

Executive Summary:

Focus of the project

The FACIT-project concerns the present role of Faith-Based Organisations (FBOs) in matters of poverty and other forms of social exclusion (such as homelessness or undocumented persons) in European cities. A FBO is any non-governmental organisation (NGO) that refers directly or indirectly to religion or religious values, and functions as a welfare provider or as a political actor. The central assumption is that FBOs tend to fill the gap left after the supposed withdrawal of the welfare state in several domains of public life, particularly in social welfare and in social protection.

At first sight, this looks like a return to the charity of former times, when such associations occupied the fore of social help in many countries. But we might as well witness the beginning of a new type of welfare regime with a stronger focus on local policies and strategies and new interplays between local authorities and civil society organisations.

The project's focus is on the urban context of FBOs. They have, indeed, direct entrance to the 'poor side' of cities because of (1) their activities in deprived urban neighbourhoods and among excluded groups and (2) as in the case of many FBOs with a non-western background, because their members often belong to these deprived and excluded groups themselves.

Questions to be answered

The project aims to answer the following research questions: What is the position of FBOs in combating poverty and other forms of social distress in cities? How has this role changed over time and how do these activities contribute to combating social exclusion and promoting social cohesion? What are the implications for policies and the governance of European cities? From both scientific and policy perspectives, there is a great need for better empirical and comparative data on what is going on in European cities in matters of poverty and exclusion policies and, in particular, the contribution of FBOs in the reduction (or deepening) of the problems.

Project Context and Objectives:

The research concerns the present role of FBOs in matters of poverty and other forms of social exclusion (such as homelessness or undocumented persons) in cities.

The concepts

FBO: Faith Based Organisations

For the purposes of this study, we define FBOs as any non-governmental organisation (NGO) that refers directly or indirectly to religion or religious values, and which functions as a welfare provider or as a political actor.

(Urban) poverty and exclusion

In our approach we use 'social exclusion' as a generic concept that refers to various situations and processes such as polarisation, discrimination, poverty and inaccessibility. Social exclusion implies two conditions: a hierarchical relationship between individuals, positions or groups and a separation by clearly discernible fault lines. Certain fault lines are the result of collective intervention (e.g. subsistence income or institutional isolation), while others arise without any explicit and deliberate intervention on the part of social actors (segmented labour markets).

Poverty is a network of instances of social exclusion that stretches across several areas of individual and collective existence. It separates the poor from society's generally accepted patterns of life. They are unable to bridge this gap on their own (Vranken 1992).

Poverty is a special case of social exclusion: it is an accumulation of interrelated forms of exclusion. These instances of exclusion concern various areas of social and individual life, and they can manifest themselves in specific ways in each of these areas. Poverty has to do with non-participation or very limited participation in various social commodities such as income, labour, education, housing, health, and administration of justice, public services and culture. These areas are interrelated. This is the essence of poverty. The incapacity of the poor to bridge this complex fault line on their own, underlines how powerful a form of exclusion poverty really is. Thus poverty possesses both crucial characteristics of social exclusion - inequality and fault lines. What makes poverty special is that it concerns a multi-faceted phenomenon.

Main ideas

The central idea is that FBO - as other NGOs - tend to fill the gap left after the supposed withdrawal of the welfare state, particularly in social welfare and in social protection. At first sight, this looks like

a return to the charity of former times, when such associations occupied the fore of social help in many countries. But we might as well witness the beginning of a new type of welfare regime with a stronger focus on local policies and strategies and new interplays between local authorities and civil society organisations.

These developments, however, are more than 'charity re-entering through the backdoor'. The role of FBOs in combating social problems in contemporary (urban) society seems different from that in the past in that they clearly are not exclusively of the 'charitable' kind, and that they are no longer limited to the Christian faith but also to a range of non-Christian and non-Western faiths and that they exert an increasing political and social impact. On the latter point some authors write in terms of a 'reconquista' of secular society. It is a challenging topic, given the fact that state or local programmes to alleviate poverty predominantly finance physical measures, with non-physical measures due to their costs and low visibility left to NGOs. The fast growing number of Muslim FBOs and of non-western Christian FBOs is crucially important for our research.

Why focus on the city?

The city provides a scale that permits the gathering in sufficient numbers of like-minded, faith-motivated, and action-oriented people. Cities, moreover, have always been the focus of, sometimes contradictory, developments that are at the heart of our subject. First there is poverty, which since about 150 years has been defined in urban terms. This situation has been mirrored by a concern of, first private and then public authorities, with helping the poor and later combating (inner-city) poverty - not only out of care for the poor but also as a factor in a strategy of self-preservation. Second, cities always have been diverse. Cities exhibit a diversity of ethnic and immigrant groups that mirror both the opportunities and problems of social integration. Third, national level support for urban FBOs as well as support of national FBOs for the activities of fellow members among excluded groups in cities, make the urban arena important for attention. This focus on cities also implies special attention to the concept of local/urban welfare regimes.

The project has four objectives:

- (1) to assess the significance of faith-based organisations (FBOs) from a variety of faiths (Christian, Islamic and others) in the policy and practice of urban social policy in general, combating social exclusion and promoting social cohesion in particular;
- (2) to assess the institutional and political conditions under which FBOs have become increasingly present in urban social policies;
- (3) to evaluate the extent to which FBOs have been informed and are operating in a context of a shadow state formed by the retrenchment of welfare states; and
- (4) to assess the relations that FBOs have developed, formally and informally, with other NGOs and with national and local public authorities.

Working plan

To answer the research questions, research was conducted in 21 cities in 7 countries, following several steps:

- (1) Theoretical conceptualisation will construct an innovative register for the naming and framing of social reality in focus.
- (2) The mapping of FBOs and their role in matters of social exclusion should provide us with an overview of the present situation.
- (3) A survey, quantitative and qualitative data collection and transnational comparison will be conducted to assess and evaluate the role of FBOs, their relation to other NGOs, the political and institutional conditions and the context of welfare state retrenchment.
- (4) Results will be translated in terms of policy implications and will be disseminated.

Project Results:

FACIT is not about religious organisations in general; faith-based organisations (FBOs) are the subject of the project. A FBO is any non-governmental organisation (NGO) that refers directly or indirectly to religion or religious values. The project, moreover, is confined to FBOs that are active in combating social exclusion within the participating countries and thus does not include FBOs that primarily operate in the international arena (on issues such as development cooperation), that are involved in other areas such as school board associations, broadcasting services, trade unions and cultural organisations.

The basic assumption of our study is that the role of FBOs is increasing because they are filling the gap that was left after the supposed withdrawal of the welfare state, particularly in social welfare and social protection. Several factors contribute to the explanation of this retrenchment. A major one is that welfare states were built on the hypothesis of almost full-employment, which means that a large and lasting number of unemployed people and persons on social assistance results in overburdening the financial means of the system - leading to the so-called 'fiscal crisis of the welfare state' (O'Connors 1973). In addition, welfare states are challenged by the offspring of former 'guest workers'. This second and third generation is less than the first one part of the working population; it has subsided into poverty and has become dependent on welfare payments. As a result, the gap widened between supply of and demand for welfare provisions, a gap that offered an opportunity for FBOs to increase their role.

Finally, changes in the ideological context brought with it a shift to more individual explanations for social problems - in terms of personal responsibility and even of 'blaming the victim'. Simultaneously, we witnessed the increasing importance of (quasi-religious) values as an inspiration for secular society, a trend toward de-secularisation or post-secularism (Molendijk, Beaumont and Jedan, forthcoming). This development could also explain the increasing importance in welfare supply by FBOs; a growing number of individuals seem willing to do voluntary work in this sector. This does not

contradict the former statements. Since voluntary work is work without any obligation and without financial compensation, we assume that in the midst of conditions of individual aspiration and competition, more individuals are willing to devote their time to help others. Maybe we should add that volunteering in a FBO does not necessarily imply membership in any given church or adherence to a religion. Many volunteers do not need religious motivation, but just a moral or ideological identification with the work developed by FBOs or even engage in such activities for reasons of personal fulfilment or social networking.

The return of the subsidiarity principle is another element in this ideological context. Based on the social teaching of the (Catholic) Church (1849), it states that what can be done by a lower level (a private organisation, the family) should not be taken up by a higher level (the state). The PPP-model (public-private partnership) could be seen as a secularised form of this principle, although its explicit aim is more down-to-earth: to increase the efficiency of services that so far were provided by the welfare state. Its implicit aim sometimes is defined as 'problems for the public partner, profits for the private partner'.

At first sight, this process looks like a return to the charity of former times, when faith-based NGOs occupied the fore of social help in many countries. The process might equally announce the development of a new type of (local, urban) welfare regime with a stronger focus on urban policies and strategies and new interactions between local authorities and civil society organisations. Either way, everywhere in Europe, FBOs are back on the welfare stage.

This welfare stage is filled with many actors, since poverty and other forms of social exclusion (such as homelessness) have not disappeared. They even haven't been significantly reduced in number and depth and this in spite of a wide array of direct and indirect policies (and strategies and programmes and projects) to combat poverty and other forms of social exclusion. The urban dimension of poverty and other forms of social exclusion has remained as important as ever before, which is one of the reasons why it is the focus of this FACIT-project. Moreover, today we witness dramatic increases of unemployment in all countries due to the financial crisis; many of these unemployed will become welfare recipients, certainly if this crisis turns out to be a structural one.

Some figures: both income inequality and relative poverty have risen over the last two decades. The rise has been significant and widespread, affecting more than three-quarters of OECD countries. The income gap between the richest 10 per cent and the poorest 10 per cent has grown. In the mid-2000s other, more sophisticated measures of income inequality were 7 to 8 per cent above the figures in the mid-1980s. On the whole, the poor population - with incomes below half the national median income - grew by 1.3 percentage points, from a 9.3 per cent to 10.6 per cent of the population in OECD countries. These trends, however, have not been universal. Of the countries participating in the FACIT project, especially Turkey, the United Kingdom and Germany saw substantial increases in income inequality between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s. The point changes in the Gini coefficient for these countries respectively were 0.014, 0.056 and 0.015 in this

period. In the same period, the gap between rich and poor also increased in Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden, although to a somewhat lesser extent. Only Spain seems to have escaped the trend: it moved towards greater equality of incomes over the past 20 years. Its Gini-coefficient decreased by 0.028 percentage points (OECD 2008). Considering the period from the mid-1990s to 2000 we see that Turkey improves its situation with a moderate decline in income inequality. The situation in Germany remained the same. The UK faces a small increase of income inequality (OECD, 2005).

How are FBOs positioned in combating social exclusion and promoting social cohesion? Has this role changed over time and if so, how? What are the implications of FBO involvement for the functioning of our welfare states? These and other questions have been answered through the research. In this summary, we describe the main insights and results by using the central concepts as structure: welfare state regimes, religion, poverty and social exclusion and the urban context.

1. Welfare State Regimes

Before discussing different welfare regimes and their impact on the position and role of FBOs in welfare provision, we would like to mention the existence of the 'welfare society' dimension of welfare regimes. In brief, 'welfare society' refers to the non-state dimension of such a regime, which is about the (important) role that NGOs play in the provision of welfare; sometimes alongside the welfare state, sometimes as an integral part (as implementing bodies). Any analysis of welfare provisions (and of welfare regimes) should take account of both the welfare state and the welfare society dimension and of the relation between both, as expressed in the subsidiarity principle we mentioned above.

In some countries, this welfare society is well developed, as in Germany or Belgium; in other countries, like in Sweden, it is rather complementary because the social democratic character of the state remains strongly articulated, despite pressures of neo-liberalism and transnational immigration. In Germany, the leading associations of independent welfare work ('Wohlfahrtsplege') are important partners of the welfare state and their provisions are indispensable for its social security network. They are expected to improve living conditions of the disadvantaged and integrate their interests in the social dialogue.

The specificity of welfare arrangements has not prevented the construction of a typology of welfare regimes of which Esping-Andersen's still is the classic model. In 'Three worlds of welfare capitalism' (1990) he identified three welfare regimes: the Nordic social-democratic regime, the Continental conservative (or corporatist or 'Christian-democratic') regime, and the Liberal regime (see also: Arts and Gelissen 2002; Ascoli and Ranci 2002; Soede et al. 2004). Later, this typology was completed with two 'residual' regimes: the 'Mediterranean' regime represented by Spain, Greece, Portugal and Italy and, most recently, that of the former Eastern Bloc countries. In both cases social insurance covering

is weak and families (especially women) and charity are expected to provide social care (Manow 2002; Sellers and Lidström 2007). The Netherlands and Norway do not fit into any of these regimes and are therefore described as 'hybrid'. Last but not least, Manow (2002, 2004) even more specified Esping-Andersen's typology by introducing religion (Catholicism, Lutheran and reformist) as a differentiating factor.

The Nordic social-democratic welfare regime (mostly Scandinavian countries, such as Sweden) is largely universalistic; its goal is to realize a high level of social protection for everybody, while reducing income differences between citizens. Entitlement to social benefits is not related to a person's occupational class; everyone participates in the same scheme. Access conditions are rather based on citizenship rights and not on former employment history. Employment plays a crucial role in this regime and people are motivated to find work; active labour market policies and training programmes (including courses, trainee placements and other on-the-job training schemes) are widely available. Retirement age is high and women are actively supported to enter the labour market. If a minimum wage is present, the amount is low, thus opening the labour market to low-production employment.

Typical for the continental regime (mainly the continental European countries, such as Germany and Belgium) is the close relation between previous occupation and entitlement to social benefits: access and level are based on a history of paid contributions. Because rights and entitlements often differ between occupational groups, these welfare states sustain existing income differentials. Though not securing the economic independence of both partners, continental countries also emphasize the protection of families with children. Labour participation of women generally is low, because this type of welfare regime is often designed to foster the traditional family structure; family provisions encourage full-time motherhood, while childcare and similar facilities are underdeveloped. Since retirement age is low, participation rates of the elderly are also low. Similarly, the incentives for disabled people to work are low since eligibility for disability benefit is determined mainly by the employment history of the claimant. Finally, amounts of social assistance are relatively low in corporatist countries.

According to the original typology, the liberal welfare regime (mostly Anglo-Saxon countries, such as the UK) provides low means-tested benefits for a restricted number of beneficiaries. Strict access conditions are applied: stringent means testing is used to determine the benefit and only those not capable of work ('the deserving poor') are eligible. The rest of the population is stimulated to purchase private social insurance plans. This results in a form of 'dual society', opposing a group of low-income state dependents to a group of people able to afford insurance plans. Because people are encouraged to participate in the labour force, the minimum wage - if present - is low and the pension age is high. The low levels of benefits and the strict access conditions encourage women to enter the labour market.

In the words of Esping-Andersen, in Sweden social democracy and the welfare state 'grew up together' (1992: 35), this helps to understand why Sweden is commonly regarded as 'the' model of the Nordic Social Democratic welfare state. The state has extensive public responsibilities for social care and poverty reduction and for preventive social work. However, the roots of the Swedish welfare state can be found much earlier, when voluntary initiatives such as the temperance movement, labour organisations and free churches were primary actors in the delivery of welfare services. Moreover, the early development of the Swedish social policy discourse took place within the voluntary sector.

Today, the Swedish welfare state is highly institutionalised. It is characterised by universalism: its social services and benefits cover the entire population throughout their life stages and eligibility for benefits is based on uniform rules. Accordingly, the Swedish welfare state caters for a very large part of the population and is not primarily concerned with the needs of the poor.

Two participating countries belong to the (continental) conservative group of welfare states to which also belong Austria, France and Italy: Belgium and Germany (Esping-Andersen 1990). This does not mean that there are no differences between the different countries within this regime.

Although Germany is the prototype of Esping-Andersen's continental conservative welfare state, all German governments and not only the Social Democratic party, regarded the Scandinavian welfare state model (and the Swedish case in particular) as their ideal. In the meantime, German reality has included many neo-liberal elements. After 1980, markets were increasingly liberalised and welfare state services reduced, which led to a retrenchment of the welfare state. The Hartz reforms, especially Hartz-IV, are the legal expressions of this abandonment of the praised 'Rhineland model' (Jacobi and Kluve 2006).

The characterization of Belgium as a continental-corporatist country rests mainly on its continued protection of employed people. The direct link between occupation and entitlement to benefits is still strongly embedded in Belgian society today. Only people with an employment history are well protected by the Belgian social security system. Unemployment, benefits are fairly high and unrestricted in time - which is unique in Europe (Soede, et al. 2004). For those not entitled to social security benefits, a parallel system of 'Right to Social Integration' (before: Right to a Subsistence Income) has been developed since 1974. A guaranteed minimum income is part of this basic social protection scheme; its level is about 66% of the European poverty risk line.

Although the concept of 'welfare state' has originated in the UK, it represents but one type of welfare regime: a liberal welfare state, embodying a truncated universalism of limited benefits and low taxes resting on the longstanding (since the 19th century Poor Law) demarcation of the deserving and

undeserving. This liberal regime is a mixed economy of welfare involving a balance between welfare provision by the state, the market, the family/individual and the voluntary sector. Despite the rather savage Thatcher assault on interventionism in the 1980s, many statist elements remain in welfare provision, albeit subject to means-testing and growing residualisation of the most vulnerable. All in all, the UK has followed a complex, even contradictory path of state centralised mixed economy of welfare, whilst maintaining some degree of universal provision through institutions such as the National Health Service and national pension insurance.

The UK welfare regime has undergone considerable changes during the reign of the conservative party under Thatcher, in the last decades of the 20th century. At present, primary responsibility for welfare provision is shared between citizens. There is a safety net of flat-rate entitlements and means-tested benefits for eligible socially excluded groups, and a range of quasi-markets consisting of public funding for both non-profit voluntary organisations and for-profit private organisations that become enrolled into the welfare administration. Market-based logics of individual choice, economic efficiency and competitiveness now inspire the design, delivery and evaluation of social welfare programmes. FBOs are seeking to play a role in these quasi-market partnerships of welfare; many of them are responding to and resisting both quasi-market conditions and neoliberal politics.

Spain, as other Mediterranean countries, was not part of the original typology. Ferrera (1996) was the first to identify a 'southern' or 'Mediterranean' model with four main traits. The first defines countries like Spain as a highly fragmented 'corporatist' model with a hyper protected and an under protected section of the workforce; the latter refers to the unemployed with little income support and workers with temporary contracts or in the informal economy. The second is that in certain respects it is an amalgamation of the strict conservative model developed under Franco and universal health care systems (like the U.K. or Scandinavian countries). Thirdly, the State traditionally played a weak role in terms of social expenditure; the family always acted as the ultimate safety net (Castles 1995; Gallego, et al. 2003). Lastly, client relationships have been crucial up to the 80s; however, still today having contacts is crucial in some areas and sectors to obtain a good job.

Walliser, et al. characterize the current situation of the Spanish welfare state as follows. Institutionally they see a consolidation of a quasi-federal system in which regions assume most social policy responsibilities, which often results in each region having its own strategy to provide social welfare and tackle social exclusion. In this respect, Spain strongly resembles Belgium (communities) and Germany ('Länder'). Furthermore, the increasing impact of the market approach led to reforms in terms of labour segmentation and the development of low added value sectors (services and construction) in detriment of industry, with a 30 per cent of temporal contracts. Finally, important socio-demographic changes have taken place: a steep increase of the population increased especially of the share of migrants.

The hybrid characteristics of the Dutch welfare state are discussed by Esping-Andersen (1990) and Van Kersbergen (1995) and empirically analysed in Wildeboer-Schut, Vrooman, and Beer (2001). A typical example of the 'hybrid' welfare state is the Dutch pension system. Other benefits are either in line with the Continental or Nordic regime. Unemployment benefits, for instance, are reasonably high and in line with the Continental regime. In line with the Nordic countries, social assistance rates are fairly high as well. No distinction is made in the Netherlands between occupational and non-occupational disability and as a consequence, non-occupational disability benefits are comparatively high. The recent de-centralisation of social policy and growing obligations in an otherwise generous welfare system are complementing recent rightwards shifts.

Part of the novelty and originality of our research (and of resulting publications) is the inclusion of Turkey. It invites us to leave stereotypes behind and to face realities, such as when trying to give Turkey a place in a welfare state typology based on EU-countries. At first sight its recent development brings Turkey closer to the liberal regime, although strong remains of a pre-industrial system of protection (through community-based institutions such as family, neighbourhood and hem?ehrilik) still are present. Liberalisation and the establishment of a market oriented system in almost all social and labour market sectors of in the post-1980 era led to the decline of public welfare (welfare retrenchment). For the liberal-conservative governments, which virtually monopolised power since the early 1990s, their first and the unique way to social security were family and community and therefore, they have given precedence to the family over the individual. The aim of liberal-conservative governments was to reduce state expenditures in the fields of education, health and social services, without paying much attention to the quality of public services - which consequently decreased.

Education, social security and health expenditures occupy a small share in the national income when compared to developed countries; 20 per cent of Turkish population is not covered by any social security but survives through family relations and community ties. In the matter of housing, the state encouraged house ownership but followed a populist and laissez-faire policy in the issue of squatter settlements. In 1986, a new social aid system was adopted. General Management of Social Aid and Solidarity and its local foundations was supported by a 'vak?f' - like in the Ottoman era - which governed the funds outside the public budget. This fund became the major component of anti-poverty activity and is used for creation of partisan voters in the poor urban areas.

Esping-Andersen's welfare regime typology has been rendered more useful for the purpose of our study by Manow's introduction of religion (Catholicism, Lutheran and reformist) as a differentiating factor. Manow (2002; 2004) argues that Esping-Andersen has not sufficiently differentiated his middle group, the continental (conservative, corporatist) regime. Countries in this category should be differentiated first by a catholic-protestant divide, and protestant countries into Lutheran and reformist. This results in three subtypes: Catholic countries (Spain, Portugal, Italy), Lutheran countries (Germany, Sweden) and non-Lutheran or reformist countries (Great Britain, The Netherlands, Switzerland). According to his model, FBOs are less frequent in Lutheran countries (like Germany and Sweden), while in reformist ones such as the UK they are more widespread. In some countries FBOs are more effective while they are secondary in countries with a strong centralist

tradition. In these countries, FBOs are subsystems of the traditional welfare model. According to Manow (2004) the UK would be classified alongside the Netherlands and Switzerland as non-Lutheran or reformist countries, targeting a residual section of the population eligible for a basic level of assistance. In Southern European countries such as Italy, where the welfare model is less dependent on the state, local civic organisations and especially the Church have always played a significant role. This brings us to the position and role of religion as a contextual variable.

2. The position and role of religion

2. 1. The position of religion in the different countries

Why this attention to the position of religion in the different countries? First of all, to illustrate (again) that there is no total overlap between religion, faith and faith-based institutions, such as FBOs focusing on poverty and other situations of social exclusion. Secondly, because it still is an important part of the context within which to situate FBOs. Thirdly, as mentioned by the UK team: 'after all, religious faith is often seen to promote individual responsibility and is therefore at least superficially in tune with key neoliberal values; meaning that although - through many FBOs - religious motivation is reacting against neoliberal values, neo-liberalism is providing the arena in which this reaction can take place.'

Three historical structures have characterised governmental arrangements with religion: the national church (e.g. Germany, the UK, and Sweden), separation (e.g. France) and the concordat (e.g. Italy, Spain and Belgium) (Shadid and Van Koningsveld 2002). The national church model is directed to create vast religious structures, while 'separatist' states rather strive to laicise. The concordat state occupies a midway position between these types: the focus is on finding or creating authoritative and representative religious bodies with which government can negotiate. The concordat permits the religious collective to take advantage of their collective power to bargain for legal spaces specific to their religious tradition. Nevertheless, it also creates serious issues for religious groups that are not hierarchically organised and governed (Sullivan 2005).

One common characteristic of Belgium and the Netherlands is that for the period between the end of WW1 and the (late) 1960s, the political, social and cultural landscape was characterised by its 'pillarisation' (verzuiling), which refers to the vertical organisation of society according to dominant 'ideologies' ('including religions): Roman Catholics, Socialists and to a lesser extent Liberals in both countries, with the Protestants - absent in Belgium - as the dominant pillar in the Netherlands. Education was the first important sector to be pillarised (usually after very heavy disputes about the organisation of the school system; 'School Wars' they were called in Belgium); other sectors of society (including labour unions, mutual aid, health care and housing, and civil society at large) would follow, thus gradually strengthening the 'pillarisation' of both societies. Lijphart (1975) called this a

'consociational democracy'; the institutionalisation of religious and ideological diversity in the political system with confessional 'pillars' as strong bulwarks of organisations and subcultures.

Increasing prosperity (in terms of income and of consumption), higher levels of education, and more social mobility, individualization, and mass secularization weakened the collective and organized dimension of all Western European societies. 'Pillars' were the most visible victims of those trends, ultimately leading to the formation of so-called 'purple' cabinets (a nickname of a government coalition of social-democrats, liberals and greens) in Belgium and the Netherlands in the late 1990s and early 2000s.

Belgium and the Netherlands were increasingly 'de-pillarised' and 'secularised', and as in other countries the religious landscape also drastically diversified as a result of immigration since the 1960s. So-called 'guest workers' - and also citizens from former colonies and from overseas territories - stayed and brought their families in; their share in the population increased and so did the number of Muslims. Asylum seekers would further increase and diversify the Muslim population. The separation of state and church and the tradition of 'pillarisation' provided these 'new' religious minorities (especially Muslims) with favourable opportunity structures to establish places of worship, education and mass media. There are, however, indicators that second and third-generation Muslim migrants show lower levels of religious participation (visiting the mosque, praying, wearing the veil) than their parents.

Sweden is a latecomer in terms of a formally secularised society. Since 1544, the church of Sweden became the state church until January 1, 2000. Religious freedom was only legally introduced in 1951, but even today the monarch and the government minister responsible for ecclesiastical affairs are mandatory members of the Church of Sweden. Today the Church of Sweden has the same status as other faith-communities, which - if registered - are entitled to certain benefits. Those registered faith-communities - about one thousand - include a vast array of orientations ranging from Christian, Muslim or Jewish to pagan devotees.

Whereas the Church of Sweden has lost its monopoly, the Church of England and the state still are closely connected; the constitutional monarch still holds the position of head of the church (at least in title), and senior bishops still are entitled to a seat in the House of Lords. In practice, it increasingly uses its position to oppose state practice and the outcomes of state policy. Christianity remains the predominant religion in this country, but this group includes a wide variety of different denominations. After Christianity, the largest religious group is Muslim. Adherents of Christian religion are spread fairly evenly across the country; other major faith groups are clearly concentrated in the major urban conurbations. Local research is required to correlate these patterns with patterns of low income and social exclusion, but it is clear that religion outside of Christianity forms an important part of the urban landscape in many UK cities.

In Germany, according a majority of 36.9 per cent are Protestants, 36.7 per cent Catholics and 4.8 per cent non-Christians. Of these the great majority are Muslims (85.2 per cent), followed by Hindus, Buddhists, and Jews (about 0.13 per cent). Both Protestants and Catholics have lost adherents, the Protestants more so than the Catholics. Non-Christian denominations have increased tenfold over the 26 years; as well the share of persons without denomination has more than doubled. Friedrichs et al. discuss the secularisation process in Germany in detail. They point to the fact that the reduced attendance of religious events is not interpreted by all scholars as secularisation, but as a trend toward individualisation of religion or more precisely: religiosity. They argued that lower adherence to churches and church services does not imply lower religiosity; instead, individuals take elements from different religions to create a - personal - "patchwork religion", which cannot be identified with a single church. It is the individual religiosity of belief system that becomes increasingly important in Western societies.

Within the EU, Spain is an exceptional case when it comes to the position of religion in society. The legitimacy of the Catholic Church, which before the transition to democracy (1977-1982) held the monopoly of education and welfare provision, decreased and consequently suffered important mutations, as well internally as in its position in the public arena. It no longer defines society's moral standards and values, but has become one actor among others in an explicit social, political and moral debate. As in other countries and perhaps more outspoken, a certain dualism exists within the Catholic Church. Whereas the hierarchy is rather conservative, other sectors of the church have a more progressive discourse in relation to poverty, exclusion and welfare.

In founding the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, was inspired by modern western rules and values. In the process of nation building, religion was pushed out of public life, and replaced by modern structures and values such as 'national identity'. The founders of the Turkish Republic preferred to control religious affairs, and they did so through the establishment of the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) in 1924; it is directly responsible to the prime minister. Diyanet controls the Mosques, which are the unique organisational element of Islam in Turkey. Diyanet has adopted the Sunni cult of Islam, whereas the unique conditions of the Alevi sect contributed to the emergence of their own religious services and worship centres (Cemevi). Because they stayed out of the mosque, Alevi institutions gained a comparative freedom, also in setting up their Cemevi. That mosques always have been controlled by the state prevented the emergence of 'church-like' FBOs.

2.2 The religious dimension of FBOs' activities

2.2.1 Distinctiveness of FBOs in Europe

Following James (2009) many Christian FBOs in Europe are reticent about their faith identity. They fear opening a 'can of worms'. Many have reached a tolerable compromise between their faith and their work. This enables them to distance themselves from the worst excesses of their faith, access secular funding, keep a diverse staff team together, and support partners in a variety of faith contexts.

Muslim FBOs tend to be clearer about their faith identity. Being younger, more homogeneously staffed and less dependent on public funds, Muslim FBOs have been less influenced by the secular environment.

The faith identity can have profound organisational implications. It can affect how they operate internally - the leadership, relationships, culture, and policies of an organisation. It can alter how they relate externally and with whom - partners, donors or other interested parties. It can affect how they build their own capacity and that of others. More attention to faith, however, is not necessarily a good thing. We assume FBOs will be more effective in achieving their missions if their staff and board are in broad agreement as to what their faith identity means in practice. The majority of FBOs, particularly Christian ones, have been reticent.

Most European FBOs operate in highly secular, 'post-Christian' societies. To a degree they are products of their environments. To survive they must adapt. Faith is a personal thing. In some countries, discussion of faith is taboo; at best irrelevant, at worst regressive. Many do not want to emphasise the faith-base of their organisation because they fear that this will be interpreted as 'arrogance', saying to secular agencies 'we are better than you'. FBOs do not want to be associated with such abuses and thereby some may distance themselves from their faith. Others have downplayed the importance of faith in an effort to be more professional. They want to overcome the problems from believing that the motivation to 'do good' was enough. They do not want to attract suspicion and constraint.

Perhaps most influential is the desire to attract secular funding sources. This encourages FBOs to dis-integrate their faith from their development work. The constitutional separation between state and religion makes European governments extremely sensitive to FBOs using public funds to propagate one faith over another. 'Proselytising' may be perceived by some as being worse than corruption. While Muslim FBOs appear to have less problems explicitly integrating their faith with their work, the mainstream Christian FBOs in Europe have found this more challenging. Many FBO recipients of government money feel they have to separate out the spiritual dimension in their mission. This can be a dis-integrating process for FBOs.

2.2.2 Faith, dialogue and difference in community work

Following Orton (unpublished) the involvement of religious faith is a natural consequence of faith being understood as a comprehensive worldview, with the potential to affect every part of a person's individual, social and spiritual life. By understanding faith in these terms, faith can also be related more easily with alternative worldviews, facilitating an analysis of difference, which relates to both belief and action. This analysis, when applied to social action on social welfare issues, especially action involving socio-political relationships between groups holding different worldviews, impacts on the assumption that a 'neutral' secular state is the best arbiter of this difference.

Our findings illustrate widespread confusion amongst respondents about the place of faith within practice. Some initial perspectives perceived good practice in terms of a professionalised neutrality supported by a basic awareness of possible cultural/faith differences. However, such perspectives quickly became challenged when practitioners and those involved in their development had to address different potential purposes apparent in the work and manage everyday situations which presented them with dilemmas. With conventional training denying or limiting any place for reflection which incorporated faith as part of a practitioner's own identity, practitioners were left to draw their own idiosyncratic conclusions about the relationship between faith and practice. However, just structuring in isolated opportunities to consider faith-related issues, without considering the character of these spaces and their relationship with the wider learning approach, was considered problematic. As a result, these findings indicate that recognising difference and incorporating reflection on difference within practitioner development is crucial. The ability of practitioners to develop their understanding of the relationship between identity, worldview and practice can then inform the way they handle difference within everyday practice. Deciding on a course of action in a particular situation can then flow out of an integrated worldview with a clearly-considered connection between personal and professional, that enables practitioners to act with integrity whilst not being closed off to considering alternatives or learning from others. Yet, the formation of a framework which enables them to make connections between these issues which facilitates future reflection, and incorporates elements of personal and organisational identity without essentialising them, seems crucial.

2.2.3 General narratives and country contexts

Most FBOs engaged in service delivery do not discriminate clients on the basis of faith. In Sweden for example, none of the FBOs interviewed states that they are exclusively serving a specific religious group. In fact most FBOs respond to the question on whether they serve a particular religious group, with the answer that they "do not ask [the beneficiary what religion they adhere to]".

For few FBOs conversion is part of their service delivery (e.g. Victory Outreach in their services for drug addicts). The importance of evangelicalism varies from being explicit, implicit to being no goal of

FBOs. In the Netherlands, for example older evangelical movements combine their 'soul saving' mission with practical assistance, and are less exclusively focussed on personal salvation than 10-20 years ago. New evangelical (migrant) churches on the other hand that have entered the scene recently are very open about their mission: they want to help society by providing practical aid and saving souls / bringing people to Jesus.

Many FBOs hire faith-members or ask from personnel to subscribe to their (faith-related) mission statement, but there are also FBOs that hire people irrespective of any faith criteria. In Sweden FBOs more often have staff and volunteers that are not confessing to a religion, although many professionals also share the particular faith that inspires the organisation. In Spain a growing number of professionals in FBOs do not belong to the church and most of them even are not religious.

When FBOs are located in areas with high levels of secularisation, they often have to contract other religious or non-religious personnel as well. Some Christian FBOs try to attract personnel from different faith groups, in order to mirror the religious background of their target groups or to present themselves as post secular pluralist organisations. Although FBOs are often exempted from anti-discrimination law in hiring policies concerning personnel in leading functions, FBO hiring policies are subject to debates in several countries (e.g. Germany, the Netherlands).

While volunteers are often recruited from faith communities, there are examples of FBOs attracting non-religious volunteers as well. Among other reasons, these volunteers want to join because of the outspoken identity of projects in terms of solidarity and justice, the target groups they address and / or the individual, practical approach to individuals and families in need.

Most Christian FBOs provide social services without discriminating on the basis of faith. In Turkey, Islamic FBOs also deny faith impacts on the people they assist. For few Christian FBOs conversion is part of their service delivery (Victory Outreach). Mosques and churches set up by migrants in Western Europe focus primarily on their members. Ethnicity and religion intertwine. When located in areas with high levels of secularisation, FBOs might be forced to contract other faith or no-faith personnel (Caritas in Leipzig, SA in Amsterdam). Some FBOs attract personnel from other faith groups to mirror the religious background of target groups. While volunteers are often recruited from faith communities, there are various examples of FBOs attracting non-religious volunteers as well.

The importance of mission/evangelicalism varies from being an explicit, over an implicit to being no goal of FBOs. While older evangelical movements are less exclusively focused on personal salvation than 20 years ago, more recently established evangelical (migrant) churches are more open and explicit about their mission (e.g. the Netherlands). In Sweden, most FBOs run programs both with and without a religious content. In the UK, an 'incarnational' approach (caring for others relationally/

being in community) exists side-by-side and sometimes versus a 'liberational' approach (bringing justice to poor). In the Netherlands we identified many more approaches: 'giving meaning', 'Liberational', 'Being in community', 'Conversion', 'Helping those without helper', 'Helping under protest', 'presence approach'.

We also note some cross-country differences within the same or related FBOs. The Salvation Army for example, seems to be more engaged in 'proselytizing while providing services' in Germany and Belgium than in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Personnel of Christian FBOs are often inspired by social Christian ethics (peace, charity, justice) or mission (serve God, spread Gospel) (GE, NL, UK, BE). For example, motives among professionals working with social issues within the Church of Sweden are 'commitment to Mankind', 'community engagement' and 'a dedication to justice and solidarity'.

In the Netherlands and Belgium, Islamic organisations are re-examining social traditions within Islam. Although faith is an important motivation, most personnel is also motivated by other considerations (income, status, affiliation, leadership ambitions, fun). Muslims are also motivated by the obligation to support the needy and the notion that good deed will be rewarded (NL, GE, BE). In the Netherlands and Belgium Islamic organisations and (informal) groups are re-examining the social traditions within Islam, in order to translate them into answers for social challenges here and now.

2.2.4 Networks of FBOs

FBOs interact with other FBOs or NGOs without any faith dimension. The way this appears to be differs to a large degree between countries. However, the main reasons to connect with other organizations depend on the specific social and/or political role of FBOs, e.g. organisations involved in political lobbying often cooperate with NGOs or labour unions striving for similar goals (AWO Germany). Some of the FBOs cooperate with other FBOs and NGOs in providing similar services or services for similar target groups and clientele.

The FBOs and NGOs gave the following reasons to cooperate: 1. The possibility to get to know each other better and to be an "open door" in church and the mosque; 2. The opportunity to exchange information on services; 3. The chance to initiate contacts for the future; 4. To increase funds, because one organisation is not able to respond to all needs alone; 5. The possibility to serve people in the right place at the right time; 6. The ability to stay informed about each other's functioning; 7. The chance to address problems.

Organisational networks are created for various reasons, including practical issues, financial relations, volunteering, knowledge sharing, or political action. But there are also reasons not to cooperate with others. There may be lack of time and manpower, competition, different religious backgrounds

and/or differences in (theological) visions on combating social exclusion. For example, the most difficult problem for the Islamic FBOs are the differences in the interpretation of Islam which are still leading to tensions between the organisations, especially with respect to the education for young Muslims in Germany.

Irrespective of these barriers, there seems to be a growing interest among most of the FBOs and NGOs interviewed in our studies to get into closer contact. However, public tendering creates competition and conflicts.

2.2.4 Conclusion

The research draws the attention on an important discussion on what actually constitutes the religious dimension of FBOs in European cities, or more specifically, what contribution the F-word in Faith makes to tackling poverty, social exclusion and other forms of social distress in European urban areas. The debate sometimes polarizes between those committed to explaining the distinctive role of faith within FBOs as a hitherto invisible, silenced and immanent aspect of the struggle against social injustice, with others, closer to mainstream secular social science, who tend to view FBOs as a specific incarnation of the more general organizations and institutions of civil society. A great deal of work needs to be done to make better sense of what difference faith makes in the frame of theological questions of motivation, post-secular ethics of engagement, liminal, transitional and radical spaces of faith-based praxis and wider concerns of what it means to get something done in our post-political times.

3. Poverty and social exclusion

3.1 FBOs combating poverty

Let us first look into the FBOs combating poverty in some countries under study and situate them in the field of welfare provision.

In Germany; six consolidated central organisations have a federalist structure; their member organisations are mainly legally independent and subdivided into a national, provincial and a local level. The associations of independent welfare work have their own ideological or religious motives and objectives (such as Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, Social-Democrat). Furthermore, there are 'private welfare organisations', providing social services on an entrepreneurial basis. Organisations from the third most frequent religion in Germany, the Islam, are classified as private organisations and therefore not subjected to the principle of subsidiarity; fundamentalist organisations are excluded from the German analysis.

As for Britain, the traditional association between faith-groups and social welfare has resulted in a longstanding presence of faith in the provision of services. Several reasons could account for this close relationship: the long history of church schools, the seemingly timeless activities of some FBOs or the historic inflection of social politics in religious denominations such as Methodism. Even during the post-war development of a welfare state, faith motivated involvement in the welfare landscape has been a continuing feature of the UK.

How did FBOs cope after the state had taken over most of the welfare programmes that they ran? The evident way was to enter into the compact contracts that were offered, but then they found themselves locked into centrally steered and controlled ways of operating. Some FBOs preferred to remain independent, thus leading to 'insider' and 'outsider' voluntary agencies. Both positions have their positive and negative consequences. Insider agencies accept government funding, but in doing so, they will have to trade in part of their ethos and their character; 'insider' organisations often are obliged to exchange volunteers by trained staff in order to fulfil formal requirements. Outsider organisations are more likely to work on limited budgets and rely on volunteers. On the positive side, insiders can exercise radically different and often performative aspects of care and welfare from within the pseudo-professionalised system; outsiders can stand outside that system, escaping the trappings of neoliberal responsibility and acting prophetically and radically, even if on limited budgets.

Muslims participate in the delivery of welfare services in the UK, but their engagement tends to be less through national organisations and more through networks of independent mosques, which means on the regional and local levels. The shortage of national Muslim welfare organisations can be explained in part by the geographical distribution and urban clustering of the Muslim population, which is concentrated in London and some northern urban centres. Moreover, the majority of British Muslims exercise their anti-poverty efforts through individual actions, such as Zakkat, a form of habitual and obligatory tithing by Muslims for distribution to the poor. This Zakkat - the same obligation exist in the Jewish religion as "Zedaka" - can take the form of a tithe paid to the local mosque for redistribution to needy members of the community, making mosques a key actor in social welfare provision for the Muslim community. However, Zakkat also takes form of private remittances to one's kin abroad, although increasingly among third and fourth generation Muslim immigrants in Britain, such remittances are channelled through Islamic international charities.

In Spain, Catholic oriented FBOs still are hegemonic, but there are different kinds of Catholic FBOs: religious congregations and orders, lay organisations with religious ends, and Catholic Social Action organisations. Other FBOs (non-Catholic Christian and non-Christian) are just starting. Not all have a well developed and oiled structure of social assistance, partly because they are relatively new, partly because they do not have a tradition of providing services beyond their community and rather rely on more informal links to fulfil this role.

Catholic FBOs are part of a rather complex institutional setting, which could be called a parallel institutional world. This world is dominated by very few big organisations, and further populated by some medium sized initiatives, and by a huge amount of locally based projects. Many smaller organisations - such as religious orders - just perform their tasks as service providers for local or regional institutions, relying on their own resources. Another dividing line within the Catholic FBOs runs between the more progressive initiatives which are close to the ideological left and which are strongly involved in issues such as undocumented people, poverty, labour and legal rights for women, and another set of organisations that are more conservative in values and tradition. Those are, however, not so strongly committed to social action, but rather focus on prayer and proselytising.

Also discussed in the chapter on Spain, is the degree of dependency vis-à-vis financing public authorities. Being too dependent upon public money could reduce the FBOs (and in general, the NGOs) capacity of advocacy on behalf of vulnerable groups in society. Some authors think that non-profit organisations (including FBOs) just seek financing and that, in return, public authorities need their voluntary and professional labour force to cover the gaps in the social service network. Other authors fear that their economic dependency makes NGOs accept public sector targets and strategies and they are reduced to implement social policy. Still one step further goes the claim that despite keeping their own organisational logics and still being a participatory and advocacy channel, NGOs are increasingly becoming a legitimising channel of public policies and stabilising the social order in some of the most vulnerable sectors.

3.2 Poverty scenarios

Poverty scenarios have a lot in common since they are often the result of fairly similar processes. Globalisation is one of the main elements that connect similar dynamics in the European cities: immigration flows, the economic and financial impact of external processes, and changes in local productive logics.

In each country, though, these common trends have produced different effects due to structural (welfare regime, population features, policy framework, productive model) and policy-making variables (specific policies, global and local economic events, political variation in different government levels). Poverty has to do with the path dependency of decades of policy developments (e.g. segregationist housing policies), the economic inertia of the State, and the economic and productive models on which they rest (i.e. productive models based on low-skilled cheap manual labour that is very vulnerable to changes in economic cycles and to strong variations in demand).

In Germany there is a relevant territorial distribution of poverty following the previous East-West divide. German welfare state provides material security, social and cultural welfare and education. Welfare provision is guided by the principle of subsidiarity. Private responsibility is regarded as more important than state responsibility. As a result, the State operates in those fields not covered by the third sector. Within some cities (Cologne, Hamburg and Leipzig), there is an increased polarisation and a deterioration of the situation in poverty areas. New forms of poverty have developed with new groups demanding for assistance, multi-problem situations and a decrease in social mobility.

Despite the strength of Swedish welfare state and the high living standards of the population, there is poverty and social exclusion among some groups. This is regarded as a local level problem rather than a national issue. Poverty is overrepresented in certain city areas and affects residents of foreign origin. There are also beneficiaries from social services living on public spaces in central areas or using them extensively. Some urban areas, specifically those of the Million Homes Programme, are increasingly experiencing segregation, social exclusion, poverty and violence.

There is a polarisation of poverty in Belgium along different lines: regional, urban-rural and within the cities. Several socio-economic causes explain the concentration of poverty in specific neighbourhoods: industrial decay, neighbourhood stigmatisation, overrepresentation of low-income groups, social expenditure cuts. Social housing estates concentrate social exclusion in a vicious circle, which welfare and urban policy do not seem to be able to tackle successfully.

The context of poverty in the Netherlands seems to follow similar patterns for the three cities in this project. Even if there has been innovation and transition in the production system (Rotterdam) or the unemployment rates have been reduced, poverty is still higher in households of foreign origin people that tend to concentrate in specific areas of the city, generally out of the city centre. There are also vulnerable social groups with specific causes of exclusion living in more central areas.

Poverty in Spain has experienced socio-economic dynamics in the last twenty years that have redefined its maps: immigration, population ageing and fast economic growth followed by abyssal economic crises. Poor households concentrate in the city centres and post war peripheries of Madrid and Barcelona. Due to its size and urban structure, Guadalajara has a more evenly distribution although some areas have higher degrees of exclusion. Still, it is relevant to highlight that Spanish city neighbourhoods are rather heterogeneous in social and ethnic composition due to the lack of big public housing estates (with two or three exceptions) that concentrate and reproduce the problems that they intend to solve - as the Belgian report suggests.

The Turkish report describes the nature and dimensions of urban poverty in the main cities as a result of poor (or non-existent) planning, rural-urban immigration and very low quality standards of housing and urban quality of life, among other structural reasons. Despite the importance of neighbourhoods with self-constructed houses on plots of land without regular building permits (Gecekondu), there are also neighbourhoods of apartment buildings (apartakondu) with high rates of poverty and social exclusion. Some inner city neighbourhoods share these conditions and also the presence of highly stigmatised and marginalised groups, such as immigrants from other countries, prostitutes, drug addicts, and other minorities (transsexuals among them). Urban social and demographic change have worsened the conditions of lower income residents in the last decades, due to the crisis of social and family institutions that used to be a solid pillar for informal welfare provision.

The United Kingdom is probably the case in the FACIT project that best portrays the impact of welfare state retrenchment on poverty and social exclusion, and therefore the role of FBOs in combating them. Although poverty is not just an urban phenomenon, it tends to concentrate in urban agglomerations. The bigger, the more visible it becomes. Dramatic cuts in the legal status of asylum seekers and new restrictive and discriminatory policy regulations have increased the importance of a number of poverty issues among this population, such as homelessness, hunger, severe material deprivation, spatial segregation, poor accessibility of facilities and public resources. Although poverty has been reduced in absolute terms, it has increased in relative terms. Some poor have become poorer. Poverty in the UK has different causes that have been tackled with different degrees of success by public authorities. Poverty is regarded as an individual state and from a policy and political perspective tends to blame the person as incapable or unwilling to integrate or move out of deprivation. Still, poverty affects families, single mother households and communities. Children, the elderly and the disabled are among the most vulnerable groups.

3.3 Policies and tools

This section reports on the different anti-poverty strategies mentioned in the case studies. Ways to tackle poverty range from the integrated, comprehensive approaches that include different dimensions of the problem to more sectorial options. Noteworthy is the role that ideology plays in poverty policies. Neoliberal approaches have a big impact on the transformation of the Third Sector, both from an organisational point of view and from the dimension of increased competition. Anti-poverty policies and the role of FBOs are also influenced by the generosity of the regime when it comes to establish who is in and who is not.

The German research team provided two illustrations. One concerns public-private partnerships: the Cologne Sozialraumorientierung. This includes NGOs, FBOs, local administrations, private firms and citizens. The project targets vulnerable areas and allocates a budget to enhance community development and area activation, cooperation and participation. The other examples of anti-poverty

policies are area-based policies: the Socially Integrative City Programme, which consists of an integrated approach in vulnerable areas for two years.

The wide responsibilities of regional, provincial and local governments in Sweden have restricted FBOs' field of action to those areas that the public sector does not reach. Despite public administration still funding the main body of social actions developed by FBOs, the scenario has changed since the 1990s with both the introduction of competition laws that have enhanced the public sector to intervene and with the literal privatisation of the public sector welfare agencies, as in the case of Stockholm. There is also a tradition of area-based policies with an integral approach, which today is facing the challenge of worsening social conditions in some urban areas (e.g. the large housing state of Rosengård in Göteborg). The fact that local authorities have wide powers over social welfare policy implies that the definition of needs and strategies and to some extent the conceptualisation of poverty might rely on the views of the party in office.

Belgium has a centralised welfare service provision centred around the Public Centres for Social Welfare, present in every municipality. Information, eligibility, and stigmatisation are barriers to benefit from social services. Belgium has not gone through the process of welfare service outsourcing that other countries have, mainly because pillarised civil society organisations, such as mutual aid societies, have always played a major role. The public welfare system relies on the third sector to cover the needs of those who are out of the system, both through direct assistance and also by "inserting" them into the welfare system through support and counselling.

In the Netherlands, anti-poverty policies are designed and implemented at the municipal level, although districts reinforce the strategies with prevention and with enhancing the accessibility to programmes. Each city has its own policy style and different strategies to tackle poverty, such as targeting specific groups through a range of proactive and active programs. Dutch welfare is comprehensive for those who are in, but marginalises those who are out. FBOs play a key role as welfare deliverers to these groups, both when contracted by the public administration and through their own programmes. The central level has initiated big city regeneration programmes that target vulnerable neighbourhoods with an integrated approach.

In Spain, policies combating social exclusion are designed and implemented at the regional and local level in a framework of a conservative corporatist welfare state, Mediterranean version. Some macro programmes with an impact on poverty are implemented at national level, and generally these are universal (e.g. maternity benefit). The Spanish welfare system is very generous in terms of inclusion (free access to health and education for every resident), but more limited in terms of social welfare; it covers less issues and with limited resources. Welfare service provision increasingly has been outsourced to both FBO and for-profit organisations.

The Turkish welfare state can be classified as belonging to the conservative corporatist family, Mediterranean subtype, although with relevant specificities. Despite the on-going reform that seeks to provide universal health coverage for all citizens, it has been launched in a context of the dominant neo-liberal policy design schemes (2008). A number of social security institutions provide aid to specific groups in need. Some of these represent the ethos of the Ottoman charity, which finances welfare partly from donations. Family and kin networks are assumed to be part of (informal) welfare provision. FBOs play a substantial role in social action programmes tackling poverty and social exclusion in those sectors that are out of the formal economy (about 45 per cent of the population).

A wide range of national and local policy initiatives in the UK intend to fight poverty in its different forms. The evolution of the legislative context for welfare provision is the key to understand the current situation. The neo-liberal reforms of the 1980s radically redesigned and deregulated the protectionist presence of public welfare, in policy and moral terms. During the last decade, there has been an attempt to redress the most dramatic imbalances, but resources required to fulfil the need of beneficiaries are still lacking. Paradoxically, the worsening situation of some social groups in terms of social exclusion is due to the impact of restrictive policies on asylum seekers that considerably limit their livelihood potential. In general, anti-poverty measures emphasise the issues of "workability" and "activation" as a condition for entitlement to benefits. There has been a strong focus on poverty reduction in families, with some success. These programmes targeted the reproduction of poverty among younger members of the families. Youngsters are also targeted in security policies with punitive strategies towards so-called 'anti social behaviour', which has a relevant spatial dimension of social control. Deregulation of the welfare state in the 1980s plus the diminishing purchasing power of their pensions, especially affected the elderly. Lately, the framework of service provision, which was still relying on local authorities, has been modified to provide better quality services with the same resources. During the last decade, welfare policies for the disabled have moved from reliance on the community to a new protective role of public authorities, but with severe restrictions of resources and accessibility to benefits. Finally, poverty and social exclusion have also been tackled through community regeneration programmes in area-based initiatives with a strong role of civil society in their implementation.

3.4 FBOs and social exclusion

Domains

This section addresses how FBOs' activities are determined by whom they have to work with and how. In the samples provided by the national teams, there is a fairly wide range of domains in which FBOs develop their social actions. Most of these domains are shared at a national level, although this is not always the case and this becomes clear when we look at the FBOs disaggregated by religion.

With the exception of Turkey, most European FBOs devote their energy and resources to combat poverty with an extremely wide array of means that range from direct intervention through social actions or charity, through funding and organisational tasks, to advocacy, political activism and raising awareness in public opinion. Religion is relevant for the domains in which FBOs provide welfare. Catholic FBOs work with all sorts of beneficiaries regardless of their ethnic or religious background. In predominantly Protestant countries, Protestant NGOs deliver welfare on a universal basis, although the religious message is very much present and in some cases constitutes a critical part of their programmes. Muslim and Muslim-based FBOs (such as Alevi ones) in Europe tend to focus more on their own communities, pursuing both integration and enhancement of their culture and traditions. In Turkey, an almost exclusively Muslim country, the universal character of FBOs is quite self-evident, because the very large majority of potential beneficiaries shares the same religion; in some cases, political propaganda is attached to it.

The main Christian organisations in Germany are Diakonie and Caritas, which provide services, solidarity, advocacy and policy guidelines for both mainstream population and excluded groups, regardless of ethnic or religious origin. These organisations are competing in the social service market. There are other Christian FBOs, such as the Salvation Army, that provide support to the fringe groups (e.g. the homeless); they use proselytising strategies. Non-Christian or immigrant FBOs mainly provide help to their own communities, they are fostering their integration and fight their social exclusion.

The space for social action in Sweden is narrower than it is in other countries. FBOs take care of people in the fringes of an opulent society and a broad welfare state, i.e. they mediate between the official institutions and persons with uneasy or impossible access to it (e.g. immigrants, undocumented people). A major strategic role is to intervene also as opinion builders, raise new social concerns and lobby the public institutions to keep their focus on fighting social exclusion efficiently. The Church of Sweden, which formerly was the Swedish State Church, but now an NGO like the others, still occupies a privileged position in this respect.

FBOs work with the people in and beyond the fringes in Belgium. They develop three main kinds of activities or fields in combating poverty: spreading the Gospel and disseminating their faith; providing material help to groups in need (food, clothing, shelter) and enhancing the emancipation of people in need (training, job activation or counselling). They develop activities in fields, such as health, education, leisure and culture; they are less occupied with care for children, the disabled and the elderly.

FBOs in the Netherlands differ in their relation with public administrations in the field of anti-poverty policies. Some big FBOs deliver services outsourced by the state in a regime of specialisation and quasi-monopoly. This generates some tensions around principles and definitions of poverty and how to deal with it. Some Christian FBOs provide services for those who are not covered by the welfare

state; the 'fringes of society'. At another scale, local churches or mosques and the so-called "immigrant churches" provide help to members in need.

Traditionally, the Spanish third sector, both secular and faith-based NGOs, have been delivering services for public administrations through contracts and grants; that is in less permanent and budget dependent programmes. FBOs also finance services from their own resources. Some of them are somehow coordinated with public administrations, but other FBOs (e.g. Protestant churches) do not and act quite independently. A minority but very active sector of Christian FBOs has an openly critical and challenging relation with public administrations around certain issues, such as undocumented people's rights and extreme poverty. In general, FBOs engage in a vast array of social action domains, both as outsourcing organisations and as actors delivering their own programmes. Muslim organisations are still at a very early stage of development, but provide aid to their community members in need. The small Jewish community provides similar programmes to its members.

In some countries, with a very specific model of social welfare provision and its associated poverty concepts, FBOs play a leading role in anti-poverty activities. In Turkey, poverty is still understood as a 'natural' and therefore somehow unavoidable condition of society. The concept of social action is inspired by the Ottoman charity ethos, which proclaims to finance social actions with private donations and to provide mainly material help to the poor. This is mixed with neo-liberal ideas that focus on personal responsibility and leaves aside structural causes of poverty. The last two decades have witnessed a revival of these mixed ideas and actions through the use of mass media. Charity turned into a tool to generate clients. There is a whole space for hegemonic FBOs that manage large budgets and distribute material aid to the most needy sectors of the population which are often outside the public welfare system relying on informal and precarious economic strategies to survive. Some FBOs also provide training and incentives to develop small enterprises, but guided by similar ideas. Alevi minority FBOs have a more specific clientele and focus their actions on mild social action, especially in advocacy and political claims.

In the UK, in spite of three New Labour governments, the ideological framework is still heavily indebted to the (in)famous saying of the former conservative prime Minister Thatcher: 'there is no such thing as society'. Authors such as Charles Murray, Lawrence Mead, Marvin Olasky and Frank Field have played an important role in shifting the responsibility for poverty and social exclusion onto the poor and excluded themselves. FBOs play a critical role in welfare provision in a wide range of welfare domains. As poverty is a complex phenomenon, most of these, as in other countries, are transversal and programmes are articulated to different social groups, often members of the same households. The most vulnerable group consists of asylum seekers and undocumented immigrants, which face different forms of legal, material and social deprivation. Homelessness has been a traditional domain of FBOs in the UK, especially since the escalation of homelessness in the 1980s. Another relevant domain is that of fighting household indebtedness by counselling and advice. Poverty is tackled also through training and education, especially for young people, and through the

provision of specific services to the elderly and the disabled in those aspects in which public assistance is insufficient.

Role of FBOs in combating poverty and social exclusion

There is a range of different ways in which the role of FBOs is defined in the countries taking part in FACIT. Three main variables account for this variability. The religious composition of the country is very relevant; the presence and potential of FBOs that represent mainstream cultural and religious values is beyond any doubt. This translates into their roles in local governance networks, their capacity of action (premises, volunteers, personnel) and in their capacity of gathering public and private resources.

Another relevant variable is the position between State and Church. Strong links between both institutions have eased with time in all countries (especially in Sweden and Spain), but they still play a significant role in the way FBOs regard state welfare and perceive their own role. There are also scenarios that are characterised by a high independence of FBOs from the state; such FBOs enjoy a high degree of autonomy in those domains where the state does not provide welfare.

Finally, the secularisation process has led to the transformation of some FBOs into quasi-FBOs. Organisations that were based on religious values and principles changed into secular NGOs to provide more specialised services and to be able to compete with other NGOs in the context of public welfare provision. In Turkey, however, a de-secularisation process has led to a rather sudden growth in the size and capacity of new FBOs.

In Germany, the importance of the main FBOs is related to the religion that is dominant in that part of the country. In mainly Protestant areas, Diakonie holds the monopoly of social assistance, while Caritas has a similar role in areas with a Catholic majority. Both organisations are less present in Länder in which they constitute a minority from a religious point of view. Salvation Army, an international organisation, is very present in areas where social exclusion is more intense and it is coping with emergency situations that require immediate action. In its social actions, the organisation stresses the need to approach people in need with a strong religious message.

Although their legal position is weak, Muslim FBOs are very relevant in Germany. Some mainly serve their own community with services that the welfare state does not provide (funeral and repatriation services for the dead) or that culturally might be preferred by the Muslim community (family and community conflict resolution). Anti-poverty action is not specifically addressed in a programme strategy, but rather through actions focussed around the Mosque as a main centre of religious and

social welfare. In the Islamic tradition, social action (Zakat) is an obligation performed through donations to the poor and needy.

Alevi communities, an Islam rooted religious group, mainly provide services to their own people, ranging from support to settle and integrate to cultural and social activities. This is especially relevant, because of their status of a minority within mainstream Islam and the Muslim communities in Germany. In the Jewish community, anti-poverty action is provided to individuals, both long-term residents and more recent immigrants from third countries (Russian ethnic Jews) facing challenges to their integration.

Swedish FBOs have a very particular position in relation to other FBOs in Europe regarding combating poverty and social exclusion. They mostly regard their function as complementary to the - universal - welfare state, filling up the gaps, and not so much to redress inequality and social injustice. The individual is given a predominant position in the processes of exclusion and its achieved independence from social ties will render him free from vulnerability of different sorts. The long-standing welfare state culture has shaped the interpretation of social exclusion and poverty in Sweden around the citizen as an individual, not so much as a member of a community.

In Belgium (Flanders), FBOs combat social exclusion from outside the system, although most of them are (partly) subsidised by government. Their activities include the provision of specific welfare services and helping less resourceful beneficiaries to gain or improve their access to public services. In this sense, FBOs use a "universalistic" logic when catering for beneficiaries both at church and parish level.

FBOs in the Netherlands often operate in cooperation with public administrations. Big organisations always have been part of shared networks and platforms. Currently, there is a trend to include smaller organisations at the local level too for consultative and participative purposes. Other FBOs see themselves as outsiders; some because they challenge governmental policy strategies, especially around issues regarding undocumented people, and others because they try to avoid the application of rules and regulations, such as those on anti-discrimination or equal opportunities. Still others are do-it-yourselfers, because it is part of their philosophy to be independent and because they have succeeded to get access to public resources.

The expansion of the third sector in Spain in the 1980s and 1990s has given FBOs and NGOs a relevant role in its developed welfare state. Still, the feeling exists that a substantial part of the most urgent social actions against poverty is taken up by FBOs on their initiative. FBOs also act as policy advisers at national, regional and local level, mainly big organisations such as Caritas. Smaller ones can have some voice at the district level. Services are provided in three main ways: social welfare through

grants or contracts funded by public institutions; programmes developed by FBOs, generally coming from a long tradition with different sources of funding (own resources, donations); "invisible" or "intangible" social action by communities and congregations at a small local scale.

The role of FBOs in the UK is diverse. The traditional role of Christian organisations went through several stages related to the changes in welfare logics and ideologies in the last six decades. The current scenario is one of an increasing role in welfare provision by FBOs as a reaction to neo-liberal policies. Neo-Communitarism, especially in community regeneration, has revamped FBOs' role in fighting social exclusion and poverty. In some domains, such as homelessness, social action is provided as an outsourced service of the State. FBOs also complement public welfare where this is inefficient and provide services to groups that are out of the system, such as asylum seekers and undocumented persons. FBOs in the UK also have a long-standing tradition of advocacy and political action through campaigning, protest and parliamentary lobby.

3.5 To whom

We have defined whom FBOs work with, whether they operate within or outside of the public realm, and therefore with different social groups in risk; this section details who are those social groups. Basically, it can be assumed that groups in risk are rather similar in all countries. Vulnerability and poverty are a matter of social class, access to resources and capacity of developing what is considered desirable and acceptable for mainstream society. Often, this definition of social class is stained by the ethnic variable, but this conceptualisation cannot be taken for granted and other elements have to be considered. For example, a group can be considered marginalised in relation to mainstream society, but can have high levels of social cohesion that would protect them from some of the consequences of social exclusion. In general, the groups that are described as target groups in the different national reports can be included broadly into the categories quoted by Vranken (2009) from Marx. Marx defined the vulnerable as: the unemployed, widows and orphans (now translated into single mothers and fragmented families), the sick and the disabled, the technologically handicapped (low skilled or unskilled workers), the elderly and the "marginal" (prostitutes, the homeless, drug addicts, etc.). In this still pretty actual and operative categorization, we could include other groups that are victims of economic transformations and social changes and especially of the speed with which those waves occur. As much as even the lowest income groups in a given society may profit from economic growth and upward mobility, things can change and turn upside down not only for the apparently more vulnerable, but also for some of those groups which were not considered so: skilled workers, small entrepreneurs, and middle class people in general.

The main two FBOs in Germany (Caritas and Diakonia) provide social welfare in a broad range of domains and to a broad range of beneficiaries. The German welfare state and the subsidiary role played by the third sector facilitates access for both integrated groups and those in a situation of vulnerability and social exclusion, including those "beyond the fringes of society" which are not

eligible for social welfare or whose needs are not included in standard social service provision. The Salvation Army mainly targets those groups. Muslims, Jewish and Alevi communities tend to supply services to their own people. Members of these communities who are in a situation of vulnerability also benefit from public and private welfare through NGOs and FBOs.

Swedish FBOs address beneficiaries through two main approaches: vulnerable and excluded people through their own programmes, in what is defined as direct and indirect methods; these are active and preventive social action. The second mode might address issues applicable to non-excluded citizens, like quitting smoking, drinking habits. We would categorise the second approach through its relation with the legal framework. Social action might be highly institutionalised and outsourced by public authorities or can be focused on persons and behaviour labelled illegal or incompatible with the public order, such as people "beyond the fringes" (mainly undocumented foreigners which lack access to services answering basic needs, such as health or education).

Belgian FBOs provide services to marginalised groups that are not covered by the public system because they are not eligible (or are out of the "legal" system) or to others in a situation of vulnerability or social exclusion whose needs are not covered by the welfare state because there is not enough supply or any at all. Among the first group, the beneficiaries are homeless people, drug addicts, asylum seekers and undocumented people. Among the second, we find local and ethnic origin people living in a multidimensional context of social exclusion. Jewish and Muslim provide services to those from their communities in need. The latter also develop strategies to foster social integration.

The Dutch situation is comparable; FBOs provide services to those who have an increased risk to or are in a clear situation of social exclusion; this means that they are not eligible for or do not have access to the public welfare system. They are mainly residents of foreign origin, some of them undocumented, or asylum seekers. FBOs also provide assistance to people in a situation of vulnerability or exclusion, which might include some of the previous and others facing homelessness, addictions, or ex-convicts.

The main target groups for Spanish FBOs' social action also are on the social exclusion map; they deliver services to those who are at the system's margins and to those who are outside. Their common feature is a lack of resources or sufficient access to existing resources (drug addicts, the homeless, ex-convicts, some immigrants). The groups with a higher risk of vulnerability are the elderly, youngsters, children and women of foreign (and local) origin.

FBOs in the UK have a range of (potential) beneficiaries in their social action programmes. These stretch from groups that have experienced downward social mobility due to age or health factors

(the elderly, the disabled) to those who are in a situation of structural poverty with little or no chance of improvement. Emphasis is on redressing and preventing chronic poverty situations through education, counselling and material help. Support to community groups through different programmes is a widespread practice related to capacity building. Minority FBOs mainly provide support to their own communities in domains related not only to cultural issues but also to discrimination and access to the labour market.

3.6 How: Functions of FBOs

Beyond the domains in which FBOs are active, it is also relevant to consider the functions that FBOs have in relation to society. We have classified them into three broad groups: community-oriented functions, public opinion and participation, and third sector and FBO-oriented functions. These categories provide a broader perspective on the multidimensional nature of poverty and the importance of developing "side" functions to strict social action, both in terms of efficiency (organisation, cooperation) and social and political transformation of society (awareness raising, policy advise).

Most FBOs focus on community-oriented functions, which contain activities that range from charity and service provision to issues directly related to a spiritual dimension. The aim of this categorisation is not to describe in detail what goes on in each country, but rather to stress the functions that are particularly relevant in each case.

We have also developed a categorisation of FBOs' functions in relation to the dimensions in which they take place: action or executive and spiritual dimensions account for the principles and primary aims of FBOs, while political, technical and organisational dimensions account for the ways in which those aims may be realised.

In Germany, the main Catholic and Protestant FBOs provide specific services to vulnerable groups that require them, but they regard poverty as a multidimensional process in which individuals require specific attention. They tackle poverty from an integral approach, seeking to identify and solve the causes of the person's situation and treating its different outcomes. Some big Protestant FBOs emphasise proselytising among their community-oriented functions. Jewish, Muslim and Alevi communities provide services to their members. These are not always directly related to poverty, but to causes that might conduct to exclusion, such as a lack of integration, poor social life or isolation. Community services are therefore provided both from an action and spiritual point of view.

Due to the almost universal coverage of welfare requirements for the population in Sweden, FBOs usually tackle those issues that are not included and develop related aspects of the community-oriented functions. Despite some FBOs not tackling emergency situations, some programmes address relevant causes of social exclusion not necessarily linked to a lack of material wealth. Social and community integration, links with the community, coping with cultural shock and counselling are some of them. Others are concerned with undocumented residents and other groups that fall out of the welfare system. FBOs provide medical assistance and other services through volunteers as well as legal counselling and other supporting services. Muslim congregations focus on social inclusion through non-religious activities (sports, education).

Preventing social exclusion and marginalisation are among the main strategies of Belgian FBOs, together with providing assistance to the socially and legally excluded. The main functions covered by FBOs can be summarised in three big sets; in order of relevance: a) covering direct needs and integration (minorities, groups in risk), information delivery, social activities, detecting new needs; b) training, coordination and financial support; c) realisation of meta-principles. Jewish FBOs provide support to the members of their own community in need. Muslim FBOs focus their social actions on integration (language, skills) rather than on explicit anti-poverty programmes.

Dutch FBOs develop various roles, apart from the ones already mentioned: providing welfare services and charity to vulnerable and excluded groups. At community level, they provide informal care and mutual support, what we have defined as intangible services, and they help to bridge the gap between demand and supply of public services and community development. Political advocacy is also a relevant activity, both in terms of political protest and in enhancing a new policy style that aims at giving voice to FBOs at the local level.

FBOs in Spain cover a vast array of functions, since they play a key role in the implementation of welfare arrangements. Anti-poverty strategies are implemented in different ways. The leading paradigm of the big FBOs (Caritas, Accem and several congregations) is a holistic approach to social exclusion; they regard it as a process rather than as a situation (or several situations). They deliver most functions shown in the table. The majority of FBOs belong to the sphere of the Catholic Church and, with some exceptions, they do not proselytise as the minority Protestant initiatives do.

Mainstream FBOs in Turkey develop massive media campaigns to collect donations and funding. 'Light House' is an extremely professional organisation with a huge logistic and communication capacity that reaches millions of people. Still, the charity it provides only solves emergency situations or alleviates poverty only temporally; it lacks transformative social programmes. Other FBOs use different strategies, but they all have very strong religious messages and these are often used as propaganda tools. Alevi FBOs mainly have a strong advocacy and political dimension to claim for their own and other minorities' rights.

The solid third sector in the UK has developed a vast array of functions in its fight against poverty; this applies to FBOs and to NGOs in general. The community-oriented functions of FBOs are dominant, but public opinion and participation functions are very relevant in the UK as well.

3.7 Conclusion

The following scheme summarises the way in which FBOs, as part of the public welfare system, intend to combat poverty. A common pattern for FBOs is that they work with those 'beyond the fringes of society'. Sometimes they collaborate with public administration for those activities, sometimes activities are developed as a complement to public services (because public administrations are not formally entitled to cater for those needs or groups), sometimes they even act in open confrontation. This focus on 'the weakest' constitutes a very significant part of the charisma of almost all FBOs, independent of their faith base.

The scheme must be read within the context of the three main variables that we consider as influencing the way in which FBOs deliver their services: the religious composition of the country, the relation of FBOs (and Church) with the State and the process of secularisation (or de-secularisation). These main variables will underline the importance of the different 'intermediate' variables in FBOs' dynamics when fighting social exclusion. This model applies to all cases studied in FACIT, although the Turkish one presents some specific features, especially in relation to the concept of poverty and the religious and moral dimension of the tools used to combat it.

4. The urban dimension

The spatial presence of FBOs in the city is highly variable, depending on the type of presence concerned which may reflect the multi-purpose use of religious buildings, the development of specific fixed-space facilities, the operation of mobile or outreach services, and the myriad confidential as well as more visible contacts with socially excluded people. Some of the locations of these FBOs are perhaps surprising. In Rotterdam, for example, the longstanding presence of a city centre church and surrounding land permitted a re-development of this prime site into the new Pauluskerk - an architect-designed combination of luxury apartments, social housing, cafe and new church-based facilities for urban outcasts. Elsewhere, FBOs are located in more shadowy urban zones. Research by May et al (2006) in the city of Bristol, UK, for example, demonstrates the variety of spaces in which FBOs have developed a service presence in the city. The major night shelter for homeless people in Bristol is located in a converted industrial building in a distinctly marginal space close to the centre of the city. On the edges of this space are also found a series of hostels and drop-in centres run by FBOs, in one case using a church building located close to the city centre. In and

around this marginal space, but also closer to the city centre where homeless people go about their lives "on-street", a regular soup-run has built up a regular clientele at key landmark points in the prime spaces of the city, while in the red light district close to the night shelter, a yellow van (nicknamed "the custard tart") provides a mobile service run by an FBO to support homeless sex workers. Responding to a different particular need, mobile youth services have been developed in both the UK and Germany. In Manchester, UK, these FBO services provide youth facilities taken onto various estates in a converted double-decker bus, creating safe places to 'hang out' and bringing regular contact between youth and trained volunteer youth workers, while in Chemnitz, Germany a mobile services consist of a youth theatre-on-wheels that puts on regular shows for the younger residents of the area. To a large extent, these FBO activities reflect the marginal spaces of the city which are already inhabited by socially excluded people; this is a case not only of locating services where needy people are, but also of benefitting from the relatively low property prices in these marginal areas. In the Netherlands, there has been a clear increase in the presence of migrant churches in areas of deprivation for this reason in particular. This has resulted in a network of support for local ethnically diverse communities providing immediate care through initiatives such as Foodbank.

One particular manifestation of how FBOs choose to establish a dwelling place in marginal areas of the city is the incarnational approach to mission. Particular organisations (for example Eden (UK), 614 (UK and Germany) and Urban Expressions (UK)) are now facilitating the placement of individuals, or more normally groups of people, into socially deprived housing estates for the specific purpose of serving the people of these estates from within rather than as an external welfare agency.

However, FBO activity in the city also takes place beyond these marginal spaces. It has been widely recognised (see for example, Baker and Skinner, 2006; Cray, 2007) that FBOs represent the last remaining nexus of social capital in urban communities. FBOs are therefore a crucial site not only for bonding capital but also for bridging capital within and beyond the city. One aspect of the social capital available via FBOs is that the buildings used by religious congregations in both central and suburban locations are typically used to provide support services, notably for the young and the elderly, but also for other socially, physically or psychologically disadvantaged groups. The prevalence of resource-based capital is often locked into the fabric of the City through longstanding historic parish structures. For example, the Swedish Church has an extensive physical representation in Swedish society through its 3500 church buildings, and with this presence comes a cultural history of religious congregation:

Similar parish structures exist among the established protestant and catholic churches of Spain and the United Kingdom, and it is often the case that FBO activities are run in and out of such churches. This on-site activity is designed partly to serve surrounding populations - reinforcing the idea that social exclusion is not simply confined to obvious marginal spaces - and partly to serve particular marginalised people who are "shipped in" to what is for them a non-local focal point of activity. In one district of Uppsala, Sweden, this has been structured around providing emergency shelter and

basic provision for asylum seekers, compassionately housing them in central church buildings when emergency responses are required. While for para-church organisations like City Missions in Stockholm, Sweden, centrally owned and used buildings provide appropriate sites to market their products and raise awareness of the charity, building bridging links between city consumers and the lives and stories of those who have experienced poverty and social exclusion. In other cases, FBO activity takes a more confidential form and visits individuals with particular needs. Thus services providing, for example, debt-related advice or support for "illegal" immigrants and asylum seekers, or care for the victims of domestic violence, will range widely and often unseen across the diverse spaces of the city. This "invisibility" of FBO infrastructure also occurs in the case of Muslim places of worship. In Sweden for example most mosques are in former industrial locations or in basements.

Accordingly, the spaces occupied by FBOs reflect: (a) Locations in or on the edge of marginalised space, to meet the needs of socially excluded groups within their own supposed territories; (b) The spatiality of existing religious buildings which are used for FBO activity. Here, activities will vary with geographical location, with buildings on the edge of marginal spaces in the city forming appropriate centres to "reach out" from or "drop into", and other buildings (often in more affluent suburban areas) offering centres for localised or specialised support; (c) Peripatetic services, sometimes highly visible but at other times highly confidential, that meet socially excluded people in their places of residence or performance.

Potential Impact:

The potential impact of the research can be measured by the participation of many organisations in the FACIT-project. The response to the survey conducted was very high. Organisations stressed the importance and relevance of analysing the role of FBOs in combating poverty and social exclusion. The impact of the FACIT-project may be described in terms of (a) increased visibility of the FBOs and their activities, (b) higher political sensitivity for the position and the role of FBOs in combating poverty and social exclusion and (c) better service provision towards beneficiaries through strengthening collaboration between different FBOs and NGOs.

Dissemination activities are very diverse. A website was created in the beginning of the project (January 2008) and has been updated regularly (www.facit.be). Publications were distributed towards organisations interviewed and a larger public. Halfway the project, temporary results were published in 'Faith-based Organisations and social exclusion in European cities' (Dierckx, Vranken, Kerstens, 2008) also downloadable from the project's website. Ten country reports saw the light end of 2010, including as well the so-called 'second country report' that every consortium member wrote on the situation in a relevant country that did not participate in the Facit-project. Several other publications are in preparation: a scientific book with transversal analyses of the situation in the different countries (at Policy Press), a book with case studies of remarkable FBOs identified during the interviews, a 'handbook for end users' that translates our research results into policy recommendations and guidelines for social action.

Two international conferences were organised in Antwerp (Belgium). During the first 'Between the Spatial and the Social', in Antwerp on 18 and 19 March 2010, some of the FACIT-results were put in a broader context. The seminar focused on the spatial dimension of social exclusion matters and on the relation between welfare state and welfare society. The second one, the final conference of the project, took place on 25 and 26 November 2010. A representative of the European Commission explained the European research context, the research results were presented by different team members (The role of faith in combating poverty and social exclusion; Social Exclusion and Segregation in urban areas, Welfare and Urban Governance) and participants discussed them in working groups. New contacts were established and plans for further research were made.

On September 21, 2010 we also organized an expert seminar for end users during which policy recommendations for combating poverty and social exclusion in Europe were discussed. Participants came from such organizations as the European Anti-Poverty Network and Eurodiakonia. The topics raised in this expert seminar were taken up again at the aforementioned final conference. The results of this expert seminar will also be used as input for the handbook for end users mentioned earlier.

Facit also participated in an expert workshop on 'European pluralism: religions, tolerance and values. Insights from European Research supported under the 6th and 7th Framework programmes'

organised by DG Research on 18 October 2010. Its promoter, Jan Vranken, presented a paper on 'Faith based organisations and exclusion'.

Furthermore, two policy briefs were written; the first in January 2010, another one in June 2010 (published, after intense communication with the research officer). The content of the latest edition is presented, To illustrate the potential impact the project may have on policies and social action, we present the 'Recommendations for policy makers' from the most recent edition. We formulated recommendations on future trends, technical matters, country specific matters, and good practices.

1. Future trends

1.1. The rising share of elderly migrants

Due to the rising share of elderly migrants, especially of Muslim faith, who wish to stay in the host country, demand for homes adapted to these people's customs is increasing. In these homes Islamic dietary laws are observed, people are able to freely practice their religion, they are assisted by an imam or by some other representatives of a local mosque.

- FBOs should (be encouraged to) take account of the specific needs of the elderly migrants and to invest in special elderly care initiatives.
- It is preferable that NGOs and FBOs establish mixed homes for the elderly, respecting the different religious customs. Such homes have the potential to become new arenas for integration.

1.2. The economic crisis

More people are in need as a result of the economic crisis, but because of this crisis less money is available. This gap is widening.

- Public authorities should put the struggle against social exclusion high on their agenda. They should support civil society actors, especially for those actions that fall outside their own scope. NGOs and FBOs are generally better placed than other actors when it comes to dealing with groups and situations that are in society's margins (and often on the border of legality).
- Because less public funding is available, NGOs and FBOs will depend more on voluntary work. To facilitate this development, the supporting framework for voluntary work should be strengthened (e.g. advice on volunteering, compensation budget for costs).

1.3. The issue of sustainability

This growing gap between increasing needs and limited public money puts pressure on public service provision and FBOs' activities, the issue of sustainability of FBOs becomes vital.

- Because more FBOs are needed to cater for the increasing problems and marginalised groups, public authorities should try to foster their sustainability (e.g. by allowing tax exemptions for donors).
- The creation of social enterprises - often linked to FBOs - should be encouraged, since they try to be sustainable in different respects: they create jobs for people outside the labour market, they provide low-priced quality goods and services, and they recycle used goods and so contribute to reducing the ecological footprint.
- FBOs also contribute to social cohesion, which may be seen as the social dimension of sustainability. Often FBOs play a positive role in cohesion through bringing people together and promoting mutual solidarity between the 'have's' and the 'have not's'.

2. Technical matters

- The need to support FBOs does not mean that they are above evaluation and control by public authorities. Referring to 'higher values' is no safeguard for receiving funding unconditionally.
- Administrative procedures and budgetary and contract controls to which FBOs have to live up differ very much between countries and sectors. More accountability and transparency are needed.

3. Country specific policy recommendations

National and regional governments of the different countries should pay attention to the country context.

3.1. Belgium

In Belgium, new initiatives do not always successfully develop because civil society actors can not live up to the existing administrative procedures. To be recognised as an elderly home, for instance, a prescribed minimum number of beneficiaries is needed. In order to address new needs and to introduce innovative practices, the threshold for starting new (funded) initiatives has to be lowered.

3.2. Germany

- Migrant FBOs in Germany, especially Islamic ones, should - as their Christian counterparts - be entitled to the legal status of welfare organisations. Then they would benefit from tax exemptions, have access to public money and be recognised as part of society.
- The recognition by German government of the Muslim population as a religious community would also facilitate receiving benefits for hiring clergymen at universities ('alim') and introducing Islamic theology at German universities; it would mean less difficulties to build mosques and member taxes could be levied.

3.3. Spain

- In order to maintain efficient service provision, there should be a collective bargaining deal for FBOs' and NGOs' hired professionals to grant adequate retributions and working conditions.
- The evaluation of services and programmes should be introduced, both through independent beneficiary evaluation (qualitative and quantitative) at neighbourhood level and independent evaluation agencies.
- More active collaboration should be enhanced between public administrations and FBOs linked to minority religious groups that have a strong potential in social action (Protestant Churches, Muslim community).

3.4. Sweden

- In stimulating interreligious cooperation in Sweden, local governments and FBOs should keep the gender dimension in mind and pay attention to the specific needs and demands of women.
- FBOs should be open to cooperation with non-religious NGOs.
- Local governments should be sensitive to the needs and demands expressed by congregations of different religions when it comes to their physical presence in a city. FBOs, on their part, should be keen not only to reserve buildings for religious aims, but also to use it for activities promoting the needs and demands of poor people irrespective of their belief.
- Local governments and administrations in Sweden should be willing to enter into dialogue with dedicated persons who are willing to initiate activities. They are important links between local government and civil society and should be met with respect.

3.5. The Netherlands

There is a need to raise awareness about the transnational dimension of the work of FBOs as part of a social justice agenda in European countries. Some FBOs cater for the victims of the sex 'slave trade', mainly African women who are brought to the Netherlands to work in the prostitution industry.

3.6. Turkey

- Turkey needs a legal regulation for FBOs operating in the domain of social assistance, in order to reduce their vulnerability to international manipulation.
- Turkish government should reorganise its relationship with civil society actors. NGOs and FBOs should be able to act independently from party politics.

3.7. The UK

- It is crucial that training is made available to all religious groups, so that they have the same capacity to bid for contracts as secular organisations. Today, this capacity is unevenly present among different religious groups in the UK, particularly among black and minority ethnic groups.
- The UK already has well established audit and regulatory bodies to ensure accountability and transparency in the voluntary and faith-based sectors.

4. Good practices

Public authorities should pay more attention to good practices in which FBOs are providing innovative and successful practices of welfare, care and multi-faith activities. One good practice is identified for each country.

4.1. Belgium

In Belgium, civil society actors are strongly involved in policy-making and policy implementation. One could say that a political osmosis has developed between private non-profit institutions and the public sector. With respect to the issue of poverty and social exclusion, participation of civil society actors is rooted in the framework of the poverty decree and the federal follow-up of the General Report on Poverty.

4.2. Germany

Between 2006 and 2009, the city of Cologne in Germany has developed the Social Area Focus, a quite successful area-based project. The Social Area Focus is led by a working group of FBOs, NGOs, local politicians, private persons and firms, which identifies poverty areas and installs facilities and provides services where they are needed. This collaboration has improved living conditions in deprived areas and the division of tasks has resulted in more effective services.

4.3. Spain

In the last decade, municipalities, regions and the State have developed integration programmes aimed at immigrant communities and locals, both at micro and macro level. Some FBOs, such as Secretariado General Gitano, have worked towards integrating the Roma community, and especially women within this community, in the labour market and the educational system. Some small Catholic FBOs are also working to provide assistance to groups that are legally and physically out of the system. This is the case for the parish of San Carlos Borromeo in Madrid, which is working with Roma Romanian immigrants in slums.

4.4. Sweden

Local governments and FBOs in Sweden contribute in different ways to successful interreligious cooperation: through cultural and social integration; interreligious integration of social service provision (e.g. FBOs serving target groups of other faiths); interreligious conflict resolution (e.g. city governments bringing together religious leaders of all beliefs to solve particular problems in the city).

4.5. The Netherlands

The Dutch Social Support Act (1 January 2007) is meant to manage the integration of people with limitations in society. It makes municipalities responsible for home care, supporting and activating care, as well as the regulations for transport, client support and various subsidies. In other words, local authorities have a leading role in implementing the law. Yet, care providers are able to negotiate contracts with municipalities to formulate a proactive and community driven intervention programme. In this respect, the law has impacted on the way that FBOs operate. It has stimulated FBOs to work more professional and to collaborate with politicians.

4.6. Turkey

In Turkey, there is evidence of actors coming together to strive for a common goal. A coalition has been established between different kinds of NGOs (Islamist, gay/lesbian and others) to form an umbrella organisation. The mission of this organisation is to fight against all forms of discrimination in the country.

4.7. The UK

London Citizens exemplifies the political potential of collaboration between different faith groups, and labour, educational and community-based organisations. The broad-based organisation represents an important non-parliamentary political route that revitalises the democratic deficit found in the mainstream political process. Campaigning on shared social issues in their neighbourhoods such as Living Wages, low cost housing, citizenship for undocumented migrants, the organisation has had some success in putting marginal issues firmly on the political table.

List of Websites:

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