, the clandestine situation of most of the migrant groups strengthens this situation of

professional exclusion, placing the population into jobs belonging mostly to building and public works sectors. Therefore, they establish an extremely precarious work bond, which does not allow them to have any kind of social protection.

5.2. Migration-related dimensions

Migration processes have been a constant in Europe, and have sometimes assumed a massive character. These processes have involved successive restructurings of the labour and employment markets. The life conditions of migrant populations are nearly always determined by pronounced disparities. Lisbon and Melilla, both experiencing important migratory processes, have developed a “cross-roads” culture, where the flows of emigration-immigration within a border context are strongly recognized as dynamic elements of social and economic life in these border cities. We now turn to the relevant target groups, in order to discuss immigration types and groups in each locality, asylum seeking, gypsy and nomadic life, transience, seasonal migration, emigration.

The immigration phenomenon cannot be considered a partial problem that exhausts itself in labour aspects or border politics, nor as an external phenomenon to the receiving countries. On the contrary, immigration constitutes a very complex social process, part of a wider framework of population flows which have given birth to crucial changes in the receiving societies and to those same demographic movements. Massive migration seems set to continue as a part of the international scene. In fact, as Lucas (1994) says, “immigration can be considered a new state of the world population, one which, nowadays, more than ever, presents itself in permanent movement”. Thus, it is “a global social mobility phenomenon, that increasingly affects the world’s geopolitics and international economy” (Dias et al, 1997: 140). We are also dealing with population movements whose course of direction is South to North and East to West, and with Brazilian migrants working in the third sector.

The analysis of the six research sites has enabled us to document this unidirectional flow, taking into account the origin of the migrant groups (as we will see later). The systematization of ideas and data about the migratory flows, however, also shows that only some of the case studies can be considered good examples of receiving cities, namely Lisbon, Lesvos, Málaga/Melilla and Gorizia. This does not mean that other cases, namely Northern Ireland, are immune to the migratory processes, bearing in mind that, in a general way, these flows cross the European continent.

Given the focus of the research, the areas we studied are peripheral in Europe, sometimes even isolated. Simultaneously, we are dealing with cities which show economic and social dynamism, with social and political contradictions, sometimes in state of war, and obviously undergoing migratory processes of great impact. In this context, and according to a tridimensional analysis -- migration/social exclusion/peripheral cities -- one can analyse the diversity and social specificities of the local histories formerly referred to. Although one can speak of a unidirectional flow, there are significant differences in the origins and social composition of the migrant groups we examine.

In Gorizia, the migrant groups come from Turkey, Iraq, Sri Lanka, ex-Yugoslavia, Romania, etc, and find themselves, for the most part, as illegal and undocumented labour. The immigration flows are specially evident at the border, involving legal and illegal immigration. On the whole, and with the exception of the cross border workers, most of the immigrant flows from Slovenia to Italy are illegal. The legal immigration includes people who work in Italy, mainly in those sectors where the Italian workers are absent: agriculture, food sector, building and road work. On account

of the high prices in Slovenia, some of them buy essential goods in Italy. The daily bi-directional flows, however, do not include undocumented and illegal crossings. Gorizia's illegal immigration has its origin in the consequences of geo-political changes in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. These migrants come from different places (Kosovo, Albania, Romania, Kurdistan) and their aim is to reach other countries within the EU. This type of illegal immigration (probably also connected to organized crime) has grown dramatically in the last decade, following the Bosnian conflict and the Kosovo war. Lately, the migratory flows include people from Russia and Romania.

The source of the migrant flows in Melilla is heterogeneous. According to this research, it was possible to identify two different situations: a) people crossing the border each day and b) 'residents'. Among the residents, there is a division between Muslim and non Muslim, and among the Muslims, documented and undocumented. As far as nationality is concerned, the migrants are mainly Moroccans, Algerians, and people from south of the Sahara. The Algerians are an important group among the illegal immigrants. The migratory processes in Melilla reflect the importance of the city's economic life and of the surrounding territory. As a cross roads, these migratory flows are very important for local commerce and for the global economy of Morocco. For the Melillan immigrants, the border is thus understood as twofold: as the symbol of a "door" to a better life, and it also represents a "wall". In this last sense the border assumes a physical meaning (barbed wire, ditches, etc) and a symbolic one (immigration laws). For these immigrants, living in marginal conditions without prospects of work, frustration and violence are "normal" feelings. Exploitation is undoubtedly another form of vulnerability for these groups, particularly in the construction sector and domestic work.

The context of the migration flows in Málaga is a very heterogeneous population, exacerbating poverty and xenophobia. The political and economic situation in Morocco also encourages migration to Málaga. Thus, the illegal immigration to Málaga assumes dramatic proportions, meaning undocumented immigrants clandestine crossings, mainly but not only, through the Straits of Gibraltar in pateras, small fishing boats between four and eight meters long, and some two to three meters wide, with an outboard motor.

The migratory processes in Lesbos show a significant increase, mainly from 1995 on, essentially among the transient populations. The island, however, has not reported significant shifts in its demographic outlines. The origins of these immigrants are various: Albania, Iraq, Iran (many of kurd origin), Rwanda, Pakistan, Romania, Bulgaria. However, they all assume an important role in the island's economic life. Thus, it was possible to verify that in Lesbos what we can call the "parallel economy" has increased. In fact, it seemed that the relatively better-off part of the local community was closely articulated to the existence of informal labour and more specifically transient immigration. Activities seem to cover a whole area of services: nursing and care workers (mostly female workers from Bulgaria, Romania and the Ukraine), construction, farming and, of course, agriculture. As to the illegal entry of political refugees, the institutional interviews were unable to uncover initiatives or strategies for the resolution of this problem. Indeed, the illegal entry of refugees evoked some ambiguous attitudes among the interviewees: on the one hand, they expressed their approval for intervention, in the sense of creating infrastructures and modes of integration; on the other hand, however, the refugees' social problems were seen as someone else's responsibility.

In Lisbon, the immigrants' origins comprise a smaller group of countries. In Portugal, and specially within Lisbon's Metropolitan Area, the presence of these groups has a strong connection with the Portuguese ex-colonies. After their independence, Lisbon received an important migratory flow arriving from these countries, (mainly from Cape Verde, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau and S. Tomé e Príncipe). There is a high level of spatial segregation to which these populations are exposed. Nearly 97% are living in precarious housing zones in terms of lodgings,

social services, access and infrastructure. From the point of view of their social and urban integration, they lead a marginal and degraded way of life. In spite of their marginality and exclusion, these immigrant groups occupy an important place within the economy of these cities. In Lisbon they are prominent in the construction sector, although contracts in this kind of work are precarious and the work itself dangerous and demanding. If at the beginning migrants were mainly from Africa, they now also come from East Europe (ex -Yugoslavia, Ukraine, Bulgaria). Although less significant, a new migratory flow (from Brazil, Hungary, Russia) should be included, comprising groups of women most of whom belong to prostitution networks. Men also arrive, whose integration is facilitated by language and positive acceptance by the broader society. This type of immigration also aims to reach other countries within the EU.

It is important to keep in mind the following question: what kind of relationship exists between the various groups of immigrants and the receiving societies? In the case of Lisbon, it was possible to verify that the immigrants of African origin ended by being “integrated”, at least apparently, though in unfavourable contexts. This “integration” into the receiving society is also ascertainable in Melilla. As for the remaining cases, the relations between the immigrants and the receiving societies suggest a different direction.

With regard to Greece, for example, the islands of the North East Aegean (especially Lesbos and Samos) are pathways of illegal entry of various populations (immigrants, refugees, people seeking political asylum). In Gorizia, generally they are just passing through, because their aim is to go elsewhere in Italy or to other countries in the EU. But whether they are illegal or not, the pressure to leave this border area is particularly acute, firstly because the surveillance in it is especially strict and secondly because they are not accepted by the local population except in official welfare facilities. Málaga is “distributing” immigrants with or without the necessary documents to the rest of Spain, mainly Catalonia, most of them coming from or through Melilla. All this seems to confirm the idea that there is a consolidated bridge of immigration between Málaga and Melilla.

The migration process in relation to Corsica and Northern Ireland leads to a different type of analytical framework. The first case concerns population movements between France and the Mediterranean island. In comparison to our other cases, migration across the border in Ireland is small-scale, and may occur as a result of:

- a) economic factors – in this case, the migratory flows occur from south to north and reveal the demand for protection and social security;
- b) family relationships – involving flows whose aim is the maintenance of family ties;
- c) intimidation – which has its influence over this “cross -border” movement, only this time from north to south.

Analysis of the different case studies confirms that immigrant communities are the most vulnerable to poverty, but also to a border condition between different realities. By moving with the intention of finding a more prosperous and welcoming society, these immigrants may, in fact, encounter the opposite. Due to the restrictions which restrain their entry one way or another, migrants suffer the consequences of being branded “illegal”. By passing through a physical frontier in order to acquire better life conditions, these communities are obliged to pass another type of frontier: a more or less evident lack of knowledge of the language, values and culture of different societies are factors which intensify their socially marginalised condition.

5.3. Vulnerability dimensions of social exclusion

The following part will compare the *vulnerability dimensions* (elderly pensioners, handicapped, mentally ill, alcoholics, drug addicts, children with special needs, population with health problems, ex-prisoners, war victims, isolated individuals, women) and the *crime-related dimensions* (smugglers, operators of boat for illegal transport of immigrants and refugees, micro-criminals, convicts, weapon and money traffickers or illegal immigrants themselves, when imprisoned or deported) in the six border areas taken into consideration by the research.

The interviewed people have given convergent answers even if they have classified them in different ways: some experts have attributed the causes of poverty and social exclusion to individual factors while other people to structural ones. So, it is possible to identify three main categories or dimensions: (1) *self-exclusion dimension*, (2) *individual dimension* and (3) *structural dimension*.

5.3.1. Self-exclusion dimension: in this case, individuals themselves develop, in various fields, processes of self-exclusion in relation to society. Gypsies as an ethnic minority constitute a typical example of self-exclusion both in Lisbon and in Malaga, but also in Lesvos and Ireland. The “choice” may be sometimes an expression of “youth rebellion” that will cause poverty initially not foreseen; in Gorizia, i.e., young people are excluded owing to lack of communication and understanding, in particular in the family, school, and church, lack of youth facilities and cultural degradation, with models and lifestyles which lead to isolation. Finally, the “choice” may be an expression of fear: along the Irish border, the victims of violence are particularly vulnerable to social exclusion because fear forces them into marginal positions and because people who have suffered bereavement are likely to erect a barrier between themselves and those they hold responsible for their suffering (there are at least fifteen associations in Northern Ireland dealing with intimidation and nine that offer support to victims of violence).

5.3.2. Individual dimension: with this category, we classify poverty and social exclusion elements which are not generated by structural causes but the society is not able to give preventive answers or adequate support. They can be classified into six groups: psycho-physical factors, cultural factors, deviant lifestyles or *social stigma*, lack of adequate relationship and affective networks, living conditions, physical coercion. Each group can be read as elements which can combine each others in a more explosive mixture. It is difficult to be an old man and not self-sufficient but this condition becomes more serious if it is combined with the economic poverty, the lack of a social net, and ignorance; it could be exhausting to be a single woman with children but this situation becomes a cause of social exclusion if she has not got adequate training for the labour market.

- *Psycho-physical factors* (old age pensioners, handicapped, mentally ill and children with special needs). In Lisbon, old-aged pensioners are a twice excluded group: from the productive system and as a result of very low pensions. In Gorizia-Nova Gorica, old people are excluded owing to loneliness and poverty, though they are culturally rich. The phenomenon affecting a large part of the population even if they receive assistance and care. The mentally ill people constitute another group of socially excluded people in these border towns; sometimes they are young and they are put in wards with old people, with no opportunity to become socially integrated. Disabled people are not excluded but neither are they integrated. They do not work or they work in co-operatives and they have scarce relationships with the rest of the population. In Nova Gorica, there is also the problem of small pensions and pensions which are not reversible, which increases social problems; those people who have Italian pensions can afford more than others. In Lesvos, these groups are perceived as excluded too but it seems very difficult to find any hard evidence with respect to how some of these groups are treated either by the local community or the official welfare

network. The network of public welfare support seems to be slowly developing towards covering a whole range of needs for the excluded populations.

- *Cultural factors*: in this category, we put the inadequate training in comparison to the labour market demand, the incapability (for cultural reasons) to achieve the available resources and communicative difficulties. In Lisbon, cultural and ethnic differences are the main identified factors leading to situations of social exclusion. Thus, the persons who, in various ways, withdraw from the “dominant culture” are considered socially excluded individuals; because of ethnic differences, language and “ways of life” nourishes forms of social discrimination, often associated with racism and xenophobia may originate social exclusion. Sometimes, the fact of exclusion is due to a lack of education or to education which does not match labour market needs like in Corsica but also in Lisbon where the immigrant male population prevails preferentially in the public works sector and women in personal and domestic services. These professional activities executed by individuals with a low level of education or poor professional qualifications, promotes their social disqualification. In Gorizia -Nova Gorica, the situation is similar: non-EU citizens encounter many difficulties in integrating; there is a lack of knowledge and preparation on the subject, and of qualified people: it is women in particular who are excluded then their husbands who are quite well integrated in the world of work.
- *Deviant life styles or social stigma* as a result of former behaviour, alcoholism and drugs use mainly but ex-prisoners and some forms of nomadism found on stigmatised life style; the social stigma processes, of intolerance and exclusion towards these groups set going processes of social exclusion and of poverty. We have an example in Lisbon with individuals with a low professional level; with a significant deficit of literacy; residents in degraded housing areas; those with economic needs; with a very low civic participation; and those working in socially disqualified professions are subject to a *socially constructed negative image*, on behalf of other individuals who are not part of this social context. Along the Irish border, there is a similar situation concerning the homeless. In Ireland the border can be a real barrier to perceiving and addressing homelessness as a problem of social exclusion, since the methodology of counting the homeless differs on each of its sides: those counted as “homeless” on the northern side of the border many not be so classified on the border’s southern side. Social ostracism for many former prisoners has taken the remarkably real form of unemployment; unemployment in Armagh has been addressed in direct correlation with imprisonment. The issue of drug use emerged quite frequently in discussions. In Malaga, the exclusion is stimulated by different personal orientation by gender and prejudice to women; the scholar absenteeism is biggest among girls. The drug use represent a constant in the studies areas and the prevention of drug abuse become a major issue. In Gorizia -Nova Gorica, alcoholics and drug addicts are excluded for cultural and economic degradation and because they have no easy access to services. In Lesvos, there has been a significant increase in the use of drugs (over the past year there have been at least seven reported deaths from drug use and probably several others, which are not reported by the families who give other reasons for the deaths rather than being exposed to social criticism) but there is very little information and research on issues like spatial distribution of drug addiction, mobility of users, possible effects to local communities, etc. It is mostly left to the police to deal with the problem at both levels of distribution and consumption. In Lisbon too, drug addicts and alcoholic individuals, associated to a marginal existence, are also particularly vulnerable to social exclusion. In the Portuguese city, prisoners and ex-prisoners are considered groups with a particularly difficult social, professional and familiar reintegration. Criminality among the younger emigrant groups with difficult integration in their present society has grown within the city and Lisbon’s metropolitan area and the social exclusion of these groups

appears as the consequence of social environment and life conditions imposed on these people.

- *Lack of adequate relationship and affective networks* : in this category, we include the problems of single -parent families, single women with children, families uprooted from the native environment. In Lisbon, women, particularly those in unfavourable conditions, are a predominantly vulnerable group to social exclusion. The situation grows worse if it deals with unmarried girls or feminine single -parent families and victims of abuse.
- *Living conditions* : homeless individuals are considered as the highest expression of social exclusion, as they withdraw from all spheres of social integration: familial, professional and housing. Simultaneously, those groups proceeding from the rural exodus towards the cities are also mentioned. Adverse urban life conditions very often lead to social exclusion. In Lesvos housing policy is ad hoc and most benefits are directed to employees of the public sector and certain long -term employed workers. There is no statutory framework to positively enable groups in greater need for housing purchase or rent, organisations are understaffed and under-resourced and provide limited services and poor benefits: it is indicative that expenditure in unemployment benefit is only 0.3% of GDP – the lowest in the EU. Along the Irish border, in relation to homeless people, there is a gap in perceptions: only 2% of respondents in the Republic of Ireland consider homelessness in their area to be a serious problem, and 21% do not see it as a problem at all; by contrast, in Northern Ireland more than 30% see homelessness as a serious problem, and only 2% see homelessness in their area as “not a problem”. Social and welfare workers are aware of the cross -border movement of homeless people, but have difficulty quantifying it, even approximately. However, they are more confident about identifying its causes: economic reasons (which encourage movement from south to north) because it was relatively easier to obtain state welfare benefits in Northern Ireland; family relations; intimidation (which encourages movement from north to south); movement of Travellers ¹¹. In Lisbon, living in precarious housing conditions is another factor vehemently held responsible for social exclusion conditions ¹². One may further keep in mind that within the range of poor housing resources the residence in depressed areas is also a factor for social exclusion. As a matter of fact, many of these socially excluded areas are registered in Lisbon’s periphery. Therefore, if we take into account the life conditions of most of the ethnic communities in Portugal - low educational and professional training, precarious professional situation without chance of social protection, illegality and housing in degraded quarters or in social quarters located in suburban areas of the big cities - the serious social weakness of those communities remain clear. This population enters thus in a *vicious circle*: on one hand, it works and lives as clandestine, without any kind of social protection, without hopes of getting the legality of its situation; on the other hand, the illegal situation itself does not allow for an improving process in labour and life conditions. In Melilla, all interviewees coincided in this perspective: the lack of resources. In Melilla, people talked principally about conditions of life. They also referred to property, employment and the capacity to obtain social rights and benefits. Not having these leads to increases of social conflict (violence, aggressiveness), delinquency and prison. Also, other consequences are

¹¹ The official estimates of homeless households are: 26 along the southern border (for the border counties of Cavan, Donegal, Leitrim and Monaghan, total pop. 257.507) and 1.983 along the northern border (for counties Tyrone, Fermanagh and Armagh, total pop. 335.225).

¹² The Lisbon and Setubal region concentrates around two thirds (64%) of all foreign people living in the Portuguese continent. In 1987, 250.000 people lived in degraded quarters, 50.000 (20%) belonging to ethnic communities of Africans, Indians, Timorese and Gypsies.

related to the lack of housing facilities or, in the worst of the cases, the total lack of housing, deprived quarters, health problems, long term unemployment and poverty¹³.

- *Physical coercion* : In Malaga and Melilla, prostitution affecting immigrant women was especially highlighted by interviewees. In Lisbon too, the opening of internal borders allows the entry into Portugal, besides the African minority, of other migrating groups coming from Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Russia and Ukraine promoting a net of illegal migration. Networks are formed, aiming at the exploitation of men in the building sector or of women in prostitution. They promote migration by promising people a world of dreams.

5.3.3. Structural exclusion dimension : the third dimension includes factors defined as “structural” ones: these are direct exclusion causes but which are connected with the previous ones. They are mainly:

- *Labour market* : in Corsica, trade unionists spoke about the process which has produced one negative impact on the state of salaried population during the last years. More exactly, they said that process has made more delicate the condition of workers. Particularly, a lot of young people seem to be excluded. One young person out of four has no job, and a lot of them live from day to day¹⁴. Rules of the free market and economic competition, which produce the worsening of working conditions and precariousness, spread out over boundaries. Facing outward competitors bigger and more efficient than Corsican firms, they risk lacking in competitiveness¹⁵. They are afraid that the problem of exclusion in Corsica will become more difficult; different factors sustain that fear: the small size of local firms, the age of the insular population, political violence, etc. Current exclusion is viewed as a cause of a future exclusion.

In Malaga, there are a lot of possibilities connected with different expressions of social exclusion: poverty, unequal distribution of income and wealth, unemployment, competitiveness of market, shortage of familiar economic resources, relative underdevelopment of the south of Spain, deficiencies in the national system of education, etc. To understand the dynamic of exclusion in the border it is important to detect two approaches to social exclusion: exclusion due to global causes and domestic exclusion. The first one is defined from the point of view of world social organisation, as a general exclusion system (“the unequal exchange” between North and South). The second one depends on local social dynamics, and included the individual exclusion system¹⁶. In Melilla, the relations between North and South, across the border, appears evident. In fact, the mechanism of social exclusion is also a problem of districts. But the districts here are distinguished as between the EU and Africa. Melilla is only the bridge to pass: it is only 12 km², and Africa has millions of inhabitants.

¹³ Poverty affects 6% of the population of the Malaga province and Melilla (75.000 people that live in more than 13.000 households). About 3.800 households (23.000 people) are in extreme poverty situation. The intensity of poverty is higher in the city of Melilla and in the less urban zones of the province of Malaga (Edis/Ecb 1996).

¹⁴ In Corsica, 14.300 people are unemployed (13.2%): one job-seekers out of two is female, two of ten are younger than 25 and seven of ten are unskilled people. The long term unemployed are increasing (4.758 in 1997).

¹⁵ An imbalance in the Corsican economy can be observed by looking at the added value (%) of the different main sector of activity: primary sector (2.2%), secondary sector (16.5%), tertiary sector (81.3%). Foreign workers compose 70% of the Corsican group of agricultural workers.

¹⁶ Unemployment in Malaga in 1998 is very high: 23% (men), 33% (women). In Melilla the figures are: 14.5% and 42%.

The number of unemployed people is significant in Gorizia and very significant in Nova Gorica. In Slovenia, unemployment started with the passage from the socialist to the capitalist system, the closing of large factories, after the dissolution of the Yugoslav Republic. Some of them feel isolated, whereas others have a good relationship and try to react and keep socially active. The middle-class people are excluded too because they cannot reach personal and social fulfilment, with lack of correspondence between skills and opportunities in the labour market. This is quite widespread and, over the last few years, on the increase, and it affects the commercial and the professional sectors.

- *Structural social aspects* which include the lack of social services and of a vital minimum standard, the inadequacy of welcoming and vocational guidance centres, the insufficient quality of training, the normative protectionism but also the difficulties to make use of the citizenship rights. Concerning the last point, in Lisbon, the concept of social exclusion included people isolated not only from resources but also from exercising their rights; in this sense, those individuals that for different reasons find themselves restrained from exercising their full rights - health, housing, education, etc are socially excluded. For example, families of the several ethnic minorities do not find other solution than to settle in a precarious house in the slums. Only those who already have their housing situation legalised, might find lodgings in social housing. Actually, more than 90% of the slum population concentrated in the municipality immediately neighbouring the city of Lisbon (Amadora municipality) is composed by African residents. The respondents are incisive in their criticism, mentioning the lack of a structured and specific domestic policy directed towards these groups: only unattached projects and programmes aim the resolution of individual problems. This situation is particularly obvious in what concerns housing, since an immigrant can only ask for a housing licence if he has a permanent residence, but as he /she is not in a legal condition, the only kind of housing he /she manages to get is restrained to degraded quarters. Also in Corsica, where public authorities stress economic criteria rather than social ones, some people are excluded from the health system. Persons without a job and without National Insurance cannot receive benefits. More precisely, the care system may become different in quality according to personal finances. People with high income can have good treatment which is out of reach for poor people, but at present, to have a job seems to be a privilege.
- *Environmental situation (border / peripheral areas)*: the border situation is decisive to explain the social situation of Melilla, and exclusion also; in Melilla there is a border feeling among the population that does not exist in Malaga, the feeling of abandonment. The harder border control, in order to try to limit immigration, affects the normal performance of trade, which constitutes the most important economic activity of the locality. In Lisbon, the existence of frontiers is felt in a particular way by the excluded groups, namely those that cannot get rid of the irregularity of their emigration process. They are, therefore, liable to control processes that can lead to banishment from the country and even more deficient return conditions. On the other hand, it is clear that the economic stability of the EU acts as the pole of attraction. In Lesvos, the dominant consensus seems to be that local society is remote from the centre of political activity and /or political decision-making, it is accepted that island societies have this characteristic feature which distinguishes them from "others".

Another aspect of social exclusion concerns people who live in areas with a different identity not accepted by the State, where e.g. differences of language exist: in Corsica, some old people who live in rural areas have such difficulties. However, the idea of the border is associated with the difficulty to communicate with the French authorities. The lack of understanding for some interviewees, contempt or indifference for others, are presented as the result of the political culture of mainland France. Centralisation and difficulty to accept diversity mark this aspect. Research underlined how areas close to the Irish border are more

likely to be affected by deprivation than are other parts of Ireland . Furthermore, border counties north and south share common socio -economic attributes as a result of their rural setting: low population growth, high age dependency rates, and an over -dependency on small scale farm agriculture. Notwithstanding such structural similarities, interviews suggest that the border is often conceived as a line which separates two quite distinct social systems: the “single community” system of the south and the “two community” system (of Catholics and Protestants) of the north. The opinion prevailing among interviewees is that the Protestants and Catholics along the border's northern edge are far from being integral elements of one community. In contrast, the “community” south of the border is conceived of as being generally homogenous, faced with the problems of exclusion familiar in other European societies. The border influences the perception of social exclusion in at least three other ways: by creating border -specific types of marginalisation (intimidated people, victims, unemployment related to political violence); by loading marginal figures at the border with ambiguous meanings (smugglers, travellers); and by separating two quite different ways of counting, classifying and responding to the homeless. The people of Gorizia -Nova Gorica interviewed believe that it does not play a role in determining social exclusion. On the contrary, the border creates a culturally richer place, and the only problems are connected with customs, because different rules apply and stay permits necessary to work in Italy. The border has provided job opportunities to Slovenian unemployed. In this respect it provides an opportunity to transform the wealth of cultural diversity into economic wealth and create a new European culture. For Gorizia the opening of borders, ensuing from the enlargement of the European Union, should mean more job opportunities for everybody and also more rights, eliminating unregistered employment for all those people crossing the border daily ¹⁷. However, in Gorizia -Nova Gorica, the gradual introduction of Euro in Italy, and Slovenian membership of the EU may lead to a market situation characterised by a strong stagnation of consumption, which mainly penalises micro -enterprises adding to the other burdens, in particular fiscal, they have to bear. The public/private synergy has to tackle what is defined as the “Gorizia commercial question”, with possible negative repercussions on social conditions.

Table 17: The main excluded groups and the dimensions identified by interviewed people in each border area

	Lesvos	Irish border	Lisbon	Malaga-Melilla	Corsica	Gorizia -Nova Gorica
Self-exclusion dimension	Gypsy	Gypsy, Victims of violence	gypsy	Gypsy		Young
Psycho-physical factors	old-age pensioners, handicapped, mentally ill, children with special needs		pensioners			old and mentally ill people, disabled pensioners
Cultural factors			ethnic minority groups, women		Groups with low professional education	non-EU citizens, women
Deviant life	Drug addicts	Homeless	drug addicts,	Prejudice to		drug addicts,

¹⁷ For both cities, the political border represents a limit that you must abolished or you must partially control (52%). The city recognises the advantages from the proximity to the border (45%).

styles or social stigma		and ex-prisoners (social stigma)	alcoholics ex-prisoners, deficit of literacy, residents in degraded areas, low professional levels (stigma)	women		alcoholics
Lack of adequate relationship and affective networks			single women, single-parent families			
Living conditions	Rural people in city	Homeless	people in precarious housing conditions, deprived quarters	People in deprived quarters		
Physical coercion			women trade, prostitution	Prostitution		
Labour market				World system North/South	International competition	passage from socialism to capitalism, middle-class
Structural social aspects		deprived citizen rights			access to national insurance, health system	absence of state
Environmental situation (border/peripheral areas)	peripheralization	common socio-economic attributes, two community model	irregular situation of immigrants	Feeling of abandonment	Peripheralization	illegal employment enlargement EU

In conclusion, with regard to the collected data, it is possible underline the following aspects for each area:

- In Lesvos, the processes which generate exclusion are not particular to the island. The same processes can be found in other areas and indeed in localities which are not positioned on the border; the excluded groups fell under the following categories: immigrants, mostly of Albanian origin, gypsies, old age pensioners, handicapped, mentally ill and children with special needs, unemployed, drug addicts.
- In Malaga too, the excluded groups are not very different to which we can find in any other Spanish city (unemployed, gypsies, homosexuals, drug addicts, etc) while in Melilla social exclusion is focused on the immigrants.
- Along the Irish border, although border counties north and south share common socio-economic attributes as a result of their rural setting, the social and national imaginaries on each side of the border generate contrasting perceptions of social exclusion, its causes, its subjects and the appropriate policy towards it.

- In Lisbon the groups predominantly considered as socially excluded are undoubtedly those formed by individuals from ethnic minorities which are deeply connected with the Portuguese colonies in the African continent.
- In Corsica, levels of unemployment and regional dynamism are linked and the first one seems to block up the second one. Impoverishment of one part of the population produces a negative effect on the social life.
- In the Italian city of Gorizia, it appears that social exclusion may be attributed to the fall of communism, the downgrading of border controls and consequent loss of jobs, the inability to keep up with the standards and pace of respectable society, middle -class impoverishment and the intrusion of illegal and legal immigrants while in the Slovenia city of Nova Gorica, it may be attributed to the change of the social and economic system, the search for new approaches through privatisation, the inability of a privatised system to provide job security and security for the future, increasing impoverishment due to the distance between purchasing power and the prices of the goods which formerly guaranteed uniform living standards, and an increasing gap between a few rich and a great many poor.

5.4. Crime-related dimensions

With regard to the data collected, the *crime-related dimension* along the border areas is mainly linked with the presence of (a) illegal immigration and of (b) border smuggling.

5.4.1. Illegal Immigration

This is a constant in the areas even if with some differences. Since 1990, Greece experienced an upturn in immigration. Various sources estimate that between 600.000 and 800.000 people live and work illegally in Greece and another 100.000 migrants come from industrialised nations and enjoy legal status. The islands of the North East Aegean (especially Lesbos and Samos) are pathways of illegal entry of various populations (immigrants, refugees, people seeking political asylum) to Greece. In Lesbos, about 700 immigrants mostly illegal and unregistered. Illegal immigrants come into the island from Iraq, Rwanda and Pakistan brought in by Turkish “drivers”. These people aim to get to Athens but also to other European countries where they ask for political asylum. In the island, there is no such thing as a centre of relief for immigrants and as a result they are driven to the local police stations where they are held under harsh conditions until their time comes to be transported to Athens. There are no clear indications to deal with the problem; main gaps in policy are seen in the inability of local organisations and institutions in mapping precise immigrant numbers and in the inability to suggest policies.

Regarding the quantification of the number of migrants in a clandestine situation in Portugal, or in the Lisbon area, it is impossible to get accurate statistical data due to the nature of the phenomena: they come to Portugal with a tourist visa, to which follows an illegal situation, because they are not recognised as immigrants. The clandestine situation of most of the migrating groups strengthens this situation of professional exclusion, placing the population into jobs belonging mostly to building and public works sectors. Therefore, they establish an extremely precarious work bond, submitted to be “underground”, which does not allow them to have any kind of social protection. Criminality among the younger emigrant groups with difficult integration in their present society has grown within the city and Lisbon’s metropolitan area. There is also a new flow, more intense flow, especially of women (coming from Brazil, Hungary and Russia)

participating in a net of prostitution houses. They come in often through Portugal, and afterwards they spread out among the other countries of the European Union, namely Spain, France, Italy. In Malaga and Melilla, exclusion affects undocumented people (illegal immigrants). The situation is worse for Algerians, because there is general rejection, due to different reasons, (criminality of Algerians; Moroccan feeling translated to all society; West-phobia and political manipulation). In Melilla, it is not possible to ignore the increase of the importance of illegal trade, mainly smuggling, drug and immigration traffic.

The north-east Italian border area is one of the most accessible gateways for illegal activities. There are many people who cross the border illegally. They come from Kosovo, Albania, Romania, Kurdistan or even further, and they are directed to other part of Europe. This area is a transit point for thousands of people every month, mainly refugees who cross the border illegally. Most try to reach the large Italian cities, because police controls in this area are very strict, or other European countries, in particular Germany. Recently, there have been many people arriving from Turkey and Pakistan and directed towards other European Countries, in particular Germany and France, where they have relatives or think there are job opportunities. These movements have increased over the last few years, in particular as a consequence of the geo-political changes in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. The first flow coincided with the Bosnian war, the second with war in Kosovo. Then the flow continued, also with immigration from Russia and Rumania. Organised crime behind this illegal immigration is becoming alarming. These arrests involve considerable costs because police forces involved have increased and the refugees are given food and shelter for a couple of days before being repatriated. In addition, there is illegal traffic of money, weapons, and drug. Money trafficking is certainly influenced by the presence of the casino (in Nova Gorica) over the border and it also involves the rest of Italy.

5.4.2. Border smuggling

The smuggling problem is evident along the Irish border in particular. During the second half of the 1970s, the border saw a steady increase in illegal activities. On the one hand, paramilitaries were intensifying their campaign, and on the other smugglers had discovered that it was relatively easy to make money by pocketing EEC benefits by faking the export of goods like tomatoes, grain, and cattle. The same load was legally exported to the other side of the border in order to obtain the benefits, and then smuggled back overnight to be re-exported again the following morning. Smuggling has been an economic resource for the local population ever since the settlement of the border. Smuggling small quantities of butter, razor blades and meat was for decades a minor but steady source of income, and apparently a cross-community activity. The overall social acceptance of smuggling was also acknowledged by Customs Officers. In areas like South Armagh, with its proximity to the border and with a rural population that was largely Catholic and nationalist, smugglers were by no means isolated or marginal individuals. On the contrary, they were well integrated into the social fabric: smuggling was never seen as a crime in society here. Smuggling is now seen as a quasi-legitimate activity and a good source of income, but not really as politically acceptable as it was in the good old days.

6. Advances in the state of the art and policy implications: The Social and the Spatial dimension

This chapter explains how the state of the art has been advanced, highlighting the most important methodological and pragmatological results that are relevant across Europe or large parts of it, and explaining how the European collaborative effort has contributed to the obtained results. This is done in the first section, which also identifies future needs for research efforts, in particular at the European level. Such needs are also highlighted in sections 6.2 up to 6.5 on policy implications, which form an essential part of this chapter. The four sections on policy expand on our project results and also recommendations in the domain of policy. We have found discontinuity and fragmentation at all levels (EU, national, regional, local) and all sectors (economic, social, urban and regional policy), as well as certain recurring problems, which can be and must be addressed by policy makers.

6.1. Methodological and pragmatological advances

Our analysis has a bearing on the intersection of identity group formations and politics, border policy and culture. It has, hopefully, advanced the understanding of minority rights, group identity, minority and majority nationalisms in the context of democratisation, and on the security and stability of localities and regions on the EU border. Although the management, settlement, and prevention of ethnic conflicts was outside the scope of this project, some understanding towards this goal has been obtained, too.

6.1.1. Methodological advances: a critique of quantitative approaches and the necessity for qualitative indicators

The insertion of social, generational and *spatial* differentiation into the notions of social exclusion, as well as racism and xenophobia, in place of the usual “national” accounts, is of paramount importance in understanding their dynamics and interpretation. The methodological advances achieved in our project, which is in effect a concrete path away from positivism, become tangibly obvious by a contrast of our methods with those of the most recent Eurobarometer survey (Eurobarometer / EUMC 2001). The latter sees racism and xenophobia in terms of national averages (Tables 18, 19), on the basis of a quantitative elaboration of data based on 16,078 questionnaires done in the EU Member States over the period 5 April – 23 May 2000. In other words, on the basis of about 1000 interviews in each EU country (a rather small and unstratified sample), “national” attitudes are stereotyped in what constitutes a form of “labelling”, tantamount to a sort of racism itself.

According to our methodological standpoint, even if the sample were larger, this is an inappropriate way to approach these sensitive matters, and can lead to the *social construction of “otherness” and social exclusion*. This is already a danger invested in accounts by the mass media. References to the national “character” of perceptions, obscures underlying causes of racism, xenophobia and social exclusion by attributing them to natives of certain nation states. Adopting a deceptive duality between host and immigrant, it also underplays conflicts between immigrant groups and deletes the important variations by age, class, history and place in social exclusion, racism and tolerance. This is something which we will expand upon in the next section, because all our case studies diverge from the “national averages” posited by the Eurobarometer survey and unshaded in the following Tables 18 and 19; and also because interpretation involves all the above qualitative components.

Table 18: Typology of people according to their attitudes towards minority groups

Country	Intolerant	Ambivalent	Passively tolerant	Actively tolerant
Belgium	25	28	26	22
Denmark	20	17	31	33
Germany	18	29	29	24
Greece	27	43	22	7
Italy	11	21	54	15
Spain	4	18	61	16
France	19	26	31	25
Ireland	13	21	50	15
Luxembourg	8	32	33	28
Netherlands	11	25	34	31
Portugal	9	34	44	13
United Kingdom	15	27	36	22
Finland	8	21	39	32
Sweden	9	15	43	33
Austria	12	30	37	20
EU 15	14	25	39	21

Source: Eurobarometer/ EUMC 2001: 25. Figures represent percentages. Differences of 6% and more are deemed statistically significant.

Table 19: „Do you find the presence of people of another religion disturbing?“

	Not disturbing	don't know	disturbing
Spain	92.9	1.5	5.6
Finland	90.7	1.8	7.5
Luxembourg	89.1	3.2	7.7
Ireland	89.1	3.7	7.2
Portugal	88.8	1.1	10.1
Netherlands	88.5	1.9	9.6
Italy	84.7	3.6	11.7
United Kingdom	83.6	5.2	11.2
Austria	82.3	6.1	11.6
Sweden	80.2	2.5	17.3
France	78.2	4.5	17.3
Greece	78.0	1.9	20.1
Germany	75.7	8.0	16.3
Belgium	71.5	2.9	25.6
Denmark	66.5	1.8	31.7
EU 15	82.0	3.7	14.3

Source: Eurobarometer/ EUMC 2001: in the Internet

Based on a general quantitative national attitudinal survey, the Eurobarometer “freezes” a time-specific – often momentary – individual attitude, crudely interprets and classifies a yes/ no reply, and certainly underplays *ambivalence* and *fluidity*. These emerge between hosts and

immigrants but also between immigrant and transient groups, such as gypsies, and are conditioned by culture contact and immigrant criminality, by the distinction between economic migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, and by the difference that *place* makes: there are places with a local history of migrations or of fixity, there are large urban areas of the core, polarized cities, peripheral regions flooded by immigrants or isolated from them, and, of course, there are EU border regions, focused upon in our own research project. A spatial differentiation already done by the EUMC, which analyzed the Eurobarometer data, defies its own method: in its multivariate regression model, “there is no model for the Mediterranean countries that explains more than 15% of the variance” (Eurobarometer/ EUMC 2001: 20). In other words, Southern Europe resists this quantitative method!

On the basis of the critique to the Eurobarometer findings which the present project constitutes, we have recommended **the construction of qualitative indicators for social exclusion**. As for quantification, we should avoid researching attitudes to “others” as we do in electoral opinion polls, and should rather concentrate our efforts in counting the membership or electorate of parties with xenophobic platforms, or of racist groups and associations, or measure and classify violent racist episodes, if we wish to follow the positivist logic at any cost.

The **methodological advance** of this project has been to argue the above points, to deconstruct dualities, and to establish the use of a *critical realist* epistemology as an alternative to the positivist logic. We have, hopefully, demonstrated that this is the method appropriate to research the *ambivalence* and *fluidity* invested in notions of social exclusion and racism, evidenced in *ambiguous* accounts which change in time in certain places. Both of the above can be supported on the basis of our research project results and on our generalisations about the periphery of Europe in general. It has been argued at length here, on the basis of findings in our six localities, that we can not even speak about social exclusion or racism, for that matter, through one round of quantitative data based on questionnaires targeted at stereotyping national averages of attitudes to “immigrants”, as the Eurobarometer has done.

6.1.2. Pragmatological advances: Ambivalence, fluidity and poles of “otherness”


The general objective of our research project on Border Cities and Towns, has been to address social tensions by placing the periphery firmly into the debate on social exclusion, empirically, theoretically, methodologically, but also politically, thereby throwing light on the causes of social exclusion in Europe *in general*. Turning away from the EU core, which is the usual milieu of poverty, polarisation and social exclusion studies, we have targeted the *periphery* of Europe: six territories and regions located on either the external borders of the EU, or in peripheral / frontier regions. The Universities and Research Institutes forming our network are located in cities and towns which experience *treble peripherality*: they are close to the external European border; in less favoured regions; and away from European development corridors.

Each one of these *three* elements of peripherality, bears with it one *pole of “otherness”*. The most important **finding** has been the demonstration of interlocking perceptions, or lack of them, at times and places, of “the vulnerable” or “the immigrant”, “the core”, and the communities “across the border”. In our field work we have found that social cohesion or its opposite, reaching up to manifestations of aggressiveness and social pathology, are closely related with all three (or four) of these poles of “otherness”, which interconnect in interpreting social exclusion. The resistance of border city residents in the context of treble peripherality, is relevant with the ambiguity of their narratives around foreigners and “outsiders”, in various ways. The six localities on or near the external borders of the EU are an especially interesting locale for the investigation of *changes in identity construction* vis-à-vis a diverse set of “others” classified here under the three poles of “otherness”:

- those who enter through the borderline as immigrants, often illegal, or as refugees, to claim residence and employment informally and then move on, or proceed to formal claims,
- those who reside across the border, and
- those who impose themselves as powerful “others” controlling funds and rules of conduct.


We found that social exclusion of vulnerable groups, especially immigrants, refugees and transients, is polyvalent, and dividing lines are more diverse than the host/ immigrant duality. Exclusion must be seen in conjunction with perceptions of “the other” across the border by hosts as well as immigrants themselves; but it is also a corollary of social exclusion felt vis-à-vis “the other” in “the core” – the national capital or the international centres or Europe, in this case. The interpenetration of these three poles of “otherness” is neither clearly formulated in relevant narratives, nor permanent. In every sense, it is *ambivalent* and *fluid*. Our conclusions will tend to revolve in insecure grounds for generalisation, until these concepts are recognized and incorporated into our theoretical framework. *Ambivalence* is the coexistence in a person’s mind of opposing feelings, especially love and hate, in a single context. This can only be detected by a researcher by *ambiguity* in a narrative. Expressions which can be interpreted in more than one way or have double meaning – deliberate or due to inexactness of expression – indicate ambiguity (Encarta 1999). We have often found *ambiguity* in the narratives by border residents, seen either as host populations or as immigrants and transients. This expresses various levels of *ambivalence* vis-à-vis each other rather than immigrants only.

Figure 4: Borders and boundaries around the island of Lesbos



Source: Afouxenidis in Leontidou et al. 2000: 37

Figure 5: Nationalist and Unionist Views of Northern Ireland's Borders



Source: Donnan in Leontidou et al. 2000: 58.

Ambivalence towards immigrant populations as “others”, is only a small part of the story in the six localities on the EU border. There is also ambivalence amongst various groups of immigrants and refugees and transient populations. At the same time, there are at least two other poles of “otherness”. The *second* pole is “*the other*” *across the border*, which, in fact, is not predictably drawn where we normally and formally place it on the map as an international border: in peripheral Europe, it may be drawn elsewhere (Figures 4 and 5). This *mental map* is usually intersubjective and may – and often does – create a *third pole of otherness*: “*the other*” *in the core and / or the global order*, the power bloc which dictates rules and often puts livelihoods in danger, as so often has happened in the Balkans.

These external power centres dictate the dominant (and often hegemonic) narratives. Concrete public (and European) policy is elaborated around official classifications and hence construction of “recognized” differences, generating institutions geared towards the “special needs” of various groups assumed to arise from cultural traditions which are defined *a priori* as not compatible with those of the host society (Leontidou et al. 2000). This is another point where we have to stress the necessity for the **construction of qualitative indicators**, not only for social exclusion, racism and xenophobia, but also for the nature of “difference” among local cultures, including transient and fluid communities.

Contradictions thus created, reproduce ambivalence coupled with *fluidity*. This follows the fluidity of the European border itself. Some of these localities have been chosen by our project as external EU borders, but will soon become internal ones. In history, borders have changed within the context of perceived challenges to the idea of the “nation-state” (Donnan & Wilson 1999). This is expressed more specifically in the dichotomy between the “nation”, which represents a bounded culture-identity entity, and the “state”, which represents the territorial form. Despite the shift towards a re-examination of identities within this context, especially with the addition of questions of European citizenship alongside “nationality”, much discussion locates the issue of “identity” in relation to the nation-state model which essentially naturalizes identities as somehow “fixed” (Leontidou et al. 2000). The most obvious example here, is the recent Eurobarometer survey. However, the fluidity encountered in our case studies undermines this institutional

“fixing” of identities, and nationalities are dissolved into other characteristics of populations: social classes, generational cohorts, “tribes” and “flows” (Castells 1996), cosmopolitans, transients, and residents in a diversity of localities.

On top of this fluidity of borders in recent history, EU integration has created an hierarchy of borders, which are rather new in European history. There is a growing distance between conditions in internal and external EU borders, and an intensification of the debate on “Fortress Europe” over the past few years. The hierarchy arose as internal EU borders have formally loosened up, formally “relaxed” or “demolished” with the Schengen agreement, while external borders have tightened (Leontidou & Afouxenidis 1999). Another type of border has followed developments in Eastern Europe, and a fourth type has emerged after discussion in Nice about further European integration which will increase the member states from 15 to 27. This *multiple hierarchy of borders* is not reflected in policy. Among different EU policies, the INTERREG Community Initiative and EUREGIO policies include many dissimilar places and create advantages for those of the *internal* borders (Leontidou & Afouxenidis 1999; Perrin 1996; Acherman 1995). And, as we will discuss in section 6.5 below, the PHARE initiative is relevant with the *external* borders and appears inadequate, if compared with the problems facing them and if contrasted with the diversity of these external borders.

6.1.3. The interpretation of six ambiguous local narratives

The several corners of Europe, where our field work has been conducted, have shown very diverse experiences: we have encountered six local narratives, each of which includes not one, but several diverse representations of social exclusion and the border, of racism and geographical spaces. Ambiguity and fluidity flow from these narratives. Even more important, each locality diverges from the national “average” portrayed in quantitative approaches (Eurobarometer Tables 18 & 19). In fact, relationships with the “core” itself are also ambivalent and fluid. Our research methodology has anticipated such diversity, rather than hoping to construct a grand narrative of “national characteristics” or of the “external EU border”, or of “peripheral Europe”, for that matter. The field techniques used have been appropriately targeted to the repossession of complex and diverse experiences and dimensions at the inter-subjective level. We have addressed institutional interviews to representatives of structured groups, or to knowledgeable individuals. The multi-faceted perceptions of “the other” – i.e. “the immigrant”, “the core”, and the communities “across the border” – are summarized below, and are reflected in the title of each distinct chapter of our first Annual Report (Leontidou et al. 2000).

1. Shifting hinterlands in the Aegean

According to the recent survey by Eurobarometer, Greece reportedly evidences the densest incidences of xenophobia in the EU (Tables 18 & 19). In fact, enclaves of social pathology, often associated with the church, are intolerant especially against religious minorities. However, given the sudden influx of immigrants from Eastern Europe and the Middle East in the 1990s, as well as Africans and Far Eastern immigrants in previous decades, given the high incidence of illegal migration and friction in the Balkans, there is clearly an element of surprise to be accounted for here. According to recent Greek surveys, the incidence of racism declines with age group, is low and sporadic, while protective and paternalist attitudes towards certain groups of immigrants are widespread. This diversity was indicated in our research in Lesvos. The island of Lesvos is a pathway of illegal entry of various populations, including immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers. Ambivalence towards them merges with aggressiveness against “the core”, namely Athens and Brussels, expressed by residents, as shown on the following table.

Table 20: Ambivalence to places and excluded groups in Lesvos

Toward “the core”		Towards immigrants	
Affirm	Deny	Affirm	Deny
Exclusion as shown by objective facts such as: lack of health infrastructure, transportation difficulties and problems related to a centralised system of government.	Although there are some problems associated with living away from the “centre”, the feeling of exclusion is more associated with the reproduction of myths generated in the “centre”, i.e. in Athens.	Some excluded groups are considered to be the Albanians, the Gypsies, and some migrants (retornados) of Greek origin who came back after the break-up of the former Soviet Union Most of these groups are exploited at the workplace.	Although these groups are excluded and there are no visible patterns of assimilation developing, the local population is much more friendly and hospitable than elsewhere. This is translated to forms of “acceptance” such as higher wages than elsewhere in Greece.

Source: Afouxenidis in Leontidou et al. 2000: 35.

Like Corsica, Lesvos is an “insular” economy, increasingly a pathway of illegal entry and transience, faced with the feeling of socio-spatial exclusion. In the context of the EU (and even Greece), Lesvos is also a frontier. Its inhabitants – along with those of Corsica – present one of the clearest cases of the placement of the border elsewhere from where we formally draw it, as shown on Map 1. In this marginal region on the periphery of Greece and away from major European or national development corridors, the residents have become ambivalent against core regions of Greece and Europe, and against globalisation, while the border with Turkey is undeniably present, too. For most of the Lesvos residents, however, the “other” across this external border is not necessarily an enemy. Going back in history, we discovered a series of phases in the development of the island which came to marginalize it over the 19th and early 20th century by cutting it off from Turkey. Changes in the demarcation of the border affected the local economy and shifted the hinterland of Lesvos from the Asia Minor coast, until the island became gradually isolated and the feeling of insularity set in. We can venture to report that, with notable exceptions such as the Prefect and other agents, there is nevertheless a hope in the island, that contacts with the nearby coast will be resumed in the context of globalisation and EU integration (Leontidou et al. 2000).

2. Back-to-back economies in N. Ireland

The inhabitants of Ireland appear as more tolerant than those of the UK in issues of foreigners according to the recent survey by Eurobarometer (Tables 1 & 2). Both regions evidence incidences of xenophobia close to the EU average. However, Ireland has been a divided island for many decades because of another rift, a domestic rift between Catholics and Protestants, Republicans and Loyalists, Nationalists and Unionists. The incidents on the border dividing the island are noteworthy. The best notion for the nature of economic life has been that of a “back to back economy” rather than “face to face”: a condition which is supported by evidence and illustrated by the nature of infrastructure which ‘runs’ along the border rather than across it (Donnan in Leontidou et al. 2000). The concept of “differentiated integration” can be also applied here, since most of economic life has been directed and organised from the central state, thus not allowing the development of certain forms of grass-roots initiatives to develop.

Divergences in meaning between the two opposing communities, point out that these groups feel mutually excluded in certain sorts of ways. The specific areas studied by our project, the towns of Armagh and Monaghan, have seen a lot of violence in recent times and have attracted a lot of EU funding in the past, with the P & R Project as an exemplary initiative for reconciliation in this divided island (Leontidou et al. 2000).

The residential communities are divided throughout history on political grounds, and this is evident on the map as religious segregation (Jones 1960). Now there are also foreigners. For the most part, they are transients – travellers, gypsies and peripatetic populations. They regularly cross the border and claim benefits from N. Ireland. In local narratives riddled with ambiguity, people appear tolerant to these sorts of “foreigners” and also do not show any resentment against the EU and globalisation. It is Protestants who voice their independence from the “core”, but in this case this is Britain. Populations do not appear to share in any significant degree the proverbial British Euroscepticism.

3. Migrants and retornados in metropolitan Lisbon

Portugal evidences tolerance and a very high incidence of ambivalence in issues of foreigners according to the recent survey by Eurobarometer (Tables 1 & 2). Inhabitants of Lisbon tend to attribute this to the culture of emigration shared with other countries of Southern Europe. The Portuguese have migrated to France, Germany, and many to Lisbon’s Metropolitan Area, in a massive wave of internal migration. Between the 1960s and 1980s, Portugal experienced an expansion of its metropolitan area, though many of the migrants eventually moved to Paris. Inhabitants of Lisbon even say that in the 1970s the second largest Portuguese city was Paris. At the same time, since the 1970s Lisbon has experienced an increase in immigration as a result of the return of people from the Portuguese colonies, the *retornados*, a flow which is currently strengthened by the arrival of African immigrants making Lisbon an inter-ethnic cross-roads – in other words, a *frontier*. Recent estimates suggest that between 160,000 and 200,000 African immigrants originating from the old Portuguese colonies have moved to Portugal, with the majority living in Lisbon (*L’ Autre Afrique*, 23 September 1997: 93 cited by Matias Ferreira in Leontidou et al. 2000).

There is a vast variety of immigrants within Lisbon: those of a colonial background, immigrants from Africa, and those from peripheral Portugal. These have highlighted the diversity of social exclusion experiences in Lisbon, as well as of the experiences of crossing borders. An interesting comparison contrasts the experiences between migrants from rural Portugal who have not crossed any “objective” border – despite the fact that there exists a symbolic boundary between the city and the country – and that of African immigrants who have had to go through an official, institutionalised border. The ambivalence shown in international statistics agrees with our findings for Lisbon. Finally, there is hardly any evidence of Euroscepticism here.

4. On the border between Europe and Africa: Malaga and Melilla

Spain figures as one of the most tolerant countries towards foreigners in the EU, according to the recent survey by Eurobarometer (Tables 1 & 2). This can be probably attributed to the culture of emigration, along with the nature of migrant communities of Spain. These include several retirement migrants from Western Europe and residential tourism (Leontidou & Marmaras 2000). Malaga and Melilla form a couplet of towns – though not a twin-city complex like the Italian one in our project – between Europe and Africa. The specificity of Melilla, a Spanish town planted in Morocco, which has its own government and is encircled by an international border, raises the issue of the hierarchy of borders: there are perceived differences between regional borders

(between Spanish regions), internal EU borders (Portugal, France) and external borders (Spain and Morocco, where Melilla is embedded). The experience of crossing different types of borders and boundaries generates different perceptions of exclusion for residents, migrants, but also for daily commuters who cross borders every morning and evening. Moroccans cross in order to work in Spanish Melilla. In addition, transitory immigrants and gypsies create in Malaga and Melilla a specific sense of the border as a gateway from Africa to Europe, in different respects (Leontidou et al. 2000: chapter 4).

In the case of Spain, ambivalence against “other regions” of the same country is frequently voiced, but this issue has not been taken up in our project. Andalusia against the Basque country, or Catalonia or Castille, rather than peripheral regions against a national “core”, is the issue of ambiguity. The EU and globalisation do not figure in Andalusian and Melillan local narratives about “the other”.

5. The feeling of insularity in Corsica

According to the recent survey by Eurobarometer, France reportedly evidences high incidences of racism and xenophobia, especially in issues of religion (Tables 1 & 2). Corsica is a case where narratives are ambiguous, merging foreigners – including tourists, for some groups – with distances from the national “core”. The island brings to the foreground, perhaps most of all other case studies, the importance of *cultural* forms of social exclusion, since strong feelings against the mainland expressed. Isolation is voiced *despite* the strong economic subsidies coming from the central French state. On first observation, this might be thought of as a paradox. Despite economic subsidies, the population of Corsica consider themselves as excluded from “the other” in the “core” and submitted to a sort of internal colonialism. The feeling of *insularity* is clear, but the actual fact of exclusion is more difficult to be observed and determined.

Corsica combines elements of exclusion on the border in terms of its geography (an island between Europe and Africa, between France and Italy), its economy (in-between the developed and the underdeveloped world) and its culture (a strong rural society attracted to an urban system). The island underlines our theory that focusing on economic determinants of social exclusion often neglects other important forms (Leontidou et al. 2000). An interesting aspect of this case study, is that it allows us to examine the degree to which subsidising, or positively discriminating, can alleviate or amplify forms of social exclusion: it can not! In terms of this dimension, important questions arise regarding, not just the level of subsidies and where are they directed, but *how* they are determined and allocated.

6. Differentiated integration in NE Italy

Just like other Southern European nationals, Italians figure as quite tolerant in the EU context in issues of foreigners according to the recent survey by Eurobarometer (Tables 1 & 2). What is not evident in such tables, is the important *fluidity* of perceptions of “the other” in Italian border regions. Slovenians changed from a population beyond the iron curtain, to associates in commerce, tourism or exchange and cooperation with Italians. The towns of Gorizia and Nova Gorica, included in our project, form a *twin city* on the Italian-Slovenian border separated by a fence under demolition. This twin city is characterized by cultural diversity, since it concentrates several different ethnic groups, but these tend to cooperate in several fronts. The end of the bipolar cold war has meant a significant change in the importance of the border between Italy and Slovenia. It became less “hard” or more “porous” as an increasing number of people, goods and services began to be transferred across the border (Gasparini & Zago in Leontidou et al. 2000).

The people living in border towns in the area demonstrate what has been called “differentiated integration”. Past research on the area has underlined the need to differentiate the wider regions in many of their institutional and official needs and requirements from those of their respective nation-states, under whose jurisdiction they operate, and to insert them into a regional framework. In the case of Gorizia, the *fluidity* of perceptions of social exclusion is closely related to the issue of nationalism: when nationalism tends to be more vibrant or demanding, social exclusion of minorities or other ethnic groups tends to be harder or more absolute (Leontidou et al. 2000). This may be accompanied by the “hardening” of previously “soft” boundaries as in multicultural areas which are characterised by heterogeneity and plurality, such as Gorizia. The ethnic variable seems to be the most important in relation to social exclusion in small towns like Gorizia. As for the “core” or globalisation, attitudes are rather positive. Italian institutions take advantage of EU funding and programmes and do not appear Eurosceptic.

In conclusion, we found that border residents tend to draw *intersubjective mental maps* with their borders and boundaries, most often more than one, which define *poles of “otherness”* in several original and apparently unpredictable ways, which have yet to be unpacked in the course of fieldwork and qualitative research, rather than being frozen as “national characteristics” in quantitative surveys. The policy relevance of these project results and advancements will be explored now in the following sections at the social, economic and spatial levels.

6.2. Social policy for exclusion and the border

6.2.1. Understanding the nature of social policy as cultural practice

The purpose of this chapter is not so much to propose or define a general harmonizing approach to restructuring social policies in the EU, for this requires a whole new research programme which would look at such policies in detail over a longer period of time and would need to target at specific areas which urgently need attention. Rather, we attempt to build on the experience gained from the research findings of the six sites and from our initial theoretical framework outlined previously (see six-monthly and Annual Reports and also Leontidou et al 2000: 14-17). The main thrust of the argument is that we need to depart from standard social exclusion research methodology of “target groups” towards an investigation of *local societies* as a whole. This acquires a stronger significance when we are dealing with border societies and cultures where concepts such as *territoriality* and *spatiality* have to be combined with social exclusion dynamics.

Different EU policies reveal their restricted theoretical and spatial scope when the border is in question. It has been argued elsewhere (Leontidou & Afouxenidis 1999) that EU policy has a strong productivist emphasis, from the Structural Funds (Objectives 1, 2, 5b) to Community initiatives, as well as a welfarist emphasis as in Objectives 3 and 4, and has turned increasingly to monetarism after Maastricht (CEC 1993, 1994). Other dimensions are rare and occasional. The INTERREG Community Initiative hardly interacts at all with social exclusion studies. Problems of ethnic tension, illegal migration, asylum seeking, hostilities, escalation of security problems, instability repelling enterprises, depopulation and brain drain, economic decline and cultural composition and identities create an environment which sustains a variety of types of social exclusion, objectively and *inter-subjectively* (Leontidou & Afouxenidis 1999). In addition, problems linked to immigrant and refugee populations have intensified: “do all countries, irrespective of their size, density, economies, politics, social structure, and political ideologies, have the same moral obligations with respect to whom they ought to admit?” (Weiner, 1995 : 169).

At the same time, profound changes are occurring throughout the whole of the EU especially in relation to employment patterns which in turn affect the finance of social welfare programmes.

Recent evidence suggests that about 70% of the new jobs created in the EU are in the tertiary - service sector with substantial increases in the amount of temporary and part -time jobs. Also, changing demographics have altered the ratio of social security contributions creating pressures on the whole system. This is a particular type of problem closely related to the delivery of social policy which almost always requires substantial levels of expenditure. For the purpose of this discussion (and throughout this project) we have taken economic and social policies more or less for granted. The basic issue with respect to the research findings is connected to the following two themes:

- firstly, the uni -dimensionality of many social policy frameworks is at present opposed to the multi-dimensionality of reality;
- secondly, in many cases, social exclusion is relational and shifts beyond economics. We have found a relative convergence of socially excluded groups in the different localities, but *fragmentation and difference* in the ways problems are tackled within the different areas. Subsequently, it is not so much only a question of measuring social exclusion but rather looking and understanding how people perceive social exclusion.

This last point brings us back to the question of *territoriality* and *culture*. The six research sites not only differ in geographical terms but also in terms of their cultural configuration. There are many distinctions (as are similarities) between them with respect to the general “macro” level of social policy, but there are also other important distinctions which stem from the more sublime cultural practices and processes which are to be found in each separate site. These essentially reflect the means and ways that the various communities and groups deal with social exclusion. For example, insularity, a common theme in both Lesbos and Corsica is perceived rather differently by the two local population groups. In Lesbos, local society accepts “insularity” as a phenomenon which draws the island away from the centre of political and economic activity and because of the existence of a “closed” border to Turkey, until recently, has not looked to the east in order to remedy this. At the same time, this disadvantage is “turned into a locational, spatial advantage, emphasizing difference and continuity” (Afouxeni *dis* in Leontidou et al 2000: 33). In Corsica, cultural identity is stressed much more by the local population as a dominant factor of social and economic exclusion: “cultural features are not understood in France and by its political representatives” (Pera ldi in Leontidou et al 2000: 144). In both cases a cultural boundary is erected, although relatively weaker in the case of Lesbos, which transcends all aspects of policy making including “top -down” social policies.

The diversity of attitudes and cultural practices resulting from the existence of the border is also evident in Ireland and in Italy. On the Irish border communities are divided both in terms of politics and of religion: “the border constitutes a source of social exclusion for the local community not only in so far as it marks the point furthest from the centre. Equally influential is the perception of the border as a line which artificially divides those who live on each of its sides. Even Unionists, who do not perceive the border as artificial and unnecessary, recognise it as a barrier and a source of isolation” (Donnan in Leontidou et al 2000: 60). In Gorizia the presence of a political border with an Eastern European country, has generated a different approach by the local community even though “the local border in the past had negative connotations” (Zago in Leontidou et al. 2000: 187). In this area the relaxation of the border has created the opportunity for social and economic development and as a consequence research showed that it was not perceived by the local community as a factor of social exclusion.

Finally the Portuguese and Spanish examples give us another set of perceptions. In Lisbon, perceptions arise from both the nature and character of Portuguese economic development and problems related to urban agglomeration and segregation, especially with respect to the migrant populations. Here the issue of urban poverty concentrated in particular areas of the city has

dominated the discussion on social policy. However, an alternative cultural trajectory has been dominant in shaping the policy debate. Most of the agents interviewed recommended changes “regarding intervention levels in the fight against exclusion: listening to people towards whom the action is directed; bringing to the spot those who have the power to decide; working *with* and not *for* the communities through their own involvement” (Matias Ferreira in Leontidou et al. 2000: 94). In Malaga, because of the existence of the twin city of Melilla, the border was perceived as a determinant of exclusion, a factor which sharply distinguishes this case from the Italian one for example. In this case the imagery of exclusion is perhaps stronger than in many of the other research sites because it reflects a sharply distinctive line of separation between rich Europe and poor Africa. However, although the border is supposedly “closed” by it being strongly fenced and guarded it is in fact a point of frequent co-operation. In cultural terms, the whole city of Melilla is perceived as a “stop cork which encloses poverty in the north of Morocco” and which simultaneously excludes people from the mainland and the Spanish welfare state. Subsequently, the whole of Melilla is viewed as a remote island similar to Lesbos or Corsica. This is opposed to the case of Malaga which, as was pointed out, is perceived in terms of good expectations while acknowledging that there are zones of exclusion and “marginal quarters” (Leontidou et al. 2000: 127-8).

All these distinct cultural representations of social exclusion usually stand in opposition to largely uniform systems of social policy and protection. It can be argued that those systems are, more or less, oriented towards promoting similarity rather than encouraging and stimulating difference. Essentially, western welfare systems generated a universal vocabulary of marginalization. Recent postmodern interpretations related to the nature of identity and/or boundary formation, are crucial in demonstrating the cultural significance of the nation-state as a ‘moulder’ of social inequality. There are still major gaps in comprehending the organizing principles (economic as well as non-economic) which promote divisions across different modern European societies. The state (and through it nationalism) has always created dichotomies and divisions, continuously shifting the ground with respect to generating new boundaries and borders which justify its existence (Anderson, 1997). In this multi-faceted context, a renegotiation of theory with respect to the character and the constitution of the state would be particularly useful.

Populations have not had the opportunity to be heard or make decisions affecting their future. Although the rhetoric of a civil society has acquired a renewed dimension in the 1990s, it has been superimposed by ideas of individual and market-oriented systems of provision. The issue of “bottom-up” policy making, of empowerment and of cultural sensitivity, that is that citizens *must* have a voice, remains open. Some of the issues concerning welfare delivery agencies are shown in the list below and are indicative of the overall problematic nature of the system:

- Agents recognize that changes in people’s needs and options mean that their operation, staffing and programmes must change, even though they are not always sure how. Conflicting views and attitudes amongst agents result in further inadequacy of provision. The agents are themselves carriers of cultural practices.
- Agencies experience internal and external tensions created by welfare reforms that negatively affect their functioning. There is a problem of understaffing.
- Agencies may not receive adequate or timely information about changes in welfare regulations and policies.
- Lack of information on some border areas with respect to issues such as poverty, unemployment, immigration, etc. creates problems.
- Fragmentation of agencies across the six research sites coincides with overlapping activities in many of them.

- In some cases inadequacy of community -based agencies and NGOs runs parallel with expectations that they play an important role in distributing information to the local community.

6.2.2. Towards developing a framework of culturally -sensitive policies for immigration and social exclusion: problems facing the localities

In general the above brief di scussion describes an initial tentative framework which calls for searching to find new and innovative ways of strengthening and extending social protection through the use of policies which can be combined in different ways and in different situations. The policy aspects which can also be translated to policy recommendations are basically related to the following four main issues:

- A greater emphasis should be given on promoting cross -border cooperation with many agencies operating on the same or either sid es of the border.
- Agencies should be more vertically integrated so that they do not duplicate efforts to resolve various issues.
- Alternative ways should be found to deal with the issue of migrant and transientt populations especially with respect to the o nes that have already settled.
- Agencies and governments should recognise that cultural exclusion may also be linked to group exclusion. More emphasis should be given on the recognition of the potential strengths cultures possess in dealing with difficult c onditions.

In the six research sites some or all of the above points were missing. In *Lesvos* for example, many agencies dealt with a variety of issues (see table below), but the service provided has not been so effective because of lack of joining up effor ts, duplication and not exchanging information. This is generally true for the whole of the social welfare network in Greece which is characterised by fragmentation and inability to cope with social problems.

Table 21: Welfare support institutions

Centre for creative occupation : mainly geared towards pre -school age children coming from working low -income and immigrant families.

Nursery and Public Library for children

Centre of psychiatric support : consultancy role, dealing with individuals and families whi ch are mainly faced with various disability problems. People are brought together following patterns of group therapy. May provide financial assistance if necessary. Understaffed.

Centre for women job seekers : dealing with legal (registered) migrant women who seek employment by providing information to local employers through the Chamber of Commerce.

Bank for clothes, food and toys : in conjunction with local businesses and private individuals such material is collected and redistributed to children in need (especially children from immigrant families). Supervised by the nursery centre.

Centre for drug prevention : in association with the local authority, the Church and the Medical Association, it focuses on drug prevention and education.

Care unit for the age d and chronically sick : voluntary, non -profit making organisation funded by private and public donations. Established in 1994, underfunded and poorly staffed.

Source: Afouxenidis in Leontidou et al. 2000: 36

As we have already discussed in the previous reports with respect to the case of Greece, two main themes came up from the responses related to immigration policy and to welfare support for the excluded groups.

An example of Immigration policy: Greece

Over the past 20 years and especially since 1990, Greece experienced an upturn in immigration. Various sources estimate that between 600,000 and 800,000 people live and work illegally in Greece and another 100,000 migrants come from industrialized nations and enjoy legal status. During 1997 it was announced that, starting from the 1st January 1998, “illegal immigrants may register with the government and receive White Cards which will allow them to live and work in Greece while preparing their papers for longer residence permits” – i.e. Green Cards (*Athens News* 1st January 1998: 1). Registration was supposed to be taking place at the various regional employment offices. However, this process proceeded at a very slow pace with only a fraction of the estimated 600,000 undocumented immigrants applying for the Green Card until now. Official figures suggest that about 350,000 (26% female) out of a possible 800,000 immigrants have applied and only 100,000 have received their cards (*Athens News* 6th November 1999: 4). Almost two years after the initial announcements, during 2000, the government, more or less, subtly indicated that the above process had failed and that alternative ways have to be found in order to resolve the issue of illegal residency. However, this has remained at the level of rhetoric and it has become commonly accepted by various organisations that Greece did not manage to formulate a coherent immigration policy over the past 10 years.

In general, governmental policy on this issue has been plagued with problems and inconsistencies reflected in the disillusionment of migrants who have opted to stay illegal. In fact the nature of policy towards the question of handling immigration has been well documented especially with respect to Albanians who form the most substantial majority of people

“the Greek authorities’ intermittent campaigns to deport Albanians reflected their ambiguous attitude towards Albanian immigration, which was seen as both economically beneficial and as a threat to national integrity... Greek and Italian concerns centred on the legitimacy of the Albanians’ presence rather than their demographic impact or their role in the economy, although, as elsewhere, there was anxiety, well-founded or not, about crime associated with immigrants” (Van Hear 1998: 126).

Problems with official policy were reflected in the fact that it proved extremely difficult to talk to some of the immigrants who live and work on the island of Lesbos. At the same time, it has become apparent that most migrants want to be legalised and this is reflected in the response of one Albanian who talked to us:

Of course, in the beginning, it was difficult because the locals looked upon us with suspicion and fear. The greatest difficulty was that I did not speak the language and we did not have enough money. But now with the Green Card things have changed a lot, since we also receive national insurance, we can send our kids to school and our life is generally much better.

Recently (April 2001) the government voted in new immigration legislation which attempts to rectify previous problems and failures. This legislation aims at primarily establishing how many immigrants live in the country by abolishing the previous Green Cards and establishing new services to deal with applications of permanent relocation. At the same time, it attempts to control more incoming migration by putting pressure on potential employers of foreign informal labour and by asking the various Greek consulates abroad to publicise available seasonal work. The assumption here is that employers will follow the rules and that immigrants will only come if they see that certain employment opportunities are available. This assumption runs totally against the reasons behind immigration on a global scale and it is very doubtful

whether this new system will ever be properly implemented. *It is important to note that nowhere in these new regulations is there even a slight hint of policies aiming to integrate foreign cultures and populations into the labour market and/or wider society, or specific measures such as vocational training programmes or programmes aiming to limit racial discrimination.* Lastly, **cooperation with origin countries** is also very low on the agenda.

Such gaps and ambiguities on the part of official policy are directly linked to the nature of policy where gaps are seen in the following areas:

- inability of local organisations and institutions in mapping precise immigrant numbers.
 - constant regard of immigration as a transient issue.
 - inability to suggest policies.
 - principle of non-interference generally inherently applied by welfare support organisations and voluntary groups.
 - acceptance of the principle of ‘racialised labour’, i.e. that these people are only here to do certain jobs and cannot be assimilated into the formal labour market.
- Additionally, the role of NGOs in this area has been insufficient. One of the most interesting examples relates to some anti-racial organisations which act as “buffers” for political parties in order to draw support and/or new membership. These organisations reproduce and reinforce the classic patronage-clientelist system of political relationships. Another problem was related to the “services” and “assistance” some of these organisations offer to migrant populations which are faced with problems with the police, especially arrest. It was suggested to us that in some organisations solicitors intervene passing out mobile phone numbers for immigrants to call once they are arrested. The solicitor then appears at the police station and in receipt of a money hand-out, mobilises the procedure for the arrested person to be released.

Similarly, the question of welfare support for various excluded groups in Lesbos, was riddled with problems which characterise the nature of the welfare state in Greece as a whole. These are related to issues of fragmented services where various authorities are having great difficulty in co-ordinating action. Organisations are understaffed and under-resourced and provide limited services and poor benefits: it is indicative that expenditure in unemployment benefit is only 0.3% of the GDP – the lowest in the EU. Our research has indicated policy gaps in almost every area connected to reducing the impact of social exclusion:

- Housing policy is ad hoc and most benefits are directed to employees of the public sector and certain long-term employed workers. There is no statutory framework to positively enable groups in greater need for housing purchase or rent.
- Policies to combat poverty. Recent estimates suggest that between 18 and 24% of the population are living below the poverty line (EKKE 1996, Rhodes 1997) and yet there are no coherent actions towards reducing the level of poverty.
- Services for the elderly and the disabled. With the exception of open care centres (KAPI), which encourage elderly people to develop an active life, but which provide facilities only for those who are able-bodied, there are no provisions for a substantial number of people who are left in the care of their families.
- Policies for drug-abuse. Users are not treated as people in need. There is very little information and research on issues like spatial distribution of drug addiction, mobility of users, possible effects to local communities, etc. It is mostly left to the police to deal with the problem at both levels of distribution and consumption.

It has been suggested elsewhere (Afouxenidis 1999, Chamberlayne et al 1999, Rhodes 1997) that there are a number of basic similarities between welfare systems in the South of Europe.

These are also culturally constructed and are related to characteristics such as the delegation of care to the family and especially to women; absence of policies for employment; fragmentation of social provision. In the case of Lesbos, the above are related to more general issues of policy reform both at local and national level. This case, however, exemplifies *fundamental structural inadequacies* of the system to deal with social exclusion. Locational and demographic aspects (border island, closed community, small -size population) are important in this respect, in that they act as a temporary filter which alleviates the necessity for finding forms of support for excluded groups.

Welfare support policy in Ireland & Portugal

In *Ireland*, research at the Irish border also suggested that there is considerable fragmentation of the effort to combat social exclusion and that community groups and other voluntary and statutory agencies can be competitors rather than partners. As we have seen, effective communication between different groups in the overall system may be impeded by divergent perceptions of social exclusion.

In 1995, research by the University of Limerick calculated that there were more than 380 cross-border links in Ireland, from environmental associations to religious organisations, from sport to tourism, and from education to agriculture (Murray and Kennedy 1995). After four years of relative peace, their numbers have increased. The directory of community relations projects (Community Relations Council 1998) includes at least forty associations which promote community relations on a specifically cross -border basis, while the second edition of the University of Limerick's register now includes over 500 entries (Murray 1998).

Far from being ignored, the Irish land border has attracted the attention of all sorts of statutory and voluntary agencies in the island of Ireland, whose goal has been to bridge the border and make its influence on social relations less keenly felt. Yet the political border still plays a central role in the shaping of culture and society, and therefore in establishing who from that society has been excluded. The different ways in which the political border influences perceptions of social exclusion which were identified are summarised below.

- Notwithstanding their many social and structural similarities, the two sides of the border have different perceptions of society and its needs, which we have glossed as the “single community” and “two communities” models.
- These models, together with a perception of the border as a divide rather than as an area sharing the same problems of peripheralisation and marginalisation, have influenced the thrust and direction of funding (namely the Peace and Reconciliation Programme), which in turn has affected how social exclusion and the measures to combat it have been identified and defined.
- At a more grass -roots level, our research suggested that social exclusion may be perceived as related to “communities” defined at different levels. In each case, a different perception of the border corresponds to a different representation of social exclusion.
- The border influences the perception of social exclusion in at least three other ways: by creating **border-specific types of marginalisation** (intimidated people, victims, unemployed related to political violence); by loading marginal figures at the border with ambiguous meanings (smugglers, travellers); and by separating two quite different ways of counting, classifying and responding to the homeless.

Subsequently, the particular features of social exclusion encountered at the Irish border can be addressed only by understanding the interrelation between perceptions of social exclusion and

representations of the border. Far from being just a geographical backdrop to social exclusion, the border is an *integral element* of the frame work within which social exclusion is currently shaped there. In short, the border is not just the place where social exclusion occurs; it is a dynamic factor in how that exclusion is perceived, understood, and does or does not become the focus of public policy (Donnan in Leontidou et al 2000).

In *Portugal*, there are some studies indicating social exclusion dynamics, and their consequences amongst disfavoured social groups. Some authors are putting their emphasis typifying the diversity on poverty and social exclusion situations¹⁸. The proposal of the authors of a study on disfavoured groups,¹⁹ seems to be one of the better approaches of the diversity of the situations, for it departs from the main nature of the problems facing the different disfavoured social groups, namely in the field of the socio-professional insertion, trying to identify the kind of necessary responses and policies for each situation. In this work, a typology is created based on the categories seen in Table 22:

- Unqualified disfavoured groups;
- Persistent poverty situation disfavoured groups;
- Marginal disfavoured groups;
- Specific handicap groups.

These authors identify, therefore, the main factors contributing to poverty and exclusion situations, namely objective social processes (influencing life conditions), subjective dynamics (reacting dynamics to everyday difficulties, prescriptive social identity, etc) and relational dynamics (due to the socio-political situation). Some of the identified groups of the first category – the unqualified disfavoured groups – are the single-parent families; the ethnic and cultural minorities; the low skilled individuals. These groups reveal weak professional and educational qualifications, a precarious employment market insertion, a high vulnerability to poverty situations, an undervalued self-image and a lack of employment search initiative. In the case of the single-parent families, for example, there are high growth rates in Portugal, but the correspondent social policy measures have been dispersed, showing a lack of a systematic support policy for these types of family. A concrete example of a policy measure not specifically directed to this group, but offering some help, is the minimum guaranteed income, recognising the application possibility for individuals aged under 18 and with children.

Table 22: Problems and political guidelines in face of disfavoured groups

Categories	Group types	Objective problems	Subjective problems	Intervention
Unqualified	Single-parent	Educational and	Undervalued self-	Professional

¹⁸ Among the most recently developed works it is important to refer BRUTO da COSTA, Alfredo (1998) *Exclusões Sociais*, Cadernos Democráticos 2, Lisboa, Gradiva/Col. Fundação Mário Soares, and CAPUCHA, Luís et al. (1998) *Grupos desfavorecidos face ao emprego – Tipologias e Quadro Básico de Medidas Recomendáveis*, Lisboa, Observatório do Emprego Formação Profissional.

¹⁹ “*Grupos desfavorecidos face ao emprego – Tipologias e Quadro Básico de Medidas Recomendáveis*” (Disfavoured groups in face of employment – a typological approach and framework for recommended policies).

disfavoured groups	families; Ethnic and cultural minorities; Weak or obsolete qualified individuals.	professional weak qualifications; Precarious inclusion on the employment market; Vulnerability to poverty status;	image; Lack of employment search initiative;	training; Special education; Professional insertion support.
Persistent poverty situation disfavoured groups	Long duration unemployment; Poverty circles environment; Risk youngsters without minimum schooling.	Little schooling and professional qualifications; Unemployment and precarious inclusion on the employment market; Professional capacities erosion; Professional inclusion handicaps (ageing); Reproduction of life condition in poverty situations;	Partial rupture of the social bounding; Family instability; Lack of relational abilities; Work habits dilution; Lack of motivation on employment search; Social welfare dependency.	Specific education; Relational and personal competence acquisition; Professional insertion support.
Marginal disfavoured groups	Youngsters in marginality situations; Homeless; Prisoners / Ex-prisoners; Drug-dependent and ex-drug-dependent;	Little schooling and professional qualifications; Lack of employment habits; Social marginalisation; Employment negative reaction; Lack of adequate responses;	Lack of life rules and routines; Self-marginalisation; Social bounding rupture; Unadaptation to social life; Cognitive capacities regression; Psychological and physical dependencies.	Social life adaptation; Relational and personal competence acquisition; Specific education; Employer consciousness; Post-insertion support.
Specific handicap disfavoured groups	Individuals with deficiencies; Chronic patient individuals.	Handicaps related to the type of deficiency; Employer negative reaction; Lack of adequate responses.	Undervalued self-image; Lack of employment search initiative; Social welfare dependency.	Specific education; Relational and personal competence acquisition; Physical barriers elimination; Employer consciousness.

Source: CAPUCHA, Luís et al. (1998) *Grupos desfavorecidos face ao emprego – Tipologias e Quadro Básico de Medidas Recomendáveis*, Lisboa, Observatório do Emprego Formação Profissional.

The main issues posed to the economic and social integration of the ethnic and cultural minorities are related to their situation concerning housing, education and employment conditions; low qualification levels; and a precarious insertion in the employment market. Existing policies to remedy these situations are also dispersed, thus generating an urgent emphasis on efficiency, namely on the educational and pedagogical dimensions (recurring to cultural mediators and school special programmes), on the self-employment incentives, and on the welcoming local communities.

Persistent poverty amongst disfavoured groups, runs alongside the long-term unemployed, and risk youngsters without minimum schooling. It is important here to emphasise the groups identified as belonging to “the poverty-cycle environment”. This refers to the long duration of

poverty, localised in specific areas, mostly in urban socio-spatially segregated territories, and tending to reproduce itself from generation to generation. This is one of the groups demanding a global and sectoral integrative policy, given the multidimensionality of the connected phenomena. The guaranteed minimum income may represent a partial solution but has to be associated with a social and/or professional integration programme.

Concerning the marginal disfavoured groups such as youngsters in marginal situations, the homeless, prisoners and ex-prisoners, drug-dependent and ex-drug-dependent, we may emphasise the homeless group, found in large numbers in the greater Lisbon territory (around 5,000 individuals). It is a group where a greater social bounding rupture is noticeable, a phenomenon that might explain the difficulty in finding effective social policy measures. In relation to this territory, there are 30 institutions aiming at supporting the homeless (food, clothing, shelter, small subsidies, medical assistance, juridical and social advising). However, *also here* we find an absence of any policy co-ordination, and a difficulty in finding specific and adapted measures to support these individuals to an active social life.

With respect to the handicapped groups in Lisbon we find individuals with various deficiencies and chronic illnesses. Concerning the integration of the individuals with deficiencies there is a rather consistent legislative structure in Portugal, compared with the framework for other disfavoured groups. The Portuguese legislation provides for professional insertion through normal integration in the employment market, integration through a protected employment framework, and integration through self-entrepreneurial paths.

Additionally, analysis allowed us to detect two main trends in social policy making: a) the rhetoric coming from institutional bodies and b) a less institutional argument made from players who have established a very close relationship with these less protected groups. Among the first there are, naturally, those who talk on behalf of their own institutions, mentioning defined programmes and protocols, namely through inter-ministerial co-operation.

On the side of the non-institutional bodies, represented mostly by NGOs (but not by all of them), critics come up and call for the need to settle adjusted actions, instead of unattached measures. In this less institutional environment, we can criticize the state for double actions towards, for example, the entry of migrants: on the one hand, illegal migration of manual labour is accepted and on the other, their usefulness and contribution to the country's development is not recognised.

In Lisbon therefore, the lack of structured and specific domestic policies directed towards these groups is stressed. In order to illustrate one dimension of this, it is interesting at this point to stress one of the statements made by one of the interviewees with respect to immigration:

“I think that the EU and the Portuguese government have a double position: on the one hand, they need the immigrants (because without them the public works in EXPO 98, Vasco da Gama Bridge or the highways could not have happened) (...); but, on the other hand, they are afraid of being “drowned” by the “immigrants” (...). If the State keeps them in a clandestine ground, that is to say, without ID papers (...) it is very comfortable, (because it gets) a mass of workers that work, but if they are unemployed, (the State) has to pay nothing.” (Leontidou et al. 2000 : 93)

*Current policies and political suggestions in Spain, Corse and Italy*²⁰

In Spain, many agents talk about political issues and political solutions. Melilla is an Autonomous City with direct responsibilities in different affairs; but the national government or the EU generate political measures which have an impact on the economy and society in Melilla.

²⁰ Drawn from Garcia Lizana, Peraldi, Gasparini & Zago in Leontidou et al. 2000

In Malaga, the situation is a little more complicated, because there is another political subject. Besides the municipality, national government and the EU, the Autonomous Community of Andalusia also plays an active role. In both cases, it is worth considering the important work of NGOs in relation to poverty and exclusion.

The two cities have different models of social exclusion. In Malaga, social exclusion is understood as a *heterogeneous phenomenon*, which can affect different risk groups, belonging to quite a large set. So, it shows a multidimensional and multifactorial reality. Unemployed, immigrants, handicapped, homosexuals and women only have in common a higher probability of being excluded, but they do not have a clear feature that determines exclusion. However, in Melilla, the concept of social exclusion almost always points towards the Muslim community. Trying to approach the relationship between social exclusion and the border, we have encountered two different images of reality. In Malaga, it was identified that excluded groups are not very different to those we find in any other Spanish or European city (unemployed, gypsies, homosexuals, drug addicts, etc). However, the situation in Melilla was different: immigrants were the main group without any doubt. Here, the difference between the two sides of the border was clearly marked. The other side is seen to be very near and the inequality which is produced very evident.

The principal political topic mentioned by informants is the Spanish laws related to immigrants. In fact, a lot of them pointed that out as a factor conditioning social exclusion of migrants, because of the extremely difficult situation to legalise residence in Spain. The necessity to change the law was so clear, to our informants as Spanish society in general, that recently it was changed. Border controls are also important, especially in Melilla.

In Spain, municipalities play an important role in this political area. The autonomous character of Melilla reinforces this responsibility. The city council of Malaga has specific programmes for each excluded group. Besides, there are two types of economic assistance, emergency and family assistance. There is also a social housing programme. However, all these are not enough and it was often mentioned that they are too improvised. Additionally, the importance of *education* to overcome social exclusion processes was often pointed out. Among policy measures pointed out is *the legalisation of illegal housing*. However, lack of political will is seen as the main obstacle in fighting social exclusion. It is believed that the economic and human resources are very important; however, the significance of the problem is at a higher level.

It was often said by informants that the church and NGOs have tried to help to tackle problems. A lot of NGOs attend to immigrants. The Melilla Red Cross has specific programmes for each excluded group, with the full immigrant assistance (social and health assistance) being the main activity. The performance of NGOs in Malaga is also fundamental for migrants, since the beginning of the problem. The trade unions are also very active, and have created specialised offices to attend to migrants. But they stress the importance of reducing unemployment in order to fight against social exclusion in Malaga and Melilla. So, they question the official policy in this sense. In Melilla, a trade unionist added that current policy measures are charitable, and there is not a reliable social intervention.

Interviewees have referred to various policy options, as discussed above, among which two possibilities of broader reforms can be discerned. The first suggests developing the national solidarity of Spain with less deprived areas (in particular, in this case with Melilla). The second introduces an international dimension. The fundamental idea is to develop the African continent and to resolve its political situation. There are several manifestations with a similar orientation toward the international distribution of employment, the solution of the external debt, or an international and harmonious economic development. Some people in Melilla recommend to consider the borderland, with a European and Moroccan co-ordinated policy. One person from

Malaga considered that frontiers need to be eliminated and Malaga should absorb the flux of immigration resulting from that.

In *Corsica*, institutional action to fight against social exclusion has seemed derisory in comparison to the extent of social problems. In the area of education, for example, public action is primarily organised to help young people without qualifications. But this kind of action generally benefits young people with qualifications. Population in the most need for education does not seem to be the concern of public policy. More generally, representatives from trade unions thought that economic policies did not serve people because they are decided by the rules of market. Some agents explained that the use of categorisations to deal with specific problems *often intensifies* marginalization. They are viewed negatively as a kind of labelling. In fact, positive discrimination to favour equality induces all the more problems because it is not the result of a public debate. Next, excluded people do not easily accept ideas by institutional organisations. They are out of the society and they refuse constraints associated with social or political activity. Often, social policies are also victims of a kind of suspicion and some social organisations seem to be suspect because they have close relations with local politicians. Clientelist practices and the disaccord between public decisions and social needs are frequently quoted. We can also say that excluded people do not accept social constraints because they want to assert a kind of liberty. This kind of liberty is a manner of preserving their own dignity and identity. The absence of institutional co-operation and the concentration of public power also seem to produce a negative effect on the social situation.

Some trade unionists think that success of politicians of the “third way” (politicians who are external to the official political groups of the right, or the left), during the last regional elections, had links with clientelism. It is viewed as the result of the action of politicians not accepted on the main official lists and as the willingness of the Corsican population to support a change in the insular political organisation. Sometimes, this change is analysed as one way to fight exclusion. Behind that idea, we find an economic argument: only a political change can favour a process of development which can create activity and employment. Thus, traditional political organisations (linked to national organisations) seem to have no efficient economic or political plans to produce this development.

Solutions of economic and social problems in Corsica which must be imagined locally. Since the problems of the island are often specific and different to the continental problems, it is necessary to adopt different policies and means. It is thought, moreover, that economic and social problems can be better dealt with when decisions are made by people close to the populations and their reality. Thus, the decentralization of public policies is perceived as a way of improving the effectiveness of those policies.

Some agents have considered the EU as a *negative constraint* for the process of development of Corsica. The EU is associated with plans of deregulation, with the reduction of public action, with the priority to market rules and with less consideration for the social problems. Others expressed an opinion generally more favourable to European re-construction. They considered it as a factor of exchange and opening up. The EU and the French state could implicate Corsican people to discuss the process of development.

In *Italy*, many organisations and agents show considerable dynamism in developing policies for “socially excluded” groups. Economic organisations propose an employment policy adapted to characteristic local problems (preponderance of the service sector in comparison with manufacturing, reintroduction of some retired people into the labour market) through either consultancy, meetings and courses to support companies and encourage them to increase their potential and create jobs, or through advice on how to find a job or set up a company. *Voluntary associations* do much in proportion with their available resources. They respond to the need of

justice and rights of those who are socially excluded, involving and attracting the attention of institutions. There is a strong policy for the reception of immigrants and the provision of shelter or temporary accommodation.

In Gorizia, public health services have a preferential channel to support non-EU women through pregnancy and birth. Public housing services have specific policies for old people, young couples and excluded people to avoid the creation of a ghetto, reclaiming the town centre and taking people back to it. Initiatives for children are organised with Law 285/97 on interventions to foster the integration of disadvantaged minors. Also, the interest of local institutions in these problems has increased. With new projects, such as Tolomeo, the Town administration has started interesting ways of tackling the problems. The Town Administration, Caritas and the Prefecture have contributed considerably, in particular during the mass arrivals from Kosovo. They found accommodation and assistance, even though they did not have any regular permits enabling them to work.

Social services give benefits to the needy and the Town administration pays the fees of homes for old people in need. In addition, there are “socially useful works” to introduce unemployed people in public institutions for temporary periods, with a partial wage, half of which is paid by the Town administration and half by the employment office. There are also training programmes to facilitate employment. Local institutions, however, have a difficult task, because citizens feel they are being neglected in favour of foreigners.

The general opinion in Gorizia was that the *state is absent* and neglects peripheral areas. Much is left to the church and voluntary associations and much is delegated to Town administrations. Law 285/97 changed this situation, because apart from providing funds, it forces the community to think and become involved in problems of minors, with concrete initiatives for them in the various towns. The situation is varied: there are disabled children, children from broken families, foreign children who need their rights to be protected etc. Policies should aim at protecting these groups also bearing in mind the cultural aspect, and not only providing training courses, such as computer courses, to facilitate access to the labour market.

Most refugees in Gorizia are in transit towards other Italian or European Union destinations. Some, however, have obtained asylum and stay permits (regular permits have been given to approximately 4,000 people in the province of Gorizia). In general, women have more difficulties in integrating. Some refugees remain: there are some 90 Albanians, approximately 35 Senegalese, a dozen people from former Yugoslavia. In the town there is a network of assistance, a high level of sensitivity that enables to provide food and shelter to these people. Even so, Gorizia remains a transit area, and refugees are a limited problem. Immigrants with regular permits can also participate to open competitions for a house. There are refugees in Nova Gorica too. The population has a mixed origin as many people originally came from other areas of former Yugoslavia. Many refugees went to stay with relatives and apparently they are well integrated, although some believe these people are in transit and live mainly in Ljubljana.

EU expansion, in particular the Slovenian membership, is cause of concern for the Italian local political and economic forces, as it will lead to changes whose developments are difficult to predict. In general, in Italy people think more about what may be lost than the possible advantages of the new situation. The main problem will be the conversion of customs workers into other sectors. If the border economic structures are not converted and the transport sector – both on rail and road – developed, there will certainly be economic and social problems. In order to develop, Gorizia will have to play a cross-border role and think “European”. The experience with Austria was quite difficult,

because nobody had realised that many things would change. This aspect has to be understood so that nobody, in particular at national level, is unprepared when Slovenia becomes a member of the EU. All economic and social initiatives, and initiatives for integration have to be adopted to avoid that the shifting of the border becomes a trauma for the populations of Gorizia and Nova Gorica.

6.2.3. Policy implications for the development of culturally -sensitive policies for social exclusion

The above analysis indicates that agents on the EU border have suggested a great variety of measures as possible solutions to the problem of social exclusion. There are people who think that the problem needs to be attacked at the root (for example, changing the mentality of the families); others suggest doing particular things (like developing sport in schools to stimulate children in deprived zones), or introducing concrete modifications (such as recognising rights for gay people, making easier the documentation for immigrants, or looking for the social recognition of all employment as valuable and dignified). Moreover, there are those who underline micro measures (such as creating groups in order to help excluded people to get away from their situation), but also macro actions (like general economic development; Leontidou et al. 2000: chapter 4).

With these references at the background, we may consider two principal approaches. The first one is directed to the immediate everyday reality and includes social measures (developing the educational level of the population or personalised aid), territorial measures (stimulating economic development of the area) and productive measures (as for example, creation and distribution of employment). Frequently suggestions incorporate several dimensions (creating employment for special groups of people and thus improving their self-esteem, etc). The second approach is more ambitious and encompasses global dynamics. These measures may seem too diverse, but we can conclude that all of them are directed towards two principal aims: a) the integration of excluded people, and b) the elimination of the process generating exclusion. Finally, we can observe the claims to solidarity and personal implications of some interviewees. For them, union and militancy is necessary and everybody needs to be involved, to clearly solve the problem (Leontidou et al. 2000).

From the above discussion, it becomes apparent that perceptions about social exclusion revolve around the issues of *identity, ethnicity and religion*, and run alongside questions of *peripheral location* and distribution of *wealth and/or power*. Research has also indicated that the debate on social exclusion and social policy systems is at present taking place in an environment of uncertainty with various types of argumentation being made, which are not always clear about how problems will be tackled. In fact, the construction of ideas about social policy in the different research sites indicated that they result from social, political and ideological notions coupled with problems arising out of gaps in present legislation and by specific economic pressures. Some of the issues arising out of current social policy regimes are related to the following themes:

- on many occasions there is no clear perception about methods and ways of *re-integrating* excluded populations.
- ideas about *preventive policies and actions* are not well developed in most of the cases examined
- there are tendencies to ignore the usefulness of *concerted* actions which would combine the efforts by various organisations such as local authorities, NGOs, voluntary associations with the local community.
- in most cases, solutions are imposed from above (top-down) instead of being *sensitive to local communities ideas and needs* (issue of enhanced participation in decision-making).

- finally, it was not clear at all how and by whom the various social policy schemes are *evaluated and/or monitored* with respect to getting a clearer view of their successes or failures and building upon them.

The interaction of social policy with cultural identity is recommended here, in accordance with the following extract from the World Culture Report (1998, UNESCO, Paris: 344).

“Policy makers have to rethink state, community and international institutions and policies to permit local populations to choose their languages, allegiances and ways of life, provided that the implementation of these choices is taken up by the local or micro-regional communities themselves. At the same time, institutions should be created that encourage a dialogue between leaders of different cultural groups to negotiate exchanges and promote better mutual understanding. Intercultural dialogue becomes a prime policy line of action which should be implemented according to local ways of management and organization. The important thing is that local communities and their administrative arrangements, and municipal, provincial and departmental or state governments should take on the main responsibility for this dialogue and ensure that no artificial walls are erected to stop the flow of intercultural discourse.”

6.3. Economic Policy


Problems of social exclusion cannot induce the formulation of a general model of economic policy. Each locality is faced with specific problems and also given policies may have variable effects with respect to the context in which they are used. From an economic point of view, such policy recommendations only have an indicative value. They must be regarded as information liable to facilitate the definition of appropriate choices.

6.3.1. EU policy against uneven development

Major socio-economic disparities persist between peripheral regions and countries of the EU. For example, the per capita GDP of Luxembourg is twice that of Greece. Similarly, Hamburg is the richest region of Europe with a per capita income four times that of Alentejo. Over recent years, these disparities of income (GDP) per capita, although still important, have been reduced. In three member states (Greece, Spain, Portugal), the average income per capita shifted from 68% of the average EU income in 1988, to 79% in 1999. This levelling of income is especially observable in analyses of countries. During the same period, disparity between regions has become clearly less mobile, in particular because the richest regions experienced higher growth rates of their income than the poorer ones. According to the latest evaluation of the regional GDP per capita, revealed by standards of purchasing power, 8 of 211 European regions registered a regional GDP per capita higher than 150 % of the average and 46 regions showed a figure lower than 75 % of the average (Second Report on Economic and Social Cohesion, 2001). The enlargement of the EU is likely to amplify the disparities and the time necessary for integration. From past experience this may mean that it could take a generation to eliminate regional disparities. In an enlarged EU with, say, 27 member states, convergence between regions would require at least two generations. It is broadly known that economic and social cohesion has been one of the most important targets of the EU for some years now. By promoting cohesion, the EU has introduced four types of

Structural Funds over the years ²¹. Likewise, there are 3 types of regional objectives ²² which are used for structural measures:

Figure 6: Former EU Regional Objectives (1994 -1999)



- **Objective 1:** promotes the development and structural adjustment of regions with backward development, i.e. those whose average per capita GDP is below 75% that of the

²¹ These are the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF), the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF), Guidance Section, and the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG).

²² To improve the effectiveness of the structural measures, Regulation (EC) No 1260/99 has reduced the number of objectives from 7 to 3.

EU average. Almost 20% of the EU's total population could benefit from the measures taken under this objective.

- **Objective 2:** contributes to the economic and social conversion of regions with structural difficulties, other than those eligible for the objective 1. No more than 18% of the EU's population will be covered by this objective;
- **Objective 3:** gathers together all the measures for development of human resources development outside the regions eligible for objective 1. It is the reference framework for all the measures taken under the new title on employment in the Treaty of Amsterdam and under the European Employment Strategy.

Map 1 shows that only one of our border localities (Gorizia, which belongs to "Objective 2") is not considered under the category "Objective 1". We must emphasize that the reduction in the number of objectives in 1999 has not meant reconsideration of the border localities under research.

With regard to objective 1, it is quite obvious that the widening of the EU will considerably modify the list of included regions. According to certain estimates (CRPM 2000), enlargement will involve a fall of the average GDP per capita in the EU by approximately 14%, which will automatically involve a relative rise of the GDP per capita in the current European regions. This relative increase will be artificial and independent of real regional performances. More accurately, with some rare exceptions, the totality of the regions scheduled for enlargement should, according to current regulations, be covered by objective 1. At the same time, 22 regions of the EU actually registered in objective 1 would come out of it.

It is visible that after enlargement and without an increase in the funds devoted to objective 1 as well as relaxing of the criteria of selection, certain regions currently considered underdeveloped will be subjected to harsher treatment by the EU, whereas their situation will not have truly improved. Such a reformulation of the using of objective 1 is obviously not easy because it involves a large financial problem. However, one can observe that community authorities have become aware of the need for action against regional inequalities. Thus, the Treaty of Amsterdam clearly expresses the recognition of territorial cohesion as a means of affirming the social cohesion of the EU. Indeed, in article 16, it introduces the concept of social and territorial cohesion. The objective of economic and social cohesion, for a long time affirmed by Community authorities, is now viewed from a territorial dimension. Of course, for such an objective to have real implications it is necessary to define an adequate body of instruments for intervention. However, the political assertion of the objective constitutes a signal which can be regarded as positive.

6.3.2. Economic policy against social exclusion

Fighting against exclusion involves two principal areas: to alleviate symptoms and to eliminate causes. The first is more easy to apply and more frequent. This political action attempts to reduce the most dramatic aspects of personal exclusion, attend to particular conditions of excluded groups, and finally, compensate for economic disadvantages of peripheral and isolated territories. In all of the localities which we have studied, people are aware of the public authorities efforts to assign funds in this way but they are also very critical of the shortages, incapacity, lack of coordination, etc. This criticism also includes the incapacity to find a permanent solution to difficulties, and the negative results derived from this traditional approach.

In terms of economic policy, the analysis of the situation of different localities shows clearly that the fight against exclusion cannot be lead exclusively by the policies of assistance which

characterized the action of the welfare state during past decades. The dread of assistance becoming a vicious circle and discouraging its beneficiaries is amply analyzed in literature. Some negative effects can be perceived at the individual level as well as at the collective level. This kind of argumentation partly explains the lack of economic initiatives in Corsica, in Gorizia and Lesvos. The importance of the investments and the public transfers in these zones make private economic action less necessary and more delicate. Henceforth it is clearly perceived that the economic policy must have an ambitious content and be more active.

In the case of peripheral areas, in order to define the objectives of the economic policy precisely, we must refer to the principal economic theme of concerning exclusion analysed in earlier parts of this report. Our diagnosis synthetically included four elements: treble peripherality, the nature of the economic policy applied and the problem of the labour market and poverty. Treble peripherality implies being on the edge of the EU, very long distance from hubs of Europe as well as localisation in underprivileged European regions. The first of these items has, at least, several consequences: it reduces the extent of the market and it places areas beside less developed economies. This position generates migrations and also contributes to reduce the potential of the market due to the populations inadequate purchasing power. In spite of this, we can observe others additional circumstances. Unequal conditions on both sides of borders generate asymmetric exchanges, tensions and conflictive relations (actual or potential). The presence of the army is therefore sometimes needed with the known implications. Peripheral as they are border localities have not the opportunity to enjoy full advantages of national and European communications, which also contributes to reduce economic opportunities and expansion.

The second dimension of peripherality refers to the capacity to obtain full economies of scale generated in developed economic corridors and to influence the more important decisions in the EU. The third dimension infers that the general economical context of the border localities participates in the limitation of their economic situation, conditioning their future. Areas touching the border line, on one side or the other, do not benefit from economic opportunities. The result obviously is economic difficulties, unemployment, precariousness of employment, poverty, etc. All of these effects interact and reinforce the reduction of the market, limited development, discouragement of private initiative, need of public intervention, and so on. Consequently, economic policy has to be organized in terms of developing regions and mastering real convergence, improving communication with economic corridors, extending the market and opportunities, stimulating co-operation on both sides of the border, rationalising the migration process, modifying the labour market, improving qualification for the population, and finally, redistributing income.

- *An active policy of development*

With reference to the objectives, the purpose of economic policy must be to correct the structural handicaps of border areas. In fact these areas are confronted, more or less strongly, with two major handicaps. First, due to the presence of the border, the zone of exchange may be limited and the constraints of profitability from economic activity are more difficult. Then, because of their peripheral situation, they are linked to underdeveloped zones. This induces the existence on their doorstep, of populations in search of a higher standard of living and eager to go into EU territory.

The need for an active policy appears clearly when reading the interviews realized in various localities of this research programme. They reveal a general impression that the state ignores the problems of border areas. More precisely, it is often noted that economic policies do not attack the true causes of exclusion (Malaga & Melilla, Lisbon, Corsica). Terms of recommendation lead us to consider that it is necessary to concentrate state action on elements which constitute the

background of economic activity. Here, we encounter the idea that the development of economic activity constitutes the best means of integrating populations coming from the exterior. This development requires the constitution of an adapted socio-economic context which is able to correct the structural handicaps of the areas. Thus, the policies developed in the field of professional training or those which support companies or economic actors seem essential. As regards to co-operation, it should be noted that the program "Peace and Reconciliation" applied in Ireland appears to be very helpful. While particularly aiming at stimulating contacts between members of different communities (North-South and Catholic/Protestant cleavages), it takes into account the essential idea that the economic activity in a given area can develop only if the social relations that feed it are not blocked.

More particularly, with regard to the tax and financial environment, the example of the economic policy led in Corsica during the last years seems to provide an invaluable lesson. More exactly, what appears interesting in the example of Corsica is the economic consequence of a system of a "free zone"²³ set up in 1996. One should first note that the effects of this system are still not well known. Information concerning the evolution of the situation of companies since 1996 is still insufficient. However, according to certain data, it seems that the tax measures adopted on this occasion (lower rates of certain taxes paid by companies and in particular of the tax rate on benefit) allowed a clear improvement of the cash flow of companies. Thus, they have also taken part in the consolidation of productive system and, if one cannot affirm that they have supported job creation, they have probably contributed to the safeguard of existing employment. To avoid low profitability, which is found in a lot of Corsican companies, a whole new financial system with specific tax rules is needed. The system of the free zone having been founded only for a limited period, the official authorities will have to rapidly consider measures likely to compensate for the structural handicaps of the Corsican economy. Obviously, to be truly effective, these measures should not be temporary but perennial. As certain recent studies showed, it is advisable to imagine permanent measures, due to the immutable character of insularity and the handicaps which it produces (Eurisles 1997).

In general terms, more ambitious economic policies carried out in border areas would imply an increase in the means allotted to them and a greater coherence in their use. It would also imply the choice of a range of measures in connection with the structural character of the economic handicaps of border areas. In other words, it is not a question of adopting transitional measures of compensation but rather of building a lasting economic and juridical context which will support private economic initiatives. Within this framework, the definition of adapted taxation, supporting investment and creation of employment seems particularly desirable. Consequently, for each type of activity it is advisable to study the nature and the extent of the handicaps caused by the border and the peripheral character of the zone. One may also imagine that a legal tax context better adapted to local characteristics can, to a certain extent, take part in the reduction of the informal economy, often very much developed in border areas.

However, economic development alone cannot solve the problems of exclusion and poverty. In the peripheral border areas, the objective of development is characterized by a sort of dilemma: economic advancement generates employment making more possible the integration of marginal populations. But, at the same time, because of the employment which it generates, economic development supports the surge of new populations coming from the exterior. Lisbon and Malaga are strong cases in this. So, from a long term perspective, it is essential to reinforce the assistance in favour of underdeveloped countries. This reinforcement undoubtedly requires an increase in allocated funds but especially a drastic redefinition of actions. As a recent report of the World Bank clearly defined, international assistance must be accompanied by a programme of reform

²³ It is not however a real free zone. The current Corsican system is composed of several tax reductions applicable to certain activities.

supported and endorsed by the local political authorities. In addition to a policy of development for the non-European countries, the border and peripheral areas require a action to control migratory flows.

- *A policy of transport*

According to an analysis of accessibility based on the equipment level of infrastructures in 1995 and transeuropean network planned for 2010, 60 to 70% of the territory of the EU has an index of accessibility lower than the average (European Commission 1999). The European peripheral areas, and in particular the majority of those which were the subject of our study, appear among these regions. The possibilities of communication between these areas and the other parts of the EU appear clearly more problematic than those of central European areas. Two types of perfectly complementary indicators can help us to establish the radius of this handicap. They relate to the time of transport on one hand and to the tariff of transport on the other.

a) accessibility deficit in peripheral areas

Evolution of the mode of economic organization, means that distance tends to lose its “pure” geographical content. The distance that the economic actors take into account is no longer the distance-length but rather the distance -time (Bonnafous 1993; Savy and Veltz 1993). In fact, difficulties in communication and transport of peripheral areas are first expressed by times of displacement or transmission which are more important than those recorded in central areas.

Within the EU, disparities of accessibility are more observable in the transportation of passengers than in that of goods. In the last case, transport conditions are not very different within European territories. The two means of transport used for this type of forwarding, road and rail, benefit roughly from identical technical and legal conditions. The speed of circulation of a given load is consequently subjected to feeble variations (Eurisles 1997), except when displacement comprises a maritime component (table 1). The differences in times of transport primarily result from differences in the distances covered.

Table 23

Times of transport travelling from Maastricht to various European destinations

	Distance	Time	Speed
Central destinations			
Amsterdam	230 km	3h12	71,9 km/h
Berlin	667 km	8h59	74,2 km/h
Brussels	114 km	1h44	65,8 km/h
Paris	396 km	5h23	73,6 km/h
Peripheral destinations			
Ajaccio	1444 km	31h45	45,5 km/h
Belfast	1259 km	34h32	36,5 km/h
Gorizia*	1151 km	14h52	77,4 km/h
Lisbon	2199 km	29h18	75,1 km/h
Malaga*	2412 km	30h33	78,9 km/h
Mytiline	2888 km	92h22	31,3 km/h

Source: Eurisles 1997 (calculated from the Eurisles data).

For the transport of passengers, the European disparities show an unequal geographical development of the fast means of transport. The development of the High Speed Train (HST) network in the central part of Europe makes it possible to notably improve the conditions of circulation between the cities served by this network. But, for the peripheral cities, not benefiting directly from this means of transport, a relative disadvantage of accessibility necessarily occurs (Plassard 1992). The development of air transport in the whole of Europe can reduce differences of accessibility between the areas. But this development is not equal everywhere. The airports of the areas characterized by the densest exchange are also those which profit from the most important supply of transport and in particular from the highest frequency of flights.

Compared to the central areas of the EU, peripheral areas undergo tariffs of transport which are clearly higher. To illustrate this assessment of freight transport, we again refer to an analysis by Eurisles (1999) in which the authors evaluate the price of conveying goods from Maastricht to several European agglomerations, for various types of conditioning. The study underlines a hierarchy of transport tariffs narrowly correlating to the degree of periphericity of the destinations. Compared to the prices of transport of the central agglomerations, those of the continental peripheral agglomerations are higher by 2,5 to 3,5 times whereas those of the insular destinations are multiplied by a coefficient ranging between 3,5 and 5.

Similar issues with regards to unfavourable tariff differentials in European peripheral areas can be also noted for the transport of passengers. Concerning the two most significant means of transport for this type of displacement on average or long distances - air and rail - the tariff practices show a very clear hierarchy in the levels of those applied to various European air links. The differences in price vary according to links. The tariff situation of a link seems to depend not only on the distance to be covered but also on the characteristics of the demand (extent and nature of the traffic) and the intensity of competition between companies.

b) Integration into the transeuropean network of transport

One cannot however, reduce the problem of the deficit in accessibility of peripheral areas to a question of distance. It may be considered that the deficit in accessibility of peripheral areas is explained by an insufficiency of the supply of transport which comes itself from an insufficiency in the demand for transport. In other words, it is because the flow of exchanges is too weak and/or unbalanced that the supply of transport appears reduced and more expensive. Weakness in the flows of transport has induced the impossibility of making full play of the economies of scale, multiplying the frequency of connections, to using fast vehicles, and finally founding a competitive climate between the companies (Peraldi 2001).

The peripheral character of areas, which appears at the same time as a cause and a consequence of their deficit in accessibility and the actions undertaken to support the economic development, participate in the attenuation of such a deficit. But, in complement to the policies of development, one can consider that certain actions in the field of transport can contribute to the continuation of this objective. These actions must aim at inserting peripheral areas into the European network of transport and specifically into circuits characterized by high speed. The schedule of development of the Community's territory is guided by a project constituting a polycentric Europe, based on the realization of a vast European network of transport; the axes of communication at high speed, in particular road and railway compose the framework of this network. For the transeuropean network of transport (TEN) to produce a positive effect on the accessibility of areas, not only central but also peripheral, it is therefore essential that they be well connected to the regional and local networks of traditional transport.

In order to allow the TEN to act in favour of better accessibility of the whole European territory, it is indispensable to modify the public policies of transport applied within the EU. More precisely, it would be advisable that these policies aim at organizing the European network in such a way that it would really influence the whole of the Community's territory. This implies the pursuit of a greater geographic coherence in decisions concerning investment in infrastructure of transport and also the definition of a more relevant use of public funds devoted to the transport sector. In particular, it would seem advisable that transport choices should not be guided exclusively by the criterion of financial profitability.

6.3.3. Employment policy and poverty outlets

As Schnapper (1996) observed, close connections exist between the employment situation and the more general social situation. Integrated people have simultaneously a good status, a permanent job and are inserted in a social background characterized by numerous exchanges. On the other hand, people in a situation of exclusion have neither employment, nor the status produced by social protection. They are also socially isolated. Obviously, relations between working life and life out of work are not simple or monolithic. Professional activity is not the only source of social identity even if it constitutes an essential element of determination in contemporary societies. In the first place, it is through professional activity that the majority of people take part in collective action. Integration by means of employment remains simultaneously the instrument and the model of common life. Unemployment, by contrast, is thought to create social exclusion.

- *The relation between employment and social exclusion*

The employment situation remains essential to defining the social status of individuals. Unemployment is related to desocialisation, while participation in economic activity is the privileged means of integration. The hierarchy of social status is directly related to the position of the person in the production system. Established employment involves, in addition to wages, a series of social and political rights. These rights are less for people with precarious employment and still less for those who are out of work. In this respect, we can observe the 1994 EU's *White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness, Employment*, which argues that the creation of jobs is necessary to "safeguard the future of our children, who must be able to find hope and motivation in the prospect of participating in economic and social activity." (European Commission 1994: 3)

Besides unemployment, inactivity and not being part of the labour market, are also factors of social exclusion. This is not obligatory but happens frequently and depends on the condition of inactive people (gender, age, health, family ties, personal motivation, social influence, etc). It is necessary to remember that in an economic sense unemployment is defined with respect to the active population. The unemployed are excluded from work, but remain in the labour market. Inactive people are excluded from the market. In this case, the participation of women in the labour market is difficult and particularly significant, their rate of participation being lower than that of men. Frequently the less developed areas have lower rates than industrialised ones. Prestige, wealth, influence, social condition, capital income, human capital, etc., are other items to be considered in the study of the economic factors of exclusion. But, in general, these aspects have significant links with employment, and probably have less importance in the explanation of the complete situation.

Employment does not necessarily imply social inclusion, and people may remain excluded even though they work, if labour conditions are bad. But, in any case, it is necessary to stress the importance of work (including unpaid work!) to the maintenance of social life and human relationships. This has often been ignored by literature. Employment is income, but it is also more

than that²⁴. It contributes to a deeper need in people who struggle to make sense of their lives. People need to structure their days; need a wider social experience than is provided by the family; need to participate in collective efforts and need regular activities. Exclusion imposed by unemployment can only be understood by considering employment as a structure which adds meaning to life. Employment provides organisation, identity, contacts, collective purpose and a target for energy. Unemployment benefit may be partial compensation for income loss, but not for the meaning and purpose provided by work.

On the contrary, unemployed people are not an excluded group in a strict sense. A person is not excluded because of being momentarily unemployed. A long period of unemployment tends to imply greater economic and social costs than a short one. Most long-term unemployed people experience a depreciation of professional skills and a loss of confidence and self-esteem. This frequently leads to feelings of hopelessness in relation to finding work and a reduction in job search activity, often resulting in eventual withdrawal from the labour market altogether. Employers may use the length of time a person has been unemployed as a screening device and tend to discriminate against the long-term unemployed when making hiring decisions. The long-term unemployed can thus become effectively stigmatised by employers and find themselves excluded from the labour market becoming “outsiders” in the sense that their prospects of returning into work fade with the increasing duration of their joblessness and in the sense that they exert little external influence on wage-setting and employment processes within firms. The long-term unemployed thus find it difficult to evaluate themselves in a job, and do little to negotiate wages proposals. In addition, in the cases where there are limits to the length of period during which an unemployed person is eligible for state social security and similar benefits, those out of work for long spells of time are also likely to suffer severe falls of their living standards and socio-economic welfare, and may drop out of the labour market altogether and into inactivity.

This research indicated that the concepts of poverty and social exclusion are related but are not equated. People may be poor without being socially excluded, and at the same time, they may be socially excluded without being poor. The strong connection between them should be underlined. It is very easy to talk about the potential exclusion of migrants. However, our experience on border localities confirms that there is no problem to social acceptance and integration concerning immigrants from rich countries, who have adequate curricula, good professional status, and money. By contrast, raising national people's incomes via social security does not guarantee integration. Subsidies are an essential part of any programme to reduce exclusion, but integration does not automatically happen if only money is given to an excluded population, maintaining dependency on public institutions. In this sense, large amounts of resources transferred to border localities are not sufficient to resolve exclusion. But they can reduce poverty if we decide to define it only in terms of income. As it has often been said, poverty has many different dimensions.

In December 1984 the European Council of Ministers defined the poor as “persons whose resources (material, cultural and social) are so limited as to exclude them from the minimum acceptable way of life in the Member State in which they live”. On the basis of this definition and taking into account the information stated previously, one can estimate that the link between the phenomena of social exclusion and the problems of

²⁴ Freud (1930) insisted that work is our strongest tie to reality: there is no satisfactory substitute.

employment, income and social relations is at the same time complex and variable according to periods and times. Consequently, no policy of employment can be set up as a model to wage war against social exclusion. We can however advance some ideas which may usefully inspire the orientation of this type of action. The development of the activities in the area of the “social economy” and a new concept of social assistance enter into this logic.

- *The virtues of the "social economy"*

From a conceptual point of view, the “social economy” presents variable contents according to different countries. The phenomenon and its perception are strongly dependent on socio-political, cultural and economic national contexts. In certain cases, even the term “social economy” is not retained and is replaced by that of the “non profit making sector”. The two concepts are not superimposed even if the economic activities that they include are relatively close. From a more empirical point of view, one can note that the institutions carrying out the “social economy” are anchored in solid old traditions: they are the organizations of the associative, mutualistic and cooperative type which existed everywhere for over a century.

By definition, the “social economy” is produced by groups and communities organized on a local scale. Thus, it is very marked by the specific cultures of these groups and communities. This is particularly obvious in developing countries where a multitude of initiatives belong to the non-official economy. The growing interest that one notes in this field of activity is due in particular to the emergence during the last two last decades of a multitude of initiatives which belong neither to the private sector (they do not have a lucrative goal) nor to the public sector. From the point of view of economic and social organization, the “social economy” shows a double interest.

Firstly, it determines the possibility of satisfying needs not taken into account by the traditional private and public initiatives. In numerous countries, certain services of proximity such as professional insertion, child care or aid for old people are now mainly provided by organizations of the associative type. A recent report about social conditions in the EU published by the Commission and Eurostat (2000) shows that non commercial services of proximity could largely improve social assistance and thus take part in the fight against exclusion.

Secondly, the social economy may determine the possibility of reinforcing social links between the members of the community. This is an extremely interesting aspect of the problem of social exclusion. In a certain manner, the organization of the social economy constitutes new areas where individuals can meet, thus replacing older areas of regrouping including the family unit. These smaller areas constitute a widened family and the expression of daily solidarity (Jeantet 2000: 491).

Until now, it seems that the official authorities were hardly interested in the “social economy” which developed and organized itself apart from any will and political strategy. But, taking into account the potential for activity which it represents and the economic and social needs that it seems able to satisfy, the “social economy” concept requires detailed attention on behalf of official authorities. As underlined by Jeantet, it is time that associations, foundations, co-operatives and the mutual insurance companies be regarded as long-term partners. This implies the allocation of financial means to the organizations concerned and also a valorization of the status of their personnel, particularly in terms of education.

- *Inciting social aid*

Another useful idea relates to the application of social aid and the passage from non-activity to activity. At the heart of this problem is what is called the mechanism of the “trap door to unemployment” which is based on the idea that a too generous protection against social risks modifies the behaviour of the assured individuals (principle of moral hazard, Caussat 2000: 112). More precisely, one often estimates that a guarantee too close to the minimum wage produces the risk that some people benefit from the system and that others have little motivation to take a job with minimum wages. Indeed, to seek and accept a job often implies the cost of prospecting and then the loss of various welfare benefits. Consequently, the passage from minimum social aids to minimum wages can sometimes have very little effect on income.

Accordingly, the use of tax credit can be of great potential. Tax credit allows plurality of social aids and wages. It consists of paying wages supplemented by a gradually decreasing benefits which are cancelled from a certain threshold of income. In theory, it must support the transition between a situation of unemployment and a situation of employment by creating a continuum between social aid and minimum wage. Obviously, this device still raises apprehension and causes strong ideological criticism, because it historically concerns a neo-liberal logic - first explicitly formulated by the monetarist Milton Friedman - it is sometimes perceived as a threat to the principle of a minimum wage which, in the mind of liberal economists, constitutes an obstacle to the correct functioning of the labour market. Undoubtedly, precise methods for use of tax credit must be imagined to allow it to support the renewal of activity while avoiding the wage drifts previously stated.

Closely related to this question of tax credit, is the idea of payment of an “universal allowance” or “income of citizenship”. This idea is not new but is seen in a favourable light today. It consists of replacing all the existing welfare payments by a single transfer versed to all individuals, without conditions of resource, family requirements or professional status. This transfer would also replace tax cuts, and so would carry out a fusion of income tax and welfare transfers. The “income of citizenship” would thus be regarded as the minimum necessary for a democratic society to work. Such a primary income would not prevent the redistribution by tax. The rich person would conserve a negligible part and the poor one would keep the totality of it.

This formula is seen to have a double advantage. Firstly, it is supposed to make social welfare more intelligible and less expensive. A single transfer would replace a stream of measures from which overall logic escapes all analysis. It is also likely to improve the function of the labour market by legitimating new forms of employment (temporary employment, part-time employment, parental vacation, etc). More negatively, a universal allowance raises the question of transforming its beneficiaries into a chronically assisted group due to automatic payment and creating second class citizens in a dual society of winners and losers.

Finally, it is advisable to think of measures of social support which will not be penalized by a disincentive effect. Admittedly it is not a question of attaching disproportionate importance to charges levelled against welfare transfers. These often meet real needs and their discontinuation could generate more negative effects than positive. However suggestions in terms of negative tax or universal income must be examined with interest. Public decision makers must be concerned with defining a means of action which combines social and economic efficiency. Threshold effects and the conditions of allocation of social subsidies must be defined in such a way that the strategic behaviour of the beneficiaries will not be opposed to the activity.

6.3.4. Agents of economic regulation

The term of economic regulation defines the place occupied by public authorities in the organization of economic activity. By way of the usual schemas, one may consider that the task of regulation can be delegated, to two types of institutions: the market and the state. When the market mainly carries out regulation, individual decisions condition economic organization. Within this framework, the public authorities do not really influence productive orientations and their role is limited to the development of general economic laws and the checking of their application. When regulation is mainly carried out by the state, the latter takes part in the reproduction of economic activity. Often the weight of public expenditure in the gross domestic product of an area constitutes a good indicator of the type of regulation which prevails.

- *A new conceptualization of economic public action*

In numerous border areas studied (Corsica, Lesvos, Malaga and Melilla, Gorizia), the presence of public authorities in economic organization appears to be relatively important. Each time, the presence can be explained by the will of official authorities to compensate for the insufficient economic contribution provided by the market. Subsequently, considerations of national solidarity or, in a more political way, considerations of national unity, lead national political authorities to develop, to a sometimes disproportionate extent, public institutions and employment associated with their utilization. These same considerations support the development of massive public transfers of funds in the direction of concerned areas. The result is the constitution of an economy strongly and inappropriately tertiarized and very dependent on the decisions taken by political authorities. Often the standard of living of the population is disconnected from the real activity of the area, giving the impression of an artificial economy.

Obviously, if one thinks that a freely operating market cannot ensure a satisfactory development in these areas, public action is an alternative. But, one cannot be unaware that massive economic action by the state can also induce negative effects. Thereupon, the problem of exclusion, approached this time from a collective point of view, seems to be clearly posed. Indeed, the perverse effects in question are rather close to those associated with the policies of assistance led by official authorities to fight against poverty. They take on simultaneously the form of an awareness from an assisted population in a situation of dependence and a form of discouragement in individual economic action.

Among the research sites, Corsica, Lesvos and Gorizia seemed most related to various effects produced by public action. In Corsica the feeling of dependence seems particularly well perceived and relatively badly tolerated. The nationalist claim is founded on this perception and develops the idea of greater control at the local level concerning the main evolutions of insular society. The elaboration of a project of development based on the exploitation of local resources (natural and cultural) indicates the will to abandon the situation of dependence. In Gorizia, it is more a phenomenon of discouragement to work or rather of an incapacity to adapt to the economic evolution, which seems to prevail. The disengagement of official authorities in the economic organization of the region, started after the change of political context in eastern Europe and caused an obvious void revealing the incapacity of local economic agents to satisfy the new economic constraints.

Two more observations, connected with public activity in border areas which have important economic consequences, can be made. The first is related to the extent of the market. The border reinforced with administrative control reduces the extent of the market. But we can also observe the creation of several links on both sides. It is very difficult to eliminate human relations absolutely and it is important for people to cross borderlines, in both directions, to sell and to buy, to visit someone or to have access to hospitals for health reasons (in the case of Gorizia or Melilla, for example). There are a lot of possibilities for business generated through such activities, which may lead to the eventual existence of complementary economies. Consequently,

these connections have a strong dependency on cross - border exchange. But the combination of this dependency with administrative intervention on frontiers generates a special fragility of commercial functioning in the area. The second consideration in relation to public intervention, is connected to defence needs and the presence of unusable military areas on the sites which reduce the possibilities of other activities. But it is also reasonable to say that military activity and the presence of troops in a zone generate a certain demand for goods and services to be supplied by local firms; even through there is an associated uncertainty of dependence on external decisions, whose eventual change could produce strong disturbances in the economy of border localities.

The welfare state is more and more contestable but at the same time, it has never been so largely solicited. It is true that social needs are growing with the lengthening of life expectancy, increasing expenditure on health, needs for education, etc (Picot 2000: 399). In fact, contemporary economic evolution (world -wide organisation, process of deregulation) considerably modifies the economic action of the state and induces a new definition of the welfare state. Certainly, the challenge of exclusion could not be taken up without a renewal of social policies. The economic and social regulation must be based on a new distribution of the state activities on one hand and to the market on the other. Therefore, it is not a question of opposing one against the other but rather of considering the action of each one as complementary.

- *Public action on the basis of divided responsibility*

It is due to the performance of all the actors composing society that a social structure cannot support a process of development. From this point of view, the action of public authorities appears essential. It must allow for a suitable legal framework but also for the realization of strong direct actions, in particular in the budgetary and tax areas. For this reason, the institutional aspect cannot be ignored insofar as it takes part in the determination of conditions of economic activity. Indeed, it forms the way in which public decision -making is locally organized and contributes to an adequate administrative context of economic reality. It is generally estimated that the decision makers locally involved are those who have the best knowledge of the population's needs. The interviews in the various localities of this research revealed that criticism levelled against public action is all the more virulent when engaged by decision makers close to the central public power (Gorizia, Ireland). In other words, the more the public decision makers are physically distant from the geographical context, the less they seem able to define relevant choices of action (Ireland).

Therefore, it appears convenient to support a greater implication of the local public authorities in decision -making. The decentralisation of state operations is perceived more and more as a factor of efficiency and a guarantee of adequate public action concerning local realities. From this point of view, one can observe that insularity produces an economic and sociological specificity that the central public authorities do not always perceive or understand. The institutional evolutions which have been discussed by, for example, the French central government and Corsican politicians are included in this perspective. In this sense, the autonomous organisation of the Spanish state generates a lot of possibilities for local authorities in Malaga (belonging to the autonomous Community of Andalusia) and Melilla, which has the special statute of an autonomous city. Nevertheless, lack of co -ordination between different levels, increases in administrative structures and political instability at a local level are three dangers to be avoided when looking for solutions.

However, decentralization of public decision -making does not constitute an automatic pledge of economic efficiency. Consequently the closer public decision makers are to the economic operators, the more they are solicited by the latter and therefore exposed to the action of pressure groups. From this point of view, the demographic weakness and the relations of

proximity which characterize insular social reality do not offer the guarantees of neutrality which should normally be associated with public decision making. The quality of public policy at local level depends on the way in which the various actors concerned - economic operators, politicians and citizens - combine their respective actions. On this combination will depend the way in which common interests will be taken into account (to the detriment of individual interests) and the adequacy of decisions connected with local requirements. It is consequently necessary to find an efficient proportioning between local and central powers of decision.

6.3.5. Conclusion

Overall, it is possible to learn from the principal criticisms which have emerged from the case studies. First, it seems that the human and financial means used by official authorities to fight exclusion are often relatively weak (Lesvos, Gorizia). Moreover, the use of these means has often suffered from a lack of co-ordination on the behalf of the responsible institutions (Lesvos). Between them, it is a competitive game rather than co-operative one which has sometimes been denounced as in Ireland.

In order to move towards eliminating exclusion, people need to be integrated in an economic and political process. There is very little chance of reducing exclusion with measures decided and applied without the participation of the concerned individuals, communities or societies. In fact, decentralisation is a way of stressing participation. We may understand the European exclusion system as a progressive and interconnected series of relative excluded "spaces":

EU Hub / Internal Regions / Peripheral Regions / Border Localities / National Excluded Communities / National Excluded Individuals / Migrant Excluded Communities / Migrant Excluded Individuals / Excluded External World

Subsequently, policies must take into account each specific "space", introducing convenient tailor-made measures. External exclusion generates migration and the reduction of possibilities for border localities, which means internal exclusion on borders, and so on. With respect to the issue of participation (García Lizana 1996:102), there are three ways of approaching it: participation in the advantages of progress, participation in the activities of progress, and participation in decision-making (García Lizana 1999: 44). State activity is directed to the first type, with financial transfers, subsidies and social services, but it is also necessary to stimulate employment by promoting the population's initiative, develop the social economy, etc. However, the inclusion process is not finalized without attaining the third level: participation at the core of human activity. The economic policy system must include action on three levels per space, and pay attention to individuals, to communities and finally to border localities. The international dimension is also very important. The concept of co-development must be emphasized and applied, to be incorporated into the perspective of border localities, national governments and European policies for co-operation.

6.4. European spatial regulation

Spatial policy has passed in European history as a sort of disaster relief, in periods of wars and refugee inflow. The current more fragmented but nevertheless massive process of entrance of migrants and asylum seekers does not concern European urban and regional planning. Spatial governance obeys to the principle of subsidiarity and is weak at the EU level. In stark contrast with the interwar period of League of Nations involvement in refugee rehabilitation and spatial governance, or the period of reconstruction of the 1940s when the Marshall Plan in Europe

backed up settlement and infrastructure provision success (Leontidou 1990: chapters 2 and 3), spatial policy in Europe today does not face the massive migration issues.

In border cities and towns, we have found few prospects for cross-national, transnational or international cooperation for spatial policy. This is a contradiction, since borders are spaces of transnational and international contact, movement and trafficking. In the Institutional Interviews conducted in the six localities, in fact, there is scarcely any mention of EU involvement in spatial planning or the territorial approach for immigration and social exclusion. Among the many references to regional policy as a way out of peripherality in economic policy, it is interesting that the question of peripherality is hardly addressed in European *spatial* policy and the territorial approach. This issue is taken up as the “spatial” component in social and economic policy, and is discussed here in 6.3.1 above, as “policy for uneven development” – or “regional policy”. It is even more disappointing, that there is no mention whatsoever about a settlement policy for immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers who nowadays increase in several European cities and towns. The concept of *sustainability* reigns supreme in European-level planning, while the attitude toward resettlement, rebuilding and spatial redistribution seems to be one of neglect or recourse to “subsidiarity”.

6.4.1. Regional planning and development: top-down strategies in Europe

There is an interesting history of international collaboration for spatial regulation for immigrant and refugee settlement in Europe, of which the collaborative effort between the League of Nations and the national government has overturned spatial imbalance in one of our case studies – Greece, and Lesbos more particularly. The population exchange between Greece and Turkey after the 1922 conflict and the Treaty of Lausanne, when 1.5 million Greeks were violently driven out of Asia Minor in exchange for 500,000 Turks, has been backed up by an overwhelming spatial planning programme in Greece. The Refugee Settlement Commission was set up as an international institution and for three decades rebuilt the Greek settlement network, cities and towns to accommodate the refugees in residence and productive activity – with various manifest and latent policy objectives and various degrees of success (Leontidou 1989; Leontidou 1990: chapter 2).

In stark contrast, during the 1990s Greece has received about 700,000 refugees, immigrants and asylum seekers without the slightest hint about European (or national, for that matter) spatial policy. In comparison to the sudden refugee inflow during the 1920s, this new migrant wave is very fragmented, heterogeneous, and has trickled into the country gradually over the last decades. This may be a reason, but not necessarily a justifiable one, that spatial policy has not crystallized at the EU level. It has been made clear that the EU does not back any building or rebuilding operations, except for the protection of heritage and the environment, in some cases. Spatial planning and the territorial approach in Europe does not have any redistributive objectives. Its emphasis has followed progressive changes of EU strategy (up to Agenda 2000) and the keyword is the current orientation towards *sustainability*. This focus is actually overwhelming, while in the blueprints of European urban and regional planning, spatial regulation, environmental and regional policy, there is *scarcely any mention of the resettlement of immigrants into work and housing, or of planning for social cohesion and combatting social exclusion, or for spatial regulation at the shifting EU border*. Social housing or immigrant settlement are out of the question, in a Europe concerned for “sustainability”.

In the area of regional economic policy, we can find fundamental reforms at every period of border changes with EU enlargement. It has been shown that the accession of Ireland and Britain in 1972 contributed to the reshaping of the structural funds, the expectation of the accession of Spain and Portugal in 1986 sparked off the Mediterranean Integrated Programmes as

a compensation to France, Italy and Greece, and the new Nordic member states more recently negotiated changes to cohesion policy (Heritier 1999: chapter 6). “Bargaining on the accession of new members constitutes an important factor with regard to regional policy” (Heritier 1999: 79). However, the overwhelming changes “outside” the EU in the 1990s, the transformation of Eastern Europe which has had an undisputed impact in the EU itself, have not led to any reorientations in spatial policy in general, and border policy in particular. The paramount importance of border changes is not reflected or echoed in spatial policy for the EU borders. Spatial policy in the EU can be considered to have had certain “biases” until recently, which orient it to specific issues:

- It gravitates toward *sustainability* tilted towards environmental issues and questions of quality of life, of which heritage is focused upon the more important. Social and economic issues are left for other policy sectors rather than spatial regulation.
- It perceives of “the spatial” in terms of *areas rather than lines*, except transport lines; it addresses *regions* and *cities* rather than divisions which cut across them, such as borders. As such, it does not address the question of borders and boundaries in its specificity. It even misses out on other linear spatial formations which cut across nations and regions, such as the littoralisation of Europe (Leontidou & Marmaras 2001).
- At the implementation level, given the subsidiarity principle and the weak European presence, we can include spatial planning in policies where “a Community ‘decision’ differs little from a stated wish, allowing, in effect, any national policy” (Mitsos 2000: 56).

The above biases are reflected in European top-down spatial policy as recently reformulated through the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP, EC 1999). The ESDP pursues a sustainable spatial development objective, based on the reconciliation and integration between three dimensions – economic, social and environmental – facing Europe today. It aspires to a coherent approach to all policies, looking at polycentric, dynamic, balanced, attractive, synergetic and competitive utilisation of endogenous resources (e.g. knowledge, urban and rural interdependencies, infrastructure, cultural heritage, landscapes and natural systems, etc.). The ESDP also recognises endogenous potentials in terms of diversity, identity and complexity, but actually includes these in its concern for the quality of the natural and cultural heritage. Its main concern is sustainable development,²⁵ to be achieved in collaboration with a number of Community initiatives, such as INTERREG II C, LEADER and ICZM. However, the ESDP admits that such ambitious integrated development approaches are still relatively few.

EU top-down policies culminating in the ESDP, have followed the policy framework determined by Agenda 2000. The EU Commission has recently defined four strategic objectives 2000-2005 for “Shaping the New Europe” (COM(2000)154), namely:

- promoting new forms of European governance;
- a new economic and social agenda;
- a better quality of life;
- a stable Europe with a stronger voice in the world.

The lack of reference to spatial *disparity* is obvious here. The above socio-economic objectives include a spatial component, in line with the concrete economic / regional policies in Europe which were introduced since 1979, when the first major widening in the European Regional Development Funds took place. European socio-economic policy has always had a

²⁵ The ESDP underlines that sustainable development can be achieved by: the development of an independent perspective; the discovery of endogenous potentials; the exchange of experience among regions; the existence of networks and partnerships; the democratic handling of decision-making; the initiative and commitment of regional and local actors and communities.

spatial component, but spatial policy as such has to address the organization, regulation and governance of European space as driven by urban and regional disparities. The 1988 reform, which can be said to have moved slightly towards a territorial approach (e.g. Objectives 1, 2) concentrated funds in six priority Objectives, already discussed above (section 6.3.1). After 1993, however, member-state governments have had to present more detailed plans weakening the Commission's influence in redistributive planning in the context of the structural funds (Mazey 1996; Heritier 1999: chapter 6). Today regional funds policy constitutes about 30% of the total EU budget, and has sparked off institutional change and reform *within* member states which is positive in many respects, but has done little for international *cooperation*. The weakest nodes in this policy gap are immigrant resettlement, spatial redistribution, and cross-border cooperation, especially with respect to *external* EU borders. "In regional policy there is such a thing as a European policy, albeit largely subject to the principle of subsidiarity when it comes to the concrete distribution of resources" (Heritier 1999: 78).

6.4.2. European Local Development and Urban Policy

However, subsidiarity has not led to elaborate decentralised policy. The above EU top-down policies are not supplemented with certain bottom-up spatial policies on social exclusion and the border. More has emerged in the agricultural rather than the urban sectors. Since the beginning of the 1980s, practical experience and knowledge have increased on the potential of local initiatives and the effectiveness of empowering communities. Specific programmes have been supported by the Community, such as LEADER (for local rural development), LEDA (Local Employment And Development Actions), ERGO (for the long-term unemployed). Statements and guidelines on local sustainable development initiatives have been elaborated, such as those identified by ICLEI (International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives) as necessary to feed the process of Agenda 21 implementation.

Most successful policy with a bottom-up perspective and objective, has been concentrated in rural development. LEADER represents the rural branch of the LDEIs (Local Development and Employment Initiatives), which has acquired a paramount importance in the European Employment Strategy, as recently affirmed by *Acting Locally for Employment* (COM(2000)196).²⁶ In this context, the new LEADER+ relies upon Local Action Groups (LAGs) for an integrated territorial approach tailored to the local context.²⁷ These bottom-up initiatives have a more redistributive outlook. Their objectives broaden the scope from the notion of sustainability to spatial disparities. However, a central problem of local sustainable development strategies seems to be a lack of instruments and methods specifically designed to empower local actors and communities to conceive and manage their own future development in a sustainable

²⁶ This document highlights basic driving forces for successful development initiatives: local dimension; integrated approach; partnership; bottom-up approach; devolution of powers to regional and sub-regional levels (subsidiarity); integration of local development strategies, sustained by the integration of administrative practices; finance provision suited to local needs; intermediate support services; appropriate vocational training systems; mutually supportive economic, structural and social policies.

²⁷ LEADER+ aims at: enhancing the natural and cultural heritage; reinforcing the economic environment in favour of job creation; improving the abilities of local communities. It relies on Local Action Groups (LAGs) to: promote innovative projects; organise exchanges of experiences and know-how by increasing efficacy of networking and technical assistance for local and transnational co-operation; adopt a global approach on the interaction between actors, sectors and products, built around a strong identity of the endogenous resources (human, environmental and economic); utilise new know-how and new technologies; improve the quality of life in rural areas; add value to local networks of production and consumption; make the best use of natural and cultural resources, enhancing the value of sites selected under the EU programme Nature 2000; foster and ameliorate the transferability of methods, practices and learning.

way. This has been particularly evident in our Institutional Interviews, where European spatial policy was out of view in bottom-up initiatives.

The epitome of “subsidiarity” can be found in the area of urban policy, which is, almost invariably, outside the EU policy orbit, as amply demonstrated in a recent comprehensive analysis (Newman & Thornley 1996). The excluded population concentrated in urban areas, mainly in territories characterised with strong social and spatial segregation rates (Jones 1960 for Belfast and its history), has not much affected relevant EU policy. Segregation trends, however, have supported a shift in the national social policies for these specific areas, with *Lisbon* as the prime example among our own case studies. In fact, there are at present policies aiming to socially sustain the two Portuguese metropolises, aiming at different but complementary objectives. Although it would be premature to evaluate their impacts in the improvement of the conditions and quality of life of their target population, these policies can be explained, especially the ones presenting a more structured envisioning. Also, some readable shifting signs can already be seen.

In the sequence of the National Program Against Poverty, launched in 1991, the Special Re-lodgement Program was created in 1993, aiming at providing the municipalities in the two metropolitan areas - the territories with the biggest and more problematic shantytown nuclei - with conditions to eradicate the existing shanties and consequent re-lodgement of their occupants in cost-controlled dwellings.²⁸ The funding of this program has had no European component: it has been divided between the central and the local government. The central government is responsible for 40%, in form of non-returnable investment, and grants the municipalities with 40% more in credit with preferential interest rates. The local government is responsible for land allocation, the support of the loans debt, and housing maintenance.

Other programmes linked directly with the one above, aim, mainly, to complement and accomplish the actions taken there. What interests us here is EU involvement in the Urban Renewal Operational Intervention and the URBAN Initiative. The first program has as main objectives the development of social equipment, public and green spaces, and the support for the implementation of economic activities in the neighbourhoods. The complementarity of this program with the one described above is as strong as the achieved connections between private housing and public spaces, in the sense of the development of social links, the prevention of social exclusion, the support of social re-insertion of the re-housed population, through social diversification and heterogeneity in the intervention areas, and retail, service and equipment development. The URBAN Initiative aims, through urban revitalisation - mainly equipment and infrastructure - at the improvement of life conditions for the most vulnerable populations.

National programs targeted more indirectly to social exclusion issues, have also achieved a considerable receptivity in the AML. That is the case of the Rented Building Rehabilitation Special Regime Compartmentation (RECRIA), starting in 1992 to tackle with urban housing degradation, generated by a long period of housing rent freezing. The AML took 92,1% of the overall fund granted.

However, in spite of the social and territorial actions generated by the implementation of these policies, there is still the need of a clear, integrated and coherent social housing policy, oriented by justice and solidarity principles, a policy strategy considering both housing quantity and quality demands - that largely supersede the aesthetic or the architectural and urbanistic necessities in the neighbourhoods. To rethink housing quality means, therefore, to provide

²⁸ The census then made by the municipalities in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area (AML), which underwent in the program, showed 29,233 shanty housing, occupied by 33,000 families (around 114,000 people). It is quite significant to refer that only three of those municipalities gathered 63% of the total shanty housing in the AML.

infrastructure and equipment, as well as to think over the the location of the new neighbourhoods. These are vital aspects for a real social inclusion promotion policy, which has to be thought over for several cities on the EU border, including, among our case studies, Belfast, where segregation is a long-standing issue (Jones 1960). As as the example of interwar Greece amply indicates (Leontidou 1989), such policy is not out of the question as an international spatial strategy for the inclusion of immigrants, refugees and transient populations, even during our own period of neoliberalism.

6.5. Policy recommendations on social exclusion and the EU border

Relevant bibliography has frequently assessed EU policy as discontinuous and fragmented, but still often moving rapidly. According to a recent study, outlets are provided by the existence of creative informal strategies termed ‘subterfuge’ or escape routes (Heritier 1999 after Benz 1992 as cited). Such strategies, which according to the relevant study prevent political impasses and EU policy deadlocks, are difficult to discern in the localities under study here. In fact, informality observed in border cities and towns, **runs counter to EU policy objectives**. In many cases, strategies are developed to **escape** regulations in most domains of everyday life – from smuggling and illegal immigrant trafficking to informal means of working and living. It is easy to understand such strategies in the context of these societies, where EU policy in any domain or any field is inexistent, with some notable exceptions where the national and the international merge in policy: P & R in Ireland and few works based on the EU Support Framework in Greece and Portugal.

More generally, after the Schengen agreement, the socio-cultural component of border policy was not reoriented, despite the fact that European integration has involved significant shifts in the domains of politics, the economy and social organisation. This echoes comparable policy inertia during the previous major change in Eastern Europe during the 1990s.

6.5.1. Scenaria of EU integration and top-down Initiatives for the Border

Among different top-down EU policies, links of spatial planning with the border are weak or missing. Other policy avenues, namely those of economic policy and rural policy, enable the Commission to target financial and practical aid to the poorest regions within the EU (Mazey 1996; Heritier 1999). However, in spatial planning matters member-state governments have defended the principle of subsidiarity, because the power to redistribute funds constitutes an important source of electoral legitimation (Heritier 1999).

Our project results show that spatial policy is either inexistent as a redistributive policy for social exclusion, or restricted to special policies adopted for the border *only*, rather than an integrated approach considering the border as a special spatial formation within European urban and regional restructuring. Border policy can be found in EU “initiatives”, a set of special projects targeting specific areas of EU interest. There are twelve schemes allocated a budget under the ‘Community Intiatives’ programme in 1989 - 99,: RECHAR for coal-mining areas; ENVIREG for Mediterranean coastal problems; STRIDE for R&D; REGEN for energy; PRISMA for infrastructure to firms; TELEMATIQUE for telecommunications; LEADER for rural areas; EUROFORM for employment; NOW for female employment; HORIZON for the integration of the disabled; as well as INTERREG and REGIS (Heritier 1999: 66).

Initiatives such as INTERREG for the borders, REGIS for peripheral regions, as well as policies such as EUREGIO, EURISLES for the islands, and community strategies such as P & R in Ireland do *not* belong in an integrated approach for regional restructuring or local development,

but address borders, islands and peripheral localities as spaces of particular and unique interest, isolated from their broader context. In addition, they *fragment the border landscape by targeting only the EU side*, which means, only the one side of the problem. Both sides are only addressed where internal EU borders are targeted. In external borders, even where member states of the near future are concerned, cross-border collaborative efforts are relegated only to PHARE. The provisions of PHARE for external borders are inadequate in the face of the complex problems on the EU border, and poor, compared with the INTERREG Community Initiative. PHARE is inadequate for the problems facing the external borders, and if contrasted with the diversity of European “neighbours” including Eastern Europe, Africa and the Middle East. The EUROMED provisions could be useful for the southern EU borders, but have as yet not demonstrated their efficacy.

These initiatives thus target many dissimilar places in a dissimilar way: they allow for collaboration between regions on the *internal* borders, targeting them with advantageous strategies; they are useful in the face of the policy gap, but could be greatly improved, as also pointed out in our Irish case study. One project worker for a cross-border community development project outlined the main faults of INTERREG II for underestimating the extent of the political conflict and for relying chiefly on top-down decision-making (quoted in Leontidou et al. 2000: 53):

“It would seem that neither the EU nor both governments are cognisant of the fact that extensive and deep-seated cleavages exist on a cross-border and cross-community basis in the region as, from an examination of the Programme in its current form, no specific measures or aspects of the Programme are geared at directly addressing these issues, the focus of the Programme lies totally on economic development.”

In general, our findings counteract the economic and environmental focus of EU policy, and stress the importance of social, cultural and political aspects. They also suggest the central role of *space*, in addition to economic change, in the creation of social disadvantage. Conversely, social disadvantage creates its own *spaces of exclusion*. These necessitate *redistributive* planning at the *international collaborative* level, to deal with cross national movement, migration and border change. This type of planning should counteract the fragmentation of border landscapes done today, even in cases where both sides of the border belong to the EU. A good case as a relevant example of isolating borders as a special field of policy and, in addition, splitting them up into two sides, is the P & R Initiative in Ireland, which, in itself, is quite successful in comparison with the policy gap elsewhere. It was established following the paramilitary cease-fires of 1994, as a special fund, the ‘EU special support programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties of Ireland’, often referred to as the ‘Peace and Reconciliation Programme’ or by the acronym ‘P&R’. As H. Donnan writes (in Leontidou et al. 2000: 53, emphasis added):

The very title of the project reveals a clear-cut differentiation between Northern Ireland on one side and the border counties of the Republic of Ireland on the other. Applications for funding under the Programme *must be addressed to different offices in Belfast or Dublin* according to the geographical area of operation, and the programme explicitly states that: “[a]pplications for cross-border projects should be sent to *both addresses*”, thus implicitly suggesting that such applications are somehow out of the ordinary. The whole Programme provides funding amounting to 300 million Ecus (240 for Northern Ireland and 60 for the border counties of the Republic) to be allocated by 1999. The structure of the Operational Programme lists seven priorities or sub-programmes, which are further subdivided into manifold measures.”

It seems as if the situation can not become any more fragmented than this, no matter how some of the borders now studied become internal EU borders in a couple of years, after the enlargement which will increase the member states from 15 to 27. The first one is Gorizia and the last ones are Malaga and Melilla, while Lesvos may also later see its transformation into an internal EU border. All scenarios involve the creation of new external borders in the EU, where new articulations between the border and social exclusion will appear.

6.5.2. Policy viewed from below: Border particularities as policy outlets

The manifestations of social, economic and political change in Europe today, if seen at the local rather than the global level, involve significant shifts in the domains of the economy, politics and social organisation but, more importantly, at the levels of *culture* and *identity* (Castells 1997; Morley & Robins 1995; Kellner 1995; Brahm 1996). Formerly distinctive boundaries between cultures are being re-examined after the rise of the Third Millennium. Change is “of such complexity that there is not as yet – and perhaps will never be – a single formula or theory for comprehending it” (Rhodes 1997: 1). Even more so at the border: the tightening and the loosening up of EU borders are two faces of the same coin, creating a rising instability around the external borders, which has become pivotal in the *informal* construction of alternative meanings about political identity on the part of the populations on the EU periphery, as analysed throughout our project.

The important distinction made in the Border Cities project between *actual/physical borders* on the one hand and *symbolic/cultural boundaries* on the other (Wilson & Donnan eds 1998; Leontidou & Afouxenidis 1999; Donnan & Wilson 1999), may be resumed at this point, with respect to the issue of representations of “otherness”. The border is always in a sense also a boundary, while the opposite is not necessarily applicable, and in fact the symbolic is also present in the actual. Moreover, borders are inscribed in individual and group identity, as for example migrant waves which pass through state borders. This can be contrasted to the case of, say, rural - urban migration, which does not involve passing through an institutional “line”, but rather through a symbolic boundary, which exists between the country and the city – as in the case of Lisbon (Leontidou et al. 2000). If we resume this point at the level of the feeling of *insularity*, especially in Lesvos and Corse, we will discover that the “objective” external EU border may be important for the residents as the *intersubjective* line dividing them from the mainland, their national metropolis, across the sea, or from the global order. Such borders are important as generators of social in many ways:

1. Notwithstanding their many social and structural similarities, the two sides of the border have different perceptions of society and its needs, which we have glossed as the 'single community' and 'two communities' models.
2. These models, together with a perception of the border as a divide rather than as an area sharing the same problems of peripheralisation and marginalisation, have influenced the thrust and direction of funding..., which in turn has affected how social exclusion and the measures to combat it have been identified and defined.
3. At a more grass-roots level, our research suggests that social exclusion may be perceived as related to 'communities' defined at different levels. In each case, a different perception of the border corresponds to a different representation of social exclusion.
4. The border influences the perception of social exclusion in at least three other ways: by creating border-specific types of marginalisation (intimidated people, victims, unemployment related to political violence); by loading marginal figures at the border with ambiguous meanings

(smugglers, Travellers); and by separating two quite different ways of counting, classifying and responding to the homeless.

... Far from being just a geographical backdrop to social exclusion, the border is an *integral element* of the framework within which social exclusion is currently shaped there. In short, the border is not just the place where social exclusion occurs; it is a dynamic factor in how that exclusion is perceived, understood, and does or does not become the focus of public policy. (Donnan in Leontidou et al. 2000: 67 -68).

Table 24: Relevance of project results for various tiers of policy

FINDINGS	LIMITATIONS	OPPORTUNITIES
<i>Grass-roots vs top-down initiatives</i>	Conflict of competences & exclusion	Empowerment of grass-roots initiatives, encouragement of cooperation
<i>Fragmentation and competition</i>	Scattering of efforts, competition	Frequent conferences and workshops for co-operation; coordination; dissemination initiatives; use of new technology
<i>Conflictual cultures</i>	Tension and war	Peace and reconciliation strategies, encouragement of co-operation
<i>Inadequacy of international / EU presence</i>	Marginalisation	Focus on peripheral Europe & staffing with qualified employees
<i>Military presence</i>	Perceptions of fear of “the other” across the border	Involvement of soldiers in local development initiatives
<i>Treble peripherality</i>	Socio-spatial exclusion	Special EU initiatives for at least one dimension of peripherality
<i>Intersection between localities and target groups</i>	Social & spatial division, transience	Decentralized self-governance
<i>Ambivalence and fluidity</i>	Conflict and contradiction	Construction of qualitative indicators for tolerance and cross-cultural cooperation

In our 2nd Annual Report, we have systematized border particularities under there under 8 headings (Leontidou et al. 2000: 197 -8): complexity; fragmentation and competition; conflictual cultures; inadequacy of international / EU presence; military presence; treble peripherality; intersection between localities and target groups; and grass-roots vs top-down initiatives. These will be now systematized as conclusions with a policy relevance or as channels for policy outlets. We will offer certain policy recommendations based on this set, as well as elaborate on new concepts derived from project results and findings, as shown on Table 24. In more detail:

1. *Grass-roots vs top-down initiatives*. The notion of community /local society (as distinct from target groups) acquires an importance for grass-roots action, and is suggestive for the elaboration of top-down initiatives accordingly – to empower local agents and residents to facilitate and encourage cross-cultural and cross-border cooperation rather than impose interpretations, representations, solutions.
2. *Fragmentation and competition*. In many of the six borders, institutions and agencies dealing with social exclusion and the border are fragmented and do not cooperate. Not only different sides of the border, but also the one side often has its government authorities of various tiers,

but also community groups and other voluntary and statutory agencies *fragmented*, sometimes competitors rather than partners. In other cases, they lack communication, with uncoordinated policy and divergent perceptions of social exclusion as a result. This has negative effects on the potential of formulating bottom-up policy, which can be alleviated by hosting frequent events for discussion and debate among agents and institutions. Frequent workshops and conferences can enhance cooperation and coordination.

3. *Conflictual cultures*. In Lesvos, Ireland, Corse, and other borders, conflictual cultures have often obstructed the interviewing process. Outsiders attribute all responsibility for conflict to the local societies, which is wrong: the international community or the national centres are heavily responsible for this. This policy-relevant issue should be seriously considered as a consideration of top-down policy – the latter including a wide spectrum of issues, from national and EU programmes of foreign policy and war, as in the case of bombing of the Balkans which created negativities coming to stark contrast with the P&R initiative in Ireland. Populations of neighbouring countries near war fields have been negatively affected by this sort of “policy”.
4. *Inadequacy of international / EU presence*. The other side of the coin of international responsibility, is neglect. This can be found in each one of the six border localities to different degrees: attention by EU programmes and initiatives is announced, but usually does not materialize. Funding and targeting local problems is deemed inadequate by almost all local institutions and agents. Comments are rather justified, despite the fact that sometimes local inertia, related with lack of organizational and technical infrastructure and inability to claim funding, invites national and international inaction (Leontidou 1993). This has an impact on both top-down and local strategies. Backing up local institutions with qualified staff is basic in alleviating part of the bottleneck.
5. *Military presence*. Military presence for security reasons can turn each one of the six borders, except perhaps Lisbon, into barriers, and counteract any aims for reconciliation or cross-border cooperation. This has to be considered as an important aspect of national policy. It can not be avoided, especially during periods of crisis, but during periods of peace the coexistence of military and civilians can become more harmonious, if the former take over some developmental tasks in the community.
6. *Treble peripherality*. Lesvos and Corse are the epitome of treble peripherality as specified in our project since the time of the research proposal: they are close to the external European border; in less favoured regions; and away from European development corridors. Insularity is a *fourth* dimension added to this. At the inter-subjective level, the feeling of *isolation* of whole communities is coupled with representations of social exclusion of certain groups to create a perception of this multiple peripherality in these island societies, as well as N. Ireland – another island. It is policy-relevant that, even where *one* of the multiple dimensions of peripherality is targeted, conditions can improve spectacularly.
7. *Intersection between localities and target groups*. Different representations of social exclusion correspond to different perceptions of the “border”, as well as other dimensions of spatial division: this side / the other side of the border, the island / mainland and the core / periphery relations in each country, create a grass-roots perception of diverse “communities” in space but also in society (Ireland), *beyond* the representations of exclusion of certain social groups. The perception of *spatial* exclusion supersedes social exclusion especially in islands – like Lesvos, Ireland, Corse – where social exclusion is often perceived as related to the isolation of “communities” defined at different levels. Hence, the importance of focusing on localities rather than “target groups” exclusively – which makes our approach to social

exclusion different from that in standard bibliography and points to the value of local *empowerment* and *decentralized self-governance*.

8. *Ambivalence and fluidity*, complexity and contradiction. In the course of the institutional interviews, we found complexity and diverse overlapping narratives with *ambiguous* representations. Even within each and every locality, divergent or conflicting representations of social exclusion have been expressed. Further, certain respondents in Lesbos and Malaga especially, tended to fall to apparent contradictions in presenting their perceptions of social exclusion. Policy makers therefore have to become wary of first-level replies to simple questionnaires (such as those in Eurobarometer 2001). A lot of research effort should be rather directed to the construction of *qualitative indicators*. The concepts of ambivalence and fluidity, diversity and fragmentation, are basic in understanding social exclusion, as well as incidences of racism, xenophobia, or their opposites – tolerance and cross-cultural cooperation on both sides of the border.

The above set of policy-relevant findings, is harmonious with a series of approaches for promoting self-governance of local communities, the empowerment of local actors and initiatives for sustainable development (e.g. Local Agenda 21) developed during the last decade. They open up concrete important prospects for these localities facing peripherality in its acutest form, on the external European border, where changes are rapid, with migrations, underground economies, illegality, but also tensions and wars. The gap in top-down specific redistributive planning has a profound policy relevance, and bottom-up initiatives should be encouraged.

7. Dissemination and exploitation of results

In the process of dissemination and exploitation of results, our main priority at this point that the project has formally ended, is to disseminate it to the people who helped us complete it, in the towns of Lesbos and Ireland, in the cities of Lisbon, Malaga and Melilla, in the island of Corse and in the twin towns of Gorizia and Nova Gorica. As underlined in section 6.5.2 above, among other things a series of workshops and conferences should aim at counteracting the *fragmentation* and *competition* of institutions and agents, which we found in all of our case studies. This becomes ever more feasible with new technology. New approaches to interaction and dissemination supersede earlier non-technical tools, improved traditional technical planning instruments, and old communication avenues. Technical methods have been upgraded considerably in the new Europe by the use of ICT (GIS systems, databases, Internet). Approaches combining social and participatory management of local development processes and the new participation and communication opportunities offered by advanced ICT-based planning instruments, though still very rare, are a priority in projects funded by the Commission, and such projects will be sought again by members of our research partnership with a view to the extension of the Border Cities network.

In developing the transnational applicability and relevance of the results and in order to stir international collaborative interest in border policy, it is recommended that several actions are funded and organized. We have already drafted a proposal under Accompanying Measures for an externally funded Euro-conference, which should be organised in collaboration with the other Border Partnership which began its project in 2000,²⁹ as well as additional participants outside the network and also *beyond the EU border*. The conference should be preceded by a series of workshops with local institutional agents, NGOs and border residents, aiming at discussion and dissemination of findings. The conference should draft a Report of conclusions and prospects and include a tentative programme of future action and means of implementation in *each* city studied. Besides all this, publications for the dissemination of the project are being drafted by the members of our partnership, in several European languages.

As for the role of the EU, much more is left to be said on completion of our project. The exploitation of our results in policy is of major importance. On the basis of analysis in chapter 6 above, we can claim that Community Initiatives have usually *fragmented* European border spaces, to the disadvantage rather than development of external borders. In European policy, we have effectively questioned the economic and environmental focus of planning for “sustainability” dominant in European documents and plans. It can be argued that certain dimensions of social disadvantage already flickering during the 1990s will escalate during the new millennium, which are *not* primarily economic. Immigration has socio-cultural implications, among which racism figures as the most menacing. It is also combined with poverty, which is already as such still a big problem, and so is unemployment. The *spatial* component in the nucleus of all these processes and its role in their creation and reproduction has been underestimated in the EU, let alone regulated. This component has become evident in the investigation of social exclusion and marginality in conditions of spatial peripherality on the EU border. It has been shown in this project, that regions on external borders, frontiers and neighbouring regions have difficulties of cross-

²⁹ We refer to Project HPSE-CT-1999-00003, coordinated by the Department of Modern Languages of the University of Bradford, on *Border Discourse: Changing identities, changing nations, changing stories in European border communities*. It is interesting that the only overlapping border area between our project and the new one, is the Italian-Slovenian border.

border cooperation under current EU projects and initiatives. They have thus *not* been successfully targeted.

Besides the spatial component, surveys such as that of the Eurobarometer (2001) have been criticized here. Much more *qualitative* effort should go into understanding the dimensions of social tensions such as racism, xenophobia and social exclusion. The latter is a diverse phenomenon and it is *because* of this diversity that a precise definition of the term is not particularly useful nor functional. While racism and xenophobia are rather well -delimited concepts, and we could easily say that their incidence in our study areas is rather ambivalent and fluid rather than positive or negative, social exclusion can be used with respect to a number of groups or individuals whose marginality stems from several sources. Definitions *do* vary across different countries or localities. Therefore, the meaning of the term “social exclusion” is *specific* to particular institutional structures, historical experiences, local discourses, narratives and human identities. Borders inflict these identities in specific ways, creating dichotomies but also their in -between spaces – hence, *triplets*. As shown in section 6.5.2 above, there is a special relationship of the border with social exclusion, evident in the different ways in which the political border influences perceptions of social exclusion which were identified in our research project. Our findings in this do deserve dissemination, but more research effort should go into research of the direction and impact of different policies. The least one can claim here, to start with, is the urgent necessity for the construction of *qualitative indicators* for social exclusion, racism and xenophobia. It is as urgent as the interruption of funding of certain European observatories treating these issues epidermically – and, after all, dangerously – as opinion polls leading to labelling and, hence, racism.

Last but not least, another axis of exploitation of results as policy avenues, has to do with no less than geopolitical questions. The objective to shape public policy for the EU border has to be *preceded* by the objective *to avoid negative policy or aggression on the border* – and this should not be only taken to mean conflict in the *local* societies: as our project on Border Cities unfolded, part of our chosen research field became a theatre of war and “collateral damage”. Our project suddenly included, not only localities experiencing treble peripherality, but also certain local societies on the edges of Europe facing coercion, conflict and war. An immensely threatening prospect arose as the *destruction* of spatial cohesion, infrastructure, settlements, bridges and buildings by an international collaborative effort unfolded during the bombing of Serbia in 1999. The detailed list of destructions published in the international press is in fact similar to a list of public works issued by any comprehensive regional plan: bridges, embassies, hospitals, schools, houses, roads, railway lines... The difference is, that the list here does not represent an inventory for necessary infrastructural works, but a list of existing works destroyed in the course of war.

Our Border Cities project began in the context of European sensitivity to poverty, unemployment, migration, ageing, social exclusion, refugees, and war victims, too. As the world was approaching the millennium celebrations, however, we watched a European capital – Belgrade – set ablaze by continuous bombing, surrounded by a disaster area. We experienced “collateral damage” close to our research field adjoining the war zone, and streams of refugees all over the Balkans, spilling over to our Border Cities. None of these is an “event” “outside” Europe: its spatial, environmental and social consequences on the material and the symbolic level have had a profound impact on the current EU member states. It is hoped that it will remain a dreary memory of aggressive spatial policy in Europe and that peaceful reforms and local empowerment will prevail around the EU borders – and in the world at large, of course – in the new millennium.

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