TSER EURCIT PROJECT FINAL REPORT

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Title: European Citizenship and the Social and Political Integration of the European Union

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Abstract

The EURCIT network sought to establish the most successful basis for the elaboration of
European citizenship. We investigated three conceptual models (the civic nationalist; the
cosmopolitan globalist; and a 'mixed' model combining elements of each of these), and
carried out empirical investigations of policy and institutional change as well as political
mobilisation by citizens and their representatives. Our findings are of great relevance for

policy making. We concluded that the mixed model offers th e most suitable basis for European citizenship, since it suggests how citizens from both different member states and third country nationals might engage with each other and the EU institutions, thereby building a sense of solidarity on a cross -border bas is. We have demonstrated that the necessary sense of common political identity for European citizenship cannot be based on the idea of a common European heritage, but can emerge from collective agreement on values and aims *– provided these values are all owed to emerge from a process of dialogue and deliberation at both mass and elite levels* , rather than imposed on the basis of supposedly common cultural and constitutional traditions. Consequently, the process of European integration must be politicised i n a new way, namely by reform of decision making to foster cross -border activism by concerned (groups of) citizens. Our recommendations for action thus focus on the issues of institutional change, policy styles and policy reform. We propose a clarification of the concept of subsidiarity to allow citizens to identify which actor is responsible for which policy. We support the reinforcement of the 'partnership principle', its explicit extension to civil society actors, and its application to many further area s of EU policy. We urge the upscaling of EU competence in the areas of consumer and social policies to ensure the protection of the individual against the neoliberal bias of much existing integration, and also to demonstrate 'added value' for the citizen f rom European integration. Finally, and most importantly, we recommend a sustained and frank public debate on the role of the EU aimed at the masses as well as the elites in the member states. It is from this process of deliberation that suitable ideas for further reform will ensue.

1.0: Executive Summary

1.1: Brief Statement of Objectives

The EURCIT project was instigated to explore how European (EU) Citizenship might be developed, from both a normative and an empirical perspective. Created in formal te rms by the Maastricht Treaty, and confirmed at Amsterdam, EU citizenship is unique – no

other non-national governance structure can boast an equivalent. However, there is limited evidence to indicate that member state nationals are aware of their rights as EU citizens, and still less to suggest that they either identify themselves as EU citizens, or use the rights and opportunities that this status gives them. Given the increasing importance of the EU - its considerable deepening over the last two decades, and its impact upon the decisions and structures of the member states - it is vital that the Union reinforces its legitimacy. Citizenship is potentially a very helpful instrument to deploy in this process, because it promotes a sense of political engageme nt and solidarity between otherwise atomised individuals affected by the same body of law and governance structures. In this respect, its inclusion in the Treaty on European Union is a turning point in the development of political integration in (Western) Europe.

However, developing EU citizenship beyond its formal Treaty status is no easy task, for several key reasons. First, the climate of popular disquiet about the EU's 'democratic deficit' renders difficult the attempt to persuade the public to accept and engage with politics and policy making at the EU level. Second, the EU does not have the resources to replicate national traditions of citizenship – it is not a state in the Westphalian sense, and cannot simply create a sense of loyalty through a mono poly of the means of coercion, welfare provision or propaganda. Third, constructing an EU citizenship cannot be done in a vacuum: both legally and affectively it must sit alongside both national citizenships and what are often already complex political ide ntities. Fourth, EU citizenship is shaped by a variety of pressures, activities and decisions (such as judgements by the Court of Justice on freedom of movement, and a broad range of secondary legislation) as well as Articles 17-22 of the Treaty. Fifth, wh atever formal status EU citizenship is given, it will wither on the vine unless it is actually taken up and invoked by its holders on a regular basis. As a consequence, it is necessary to develop a normative framework, or blueprint, which indicates how EU citizenship can successfully be developed. It is also necessary to point to the kind of structures and policies which the EU will need in order to translate Treaty provisions into lived experience.

1.2: Principal Results

The present research has thus served to establish a laboratory of ideas and concepts related to EU citizenship. Its primary findings are theoretical, and speak to the conceptual elaboration of a meaningful and workable European citizenship. As a network, we have established that blueprints for the successful development of European citizenship cannot be based on a sense of either `thick' communitarian ties or `thin' cosmopolitan ones. Rather, the two need to be combined in a mixed model that we dub cosmopolitan communitarianism. At the national level, community affiliations rather obviously preclude the development of transnational communitarian affinities and loyalties. The evidence of the feasibility of such ties developing at the EU level is not strong in even the fairly long term, and thus the kind of citizenship which is possible at EU level will need to be conceived and fostered on a different basis from its national equivalents. A cosmopolitan commitment to human rights has been seen as the answer by some. But these are broader than the EU, extending to humanity more generally. Moreover, rights may be `thickened' in numerous and not always compatible ways. After all, the member states all aim to uphold human rights but occasionally differ substantially in how they do so. A mixed conception recognises this fact, regarding the EU as emerging from a dialogue between different sorts of community. These operate not just at the level of the member states, but also below and above them. As a result, it is important to develop a kind of citizenship which prioritises political engagement and opportunities over either prescriptive `thin' statements of rights or 'thick' bonds of solidarity and identity. Only then will a distinctive European union of the two be able to develop.

Therefore, the primary result of the research is that the 'mixed model' of EU citizenship provides the most effective blueprint. Although some members of the network favoured a greater element of cosmopolitanism than in the original model, all accepted the mixed model as likely to be the most successful design to apply, as well as the most feasible given the existing structure of the EU – a 'fused', multi-level polity. Indeed, we found some evidence of a deepening of EU citizenship in this direction in the world of real politics and decision making, with an increasing range of actors from civil society

exploiting all available political opportunities to mobilise at EU level. However, the elaboration of EU citizenship in the Treaty remains confused from a normative perspective, as well as truncated. Moreover, citizens themselves primarily view EU citizenship instrumentally, i.e. as a means of legitimating demands and pressing a predetermined agenda, rather than as a normative good in its own right or as a source of identity-generation. Thus, even the `mixed model' has yet to be fully realised in a normatively satisfactory way, even if the basis for a development in this direction exists.

The proposed solution to these current shortcomings lies in a neo-republican perspective on the mixed model of citizenship and the reform of the EU's multi-level structures in the direction of a `mixed commonwealth'. In this neo-republican view, citizenship must be cashed out in primarily political terms, since what counts above all is not so much the content of citizenship but widespread engagement with a process of negotiation which shapes citizenship. Politics has primacy over law, in that it is held to be highly questionable whether either fixed constitutions or substantive (as opposed to purely procedural) judicial review are legitimate. This is because the former tend to reflect a time-bound set of values which can subsequently be difficult to change even when public opinion has altered substantially, and the latter empowers unelected actors to decide important matters in a way which can be divorced from popular control, resulting in decisions which can be out of step with public opinion and which also reflect legal rather than political culture and values. Instead, the key to efficient and just decision-making lies in securing a balance between the different actors involved so that all are forced to take account of others in their deliberations. Multi-level governance has the potential to provide such a balanced political constitution. At present, though, certain levels are too weak – particularly the sub and the transnational – others too strong – notably the national and supranational.

The role of courts and constitutionalisation of the Euro-polity are not discounted totally in this scheme. As those more inclined towards cosmopolitanism rightly stressed, the value of citizenship rights in political struggles means that the use of legal processes and structures offers an important source for developing European citizenship. The law can

often be used to entrench or extend citizenship rights in politically reactionary contexts, and can thus provide an important source of protection. Constitutions can also serve as a useful device for transparency and the generation/expression of values, lending t hem a practical and symbolic importance which could be of particular utility in the context of European polity development. Seen in this light, the law can offer resources for a republican-driven process of ongoing constitutional politics.

Our recommenda tions for action thus focus on the issues of institutional change, policy styles and policy reform. We propose a clarification of the concept of subsidiarity to allow citizens to identify which actor is responsible for which policy. We support the reinforcement of the 'partnership principle', its explicit extension to civil society actors, and its application to many further areas of EU policy. We urge the upscaling of EU competence in the areas of consumer and social policies to ensure the protection of t he individual against the neoliberal bias of much existing integration, and also to demonstrate 'added value' for the citizen from European integration. Most importantly, we recommend a sustained and frank public debate on the role of the EU aimed at the masses as well as the elites in the member states. It is from this process of deliberation that suitable ideas for further reform will ensue.

It was further agreed that a successful model of EU citizenship must reinforce its cosmopolitan element with regar d to the issue of migration in the single market. Both nationally and at the EU level, citizenship construction has been linked to the idea of economic migration. Given this, and the likelihood of continued immigration into the EU by 'third county national s', it is necessary to acknowledge that immigration is part of what makes EU citizenship both necessary and feasible. Thus, it needs to include a more extensive set of migration -related rights and be more accessible to nationals of non - member states. The m embership dimension is crucial in the European Union, especially given that all member states have experienced substantial immigration of third country nationals. Access to Union citizenship for immigrants and their descendants depends on the nationality l aws and naturalisation policies of the fifteen member states, and these raise hurdles of very different heights. Domestic considerations about the legal

integration of immigrants have already led to a growing convergence of these laws and practices in some , but not all, member states.

The question is whether the institutions of the Union should also take the initiative to harmonise the legal status of third country nationals and their admission to citizenship. The answer given is affirmative. By choosing to introduce a formal status of Union citizenship into the Treaty rather than simply adding some additional rights citizens of member states enjoy under Community provisions, the Union has rhetorically established itself as a quasi-federation with a common citizenship. From this perspective, the rules for access to common citizenship (i.e. the EU level) ought to be the same in all the member states. This normative implication of the language of Union citizenship may, however, have little weight for policy d evelopments as long as third country nationals remain a rather marginal political force in most member states and as long as the mobility of European Union citizens across internal borders remains low.

Concerning the content of Union citizenship there is a significant rights deficit which makes it difficult to build loyalties of Union citizens on the benefits and commitments of membership. Citizenship rights in the European Community originate in provisions for free movement and non-discrimination between nationals of member states. These are highly relevant for citizens who migrate within the Union, but cultural and other barriers have so far kept intra-Union mobility to very low levels. Although the Amsterdam Treaty has significantly strengthened the righ ts dimension with the adoption of the extended anti-discrimination clause, it has failed in the broader task of consolidating and systematising the human and citizenship rights guaranteed by the Union to those living under its jurisdiction. This task will remain on the agenda for future steps towards 'constitutionalising' the Union.

It also needs to be remembered that EU citizenship should be a response to, rather than simply a product of, globalisation – i.e. that to be both worthwhile and effective it mu st act to replace or protect rights which might be lost through a neoliberal project of marketisation, rather than a set of minimal transnational entitlements which facilitate that

process. It should be remembered that citizenship of the EU is necessary be cause it attaches a normative element to the integration process, and fosters a sense of trust between otherwise disparate actors in common rules and institutions. This is only likely to mature in a context which makes citizenship rights more extensive tha n they currently are. In this respect, citizenship is a vital element of any review of the scope and powers of the EU, and provides the normative element to justify the EU's democratisation, a process which must in all likelihood be effectuated by elites.

That said, it also results from our research that, providing the supporting political structures are adequate and sufficient public goods are supplied, it is possible to develop a form of citizenship from the top -down, although clearly it is necessary th at the citizenship thereby created serve the purposes of the population at large rather than a narrow elite. Studies of national citizenship -building - particular in Portugal – revealed that elite construction of a specific variant of citizenship against the will of the populace can be successful and endure over time. However, in the EU context, it is unlikely that top-down citizenship construction could survive significant mass disquiet for two reasons: it would occur not in a citizenship void but against a backdrop of already - existing national citizenships; and also, the EU does not possess the monopoly of coercion necessary to entrench a sense of citizenship by either force or provision of public goods. A quasi -national conception of identity which empha sises a common history and cultural heritage is not merely unattractive for most citizens who primarily identify themselves as nationals of their member states, it is also at odds with the project of enlarging the Union. Thus, the emphasis must be on encou raging much greater public engagement with the integration process and the EU's decision making.

1.3: Policy Implications

The network has produced much work of relevance for policy making. We have defined a key problem – the need to build popular solidar ity through increased political participation on a cross -border basis – and put forward a model for how this might be done, i.e the refined 'mixed model' of European citizenship. We have also demonstrated

that the sense of common identity necessary for thi s mobilisation cannot, and indeed need not, be based on ideas of a deep common cultural heritage but must emerge from a complex of political practices, as republicans advocate – although these must be geared towards a mutual modification of communitarian a nd national allegainaces in a cosmopolitan direction. The implication here is that EU citizenship will be advanced more by creating new structures and opportunities for popular political participation than by the advent of new symbols of unity such as the EU flag and hymn.

A major implication of the research for citizenship policy is that traditional models of citizenship have little value as referents in the construction of EU citizenship. We can learn useful lessons about how these citizenships were co nstructed, but it is idle to seek to replicate any one national model and equally unhelpful to seek a deep synthesis of common European citizenship values. These exist only in a shallow sense based on commitment to different varieties of liberal democracy. Instead, EU citizenship must be constructed alongside an acknowledgement of the different context in which European integration is taking place: economic globalisation and increased immigration both inside and into the EU area. Traditional tools of citize nship construction – inclusion and exclusion – are of less value here than the provision of both citizenship rights and the political opportunities to use them. Thus, EU citizenship must be elaborated not as a tool of 'state construction' but as a means of eradicating the democratic deficit through empowerment of the various national publics. Of course, once so empowered, EU citizens will start to shape the EU polity. However, that process is different to elites using the status to try and create a particul ar kind of EU state.

To be viewed positively by the public, citizenship in the EU must entail or at least be flanked by a deeper social policy in order to demonstrate to the public that it is a status worth having. This is partly a question of the provisi on of sufficient public goods to appear worthwhile. It is also about shaping the EU as a response to, rather than device of, globalisation on the neoliberal model, a step which is necessary to attract the support of the Scandinavian bloc and many on the Le ft of the political spectrum. It is thus necessary

for the EU to go beyond UK -style 'third way' thinking and develop a stronger social policy.

We also demonstrate crucially that citizenship must be more than about the provision of even judicially enforcea ble rights. It is not enough to tell EU citizens that they now have extra rights thanks to the EU; given even post -Nice structures in the European Court of Justice it is not easy to enforce these rights, and they are of a limited nature. Indeed, most citizens expect to have such rights as freedom of movement anyway, and regard the EU's provision of such rights not as a boon but rather as mere fulfilment of a duty. Instead, and whilst legal rights must form the background of EU citizenship, the latter must b e expanded to cover a deeply political set of practices of participation in EU governance. Decision-making must be reformed to favour cross -border activism by concerned citizens, and opportunity structures at all levels of EU governance must be enhanced. I t is vital that this new role allows citizens opportunities to participate at every stage of the legislative chain, i.e. in shaping legislative proposals rather than simply accepting or rejecting them.

The role of elites in this aspect of citizenship cons truction cannot be avoided. In creating the necessary structures, they must play the key role since bottom -up pressures are as yet insufficient. EU citizenship remains malleable, and it is still possible to encourage its deepening should the proper institu tional set-up be created. It is thus vital that in both its narrow (i.e. Treaty provisions) and broad (the set of opportunity structures and secondary legislation) senses, EU citizenship is deepened at the next Intergovernmental Conference and by the Counc il and European Parliament in their legislative capacities in the interim. It must be remembered that the EU will be shaped by the (in)action of its citizens as part of its ongoing constitutive process. Member governments which have invested so much in the integration process must therefore encourage their nationals to engage with EU policy making if they are to secure their investments in the long term.

It is also vital that the EU deepens its commitment to linguistic and cultural pluralism, particularly as pressures to adopt a small number of working languages will grow after

enlargement to Eastern Europe. European citizens will not support deepening of their current rights at the EU level if they perceive this to endanger their cultural and linguistic identities. Thus, the commitment to unity in diversity must be made more than rhetorical and reinforced by provision of measures to promote cultural and linguistic diversity.

The network makes the following specific recommendations for the development of E U citizenship. They can be grouped into three sections: institutional reform, reform of policy styles, and deepening of EU competence.

Institutional Reform

(i) The separation of powers between the EU institions and also vertically between the EU and its member states and their subnational governments needs to be clarified. There is no need to impose a certain model decided *a priori* (see below), but this issue of subsidiarity must be clarified for two main reasons. First, it must be clear to the citizen who is responsible for what. Second, citizens must be able to develop a sense of multiple loyalties and responsibilities in a transparent way: they must be able to know how and when it is necessary to mobilise at any given level of governance without confusi on or conflict. Thus, it is vital that the next IGC clarifies the issue of subsidiarity.

(ii) It is vital to hold a widespread public debate which involves not just the various elites but also members of the public on what the EU is for. The basic rationa le of European integration – the provision of economic wellbeing, public welfare and peace on the continent – are still valid, but need to be restated to a set of publics which is often sceptical. The publics of the member states must be allowed to questi on the role of integration and its continuing validity. There must also be a real acceptance that the EU should not become a Westphalian -style state unless that is the wish of the various demoi. Instead, what is necessary is a debate about the powers and r ole of an EU which sits alongside national and subnational governments. It must be accepted that this debate could result in the 'return' of certain competences to the national level as well as the accretion of new competences for the EU. The issue of vari able geometry must also be

investigated and viewed with less hostility than at present. Instead of cautious rules on 'enhanced cooperation', flexible integration must be embraced as a means of allowing deepening integration to be accompanied by democratic sanction. The EU may well have to live with being non -uniform if such is the wish of the national publics. In this respect, we welcome the proposals for a deep -seated debate about the role of the EU which has been called for the post -Nice process, and urge that it be carried out in the above spirit. It is also vital to entrench this process of deliberation as the norm of European governance, allowing for the sporadic re -examination of the EU structures and roles according to popular will.

(iii) The role of the European Parliament must be re -examined, and possibly enhanced with the extension of codecision in all matters of the first and third pillars (pending the above constitutional debate). The links between the European and national parliaments must be strengthened, perhaps by reserving a small quota of seats in each committee of the EP for national MPs in order to increase knowledge of, and popular input into, EU decision making at national as well as European level. Such reforms would also increase the ability of national parliaments to hold their governments to account for decisions taken in the EU and European Councils. The European Parliament must also be given greater visibility, so that its role and powers are understood by the public. The inclusion of national MPs in EP committees would also be beneficial in this regard.

(iv) Reform of the advisory committees is also necessary. The role of the Committee of the Regions must be enhanced, not by turning it into a further legislative chamber but by making the Committee co -guardian of the subsidiarity principle and by popular election of its members from national lists supplied by the respective organisations of local/regional government. This would enhance the Committee's democratic legitimacy and allow it a real function in the policing of the newly -clarified principle of subsidiarity. The Economic and Social Committee must be radically reformed. It should be stripped of its membership from the social partners and made into the voice of civil society,   with its members appointed by independent commissions in the member states. The role of the Committee would be to integrate civil society more fully into EU decision making by

acting as a think tank and source of policy ideas on the basis of the currently much-underused Treaty provision on 'exploratory opinions'. Thus, membership of the Committee should be a full time (and paid) activity.

Policy Styles
In order to improve the visibility of EU legislation, member states must be obliged to acknowledge the fact that they are legislating in keeping with EU requirements in a preamble to all national laws elaborated to make good both Treaty and secondary law commitments. The role of civil society in all stages of the legislative chain must be enhanced. To that end, national governments must have a duty openly to consult relevant civil society actors about proposed EU legislation according to a quasi-corporatist model based on a system of national committees appointed by independent commissions. Moreover, the 'partnership principle' of cohesion policy must be exported to other areas of EU activity in order to entrench the Europeanisation of civil society at the local level. This could be done particularly effectively in environmental, consumer and social policies. In addition, the EU should adopt legislation similar to the Administrative Procedures Act which exists in the USA as part of a commitment to good governance. Such an act would also be a source of empowerment to the EU Ombudsman.

Policy Reform
In addition, it is necessary to enhance EU competence (the above normative debate notwithstanding) in certain policy areas. These are consumer and social policies. Currently, the EU citizen receives insufficient protection at European level, and there is a need to integrate in order to rectify this in the context of the single market. It would also be possible to use such a reinforcement of consumer policy to differentiate the EU from the USA, which in turn might contribute to the development of a specifically European layer of postnational political identity. As indicated above, and for similar reasons, it is necessary to deepen EU competences in social policy. The single market must be a means for the elaboration of a continued commitment to the welfare state, both in order to save

the EU from allegations of undermining social democracy and to add to the distinction between European and US varieties of capitalism.

Lastly, the right of suffrage in local and EP elections should be extended to third country nationals in order to extend the logic of postnational political participation and to differentiate EU citizenship from its national forebears. Four policy options for harmonisation of the membership dimension of Union citizenship are possible: first, automatic access to Union citizenship through either birth or residence in the territory; second, optional European citizenship by establishing a separate naturalisation procedure alongside those for national citizenship; third, creating a Union -wide legal status for long term residents with third country citizenship; and fourth, retaining the link between member state nationality and Union citizenship but harmonising the acquisition at birth and by naturalisation. A combination of the third and fourth option best fits an inclusive conception of Union citizenship. At the same time this solution would respect the quasi - federative character of the European Union by affirming that every citizen of the Union is at the same time a citizen of a member state. Harmonising the ad mission rules would mean a significant transfer of a traditional aspect of sovereignty, but it would not deprive the member states of their power to shape the contents of their own citizenship in terms of rights, obligations and historical identities.

2:0 Background and Objectives of the Project

2.1: Rationale of the Project

The EURCIT project aimed at exploring how European (EU) Citizenship might be developed, from both a normative and an empirical perspective. Created in formal terms by the Maastricht Treaty, and confirmed at Amsterdam, EU citizenship is unique – no other non-national governance structure can boast an equivalent. However, there is nonetheless limited evidence to indicate that member state nationals are aware of their rights as EU citizens, and still less to suggest that they either identify themselves as EU citizens, or use the rights and opportunities that this status gives them. Given the increasing importance of the EU - its considerable deepening over the last two decades, and its impact upon the decisions and structures of the member states - it is vital that the Union reinforces its legitimacy. Citizenship is potentially a very helpful instrument to deploy in this process, because it promotes a sense of political engagement a nd solidarity between otherwise atomised individuals affected by the same body of law and governance structures. In this respect, its inclusion in the Treaty on European Union is a turning point in the development of political integration in (Western) Euro pe.

Developing EU citizenship beyond its formal Treaty status is no easy task, however, for several key reasons. First, the climate of popular disquiet about the EU's 'democratic deficit' renders difficult the attempt to persuade the public to accept and engage with politics and policy making at the EU level. Second, the EU does not have the resources to replicate national traditions of citizenship – it is not a state in the Westphalian sense, and cannot simply create a sense of loyalty through a monopoly of the means of coercion, welfare provision or propaganda. Third, constructing an EU citizenship cannot be done in a vacuum: both legally and affectively it must sit alongside both national citizenships and what are often already complex political identit ies. Fourth, EU citizenship is shaped by a variety of pressures, activities and decisions (such as judgements by the Court of Justice on freedom of movement, and a broad range of secondary legislation) as well as Articles 17-22 of the Treaty. Fifth, whatev er formal status EU citizenship is given, it will wither on the vine unless it is actually taken up and invoked by its holders on a regular basis. As a consequence, it is necessary to develop a normative framework, or blueprint, which indicates how EU citi zenship can successfully be developed. It is also necessary to point

to the kind of structures and policies which the EU will need in order to translate Treaty provisions into lived experience.

2.2: Original Objectives of the Project

The network had the overall objective of assessing the extent to which European citizenship could and does promote the identification of Europeans with the institutions of the Union. It investigated three broad approaches: the civic nationalist, the cosmopolitan globalist, an d a mixed model which draws on both the first two. Elements of each of the latter are present in the citizenship traditions of both the EU and its member states. All three models were assessed in terms of their compatibility with national and other allegia nces on one hand, and their ability to avoid invidious and potentially destabilising exclusions of particular categories of persons on the other. In order to meet this central aim, the project had eight specific objectives:

3   Developing a conceptual framewo rk for the analysis of the evolution and impact of the policy of European Citizenship, based on a comparison and critique of two broad approaches towards the citizenship ideal – the civic nationalist and the cosmopolitan globalist – and the possibility of a third approach which combines elements of the two.

4   Comparing citizenship traditions within the following states: Britain, France, Germany, Austria, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Norway with a view to exploring the possibility of a composite European civic identity. Particular attention was paid to the different ways these traditions relate social and economic to legal and political rights, and their greater or lesser inclusiveness. Points of compatibility and incompatibility between the traditions were hig hlighted.

5   Tracing the development of the policy of European citizenship, and assessing the evidence for its reflecting one of the three conceptual models.

6   Examining evidence of either an emergent European national identity or the continued presence of an d tensions with national allegiances, such as that provided by Eurobarometer polls and similar surveys.

7   Examining evidence of a cosmopolitan globalist approach based on either universal human rights or functional ties within the EU. The rights based judgements of the European Court of Justice and appeals to the European Ombudsman provided the main focus of this work.

8   Exploring the tensions and complementarities between national and European judicial, legislative and administrative bodies in the development of a multiple or mixed sense of citizenship.

9   Assessing the practical impact and desirability of the three models of citizenship in terms of their social and political inclusiveness.

10   Exploring the institutional consequences of adopting each of the two main models and different versions of the mixed model, in terms of both changes to the existing constitutional arrangements and the need to devise novel political institutions and mechanisms of accountability and welfare provision.

2.3: Reorientation of these Objectives Over the Duration of the Project

Regular meetings of the Scientists -in-Charge were held throughout the project, at approximately six monthly intervals. These meetings served as forums for the evaluation of progress in the research as well as as sessment of the need to adapt the objectives of the project. Whilst inevitably the research underwent a degree of evolution, given the changing political and academic contexts, it did not depart from its central objectives in any significant way. However, it should be noted that research into the normative aspects of the project emerged as the key focus of the network. Institutional aspects of the objectives were by no means abandoned, but they were not as fully developed, since the Scientists-in-Charge con sidered that the development of the correct normative framework was indispensable if suitable decisions about institutional reform were to be made.

With regard to Objective 4 above, there was a deliberate change in methodological focus, but no change in the study aim itself. The focus was changed from the study of Eurobarometer and similar survey data to an original case study of how citizens can engage with the EU decision making process via non -governmental organisations

(NGOs), and how this process of e ngagement might contribute to a reinforced sense of European citizenship. The rationale for this change of focus was twofold. First, much academic work focusing on analysis of Eurobarometer data regarding questions of political identity was published since the original proposal was submitted (Gabel 1998; Blondel et al 1998). It was decided that undue replication of work should thus be avoided. Second, it was considered that greater utility could be gained from a case study of how citizens are able to feed i nto EU decision making under the present institutional system, as this would be more likely to yield recommendations for institutional reform. This alteration also served an academic purpose by exploring the real -world possibilities and modalities of 'citi zenship practice' (Wiener 1998), i.e. the practical use of citizenship rights and opportunities for political action.

In other respects, the work carried out for the network did not depart significantly from the original scheme.

However, two meetings w ere held in addition to those in the agreed schedule. A meeting of the Scientists -in-Charge was held in Berlin in January 2000, in order to plan the final year's work and review a key theme which had emerged over the course of the study, namely enlargement of the European Union. In February 2001, a workshop was held in Florence to generate feedback on a draft of the final report and to set its conclusions in the context of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, a key indicator of the development of EU citizenship which was attached to the Nice Treaty but not on the EU agenda at the time of the project's design.

3.0: Scientific Description of the Project Results and Methodology

3.1: Methodology

The overall goal of the network was to investigate the integra tive potential of European citizenship, and establish a normative blueprint as well as a set of institutional/policy recommendations which would contribute to its further elaboration. Particular attention was focused on a comparison of the relationship bet ween EU citizenship and its national equivalents. We also sought to investigate the social and legal impacts of citizenship, in particular the mix of rights, practices and institutions which EU citizenship must embrace in order to be optimally effective. W e thus sought to bring together scholars from politics, law and sociology in order to draw on the necessary breadth of expertise.

Citizenship provides a link between normative and empirical/analytical work in the social sciences. Thus, the research undert aken by the network members combined theoretical approaches deriving from political theory, legal theory and the 'acquis académique' in EU studies with more empirical work in intellectual history, EC law, political economy, social and public policy, and so ciology of law. The project was also comparative, since it sought to investigate and analyse selected citizenship traditions and how they relate to EU citizenship. Interdisciplinary and comparative, the project drew on primary sources of a diverse nature (legal decisions, policy documents, parliamentary statutes) as well as new original data derived through empirical studies. We also drew on secondary sources and the works of political and legal thinkers.

Three major conceptual frameworks for the developm ent of EU citizenship were analysed and compared. These were the civic nationalist, the cosmopolitan globalist and the 'mixed' model which synthesises aspects of the two. Elements of the first two are present in the citizenship traditions of the member sta tes. Because both the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties make clear EU citizenship's subsidiary status to its national equivalents, we sought to test how a European citizenship based on each model would sit alongside national and other allegiances. We sough t in particular to test which model would be the most inclusive and likely to both encourage and protect cross -border solidarity and political engagement. We also sought to test which model of European citizenship would be likely to be the most inclusive, and thus offer the best means to help combat social exclusion. Consequently, we focused on the various historical,

sociological, cultural, legal and political contexts which shape the national citizenship traditions of selected member states [1], the nature of the ongoing integration process, and the decisions and goals of the various EU institutions.

National citizenship traditions were selected for study on the following basis. We examined the citizenship traditions of the four states with the greatest number of votes in the Council of the EU: Germany, France, Britain and Italy. These four states also represent four very different paths to nationhood, with correspondingly varying approaches to citizenship traditions. Britain is a *united kingdom* of subjects rather than citizens, where rights are seen in largely liberal terms as legal protections rather than tied to political participation as in the republican tradition. The latter is the main characteristic of French citizenship. In the case of Germany, citizenship has been related to blood (birth) and culture. The reunification of Germany after 1989 and the country's federal structure also offered interesting variables in the context of an EU about to enlarge to Eastern and Central Europe and with the goal of 'ever closer union'. Italian citizenship draws on all three traditions represented by the citizenships of the UK, France and Germany. It also offers an example of citizenship in a 'southern' member state. Relatedly, Spanish citizenship was studied as Spain is a plurinational state often offered as a model for both the EU itself and those countries seeking to entrench liberal democracy and the market economy as part of their efforts to accede to the EU. Portuguese and Austrian citizenships were studied as examples of citizenship in two different European traditions: Napoleonic states from the South, and a state born out of imperial collapse in Central Europe. Norway was studied as an example of a state with a very developed social citizenship on the Scandinavian social democratic tradition, the retention of which is a key factor in the ambivalent attitude of many in Scandinavia towards the EU.

Citizenship was defined as a primarily legal and political status, albeit one which is defined to a great extent by other contextual criteria such as membership, ethnicity and

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[1] We also studied the citizenship traditions of Norway and the USA. Norway was selected because of its embodiment of the social democratic tradition. The USA was studied as an example of a citizenship

even residence. Research focused on the different responses of the countries studied in reaction to global forces in the field of social and political rights. The aim was to answer the following research questions:

a) is it possible to distil a common core from the various European citizenship traditions, in order to demonstrate a consensus on key principles which could then be taken as the key tenets of European citizenship?

b) Is it possible to reach a common definition of citizenship across the different traditions through a process of mutual adaptation?

c) Can universal normative criteria, such as human rights, provide a suitably solid basis for 'constitutional patriotism'?

d) Can functional criteria add u p to a viable European citizenship?

e) Will it be necessary to devise a totally different understanding of citizenship which can accommodate multiple levels of membership and participation in the several communities (subnational, national and supranational) t hat together comprise the EU?

We aimed to explore the various citizenship traditions cited above through the lens of these five questions. The network's tasks, predominantly but not exclusively theoretical, were broken down into six 'work packages' which ran throughout the duration of the project but which were each in turn the central issue of study. These work packages were not considered as discrete tasks but as a complementary set of issues which needed to be studied in order to generate an holistic un derstanding. That said, the focus of the first three work packages was on the exploration of the three main models of European citizenship, and the final two work packages concentrated on a comparison between them illuminated by empirical evidence.

Empirical work was carried out in four main areas. First, an analysis of citizens' representation in EU decision making by NGOs was undertaken. It focused on selected legislation in EU environment and consumer policies. Second, a case study on EU legislation on genetically modified organisms (GMOs) was carried out. This focused on

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tradition constructed out of various European predecessors.

the EU's developing role as an actor in the fields of food safety as part of the development of European consumer policy. Third, empirical investigations of the Charter of Fundamental Rights were undertaken. Fourth, analysis of policy documents submitted to the IGC 1996, especially those pertaining to citizenship and democracy, was carried out. All empirical work was undertaken by members of the teams from Reading, Vienna and Florence. They relied primarily upon triangulated research interviews and the analysis of often otherwise unavailable primary documents (e.g. legislative drafts, political group discussions, briefings from key actors involved).

3.1.1: Description of the Work Packages

Work Package 1 involved the tracing of the development of the different selected national models of citizenship and relating them to their contexts of state development. These traditions were compared, and points of similarity and difference noted. A literature review exploring the historical, sociological, political and legal studies of EU citizenship was also produced.

Work Package 2 explored the civic nationalist model of EU citizenship. We looked for evidence of a shared European culture which either overlaps with or informs the various national cultures of the member states in order to establish whether there is the possibility of creating a demos (or people) at the European level based on common modes of understanding, values and practices. We also examined the possibility of a shared European set of criteria for EU citizenship, which must at present respect the various different definitions set up by the member states despite the fact that there are several exclusionary anomalies between these definitions. We also sought to explore how EU citizenship came to be defined through intergovernmental decision making in order to establish how far it was designed to be compatible with the various national traditions.

Work Package 3 investigated the cosmopolitan globalist model of EU citizenship. Here, we sought to establish whether there are shared political and legal norms (such as human

rights) common to the constitutional arrangements of the member states, and whether this could serve as the basis f or a European political culture based on a commitment to certain shared values (such as a common understanding of tolerance, equal rights and treatment) to which all individuals would have to adhere in their capacity as citizens. We also sought to investigate whether more functional criteria, such as EU policy in a given policy area which could benefit certain key groups of people, could form the basis of EU citizenship. This issue focuses on federalism, subsidiarity and associative democracy (whereby we exercise different kinds of citizenship with different bodies according to how they affect us and our interest in them).

Work Package 4 related to the 'mixed' model of EU citizenship. We investigated the elements of EU citizenship based on residence and pa rticipation (such as the right to stand and vote in both local and European Parliament elections in one's member state of residence rather than one's member state of origin). We sought to determine whether these rights were evidence of a nascent European p olitical culture, purely functional (facilitating the working of the single market), or a cause of intractable conflict with national political cultures (which required either the holders of such rights to be assimilated into the dominant culture or themse lves to be adapted to the demands of newcomers). We also sought to investigate the feasibility of multiple citizenships, based not just on functional criteria (as in Work Package 3) but on more normative elements.

Work Package 5 centred on a comparison of the three models of citizenship, based on the following key variables:

> Exclusion/inclusion;
> Membership and definitions of belonging;
> Civil, political and social rights, and their inter -relationships;
> Social policy (pluralism and corporatism);
> Immigration, gender and multiculturalism.

We also sought here to establish the extent to which each model could promote identification with the EU whilst preserving (or at least without requiring the

abandonment of) national and sub -state identities and allegian ces. The key issue here was one of 'variable geometry' – is it necessary to have a harmonisation of citizenship rights, or are certain rights traditions rightfully exempt from standardisation?

Work Package 6 sought to establish the institutional/policy co nsequences of each of the three models and establish a blueprint for the successful further development of EU citizenship as a means of social and political integration in Europe. We focused on the following issues:

* Constitutional change in the member s tates;

* EC law and its challenged supremacy;

* The need for a European constitution;

* The need for changes to the decision making processes of the EU, in particular the role of the European Parliament and the issue of subsidiarity;

* The need for greate r participation by citizens in the EU decision making process;

* Social policy – the case for harmonisation, and the case for extensive EU activity in this area.

3.1.2: Intellectual Division of Labour

The following table indicates the contribution of the various research partners to the project.

NB: WP = work package; * = low involvement; **** = high involvement

PART-NER	WP 1	WP 2	WP 3	WP 4	WP 5	WP 6
Reading	**	**	***	****	***	****
Exeter	****	***	**	****	***	***
Florence	**	**	**	**	****	****
ARENA	*	*	***	*	***	***
Berlin	*	**	*	*	**	***
Minho	***	***	***	*	*	*
Sassari	****	*	*	*	*	****
Vienna	*	*	*	****	****	***

All partners thus made a contribution to each aspect of the project, being involved in each work package. Overall responsibili ty for coordination of the project was held by Reading, facilitated by regular meetings of the 'scientists in charge'. Workshops were held at approximately six monthly intervals, and were accompanied by a meeting of the Scientists in Charge.

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3.2: Results Achieved.

Figure 1: Network Research Objectives

NETWORK RESEARCH OBJECTIVE	HOW IT WAS MET
Development of conceptual framework	Research into the three models of EU citizenship, resulting in a revision of the 'mixed model' and its adoption as the conceptual framework of the network
Comparison of specified national traditions of citizenship	Workshops devoted to this aspect of the research. Conclusion: no single national model is appropriate for the EU, but lessons can be learnt from national strategies of citizenship construction
Tracing the development of EU citizenship	Production of literature review on EU citizenship. Empirical work dedicated to various aspects of EU citizenship. Development of conceptual blueprint for EU citizenship's further elaboration
Examining evidence of an emerging EU identity	Empirical investigations of citizenship practice
Examining evidence of a cosmopolitan globalist approach to EU citizenship	Analysis of EC law and empirical research into popular engagement with the EU via civil society groups and lobbying
Exploring tensions and complementarities between national and EU legal, political and administrative systems of citizenship	Empirical research into lobbying by civil society groups, and normative work based on historico-comparative methods
Assessing the practical impact and desirability of the three models of EU citizenship	Normative work elaborating the consequences of each model and empirical investigations of citizenship practice
Exploring the institutional consequences of the three models	Normative work drawing on political and legal theories

It is important to recall here that the present research results from a *thematic network* rather than a single, common research project. Consequently a great degree of the project's value, both academically and from the institutional perspective, stems from its ability to facilitate the exchange of views between otherwise isolated actors in the member states concerned. European citizenship itself dictates a somewhat varied analysis: in the context of nation states, citizenship was constructed as a means of making an existing political structure cohere, but in the still -evolving EU citizenship is fragmented, partly a device to facilitate the workings of the internal market and partly a device to foster spillover in the integration process. Consequently, it plays an almost opposite role to its national equivalents in the member states. A degree of variety in the conclusions is thus to be expec ted. The evolution of the EU in general, and EU citizenship in particular, will be viewed differently depending upon the chosen conceptual lens and the issue in question. However, *it was agreed by all participants that one of the models of citizenship pro posed for the EU is inappropriate: the civic nationalist*. This model was deemed to be inappropriate to the transnational context of European integration, and too deeply rooted in a tradition of a bounded demos to cohere in the European Union.

To aid comprehension of our conclusions (3.2. 4), we now elaborate briefly how citizenship became an issue on the EU agenda (3.2.1), describe the constitutive nature of citizenship practice (3.2.2) and outline our three conceptual models of citizenship (3.2.3).

3.2.1 The History of European Citizenship

All modern debates about the nature and construction of community in Europe have their origins in the perceived break -up of the pre -industrial regulative community. The current lexicon or vocabulary of governance, ins ofar as it uses the terms community, civil society, social cohesion, solidarity, and the like, harks back to debates that have their origin in the late 18th and 19th centuries. This was both the period at which the break -up of pre -industrial community beca me evident to observers and the period during which it became increasingly clear that the spontaneous generation of community through the operations of free markets would remain incomplete. From this point on, the problem of

reconciling individual liberty (itself seen as dependent on market freedom) with the (re) -building or maintenance of community, rooted in the meeting of social needs through regulation of the market, would time and again emerge as the centrepiece of much of European intellectual endeav our and debates over state policy.

The trauma of the First World War marked a watershed in these debates. The destruction of European society and the threat of Bolshevism gave rise, most notably in the writings of Keynes in his Economic Consequences of th e Peace, to a call for the conscious construction of European community and later, amidst the trauma of fascism and renewed European warfare, for the project of the regulation of market demand in the name of social stability. It was as part of this project of market regulation that the European Community was born and elaborated for the first several decades of its existence.

The fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe not only removed the major inspiration for economic regulation in the name of co mmunity but, in the face of an increasingly competitive market for investment, made such regulation more and more costly. In this context, regulation at both the Union and component state levels has been re-oriented toward the removal of obstacles to comp etitiveness. It is for this reason that the language of governance now contains a significant business management component. However, as this re -orientation in the content of regulation has taken place, the older issues of social cohesion and solidarity, s ubdued during the era of Community construction, have now resurfaced as the social conflicts attendant upon the shift toward an increasingly competitive regime themselves reappear. Faced with the return of what in the early 20th century was known as the 's ocial question', the vocabulary of governance has itself evolved. Once more, discussions of community and civil society occupy a central position in European thought and writing.

Market-integration in Europe, however, gave rise to an incomplete market -society. This European market -society is severely hampered by considerable obstacles to the free movement of persons, which are partly of a legal and administrative nature and partly

cultural. The limits of integrating the European citizenry by economic means   lie in the instrumental relationship which is thereby established. The relationship between the institutions and the people are based on the expectation of direct economic gains which makes the transfer of loyalty to the common institutions highly vulnera ble and unstable. The relationship between the citizens is primarily of a competitive nature and limited to the economic sphere.

Market-integration was promoted to a great extent through the medium of law. By creating and implementing European laws, the m ember states pooled their sovereignty and fused their separated political bodies. As an unintended consequence of this process the European Court of Justice – in tandem with national courts and litigants – established a common legal space. From the perspe ctive of the individual, the common legal space gave rise to the status of 'market citizen' which transfers a bundle of particularly economic rights on employed European citizens but withholds supplementary civil, social and political rights. The more the citizens are subjected to European laws, the more it becomes evident that the standards of citizen participation differ considerably between the national and the European level, raising concerns of legitimacy and public acceptance.

The Maastricht and Ams terdam treaties for the first time directly addressed those questions by envisaging a political union between the European peoples. However, they failed in developing a consistent approach of how such a community could be put into practice. The concept of Union citizenship, which was interpreted as serving as a cornerstone for such a new development, falls short of building the basis for a political union of people(s) in many respects. It does not establish the sovereignty of the people in the European Unio n; it does little to enhance the substance and content of individual rights; and it lacks the capacity to foster a European sense of identity. Its dynamic character nevertheless has the potential for growth and progress. The regulation of the integrated ma rket was delegated to the European institutions – particularly the Commission and the European Court of Justice. Their operation for a long time affected the individual citizen only marginally and the citizens hardly took notice of them. The

aim of securing the freedom of movement for persons, the dismantling of border controls and the transfer of important economic policy instruments to the European level politicised the process of market -integration and raised the concerns of the citizens.

In sum, the legitimacy of European decisions, their implications for national politics, and the limited involvement of the citizens in European affairs became perceived as a growing problem by the Community institutions and the member states alike. The Maastricht treaty established two new 'pillars', which aimed at complementing the economic with a political union. However, it was clear that constructing a political union could not be done only through 'high politics' - new policies were also necessary in order to 'bring the European institutions closer to the citizens' and to make European integration more relevant to the people. The questions of what a 'community of European citizens' could encompass, and on what basis citizenship policies should be elaborated, then arose.

However, the conceptual basis on which action should be taken was unclear – in elaborating 'European' citizenship, the EU (and its member states) were in effect innovating with the very structures and conceptual bases of citizenship. Thus, it is vit al to examine in some detail the constitutive role and practices of citizenship in order to guide research into its reinvention at 'European' level.

3.2.2 The Constitutive Role and Practices of Citizenship

Historically, the processes of state making, con stitutionalism and the development of citizenship have gone hand in hand, reflecting not only external pressures, notably war, but also internal political struggles amongst citizens themselves. Most normative citizenship theorists and many legal and politi cal scientists have discounted these factors. They have seen them as either a matter for historians and political sociologists or fallen back on an implicit teleology derived from a Whiggish reading of Marshall (1950), whereby an expanding set of citizensh ip rights forms part of the natural evolution of modern democratic societies. Their focus has been on various ideal models or typologies of just, democratic societies (e.g. Held 1989, Ch. 7; Janoski 1998). However, liberal

democracies are far from converging on a single model, though many of their procedures and norms share certain affinities. At least part of this diversity is to be attributed to the various ways struggles between citizens have played out. Though these struggles have been geared towards securing justice for those involved, only a Panglossian optimist would regard them as moving towards a consensus on justice. Rather, they have been debates about justice – debates, to be sure, that might well assume an objective and ideal account ultimately exists, but which arise because citizens disagree over what that account might be and have no common basis for determining whose version is right.

It is sometimes alleged that such disagreements result solely from the presence of injustice, the product o f self-interest, ignorance or bad faith by one or more groups within the polity. Wittingly or unwittingly this is often the case. However, disagreement also arises because human beings value a variety of goods which different people prioritise and order in divergent and occasionally incompatible ways. This perpectival diversity stems not just from their different experiences, backgrounds and social positions, but also from the ways the sheer complexity of many political issues renders the relevance of different facts and considerations dependent upon rather than independent of the views of the discussants. Many contemporary rights or justice -based constitutional theorists acknowledge the `fact of pluralism' yet seek to circumvent it. Thus, John Rawls accepts the significance of what he calls `the burdens of judgement' when seeking to adjudicate between different comprehensive conceptions of the good (Rawls 1993, pp. 56 -7), but argues that they should lead to a consensus on common principles of political justi ce that limit what we may legitimately propose or impose on others in the name of our inevitably contentious beliefs (Rawls 1993, pp. 36 -8). Unfortunately, the right proves as controversial as various views of the good, as debates over abortion, affirmativ e action, the death penalty, taxation and welfare amply demonstrate.

If no collective agreement was ever necessary and we could each simply go our own way, such disagreements would be like academic quarrels about these same matters: challenging, provocat ive, diverting and occasionally frustrating but not an issue of life and death. However, what Rawls (1971, pp. 126 -30) (following Hume) calls the

`circumstances of justice' - namely the conditions of moderate scarcity, limited altruism and unavoidable soc ial co-existence – mean that some common rules are necessary. The benefits from collective action within a shared framework range from the security of the person and property to environmental protection and public health. The difficulty is that we disagree about the character of the framework, what should be pursued under it and even the best way to implement those policies we do agree to. Jeremy Waldron has coined the term `the circumstances of politics' to describe the resulting condition of having to reach agreement in the face of such disagreements (Waldron 1999, p. 102). The upshot of this predicament is that citizens search not for a just consensus but for a politics that shows equal respect for their different views in the ways common decisions get deliberated and decided. Waldron believes majoritarian voting satisfies this goal because of its procedural fairness (Waldron 1999, pp. 107 -118). But he takes as given that all relevant views are adequately represented and that we can agree on forms of respe ct without invoking controversial views of justice. By contrast, we argue that disagreements about the nature of justice inevitably spill over into debates concerning who is recognised as respectworthy and how their beliefs are represented. Disagreement en ters into the form of politics, therefore, producing an on -going political constitutionalism whereby a polity is continually reconstituted more appropriately to recognise, respect and represent the opinions of its members. Herein lies the constitutive role of citizenship.

We can analyse this phenomenon via the ways political recognition, respect and representation get mediated through four intersecting dimensions of the polity: namely, the sphere, subjects, scope and styles of politics. The *sphere* of politics refers to where politics takes place. These borders involve not only the external frontiers of the polity but also its internal administrative divisions. These tend to be both territorially and functionally defined, with different functions usually ma pping on to different territorial units and occasionally cutting across them. They are also frequently subdivided into more localised units that implement and inform central decisions. There are also demarcations between the political and non -political are as of life, as in attempts to distinguish a public from a private sphere. The *subjects* of politics concern the definitions of rulers and ruled, or who decides for and over whom. Even in a democracy, where the designated demos

are potentially both governor s and governed, the criteria for voting can be different to those for standing for election. Meanwhile, no polity identifies citizens simply with those physically present within a relevant sphere. Citizenship is standardly associated with certain capacitie s and commitments that only a subset of these will possess. The *scope* of politics has to do with its aims and the claims it makes upon people within its designated spheres. Different areas of political life may warrant a greater or lesser degree of intervention and be more or less demanding than others. A politics aimed at ensuring non-interference and forebearance will have a very different character and impact to one demanding positive action. Finally, the *styles* of politics relate to the ways politics is undertaken as a result of the various types of formal and informal consultation and influence that the political system allows. These may range from voting as determined by the electoral system, through membership of political parties, unions and variou s lobbying organisations, to consultative meetings, letter writing campaigns, demonstrations, direct action and even – in extreme circumstances – terrorism and civil war.

These four dimensions of politics are clearly related, with the character of each influencing that of the others. Thus, the boundaries marking the sphere of politics will partly, though not entirely, determine its subjects, scope and styles by creating certain constituencies and designating which areas are political or not. Recognising a region as a legitimate sphere of politics by granting it a degree of political autonomy may be tied implicitly or explicitly to recognition of a national minority as a subject of politics. Giving them a degree of self -government, however, will also lead to acceptance that the claims of language or culture fall within the scope of politics, and that new styles of politics may be necessary to allow certain minority groups to participate according to their particular linguistic and cultural traditions. Similar ly, if the scope of politics consists simply of upholding negative rights then its legitimate sphere, subjects and styles will differ from a view that includes positive rights. For example, it is more likely that the economy will be treated as a largely pr ivate sphere, employees not recognised as political subjects, and certain styles of consultation, such as workplace democracy, deemed inappropriate. When citizens struggle to be recognised as political subjects, therefore,

they are not simply demanding acc ess to a pre -constituted set of political rights. For that recognition will invariably have profound consequences for the other dimensions of politics and hence for the very constitution of the political. Moreover, struggles between citizens over any of th e other dimensions, such as the appropriate scope of politics, will equally have constitutional consequences for how we conceive its sphere, subjects and styles.

Because political disagreements invariably turn on the definition of one or more of these dimensions, citizenship has performed a pivotal constitutive part in the transformation and re -formation of political communities across all four of these dimensions. In the nineteenth century, for example, nationalist movements played a significant role in defining the sphere of politics as the nation state. Frequently tied to revolutionary and democratic movements, these struggles for national self -determination also served to make `the people' the subject of politics and in the process altered both its scop e and forms as well. Similarly, later struggles to extend the franchise to women and workers have not only expanded the subjects of politics but, as we noted above, inevitably changed its sphere, scope and styles as well. Though the United States constitut ion is sometimes treated as the archetypal rights -based document, establishing the republic on `self-evident' just constitutional principles, its true foundations lie in `we the people'. As Bruce Ackerman (1991) has shown, citizens have transformed it thro ugh successive waves of constitutional politics, from the extreme case of civil war, through the depression years that gave rise to the New Deal, to the civil rights movement of the 1960s. In all these cases, citizens have been struggling to construct a fr amework within which their concerns will be recognised and respected. Yet that has not been simply a matter of getting noticed under the established rules but, as we have seen, has inevitably meant challenging those rules as well.

Three features of these constitutive citizenship struggles need emphasising. First, some commentators grant such constitutional moments occasionally arise but like Ackerman regard them as exceptional, with `normal' politics occurring within the framework set by the last constitut ional struggle (Ackerman 1991, pp. 3 -33). To some degree that is

inevitably true. Revolutions are rare and even then attempts to start totally anew prove impossible. The constitutional ship is necessarily rebuilt at sea, with modifications in one area being realised through the established practices in another. Nevertheless, this is a more incremental and everyday process than Ackerman and others allow, with momentous transformations usually the cumulative result of a gradual alteration in public opinion produced by numerous small shifts within debates on a variety of particular issues.

Second, past struggles by workers, women and ethnic minorities (and occasionally majorities) are sometimes contrasted with current struggles over gender and multiculturalism (Fraser 1997, Ch 1). The former are typified as struggles for inclusion within the established framework – as demands that the cooperatively produced benefits and burdens of political community be shared more equitably. In sum, they are struggles for a fuller realisation of justice. By contrast, the latter are characterised as struggles to be recognised as different and to enjoy an exclusive status. They seek a more diverse rather than a more equal society. Certain critics go so far as to villify them for promoting injustice by seeking to entrench the very inequities and hierarchies past groups struggled to overturn. The foregoing analysis, however, suggests far greater continuity between the two (see too Tully 2000). Like contemporary struggles, those of the past involved demands for recognition as well as distribution. They sought not only admission to, but also a reconstitution of, the political community and the forms of justice and equality it inscribes. Thus the enfranchisement of women brought with it an enlargement of the sphere of politics to include the domestic arena, a corresponding extension of the scope of politics to include issues such as sexual harassment and marital rape, and demands for new and less confrontational styles of politics. Like past struggles, those of the present are for a more inclusive and equitable society. However, once again these demands involve reconceptualising how political goods are produced and distributed. As we saw, the struggles of workers and national minorities entail parallel transformations of the sphere, scope, subjects and styles of politics.

Third, and most importantly, it is impossible to say <u>a priori</u> what the `best' conception of these dimensions and their relations to each other might be. Any criteria we might come up with will not only have to be tailored to varying and highly contingent circumstances in ways that are impossible to specify in advance, but also be subject to diverse judgements and interpretations by citizens themselves. Indeed, divergen t priorities and values may lead groups to propose different criteria to each other. Meanwhile, as one group alters the ways they are recognised by others, that has knock on effects both for the ways these others are recognised and how they recognise thems elves. Thus, new struggles are spawned as identities, ideals and interests change in response to the new structures, producing in their turn further struggles for new forms of recognition. Consider, for example, how in recent times gains in certain domain s by the feminist movement have given rise to `post -feminist' discourses, on the one hand, and a reappraisal of masculine gender, on the other, fostering a further spate of political dialogue and change. In sum, the process of reconstituting the polity is a continuous one; the need to find agreement in circumstances of disagreement produces struggles over how different groups are recognised, respected and represented which are directly related to the ways the polity is constituted. Hence, citizens are not r eady constituted by a pre or supra-political constitution, they seek to constitute themselves and thereby the very shape of politics itself. This has many implications for the elaboration of citizenship in the EU.

Few would deny that all four political di mensions of the EU are matters of a greater or lesser degree of contestation. So far as its sphere is concerned, both its territorial extent and range of competences are at best uncertain and at worst matters of deep dispute. Similar doubts and discussions surround the designation of its subjects, both actual and potential. Though European citizenship is currently restricted to nationals of member states, for example, certain entitlements of the Union are enjoyed by resident third country nationals and othe r `legal persons' as well. The scope of the EU is likewise much debated, with some seeing it solely in terms of removing trade barriers whilst others extend this logic to a whole range of common financial, fiscal, welfare, security and other policies. Fina lly, discussion of the styles of EU politics ranges over such disparate issues as the introduction of qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers and the

establishment of European -wide political parties, to the direct election of the President of the Commission and the opening up of the comitology process to all through more freedom of information.

As we have seen, struggles over some aspect of any one of these domains has often unintended consequences for the others. Thus, few would deny that a potent source of European integration has been the search by commercial interests for intergovernmental compliance and cooperation in certain policy areas, such as tariff harmonisation, where economic interdependence renders such agreements beneficial. How ever, in the process they have created institutions that have served to alter the sphere, scope and styles of politics of the member states by changing both the context within which they and other subjects now operate, and the character of their domestic a rrangements. The development of European citizenship offers a good case in point. Though orientated initially simply towards facilitating the free market of labour amongst member state nationals, its various provisions provide a source of norms of a non -economic nature which can be exploited by other actors such as immigrants and gay and lesbian couples. In these cases, groups use the opportunity to create a supranational political subjectivity in order to circumvent and undercut state centred definitions. In the process, they offer alternative reasons to mutual economic convenience for constraining certain nationally defined notions of the scope, subjects and styles as well as the sphere of politics.

Struggles within member states now invariably have a Eu ropean aspect, be they over the recognition of certain subjects, such as regions, or the scope of politics, as arises in areas such as privatisation and welfare reform. Moreover, the EU renders political struggles multilayered as well as multidimensional. Though within a polity there are multiple spheres of politics – from the domestic to the state, with individuals and groups possessing a somewhat different subjecthood in each and adopting a correspondingly different style and view of the scope of politic s, these spheres are to some degree `nested' within the larger constitutional order of the polity. Within the EU context, however, one has an interaction between the different constitutional orders of the member states and between each of these and that of the EU. The potential and actual conflicts between

these different normative regimes are akin to those between different cultures and pose parallel challenges to those found in multicultural states.

These developments have rendered the constitutional im plications of `normal' politics particularly evident with regard to Europe. The EU now involves not only interest group bargaining but also the negotiation of different normative perspectives, values and systems. Though analysts may disagree over how far t he integration process results from the latter as opposed to the former factors, few (if any) would deny that a political and constitutional debate about the EU now exists within all of the member states. Given the predominant economic rationale of the EU, these debates admittedly centre on issues such as the nature of the economic benefits brought by the Union, whether the EU may be undermining some of these, and the possibility and acceptability of certain trade offs between economic gains and various los ses in other areas. Like most political disagreements, however, the actors' different normative positions lead them to diverge in their evaluation of the pay -offs and risks, and to hold contrasting views of what can and cannot be traded. Even if the motiva tions for integration remain primarily economic, therefore, the political principles invoked to legitimise them are not and they constrain what can and can not be done in the name of economic interests alone. Put another way, the games of rational economic interest are overlaid with the language games of normative discourse.

Unlike interest pluralism, value pluralism is harder to conceptualise in ways that allow disputants to `split the difference' or agree mutually beneficial trade -offs: their positions may be simply incommensurable (Bellamy 1999, Ch. 4). In the absence of a common currency or agreed exchange rates, apples cannot be traded for pears without first discovering and negotiating links between the different ways the parties conceive them. When one cannot have both and no negotiation has occurred, then confrontation threatens. This experience has been all too common in multicultural and multinational states, such as Canada and Belgium, producing deep constitutional divides (Gagnon and Tully 2001, Austin and O'Neill 2000). As we have noted, the EU now shares certain features of such deeply divided societies. However, we have also remarked how these

divisions are simply heightened versions of the normative conflicts that animate most political disagreements – the result of their reflecting general and systemic differences between whole forms of life rather than particular moral claims, goods or judgements. Thus, whilst attempting to bridge its legitimacy deficit, the EU must, via citizenship, provide a means to allow individuals to enter a process of negotiation about the future of European governance and their role in it. It must also allow this process to evolve, rather than seek to impose a predetermined outcome.

3.2.3 Three Models of Citizenship

In evaluating the evolution and prospective futures of European citizenship our research focussed on the following three models:

i) The Civic National Model
The first phase of the research involved a comparative and historical analysis of the development of citizenship from the nineteenth to the twentieth centuries in eight European countries. The aim was twofold: first, to explore the nature of the civic national model of citizenship, and second, to investigate whether there was a common European civic national tradition on which EU citizenship might build.

A prominent strand of the recent sociological literature has analysed different citizenship traditions in terms of their various criteria for membership. Citizenship is conceived as a ready made status reflecting different types of social and political regime. The traditions are then compared in terms of the various ways they include and exclude non -nationals. So conceived, citizenship is viewed as a top -down and state -led process, whereby political elites seek to make an existing political structure cohere. The goal is to create `thick' bonds of solidarity between citizens and a strong sense of national identity that is linked to the state. There are numerous problems with this view, however. First, there are considerably more communal loyalties than those binding citizens together as members of a single state – most states contain more than one national grouping, for example. Moreover, many of these communal loyalties can at various points conflict with state loyalties – be it an allegiance to family, class, religion, a minority culture and so on.

Second, a `thick' European civic identity would be ill -suited to a Union containing numerous well -established rival civic identities. Since these are unlik ely to be displaced, such a move could only be a source of tension. Rather, any European civic identity would have to be of a kind that it could co -exist along side these other civic attachments, facilitating their interaction within a European public spac e. As a result, the network were agreed in rejecting this conception of a civic national model of European citizenship.

However, this top -down perspective gives a very partial picture of how citizenship has developed in nation states. National models of citizenship have always been internally contested. Indeed, they have been partly shaped by internal struggles for inclusion. Our research focused on this process of internal contestation. The research examined the interaction between the main political lan guages of citizenship, on the one hand, and the social, economic and political structures of different states, on the other. Though structural and circumstantial factors tend to favour certain conceptions of citizenship over others, it emerged that alterna tives were always available and were exploited by excluded groups. These were often resurrected by immigrants seeking access to citizenship.

The case studies concentrated on two main variables, therefore: 1) the role played by internal struggles for socia l and political inclusion in shaping the character of the state and hence of citizenship, and 2) the deployment of two main political languages, associated with liberalism and republicanism, in legitimating claims to citizenship. They showed how citizenshi p has played an active part in shaping states rather than just passively reflecting state structures. We believe this approach provides a richer understanding not only of the history of citizenship but also of how it might develop in the future as evolving sub- and trans -national citizenship practices reconstitute both the EU and its member states. Seeing citizenship construction as a bottom -up reveals the tremendous variety in national traditions of citizenship. As a result, appeals to a common European he ritage of liberal democracy, such as appear in the Amsterdam Treaty and the preamble to the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, are shown to be somewhat empty. Both democracy and liberalism have been articulated in ways that reflect the very diverse ci tizen struggles of different states, themselves reflecting historical contingency,

most notably the influence of external events – notably war, different social structures and different political institutions and traditions, especially the interaction with republicanism following the English and French revolutions. This also has consequences for a cosmopolitan perspective, as we shall see. But there is a potential, also explored below, of seeing the on-going processes of citizenship practice as producing a mixed model of citizenship.

ii) The Cosmopolitan Model

At first glance, the cosmopolitan model appears to offer a salutary corrective to the defects of the type of civic nationalist model rejected above. It appeals to the universality of human rights as the basis of a common constitutional framework within which different national identites can co-exist. This is the view that in part inspires the recent European Charter of Fundamental Rights. Yet the claims of such a `rights-based' `constitutional patriotism' to be `thinner', and hence more acceptable than, a civic national communitarian identity turn out to be false.

Taking its cue from the Treaty of European Union as amended at Amsterdam (Art 6, formerly F), this proposal is premised on the member states and `peoples of Europe' sharing certain `common values' and `universal principles' intrinsic to democracy and the rule of law (Charter, Preamble 1 and 2). Though the diversity of their political and constitutional `cultures', `traditions' and `identities' is acknowledged, this is alleged to pose no problem (Charter, Preamble 3). First, these are supposedly variations on a core set of fundamental principles (Charter, Preamble 5). Second, the Charter applies to the institutions and decisions of the Union, which allegedly complement and provide an additional layer to the domestic arrangements of the member states (Charter, Article 49). To the extent the EU and member state levels interact, the principle of subsidiarity will ensure the Charter's implementation, and fine tuning will also be in large part a domestic matter.

Both these assumptions are misplaced. With regard to the first, the possibilities for reasonable disagreement over rights extend even to the most basic provisions. As our

historical case stud ies revealed, constitutional democracy has developed in quite different ways and under very different pressures within Western Europe, whilst in the East the differences are even more dramatic. Thus, the Italian constitution reflects the presence of Commun ist and Catholic traditions, the reaction against fascism and the experiences of the resistance which are largely foreign to Britain and which played out in quite different ways in the writing of the post -war German constitution. Likewise, the French constitution reflects a revolutionary republican tradition that accords a constituent power to the sovereign people absent or considerably weaker in other constitutions. These distinctive civic cultures have led multiculturalism to be handled very differently w ithin the various member states, for example, producing important variations in the interpretation of rights to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, discrimination and freedom of expression. With regard to the second assumption, the EU interacts wi th – indeed is in part a manifestation of – the changing political dimensions of the member states. The economic and associated legal and social regulations stemming from the EU are not discreet. They affect core functions of government policy and the stat e's very raison d'être.

Because of this complexity, the Charter is likely to prove far more problematic than its proponents assume. Although the European Court of Justice has consistently asserted the supremacy and direct effect of European law, this has never been entirely accepted when it effects constitutional essentials peculiar to the member states. Indeed, as the decisions of the French Conseil d'Etat in *Nicolo*, the German Federal Constitutional Court in *Internationale Handelsgesellschaft* and *Brunner*, the Italian Constitutional Court in *Frontini* and *Granital* and the House of Lords in *Factortame* all indicate, member state courts have consistently grounded the validity of Community law, including its claims to supremacy, in the domestic legal order. W hen the two seem to collide, therefore, a constructive constitutional dialogue has got underway. Despite some posturing by both sides, mutual accommodations have always been found and outright conflicts side - stepped. Most importantly in this context, the E CJ has come to recognise a patchwork of rights claims and generally been sensitive to national peculiarities (e.g. *Nold*, *Rutili*).This is not to say that there are not difficulties. In *Cinéthèque*, for example, the ECJ tried to

distinguish its role in ensuri ng the compatibility of community law and rights and the role of national courts in upholding rights within domestic legislation. But as *ERT* revealed, that distinction becomes problematic when a domestic rights -based judgement becomes the basis of a deroga tion from fundamental Treaty rules. Similar problems emerged in *Grogan* (for details of the cases cited in this paragraph, see Craig and De Burca 1998, pp. 264-94).

These difficulties are not evidence of a lack of human rights protection within the EU, however, but of its strength. The Charter simply adds an unnecessary further tier which lacks the subtlety and flexibility of the current system of negotiation. Instead, it is a highly conservative document which gives a status quo approach. The articles on citizenship are particularly telling in this respect (Charter, Chapter V Articles 37 -44), since they now appear to raise to the status of Fundamental Rights what has been a limited policy reflecting the lowest common denominator of what can be achieved give n existing institutions and member state sensibilities. For example, the key right on the present account is the right of citizens to define their rights and hold accountable those empowered to defend and serve them. In its place, however, we get the far f rom fundamental shadow of this essential entitlement – the right of every citizen of the Union `to vote and stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament in the member state in which he resides, under the same conditions as nationals of that state' (Charter, Article 37) In sum, what seems to be missing is the possibility of an on -going dialogue between and within the different member states whereby citizens and the various agents and agencies that represent them seek to construct a European c onstitutionalism and citizenship practice that recognises their differences. It is precisely this process that is the basis of the mixed model.

iii) The Mixed Mode l

The mixed model contends that to sustain the EU, we need somehow to inject a degree of communitarian identification whilst retaining a cosmopolitan concern with broader issues of justice and rights. The Amsterdam Treaty claims to reconcile the two, by maintaining that the cosmopolitan values of 'liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and

fundamental freedoms and the rule of law' are 'principles which are common to the member states' (Article F1, Amsterdam Treaty). The Union can thus respect both fundamental rights of the individual and the national identities of its member states. This 'communitarian cosmopolitanism' posits that the different communities which compose the Union share with it basic political values. These can form what the German philosopher Jurgen Habermas (1992) has called a `constitutional patriotism' around which all can rally whilst maintaining their distinct ethnico-cultural identities.

However, there are numerous potential difficulties with this position, which tends to shade into the cosmopolitan globalist stance outlined above. As we have seen, rights can be in conflict and will always need to be applied to concrete circumstances. These rights disputes cannot always be resolved *a priori*. There may be several reasonable solutions to a problem on the table, reflecting the priorities and values of different groups of people. For example, there is considerable variation across Europe over the ways freedom of speech is set against a right to privacy. There are also differences regarding the age of consent. These dissimilarities mirror divergent political traditions, view s of agency, and so on. In consequence, political principles will not prove separable from our broader identities and commitments in the way Habermas conjectures. Moreover, there will need to be authoritative mechanisms for interpreting these principles an d resolving disputes about their relative balance or bearing in particular cases. This issue emerged in the German Federal Constitutional Court (BverfG)'s verdict on the Brunner challenge to the validity of the Maastricht Treaty. Brunner's concern was that the Treaty endangered the German constitutional order by transferring powers away from the national parliament, thereby weakening German democracy. The BVerfG's ruling that it had a duty to ensure integration did not undermine the self -determination of the German people or their particular constitutional order is significant, since it is apparently mirrored by public attitudes across the Union. National political cultures possess a legitimacy the Union presently lacks.

And yet, it is also true the Union i s progressing beyond its confederal phase and evolving, as we noted, into a multi-level system as the very forces which drive the member states

together also challenge their internal integrity. Politically, a profound sense of community may not be detectab le at the EU level, but it no longer purely resides at a national level either. As mentioned above, the Union is a mongrel animal, in which according to policy area national interests and ideals can either prevail or be subsumed in regional, functional or ideological affiliations: witness the difference between the intergovernmental treatment given to police and judicial cooperation in criminal issues compared to matters of *acquis communataire* , i.e. pertaining to the single market, which are decided by the 15 governments jointly with the European Parliament. As a result, a different approach to conceptualising European citizenship is arguably needed that can reflect the messy reality of the Union and its politics. This alternative version of the mixed model is best characterised as a *cosmopolitan communitarian* perspective.

In this view, citizenship has to reflect the fact that the Union involves its citizens in several communities at once and that our identities are multiple rather than unidimensional. Thus, we may have affiliations to a particular ethnic or social group, a given church, work and family, a neighbourhood or region as well as to a state. Not all of these allegiances will always prove either relevant or harmonious. For certain decisions it may be more important for a citizen to be represented as a parent, or a Christian or as a Basque than as either a European or a member state national. In other decisions, more than one identity may be at issue, and these may conflict. Thus a policy such as the recognition of same sex marriages may involve a clash for some between sexuality and religion or ideology. For example, the state's religion may not be the same as our own, regional identity may be stronger than national; ethnic identity may be of more importance than either. According to the policy or circumstance these tensions may be either dormant or acute. Consequently, in a polity characterised by difference and multi - faceted identities, we need multiple forms of citizenship that provide a means of gi ving these different identities, interests and ideals political recognition. We also need ways of negotiating policy decisions which are acceptable to different groups and the different aspects of our own selves.

Unlike civic nationalism, this model does not assume a homogeneous people bound by common values and history. As a result, it is necessary to espouse a cosmopolitan respect for the rights of others. Unlike pure cosmopolitans, however, cosmopolitan communitarians believe that universal principles h ave to be tailored to different communities. Most especially they think that it necessary to show why the EU, rather than the whole globe, deserves citizens' allegiance if European citizenship is to work. On this account, citizenship cannot be used simply to flesh out an existing consensus on universal principles between the member governments and the peoples of the 15. Instead, rights will have to be interpreted through an ongoing political process and that a similar process will be necessary to establish what rights should even exist at the EU level. Communitarian affiliations are accepted as politically important but are forced into a dialogue with each other. Over time, such processes are hoped to cause notions of shared rights to gather weight in a vari ed pattern, as groups and policies shape and are shaped by the evolving Union system. However these rights must be tailored to the complex needs of the various communities within the Europolity, and coupled with a sense of responsibility for maintaining th em. Advocates of the mioxed model submit that this can only arise through a political system which reflects the diversity of the EU whilst engendering solidarity and respect betweenits component parts (understood not only as the member states but also as s ocial groups).

Thus, the mixed model conceives the EU as a multi -level, multitrack polity, involving co - operation between actors with different kinds of values and concerns. We assume that citizens of the Union are simultaneously members of a variety of d ifferent, interacting and occasionally conflicting communities which can exist at every level of the polity's structure (EU; member state; region; locality). Issues of identity are also crucial: citizens continue to see nationality as important, but also f unction as residents of regions, or members of interest groups, and can even put political orientation before nationality (represented at its extreme by the ability to stand for election to the European Parliament in a member state in which one resides but whose nationality one does not enjoy).

The development of this system is the key factor in aiding the establishment of a workable European citizenship. The emerging multi -level structure of the EU brings the member states and the supranational institutio ns together in an interlocking system, which blurs the distinction between their respective powers and is also both evolving and fluid. What it does not do is provide a federal constitution, or, crucially, a new nation. Power is dispersed horizontally betw een the various levels as well as vertically, and is not organised according to a clear hierarchy. At least for the time being, no one in the Commission could say 'We the people' in American fashion and be credible. Instead there exists a system of 'partne rship' between not only the EU and member governments but also subnational authorities and the private and voluntary sectors, that encourages them to work together to formulate and implement policy. A good example is EU regional policy, in which subnationa l governments have a key role in determining how development projects are designed and carried out. But these partnerships are not to be taken for granted; alliances can be difficult to construct, and may not have a long life. What is certain is the nature of the emerging system, not any given pattern of alliance.

This multi-level Europe offers the potential to develop a viable framework for a multiple citizenship that combines civic nationalist and cosmopolitan positions. However, this cannot be done auto matically. It will require contestation and negotiation, not simply the fleshing out of an agreed set of principles in a once -and-for-all fashion as envisaged by communitarian cosmopolitans. Making European citizenship work depends on ensuring that all concerned parties receive a fair hearing and are respected by other participants in the process. This involves focusing on the value of civic participation. Citizenship, variegated and multi -level though it will be, must be the means of promoting a system of government which seeks to make ongoing decisions about conflicting interests not on the basis of a legal framework but as the result of a culture of political engagement. In turn, this requires both the availability to every citizen of opportunities to voi ce concerns and the recognition of every citizen that their ideals and interests will be taken into account by those making the decisions. From this perspective, the complexity of the Union's decision making process becomes an asset rather than a liability . EU citizenship can sit

alongside other (political) identities, invoked or not according to the issue at hand, without claiming superior status.

Multi-level governance and flexible integration (opting in and out of policies, or treating different policy areas in different ways) thus offer an opportunity to develop a system with which people can identify and which they can support despite its lack of symmetry if they can claim a stake in its evolution. In other words, there is virtue in living with mess if we can make it ours. Multi -level governance and flexibility are the outcome of a long process of interstate bargaining; they may not be its end -point, but they need to be respected as a means of maintaining the viability of an integration process from whi ch (albeit with significant costs) member governments can simply withdraw. Democracy and citizenship dictate the extension of this ongoing negotiation process to the peoples of Europe in order to cement the Union construction begun by the various national (and EU) elites. In the messy polity of Europe, a mixed view of citizenship of the kind outlined above could facilitate popular engagement with the Union and lend stability to its contested, but developing, experiment in transnational governance.

10.2.4 Analysis and Conclusions

The present research has served to establish a laboratory of ideas and concepts related to EU citizenship. Its primary findings are theoretical, and speak to the conceptual elaboration of a meaningful and workable European citizenship. Tw o main conclusions e,merged from our analysis. First, general support for the cosmopolitan communitarian version of the mixed model, albeit with a slightly stromger emphasis on the cosmopolitan aspect than in the original schema – especially with regard to third country nationals. Second, the view that a mixed model of citizenship leads to a neo -republican style `mixed polity' as the most suitable political form for the EU.

i) The Mixed Model of Citizenship
As a network, we have established that blueprin ts for the successful development of European citizenship cannot be based on a sense of strong communitarian ties. At the national level, such ties rather obviously preclude the development of transnational

affinities and loyalties. The evidence of the fea sibility of such ties developing at the EU level is not strong in even the fairly long term, and thus the kind of citizenship which is possible at EU level will need to be conceived and fostered on a different basis from its national equivalents. At the sa me time, cosmopolitanism is also unlikely to foster commitment to the EU either. Human rights have a broader application than Europe and are too `thin' to sustain an allegiance to the EU as opoosed to other political units. Meanwhile, national communities of the member states seek to justify, balance and interpret rights in validly divergent ways that leads to alternative and not always compatible views on how they might be thickened. So the EU must develop a kind of citizenship which prioritises political engagement and opportunities over 'thick' bonds of solidarity and identity or `thin' rights, so that the two can be combined in distinctive ways. Over time this political process will issue in a distinctively European civic identity and rights culture, but it cannot be imposed from above. We have attested to some evidence that this is taking place as an increasing range of actors from civil society use political opportunities to mobilise at EU level. What is less clear, however, is the set of principles upon which this deepening is based, either officially or by the actors themselves. The elaboration of EU citizenship in the Treaty is confused from a normative perspective, as well as truncated. From the perspective of bottom -up use of citizenship, it appears that citizenship is primarily viewed instrumentally, i.e. as a means of legitimating demands and pressing a predetermined agenda, rather than a normative good in its own right or as a source of identity -generation.

The primary result of the research is t hat the 'mixed model' of EU citizenship offers the most normatively attactive blueprint as well as the most feasible given the existing structure of the EU – a 'fused', multi-level polity. However, all agreed that a successful model of EU citizenship must reinforce its cosmopolitan element with regard to the issue of migration in the single market. Both nationally and at the EU level, citizenship construction has been linked to the idea of economic migration. Given this, and the likelihood of continued imm igration into the EU by 'third county nationals', it is necessary to acknowledge that immigration is part of what makes EU citizenship both necessary and feasible. Thus, it needs to include a more extensive set of migration -related

rights and be more acces sible to nationals of non -member states. The membership dimension is crucial in the European Union, especially given that all member states have experienced substantial immigration of third country nationals. Access to Union citizenship for immigrants and their descendants depends on the nationality laws and naturalisation policies of the fifteen member states, and these raise hurdles of very different heights. Domestic considerations about the legal integration of immigrants have already led to a growing c onvergence of these laws and practices in some, but not all, member states.

The question is whether the institutions of the Union should also take the initiative to harmonise the legal status of third country nationals and their admission to citizenship. The answer given is affirmative. By choosing to introduce a formal status of Union citizenship into the Treaty rather than simply adding some additional rights citizens of member states enjoy under Community provisions, the Union has rhetorically establis hed itself as a quasi -federation with a common citizenship. From this perspective, the rules for access to common citizenship (i.e. the EU level) ought to be the same in all the member states. This normative implication of the language of Union citizenship   may, however, have little weight for policy developments as long as third country nationals remain a rather marginal political force in most member states and as long as the mobility of European Union citizens across internal borders remains low.

Concerning the content of Union citizenship there is a significant rights deficit which makes it difficult to build loyalties of Union citizens on the benefits and commitments of membership. Citizenship rights in the European Community originate in provisions for free movement and non -discrimination between nationals of member states. These are highly relevant for citizens which migrate within the Union, but cultural and other barriers have so far kept intra -Union mobility to very low levels. Although the Amsterdam Treaty has significantly strengthened the rights dimension with the adoption of the extended anti -discrimination clause it has failed in the broader task of consolidating and systematising the human and citizenship rights guaranteed by the

Union to those living under its jurisdiction. This is a task that will remain on the agenda for future steps towards 'constitutionalising' the Union.

It also needs to be remembered that EU citizenship should be a response to, rather than simply a product of, globalisat ion – i.e. that to be both worthwhile and effective it must act to replace or protect rights which might be lost through a neoliberal project of marketisation, rather than a set of minimal transnational entitlements which facilitate that process. It should be remembered that citizenship of the EU is necessary because it attaches a normative element to the integration process, and fosters a sense of trust between otherwise disparate actors in common rules and institutions. This is only likely to mature in a context which makes citizenship rights more extensive than they currently are, allowing both welfare and social policy concerns to become part of the EU's mandate. However, this extension cannot be legitimately or efficiently effectuated by elites simply telling citizens what their rights are. Citizens have to be provided with structures that allow them to effectively deliberate on the scope, sphere and subjects of the EU, and to elaborate suitably new styles of politics suited to its *sui generis* and hybrid character.

Although studies of national citizenship -building - particular in Portugal – revealed that sometimes elite construction of a specific variant of citizenship against the will of the populace can be successful and endure over time, this is not possible in the EU context. First, such elite construction does not occur in a citizenship void but against a backdrop of already-existing national citizenships. Second, the EU does not possess the monopoly of coercion necessary to entrench a sense of citi zenship by either force or provision of public goods. A quasi -national conception of identity which emphasises a common history and cultural heritage is not merely unattractive for most citizens who primarily identify themselves as nationals of their membe r states, it is also at odds with the project of enlarging the Union. In contrast with nation -building projects the Union is neither constrained by an imagined shared past nor by claims to sovereignty in a specific territory.

Of course, cosmopolitan conc eptions stake their hopes for a common political identity on an affirmation of constitutional principles. However, this model is difficult to apply to the European Union which has not yet developed the kind of constitution which could serve as a reference point for 'constitutional patriotism'. Some cosmopolitans hope that in time a European civil society will emerge and that cosmopolitan sentiments will develop from the shared experience of a common politically organised space, the shared impacts of the common legal order and a future merging of national civil societies. For the present, though, European civil society remains profoundly divided along national lines. Furthermore, as such an experience -based identity would only emerge as a result of further integration one can hardly hope that it could muster anticipatory support for this project.

Thus, the emphasis must be on creating a more politically active citizenry and encouraging much greater public engagement with the integration process and the EU's decision making. In order for this to be successful, the EU must accept and encourage linguistic, cultural and institutional pluralism. Linguistic and cultural pluralism is essential for the development of a deeper culture of toleration amongst European c itizens, both of each other and of the integration process: the latter cannot be seen to pose a threat to their linguistic and cultural identities. Such pluralism is not impossible in the EU, and can even be compatible with the privileging of certain langu ages as 'working languages' of the EU institutions. As we detail below, institutional pluralism is also required to match both the plurality of people's cultural and other affiliations and the complexity of modern societies. Moreover, plural institutions f urther foster tolerance and justice by creating checks and balances between the various interests and ideals of different groups, sectors, states and regions within the EU that force them to engage and compromise with each other.

With regard to fostering political participation by citizens, the research revealed that EU citizenship must be understood in terms broader than its formal articulation in the Treaty (Articles 17 -22). Empirical studies undertaken for the project show that, although this is limited, there is definite real -world use of EU citizenship rights by member state

nationals and also a broadening practice of engagement with the EU by civil society actors. It is clear, however, that EU citizenship is by no means uniform, even if understood as a set of practices of engagement or a mixture of rights scattered through the *acquis communautaire* . EU citizens do have rights and legal protection which stem from secondary legislation as well as the Treaty, as consumers, humans and inhabitants of the single market zone, and they are increasingly seeking to activate these rights. However, they are not doing so in a coherent manner, and even in cases where engagement produces positive outcomes there is little evidence of a 'Europeanisation' of political identities as a consequence. Thus, although EU citizenship must be considered in the round, there is no guarantee that even such an inclusive approach to understanding and developing it will produce a desired result: use of EU citizenship rights remains low in frequency, and predominantly instrumental in purpose. Moreover, they can also be used in an anti-European way. Research into alien suffrage rights granted under the Treaty for European Parliament and local elections revealed not just a lack of awareness and invocation of these rights by their holders but also their use as part of xenophobic campaigns by extremist politicians seeking to oppose the 'dilution' of national electorates. It is thus clear that at least to date the right to vote and stand in loca l or European Parliament elections in one's member state of domicile rather than origin has not in practice heralded either a 'European' electorate or a type of citizenship which is more open to third country nationals. Much work is thus necessary to promo te and defend such rights to the public.

ii) A Mixed Commonwealth
Though the `mixed model' of citizenship may appear the most realistic within the current state of the EU, a major challenge exists as to how it might be further developed in a coherent way. A final result of the research is that it is necessary to inform the construction of EU citizenship through a clear and thorough discussion of what kind of polity the EU should be. Indeed, the `mixed' model not only offers a blueprint for the development of European citizenship but also for the Euro -polity itself.

Here the Network drew on the neo -Roman tradition as recently revived by Quentin Skinner (1998) and Philip Pettit (1999), seeing it as the most suitable political framework for the mixed model. As they have shown, the heart of this approach lies in a distinctive conception of freedom. Liberty is seen as a civic achievement. It results from preventing arbitrary domination. Domination denotes a capacity to intentionally control and diminish an ag ent's realm of choice, either overtly through various explicit forms of restraint or obstruction, or covertly by more subtle forms of manipulation and influence. Arbitrariness rests in the power to exert domination at whim, and without reference to the interests or ideas of those over whom it is exercised. Pettit notes that an absence of interference can be consistent with the presence of domination. Those with such power may simply choose not to wield it. Social relations will be adversely affected nonethe less. Likewise, seeking to reduce interference may in given contexts be compatible with leaving certain agents or agencies with considerable power over others.

This view of liberty shapes the republican understanding of the role and design of the political system. (Bellamy 1996) Much as we associate a person's physical health with his or her bodily constitution and regard a fit individual as someone with a balanced diet and regimen, so republicans attributed a healthy body politic to a political system cap able of bringing its various constituent social groups into equilibrium with each other. The aim was to disperse power so as to encourage a process of controlled political conflict and deliberation that ensured the various social classes both checked and u ltimately co- operated with each other, moving them thereby to construct and pursue the public good rather than narrow sectional interests.

Audi alteram partem forms the watchword of political justice. `Hearing the other side' within a pluralist polity imp lies respecting that people can be reasonably led to incommensurable and incompatible understandings of values and interests, and seeing the need to engage with them in terms they can accept. This criterion places constraints on both the procedures and the outcomes of the political process. It obliges people to drop purely self-referential or self -interested reasoning and to look for considerations others can find compelling, thereby ruling out arguments that fail to treat all as of equal moral

worth. Political actors must strive for common ground through mutually acceptable modifications leading to a fair compromise.

Political compromise takes the place of a pre-political consensus, for the clashes of principle and preferences associated with pluralism preclude substantive consensual agreement (Bellamy 1999, Ch. 4). How such compromises are to be achieved, and what counts as a fair hearing, depends on the issue and the character of the groups debating it. Where the clash concerns divergent preferences, then a fair compromise is likely to be achieved through splitting the difference or some form of barter. Here fairness makes the proportionate weighting of preferences appropriate. For the political equality espoused by democrats would be violated in cases where a majority vote meant that the preferences of a group that constituted two thirds of the population always held sway, and those of the remaining third never got a look in. But the character of the compromise is different in matters of principle. Here the object will be to ensure equal consideration of the content and intrinsic importance of different values for particular groups of people, so that they seek solutions that are acceptable to a variety of different points of view. Instead of bargaining, participants in this sort of dispute negotiate and argue. In the case of bargained compromises, preferences can be taken as exogenous to the system and democracy seen in largely instrumental terms. A negotiated compromise involves a more deliberative model of democracy, that leads to preferences being shaped and ranked endogenously through the democratic process itself as otherwise inaccessible information regarding the range and intensity of the moral and material claims involved comes to light. Achieving this result requires that groups reach a sufficient threshold to have a voice that people take seriously. With very small groups, that may involve more than proportionate voting power, with others somewhat less will suffice.

Political system builders often overlook that different sorts of policies call for different kinds of compromise, and hence for a different quality of decision-making. Yet, these considerations prove more crucial than functional efficiency when deciding the level at which decisions are to be made, how groups should be represented, and the degree of autonomy particular bodies or sections of the community may claim. They are integral to

a political constitutionalism, with its intimate linking of justice, the rule of law and the democratic dispersal and division of power. In the ancient ideal of mixed government, the favoured mechanism was to assign particular governmental functions to different social classes. In contemporary societies, the answer lies in multiplying the sites of decision - making power and the forms of representation employed for different purposes.

Within a more complex and differentiated social context centralised and hierarchical ways of distributing power will be inadequate. Territorially based representation has to be supplemented by functional and cultural forms within particular sectors. Social and cultural interests are often territorially dispersed, or located below any specific territorial unit. Empowering certain groups may require their representation within a spec ific location, or across a given sector, or in the case of vertical cleavages, according to segment. Work place democracy and parent governors at schools are examples of the first, corporatist representation of unions, employer organisations and profession al associations of the second, consociational representation for given ethnic, linguistic, religious, and cultural groups of the third. Such mechanisms allow minority opinions to have both a degree of autonomy within their own sphere combined with a say in collective decision -making. On the one hand, all groups (those asking for special consideration included) are obliged to consult the broader interests and concerns of society as a whole. On the other, these same mechanisms operate as checks and balances on the purely self -interested or partial exercise of power.

Democracy plays a central role in this system, protecting against arbitrary rule and enabling the educative engagement with others. Interests are not simply advanced and aggregated, as in liberal accounts of the democratic process. They get related and subjected to the criticism of reasons, transforming politics into a forum of principle. In consequence, the need diminishes for a judicially monitored principled constitution to frame democracy. Judicial review can track whether reasoned debate occurs, but need not substitute for an absence of such deliberation. Democracy also operates within civil society as well as the state. Power is not simply devolved down in a hierarchical manner to lesser levels of the state, as in a standard federal system. It is dispersed amongst semi -

autonomous yet publicised private bodies. In this way, politics shapes rather than being simply shaped by social demands.

To the extent that multi-level governance represents a dispersed political system that shares power amongst different actors and agencies representing a variety of ideals and interests, it fits the republican scheme well. The challenge is to ensure the system is so designed as to prevent domination and to pro mote negotiation and compromise between the various parties. In other words, the EU's mixed nature as a polity requires a suitably mixed regime to govern it.

There are encouraging signs of developments in this direction (Bellamy and Castiglione 2000). At the intergovernmental level, the EU has been characterised as a confederal consociation, for example. All four of Lijphart's criteria for a consociational system - grand coalition, segmental autonomy, proportionality and minority veto - have typified the deliberations of the Council of Ministers and negotiations surrounding the various treaties (Chryssochoou, 1998). These consociational mechanisms have had the aim and effect of rendering the integrative process consistent with the protection and, to some degree, the enhancement of national identities and interests. Moreover, the Council and Inter Governmental Conferences (IGCs) have divided legislative authority with the European Parliament and Commission. Paul Craig (1997) and Neil MacCormick (1997) have also given a republican rationale to this arrangement. They see it as embodying the notion of institutional balance typical of a mixed commonwealth, that represents the various interests and constituencies involved within the EU far better than making the EP the principal legislative body could.

At the other end of the policy process, Joanne Scott (1998) has argued that the 'partnership' principle employed within Community structural funding can also be interpreted in republican terms. Partnership demands that Community development operations:

> be established through close consultations between the Commission, the member state concerned and the competent authorities and bodies -

> including within the framework of each member state's national rules and current practices, the economic and social partners, designated by the member state at national, regional, local or other level with all parties acting as partners in pursuit of a common goal. (Council Regulation 2081/93 OJ 1993 L193/5, Article 4(1))

She argues that partnership shares power across different levels of government, with the Community recognising that member states are not single units and that actors outside the official public sphere also merit a political voice. Thus, it `does not involve the parcelling out of limited pockets of sovereignty, but a genuine pooling of sovereignty'. In other words, it ensures the mixing of voices that is distinctive to the democratic liberal approach, promoting dialogue by dividing power. At the same time, the exam ple shows how international solutions to global problems can build on local initiatives.

Of course, the compromises of the present system are frequently based on bargaining rather than negotiation and reflect a modus vivendi that entrenches rather than challenges current inequalities of power and wealth. They are also brokered mainly by elites with an interest in maintaining the status quo. A genuine republican scheme for Europe must look at ways of enhancing popular influence and involvement in the po licy process. Proposals for the associative democratic governance of Europe by Paul Hirst (1994, pp. 139 -41), Philippe Schmitter (2000), and Joshua Cohen and Charles Sabel (1997) attempt just this. To realise the republican device of dispersed sovereignty and the participatory ethic that goes with it, they advocate a scheme of vouchers, redeemable against public funds, that citizens can distribute to associations of their choice. These associations can constitute themselves on a variety of different bases, such as religion, ethnicity, profession or locality, and serve a range of purposes, from the provision of a particular service in a given place through to a more comprehensive range of services equivalent to a welfare system. The only limits on them are th at they permit exit, are democratic in organisation, and meet certain conditions of viability. Associationalism is a reformist strategy that does not supplant but supplements, and offers an alternative to, existing bureaucratic and market mechanisms. Thoug h often seen as mutually exclusive, these last two actually go together. For the regulative failures of the market produce the need for ever more

stringent control by a central bureaucracy, be it the member states or the EU, which in turn generates alloca tive inefficiencies that only the former seems able to remedy, thereby leading full circle. More dispersed decision making that draws together local groups on issues such as regional development or schooling offers an alternative. They publicise areas that liberalism treats as private without becoming part of a state bureaucracy or subject to centralised legislatures. Rather, they pool their knowledge within a number of confederal institutions that group associations and determine revenue raising powers.

This scheme aids a process of positive as well as negative integration. The removal of constraints requires positive changes too, of course, but these have often proved inimical to initiatives requiring greater collective action. For example, the develo ping social agenda of the EU, with its focus on the problems of exclusion, uneven economic development and employment opportunities, and the rights of workers and immigrants, seems far better characterised in terms of the removal of domination rather than of interference. So too does a more collaborative policy in the realm of security and home affairs. In other words, a more devolved and flexible political structure for the EU need not inhibit greater European integration. On the contrary, while the proc ess may be more differentiated, greater legitimacy and efficacy may well render it deeper too.

Multi-level governance offers the only suitable model for the European Union as we enter the new millennium. Attempts to revive the nation state or reinvent it in a supranational guise in the form of a Federal Europe are equally misguided. The global processes that brought the Union into being have enhanced the complexity and pluralism of modern societies, subverting traditional patterns of political authority a nd control. However, institutions need to be designed so as to obtain the virtues of such a flexible and dispersed system rather than suffering its potential vices. We have suggested the republican notion of a balanced constitution, that mixes the appropri ate social classes and interests so as to avoid domination, offers suitable criteria. It also reflects the `mixed' character of European citizenship with its combination of multiple communitarian affiliations that mutually modify each other in cosmopolitan ways.

3.3: Progress Made by the Network vis-à-vis the State of the Art

The research of the network has made significant progress with regard to the previous state of the art. We have created a laboratory of concepts and established both that EU citizenship must be seen in a much broader way than its narrow reflection in primary law (Articles 17-22) and that it is vital to link the study of the underpinning principles of EU citizenship with study of the processes through which EU citizenship is being elaborated in the real world. This link between empirical and normative enquiries, whilst not absent from previous scholarship, is strengthened by the work of the network and has emerged as a key method for further research.

Moreover, by subjecting the original conceptual framework of the network to rigorous analysis both normatively and in the face of empirical evidence, we have produced a sharper and more fully developed blueprint for the development of European citizenship. The resulting `mixed model' represents a key advance on the state of the art, itself largely represented by the conceptual framework developed by participants in this network. We have generated a more holistic and empirically tested model of EU citizenship than is offered by previous scholarship. We have produced and published a literature review, which summarises, exposes and critically evaluates the previous *acquis académique*, thereby facilitating the generation of useful research avenues and adding a resource for both scholars and practitioners seeking to understand what was previously a largely unmapped area of scholarship.

The various pieces of empirical work undertaken either for or in conjunction with this project have themselves generated much new, original data that would otherwise remain unavailable. The stress we have placed on involving practitioners and other key actors in our research means that we have generated new understandings of several dynamics of citizenship construction which bridge the practitioner-academic gap, e.g. studies of lobbying by civil society groups and the real-world value of alien suffrage rights. Original studies in their own right, when applied to existing conceptual work, these

studies have refined and in some cases questioned existing scholarship. For example, the stress placed on the role of NGOs as agents of 'citizenship practice' (Wiener 1998) is questioned by our findings on the role of NGOs in EU decision making, and our findings on alien suffrage rights dampen the enthusiasm that a de jure Europe an electorate would quickly transform itself into a de facto one.

The role of deliberative democracy in the EU has been explored and analysed by network scholars, representing a significant addition to the existing work which focused on a more restricted view of legitimacy and democracy in the EU. This aspect of our work represents a key contribution to scholarship in the field, and is likely to shape the agenda for work in the area in the coming years.

Methodologically, we have innovated in capturing t he growing cross-fertilisation between legal and political sciences in EU studies, and we have been concerned to be multi-disciplinary in our approach. This has had the benefit of allowing us a broad perspective informed by events and theories of legal and political developments in the EU, and to generate correspondingly holistic analyses of the development of EU citizenship. It has also allowed us to move beyond a focus on issues of immigration – these remain vital variables in the study of EU citizenship, but we have been able to complement them by our empirical work on other, under -examined areas of EU citizenship.

We have also been well-placed to respond to, and shape, the 'normative turn' in EU studies, in which questions of democracy, legitimacy and identity are increasingly integrated into the more traditionally international -relations derived scholarship on European integration as part of a revision and reorientation process in EU studies. Our work, primarily conceptual but drawing on new empirical investigations to inform our conclusions, will be of interest to all scholars seeking to understand the ongoing process of European polity-formation. It has also led to the creation of new models of parts of the EU legislative chain, drawing on empirical w ork to challenge existing understandings of the lobbying process and the construction of policy networks in the EU (Warleigh 2000).

Moreover, we have attempted to pull all the strands of the research together within a distinctive view of the EU as a neo -republican `mixed polity' (Bellamy and Warleigh, 1998; Bellamy and Castiglione 2000)   - a position that has already begun to be cited in the literature (e.g. Shaw 1999; Lavdas 2001).

Finally, our work has demonstrated a more varied understanding of the for mation of national citizenships than most existing studies offer. We have highlighted the fact that in both ideological and institutional terms the formation of modern citizenships has been internally contested, and it is difficult to identify historical e xperiences with simple models based on inclusion and exclusion, a shortcoming of many existing texts. We have also shown that issues of social co -operation and solidarity within a polity play a vital role in the formation of citizenship, highlighting issue s of affective or cognitive mobilisation as central to the evolution of EU citizenship. In advance of existing scholarship, we also indicate that what is at stake in the context of EU citizenship is not just the boundaries of citizenship but also the natur e of cooperation, since in the Europolity national and transnational forms of power coexist.

We also advance on recent literature in the field by questioning the 'naturalistic' view of identity held by many scholars. We instead insist on identity's socia l and political construction, thus advancing on even those who stress its civic and political perspective by appreciating the full extent of the impact of socialisation and politicisation upon identity. We do not deny the importance of identity in the cons truction of EU citizenship; rather, we argue that in order to see how identity might be affected by Europeanisation it is necessary to develop a broader understanding and examine rather more variables than is acknowledged by many scholars.

4.0: Conclusions and Policy Implications

4.1: Implications for Policy Making [2]

The network has produced much work of relevance for policy making. We have defined a key problem – the need to build popular solidarity through increased political participation on a cross -border basis – and put forward a model for how this might be done, i.e the refined 'mixed model' of European citizenship. We have also demonstrated that the sense of common identity necessary for this mobilisation cannot, and indeed need not, be based on ideas of a deep common cultural heritage but must emerge from a complex of political practices, as republicans advocate – although these must be geared towards a mutual modification of communitarian and national allegainaces in a cosmopolitan direction. The implication here is that EU citizenship will be advanced more by creating new structures and opportunities for popular political participation than by the advent of new symbols of unity such as the EU flag and hymn.

A major implication of the research f or citizenship policy is that traditional models of citizenship have little value as referents in the construction of EU citizenship. We can learn useful lessons about how these citizenships were constructed, but it is idle to seek to replicate any one nat ional model and equally unhelpful to seek a deep synthesis of common European citizenship values, since these exist only in a shallow sense based on commitment to different varieties of liberal democracy. Instead, EU citizenship must be constructed alongsi de an acknowledgement of the different context in which European integration is taking place: economic globalisation and increased immigration both inside and into the EU area. Traditional tools of citizenship construction – inclusion and exclusion – are of less value here than the provision of both citizenship rights and the political opportunities to use them. Thus, EU citizenship must be elaborated not as a tool of 'state construction' (which is in any case seeking to put the cart before the horse, since national citizenships were constructed to legitimise state creation, not as a means of it),

but as a means of eradicating the democratic deficit through empowerment of the various national publics. Citizenship in the EU can thus be seen as a means of supp orting integration, but not of state -creation. Moreover, to be viewed positively by the public, citizenship in the EU must entail or at least be flanked by a deeper social policy in order to demonstrate to the public that it is a status worth having. This is partly a question of the provision of sufficient public goods to appear worthwhile. It is also about shaping the EU as a response to, rather than device of, globalisation on the neoliberal model, a step which is necessary to attract the support of the S candinavian bloc and many on the Left of the political spectrum. It is thus necessary for the EU to go beyond UK -style 'third way' thinking and develop a stronger social policy.

We also demonstrate crucially that citizenship must be more than about the pr ovision of even judicially enforceable rights. It is not enough to tell EU citizens that they now have extra rights thanks to the EU; given even post -Nice structures in the European Court of Justice it is not easy to enforce these rights, and they are of a limited nature. Indeed, most citizens expect to have such rights as freedom of movement anyway, and regard the EU's provision of such rights not as a boon but rather as mere fulfilment of a duty. Instead, and whilst legal rights must form the background o f EU citizenship, the latter must be expanded to cover a deeply political set of practices of participation in EU governance. Decision-making must be reformed to favour cross -border activism by concerned citizens, and opportunity structures at all levels o f EU governance must be enhanced. It is vital that this new role allows citizens opportunities to participate at every stage of the legislative chain, i.e. in shaping legislative proposals rather than simply accepting or rejecting them.

The role of elites in this aspect of citizenship construction cannot be avoided. In creating the necessary structures, they must play the key role since bottom -up pressures are as yet insufficient. EU citizenship remains malleable, and it is still possible to encourage its deepening should the proper institutional set -up be created. It is thus vital that in both its

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[2] Please note that the report on the project's progress relative to the state of the art can be found under section 3.3.

narrow (i.e. Treaty provisions) and broad (the set of opportunity structures and secondary legislation) senses, EU citizenship is deepened at the next Intergover nmental Conference and by the Council and European Parliament in their legislative capacities in the interim. It must be remembered that the EU will be shaped by the (in)action of its citizens as part of its ongoing constitutive process. Member governments which have invested so much in the integration process must therefore encourage their nationals to engage with EU policy making if they are to secure their investments in the long term.

It is also vital that the EU deepens its commitment to linguistic a nd cultural pluralism, particularly as pressures to adopt a small number of working languages will grow after enlargement to Eastern Europe. European citizens will not support deepening of their current rights at the EU level if they perceive this to endan ger their cultural and linguistic identities. Thus, the commitment to unity in diversity must be made more than rhetorical and reinforced by provision of measures to promote cultural and linguistic diversity.

The network makes the following specific recom mendations for the development of EU citizenship. They can be grouped into three sections: institutional reform, reform of policy styles, and deepening of EU competence.

4.1.1: Institutional Reform

(i) The separation of powers between the EU instition s and also vertically between the EU and its member states and their subnational governments needs to be clarified. There is no need to impose a certain model decided *a priori* (see below), but this issue of subsidiarity must be clarified for two main reaso ns. First, it must be clear to the citizen who is responsible for what. Second, citizens must be able to develop a sense of multiple loyalties and responsibilities in a transparent way: they must be able to know how and when it is necessary to mobilise at any given level of governance without confusion or conflict. Thus, it is vital that the next IGC clarifies the issue of subsidiarity.

(ii) It is vital to hold a widespread public debate which involves not just the various elites but also members of the pu blic on what the EU is for. The basic rationale of European integration – the provision of economic wellbeing, public welfare and peace on the continent – are still valid, but need to be restated to a set of publics which is often sceptical. The publics o f the member states must be allowed to question the role of integration and its continuing validity. There must also be a real acceptance that the EU should not become a Westphalian -style state unless that is the wish of the various demoi. Instead, what is necessary is a debate about the powers and role of an EU which sits alongside national and subnational governments. It must be accepted that this debate could result in the 'return' of certain competences to the national level as well as the accretion of new competences for the EU. The issue of variable geometry must also be investigated and viewed with less hostility than at present. Instead of cautious rules on 'enhanced cooperation', flexible integration must be embraced as a means of allowing deepening integration to be accompanied by democratic sanction. The EU may well have to live with being non -uniform if such is the wish of the national publics. In this respect, we welcome the proposals for a deep -seated debate about the role of the EU which has been called for the post -Nice process, and urge that it be carried out in the above spirit. It is also vital to entrench this process of deliberation as the norm of European governance, allowing for the sporadic re -examination of the EU structures and roles according to popular will.

(iii) The role of the European Parliament must be re -examined, and possibly enhanced with the extension of codecision in all matters of the first and third pillars (pending the above constitutional debate). The links between the European and national parliaments must be strengthened, perhaps by reserving a small quota of seats in each committee of the EP for national MPs in order to increase knowledge of, and popular input into, EU decision making at national as well as European level. Such reforms would also increase the ability of national parliaments to hold their governments to account for decisions taken in the EU and European Councils. The European Parliament must also be given greater visibility, so that its role and powers are understood by the public. The inclusion of national MPs in EP committees would also be beneficial in this regard.

(iv) Reform of the advisory committees is also necessary. The role of the Committee of the Regions must be enhanced, not by turning i t into a further legislative chamber but by making the Committee co -guardian of the subsidiarity principle and by popular election of its members from national lists supplied by the respective organisations of local/regional government. This would enhance the Committee's democratic legitimacy and allow it a real function in the policing of the newly -clarified principle of subsidiarity. The Economic and Social Committee must be radically reformed. It should be stripped of its membership from the social partn ers and made into the voice of civil society, with its members appointed by independent commissions in the member states. The role of the Committee would be to integrate civil society more fully into EU decision making by acting as a think tank and source of policy ideas on the basis of the currently much -underused Treaty provision on 'exploratory opinions'. Thus, membership of the Committee should be a full time (and paid) activity.

4.1.2: Policy Styles

In order to improve the visibility of EU legislati on, member states must be obliged to acknowledge the fact that they are legislating in keeping with EU requirements in a preamble to all national laws elaborated to make good both Treaty and secondary law commitments. The role of civil society in all stage s of the legislative chain must be enhanced. To that end, national governments must have a duty openly to consult relevant civil society actors about proposed EU legislation according to a quasi -corporatist model based on a system of national committees ap pointed by independent commissions. Moreover, the 'partnership principle' of cohesion policy must be exported to other areas of EU activity in order to entrench the Europeanisation of civil society at the local level. This could be done particularly effect ively in environmental, consumer and social policies. In addition, the EU should adopt legislation similar to the Administrative Procedures Act which exists in the USA as part of a commitment to good governance. Such an act would also be a source of empowe rment to the EU Ombudsman.

4.1.3: Policy Reform

In addition, it is necessary to enhance EU competence (the above normative debate notwithstanding) in certain policy areas. These are consumer and social policies. Currently, the EU citizen receives insuffi cient protection at European level, and there is a need to integrate in order to rectify this in the context of the single market. It would also be possible to use such a reinforcement of consumer policy to differentiate the EU from the USA, which in turn might contribute to the development of a specifically European layer of postnational political identity. As indicated above, and for similar reasons, it is necessary to deepen EU competences in social policy. The single market must be a means for the elabo ration of a continued commitment to the welfare state, both in order to save the EU from allegations of undermining social democracy and to add to the distinction between European and US varieties of capitalism.

Lastly, the right of suffrage in local and EP elections should be extended to third country nationals in order to extend the logic of postnational political participation and to differentiate EU citizenship from its national forebears. Four policy options for harmonisation of the membership dimens ion of Union citizenship are possible: first, automatic access to Union citizenship through either birth or residence in the territory; second, optional European citizenship by establishing a separate naturalisation procedure alongside those for national c itizenship; third, creating a Union -wide legal status for long term residents with third country citizenship; and fourth, retaining the link between member state nationality and Union citizenship but harmonising the acquisition at birth and by naturalisati on. A combination of the third and fourth option best fits an inclusive conception of Union citizenship. At the same time this solution would respect the quasi - federal character of the European Union by affirming that every citizen of the Union is at the same time a citizen of a member state. Harmonising the admission rules would mean a significant transfer of a traditional aspect of sovereignty, but it would not deprive the member states of their power to shape the contents of their own citizenship in term s of rights, obligations and historical identities.

4.2: The Value of European Collaboration in Achieving These Results

It is obvious but worth stating that the network could not have produced these results without collaboration at a European level. The work envisaged for the network was impossible to design as a single project. Instead, it was necessary to undertake it as a set of complementary tasks coordinated around a common set of research questions. The value of European collaboration was thus both managerial and academic. It allowed the project to be realised, and also facilitated its revision and embellishment through the contributions of experts from different national and academic traditions. The critiques which were thus possible were fundament al to the success of the project.

The comparison of national traditions of citizenship and political culture undertaken in this network required the participation in the project of experts steeped in those traditions, a role not normally possible for out siders. Moreover, without drawing on the different traditions of political culture and thought it would not have been viable to attempt the refinement of the theoretical framework, since this required attention to both domestic politics/national traditions and different understandings of cosmopolitanism put forward by the various respective academies. The empirical work for the network was only feasible at the EU level. Moreover, it often required study of the impact of the EU in different member states, a process which is much more effective if coordinated as part of a single study.

4.3: Necessary Future Research at EU Level

The conclusions of this study indicate that the process of citizenship construction in the EU will be a long and complex one. Much r emains to be done to chart empirically the development of citizenship practices, and also to examine reforms of both the EU institutions and its policy styles. It is above all necessary to investigate the development of a Europeanised civil society in whic h the kind of citizenship practices necessary for EU democratisation may flourish. Research into the conceptual blueprints for, and institutional underpinnings of, this civil society is vital to build on the conclusions of the present research. Specificall y, further research is necessary into the devices which

citizens have begun to use as a means of mobilisation at the EU level, such as recourse to EC law and direct action/lobbying. It will also be necessary to monitor, evaluate and prescribe further action based on the post-Nice deliberations on EU reform. Research into flexible integration must be deepened, and a clear blueprint for its implementation as a tool for democratic reform rather than Euroscepticism must be established. Finally, research into the rest of the major policies is necessary to ensure that reinforcement of EU citizenship along the lines suggested here is not counteracted by the erection of dissimilar and undemocratic regimes in areas such as economic and monetary union and the foreign and defence policy.

5.0: Dissemination and Exploitation of Results.

5.1: Dissemination During the Lifetime of the Project

During the project, we have concentrated on the dissemination of results via publications in the academic media and to our selected users in the practitioner communities. Members of both academic and practitioner communities who share the interests and objectives of the network have been invited to participate in our workshops and helped design the shape of the research itself through attendance at early meetings of the Scientists-in-Charge. Participants in the network have also been able to disseminate our findings via Visiting Professor positions in universities both across the EU and beyond. Researchers participating in the EURCIT project were also active in other programmes with official funding, leading to the ability to disseminate ideas horizontally (i.e., in national academic and practitioner circles). An example is the involvement of the teams from Florence and Sassari with the Italian national research project on Citizenship, Inclusion and Exclusion. Please see section 7 below for a full list of publications and conference papers related to the work of the network given by network members since the start of the project. For details of project publications and links to the web pages of partner universities/research teams, please access the following internet site: http://www.rdg.ac.uk/AcaDepts/lp/PolIR/GSEISframeE.html

New courses at undergraduate and postgraduate levels have been established as a result of the project. At Reading, the new Jean Monnet MA module in *Democracy and Reform in the EU* is a good example, since it has attracted students from across th e EU and beyond, roughly two thirds of whom have so far gone on to undertake related doctoral research in other member states (Italy and Denmark). A further case is the course at ARENA entitled *The Political Philosophy of the European Union* . Courses relate d to the research have also been established at the University of Minho. At Reading, four PhD students (Emanuela Lombardo; Chris Longman; Justus Schönlau; Shivdeep Sinxh Grewal) have carried out research related to the project, and have attended several of the workshops. The first three are due to complete their studies in the Summer/Autumn of 2001.

Links with users in the media and in political circles have been established by many members of the network, leading to the publication of articles in the pri nt media by network members. We have also been able to access decision makers at both national and EU levels, through contacts in political parties, social partner organisations, the civil services of the network members' home states. Through similar resea rch undertaken for the UK ESRC's 'One Europe or Several?' programme, we have been able to access the British government and think tanks in a way which would otherwise have been unlikely. Our workshop in Vienna in October 2000 was very high profile, and att racted the interest of politicians and media from Austria and beyond. In addition, the Florence and Braga teams had very close links with members of the Convention responsible for drafting the Charter of Fundamental Rights, respectively Stefano Rodotà and Pedro Bacelar de Vasconcelos.

5.2: Dissemination and Exploitation of the Results After the End of the Project

Please note that details of the project volumes are to be found in section 7.2 below.

PARTNER	RESEARCH FINDING	EXPLOITATION STRATEGY
Reading	Democracy and the dynamics of lobbying in the EU	International conference, February 2000
Reading	Refined mixed model of EU citizenship	Application to FPV for research into Europeanisation of civil society, ESRC project under 'One Europe or Several?' programme
Reading	Prescriptions for institutional reform	Book on 'Democracy and Reform in the EU'
Florence	Models of Citizenship	MURST Research project on Citizenship, Inclusion and Exclusion
Exeter	Refined mixed model of EU citizenship	ESRC project under 'One Europe or Several?' programme
Exeter	Citizenship and inclusion/exclusion	ESF conference on Social Capital (September 2001)
ARENA	Citizenship and democracy in the EU	Book on Democracy in the EU
Minho	Reform of EU Citizenship	6 month sabbatival at Brown University, USA

		(January-June 2001)
Minho	Theories of European Citizenship	Two volumes. Published jointly with University of Santiago de Compostela
Vienna	Inclusion/Exclusion	Research project funded by Austrian ministry on 'The Boundaries of Political Community'
Vienna	Models of citizenship and democracy in the EU	Two book projects

Dissemination of the research findings after the end of the project can thus be expected to be broad. Project partners are involved with several further projects on relate d issues, funded by national ministries and research councils, with excellent links to national user communities. In addition, it should be noted that in the three years after the completion of the project it can be expected that the partners will publish at least 6 books related to the project's findings in addition to the agreed deliverable project volumes (on which, see section 7.2 below).

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Aziz, M: 'Citizenship and Social Rights: Europe Sans et Avec Frontières' (EURCIT Workshop, Sardinia, June 2000)

Aziz, M: 'Immigration and Citizenship in the EU: Spheres of Belonging' (Law and Society Annual Conference, Miami, May 2000)

Aziz, M: 'EU Citizenship and Social Rights' (21/6/99: Bundesinstitut fur Politische Bildung, Bremen)

Aziz, M: 'In Search of a Common Mi gration Policy for the European Union: Citizenship and the Politics of Inclusion' (7/1/99: Prof UK Preuss Graduierten Kolleg, Otto-Suhr-Institut, Berlin)

Aziz, M: 'Monetary Union and Citizenship in Europe' (29/6/99: *Die Zulunit der Europaischen Wirtschaft s-und Wahrungsunion - Politische, soziale und wirtschaftliche Themenstellungen der Politischen Bildung,* University of Bremen)

Baccelli, L: 'La Cittadinanza fra inclusione ed esclusione: Contenuto Teorico e Suggestioni Operative' (Seminario di Porto Conte, June 2000)

Baccelli, L: 'Les Avatars de la Souveraineté' (MURST/CNRS Seminar, Pisa, June 2000)

Baccelli, L: 'Parole Chiave della Comunicazione Politica: "Cittadinanza"' (University of Pisa, May 2000)

Bacelli, L: 'Italian Citizenship and the Italian Tra dition' (28/5/99: TSER EURCIT Workshop, Florence)

Bacelli, L: 'La liberta americana' (Corso di aggiornamento La Liberta degli antichi e quella dei poster), Forlimpopoli, November 1999)

Bacelli, L: 'Le fondement des droits: les pouvoirs des individus et l es paradoxes de l'universalisme' (13/3/99: *Consensus, conflits et deconnexions dans la relation et les systemes politiques: les 'pouvoirs'de l'universel,* College International de Philosophie, Paris)

Bacelli, L: 'Ti constringeri ad essere libero' (Legge, l iberta, sanzione: Corso di aggiornamento culture della legalita, San Giuliano, October 1999)

Bacelli, L: 'Virtu repubblicane e democrazia moderna' (6/3/99: Convegno su 'Onore e democrazia', Locarno)

Baccelli, L: 'Che fare del Repubblicanesimo' (Workshop on Repubblicanesimo e Liberalismo a Confronto, Rome, 9 January 1998)

Baccelli, L: 'II Particolarismo dei Diritti' (Workshop Sulla Soglia dell'Universalismo La Critica tra Contingenza e Fondazione, Urbino. Italy, 26 -27/6/98)

Baubock, R: 'Dual and Supranat ional Citizenship Comments on Mexican and EU Citizenship' (Comparative Citizenship Project Conference, Airlie Center, Warrenton, Virginia USA, 3-6/6/98)

Baubock, R: 'Three Deficits of European Union Citizenship' (Conference on Citizenship and Cosmoplitani sm, University of Madison, Wisconsin USA, 7/l l/98)

Baubock, R: 'Transnational versus Suprannational Citizenship in the EU' (CEPIC Conference on Nationality, Immigration and Integration in Europe and the USA, Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, P aris, 27/6/98)

Baubock, R: 'Transnationale Staatsburgerschaft' (Visiting Lecture at the Mannheimer Zentrum fur Europaische Sozi alforschung, Mannheim, Germany, 7/7/98)

Baubock, R: 'Changing Conceptions of Nationhood' (1/5/99: Roundtable at the *Workshop on Migration and the (Supra -national) State,* International Center for Migration, Ethnicity and Citizenship and European Union Center of New York, New York School for Social Research)

Baubock, R: 'International Migration and Liberal Democracies: The Challen ge of Integration' (6/3/99: *Multiculturalism and Struggles for Recognition in Comparative Perspective,* Center for European Studies, Harvard)

Baubock, R: 'Recombinant Citizenship' (TSER EURCIT Workshop, Braga, November 1999)

Baubock, R: 'Three Deficits of Euroean Citizenship: Inclusion, Rights and Identity' (15/2/99: Visiting Lecture at Institute for European Studies, Cornell University)

Bauböck, R: 'Conceiving Cosmopolitanism' (University of Warwick, April 2000)

Bauböck, R: 'Föderalismus und Einwanderun g: Tagung Integrationspolitik in Föderalistischen Systemen im Vergleich' (Munster University, February 2000)

Bauböck, R: 'Limits of Self -Determination' (Centre for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster, London, March 2000)

Bauböck, R: 'The Fr anchise for Non -Citizens' (Comparative Citizenship Conference, Carnegie Endowment for Peace, Florence, April 2000)

Bellamy, R: 'Pluralism and the Politics of Compromise' (Oxford Political Thought Conference, St Catherine's College, Oxford, 9/1/98)

Bellamy, R and Castiglione, D: 'Democracy in a Mixed Polity' (Conference on Democracy in Europe: Integration and Deliberation, University of Bergen, Norway 20/2/98)

Bellamy, R 'Autonomy and Cohesion in the EU' (Dept of Political Science, MacGill University, Mon treal, 26/3/98)

Bellamy, R 'The Democratic Deficit and the Constitution of Europe' (Conference on Justice and Stability A Comparative Perspective, Groupe de Recherche sur les Societes Plurinationales, MacGill University, Montreal, 27/3/98)

Bellamy, R: 'B ack to the Future: Pluralism and the Republican Alternative to Liberalism' (Conference on Liberalism at the Millennium, Dept of Politics, University of Swansea, 2/5/98)

Bellamy, R: 'Four Models of European Citizenship' (EC Programme 'Give a Soul to Europe', Conference 'Is There a Cultural Identity of Europe?', Florence, 9/5/98)

Bellamy, R: 'Four Models of European Citizenship' (Conference on The Boundaries of Understanding, International Social Sciences Institute, University of Edinburgh, 6/6/98)

Bellamy, R: 'Calhoun, Compromise and Democracy' (Public Lecture, Forschungsinstitut fur Philosophie, Hanover, 11/6/98)

Bellamy, R: '"A Republic if You can Keep It": Rethinking the EU Deficit', 12/11/98: Dept of Politics, University of Aberdeen, 14/12/98: Centre for European Studies, Universite Libre de Bruxelles, 9/2/99: Dept of Government, University of Essex; and 30/4/99: Centre for European Studies, University of Leeds, 10/5/99: Social sceinces institute, Lisbon, 11/5/99: CERI, Paris)

Bellamy, R: 'Four Model s of European Citizenship' (12/1/99: Challenging the Nation-state: Perspectives on Citizenship and Identity , Ben-Gurion University, Israel)

Bellamy, R and Warleigh A.: 'Cementing the Union? European Citizenship', 11/3/99, St Anna, University of Pisa

Bellamy, R: 'Back to the Future? Pluralism and the Republican Alternative to Liberalism' (21/5/99: All Souls College, Oxford)

Bellamy, R: 'Sovereignty, Legitimacy and Democracy in the EU' (Morrell Conference on Sovereignty and Political Theory', University of York, September 1999)

Bellamy, R: `Citizenship Practice and European Integration', Incontro internazionale di studi sull'Europa: integrazione, identità, diritti, Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna Di Studi Universitari e di Perfezionamento, 29.6.00

Bellamy, R: `Citizenship Practice and European Integration', Workshop on `After National Democracy: Rights, Law and Power in America and the New Europe', International Institute for the Sociology of Law, Onati, Spain, 2.6.00.

Bellamy, R: `Democracy, Sovereignty and t he Constitution of the European Union: The Republican Alternative to Liberalism', Dept. of Social Policy and Politics, Goldsmith's College, University of London, 15.3.00

Bellamy, R: `Theory and Practice – Why the Charter is Superfluous', ESRC OEOS and Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, Leeds Conference on `A Charter of Fundamental Rights for the EU: Issues and Opportunities', Royal Institute for International Affairs, Chatham House, 28.6.00.

Bellamy, R.: `EU Citizenship and European Integration: A Normativ e Analysis', OEOS Democracy Workshop, University of Leeds, 17.3.00

Casalini, B : 'Diritti e particolarismo' (Seminario interuniversitario su cittadinanza e globalizzazione, Florence, 17 September 1999)

Casalini, B: 'American Citizenship Between Past and Present' (28/5/99: TSER EURCIT Workshop, Florence)

Casalini, B: 'Culture Nazionale e Conflitto Etnico' (Workshop on Identita e Conflitti of the Forum sui Problemi Della Pace e Della Guerra)

Casalini, B: 'Rights, Citizenship and Constitutionalism in the U SA' (2/2/99: Seminario Interuniversitario Permanente su cittadinanza e globalizzazione, Florence)

Casalini, B: 'Stato di diritto: untintroduzione' (14/5/99: Seminario Interuniversitario Permanente su cittadinanza e globalizzazione, Florence)

Castiglione, D: 'Sovereignty and Citizenship in theEU, (University of Birmingham, UK, February 1998)

Castiglione, D: 'Public Reason, Private Citizenship' (January 1999: University of Exeter)

Castiglione, D: 'The Virtues of Democratic Rule in Global Contexts' (April   1999: Ethics and Globalization, Yale University)

Castiglione, D: 'Sovereignty and Citizenship in the European Union' (European Network at McGill [ENAM], Montreal, Canada)

Castiglione, D: 'Civic Inclusion in Pan -European Civil Society' (First ESRC "One Eu rope or Several?" Conference, University of Birmingham, September 1999)

Castiglione, D: 'Civility and Civicness' (Seminario di Studi on "Genere, famiglia e civicness", University of Urbino, November 1999)

Castiglione, D (2000): Chair of Workshop C and Or ganiser of Conference on 'The Institutions of Tolerance', Conference on 'The Culture of Toleration', University of Exeter, St Luke's Campus, Heavitree.

Castiglione, D: 'Four Questions on Global and Transnational Democracy' (ESRC 'One Europe or Several?' W orkshop, Leeds, March 2000)

Castiglione, D: 'Four Questions on Global and Transnational Democracy', Workshop on `After National Democracy: Rights, Law and Power in America and the New Europe', International Institute for the Sociology of Law, Onati, Spain , 2.6.00.

Castiglione, D (July 2000): Course on 'Supranational and International Democracy' as part of the 8th IWM International Summer School in Political Philosophy (Cortona) organized by the Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen (Vienna).

Castiglione, D (October 2000): Course on 'Cosmopolitismo ed Istituzioni Sovranazionali' as part of the Global Governance special Programme for Postgraduate students at Scuola Superiore St. Anna (Pisa).

Castiglione, D (November 2000): Organiser of the Exeter Col loquium on 'Constitutionalism, Democracy and Citizenship: Current Debates', University of Exeter, 24-25 November 2000.

Chryssochoou, D: 'Demos Formation in the EU: Constructing a European Civic Space' (Workshop: European Identities in Flux, University of Bath, 20//3/98)

Chryssochoou, D 'Integration Theory and Treaty Reform: AConsociationalist Approach' (University of Cambridge and Free University of Brussels Joint Seminar, Cambridge, UK, 15-16 March,1998)

Chryssochoou, D: 'Comparative Perspectives on Fe deralism and Democracy' (Joint ECPR Workshop 26, University of Warwick, UK, 23 -28 March 1998)

Chryssochoou, D: 'Compromising Civic Competence: Amsterdam and Its Limits' (TSER EURCIT Workshop, Braga, November 1999)

Chryssochoou, D: 'Metatheorising the Eur opean Union' (7/5/99: *The State of the Art: Integration Theory in the Post -Amsterdam Era,* University of Aston)

Chryssochoou, D: 'Democracy and Integration after Amsterdam' (Sixth Biennial ECSA-USA Conference, University of Pittsburgh, June 1999)

Chryssochoou, D: 'The Amsterdam Reforms: Forward March or Retreat?' (Pembroke College, Cambridge, October 1999)

Chryssochoou, D: 'Understanding the European Polity: A Metattheoretical Perspective' (Advanced Training Programme on European Affairs, University of Tu rku, Finland, November 1999)

Chryssochoou, DN: 'European Citizenship, Civic Competence and the Making of a Transnational Public Sphere', Conference on 'Democracy Beyond the Nation -State: Perspectives on a Post -National Order', Hellenic Political Science A ssociation, Athens, 5-7 October 2000.

Chryssochoou, DN: 'Models of Democracy and the European Polity', Exeter Colloquium on 'Constitutionalism, Democracy and Citizenship: Current Debates', University of Exeter, 24 - 25 November 2000.

Chryssochoou, DN: Discussant on 'Law, Citizenship and Public Justification in the European Union', EurCit Workshop on 'The Constitution of European Democracy', Vienna, 29 September 2000.

Costa, P: 'I1 discorso della cittadinanza in Europa: ipotesi di lettura' (Cittadinanza: Individui, diritti social), collettivita nella storia contemporenea, Padua, 2 -3 December 1999)

Eriksen, E O: 'The Question of Deliberative Supranationalism in the KU' (ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Mannheim, 28/3/99)

Eriksen, E O: 'Towards a People's Eu rope? On Assessing the Democratic Deficit in the KU' (28/3/99: ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Mannheim)

Eriksen, EO: 'Strategies for Handling the EU's Legitimacy Deficits' (ESRC 'One Europe or Several?' Workshop, Leeds, March 2000)

Estrada, I: 'Local Associationalism and the Path to a Post -national Understanding of Social Relations in Europe' (TSER EURCIT Workshop, Braga, November 1999)

Follesdal, A: 'Human Rights: A Paradigm in International Politics? Does the EU Have Resposibilities? On Sanctions Ag ainst Austria' (Amnesty International Conference, University of Oslo)

Follesdal, A: 'Re -thinking Democracy for Multi -level European Governance' (Boston Working Group on European Integration and Democracy, Harvard University, USA

Follesdal, A: 'The Legit imacy of Comitology' (Max Planck Institut, Cologne, 2000)

Follesdal, A: 'When Most are More Equal than Others' (Multiculturalism: Learning from the Canadian Experience, Canadian Embassy, Oslo, 2000)

Follesdal, A: 'Contractualist Egalitarianism Whence and Whither' (Conference on International Justice, University of Reading, 23/4/98)

Follesdal, A: 'Democratic Europe' (11/6/99: CERI, Paris)

Follesdal, A: 'European Citizenship: Philosophical Challenges (Introduction to Round Table on European Citizenship)', (World Congress of Philosophy, Boston, USA, 13/8/98)

Follesdal, A: 'How Nationality Matters: A Liberal Contractualist Sketch' (28/3/99: ECPR Workshop, Mannheim)

Follesdal, A: 'Just European Patriotism?' (9/6/99: Freie Universitat, Berlin)

Follesdal, A: 'Rethinking Democracy for Multi -level European Governance' (15/6/99: Boston Working Group on European Integration and Democracy, Harvard University)

Follesdal, A: 'Subsidiarity and Democracy' (Conference on Democracy in Europe: Integration and Deliberati on, University of Bergen, Norw ay, 20/2/98)

Follesdal, A: 'The Units of Europe: Autonomous or Equal?' (7/6/99: Humboldt University, Berlin)

Follesdal, A: 'Third Country Nationals as Euro -citizens: The Case Defended' (Conference on Migrants, Minorities an d New Forms of Citizenship in the EU, European University Institute, Florence, Italy, 5 -7/3/98

Hampsher-Monk, I: Chair of Workshop A on 'The Idea of Tolerance and its legal and political dimensions', Conference on 'The Culture of Toleration', University of Exeter, St Luke's Campus, Heavitree.

Jordan, B: 'Globalisation, Exclusion and Community', Deakin University Geelong, Australia, November 2000

Jordan, B: 'Tough Love and Social Policy', University of Queensland, Australia, November 2000.

Jordan, B: 'The Issue of Social Justice in a Global Context: The Case of Immigration to the UK' (Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, April 2000)

Jordan, B: 'Labour Market Activation in Britain and Denmark' (May 1999: Conference on Unemployment, Graz [Austria])

Jordan, B: 'Morality and Welfare: An Anglo -Irish Comparison' (June *1999: The Morality of Welfare,* St George's House, Windsor Castle)

Jordan, B: 'Social Exclusion and the New Politics of Welfare' (London School of Economics, November 1998)

Jordan, B: 'Social Work in the Shadow of the Market Economy' (June 1999: Conference of the International Federation of Social Workers, European School of Social Work, Helsinki)

Jordan,B: 'History and Dilemmas of Community Work' (John Wesley College, Budapest)

La Torre, M: 'Interpreting Legal Facts' (June 1999: University of Edinburgh)

La Torre, M: 'Legal Theory and Community Law' (April 1999: Istituto di Applicazione Forense, University of Bologna)

La Torre, M: 'Philosophies of Law in the Weimar Republic' (May 1999: Un iversity of Murcia)

La Torre, M: 'The Nature of the European Community Legal Order' (March 1999: University of Lecce)

La Torre, M: 'Toleration and Legal Rationality' (March 1999: Universidade Nova of Lisbon)

Lobo-Fernandes, L: 'The European Union and Ch anges of Patterns in National Governance' (TSER EURCIT Workshop, Braga, Novemober 1999)

Loretoni, A: 'I1 principio federale nella prospettiva dell'integrazione europea' (Seminario Interuniversitario su Cittadinanza e Globalizzazione, Pisa, May 1999)

Loretoni, A: 'Uno sguardo critico dentro la globalizzazione' (Seminario Interuniversitario su Cittadinanza e Globalizzazione, Pisa, November 1999)

McKinnon, C: Chair of Workshop B on 'Toleration and political neutrality',and co - organiser (with D Castiglione), Conference on 'The Culture of Toleration', University of Exeter, St Luke's Campus, Heavitree.

Melchior, J 'The Ambiguities of Constitution -building in the EU' (Colloquium on a European Transnational Constitution, Zukunftswerkstatte, Vienna, 22 -24/10/98)

Melchior, J: 'Is the EU Capable of Being Democratised'?' (Annual Conference of BEIGEWUM, Vienna, 15 -16/5/98)

Melchior, J: 'Die Rolle Österreichs im Europäischen Integrazionsprozess' (Workshop entitled Ostmitteleuropa Zwischen Regionaler Koperation und E uropäischer Integration', Weiden, Germany, April 2000)

Melchior, J: 'Österreich und die EU' (Office of the Vienna Region in Brussels, April 2000)

Melchior, J: 'Democratic Foundations of Political Community in the EU' (SGIR -ISA 3rd Pan-European Conference , Vienna, 16-19/9/98)

Melchior, J: 'Die Europawahlen in Osterreich 1999' ('Superwahljahr 1999', Institute of Advanced Studies, Vienna, November 1999)

Melchior, J: 'Identity and Democracy in the EU' (TSER EURCIT Workshop, Braga, November 1999)

Melchior, J: 'Is a Transnational Political Community Possible?' (94 [th] Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, 2 -7/8/98)

Melchior, J: 'National Identities: Chance or Challenge for European Democracy?' ('Globalisation, European Integrati on and National Identity:

Mura, V: 'Democrazia e potere della maggioranza' (Associazione studi parlamentari, Università degli Studi, Florence, 8 and 22 March 2000)

Mura, V: 'Diritti dell'uomo e diritti del cittadino' (Coordinamento dei filosofi politici italiani, 5 [th] National Congress, Lecce 13 -15 April 2000)

Mura, V: 'Democrazia e regola di maggioranza' (6/5/99: Ciclo Seminariale Ermeneutiche della politica, Universita degli Studi di Urbino)

Mura, V: 'I1 fondamento della regola di maggioranza' (10/3/99 : Associazione Studi Parlamentari, Florence)

Mura, V: 'Modello maggioritario e modello consensuale della democrazia' (17/2/99: Associazione Studi Parlamentari, Florence)

Pellegrin, J: 'Governance and Accountability in an Enlarged Europe: The Case of Germ an Production Networks in Central/Eastern Europe', Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Los Angeles, March 2000

Pellegrin, J: 'The New European Industrial Architecture: production Networks and Regional Systems Innovation', School of Eastern and Slavonic Studies, University of London, June 2000

Preuss, UK: 'Ist Europa Verfassbar? Moglichkeiten und Grenzen der Integration der Verfassung' (20/4/99: Institut fur die Wissenschaften vom Menscjen/Grune Bildungswerkstatt, Vienna)

Preuß, U: 'Citizenship und Gemeinwohl' (Contribution to Series of Lectures on Issues of Public Interest, Berlin Wissenschaftszentrum, February 2000)

Preuß, U: 'Perspektiven einer Größeren Bürgerbeteiligung als Voraussetzung für Mehr Integration' (Workshop organis ed by the Foreign Affairs Ministries of France and Germany in conjunction with the Centre for European Integration Research entitled *The European on the Way to a Union of States and Peoples: The Challenge of Legitimacy and Democracy* , February 2000)

Preuß, U: 'Die Europäische Grundrechtscharta' (Parliamentary Group of Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, State Legislature of Berlin, March 2000)

Preuß, U: 'L'Impossible Institutionalisation de l'Espace Public – La Dimension Européenne' (Centre Marc Bloch, Berlin, March 20 00)

Preuß, U: 'Nationalismus in Einer Globalisierten Welt: Welche Rolle Spielt Europa?' (Europäische Akademie Berlin, April 2000)

Preuß, U: 'Eine Verfassung für die Europäische Union?' (Club Malraux, Berlin, May 2000)

Preuß, U: 'Was Bedeutet Staatsbürge rschaft?' (Contribution to Series of Lectures on Citizenship and Ethnicity, Humboldt University of Berlin)

Preuss, UK: 'German Federalism and the Impact of the German Bundeslander on the European Union Procedures' (Europa -Institut der Europaischen Staatsb urger Akademie, Berlin)

Preuss, UK: 'Membership and Identity: What Does it Mean to be Integrated?' (The American Academy, Berlin)

Preuss, UK: 'The Changing Role of Citizenship in a Denationalising World' (ARENA, Oslo)

Preuss, UK: 'Verfassungspatriotismu s und Nationale Identitat' (Grossbritannienzentrum der HUB, Berlin)

Preuss, UK: 'Vortrag: Braucht Europa eine Verfassung?' (Bundis 90/Grunen, Bremen)

Rocha, A: 'A Europa como Ideosofema' ('Thinking Europe': University of Minho, December 1999)

Rocha, A: 'Approximations to Philosophical Structuralism' (April/May 1999: University of Santaigo de Campostela Workshop)

Rocha, A: 'Cultural Relativism versus Ethical Universalism' (29/1/99: University of Azores)

Rocha, A: 'Ethical Values for the Next Millennium' (5/2/99: Association for the Development and Solidarity Ze Moniz, Cidade de Praia [Cabo Verde], Colloquium on Human Rights)

Rocha, A: 'From European Linguistic Pluralism to European Interculturalism' (TSER EURCIT Workshop, Braga, November 1999)

Rocha, A: 'From Structuralism in Question to Questions of Structuralism' (5/5/99: University of Santiago de Campostela at Lugo)

Rosas, J: 'A Idea Cosmopolita de Cidadania' (University of Minho, January 2000)

Rosas, J: 'Cidadania Entre Direita e Esquerda' (Escola Francisco de Holanda, Guimarães, March 2000)

Rosas, J: 'A Cidadania Europeia: Conceito e Concepcoes' ('Thinking Europe': University of Minho, December 1999)

Rosas, J: 'Peace Culture and Human Rights' (16/4/99: Unesco National Meeting, Braganca)

Santoro, E: 'Citizenship and the Rule of Law', (Workshop on Cultural Politics, School of Economic and Social Studies, University of East Anglia, 1/1 0/98)

Santoro, E: 'Il Panopticon invisibile L'Ordine Liberale tra Mercato e   Disciplina' (Permanent Interuniversit y Seminar on Citizenship and Globalization, Florence, l ()/3/98)

Santoro, E: 'La Funzione Disciplinante dei Diritti Sociali" (Paper to Permanent Interuniversity Seminar on Citizenship and Globalisation, Florence, 25/6/98)

Santoro, E: 'Cittadinanza: una p rospettiva anti -antomista su individuo e diritti' (2/3/99: Seminario Interuniversitario Permanente su cittadinanza globalizzazione)

Santoro, E: 'Cittadinanza e poverta' (Seminario Interuniversitario su Cittadinanza e Globalizzazione, Florence 11/11/99)

Santoro, E: 'Stato di diritto e sovranita' (Seminario Interuniversitario su Cittadinanza e Globalizzazione, Florence, May 1999)

Santoro, E: 'Un' archeologia dei diritti di cittadinanza: la rottura volontaristica' (14/5/99: Seminario Interuniversitario Perm anente su cittadinanza e globalizzazione, Florence)

Sassatelli, R: 'Desire and Rationality', International Conference on Alcohol Policy and the Welfare State in Consumer Society, Lillehammer, Norway, January 1998

Sassatelli, R: 'Identity, History and Int eraction' (Experiences and Identites, Cork, Ireland, February 2000)

Sassatelli, R: 'The Politics of Consumption', Conference on Cultural Politics, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK, September 1998

Sassatelli, R and Scott, A: 'Food Consumption, Citizensh ip and the Erosion of Food Confidence' (EURCIT Workshop, Sardinia, June 2000)

Tupman, B: 'The Financing of Russian Organised Crime', Keynote address to Conference for representatives of Eastern and Central European Embassies and major law firms at Institu te of Advanced Legal Studies, University of London. January 2000.

Tupman, B: 'People as Money', Keynote address to OISIN -sponsored [EU-funded programme] Conference of European Delegates on Trafficking in Human Beings, Sunningdale, June 2000

Tupman, B: 'Responding to organised crime: where does private security stop and the krysha system begin?', Third Meeting of the European Security Education Forum, University of Barcelona, June 2000.

Tupman, B: 'The Technologies at the Disposal of Criminal Intelligence: The recourse to visual techniques in the search for evidence', 19th Higher Police Course, Acireale, Sicily, Italy, October 2000.

Tupman, B: 'Legitimacy, Europol and Data -based Initiative Proactive Investigation' (Socio-legal Studies Association, Loughboro ugh)

Urtis, V: 'Nation and Citizenship in a European Perspective' (TSER EURCIT Workshop, Braga, November 1999)

Warleigh, A: 'From Markets to Membership Citizenship and the European Union' (Public Policy Research Seminars, Southampton Institute, Southampt on UK, May 1998)

Warleigh, A: 'An Ethics of Construction and an Ethics of Participation: Citizenship, the EU and the Future' (Conference on Social Constructivism and European Studies, Aarhus, Denmark, 25 -28 June 1998)

Warleigh, A: 'Codecision and EU Deci sion Making' (UACES Research Conference, Sheffield, September 1999)

Warleigh, A: 'EU Citizenship Beyond Amsterdam: Looking Beyond the Treaty' (University of North London, November 1999)

Warleigh, A: 'Getting the Big Picture: Framework Theory and Explaini ng EU Decision-making' (7/5/99: The State of the Art:Integration Theory at the Turn of the Centur*y,* University of Aston *)*

Warleigh, A: 'Governments Prefer Bonds: Crises, Upgrading Integration and Democracy in the Europe of 2010' (14/5/99: The EU in 2010 , University of North London)

Warleigh, A: 'Surrogate Citizens? NGOs and Citizenship Practice in the EU' (4/6/99: ECSA Biennial Conference , Pittsburgh USA)

Warleigh, A: 'Purposeful Opportunists? EU Institutions and The Development of European Citizenship' (Leverhulme Trust Workshop, Reading, September 1999)

Warleigh, A: 'Hit and Miss: NGOs, EU Environment and Consumer Policy Régimes and Citizens' Representation' (ESRC 'One Europe or Several?' Workshop, Leeds, March 2000)

Warleigh, A: 'Policy Entrepreneurs and Policy Coalitions: Exploring NGO Lobbying Influence and Legitimacy in EU Environment Policy' (ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Copenhagen, April 2000)

Warleigh, A: 'The Euro -Vision Thing: On Flexibility as a Strategy for Managing European Integration ' (UACES Research Conference, Budapest, April 2000)

Warleigh, A: 'Beyond the Functional -Ideational Gap: From Network Governance to Network Democracy in the European Union?' (EURCIT Workshop, Sardinia, June 2000)

Wilks, S: 'Competition Policy and the CEEC s: The Institutions of a New Market Economy' (Thorkil Kristensen Institute, South Jutland University Centre, May 1998)

Wilks, S: 'Corporate Governance' (February 1999: *Round Table on Business and Government in the Age of Globalisation,* University of Canbe rra)

Wilks, S: 'Consolidation of the British Regime of Utility Regulation', International Workshop on Regulatory Reforms, University of Haifa, 12 -13 January 2000.

Wilks, S: 'The Evolution of the MMC' and 'The Development of Competition Policy in the UK', Seminar for members and senior staff of the Competition Commission, 28 January 2000.

Wilks, S: Organiser of Workshop on European Regulation, Nuffield College, Oxford, preparation for a Special Issue of West European Politics, 2001, under the editorship of M. Thatcher and Alec Stone Sweet.

Wilks, S: 'Competition Policy and the Reform of Utility Regulation in Britain', KAPA International Forum on 'Reforms in Government and Business', Seoul, 29 April 2000.

7.2: Deliverables

7.2.1: Deliverables Audit

Below is a table of the project deliverables. Please note that in addition we held 6 workshops, plus 8 meetings of the Scientists -in-Charge, of which 6 took place at the same time as a workshop. We will also be publishing two edited volumes related to the wor k of the network. They are both in preparation, although the first is nearer publication as it relates to the first 2 years of work of the project.

Volume 1

Lineages of European Citizenship , edited by Richard Bellamy, Dario Castiglione and Emilio Santoro

Volume 2

Realising European Citizenship , edited by Miriam Aziz, Dimitris Chryssochoou and Alex Warleigh

As part of a parallel Leverhulme project, the Reading team have also published Richard Bellamy and Alex Warleigh (eds), Citizenship and Governance i n the EU, London and New York: Continuum, 2001. Reading and Exeter have also collaborated in producing a joint volume as part of the related ESRC One Europe or Several Programme, Richard Bellamy, Dario Castiglione and Jo Shaw (eds), Making European Citize ns: Strategies for Civic Inclusion , (London and New York: Palgrave, forthcoming).

AGREED DELIVERABLE	STATUS
Survey of literature on EU citizenship 'Frozen – Citizenship and European Unification'	Completed
Report: 'Civic Nationalist and Cosmopolitan Globalist Conceptions of Citizenship': `Cementing the Union: Civic Nationalist and Cosmopolitan Globalist Conceptions of European Citizenship' – Richard Bellamy and Alex Warleigh	Completed
Selected papers from Workshop 1	Completed
Selected papers from Workshop 2	Completed
Report: 'Traditions of Citizenship' : `European Citizenship Traditions: Towards an Overlapping Consensus' - Richard Bellamy and Alex Warleigh (with Pietro Costa)	Completed
Selected papers from workshop 3	Completed
Report: 'One or Many? The Nature of European Identities': 'One or Many? The Nature of European Identity/Identities' – Alex Warleigh (with Furio Cerutti)	Completed
Selected papers from Workshop 4	Completed
Report: 'Models of Citizenship and Forms of Social and Political Exclusion': `The Problem of European Citizenship' - Gian Enrico Rusconi	Completed
Draft Final Report	Postponed; presented at EURCIT workshop in Florence, February 2001
Selected papers from Workshop 5	Completed
Report: 'The Constitution of European Democracy and Social Policy': :A European Republic: Plural and Divisible - Richard Bellamy	Completed
Final report	Completed

7.2.2: Deliverable Reports

7.2.2.1: 'Frozen – Citizenship and European Unification' – Alex Warleigh

7.2.2.2: `Cementing the Union: Civic Nationalist and Cosmopolitan Globalist Conceptions of European Citizenship' – Richard Bellamy and Alex Warleigh

7.2.2.3: `European Citizenship Traditions: Towards an Overlapping Consensus' - Richard Bellamy and Alex Warleigh (with Pietro Costa)

7.2.2.4: 'One or Many? The Nature of European Identity/Identities' – Alex Warleigh (with Furio Cerutti)

7.2.2.5: `The Problem of European Citizenship' - Gian Enrico Rusconi

7.2.2.6: A European Republic: Plural and Divisible - Richard Bellamy

7.2.2.7: Taking the Charter Seriously? - Dario Castiglione