Final Report

Gangs Policies: Youth and Migration in Local Contexts. The Case of Madrid and Barcelona.

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YOUGANG – Project N. IEF 272200

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"By constructing the gang as a suitable enemy, complex social problems that have their origins in the way our society is organized are being translated instead into problems of law and order to which illiberal law and order solutions are then to appear logical and necessary" **(David Brotherton and Simon Hallsworth, 2011)**

"Doubt everything anyone in power tells you" **(Howard Becker, 1998)**

www.yougangproject.com - fb: buscando respeto la pelicula

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Introduction

In order to accomplish the objectives of YOUGANG a strong effort in term of ethnography and qualitative research has been developed.

Part I of the present Report develops a state of the art about youth-migration nexus.

Part 2 of the present Report develops a critical analysis of youth, penal and social policies on gangs in contemporary Spain, exploiting interviews with different stakeholders and key informants (local administrators, gang leaders and members, media opinion leaders, social workers, police officers, ..).

Table of interviews and key informants contacted. 2011-2013

	T	**M**	**F**
Youth informants in the gang scene	36	26	10
Adult Stakeholders in Catalonia	28	18	10
Adult Stakeholders in Madrid	15	7	8
Total	**79**	**51**	**28**

Moreover, 9 focus groups in Genoa, Madrid and Barcelona have been realized, involving 94 informants coming from different State agencies. A 6-month film laboratory has involved gang members and other youth key informants (20 persons) on a permanent basis. The Facebook site of yougang – Buscando Respeto la Película – has allowed us to spread our findings and get in contact with nearly 800 hundreds youth coming from the gang scene, mainly from Spain, Italy, Ecuador, Santo Domingo.

The present text, a summary of a larger report in Spanish published in YOUGANG website, has been translated by Teresa López, University of Lleida.

Part 1

The social construction of the youth-migration nexus in contemporary Spain. A critical overview.

1.1   *Behind the production of youth*

According to the last institutional report about youth (IJE, 2008), Spain is probably the European country with the greatest number of studies about youth promoted from public and social institutions. The *Instituto de la Juventud* (INJUVE, Youth Institute), a consolidated Ministry Agency since the transition to democracy, promotes a wide range of studies about youth from different perspectives; *youth* has thus become a recurrent subject in the social sciences since the 1980s, as also in the political debate and arena (Martín Criado, 1998).

One could see in the institutionalised age range ("the famous 15-29"), in the setting of administrative criteria for measurement, in the generation of statistical groups that are meant to be significant, in the proliferation of figures and objective tendencies that have become natural objects and facts, the mirror effect of the ways a society is produced or represented, as well as an interesting and interested range of concerns.
Behind any smokescreen thrown up by the different institutions to articulate a discourse, i.e. a cultural hegemony, we need to look at the simpler device that this is trying to conceal: to affirm the discourse of a society which is stratifying around a generational axis, making other factors invisible and putting them backstage of legitimate representations.

If contemporariness is not sufficient to create a generation (Mannheim, 1990), if youth "is just a word" and to talk about young people is only "an evident manipulation", "a language abuse to put different social universes that have nothing in common under the same concept", in other words an illusion (Bourdieu, 1984), we will need to ask ourselves about the performative and effective character of this production from a symbolic and a material approach. Under this perspective, Martín Criado highlights the boundaries of the first wave of grand reports and youth studies in the 1980s, inserted in a quantitative framework: substantialism and essentialization, homogenization of a category, culturalism and association of identity profiles from the coexistence in the same age cohort, concern about the distance from the rules. Thus, the age/generation struggle would replace the class struggle in the discourse of social hierarchy and its transformations.

Once the articulation young versus adult established as a distinction, not only through the administrative denomination but also through the generalisation of the school system, the detachment of some age groups from the obligation to work and the proliferation of youth culture markets, the subjects can be the object of questioning alternatively or at the same time by the industries of moral and control (*youth as a problem*) and by the industries of cultural consumption and leisure (*youth as a style*).

Much of the expert literature in the 1990s is devoted to overcoming the old *substantialism of youth*, by giving the brush strokes of a new *culturalism of youth*: catalogues of styles and aesthetics which are now depicted at times as the effervescence of social changes and at other times as a dangerous challenge of the adults' moral order. It is possible to identify two fields of discourse production that proliferated during the 1990s: on the one hand, the recurring listing of a number of youth cultures and urban *tribes* (a media phenomenon as well as one of the scientific doxa that we will get to in

the next section), on the other hand, the parallel emergence and sedentarisation of migration as an imposed fact and as a problem perceived and propagated in the Spanish society.

But only very recently did an *Informe de Juventud* (Youth report) (IJE, 2004) give migrant youth the category of a measuring object, and did a monographic work settle the deficit relationships of this group with training and employment as an object of study (Chacón, 2003). As Chacón himself puts it, in the first years of the new Millennium there was not yet a category around the criteria of nationality or ethnicity of youth or an imaginary around the existence and probable social turbulence of these subjects, thus transforming an object into a social problem. A symbolic impact similar to the events of El Ejido in 1999 – the first major social conflict getting media attention that gave rise to an expression of the radical tensions around the migrant condition as class condition - had not yet materialised in the first State and academic reports, that only put migrant youth on the agenda and formulated it in public as an object for further study and action [1].

Spanish youth is outlined in the specialised literature, according to the Mediterranean model: in the framework of an expanding school system (and expanding selective drop out) biographies and trajectories, opportunities and links crystallise around a long lasting permanence in the household (the cliché of *emancipation* that Injuve reports often measure[2]) and around the consequent family economic dependence, low birth rates and a global reduction of the young layers in the population pyramid, hardly any intervention from the State in terms of social transfers and entitlements and the big impact of unemployment and informal work. Spain, Italy, Portugal, Greece place young people in what Esping Andersen (1990) among others, has called *family welfare*. These traits have deepened turning the family into the main safe box at the breach between education and employment, and at the structural precariousness imposed by the neo-liberal discourse and the logic of the new post-Fordist production regimes. Of course, the family is a homogenizer category that, just like the discourse of *youth*, makes invisible the vast and differentiated range of capacities to become viable as a welfare institution, and to guarantee the symbolic and material reproduction and heritage, i.e.: capital accumulation in its different forms and generational transmission (Bourdieu, 1997).

In the INJUVE 2008 report, for example, the invisibility of social classes is clearly stated. Following the typology introduced by Zarriaga (1985:18) two aggregates are constructed in function of the economic dependence/independence. Thus, in 2008 we would have half of the sample of interviewed young people totally or partially independent (50,6%) and the other half (49,5%) totally or partially dependent. The tendency in the last three surveys would also reveal an increase of independent young people. See how by analysing the relationship with the economic resources through the aggregate – *dependence* / *independence* – the class cleavages are hidden. The meaning of dependence is indeed very different between those who have it through a family stable economic capital and follow a successful trajectory in accordance with the

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[1] By the way, all the problems enumerated by Chacón in 2003 (345-351) are still on the table after ten years: school failure, the difficult appraisal of degrees by the labour market, discrimination and assignation of socially unwanted jobs, the segregation of leisure and socialising time.

[2] Today, under the blows of the crisis, experts, media and public administrations introduce the category of *disemancipation,* that is: the emancipated children moving back into their family home.

educational trends, and those who have to survive among unemployment, precarious work and informal work, thus contributing to a reciprocal mutualization of risk and resources within the working class families. In other words, within the same category (economic *dependence* or *independence*) there is a field of positions and representations which are differentiated and at the same time hidden. But the issue of classes and the different youths will be seen obliquely under the emergence and the construction of new criteria of distinction.

The visibility of a migrant youth topic in the official surveys in 2004 and successively in 2008, allows us to give evidence of the new devices that become mechanisms of vision and division of the youth social space; of new legitimate, relevant and productive narratives. As the data from the 2010 municipal census reveal (tab. 1), almost one out of five young people is of immigrant origin, and the proportion increases in large urban areas. In summary, it can be asserted that *the young issue* is largely a phenomenon tightly related to the incorporation of migrants at the national level, and especially in urban areas, as well as one of the most significant transformations that such flows generate in the receiving society.

Table 1 – Distribution of the young population in Spain per nationality and age group. 2010

Age groups	1.Total	2. Nationals	3. Foreigners	4.South and Central America	5.Percentage 3/1	6. Percentage 4/3
1. 15-19	2.303.428	2.008.604	294.824	123.391	12,7	41,8
2. 20-24	2.695.223	2.204.637	490.586	162.680	18,2	33,1
3. 25-29	3.444.435	2.673.768	770.667	277.103	22,3	35,9
4. Subtotal 15-29	8.443.086	6.887.009	1.556.077	563.174	18,4	36,1
5. Whole of the population	47.021.031	41.273.297	5.747.734	1.791.554	12,2	31,1
% 4 out of 5	17,9	16,6	27,1	31,4		

Source: Municipal census on 1-1-2010. INE

The Youth reports expose some structural characteristics of this migrant youth. Ironically, in terms of *residential emancipation*, migrant young people are more similar to Scandinavian than to Spanish young people, that is, a greater number of them live on their own, in couples, get married and are parents; according to the working population survey in 2007, "65 percent of them are emancipated in Spain, versus 21,4 percent of Spanish young people. In direct relationship with their degree of emancipation, the percentage of married immigrant young people is almost one third of all the immigrant young people (31,5 percent). Thus, young people who do not come from an immigrant family tend to extend further their family dependency (at the parental household), hence delaying their entry into the labour market" (Carpo, Riezco 2011, 198).

Behind the image of *emancipation* as a neutral concept designating the cultural-national patterns for distance or permanence in the original family household, we should maybe observe the different relationships with the labour world and, therefore, the different

social positions and class habitus. This dimension fades in the affirmation of a colour line (Du Bois, 2010) which, through migration statistics, constructs a native *us*, presumably homogeneous and differentiates it from the immigrant *others*, disqualified and in deficit. In table 2 (Youth Report 2008, 124) the radical disparity regarding employment and education between Spanish and foreign young people becomes evident. This becomes even more polarised and exaggerated in the age range 20-24; mass incorporation to employment and unemployment, smaller salaries and greater incidence of temporariness (Carpio Sanz 2008), and the quick departure from the educational system would be the qualifying elements of the condition of children of migration. Moreover, if we take into account the age range 16-29 (where education is not compulsory), the distinction is even clearer: "While 50 percent of the young Spanish are in some sort of education (formal and non-formal), immigrant young people in education represent less than a quarter" (Carpio, Sanz 2011, 198).

Table 2 – Structure of the young population with regard to the economic activity per nationality and age group.

	15-19		20-24		25-29	
	Spanish	**Foreign**	**Spanish**	**Foreign**	**Spanish**	**Foreign**
Active population	**22,3**	**32,1**	**63,3**	**79,7**	**87,5**	**87,4**
Working	11,6	20,0	44,8	56,4	68,1	74,2
Working/studying	3,1	0,7	8,4	6,2	9,2	1,1
Unemployed	7,6	11,4	10,0	17,2	10,2	12,0
Active population in intermediate situations (studying and working)	**7,7**	**5,0**	**8,6**	**2,6**	**3,6**	**1,7**
Inactive Population	**70,0**	**62,9**	**27,9**	**17,6**	**8,8**	**10,9**
Studying	69,2	60,7	26,0	8,4	6,2	2,5
Others	0,9	2,1	1,9	9,3	2,6	8,4
Total	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**

Source: IJE, 2008

Returning to the explanation given above, first, the emergence of the youth issue makes the social stratification invisible under the sign of age and generational struggle; second, the emergence of the immigrant youth will lead to the drawing of a colour line between *the others* and *us*, which in fact is a proxy in the framework of a spurious correlation of the different capitals that differentiate youth. In other words, migration makes visible again, and at the same time, hides behind the ethnic-national issue the class stratification within the framework of youth. We could have found a very similar statistic distribution to the one on table 2 if the independent variable were the cultural capital of the family of origin or the economic capital.

We are maybe living in societies where *race*[3] is a synonym of the term class and articulates new forms of stratification and (im)mobility. *Race* can often become an internal supplement in the construction of the labour market (Mezzadra, 2007) and migration a *de facto* labour reform. The experiences of other countries show how these processes of racialization make the attempt of contrasting the young people's rejection

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[3]   For the Spanish case, see the works by Vives and Sité about a gender approach of the blackness (2010) and by Giliberti (2011) about the construction of blackness between the migrant young people.

of their parents' subaltern integration (Gans, 1992,182). Of course we need to explain the trajectories further if we want to go beyond Bourdieu's excessively rigid polarity between bourgeois student and young worker in his studies of the 1960s. The approaches of the Spanish sociology of youth that tackle the subject of transition (Casal, Gracia, Merino, Quesada, 2006) can help in this matter; the two axis that draw up the space of the different modalities of transition are individuated by the celerity or delay in the family emancipation on the one hand, and by the simple (low cultural capital and unqualified work) or complex (labour success and high investment in education) character of entering the workforce. Thus, we would have six different trajectories: 1) early success; 2) attachment to family business; 3) worker; 4) precarious; 5) successive approximation; 6) erratic and blocking (Casal et alii, 2006: 39).

We could say that the first three transition models correspond to the logic of simple reproduction of the economic cultural and family cultural capital in the framework of a rapid emancipation from the family of origin; the other models present significant time mismatches between cultural capital and the valuation of educational degrees by the labour world, or more simply, are structurally conditioned by a scenario where precariousness became the rule of articulation and transformation of employment; therefore, the exit from the family nucleus became a long term project. The field of transitions, a space of construction of the different kinds of youth, presents some specific features since the end of the 1970s: long duration, fragmentation, institutionalisation of the management of mobility and precariousness (Cachón, 2003).

In the last decade the consolidation of a migrant youth has been parallel to its massive placement into precarious and erratic working trajectories, emphasizing a greater administrative, juridical and symbolic vulnerability to that of working class native young people, together with an earlier obligation to emancipate, caused by the need to economically help the family of origin[4]. In other words, we can imagine contemporary transitions of migrant young people as a space where new labour insertions, under the bias of precariousness and fragmentation, result in quick time family emancipations and the construction of new households. The distinction between working class native young people and migrant young people has to do on the one hand, with an obligation/option of a faster emancipation from the family, and on the other, with a deepening of the elements of vulnerability, that are destined to become more radical every time the economic cycle goes through a crisis, by the effects of institutional (new harder laws against the rights of settled migrant families and return policies) social and symbolic discrimination and racism, as an effect of the concurrence in the labour market with the impoverished native working classes (*the white poor*). Ahead of the resentment of the white poor –of course used as sudden political capital by significant sectors of the dominant classes- we have a symbolic territory where multiple ways of discrimination take place, for being young, working class, migrant, for the name, the colour, the neighbourhood of residence, sometimes for the religion and often for some sort of cultural bias. It is important to discuss how a set of cultural tropes can articulate different mechanisms and chronologies between Spanish young people and migrant

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[4] "Greater availability for employment and shorter educational trajectories, with a big component of sacrifice and family responsibility in a context of scarce choice that often leads to joining *labour for migrants*". (Carpio, Riezco, 2008: 198)

young people, establishing two different *loud and floating*[5] discourses (Santamaria, 2002): the discourse of tribes and the discourse of (Latin) gangs.

1.2. Between youth cultures and urban tribes

"…which means that *urban tribes* takes us back to the first settlers of the city. That is, to the savagery of those who act unbridled, without complying to any rules, where the law of the strongest holds sway" (Donald Rivera, 1995)

The quotation comes from a monographic work in a specialised magazine (*Cuaderno de Realidades Sociales*, 1995) that attempts to build a scientific discourse about a new classificatory language appeared in the public debate: *urban tribes*. How is this signifier inserted into the processes of creation of youth? To what extent does it represent a significant antecedent to understand the symbolic construction of gangs and migrant youth from the receiving society?

As we have seen, in the 1980s the official reports and the general research on youth from the State thought presented some restricting features; the youth, part of a homogeneous collective to be measured, was outside the territory of cultural representations and significations (Feixa, Porzio 2004). In other words, the dominant scientific discourse –functionalist and quantitative, Wright Mills would have called it abstract empiricism- placed the young person outside of all the literature from the School of Chicago to the School of Birmingham, that had put forward the issue of youth cultures in their multiple facets. It was anthropologists such as Manuel Delgado and Carles Feixa who rescued some essential categories (the style and the bricolage, the ritual resistance and the parody, the role of class, the invisibility of gender, the relationship between subaltern, hegemonic, parental and relational cultures, the caricature nature of transgression, hybridization and playing in youth micro cultures, the magical resolution of structural contradictions, and others) putting thus the basis to the need to overcome the positivist discourse of measurement. Also, some sociologists such as Martin Criado (1998; 2002 a,b) put the material and symbolic power mechanisms in the construction of youth into the stage, parting from a Bourdieusian approach.

Parallel to that, while the State thought replicated Parsons and the critical thinking applied and nuanced the approach of cultural studies, the mass media were establishing a *tribalist* referent with significant effects inside the academy. Like Isabel Gutierrez (2004) points out, the term *urban tribes*, born with the Madrid *movida* in the early 1980s, would be in its first media appearance and its consolidation essentially tied to a youth cultural and style dimension. During its peak period in the mid-1990s, this aspect would be overcome by a discourse of *violence* and *deviation* in some specific groups: the *okupas* and the *punk* as transgressors of the property order, the skinheads as paradigmatic barbarians of a total racism which was considered unacceptable and inopportune[6]. To some extent, these cultures had gone from aesthetics to shame

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[5] "A discourse from a diffuse and multiple emitter, expressed through different means, which is the product of a group practice and constructed from a thematic isotopy, which gives it coherence…" (Santamaría, 2002)

[6] According to the report by the Spanish Observatory on Racism and Xenophobia (*Observatorio Español sobre Racismo y Xenofobia*) (Oberaxe, www.oberaxe.es), in 2009 36% of interviewed people were reluctant towards immigration (D'Ancona M., 2010). We could conclude that skinheads put into practice a solution to what a significant group of blameless citizens described as a main problem and the

(Delgado, 2002) hence needed a sanitizing treatment and a moral-police intervention[7]. From the 1990s until the early 2000s, while there was no irruption of a migrant young condition in the scientific and popular doxa, and thanks also to the support by Maffesoli's work (1990), the brand *urban tribe* spread and became part of everyday life, having the effect of a caricaturized cultural approach to youth.

The media discourse is being reappropriated from the social sciences in books, papers and magazines in an attempt to articulate a narrative empirically based on some tropes: *savagery and primitivism*, *group narcissism*, (Aguirre, Rodríguez, 1997), *hazard*, *violence* and *sensationalism*, (Costa, Perez, Tropea, 1996), *pathologization* and, finally, *hierarchisation inside the magical*, being the tribes defined by the existence of chiefs, charismatic authorities and mythologies (Donald, 1995: 25).

All these elements, in different combinations, feed group and style catalogues, identikit and taxonomies that search, without irony, an empirical basis on press news. Information is gathered on each of them regarding origin, ideology, characteristics, clothing, drugs, music, religiousness, tendency to violence. Once fixed, groups become independent and dependent variables that can be statistically processed; thus, at the Institute of Applied Sociology of Madrid (*Instituto de Sociología Aplicada de Madrid*)(1995:119) Spanish young people are interrogated about the positive and negative characteristics of tribes, values and counter values, attitudes to have towards those who eventually would like to be part of such groups. Of course, as with any picturesque landscape, there will be the *good and the bad Indians*, those who can be saved and those who are lost.

As Manuel Delgado states, "it is this pseudo-science that allows assigning tribal responsibilities to all sorts of crimes, aggressions, mass fights, pillage or destruction…" (2002:132). An approach that gets a certain complicity from public institutions (that order and finance reports), the State repressive apparatus (that ensures safety ahead of these new hazards), the media (who create mass sellable narrations and moral panic), social scientists (who legitimate the subject and make it a problem to some extent), moral and health professionals (who spread damnation, salvation and pedagogy).

The discourse of *tribes* puts into operation different effects of reality: first, it allows an interpretation in terms of deviation of what is a conflict on the use of resources and the city, making disobedience and transgression something incomprehensible; second, the space of youth cultures becomes ethnic, expelling from the cognitive map any structural element tied to class factors. As Delgado states again, reflecting on Bourdieu's legacy on the power of social vision and division, "we are not classifying real objects which are unclassified, we recognize objects from reality according to the taxonomic organization to which we have previously submitted this reality. (…) Then the difference is not the cause, but the consequence of differentiation" (2002:140). This mechanism of ethnification of the young issue anticipates the emergence of the young migrant and the young gang member, especially Latin. In fact, the first emergence

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reductio ad hitlerum (Delgado, 2002) and the figure "racism as breakout" exerted the function of self-absolution on the receiving society (Santamaria, 2002) . In this way, racism can be explained as a reaction to an excess of immigrants in an interesting process of blaming the victims.

[7]   In the 1990s many police forces at local and national level constituted "Anti urban tribe brigades". The surveys about citizen security added in some cases questions about the fear of towards groups of young people.

comes after the second; in other words, it is through the young Latin gang member that the migrant youth will become visible, and by the way, deviated, pathological and violent.

In what could be a general balance of youth studies, Feixa and Porzio (2004) point out the following critical features about the previous period up to year 2000: uncritical acceptance of the concept of tribe, denial of the public conflict[8], equalization of differences into homogeneous categories, stereotyped cataloguing, absence of serious ethnographies that don't fall into journalism, invisibility of gender. In more recent years a massive growth of publications has been observed (between 2000 and 2003 there were more publications than in the previous three decades) and a certain institutionalisation of research (centres, observatories, etc.)

Thus, here we attach some preliminary considerations. From 2003 onwards, migrant youth broke into the scenario of studies and debates, with their labels in terms of *gangs*[9]. From an academic point of view, at that time there was no relationship between youth studies and migration studies, even though in the tradition of the School of Chicago, the trajectories of the *street corner societies* articulated structurally the issue of *ethnical* recovery and the urban settling/succession of migrating flows. Finally, any study of youth socialization with a minimum scientific ambition cannot approach this subject without taking into account the heritage of the Birmingham School and the post-subcultural contributions (Thornton, 1996; Muggleton, Weinzierl, 2003) and the concepts of class, resistance, rituals and styles. These latter should not be romanticised into univocal belongings, but should be placed inside the logic of a bodily and hybrid performance (Butler, 1990, 1993).

We have focused on the crystallization of the *tribalist* discourse, not with the aim of questioning the existence of other perspectives in the frame of the Spanish youth studies, but in the attempt to underline the functioning of a visible language and a dictionary –as well as its scientific, institutional and media legitimacy- which can be potentially used to capture the subject of sociality of migrant young people. However, the language of *gangs* is imposed on migrant youth even when the discourse of *tribes* has all the necessary elements to be meaningfully used. Why is that? We will come back to this, but one of the keys may be on the *normative* or *latent* side of the *tribalist*

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[8]　　In this sense, the *okupa* is not a pathological barbarian with affective and family detachment problems, but a subject that questions with all his ambivalence, a crucial element of the capitalist city, the real estate property.

[9]　　We need to go back to the phenomenon *Quinquis (crooks)* (Cuesta, Cuesta, Fernández Porta, Méndez 2009) in order to locate the previous use of the term *gang* in the field of youth. Since the transition into democracy a working class youth, partly biased by the *gypsy* and the Andalusian internal migration, constructed aesthetics and criminal practices through the re-appropriation of wealth. These subjects –called *quinquis* (from the Spanish *quincalla* (junk), a business undertaken by many gypsies) or *quillos* (from the Spanish *chiquillos*, a common name to be called in Andalucia)- opened a narrative and cinematographic genre and imposed protagonists whose personal achievements took place in the news (El Vaquilla, El Torete, …). *Gang* as a social object is a mechanism to designate forms of non-conforming socialization of the dangerous classes, often ethnical or ethnisizable, of working class young people, of those who in the English industrial revolution were designated as undeserving poor and were treated through work and correction laws and the banning of vagrancy. Regarding the contemporary construction of the object *gang*, the *quinquis* generated an epic and an affirmation of protagonists, a media industry different from the one that migrant young people have today. For a critical analysis of the social construction of gangs in Spain from academic studies, see the work by Feixa (2006), Feixa, Scandroglio, Lopez Martinez, Ferrandiz (2011), Scandroglio, Lopez (2010).

discourse. The elements composing tribalism in Maffesoli's postmodernism are taken as reference (emotional communities, underground energies, disperse sociality, physical approach of the experience, breakdown of the great narratives, nomadism and collapse of political-national loyalties) but are judged and from a moral point of view (loss of values, pathology, narcissism, moral untying, affective deficit, etc.); it assumes a panorama of emergent socialities that is immediately catalogued as dysfunctional in relation to institutions. In this sense the discourse is pre-multiculturalist: the fascination by the exotic lights that these groups can shed is minimal; the issue of cultural recognition is absent, and the key concern is to denounce their transgression of the moral order. At the same time, the dark side of these subjects –*primitivism* and *cannibalism* of the urban arena- can always be acknowledged as culturally close, as a perverted child of our institutions, not a total stranger. Finally, the class issue should not be forgotten: the label *tribe* is applied to the nonconformist children of the middle class, while the label *gang* is applied to the dangerous classes (Wacquant 2002), to the *undeserving poor*.

It is an ethnicization of youth –previous to the label of migrant youth, remember- which is therefore truncated, incapable of building a community of *us* which is not residual and nostalgic (adults bearers of the old, healthy values) and at the same time clearly distant from the *otherness* that it constructs; this otherness lies within the bowels of the adult society and is never evacuated. In spite of the words, the sign of the tribal discourse resides in this truncation, with little colonial efficacy, understood as the capacity to perform a fully subaltern and distant otherness, and at the same time asserting a new nativism culturally legitimated, naturalised as hegemonic and capable of stating a mission of civilisation. At the same time, the search for a colonial efficacy is articulated within the framework of a discourse biased by the idea of integration, of cultural selection of migration, by the polarity between the *Moorish* and the *Latin* as two great references of Spanish experience and national history.

1.3 The ballast of origin. The restless emergence of the young migrant

Let's interrogate ourselves more deeply in relation to the impact of the birth of a migrant youth condition within the field of discourses and practices. A 2001 paper by Rosa Aparicio devoted to the research literature about the children of immigrants pointed out that nearly all the available works so far had taken the school environment and primary school children as the object, as a result of the public administration concern about "the tensions occurred in some schools" (2001:172). At that time research about migrant families and their influence on their children's socialization did not exist out of the educational arena. A few years later, Natalia Riba Mateos (2004) pointed out in a summary text about migration studies in Spain, that research about youth just did not exist. Youth was captured through education: curricula, access rights, concentration in certain secondary schools, performance and language learning. In other words, the object emerged under different effects: its school determination and the concern of public authorities facing a new social composition in compulsory education, the intercultural debate that evokes the cultural conflict as the problem to manage and solve, and the impact of abundant international literature about second generations (García Borrego, 2003).

Earlier, in 2000, the events at El Ejido had turned migration into a social object seen through the lens of social problem. In 2003 the first conflicts on the use of public space

by migrant young people –often called *Latin gangs*- were given media coverage, and the first publications by Lorenzo Cachón (2003) about the subject appeared. In 2004 the object got into the surveys of Injuve, the official Youth Institute. From then on, studies and debates multiplied. How do we explain these dynamics of affirmation of a research object?

In general, research results and methods on migration, with an overwhelmingly expanding literature from the 1990s onwards, correspond to some very well identified guidelines by Sayad (2008) through his category of State thought. Migration as an object is over determined by the state interests and governed according to the financing of subjects and research lines that impose a way of thinking on a phenomenon. García Borrego (2001), Santamaría (2002), Álvarez (2002) among others, make the features of the political economy of knowledge evident in Spain –although it is not very different from other countries: a) the methodological nationalism of studying migration in terms of benefits and disadvantages for a nation; b) the fragmentation of migrants according to their national groups; c) the construction of culturally close and distant subjects in function of their nation-cultural classification; d) the division of issues parallel to the state interventions (housing, work...) and the geography of administration e) the affirmation of a problematic state and of a deficit, as an ontological condition of the migrant, that needs to be overcome when possible; f) the affirmation of the trope of integration as a primary focus in the analysis of migration.

The internalisation of the point of view of the State as the client (García Borrego, 2001), of its capacity of financing and organising the research, determines implicitly the field of studies and also damages naturally, that is without direct censorship, its autonomy. This is why Santamaría's (2002) suggestion of *unthinking* the phenomenon, of determining an epistemological rupture and "examine the mechanisms of social designation" (2002:96) is so important. This includes the discourses – the tropes and the metaphors- that constitute the object of study: *Spain as a country of immigration* (a country that has moved from being backward into the modern side), *the foreign woman as a victim* (affirming again the national cultural superiority), *the problematic character of integration* by fragile subjects in conditions of deficit, need of help and at the same time transgressive (discourse reinforced by those who denounce inequalities and by those who underline threat and danger), *the fear of a racist outbreak*, *the religious fundamentalism*, and above all, *the cultural difference between them and us.*

These tropes, in their floating and loud character, substantiated by different media in different arenas (from the press to the academy, from the cultivated to the popular, from advertising to political debates), are used as many varied metaphors: *water* metaphors, as an invitation to channel the things that can overflow; *botanical* metaphors, the garden needs pruned, arranged and we need rid of all the weeds; *medical*, we need to heal; *war*, we need to fight the enemy within. These are metaphors that articulate the discourse of civilisation, contention, protection, a public and national order perceived as violated and questioned from the outside and the inside. The discourse on integration will gain a leading role both, in science and in cultivated and popular debates. Integration seen as a voluntary and individual fact, as a demonstration and rewarding of what's a good and useful immigration, as an action going from the migrant person to the *hosting* society, as positive pole (as it assumes a certain dose of cultural difference as tolerable) in relation to the negative nuance assigned to assimilation. In parallel, the figure of the culturally not integrable will be constituted, where the *Moorish* and the *Islamic* will

replace the *Gipsy* (Alvarez, 2002) and where it will be allowed to think Spain, a State of autonomies marked by linguistic plurality, as a homogeneous society ahead of the challenges threatening its social cohesion.

The construction of good and bad migration will give rise to debates and arguments towards a cultural selection of flows, which will, among other factors, determine the massive growth of Latin-American migration in the new millennium (ahead of the historical North African migration). Cultural selection anticipates the most recent discourse of *migration choisi*, where the centrality of the State is reaffirmed by choosing the volumes and characteristics of the migrants and favour some sectors according to their economic usefulness. Thus, Mikel Azurmendi (promoted during Aznar's first government as the president of the Forum for the social integration of migrants), Herrero de Miñón (one of the fathers of today's Spanish Constitution), and other intellectuals, archbishops and of course political decision makers draw up a map of desire where *Latin* represents the pole of cultural and linguistic proximity as opposed to the *Moorish*. Those close and known (colonially) against the Islamic danger – the jihadism– as a mechanism of binding extremely heterogeneous subjects together: those who can be civilised and integrated and those who can not.

This is not about going in depth into each one of these tropes, it is rather about placing the elements that define the discourse about non-EU migration for their capacity of shaping an object –be they *young people of migrant origin*, *children of migration*, *second generations*- which is massively evoked and studied since 2004. Pedreño summarizes very clearly the two imaginaries that stage the vision of this object: on the one hand, its quality of *target of public policies* through their deficits at school or at work; on the other hand, the Latin gangs as urban dangers and the North African young people in their exhibitions of religious symbols and possible fundamentalist affiliations (Pedreño, 2007: 138). Moreover, the services specialized in insertion build them as fragile subjects, in need of help (Parauja, 2004) and implement the learning of cultural devices (Montenegro et alii, 2010) to promote their employability combining a behavior contention (*you need to be punctual*) and a correction of cultural characteristics (*you don't speak Arabic, you don't wear a hat*), while the integration plans from the youth policies and migration policies in a more abstract framework, reaffirm the need and urgency of integration.

As for the young bodies, we can see the same biases that define the discourse of non-EU migration somewhat amplified. At the same time, an interesting –and interested- sudden transformation can be seen: the perception of young Latins as problematic for their culture. *Gangs* and *jihadism*, after the 2005 insurgences in the French peripheries, become the subtexts of many discourses about migrant youth, spread by the media and academic and intellectual sectors, the worrying articulation of the *Latin* and the *Moorish.* "The question is: Will these things appear in Spain?" (Aparicio, Tornos: 2009: 17).

Ultimately, in Spain as in many countries of new settlement, young migrant people are often conceived as a homogeneous community, articulated on ethnic-cultural cleavages, while their presence represents a challenge to social cohesion and their vulnerability resides in being suspended between two cultures (García Borrego, 2011; Queirolo Palmas 2012).

The migrant youth plays a symbolic role that questions the temporary character of migration, that is, projects a *posterity* which is unwanted by the receiving society. Many signs (from naturalizations to mixed marriages, from educational insertion to birth) are testimonies of the force and the speed of the process of settlement in Spain (Table 3), which invites us to consider the country as a post-migrating society (Martiniello, 2000). In contrast to the 80.000 foreign students enrolled in 1998/1999, more than 770.000 have enrolled in 2010/2011 between primary and secondary school, 9,9 percent of the total of students (Mec, 2011). The autonomous communities of Madrid and Catalonia (with an incidence of 12.9% and 13.8% above the average respectively), constitute the two great poles of attraction and settlement of family migration with potential for future loading. One in every four marriages has a foreign partner and one in every four children has a foreign parent. In less than 10 years nearly half a million naturalization processes were filed, most of them Latin American citizens under the criterion of two-year residence.

Tab. 3 – Some indicators of migration *posterity* in Spain

Total foreigners 0-19 (2011)	1,128,455
Incidence over the total resident foreign population (2010)	19.6%
Foreigners born in Spain (2011) Absolute value and incidence of the range 0-19 over the total of foreigners	381,418 (33.8%)
Incidence of the range 0-4 born in Spain over the total foreigners (2011)	83.8 %
Incidence of the range 5-9 born in Spain over the total foreigners (2011)	35.6%
Total born with one foreign parent (1996-2009)	871,093
New born with one foreign parent (2009)	119,721
Incidence of foreigners over the total of new born (2009)	24.19
Foreign students (2010/2011)	770,384
Incidence of foreign students over the total of students (2010/2011)	9.9
Foreign students in pre-primary school	131,135
Foreign students in post-compulsory education (2010-2011)	42,833 (6.8%)
Foreign students in Vocational Training (2010/2011)	44.760 (7.7%)
Foreign students in PCPI (Initial Professional Qualification Courses)	14,394 (18%)
Foreign students enrolled at university (2008/2009)	37,230 (2.7%)
Citizenship granting (2009)	79,597
Incidence of naturalizations for 2-year residence	76%
Total amount of citizenship granting (2001-2009)	444,184
Incidence of Latin American citizen granting over the total (%)	76%
Incidence of mixed marriage over the total marriages (2009)	24%

Source: Mec 2009/2010; 2010/2011. INE 2011

We can highlight that one third of what we call migrants are children, adolescents or young people that have never migrated. This would be the strict definition of second

generation; but if we observe the difference between absolute figures of foreign young people (0-19) and the number of born between 1996 and 2009 (almost 900,000), in the absence of more accurate data, we need to conclude that a great portion of this generation have accessed Spanish citizenship and for that reason is invisible to migration statistics.

If we pay closer attention to the educational statistics, the fall of registrations from compulsory to post-compulsory school, show an obvious school failure and drop-out (Serra 2010) and the massive orientation of these young people into vocational training trajectories[10], to an extent that we could see an anticipation mechanism of what Ambrosini calls *subaltern integration* (Ambrosini, 2005) y Mezzadra calls *differential inclusion* (Mezzadra, 2004). Franzé Mundanó introduces the term educational externalization of students from migrant origin, which is expressed "through a triple tendency: attributing the explanation of their trajectories and academic performance to such external factors; moving immigrant students from the ordinary classroom and/or the school towards places that slowly move them off the academic and ordinary track; and leaving the socio-educational intervention in the hands of specialized professionals" (Franzé et alii, 2010: 125).

If, as Bourdieu puts it, what unifies a generation is their relationship with the school, we can state here a radical difference that is built between natives and foreigners from the very educational apparatus; this inequality of opportunities within a generation, depending on the origin, is still active, even if in 2009 some legal obstacles were overcome that had previously prevented significant groups of migrant students from following their non-compulsory education and also prevented reunited children from working legally. Franzé's work helps us interpret these issues beyond the binary logic inclusion/exclusion; it is rather a grooved space, in school as in other areas, where multiple processes of differential and subaltern integration operate. Ten years later, we can see these processes fully applied on the same subjects –the Latin American- that had been attracted and previously seen as culturally close.

Whatever their origin, the children of migrations, a stable presence in European cities, incarnate what Sayad (2002, 2008) defined as inopportune posterity, since they break the myth of the temporariness of migration and question the role of the migrant as the good, neutral and silent guest. They represent a projection towards the future, making permanent what was thought to be temporary, thus breaking the dream and the myth of their return present in the State thought and in the expectations of the first generation migrants. The children of immigrants are thus, for the nation's body and thought, the emblem of an imposed migration, the ghost of all contemporary rhetoric about the State's right to choose what migration they accept.

However, if we take as an example the case of second generations, it is not clear who should be included in this category. What is it that matters? Is it the place of birth, having foreign parents, the characteristics of socialization, school experience, a mixture of all that? As we pointed out, Rumbaut underlines the importance of the place of birth and the time of socialization in the receiving society in his proposal of decimal

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[10] More than 60% of foreign students who follow education after the compulsory stage (or after having expelled from it) are oriented towards vocational training and initial qualification courses (see Tab. 3) The processes of educational segregation would be even more glaring if we took into account not only foreign students, but Spanish students from a migrant origin.

definition of second generations. Ambrosini (2005), in a pragmatic way, opens the limits of this category to all the children of migration.

In Spain, recent works about second generations (Portes, Aparicio, Haller, 2009; 2011; Aparicio 2011) give examples about many of the limits of migration studies, as many authors have pointed out. We find paradigmatic one text by Aparicio (2011), which contains data from a statistically representative survey done in private and public schools in Madrid and Barcelona about young people aged 13 to 15[11]: the risk of *downward mobility* is regretted (as if there was no class society, inside and outside the educational space, which uses massively origin as a selection mechanism) and it is linked among other things to a gang membership. It gives no description of the structural mechanisms that explain the reproduction of inequalities in the receiving society, but rather a complacent and moralist look (on the one hand discrimination would be something not perceived by the majority of students[12], on the other hand, the risk of having conflictive attitudes and making up conflictive groups would depend on a dysfunctional family nucleus); a referent is individuated in gangs to explain the deterioration of relationships, expectations and quality in schools.

Therefore, what Spain has in common with other countries is confirmed: the underlying fear in the research about young people and a conception of integration as an individual voluntarism (García Borrego, 2007). This ambiguous and polysemic word -*integration*- is totally internal of the receiving society's functional logics and is articulated through a dictionary that mixes cultural and socio economic elements, like in the theory of Portes and colleagues (Portes, Fernandez Kelly, Haller, 2009) amplified in Spain by Aparicio (2011) about segmented assimilation; in this perspective the *official* question -real mechanism of self-absolution of the receiving society- often turns back on the individual's capacity to *integrate* better, and rarely on how institutions need to transform to assume a new social composition of the public space.

We think that an important step in the progress of studies needs to be placed on the one hand in a radical exit from culturalism, from this restless construction of the object, and on the other hand in the capacity of constantly questioning the production of these constituting views of receiving societies under the tropes of the fear and the misery (Carasquilla Coral et alii, 2007). As we have pointed out in another context (Queirolo Palmas, 2012), there is a plurality of cognitive effects of this culturalism: on the one hand, insisting in the migrant origin of this generation underlines a quality that seems to come from a quasi ontological definition of these subjects (*reification effect*), which makes their lives incomparable with those of their native contemporaries (*effect of removal* of a similar condition of youth), reducing a biography to an origin (*methonimic effect*) and then transforming the origin into the destiny (*effect of overdertermination*).

The category *second generation*, placing an emphasis on the conservation of the cultural distance, reminds the children of immigrant families and popular classes that, in spite of their efforts, they will always be tied to another cultural space, and therefore, their

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[11]   The definition of second generations here is: having one foreign parent, having been born in Spain or having arrived before the age of 12, be aged between 13 and 15 (Aparicio, 2011: 119)
[12]   If according to Rosa Aparicio discrimination is a minor issue, from the declarations of self-perception of adolescents aged between 13.5 and 14.4 (the mean age of the sample in Barcelona and Madrid respectively), for Iñaki García Borrego (2010) and other authors (Pedreño 2007) discrimination is the fact that sets the children of migration as a group and as an object.

existence does not deserve full citizenship. In what logic can a past participle (migrated) be applied to people and imagine them petrified in time? And in parallel, how can we talk about migrants "using a present tense to describe an action that took place in the past?" (Delgado, 27:2010). On what logic can we talk about migrant minors when many of them were born or spent their childhood in Spain? According to the citizenship regulations, shouldn't we more appropriately talk about *non migrant foreigners*, a pair of words that appear contradictory at once? And last, is the quality of migrant inherited, passed from parent to child, as the term second generation seems to suggest?

It seems more promising, therefore, to shift the observation plan towards the plurality of processes articulated around the definition and image of a social group, real symbolic fights between hetero-representations and self-representations. We wouldn't have to question about second generations, but rather about how certain subjects are constructed as second generations and about the effects of the discourse in terms of strategies and practices that the subjects involved put into operation in the public representation of themselves.
In the case of the children of migration, this symbolic and material operation confronts the dimension of posterity, the collapse of the myth of return, and what has been called the paradox of integration (Wrench, Rea, Ouane, 1999): the perception of a surplus of discrimination, for having been exposed to mechanisms of socialisation that operate in the receiving society, the crash between expectations and opportunities, the internalisation of the social objectives (speaking in Merton's terms) and the difficulty of finding appropriate means to reach these shared objectives.

Coming back to the question that opens this section, these categories of people designed from the top, stop being immigrant / migrant / of immigrant origin only when they manage to access the prerogative of citizenship that using Goffman's words we could call *polite disregard*, or in words of Delgado (2007:192) *right to indifference,* a condition of opacity by which some subjects "are not forced to explain or justify what they do or think, the rites they participate in, what they eat, what sexuality they have, what their religious feelings are, what their view of the world is, all the data that we, *the normals*, would not provide to people outside our intimate circles". To claim the right of opacity for everyone is the condition to generate less asymmetric forms of encounters not subaltern to a colonial gaze (Glissant, 2007). The right to opacity or indifference incorporates the best challenge of the discourse of integration or integrability applied to youth, a discourse based on the migrant condition as material and cultural heritage (Pedreño, 2007).

1.4. Beyond the ballast of heritage. An approach in terms of agency.

The heritage, seen from receiving societies, is also denounced as a deficit (*the cultural ballast*); if it is true that the socialisation of migrant families influences their children (García Borrego, 2011), we need to imagine heritage as a critical link that opens the possibility of an agency by itself. It would be necessary to constantly see among those designated *as others*, *by others* what the forms of resistance, effervescence and creativity are, in mimicry and in the search for the right to anonymity, in the spectacularity of transforming the stigma into an emblem (Goffman, 1963).

In the lines of Mannheim (1990), generations as age groups are defined, formed and search for their responses and claims by relating to a historical transformation of the world. The crisis and birth of a post-migrating society are the two axis of contemporaneity, at the forefront of which actors, subjects and generational segments are taking their positions. *Natives* and children of migration experiment similarities and differences. Mass education, unemployment and work precariousness, extension of the permanence with the family are structural conditions of the current youth condition in Spain like in other countries, but they incarnate in the same age group in different ways according to class, *race*, and nationality. For young people of migrant origin, school takes place in the lesser valued forms of education and is biased by high drop-out rates, precariousness and unemployment is affected by a surplus of exploitation and a constant series of administrative irregularities imposed on their lives by the State, while the social relations inside the families push them towards a rapid entry into the adulthood and to assume a responsibility within the household economy. Therefore, there is a triple discrimination placed upon these new Spaniards: they're young, migrant, and proletarian.

The children of migration nowadays face a re-proposal of a logic of assimilation and cultural selectivity (accompanied by emphasis on the invasion and invitation to return) on the one hand, and on the other, a structural crisis affecting young people's mobility trajectories -assured by the school and the factory, training and work, during a long part of the 20th Century- that they see multiplied in their bodies by processes of illegality, imprisonment (Oddone and Queirolo Palmas, 2011) and administrative constraints of the right to exist, to live, to stay and to travel. In the framework of the crisis, the apparently contradictory mixture of desire of assimilation, culturalism, statement of the social costs of migration[13] and the invitation to return is trying to define the courses of subaltern integration from the receiving society.

But as Lydia Lo Schiavo (2011:2) points out, *"the collective illusion of temporariness confronts the young migrants' emerging historicity-subjectivity"*; the key for a different approach lays on the concept of *agency*, as the capacity of protagonism, of creative transformation of social relations, of infra-political resistance to differential inclusion. The space of an agency lays between the condition of the actor (the one who plays a role within the script of social relations) and the condition of the author (the one who transforms, establishes the pace and the characters in the script). It is the dimension of improvisation that according to Bourdieu works in every field and breaks the ties between the space of positions and the space of positioning.

We can localise the threads of agency in assertive attitudes (the claim of rights) but also in the tactic, opportunistic and instrumental uses of difference, in the exhibition of bodies and presences, in the aesthetics exhibited, in the microphisical appropriations of urban spaces. Agency should also be assumed in its most embarrassing modalities: swindling, theft, predatory practices in the streets that represent, as Bourgois (2005) pointed out in a masterly ethnography, forms of agency submerged in ambivalence and mechanisms of social reproduction of the assigned destiny[14].

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[13]   Guided by this perspective, Partido Popular's right wing government has decided in 2012 to exclude undocumented migrants from the health care system.

[14]   In a recent research that we carried out in an Italian prison, several young people from immigrant origin claimed their criminal *cursus* as their only way of resistance against work exploitation and social humiliation.

In any case, as Colombo (2010) suggests, it is necessary to overcome the idea and the stigma of deficit and division between cultures in order to consider in a reversed way important portions of this generation, the child of immigration, as an active minority: young people affected on the one hand, by multiple processes of discrimination which are marked by the renaissance of a colour line (Du Bois, 2007) and on the other hand, capable of moving within the pores of the social space, counting on ambivalence as a resource and as a creative response to the material and symbolic tight boundaries in order to gain an advantageous position inside the becoming global of the world. To think about the different forms of agency of the children of migration means to envisage differences, not as things, but as strategies, a repertoire of practices that are used in a contingent manner, that articulate irony, mimicry, ostentation, emphasis and roaming, far from any idea of culture as specific container, essentialised and naturalised, that needs to be legitimised and organised through specific cultural policies of recognition (Colombo and Semi 2007).

Sayad (2002) taught us that racism exists and is perceived only when one leaves the warm welcome of the ethnical-national-family circle, when one takes the first steps into the host societies. The generation we are talking about has grown within the host countries, it cannot be expelled or aborted, but it can be re-located and ethnicised as it does not accept an assigned destiny. In this perspective, the *colour line*, a control mechanism of the symbolic and material mobility of a generation, is the posthumous reaction to *invasion*: the reaction of those who question with their own practices the heritage of the migrant condition and consider themselves, on the contrary, a child of their own life instead a of "a child of migration".

To cope with a stigma that organises itself in a mobile way constructing race, culture, colour -inventing the white race, the black race and the many intermediate colours of races and crystallisations- the young children of migration organise different practices of resistance: from transforming the stigma into an emblem (*the mestizo pride, the blackness, the Latin race*) to mimicry, to the oblique gestures and the claim of a right to indifference. In a recent research carried out in Barcelona (Giliberti, 2011), young migrant Dominicans, used to thinking about themselves as white (compared to the Haitians as their black reference), discover that they are treated as *blacks* in the receiving society; colour and race appear in the words of one of the informers with a clear mobile label applied to exploitation "*blacks work like blacks because blacks are always working harder to live like whites...*". To cope with racism, these young people accumulate symbolic capital claiming their pride to be *the blacks of Barcelona* on the one hand, and refusing any label, acting on the territory of indifference, on the other. On the contrary, other young people internalise the negative value of being considered *black* and try to find new objectives and new social groups on which they can project the stigma.

Therefore, to assume agency means to go beyond the debate itself about the second generation, a term that reduces the space of sociability to an origin and a descent, obliterating the creative capacities of the subjects to challenge the State thought, the inappropriate posterity, the colour line. Young people cease to be immigrants in this context, freeing themselves from the residues of the scientific and popular *doxa* that would like to enclose them in stereotyped narratives in terms of social cohesion, deficit and passiveness, ethnic communitarism and suspension between cultural universes. This dimension of agency / resistance, transversal in the generations we are talking about is,

however, strongly marked by class lines and, within the crisis, is articulated between the marginalised middle class and the young proletarians: on the one hand, we have those young migrants who have tried to turn the family cultural capital into new educational investment, and on the other hand we have those who, expelled by the educational and employment circuits, resist in a creative way or succumb to what, for North America, Loic Wacquant (2011) has called the deadly symbiosis between ghetto and jail.

Throughout this text we have identified different features that mark the academic debate: a) the ideological production of youth as a classless subject; b) the ethnification of national young people in terms of tribes and vulgarisation of a culturalist discourse; c) the oblique visualisation of class under the sign of race and ethnicity in a post-migrating society and d) the construction of differential integrability criteria by culture. The emergence of a migrant youth issue in Spain in 2003/2004 was strongly marked by the discourse of *gangs* termed *Latin*, as the children of the *undeserving poor*, judged for making a non conforming use of the city. Paradoxically, these subjects, thought of initially as culturally close, could suddenly make a shift in the public representation, enacting with their memberships and behaviours the panic and the virus of imagined gangs and violent young people, not as a product of the receiving society, but rather as an imported product. This permanent mobility of the labels that define the good and the bad, the close and the distant, has also something to do with the permanent fight between posterity and *nouria*, a term that in Sayad defines the rotational character of migration and the pressure of States to make it be like that. The children of the *nouria*, even those defined as integrable, can quickly become inopportune and, therefore, distant, as they take hold of the urban space, they give it a different sense and thus overstep the established social and moral order.

Part 2

The Policies and Policing of Gangs in Contemporary Spain. Ethnography of a Bureaucratic Field of the State

2.1. Unthinking the gangs

Over the last few years a developing interest in gangs has arisen as a consequence of the French *banlieue* explosion, the UK and Swedish riots and other phenomenon concerning young migrants and second generations in Europe. According to Brotherton and Hallsworth (2011:1), in the case of Great Britain, "by constructing the gang as a suitable enemy, complex social problems that have their origins in the way our society is organized are being translated instead into problems of law and order to which illiberal law and order solutions are then to appear logical and necessary". Similar media panic processes and the depiction of gangs as scapegoats, have been documented in the case of the young *latinos* in Spain and Italy (Feixa et al. 2006; Queirolo Palmas 2009). Moreover, research networks such as EuroGang (Klein et alii, 2001) have been set up with the aim of observing the development of such phenomenon in Europe, underlining analogies and differences with the American case study both in terms of groups' criminal characteristics as well as proposed solutions, which tend almost always to be of a repressive nature.

Despite the concept of gangs developed in the early years of sociology (Hagedorn, 2009), its definition is not so widely shared; pioneer studies led by Trasher and the Chicago school provide an open representation of the phenomenon where conflict is only one aspect among other main elements incorporating "corpus spirit, solidarity, mood, group consciousness and attachment to territory" (Thrasher 1927: 46). Klein (1971) instead has developed a definition, probably the most predominant among those currently in use, whereby criminal potentiality is considered to be the main feature of a gang; following Brotherton and Barrios, from an alternative perspective to the sociological and criminological mainstream, gangs can be observed as street organizations or "groups composed mainly by youths and adults from marginalized social classes whose aim is to provide members with a solid identity, a chance to be recognized at individual and collective level, a voice to challenge the dominant culture, a refuge from tensions and pressures of the neighborhood and ghetto life and a spiritual *enclave* where new rituals can be generated and considered as sacred" (Brotherton, Barrios 2004: 23). In line with this perspective, resistance to subordination, mutual help and cultural recognition all become a means of interpreting and observing the daily behavior of the gangs members.

However, the main focus of this article is not about the social working of youth gangs but rather the fabrication of gangs[15] as a social problem in Spain during the last decade. Therefore we attempt to interpret the genesis and transformation of the object-problem *gangs* from a theoretical perspective that revolves around some classic categories of the contemporary sociological thought: *field*, *capital* and *habitus*. Constructing a scientific object means breaking away from with the academic *doxa* and common sense; generating this change in approach means to *unthink gangs,* to view them from behind and assume as object the work of construction of the gang-object, as problem and as

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[15] In the present text we use the word *gang* aware that it is an *etic* category, blurred by the social control agencies, which does not correspond to an *emic* language of the young members that prefer to talk about *chorus*, *group*, *nation*, *association*, *clica*, *family*, *organisation*. We will also use the *etic* term gang scene to highlight the fluid, turbulent and heterogeneous character of the memberships of street sociability. For an insight on gangs from a rhizomatic, versus an arboreal approach, see Hallsworth (2011); for a theoretic overview about the topic, see Feixa (1998) and Scandroglio (2010).

target of intervention.

The mobilisation of the different agencies in Spain during the last ten years to highlight, eradicate, heal this object-problem has created expert officials from different state bureaucracies and their local frameworks (Autonomous Communities, Provincial Administrations, Municipalities…), as well as models of relationship, cooperation and conflict between them. According to Bourdieu (1992) a bureaucratic field is a space where government and non-government agents struggle to control a field of practice (the *policies* and the *policing* about gangs, that is, the management, supervision control and repression measures) through laws, regulations, funding, classifications and the production of suitable languages and codes. Each field, in turn, is defined by the specific capitals, by the betting and habitus of its players, by the faith that the game is worth playing by their rules, by the entry rights required from new players, by the fights between the dominant and those aspiring to be (*orthodoxy and heterodoxy*), by the construction of vision principles and division principles, by a topography of positions and stances, by the reference public (*the clients of the field*).

The specialised field that we study here emerges from the intersection of many bureaucratic fields (police, penal, social, educational..) and experiences articulations, struggles and variable relations of force between their different agents (broadly speaking, between the State's *right and left hands*). The gangs – the whole gang scene in all its heterogeneity – are the public of this field, the clients, partly captive and partly resistant, towards which practices and discourses are addressed. The State is the ruling meta-field, constituting the policy guidelines and defining priorities and resources towards this specialised bureaucratic sub-field[16]. How can this specialised field be located and studied? As Bourdieu shows us, on the one hand the boundaries of a field are the boundaries of its effects; on the other hand, agents and institutions are part of a field so far as they act and produce effects in it. We can imagine that this boundary is placed in the transformation of the gang scenario, in its autonomy and permanent turbulence, in a public-client of *policy* or *policing* of some sort (be they prison protocols, specific social programmes for this category of young people or police mechanisms of investigation and detention). What agents share to be able to play on the same field, is having, as capital of their own, experiences of intervention on the young migrant condition (and their leisure practices within the urban space) seen as inopportune and problematic, as they are seen to generate and import violence, and therefore are susceptible to being denounced, corrected, transformed, watched, suppressed or punished, according to the circumstances.

Thus, we have identified the following effect-producing positions: a) the police; b) the justice; c) the prison; d) the school; e) the territory (local institutions) with their clients (religious or laic associations) in charge of certain categories of marginal people; f) the academia; g) the media; h) the group leadership in the gang scenario. The first three (police, justice, prison) articulate the State's right hand, the second two (school,

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[16] Public officials mainly populate a bureaucratic field; nonetheless the habitus of *professionalism* that these agents often mobilise as rhetoric is always sensitive to the political relations at State level. State, through his political capital (decision about the importance of the specific bureaucratic field) and economic capital (resources and allocations assigned), acts on the birth, the reproduction, the transformation and, eventually the death of his bureaucratic field. Agents fight in order to legitimate the importance of their practices and sustain some autonomy for the field; others scholars call this field devoted to the fabrication of a phenomenon as a problem-target the gang industry (Hallsworth, 2013).

territory) are the left hand, and the last (academia and communication media) work – both for the State's right and left hands - in the production of a public narration and interpretation of the phenomenon. Finally, the gang leaderships express the point of view of the clients of the policies boosted by the State's right and left hand. In this text we will develop a field analysis focusing on the State's right and left hand actors; in other works we have explored in more detail the role of the media (Queirolo Palmas, 2013a) and the academia (Queirolo Palmas, 2013b).

2.2 About contexts and methods

We have chosen to focus on two great metropolitan areas - Barcelona and Madrid, scenarios of massive reception and subaltern insertion processes of immigrant labour - because of the polarity that they express and publicly narrate, in terms of institutional interventions facing the gang scene[17].

The murder of Ronny Tapias, a young Colombian boy in Barcelona, in October 2003 outside a school marked the media and social emergence of the *gangs*: groups of migrant young people with dangerous and exotic names (Latin Kings, Ñetas, Vatos Locos, Dominican Don't Play, Trinitarios, Mara Salvatrucha), fighting for their territories and taking part in violent actions perceived as gratuitous and novel. Three years later, as an effect of the explicit policy of Barcelona City Council, these groups had been turned into youth cultural associations, registered by the Government of Catalonia. The change in the approach – *institutionalising and normalising[18] gangs* – emerged from a public intervention in which academia, local institutions and the autonomic police collaborated with the aim of directing this phenomenon within a framework of control, vigilance and social empowerment, and damage and violence reduction.

The same groups that in Barcelona institutions consecrated as cultural associations since 2006, in Madrid fell within the area of illicit organisations and into the consequent legitimacy of a repressive type of action[19]; different judicial sentences – some of them later annulled by the Supreme Court of Justice - declared these youth groups illegal, thus just belonging was a criminal offence, detaining and deporting members and the top leaders.

The gang-policy field emerges within the two contexts of study under different force correlations: in one case the focus is placed on the State's right hand, and in the other case it is placed on the left hand. The physical and symbolic sign of this polarity is the opposition between *cultural association* and *illicit association* in the treatment of the young people. At the same time, the polarity between *zero tolerance* on the one hand and *normalisation* on the other hand, cloud the incoherencies that in many cases are hidden between the practical needs and the discourse needs.

At the end of 2011, when this research began, little remained in Catalonia of the social interventions with street groups: the legalised associations were ephemeral and void of any public relevance, while a new hegemonic, political and media discourse attempted to overcome "the kindness that had lead to funding gangs". In Madrid, at the same time,

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[17] For further details see Feixa, Scandroglio, López Martinez, Ferrandiz (2011), Scandroglio and López Martinez (2010), Canelles (2008), Lahosa (2008), Aparicio y Tornos (2009).

[18] *Normalisation* is the word used by many of my informants to describe the sense of their actions and policies toward the gangs.

[19] It is important to point out that until that time, the figure illicit association had been used almost exclusively in the fight against ETA, the "gang" par excellence in Spain.

institutions attempted not to mobilise the discourse of *gangs* too much in public terms and held onto the same policy of zero tolerance.

The crisis is the crucial element that marks a before and an after in the history of this bureaucratic field in both contexts: the first stage corresponds to a period of economic prosperity that lead to the increase of social expense and of the youth and *integration* policies, but since the end of 2008 the economic cycle is radically reversed in all its indicators. My entry into this field thus corresponds to the peak of the crisis: all sorts of social cutbacks in basic sectors of society (education, health, pensions, public salaries...) and massive unemployment (approximately 50% of young people and 25% of the total labour force in 2012), even more pronounced among the immigrant population (35%) due to the collapse of the building sector; the reduction of the net stock of immigrants and the increase of migration of Spanish citizens to other countries must be added to these. The crisis is thus a key element to be taken into account within the research panorama, as it changes the resources the players have on the field, transforms the game and its rules, the order of priority in public policies, and structurally modifies the logics of action in the gang scene[20].

We have opted for a methodological triangulation, crossing different accounts and empirical tools : a) grey literature produced by the actors in the field (protocols, press statements, reports, congress and conference minutes, statistics, judicial sentences, etc.); b) 43 interviews were carried out in Madrid and Barcelona with the different actors that are involved in the gang scene; c) 9 focus groups with the relevant actors were conducted; d) the participation as an expert in consulting committee fostered by the right and left hands of the State in Catalonia[21]; e) 36 gang leaders and members have been contacted (in Madrid, Barcelona and Alicante) and interviewed, mainly in order to realize the documentary film.

What was at first envisaged as a classical research mechanism focused on interviews, has little by little turned into an ethnography of a bureaucratic field of the state; we have shared many informal conversations with the informants, participation in events and lectures, meals and coffee meetings at restaurants, salsa and reggaeton concerts, e-mail discussions, visits to significant places and work-related journeys; all of which have enabled the accumulation of time together and a crucial capital of trust to go beyond the effects of representation consubstantial to the interview technique.

2.3. The State's right hand and the warrior capital

Throughout this ethnography, police officers and other justice and security agents were the subjects with whom I had most interactions. This wasn't intentional, but a natural

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[20] For example, the growth of the importance of the ties between groups, young people and street economy, within the framework of a radical increase of unemployment.

[21] The *Gabinet de Seguretat del Departament d'Interior* de la Generalitat de Catalunya (Catalan Government's Security Cabinet) invited me to participate in a discussion workshop about "violence and the public space", focused on the so-called NGJOV (*Nuevos Grupos Juveniles Organizados y Violentos*) (New Organised, Violent, Youth Groups), the politically correct acronym to refer to gangs at the time. The workshop was held monthly from January to July 2012 and officials from Barcelona City Council, the Catalan Government, the Catalan Police (Mossos d'Esquadra), the Juvenile Justice Agency, the Catalan Ministry of Education participated. In November 2012 I was contracted by Barcelona City Council as an expert in order to put forward: "A theoretical framework for a public intervention about the phenomenon of gangs".

thing that emerged from the field work. They were the one who had up-to-date information about and dealt with the young people in the gang scenario[22]. As we have seen in other works (Queirolo Palmas, 2013) the policy gang field is populated by multiple actors, but only some of them are constantly incorporated in the production of the media account. This means that the sources mobilised in this narrative are probably the best indicator to identify the hegemonic subject in the field[23]. In this sense, throughout ten years of public discourse, we can conclude that the police actor has almost always been hegemonic.

This natural finding is the sign of a structural process: young people in the gangs are mainly *treated*, and therefore known, by what we can call, following Bourdieu, the *State's right hand*,; a position from which warrior capital is articulated, accumulated and sought: the power to discipline, judge, punish and, in the case of migrants, also deport. But this power is only legitimated by its attempt to redress and exert pedagogy on social *deviance*, which demands complicity with the agencies of the state's left hand; that is, the agencies that carry out *care* and *sanitation* of the social body, accompanied by mechanisms for the redistribution and attenuation of the class stratification. These two hands have competed with each other for power and position throughout the history of the contemporary State. The second post-war period corresponds to the establishment and expansion of the Welfare State; however, in the last twenty years we are witnessing the consolidation of a *Penal State*, oriented to punish the poor (Wacquant 2002). In contemporary Spain, the massive cutbacks in health, education and social policies show clearly this course in the construction of the State. At the end of the economic *bonanza*, which somehow transformed the school failure of these young people into a more or less assured and more or less subaltern incorporation into the labour market, the gang scene had to face this new articulation of forces in which the penal state is hegemonic.

What types of capitals are sought from the state's right hand? Sauvadet (2006), building on Bourdieu's theory, has introduced the category *warrior capital* to qualify what is wanted within the gang scenario: the body, the physical strength, the capacity to create or threaten with violence, of giving and procuring protection, of demonstrating superiority and, in certain cases, eliminating those defined as the enemy. These are the elements that compose the warrior capital. If the warrior capital within the gang scenario is an extension of the physical capital, in which power makes the law[24], then in

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[22] In the middle of a crisis, police –a category of subjects from a lower social background – experience more acutely the contradiction between being the armed force of the dominant classes in their endeavour to keep public order and their own class condition; X. for instance, tells me that he would like to put a hood up and burn a bank down; Y. feels part of the working class, he goes to the demonstrations against cutbacks and he would rather arrest corrupt politicians and bankers than chase poor people; Z. gives me a t-shirt from the movement in defence of public schools and tells me, outraged, about the brutality of the police repression during a demonstration in Madrid.

[23] "A parasite is someone who is somewhere but needs someone else to survive … and vice-versa, isn't it? The relation that we have with the police is a parasite one. I'm all day on the phone with my police sources", says a journalist that built the imaginary of gangs in Catalonia.

[24] This is how the author defines the warrior capital that young people develop in the French suburbs: "In my field, physical confrontation was the main way to determine social hierarchy. The physical capital was thus a strong principle of classification (…). Just a few street confrontations were sufficient to lay the foundations of hierarchical order that later developed its own story in the field. (…) What capital is that? Of course it includes physical capital, but also takes us to a form of moral discipline (not to relinquish, to defend the honour, to know the rules of the street school, etc.), to the use and modulation of violence and the art of socialising that the actors call *vicio*. This represents the manipulation of the other and allows us

the State's right hand, it is the law that makes the power: a belligerent logic promotes the State's right hand in relation to certain categories of subjects defined as enemies of the public order, in this case, gangs members. The power that is built up lies within the collective body – institutions as a political body – it is applied and produced through the law, the legitimate pretention of having the political monopoly of violence, which ultimately, according to Weber's theory defines the State and is questioned in the group use of violence by the gangs; it is not by chance that many young people in the ethnography perceive the police simply as "the gang with the most power" whose violence has immunity and impunity and is superior. The warrior capital, as a resource and as a search of the State's right hand, is supported by an imaginary which needs to justify the activity of repression: this is why the presence of gangs is pictured and focused upon from a criminal viewpoint and exhibited within this code[25].

The police –judicial- and prison fields are the ones who define the interventions in the gang scenario, in Madrid, in Barcelona and at State level; but we will attempt to qualify more precisely which are the practices and styles that are generated within the different contexts and political cycles, that is, the different uses, productions and accumulation of the warrior capital.

2.3.1. At the State level: emergence of a police plan against violent youth groups

During the socialist government term in office, the Ministry of Home Affairs became active and started a specific line of interventions towards the end of 2005[26]. While the death of Ronny Tapias in 2003 opened the discourse of institutional interventions into the gang scenario in Barcelona, in Madrid a series of murders in 2005 nationalized the issue. Here it was the death of a local boy and the successive manhunt by the natives against immigrants that gave birth to a phenomenon and crystallized it through a glass prism of a *color line* (Du Bois, 2010), opening thus specific programmes in the Autonomous Community and the City Council, and especially generating a State framework of interventions.

The "*Plan de Actuación y Coordinación Policial contra Grupos Organizados y Violentos de Carácter Juvenil*" (Police Coordination Plan Against Organised and Violent Youth Groups) is created within this context and encourages cooperation between police forces and prosecutors, building data bases and follow-up protocols,

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to distinguish between those who know the streets and the *charlatanes*. (…) Finally, the warrior capital takes us mostly to the alliances built by the groups: The strength of the number is the first way of capitalization of the warrior capital." (Sauvadet 2005:118). There are many analogies between police officers and gang members; the cult of the body and the physical capital is one of them. Many gang members frequent gyms, practice martial arts, work occasionally in the field of private security, are children of police officers or soldiers, and sometimes even enrol in the Spanish armed forces. In November 2012, I interviewed a high ranking official of Barcelona City Council and talking about the social background of police officers in Catalonia he told me that many officers were recruited at gyms and boxing clubs.

[25] We could add that an epic of this struggle is needed and also the exhibition, as a trophy, of the enemy and their belongings. Just like for the young people in a gang taking an object from another gang can be a sign of humiliation and status; it is common, although above the law, for police to seize objects (crucifixes, necklaces, literature, etc.) from the different groups. In training I took part in, police speakers circulated among the participants certain objects inside numbered plastic bags. In this way objects are crystallized and transformed into the body of evidence of a crime, that of belonging.

[26] Besides, during the same socialist political stage, crucial changes were made to the Minors Act that increased the possibilities of punishing offenders.

surveillance of websites, mapping of group locations, quarterly assessment reports including operational definitions and intervention philosophies. The Plan aims to prevent and deter the emergence and consolidation of youth groups (aged between 12-30 years) that cause alarm due to their organisation and discipline and to the violent behaviours that they may have; starting from these object individuation criteria, *gangs* are divided by their political affiliation (extreme right – extreme left) and their ethnical affiliation (*latin*); according to this police definition, the category *gang* is applied to collective subjects that manifest a social and/or political conflict, and that may resort to violence. Moreover, the Plan suggests the training of prosecutors and other justice professionals, information activities in schools and with families by the police, and structures activities according to the age of recipients: a) detachment of minors and coordination with social services for eventual protection measures; b) building of criteria and police files to encourage "an energetic response within the judicial process towards major offenders".

In July 2009 the Ministry of Home Affairs revalidated the Plan, resorted to deportation as a tool to *eradicate* the problem and promoted the accumulation of circumstantial evidence and documentation that enable the proving of the criminal offence of unlawful association. It is not by chance that from 2005 onwards, the State Prosecutor's reports classify *Latin gangs* within the framework of organised crime, which includes belonging as a crime[27].

2.3.2. Local articulations of the State's right hand

Although the repeated attempts to outlaw groups mark out the national arena, actions at Autonomous Community level are quite varied: until March 2011 the official position of Catalan Police (Mossos d'Esquadra) was to maintain the idea that gangs did not have the explicit objective of carrying out crimes; therefore, any parallelism with organised crime was inappropriate. According to this police view, groups didn't emerge around illegal activities that needed to be protected using violence, although the members could be involved in criminal activities; data gathered by the Home Affairs Ministry of Catalonia (2011) yielded that the members of such groups had a very little incidence on the total volume of registered crimes (0.18%)[28]. Until the end of 2011, this police approach in Catalonia was supported by the members of the judicial system and the public policies that supported transforming these groups into acknowledged cultural associations.

What in one case – Catalonia - is represented as a possible factor of associated risk, in the other case – Madrid – becomes an objective criminal offence that needs to be prosecuted. The crime of unlawful association generates mechanisms to clearly define what belongs to the social realm and what to that of policing. Many educators throughout this our field work explain that "gang is a police issue", and this makes any intervention unfeasible on such groups, who are consequently defined as *inaccessible* for social work. The efficacy of the unlawful association has to do on the one hand with the symbolic, and on the other hand, beyond its penal-prison effects, with the material.

Making the groups illegal, removing them under the force of the State's right hand, becomes the imperative model of intervention in Madrid, agreed and mutually

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[27] Circular 2/2011 of the State Prosecutor's Office on the reform of the Criminal Code by Organic Law 5/2010.

[28] Records on organised crime in the Prosecutor's Office in Catalonia, unlike that of Madrid, rarely mention Latin gangs.

confirmed by the different actors – Justice, Prisons, the Police. The dominating actors try to gain and accumulate *warrior capital*, enabling the fight against the gangs' reproduction through a law that punishes the identity rather than conduct (unlawful association). In the following account a high ranking national police officer evaluates actions previously carried out in terms of effectiveness.

> "You know, with our repression we expected to destroy the gangs and to be left only with those devoted to organised crime… but this is not what happened. (..) What has happened 5 years later? We have gangs, with younger members who are still a strange mixture. We failed. We are now still detaining more minors…" C. has certain criteria to determine how dangerous a group is, their capacity to get economic resources... "These ones, Luca, do not sell a thing, they don't have money to buy a single gun, 500 Euro, and if they do not have money this means that in the drug market, which is where the money comes from, they're nobody." Why so much energy and harshness with them? "You know, in terms of quantity the amount of crime they commit is hardly any, 0,000001 of all crime... but in qualitative terms it has great repercussion..." Repercussion? "The press talk, generate alarm, politicians make declarations and we have to intervene. This is the repercussion I'm talking about. Ours is an obliged response…" (Field diary, May 2012)

This self-critical account seems very far from the persistent association made of these groups with organised crime by the highest judicial bodies in official acts. All discourses have suitable places to be archived; in this sense, my informer asks me to quote his account as an anonymous police source without further mention. In the field of the official discourse, the State Prosecutor's Office report for 2011 details, in the case of the Autonomous Community of Madrid, of a stabilisation of the groups' activities (tab.4) [29], it values as positive the increase in the number of detentions and the confirmation of sentences for unlawful association, and values as negative the decrease in the requested prison sentences.

Tabla 4 – Autonomous Community of Madrid: murders and detentions in the gang scenario

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Murders	2	2	0	0	1	0	0	2*
Detentions/ prison	121	56	-	114/32	54/24	44/20	144/12	-

Sources: Records of the State General Prosecutor's Office, Autonomous Community of Madrid. *: newspapers information.

In their fragmented character, data on detentions reveal that in contexts where unlawful association operates, police pressure can be facilitated, but it seems difficult to link this control with effective imprisonment, and vigilance with punishment. The account of the high ranking police officer mentioned above –who points out the ineffectiveness of their own practice - confirms that the mechanisms of deportation, imprisonment and control did not stop the reproduction of groups or the violence.

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[29] However, data on detentions and crime and membership are very variable according to the sources and local contexts. In Catalonia the Police estimate there are 3500 members (2011), while in Madrid in 2012 police sources talk of about 1000 members. In 2007, Home Affairs Ministry sources estimated that *Latin gang* members throughout the State were 2000/2500 (Soriano Gatica, 2008).

The model of police intervention in Catalonia has not stopped the reproduction of groups either. In this context the definition used by the specialised unit of the Catalan Police (NGJOV – New Young Organised Violent Groups) attempts to avoid the stigmatisation of the Latin collective, avoiding any ethnic reference. In spite of the different rhetoric and the non-prosecution of members for unlawful association, more murders took place in Catalonia (table 5) and the pressure on these groups was a lot tougher than in Madrid[30]. From a police estimation of 3500 members, police interventions generated 903 detentions in 2010: nearly one out of three members. The increase in global figures –of course in the volume of detentions and offences there is a quota of recurrence - is explained by our police informants as a result of a greater intensity of the control action and a better understanding of the phenomenon.

Tabla 5 - Catalonia: Offences, detentions and murders in the gang scenario

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Criminal offences and administrative breaches	-	-	-	-	-	1185	1293	1550	-	-
Detentions	-	-	-	151	361	754	861	903	-	-
People murdered	1	1	0	0	0	2	5	1	1 (*)	6 (*)

Source: Mossos de Esquadra, press release, 22/11/2011; the data on deaths in 2003-2007 y 2010-2011 is a reconstruction through the press and my informants in the police. However, regarding 2012, the new specialised team in gangs of Mossos officially mention 3 people killed.

We could question the legitimacy of the construction of the data that self-confirm the criminal character of these subjects, and includes in the number of known crimes murders and driving offences; we could equally question why similar statistics or pictures that build an objective, rather than reflect it are not made for other groups (traders, politicians, businesspeople or schoolteachers) and also whether these figures ultimately reveal are criminal activity or institutionalised processes of criminalisation of certain subaltern groups. It has been made clear that there is always a great selectivity in the surveillance work and punishment from the State's right hand and that this factor allows the capturing of only certain categories of subjects within the justice system; what is interesting to observe is that, in spite of the public discourse and representations that oppose a *zero tolerance* strategy in Madrid to a *neighbourhood police* in Catalonia, the global figure of detentions, a simple indicator of the police pressure, is more intense where it should not have been, just where unlawful association has not been used, and where there was a social policy of normalisation of the gang scene.

2.3.3 Surgery, proximity, intervention and arbitrariness in the police work
In Catalonia, police work has been characterised by an attempt to articulate *knowledge*, *prevention*, *intervention* and *suppression* in a comprehensive manner. The accounts of events by the leaders of the specialised unit NGJOV until the mid 2012 highlight on the one hand normal police work (crime prevention and repression) and on the other hand the need to establish a constant relationship with the group members and leaders thanks to a proximity approach. The Mossos d'Esquadra were the hegemonic subject in the

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[30] As other researchers add, there is an evident problem with lack of transparency from official sources in all the statistics on the subject. For example, evaluation reports of the Home Affairs Ministry Plan against violent groups are not available for researchers.

field, they gave support without doubting the process of institutionalisation of the Latin King and Ñetas promoted by Barcelona City Council, they started their activities before any other actors and remained in the field when the actors of the left hand withdrew. We introduced here an extract of an interview with two of the senior officers of that police unit.

> **(Police officer 1)** Communication is a fundamental element, you need to talk to them, identify their leaders and talk.
> **(Police officer 2)** One of the things that didn't work was direct confrontation, understood as wanting to finish the groups by force; it only causes group members to become more entrenched in their positions with time, they become more impermeable, less accessible and even more extremist.

What did that police practice or habitus consist of? The accounts mentioned: *supporting those deserting* (helping harassed members who want to leave the groups); *control of recruiting and chapter management* (favouring the entry of new members into chapters with whom there is a relationship of trust and information); *leader training* and distinguishing good from the bad members (through police control and practices of deportation towards the latter); *imposed mediation* (preparing a suitable environment for the groups to organise a *gang diplomacy*); *aggression prevention* (use of the information to anticipate acts of violence). This practice, in the framework of a harm reduction approach, reflect how police actors in Catalonia shaped the gang geography through a work of moral surgery and pedagogy of the members, structurally alternating the *carrot* and the *stick*; the bet was to accumulate warrior capital (the capacity of fighting against the reproduction of violent and criminal behaviours within the gangs, and if possible, cut the groups own reproduction) through an investment of social capital (cultivating relationships, constituting alliances, supporting certain leaders and having preventive and intimate knowledge of the groups).

Towards the end of 2011, when our ethnography started, the description of the context by the police actors in Catalonia made it clear that the objective of breaking up the reproduction was an ephemeral one and, nearly ten years after their first appearances, the groups were still recruiting new people. Police information services stated the following elements from the gang scene : a) the great rotation of members among groups (some young people get in and out and go from one group to another); b) the numeric and territorial expansion throughout the whole of Catalonia[31]; c) the fragmentation of the historical groups (Latin Kings and Ñetas) into different branches and the generation of violent episodes among them; d) the incorporation of Spanish/Catalan and other non Latin young people into the groups.

However, the intervention into the gang scenario in terms of an articulation of social capital and warrior capital does not mean that police work does not take place in parallel – like in Madrid, thanks to the adoption of the unlawful association measure – with some degree of arbitrariness. Sometimes, as our informants tell us, in order to detect those suspected of breaking the law one needs to do something illegal; which ultimately

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[31] Supposing that all members are Latin – which is not true -, this volume would represent around 3% of the residents aged between 15-29 years (Catalonia Home Affairs Ministry, 2011). In a press conference in January 2013, the new team of Mossos reduced the number of members from 3500 to 2480, as well as the participation rate (2% aged between 13/25 years). Figures are always an area of political dispute, communication and social construction.

makes us wonder what is the crime and who the criminal. For example, we hear the accounts of young gang members and a judge.

> I am with a retired leader of an important street gang: "When we had meetings the police always arrived. They came in and searched us for weapons, drugs and papers. They seized personal objects. I told them there was nothing secret and they could stay and listen..." Other brothers tell me how the police seize personal belongings without any permission and get into parties organised in private premises hitting people with their batons in order to make identifications. (…) I tell a judge the same things and add about phones and e-mail hacking done without authorisation. He says: "I think there was a problem of coordination between the police and social parties in this story. Of course, police officers do illegal things, it is illegal to hack phones if a judge doesn't tell you, if there isn't a crime suspect…. it is illegal to seize objects and people for no reason (Field diary, December 2012)

These accounts reveal how an amount of discretion is common in all types of police work and, once more, many differences exhibited in both contexts have to do with rhetorics; besides, it is worth highlighting that, in spite of having a significantly different approach from that of Mossos in Catalonia, there were police actors in Madrid – juvenile liaison officers from the Municipal Police – that operated in the gang scene following a proximity, damage reduction, communication and mediation approach. The police officer from the next extract of our field diary had meetings with all the chapters of the Latin Kings in the city in order to give support to a non-violent conflict resolution culture; we are in the neighbourhood of Tetuán at a discussion between police and educators.

> **Police:** Police work cannot be done like in a hunt.... and take the streets. This only generates fear. We need to establish communication channels...
> **Street educator:** They grew up here... we must have done something wrong.... we continue to insist in "we need to detach the young people..." this is the problem... we don't do structural prevention... there are a lot fewer resources than there used to be....
> **Police:** Why can't they wear their colours? This would help a lot. Adolescents wear uniforms today... why are certain aesthetics not legitimate? If the kids don't tell you there's no way of knowing if they belong to one group or another. Gang kids wear their colours less to protect themselves. We need to talk to them.
> **Street educator:** We need to get the groups to sit down and let them talk. There was no fight before between Trinitarios and Ddp[32]. We need to work with the Dominican community; we need to work with positive leaders. (Field diary, May 2012)

The narration itself from the glaring discrepancy in the police approach between Barcelona and Madrid loses its legitimacy in 2012, when the leaders of the specialised group in Catalonia are replaced and other discourses and priorities take over. Until then, the articulation between warrior capital and social capital, and a yawning gap within the social policies on the phenomenon had concentrated both functions of the State's right hand and left hand in the Mossos: gang members were being arrested and at the same time they were being helped to organise sports events; members' personal posessions were being seized without judicial permission and at the same time police helped gang leaders to anticipate conflicts and fights in discos; they made protocols to detect members in schools and they favoured the less confrontational leaders. Punishment was

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[32] Groups of Dominican origin (DDP, Dominican don´t play). "Trinitarios" evokes the three homeland heroes in the fight for independence.

being carried out, as well as vigilance and selective healing: an articulated habitus between proximity and criminal-moral surgery. Such overlapping rapport between the right and the left hand is clearly perceived by a high ranking civil servant in the City Council when he tells us – once the euphoria of the policy of *normalisation* of the groups was exhausted – "the only community worker left was the policeman"; the penal State, by the way, can incorporate certain types of actions that were typical of the social State.

The new discourse in 2012, in the aftermath of the political change in Catalonia and using a case of murder to denounce publicly the failures of the previous police *do-goodism*, is sustained on the idea that it is necessary to end the communication/intervention activities with gang leaders in order to repress, illegalise and imprison. For many of my informants, this change of habitus – which ends nearly ten years of construction of intervention and communication practices with the street groups leaders- is perceived as a *blow* to which the subaltern ranks within the police will have to accommodate, or exile to other tasks within the police force, being in a military hierarchical non democratic organisation.

> I'm discussing with a cop "..It doesn't matter, it's all theatre. The new cops want to do something spectacular where they arrest the leaders and say they have finished the gangs. But as you know, this doesn't end with this sort of operation." (Field diary, April 2011)

> Z. Tells us that they finally got to hear the new policy guidelines from their bosses... "go after them, that is, stop the do-goodism. Detentions, detentions. Nothing preventive, repression. There's a new protocol…" (Field diary, May 2012).

> Another policewoman says: "When they go to detain them, they say.. let's get the fucking blacks. And you hear only what they tell you in public, you don't see the inside. They encourage one another… They have won, you hear unrepeatable comments. In two months we became Franco's police again". (Field diary, June 2012)

> Another policeman said "It was all smoke and mirrors…and specially us, the Mossos with this idea of mediation we ended as subaltern to the gang leaders, and this had to end, it ended. Now we will take action" (Field diary, May 2012)

Massive detection, which was always practised, becomes common; great raids to fill archives with members in parks and in front of the church where the groups meet[33]. These police operations are, in a certain way, contrary to proximity policing; when there is no social capital available, that is, cultivating trust between police and young people from the gangs, more serial control operations are applied. The change of team members in the specialised gang Unit of Catalan Police resulted in a drastic loss of social capital and hence the need to reconstruct lists and archives through a greater investment in massive operations, phone tapping and the use of *informants*. In the words of a police officer, "unless you're in the street you don't understand anything, you lose all your contacts; you don't know what alliances are built up. In one month you lose everything. Now the police do not have any contacts and my contacts from before do not want to talk to them."

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[33] In February 2012 and January 2013 the Catalan Police carried out two great operations in front of the churches where the young Latin Kings and Ñetas meet; communication media talk about preventive operations in meeting places without specifying.

This account confirms that the warrior capital resides not only in the physical capital, but also in the social capital that police officers accumulate within the gang world; and that this articulation of social and warrior capital can have very different signs[34].

2.3.4 The jail solution

This change in the police action evidences the isomorphism of the repressive work in Catalonia, Madrid and at a State level, and the centrality of the warrior capital in its purest form: accumulate force and law to counter, end with or pretend to end with the youth groups defined as violent.
In this sense, a crucial part of the State's right hand apparatus is the prison; police work, judicial work and certainly the life of many young people in gangs precipitate in prison. Of course the rate of conversion from arrest to imprisonment is always variable; in the case of Madrid – according to the reports of the Office of the State Prosecutor – it ranges from 10% to 50%. In the case of Catalonia we do not have quantitative data available on the success of the police pressure, but the following accounts about incarceration in juvenile justice and detention centres confirm how many of the arrests ended up in deprivation of liberty, and how prisons little by little filled with gang members.

> We're in a prison module. The gang scene is concentrated here. The person accompanying me adds that she could never say the same things in an official recording, because the administration policy is to deny the existence of gangs in prisons; in spite of that, almost every young Latin in prison belongs to a group. When I visit the prison's entrance yard, what we could call the *lion's den*, the entrance to prison, I can see inscriptions and graffiti on the walls that reveal the multiplicity of groups living together behind bars (Latin King, Ñetas, Maras Salvatrucha). (Field diary, February 2012)

> "Between 25 and 50% of the inmates are from gangs" the educators of the juvenile justice centres told me during training I was giving them. (Field diary, May 2012)

In a more general note, during the last twenty years the quota of foreigners in prison increased more than in proportion with the increase in immigration in Spain. Today (2012) approximately one in three inmates is a foreigner[35], making it one of the highest levels in Europe; what's more, Catalonia stands out as having a massive level of foreign inmates, well above the national average: one in two (45.87%), which makes the

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[34] We have other signs of these changes in Catalonia in the option for the prosecutors to ask for the crime of unlawful association for these groups. In November 2012 Trinitarios are the target of a large police operation that ends up with 19 detentions based on different accusations (unlawful association, drug trafficking, assaults, threats, coercion and robbery with violence and intimidation). In January 2013 most of the detained were released on bail. In December 2012, the High Court of Barcelona sentenced 6 Latin Kings to 26 years for attempted murder and 4 years for membership of a criminal gang. In February it was the turn of the Black Panthers: a spectacular operation by the Mossos produced around 30 detentions. Once more the charge is, along with other crimes, unlawful association. One informant in the judicial-penal system tells us: "How sad, they started with the Tinitarios and the Panthers, and now they'll go after all the rest for unlawful association, they are scapegoats, a smoke screen to divert attention, while the country lives through one political scandal after another".
[35] With a slight decrease in relation to the previous year, due to a regulation that allows foreigners to opt for repatriation in case of minor offences. In 2011 out of 70.472 inmates, 24.524 were not born in Spain, an incidence of 34.8% (according to data from the General Directory of the Directorate General of Penal Institutions).

criminal justice and prison policy of this Autonomous Community an emblem of the criminalisation of immigrants.

Prison for gangs is close to their social reality and is often part of some of their member's daily lives; their condition as young, migrant and proletarian makes them easy targets of the penal system. The street and the prison are still two communicating spaces in the members' lives. But what relationships are there between them? To a certain extent the aim of institutions is that *prison* can punish, and also rehabilitate the *street*. But many of the State's right hand operators I have met throughout the ethnographic work, doubted the pedagogical character of prison and are sceptical about the possibility that the deprivation of liberty interrupts the reproduction of groups. Besides, with the crisis, all the *treatment* and production of rehabilitation is subject to intensive budget cutbacks; in this context, prison experience is easily reduced to a simple place of contention.

> "It is not a police problem, the causes are elsewhere and it is not by detaining members that we're going to bring these groups to an end. We can detain 2000 people tomorrow, but we're not solving anything. Every young prisoner is a failure. They only make groups in the street grow". (Field diary, March 2012)

> I am with a former Trinitario leader in Madrid: "Young people need attention, many are lazy kids that are talented but they just don't realise. Putting them in prison is not the solution, they come out worse, we have more policemen but it serves for nothing, but this is what we do here. Others have the big businesses: Colombians have coca, Moroccans have hashish. The gang is something else, but this is the city where it is unlawful association to be part of these groups". (Field diary, May 2012)

The judicial-criminal treatment can also contribute to the production of conflicts and the fragmentation of groups. A leader of the Ñeta association explains: "the police want us to resort to the Justice system as a way of conflict resolution, but they do not understand that by doing this we would have a permanent war on the streets". Another young man from a Dominican group in Madrid, referring to a conflict that was taken to court, adds: "but you're in the gang, how can you report them? You either report the gang or you belong to it". The process of institutionalisation of the Latin King and Ñetas during 2006/2007 was viewed with great disappointment and scepticism by the young people in prison: "they sold us out to the police", inmates from the two groups told me.

Visiting prisons in Catalonia has unveiled a domain of occult practices by civil servants: in these places where the conflicts in the street are always heard about, in a discreet and anonymous way certain civil servants work to maintain positive relationships between the youngsters of all the groups, a neutral space that attempts to prevent the transfer of the problems in the street into the detention units.

> In the interview, Z. tells me that foreigners go to prison because judges always mention the risk of escape. Z works daily with young people in the groups; if there is a space of non conflict in this prison it is thanks to her. The administration knows part of it and prefers not to know the rest. It is comfortable not to have gang trouble inside and they don't want it known that most of the young Latin inmates belong to these groups. Z. knows kids from all the groups, helps them have meetings, sends information from one unit to another, helps them negotiate and he even tried to organise a ritual of a group inside the prison. (Field diary, July 2012)

The young inmates, a great number of them Latin American children of the reunification, enjoy a superior status thanks to the family solidarity they receive, compared to other inmates who experience complete isolation behind bars. Many gang members rediscover during detention the importance of the family and the inconsistence of the street groups when emotional and material support is needed. Prison administrations deny publicly this presence and refuse to acknowledge them officially; but sometimes foster detection and labelling processes, or they give civil servants some room for action so that they can work beyond their normal remit to break up the prison/street connection and end the continuation inside of problems from outside.

Throughout the research we encountered very complex situations. Paco is a Latin King recently released from prison in Madrid and he explains other aspects of the experiences behind bars; as a gang member he was treated as a dangerous inmate in the FIES regimen[36] and wants to document the conditions of institutional violence and human rights violations against inmates.

> "All the gang members go to certain prisons. In one of them there were 8 people killed in recent months. It's the civil servants with their beatings. The prison belongs to them, and now with PP everything is worse; it's the war against the immigrants. I was a dangerous inmate, I was alone all the time in a cell. I read and did sport, one joint every night to sleep well. Jails run with drugs, methadone. When I got in, I quickly settled in with the chapter of Latin Kings; there were 150 of us, with our necklaces and all. Then they transferred us all and put us in different jails. It was the end of 2004, when unlawful association became law and the gang chapters were ended in the prisons. I was a dangerous inmate, and prison officers always beat you. One day I put on a show, and I cut my arms to attract attention. Sometimes they tied us up. Many of my friends were tied up in their cells and injected with Gardenal to tranquilise them. Then I saw them in the yard like mummies… This is how they treated us. What prison civil officials tell you is all false. The truth about inside is not known outside". (Field diary, May 2012)

Beside the discourse of rehabilitation and the practice of contention, there is a practice of institutional revenge and torture. We see another example; the witness has committed a small crime linked to drugs in the national territory and at the same time was an important leader of a street group in Barcelona. If he committed a crime as an individual, his account shows that he was punished for being in a gang.

> "I had to pay a bill and I didn't know how to do it. So I accepted to carry some stuff. They caught me and discovered that I had been a gang leader. They put me into a solitary confinement. They held me like that for 9 months, in total isolation, they only let me out one hour a day, handcuffed, to eat and have a shower. What was it like? I wouldn't want it for my worst enemy; 23 hours alone in one cell –*he bursts into tears*– they want to destroy you psychologically. I nearly went nuts, I had to organise my time, I didn't sleep, I only saw a priest and together we talked about the bible. Then for one hour I read the Bible on my own, and I had one hour of physical training. I didn't know when it was night or day. I still have disorders as a result of that. Then in the other prison they assigned a psychologist to help me get over it". It's amazing the role the State has in perpetrating torture, because it's about a person. They never deny you a

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[36] *Internal Files for Especial Follow-up*. Many human rights organisations have criticised this unit for being illegal and brutal, which was really invented for political prisoners and protesters in prison. In recent changes, organised crime can be object of this unit. Control is very hard and isolation can be up to 23 hours a day. Members of *Latin gangs* may deserve this treatment which has many affinities with torture.

priest, and afterwards a psychologist. "Once I was sleeping in my cell, they got in and started to beat me up after covering me with a blanket. They were hooded, but of course they were prison officers, and they told me that this was for being a gang member. I lost consciousness and the following day I woke up in the infirmary with two drips in my arms. Why didn't I report them then? Because I didn't want them to make life impossible for me. Why don't I report it now? It's done, and I don't want to remember it… sometimes at night it all comes back to me and it's terrible". (Field diary, October 2012).

We cannot forget that today the crisis is having an effect on institutions, like on the gang habitus in Barcelona and in Madrid: fewer social resources, fewer mechanisms of contention, more orientation towards street economy, and therefore, more police-prison involvement in the lives of these immigrant and proletarian young people. From this context we will try to reconstruct the action of the State's left hand in the two fields of study.

2.4. The State's left hand

We will now look at the work done by different agencies at a local level in Madrid and Barcelona in *dealing* (producing practices, discourses and visions) with the gang scene: a field of positions populated by local institutions, associations contracted by City Councils to implement activities designed for young people considered as problematic, schools that digest pupils coming from migration, churches that get involved in welcome projects of street groups. Public officials, social assistants, teaching staff, educators and priests are the people we find in these positions; their habitus, their discourses and their practices, their mutual relationships and interests, their conflicts and power relations articulate interventions.

We would like to add that the action area of the left hand is somehow a secondary and discontinuous segment in our field of study: secondary, because the gang presence is primarily approached and treated from a delinquency standpoint; discontinuous, because its development is cyclical, while the police knowledge and treatment is continuous. The penal-police system reacts permanently on these types of subjects, while the left hand is activated through projects that depend on the situation. The separation in the field between what concerns the right hand and the left hand is always mobile; it is a territory of variable conflicts and alliances, not all of them verbalised. It is never a linear relation between the actors of the right and left hands: discourses and practices often converge formally only, and an invitation to network can be accompanied by hidden resistance or diverging practices from the actors; like a street educator from Madrid told us, referring to the discretional controls in public parks, "three minutes of police intervention destroy six months of educational work". In the account below, social services technicians and a high ranking official of the Madrid Council express the conflict between the left and the right hand.

> **High ranking official.** Since at least 4 or 5 years ago, all the people who have immigrant phenotypic traits, who on top of that are young, are systematically detained, even at the door of our premises; they look out for undocumented aliens, to take them to the police station and open a file for expulsion, etc. This phenomenon takes place in parks and leisure areas a lot. It is harassment, this is called harassment.
> **Technician 1.** Such a continuous police presence, with all the paraphernalia, sirens and their uniforms, it only makes the kids move about a lot, they disperse.

> **Technician 2.** It also generates a social alarm, an association between immigration and criminality, a social stigma: "if they detain them, it is for something, there must be a reason". (Madrid Council officials, Department of Immigration, Madrid)

If the right hand is built upon warrior capital, the media produce a capital of visualisation and academics produce a cultural capital, being the three capitals always connected with certain forms of social capital that empowers the others, what type of capital is sought and accumulated between the actors of the state's left hand in the measure in which they intervene and get involved in the gang scene? We imagine the left hands of the State as agencies working to produce social capital within the gang scenario and transform it into symbolic capital, that is, giving value and recognition to certain types of interventions.

2.4.1 Conversion and ostracism: official channels and occult practices
In Catalonia the police position until spring of 2012 – "gangs are not a police problem", summarised the senior officer of the group specialised in the phenomenon – opened the path for social interventions for a long time. Since 2005 the aim of Barcelona Council was to transform the street groups called gangs into associations, their *institutionalisation* and *normalisation.* Around this process of conversion into associations, different actors were mobilised, and alliances and complicities were built with the hegemonic positions of the State's right hand.

The medium is the message: to articulate pedagogy about values through the relationship and through the group involvement in a project of institutionalisation. Normalisation evokes on the one hand, the possibility of access to the public resources and facilities; on the other hand, it seeks to weaken those uneasy and *improper* aspects of street groups: the practice of violence (outwards and inwards), male chauvinism, the lack of democratic processes, the use and occupation of the urban territory. The objective of the City Council in that time was an acknowledgement that allowed groups to disappear and to reduce the symbolic association between the Latin American collective and youth violence; it also entailed generating a classification and segmentation between groups that could fall better within a more institutional logic and those that opted to reproduce in a space of strictly street bound rules and relationships.

In this sense, the intention was to promote a conversion which was not just material – to give the gangs an association status – but mainly symbolic; the conversion implied the production of a self-critical distance in relation to what groups were, or were thought to be, and a materialisation of what groups could become thanks to the public intervention. It was about building an example, a referent of a disappearance which came from an incorporation, a policy that we can call *gangs in*.

> My prospective imaginary was that if the group was transformed into a normal juridical entity and had a normal relationship with the city's association world, in 5 years they would disappear as specific group; in fact, through the intervention we could see that the interest and needs were the same as of any other youth group. (Barcelona Council Official, Prevention Directorate)

Bauman (1999) mentions two solutions in the management of the foreigner, the *anthropophagic* and *anthropoemic*; the policy of *gangs in* implies the first strategy, incorporating foreigners so that they cease to be, that is, incorporating a certain group of street gangs so that they cease to be what they were. *Gangs in* is a departure point, but it also implies its reverse, that is *gangs out,* as not all groups will be able or willing to follow a process of conversion and consecration: the second strategy, that Bauman calls

anthropoemic, consists in rejecting the foreigner, erasing them straight away from the social space. Recalling the experience of ancient Greece, we call this situation with the term ostracism: the visibility of a stigma and a collective shared deliberation by many agencies that allows to define these groups as dangerous for society.

In the case of Madrid, the policies fostered have the second strategy as a departure point, *gangs out*: the phenomenon is a police matter by its criminal definition and what is left to the agencies of the State's left hand is residual on the one hand, and subaltern to the pathologically dominant vision on the other. Social policies are thus based on the *pre-gang*, as our informants express, that is, in the prevention of the phenomenon, in order to avoid "young people falling" into these groups; while the only imaginable social treatment for members is based on the formula of *detachment*.

> They are gangs so organised, they won't tell you: "I belong to this gang" and the one thing about them is they are really violent, and this is punishable. We don't have access, but police do. They know the young people, they follow-up, they are the ones who have most information. We are in the pre-gang, in the prevention. (Madrid Council Official, Department of Immigration)

Dividing the tasks between the right and the left hands makes the groups invisible and inaccessible for social interventions that work on youth cultures from the languages of youth; the issue belongs to different perspectives and a different kind of work, thanks also to the establishment of the juridical discourse and a police practice around unlawful association. As a consequence, social work will be placed in a space of complicity with the police-criminal work, accompanying the roles of detection and imagining the possible cure to a pathological phenomenon.
Mentioning the importance of prevention in the pre-gang, through the thrust of transversal activities to youth and the coexistence in neighbourhoods, social work is then conceived as a way to generate detachment with the active members of groups, that is, to favour processes of detaching with the help of social, psychological and family treatment. These types of interventions have been implemented since 2005 by companies offering social services, tightly tied to political guidelines coming from institutions.

> Agency X wanted to detach the minors that were in violent groups. Street educators in our program drew maps of hot spots. Those maps were sent to the police. If I had 2 districts, I drew a map and I had to draw the points with the gang letters. That is, in that park if there were *Ñetas*, then I was supposed to draw a blue dot with a *Ñ*. The agency had 3 day centres for the whole of Madrid, but they had no street educators, they didn't do the real work, the grassroots work with these kids. (…) in order to work with gangs you need to be in the street. (Street educator, Madrid)

Looking at these groups with the approach, often rhetorical, of detachment, is a sort of double mistake: on the one hand membership is seen as something fixed, when in reality we find it has a transitory character and typically of young-adolescents. This means that many members get uninvolved by themselves through the elements that mark their own biographic cycle (setting up a family and getting a job). The discourse of detachment means that: a) members are obliged to participate (which may happen in individual cases but is not the normal thing); b) that their own will is not capable of being manifested (here is the dramatically evoked figure by school teachers of *recruiters,* responsible for the reproduction of groups); c) that adherents do not obtain significant

advantage by getting the status of members, when what really happens is the opposite, and explains participation. In other words, for many young people participating in these groups allows them to enjoy social and symbolic resources from which they were excluded previously: being in the *gang*, in the *choir*, in the *nation*, in the *association* provides with status, esteem, respect and acknowledgement in the street social scene. It means to shift from a condition of invisibility to a condition of visibility, from being *nobody* to being *somebody* (Queirolo Palmas, 2009).

In Barcelona the challenge was to incorporate certain groups to defuse their dangerousness; the incorporation of some implies, of course, the exclusion of others. In this sense, if Madrid played the strategy of *gangs out* in an integral way, Barcelona complemented the two strategies; it was a federation of Latin American associations who was in charge of activating these processes of normalisation and pedagogy (*gangs in*) that were particularly intense until 2008, although they were concentrated on the Latin Kings group who had become an association. The tool used were workshops on gender and sexuality, artistic and musical groups, learning tied to the management of an association, fostering of sports events, work training. The process of normalization, which was supported by the connections between educators and the young Latin Kings, had the aim of reducing the culture of violence, the generation and access to alternatives, the broadening of symbolic and social references for members: acknowledging and binding, institutionalising, if possible the group, and making it disappear little by little.

The projects of intervention by social service agencies in Madrid, financed by the City Council, worked at an individual level, making an investment in un-addiction: the gang is a *sect*, a *drug* and hence dependence needs to be reduced to produce detachment. Educators were supposed to detect, attach themselves to and accompany members in protected spaces of socialisation, psychologists needed to cure, social assistants had to do the case reviews and follow-ups. The frame of interventions was fixed and investment was only made on *derived* minors, that is, cases detected and inserted into the channels of social services.

> You had to do what they told you in the city Council, you're never free to decide on a job. You worked with minors derived from social services. But when you work in the street you're aware that not all minors pass through social services (Street educator, Madrid)

Moreover, agencies specialised in the subject wanted the monopoly on the referred young people who had entered the official channels; they needed to produce figures, because behind the treated cases there was financing. This mechanism generated competence over the cases to treat, between the small associations with less resources who worked in the street, outside the boundaries of these channels, and the large associations that execute activities with clients from their offices. As a street educator in Madrid told us in November 2012: "they make us refer them to the official project if they belong to the gangs and they have a file in social services. Social services never talk about gangs; they talk about "young people in a social conflict. It is difficult for us to work with these groups; we work outside the law". The hegemonic culture, which as a matter of fact is driven by institutions, is that gangs and members are approached as pathologic and criminal.

In Madrid the intervention is organised around an official path that provides subjects referred from other agencies, while in Barcelona a range of interventions were officially organised around the proximity of street educators to vulnerable groups. Any alternative intervention outside the detection/un-addiction/detachment, had to be done as an occult practice in Madrid, it is done, but not said in public; in order to attempt to do something similar to what Barcelona City Council did between 2005 and 2008 and to experience a social intervention that acknowledged the existence of the street groups, one had to get into the register of the non-reportable[37].

When I carry out the ethnographic work in Madrid in May 2012, I find a field articulated around the occult: there is a gang scene and youth violence that is not portrayed by the media; general policies to officially treat and prevent youth violence are in reality *anti-gang* programmes in disguise. Moreover, there are actors and experiences that, beyond the formality of detachment, generate activities of harm reduction similar to the ones implemented in Barcelona with institutional support: street work with chapters of DDP and Trinitarios, conflict mediation, leader involvement.

> **Educator 2.** (…) A big part is prevention, we think we need to prevent, because very young kids are getting involved and we need to do something so that such little kids do not become involved in the groups, so the work now is containment.
> **Educator 1.** Or if they become involved, we have to work so that they do not commit crimes. Then there's group work to be done on certain positive values that they have, brotherhood, for instance. Now my objective is not to detach them, like it was 5 years ago.
> **Educator 2.** We need to find the alternative, that is, give them their strength back, they have an enormous potential. They also need to be the regenerators of their own change. (Street Educators, Madrid)

All these work experiences with the groups take place in the street, in an informal manner, they are born form the day-to-day contact with the young people who place their sociability in public spaces and avoid the referral and follow-up protocols dictated by social services. There are also frictions within the projects, the discourses and the practices that social work wants to control. We observe for example the development of the discussion between the professionals of the project ASPA, who after a period in a vacuum have recovered the *business* of young people from gangs. Option 3, the social service company that manages the ASPA program runs 4 labour and socio-educational centres in four districts of the city of Madrid; they deal with 250 young people in a special program of violence prevention. The latter – who are mostly gang members – are referred from schools and social services; the heart of the activity is focused on the search for job opportunities, a difficult task in times of crisis.

> **Educator 1**: Often there are cars from the gangs that come to recruit with the music very loud. Thank goodness the police intervene....
> **Educator 2:** They become criminalised very quickly, there are many legends about gangs in this city and they are very harmful. I think these are processes of youth identity. They do their gang theatre and I do my educator theatre... I never ask them to get detached.

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[37] But occult practice can also be functional and fostered by the institutions themselves; see Giliberti (2013a: 1).

Educator 3: It would be fascinating if they let us work with the groups like they do in Barcelona, but here it is not allowed...

Educator 4: The kids feel harassed by the police. And they react, they defend themselves.

Coordinator: We don't call them gangs in Madrid, they are violent groups. It has to be made clear that we do not search for gangs in order to help them. Our experience is not with gangs, but with risk practices. Our approach is always about the individual, we do not work with groups. We're interested in the practices; we want to defuse the risks of belonging to violent groups. (Field diary,May 2012)

Any space of discourse is stratified, positioned, contingent. There is a façade and a backstage; each discourse is instituted by power relations. Thus, an educator from an association from another district talks about the relation they have with the City Council:

"Some associations made a lot of money with the gang thing, projects of detachment, money went there… Many of us preferred not to talk about the subject". I show him an official report: "this, for example, I wouldn't believe it much, it is produced by the City Council. We don't say anything because they're going to send us more police … why talk?" (Field diary, May 2012)

If the texts are constructed, our work as researchers is to show the breaches. Associations live on public contracts, they follow the guidelines given by politicians, and this factor, outside any discourse about professionalism, determines a crucial point on autonomy; social workers are often precarious workers within a precarious contract of service between agencies and the City Council[38]. The official version is that the work is individual and has to do with detachment; practical work sometimes goes in different directions.

If in Madrid an official path of intervention is accompanied by occult practices of a different nature, in Barcelona two official pathways coexisted, measuring their forces in the field and in time, with their occult practices: on one hand the pathway of normalisation/conversion that worked in the modality *gangs in*, on the other hand, the classical pathway of approximation to the phenomenon by social services, by schools, by the public facilities who organised barriers and device of exclusion. We now try to analyse in depth the evolution of the approach *gangs in* in Barcelona, with full detail of its characteristics.

2.4.2 Evolution and truncations of interventions on gangs in Barcelona

If in Madrid we observe signs of group-based interventions as an axis of parallel and occult experiments, in Barcelona those who bet on the group somehow re-discovered the individual as a target of intervention. Encompassing the group allowed the opening of the way for individual interventions; however, to broaden this type of intervention, the group structures had to be broken. In order to go on with the normalisation, groups had to disappear; although not declared, the objective, the practised desire, but not achieved, was to detach the young people from a group dimension which was seen as problematic, as *a burden that had to be taken off their shoulders*. We see how a person

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[38] Of course these processes of externalisation of social interventions to companies and associations also exist in the Catalan experience.

responsible for direct intervention on gang members in Barcelona explains to us and constructs a narration on the need for a change in approach:

> The group had to open up. In 2009 we went through all this definition revision. (…) I kept telling them that if they went around saying that they were those fantastic Latin Kings: the girlfriend's father chased them away, the boss at work sacked them, the principal at school didn't accept them either and then the police came and took them to jail … Where was the deal? I liked to say "take this burden off your shoulders". I interpreted all that as a shield that in the beginning has a use, but then it becomes a very heavy rucksack. (Educator, Barcelona)

The intervention directed itself to the reduction in the autonomy of the groups, to their institutionalisation making their members clients of a specific administrative activity and setting aside the development of their members' lives in the street. However, the conversion into an association being the sign and proof of this process, institutions and their operational arms also remarked critically how the group and its members expressed a lack of autonomy, that is, a not very enthusiastic or active party in the appropriation of this official code. The narration about the groups' autonomy issue in the accounts of the different informants is, by its ambivalence, a very interesting indicator of the political-administrative desires: to insert the members within another container (the *association*), to empty the previous container (the *gang*), to value the first one and to devalue the second one as channels of normalised access to the host society. The members were asked to be active in the first one and to defuse themselves in the second one; a lack of investment in the first field is classified in consequence as a lack of autonomy.

> We have tried to support the groups' autonomy. But in the past 8 years there hasn't been one single autonomous project by any of the two associations. (..) What's the main failure? It is dependence. We have consolidated a group with no capacity of generating projects of their own. (Barcelona Council official, Directorate of Prevention)

At the same time we think that this lack of activism in following the channels marked by institutions is a clear indicator of gang *autonomy*; a tactic that articulates opportunism, and non permeability, a resistance to the individualisation ideas promoted by the institutions.

The desire of achieving the disappearance of the groups is assumed as the condition for individual incorporation and success into the host society; the role of social work was to implement guidelines for the institutional intervention with those who were available for this type of intervention, *those available for integration*: a classification criteria of the gang scene and of course of migrations. Our informants in the organisation that carried out the street-based activities use the following language: "to be a bridge"; "to achieve normality"; "young Latin management"; "entrance door to normality for these youngsters that now have Catalan children"; "offer them a more interesting role than being in a square"; "provide with tools for integration"; "guarantee the safety of public places where these young people are"; "our objective as organisation is to disappear, it will mean that we normalised these young people"; "we want to be part of the administration"; "the day of normality will be when we have a coloured policeman, a coloured journalist in Catalan TV, a coloured public official"; and of course we could not avoid the local-national discourse, as "in year 2000 we only gave foreigners services, now we are a real Catalan entity".

These tropes articulate an interesting and interested mixture of assimilationism and multiculturalism, hymns to coexistence and a reivindication of a role in the sub-contracting within the mechanisms of public policies, and it should never be forgotten that the work done by these associations, and their autonomy, depend on resources passed on by institutions and, ultimately, on a political relationship and filiation. What did the directorate in the City Council fostering the process aim at? Something different from acknowledgement of gangs, if by this word we refer to the classical approach of multiculturalism:

> "Our strategy? Community mobilisation, control, change in the organisation (I doubt they can change now), access to alternatives. Make them appear and disappear… both things go together in the strategy we had with the groups. The process was instrumental. We wanted them to disappear, to blend with the environment". (Barcelona Council official, Directorate of Prevention)

Intervention from the left hand sought to open an option for the groups: inviting them to be placed alongside the institutions and elevating the converted as an example. The fragmentation – that is, a classification between good and bad – was partly an objective of the process, which also helped distribute tasks between the State's right and left hands; the gang scene indeed fragmented and was divided between those for and against the conversion process started by the institutions. However, associations formed during the time of our ethnography also disappeared as subjects of activities; the groups reproduced and transformed outside the institutional logic. The fact that most groups did not settle in the process of normalisation can be seen as a flaw in the construction of a policy, but also as another evident sign of what we call *gang autonomy*.

There were some important truncations in the processes of conversion – normalisation; the first has to do with the unfulfilled administrative transfer of the interventions from prevention/security to social and youth policies. The areas of policy production are organised around philosophies, practices and intervention routines. Above all, social services manage *cases*; problems are assessed on an individual basis and on the needs, articulating follow-ups through the activation of different administrative and professional subjects; a routine that appears in Barcelona and in Madrid is, for instance, to address the subject of gangs as an addiction and lead the subject classified as such into certain programmes of psychological therapy.

Assuming the group, not the individual, as the target for intervention by social services entails a rupture in a deeply rooted professional culture, as the other pole of social work – street education – has less power within the administrative structure: on the one hand it is externalised towards companies and associations (and precarious workers, not officials), on the other hand, in the framework of the crisis we witness a process of withdrawal to the social work offices; as a consequence of the cutbacks, users go to the services rather than the services going to the clients' life spaces. Social services focus on problematic cases, while youth policies foster creativity and opportunities for the subjects who attend school and have some amount of cultural capital, which makes it inappropriate to consider gang members as clients. Here's an account about this frictions:

> The culture of social services had embraced the mythology about gangs, partly because they had the practice of protecting minors, and partly because gangs appeared as a violation of the rights of the minor. Besides, the Youth Directorate wanted to chase them from the youth centres; there was the idea that intervention had to be earned… and this blocked the relationship with the groups. Our work has been easier with the police

than with the social services, and that's because our intervention put their professional paradigm into crisis. (Barcelona Council official, Directorate of Prevention)

These frictions are manifested in the relationship between groups and public facilities; the process of conversion gave broader access, but at the time they also maintained resistance and mistrust towards the *gang-associations* about the access to the *normalised* spaces, that is to say, spaces that according to some areas of the administration would allow the reduction in the importance of street socialization.

Some professionals believe that these groups are harmful and are afraid that if one group comes, then another will come and there will be a conflict and his centre will be stigmatised. (Barcelona Council official, Directorate of Prevention)

Access to public facilities was a field of conflict and of social-police surveillance, also during the golden time of *normalisation*, according to the account of a Latin Queens leader.

In the *Centre*, we had the police one day. They installed recorders, in order to listen to our meetings… It's a feeling of, "ok, I'm going to trust you but not quite, I'm going to be watching you". Of course, we learned how to use the public space, what forms we had to fill in. In that sense, everything was all right, even though there was always that fear, that mistrust which is still present today. (Latin Queen leader, Barcelona)

From 2008/2009 onwards direct interventions of the City Council with the groups are interrupted. The *conversion* model is not replicated on the new street subjects that were emerging. The reason for such interruption is officially explained in different ways: the existence of a pathway is evoked, and of some possibilities already in place; therefore, available to whoever expresses a desire for institutionalisation; a different quality –more delinquent- is added as specific of the new groups who are now dominating the street life[39]; the impact of the crisis is added, which causes political priorities to change for local institutions. These appreciations can be contrasted if we observe the account of other professionals that question the persistence of a memory effect among the new gang scene about the conversion policy, the real accessibility to resources, the structural difference between the street groups then and the street groups now.

During the period of our ethnography, social services officials in different neighbourhoods of Barcelona tell us that nowadays there is a certain amount of tension when one of these groups try to apply to use municipal infrastructure to carry out their activities; the reason is the stigmatised label that these groups have associated to their collective identity. Some professionals explain to us that if these young people are accepted, then that space suffers from a social stigma; others tell us that they would be willing to accept them with an increase of resources. The fear arisen has to do with the possibility that the young people use these spaces for violent activities and rituals. This attitude of distrust and exclusion is contradictory with the work of other branches of the administration – for example the Service of Conflict Management and previously, the Directorate of Prevention – who have as one of the objectives of their interventions to bring the street groups into public centres; the administration tried to persuade the

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[39] "When a confrontational movement takes a step forward and becomes a political movement it does not belong to the street any more, then others occupy the street", an educator tells us.

leaders of Latin Kings and Ñetas that being an association was the necessary status to access public infrastructure on equal terms, but after 6 years, many of those barriers are still standing. Nonetheless, the process of normalisation allows to visualise the space of conflict between different branches of the institutions, between two official pathways dealing with the same issue, and to open a dialogic dimension that is part or condition of a solution.

If we look at the timings of the interventions, after a specific policy of *gangs in* there was a void where the only subjects that took action were the police. The group reproduction (beyond the institutions) and the persistence of the boundaries of normalisation open again a reflection about the need of an intervention. From 2010 onwards, the Municipality launches a pilot diagnosis in the districts with the objective of building relationships and defining courses of response and action protocols between the different actors involved, that is between the two intervention practices (*gangs in* and *gangs out*); this process sought to generate trust and harmonise the different positions and professional cultures (prevention, school, police, social services).

One objective was also the detecting and gathering of case files for intervention; but detection encountered resistance in schools and in many cases there was no intervention carried out, or any harmonisation practice completed. As an official in a social service centre of the Municipality said in an interview:

> "..We filled file after file, and then it wasn't clear what we were supposed to do with the cases. Those above can't even agree on the language to use: gangs, NGJOV, groups… They should tell us what to do: detach, detect, empower, prevent, acknowledge… here everyone does their own thing. They should agree among themselves what it is we should do and then we'll do it". (Field diary, November 2012)

After 2009 as interventions with groups came to an end, a background practice shared by different left hand agencies regains space and legitimacy: the detection of individuals oriented to improve the circulation of information, visualising certain memberships and labelling certain lives. The emphasis on the need of detection, the opening of case files and protocol production indicate on the one hand, that the pathological imaginary about the young people's experiences returns, and on the other hand that the contacts with the groups are lost; that social capital has weakened and to produce knowledge we need to resort to a more bureaucratic form of involvement; files from social services and other agencies are not very different from the detection mechanisms the police are starting to use massively as the strategy of proximity is being abandoned. Even more, as we have already seen in the case of Madrid, as in Barcelona, the detection efforts are shared between the administration's right and left hands; at the district level commissions are organised with the assistance of social workers, police officers, educators and schools with the aim of generating a general archive of members and cooperating in the production of information.

In January 2013, within the framework of the *Servei de Gestió de Conflictes* (Conflict Management Service), a new team specialised in street work is constituted with the task of intervening in an experimental way in certain districts; the gangs young people are now defined as "subjects with an intensive, territorial and exclusive use of the public space" and the team will work as an invisible subject, with little advertising, as the officials in charge tell us.

> **Official 2.** When you have someone to rely on it is easier to tell your team: we have a service that will come to us, who will accompany us, that we can trust, who will guide us and give us support.
>
> **Official 1.** A team that sets boundaries in the street, that mediates between the *chapters*. Not only a service that works for the administration, but who works with the group. In the same way that we have specialised services for the *homeless*, for parentless children minors, we need to set up a specialised group for these types of groups. (Barcelona Council officials, Conflict Management Service, Barcelona)

This is how the interventions were transferred from the field of prevention and safety to social and youth policies. The intervention attempts to recover the concept of the link with the gangs through a harm reduction approach; to a certain extent the aim is that social capital is again a resource in this field, beyond the logic of detection, although it is early to make a diagnosis of this policy.

2.4.3 Ostracism and school minorisation

The school experiences of the children of migrants in Spain can be summarised through the idea of school minorisation: a multiplicity of inter-school and intra-school segregation mechanisms put this category of students in the spaces of lower qualifications, lower expectations, a more rapid ejection towards the labour market (Carrasco et al. 2011; Pámies 2013; Ballestín 2010; Giliberti 2012, 2013). Subaltern integration in the labour market is founded in school minorisation; but in the context of the crisis, this expulsion does not place these youths inside the official job market, but on the street, with its double dimension: void of opportunities and insertion into the illegal economy[40]. How schools deal with gangs is part of this process of minorisation.

Schools represent crucial places where a permanent struggle and ambivalence on the visibility and invisibility of the gang phenomenon take place. Most of the young people in the gangs have gone through the school system, where they found a place to access and build this kind of experience. Dropping out of school, the decrease in public investment in education and transfer into a context which is devoid of work opportunities is a structuring axis for understanding the reproduction of street groups during the crisis. School labelling of gangs is at the same time an interesting and interested rhetoric as it allows educational institutions to self-absolve from their own failure with the most fragile groups of students, those from a migrant origin; an educator in a program for violent young people in Madrid tells us the following:

> "From the services they send reports, they label the young people that come to our prevention programme as gang members, for their suspicious attire, for example. Reports are short and very simple. At schools they are labelled as gang members because they are Ecuadorian, problematic, absent, a failure. My impression is that they have found the perfect explanation: any child who is problematic is in some way turned into a gang member. Any behaviour which is not understood is associated with the gangs". (Field diary, may 2012)

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[40] According to the research of the collective IOE (2013: 48-49), in 2010 "37,000 young Latin American people have abandoned their studies without obtaining a degree in Secondary Compulsory Education (over 20,000), or without *finishing* baccalaureate or the Secondary Education Vocational Training (17,800 students)". The global dropout rate among young Latin American is 22.3% in the range 16-19 years and 38.9% in the range 20-24 years.

In this account, being defined as *gang member* by the school institutions is a metonymic mechanism to define and explain school dropout; unlike the simplistic explanation provided by Aparicio, Haller, Portes (2009a,b) – gangs are an independent variable to explain educational failure – rather, the thing to do would be to assume the school discourse and classifications of these groups as an argumentative rhetoric to legitimate intra-school segregation, which articulates the students' social inequalities. As another educator adds, teachers produce a pathological discourse about those youth cultures that fascinate some of the students, giving respect and a group identity.

> "Gangs are part of the environment, the microclimate of the district of Vallecas; it's like with football, you follow who wins and who loses and you talk about it in the street… In schools belonging to gangs is demonised, the police train the teachers in this matter, when they raid the parks they take the TV crews along with them, and the kids hide even more as they know they can be charged with unlawful association". (Field diary, may 2012)

In a study about San Cristóbal district in Madrid, carried out between 2005 and 2008, Eseverri (2012) states how the *special workshop* in schools is the place for the *bad ones*, where the most problematic students are sent to and treated through manual activities. At the same time the recent cutbacks[41] in the field of education also limited the use of these educational mechanisms, inside and outside the classroom, devised to create contention structures of youth sociability; a similar process takes place in Catalonia with the decrease in training opportunities in the PQPI[42], the compensatory training offered to young people of migrant and working class origin who do not complete their compulsory education. Some analysts (Ferrer et al., 2008) have also highlighted that Catalonia is the community with the highest intra-school segmentation practice: about one in three schools separate students according to their level. In the city outskirts, as stated by Luca Giliberti (2012 a, b) in his school ethnography, the result of these mechanisms is that school stratification is a mirror of the relations of class and *race*, which despite the rhetoric of inter culture, reduces the meeting and contact spaces between students (Ponferrada 2009).

In Madrid, the works by Cecilia Eseverri (2012) give an account of how for many young people of migrant origin a culture of school dropout is established in the suburbs, where "school dropout is, in some situations, a solution as it takes the young people away from an adverse social environment" (ibid., 300) and allows them to recover some self-esteem in the face of a process of material minorisation – the inclusion in the segregated niches of education – which always has a symbolic side and a consequence. School puts to the fore its reproductive function (Bourdieu, Passeron, 1970) and transfers some sectors of youth to other determinisms and other agencies (the labour market or prison institutions), as the following account of my ethnographic work shows clearly:

> I am in a park in the outskirts of Madrid, with some street educators, with a group labelled as Dominican. The educators try to explain to me the multiple mechanisms of minorisation of the young migrants at the school. It is not by chance that the kids I find

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[41] In Catalonia expenditure in education was reduced by 7.5% in 2011, and by 6.3% in 2012; similar measures are applied in the rest of Spain (Albaigés, Martínez, 2012).
[42] Programas de Calificación Profesional Inicial (*Programmes of Initial Professional Qualification*).

these days speak so much about their experience in the juvenile detention centres. "Hey, did you get out of Teresa de Calcuta? And how about you at Meco[43]?". They are DDP, they pass on information about the last prison *hotels* visited. I talk to a youngster a little while in private, who is from the *choir...* "It is the crisis brother, I used to work as a maintenance operator at the airport, then in the building trade… the crisis caught me in 2008 and now my unemployment benefit is over... we're here. They treat us as offenders, the police are always doing raids, companies only hire Spaniards ...". (Field diary, May 2012)

The process of normalisation-conversion which attempted to open a path to legitimisation within Barcelona's municipal facilities never reached the schools, where failure and expulsion are often connected to the institutional practices toward young gang members; this ostracism culture is acknowledged in 2010 when a district school won the educational prize City of Barcelona with the project *Gangs out*. Listening to the protagonists' accounting this experience is a prism that sheds light on fears and passions, conflicts and practices in educational environments.

> The conversation with these teachers starts with the subject of the groups legalisation: "here in Catalonia they are legal, cultural associations, I can't understand the policy from the City Council, nobody does. Here we have mainly Latin kids and the risk that they belong to a gang is high. If you want to be in a gang, do it far from our school, you don't play out your private life in here. You shouldn't wear a cap. Muslim girls can, but that's a religious issue". Such discourse is strange because it is accompanied by a rhetoric about the benefits of multi culturalism. Multi culturalism for everyone, except for gangs, who cannot be considered part of a youth culture because of their intimate criminal qualities. (Field diary, March 2012)

Many schools defend protocols of uniforms and styles that forbid the signs of gangs. What was generated at the school's micro level little by little became the Catalan Government's Ministry of Education recommendation for the whole educational system.

> At the school level we forbid any displays by the gangs. We had a great war with the caps. We also banned scarves, wrist bands, belts with buckles, weapons…. We realised that by concealing the group insignias the violence inside the school went down. (Ministry of Education official)

Detection is a practice which spreads to all schools in Catalonia thanks to an official protocol between the police and the Ministry of Education who, on the one hand enables a referral to the police and the Judicial system of individuals suspected of belonging to groups, and on the other hand promotes education-police cooperation in the field of teacher training with the aim of improving teachers' capacity to identify the signs of the gang phenomenon in the classroom.

> The aim of the protocol is to detect students who are susceptible of belonging to a gang. It is a matter of learning how to recognise all the clues that a student may enter a gang. Part of the intervention and action is made by the whole social network: the police, street educators, social workers. It is also very important that the schools prevent these kids from entering the gang. (Ministry of Education official)

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[43] Juvenile detention centres in the Community of Madrid.

The image of these youth groups is completely slanted towards a criminal view; this brings the need to detect and produce joint records within the State's right hand through an action protocol that mentions, in its first page, the need to maintain the *maximum confidentiality* of the document. If we made protocols to detect squatters, anti-system, indignants, independentist militants at schools with the complicity of the educational authorities and the police, this would entail some sort of democratic scandal within public opinion; but here we would be talking about groups of native Spanish young people, while the gangs constitute the main space of the young migrants self-organisation that ultimately enable what Sayad (1996) has called the double punishment: violence and crime of the non-native always has to face their role of host and the accusation of ingratitude in the receiving society's imaginary. The same crime, or the same behaviour by a migrant child and that by a native child will hardly have the same symbolic value.

While prohibiting the gang aesthetics invisibility is pursued, on the contrary, detection aims to make this presence visible[44]; there are also shortcomings in the willingness of schools to cooperate. We see some examples: a police officer responsible for school training explains that in his visits to Hospitalet, a town known for its flourishing gang scene, teachers denied the presence of gangs among the students; the principal of an important secondary school, in an informal meeting, tells me that he is not going to apply any protocol of reporting his students; social services professionals mention often the lack of willingness of schools to participate in the case detection, that is, to contribute to the production of files on gang kids. Behind all this resistance there is the fear of associating the school with falling standards, and of losing native students. The following account has been collected in a district school in Barcelona:

> **Teacher 1:** "gang legalisation was a false model. We don't want to reinforce these groups".
> **Social assistant 2:** "Schools are afraid of being labelled as gang places".
> **Social assistant 1**: "The people at the City Council? They can't even agree on what to call the gangs. How could they ever do anything?"
> **Teacher 2**: "when we heard about the process of legalisation we wanted to do things, but nobody from institutions helped".
> We left the school; the most interested social worker in an alternative approach about the subject tells me that many schools expel the kids just for suspecting that they belong to these groups. "There are no resources, teachers are angry: they don't want more problems with fewer resources. It is the same discourse pronounced by the principal of a youth centre: "With no resources these kids don't get in here as gangs". (Field diary, November 2012)

In conclusion, there is no doubt that in educational contexts in Madrid and Barcelona school expulsion was pursued as well as detachment and derivation to other agencies which were preferred for this type of young people: immigrant, defined as gang members, problematic and trouble makers.

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[44] At the same time the prohibition, since it has a public status, makes the issue of gangs visible within schools, while their detection remains *confidential* and a practice that is not displayed to the whole of the educational environment.

2.4.4 Space ostracism

Gangs have played an important role in the use of the public space and at the same time have stirred debate, created outcry and controversy about the use of territory. According to Canelles (2006) the presence of Latin American young groups in public spaces has been described in terms of fear, nuisance, disorder and occupation. In the following account between a Justice official and a police officer from Barcelona, the public space becomes the crucial place for conflict, where a nuisance is expressed but also the possibility of control:

> **Justice official:** "They were a visual nuisance, neighbours complained about them. The City Council said that if the kids were just hanging about, there was nothing they could do about it. The park is big; they didn't even bother the neighbours, only park users"
> **A local police officer**: "In terms of policing, it's good for us that they are in the street. It's easier to control them". (Field diary, February 2012)

The public space – spaces that are not subject to commoditisation of their use – has seen a change in its users with the arrival of the immigrants' children. As Canelles (2007) states, rather than "take the square off us", these young people start to use a space that they find virtually empty. In Barcelona, officials from the Conflict Resolution Services tell us how many interventions are prompted by calls from local neighbours and elderly people who denounce inappropriate use by young immigrants, so there is also a generational issue to be taken into account.

In the urban spaces of the ethnography, like in any other capitalist cities, the use of space is regulated and *civicness* tries to regulate the use and punish the behaviour understood as inappropriate[45]; thus, law becomes an excluding mechanism, something that contributes to the ebbing away of the city's public character. As Cerbino and Rodríguez add, reflecting upon the relationship between gangs in Madrid parks (2012:177), one of the most surprising things for the newly arrived young immigrants "is that territories do not belong to a community, that is, they are not negotiated with the people living in there, but are accessible through an established regulation, which takes away the real possibility of insertion through negotiation"; Manuel Delgado in a masterpiece about Barcelona as a paradigmatic city (2007), had already evidenced how urbanism becomes an enemy of the urban.

The fear of territorial occupation has been often created by the media and the shared public opinion. The young people from street groups are thus accused of improper use of the public space; improper because it is intensive and excluding other possible users; the crime thus would be monopolisation and privatisation of the public space; a

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[45] Since 2005, with the "Ordinance of measures to promote and guarantee citizen coexistence in the public space", using the rhetoric of civility, beggars are disciplined in Barcelona (not for begging, but for using public space without authorisation), like sex workers and other categories of poor people, for improper behaviour. The aim is to build an intimidating environment and the establishing of preventive repression; Manuel Delgado (2007) talks about the new social hygiene in the urban environment that has to be transformed into a theme park, immersed in good behaviour and without any trace of conflict and the foul character of social inequality. The policy of turning gangs into associations is contemporary to the ordinance on civicness, maybe we could add that it is a reflection and a rehearsal of that ideology: civilise the behaviours of certain individuals considered as barbarians and primitive, putting them within the framework of a long list of statutes, regulations and protocols.

supposed privatisation. We can see below a definition of this *crime* by the Service in charge of this issue in Barcelona:

> **What does it mean they say intensive use?**
> Being in the square. When you go at 10 a.m. there's someone from the group, and they're still there at 2 a.m. The corner where the kids are, the site used by Ecuadorians to play volleyball, or the bench used by the *homeless* to sleep and spend the day, this is what we call *massive* or *intensive use*. It is *massive* when it is used by a large number of people and *intensive* when it's for a long time. Of course, if you spend half an hour or two hours in a public space, you have a different impact than if you stay all day in the same space. (Barcelona Council official, Conflict Management Service)

But the fact that the meeting place is fixed doesn't mean the space isn't – or can't be - shared. Indeed, in different diagnoses carried out about the use of public space by young people in Barcelona Metropolitan Area (Porzio et al. 2008 and 2010) it is stated that, in spite of the presence of gangs in squares and parks, their use always ends up being shared. This doesn't mean that there are no conflicts between the groups because of the use of space that of course happen in certain circumstances.

Why do gangs use public space so much? On the one hand, as we have seen, the groups do not have free access to the spaces managed by the public administration. In this sense, the presence of these young people in parks and squares reveals the lack of social and educational youth policies. On the other hand, the street is always an important space for socialisation for young people from different countries, who keep this habit throughout their migration process. The use of public space is also connected to a social class issue; it represents a territory for leisure activities that does not involve the need for money.

The use of public space by gangs is based on socialisation and sport and leisure activities – spend some time with their mates – in a fixed place that becomes their second home; we should consider the frequent limitations and precariousness of the first home. We have a story about an everyday situation in the words of a Latin Queen leader in Barcelona.

> Once we organised an activity at the beach, here in Badalona, the police on bikes arrived and told us that there were too many of us and we should have warned the City Council and asked for permission. Another time we were playing football and, well, someone called the police and then they came, and then we were all lined up against the wall for a search. We spent hours there – there were lots of us – and we felt uncomfortable and ashamed, because everyone was looking from their windows at what was going on. A show, like in the films. (Leader Latin Queens, Barcelona)

Thus, the public space is the stage for identity construction and representation - individual and group identities – and at the same time is a context where young people live, develop cultural practices and experiment forms of discrimination; in a certain way they make up their own space, they recreate with old and new habits the usage of public space that had been abandoned and commoditised, they perform what Mike Davis (2012) calls, in a classic work about Latin immigrants in the USA, the *magical urbanism*.

The professionals who most often approach young people in the street and parks are the police. The groups and young people I met in Madrid and Barcelona, talk about

continuous checks and searches by the police in the public space. The pressure is so excessive that a young Latin King tells me during a workshop for the production of the research documentary: "they talk about democracy here, but I don't understand why in this country, for us young immigrants, the right to meet is forbidden".

These young people – expelled from schools and not accepted in public facilities – end up relating to the police as the most visible face of the *host* society. The police actors that intervene in the street invite them to vacate the public spaces, social interveners evoke the need to access normalised resources (public facilities, youth centres, sports centres, etc...) without the guarantee it is within the boundaries of possibility, neighbours evoke alarm at their presence and the media narrate the privatisation of the public space by immigrant youths. New categories of criminalisation of their practices emerge: *the intensive and privative use of space*. Often, as a consequence of these actions and gazes, the young people in the gangs get dispersed and become less visible, in order to escape from these forms of permanent surveillance.

Expelled from schools and public facilities, controlled in parks and the street, many gangs find a welcoming space in the churches. It is called to our attention that the Church hosts what for secular public spaces, schools and youth centres is so problematic; of course, with the increasing distancing of autochthonous new generations from the church, these young people represent *clients* that churches otherwise would not have.

A priest told us, reflecting on the experience of the encounter of his parish with the young Latin Kings and Ñetas who have frequented the church since 2005: "It is hard to understand what they are doing". In spite of all attempts to turning them into clients with certain benefits, in this case religious benefits, the young gang members keep their autonomy and seem to make an instrumental use of the spaces, which nonetheless are not totally immune to police pressure. The multiple processes of ostracism in the public spaces have driven these categories of youth into the only place that by definition has the mission of hosting *sinners*: the churches. When the police identify churches as meeting points and organise operations to check and detect around them, they tend not to name them, maybe to protect the religious authorities, or maybe to avoid awkward questions that may reveal institutional racism: why are these terrible youth gangs meeting and praying in our churches? The religious space thus configures itself as the final space of social discharge for those interventions that the other left hand actors carry out.

2.5 Summarising the field

Throughout this analysis of State's left hand we have seen a plurality of logics and temporalities. In the following table we mention these polarities that help us place social interventions into the two contexts, relating them at the same time with the work of the State's right hand. The modalities presented here were experienced in Barcelona and in Madrid; the difference has to do with the power relations within the State's left hand and the complicities/resistances towards the right hand.

In Madrid there was on the one hand a privileged official channel and on the other a set of occult practices to manage the phenomenon and experimentation at the micro level; the aim was, and still is, to detect, to insert *those detected* into the channels of personalised intervention (*refer them*, in the words of actors), detach from gangs and prevent entries. This official policy - *gangs out* – runs in parallel to the work of the State's right hand, who imprison, deport and illegalise street groups.

The dominant actors in the field look for social capital (detection of the gang scene) to turn it into warrior capital (gang disappearance) and symbolic capital, that is, to give their practices and discourses, and the policies *gangs out* value and legitimacy. The dominated actors experience practices of investigation and action (academics), conflict mediation and empowerment of the members (neighbourhood associations), neighbourhood police (the mentors), trying to turn social capital, fruit of a more empathic relationship with the street groups, into symbolic capital, that is to affirm the value of approximation in terms of incorporation and harm reduction (*gangs in*). But the dominated actors develop part of their practices in an occult way and without any political support, which ultimately is the one to give efficacy to the symbolic capital. In the context of Madrid, cultural (views), political (decisions) and economic hegemony (resources) is clearly located under the sign of ostracism.

Table 6 – A map of policies on gangs from the State's left hand

Policies	*Gangs out*	*Gangs in*
Subjects of intervention	*referred*	free
Focus of intervention	individual	groups
Space of intervention	Office - service	Street –informal education
Definition and principal assignation of the phenomenon/problem	Police-security	Social-cultural
Objective 1	Membership prevention and detection	Membership prevention and detection
Objective 2	Detach	Re-attach (associations as a pedagogical and transformation tool) to detach
Objective 3	Make the street gangs disappear through social exclusion and police pressure	Make the street gangs disappear through the normalisation of their behaviour. Fragmentation of the gang scene and segmentation of police pressure

In Catalonia among the actors of State's left hand there was a much more balanced struggle between anthropophagical (*gangs in*) and anthropoemic strategies (*gangs out*); different branches of the administration – schools and municipalities, prevention policies, youth policies, social services and facilities at a neighbourhood level, backed one strategy or the other in a conflictive way. Moreover, within each branch of the administration occult practices of resistance also took place; the insistence in creating protocols and response pathways from the different institutions can also be explained as a political-administrative attempt of unifying a deeply striated space.

Power in the field was maintained for a long time by a coalition partnership that tied police work in all of Catalonia with certain social interventions in the region's main urban conglomerate. The conversion into an association of the Latin Kings and Ñetas between 2006 and 2007, as well as their appearance before the Catalan Parliament were the symbolic acts of consecration of this anthropophagic strategy. The hegemony of this coalition in the field was assured by the continuity of a culture and a police team that

worked to segment the gang scene into those who are *good* and *bad*; the first are granted mediation, help and acknowledgement; the latter arrest and deportation.

The difference in field operation between Madrid and Barcelona is first a political one, as the groups have the same dynamics for generation of violence, based on status affirming mechanisms. The political difference of the Catalan experiment turned around the idea of normalisation, a magical word, a field language that many actors shared; however, it was diluted and fragmented between the different institutions. Normalisation evokes also another dimension, the transformation of the social capital into symbolic capital, as a gamble by the State's left hand: to establish a cultural relationship with the host society giving value to the gestures, in the groups and the institutions, that allow collective identities performed by gangs to transit from a space defined by the origin to a space defined by the destination. This was an attempt of pedagogical work, unfinished and unaccomplished, in certain aspects *colonial* because it endeavoured to solve and to cure the condition and the symbolic inventions of a subaltern group from the standpoint of a sentiment of superiority of the receiving society towards those it considered as culturally disabled (Delgado, 2010). Maybe the gamble for normalisation failed due to its excessive, assimilative character, as Barbara Scandroglio and Jorge López add:

> You cannot keep the essence of a youth organisation like the *Latin King* or the *Ñetas*, if you dissolve completely the dimension of identity spaces that are contrary or marginal. If you don't preserve part of the other dimension, you miss many of the group essences on the way, needed to integrate and work with people who are outside the normal procedures of insertion into society.

One of the protagonists of the intervention with the Latin Kings says: "the aim was to normalise, tackling the problems rather than the identity"; "we wanted to do a pedagogy of the autochthonous"; "groups don't do anything by themselves". In these expressions we find certain features of the field, of the mainstream coalition and transformation: the contact, the pedagogy and the maieutic, the passivity of the young people, the adults as educators, and the desire of recovering the members as individuals to be able to counter their deficits in their access to citizenship. Our informant goes on:

> *Latin gangs* represented the secular detritus of the old fashioned baroque Hispanity. These ties of fraternity between Spain and Latin America (more so now with the economic crisis), the exaltation of the blend of the Latino cultures, all sounds to me like the other side of the same old fascistoid coin. These "organisations" share all the repertoire of anti-modernity: verticality, spirit of body, royalty, casts, kings, queens, rites of initiation, liturgies, etc. This always seemed to me more dangerous than a knife. (Educator, Barcelona)

The *Latin gangs* like the *secular detritus of the old fashioned baroque hispanity*. The expression is fascinating; but mistaken, I think. Because after all it still assumes these groups as an importation product, even evoked as a colonial type of history, while their reproduction, here and now, invites us to re-think them as a genuine product of contemporary receiving society, one of the many possible forms of creative resistance that the youth of immigrant origin and from a lower class background invent to confront the multiple mechanisms of ostracism that cause bias in jobs, education, leisure, and ultimately hinder the construction of a future for these generations. Gangs are a genuine commodity produced by the brand Spain.

Maybe what marks the field in a most radical way, both in Madrid and Barcelona, is precisely the crisis: when the structures of contention or empowerment weaken, an empty space grows – an area of non work and non study – where the street gangs reproduce between economy and politics of the street. We could add that under the weight of the crisis, the final result of this multiplicity of interventions around the object-gang is something similar to what Young (1999) has called bulimic society: a space where pretentions of inclusion or moral and cultural correction are accompanied, falsified, through radical processes of structural exclusion.

The crisis is a process of expulsion and a deepening in the construction of an even more segmented social space by class and race; this empty space also generate a parallel time, as Perea Restrepo suggests (2007), a temporality disentangled from school routines and work obligations. What will be left in the day-to-day territories of the proletarian and immigrant youth looks like the State's right hand. In this sense social interventions become more discontinuous, distant and secondary in contemporary Spain[46].

In this space emptied of those resources and relations that would have normally provided the State's left hand, and at the same time populated with subjects abandoned to their vulnerabilities, the discourse of institutionalisation – the idea of conversion of the *gangs* into associations – was wiped off the map; to a certain extent that attempt and wish was framed within a trajectory, a gamble on an ascending mobility that is no longer possible nowadays. The opinions that we collected among the leaders of the groups that accepted that gamble are now critical and disappointed; it is something they would not do again.

> Z. still expresses all his disappointment at that process: "now the problem is that the new generations don't know anything about the peace we had in 2006". Z. was the public face of the process in Barcelona. What G. was to the Latin Kings, Z. was for Ñetas. "Have you any idea how I stood up for the process of legalisation, and I had to give a lot inside and outside. Inside, because the idea was to walk on the right path and there was a lot of cleaning that we needed to do. I'm being honest, we had a heavy conscience for what we were doing ourselves… but many did not agree and they left. And outside, to become public, all of us. You know, Luca, we were disappointed, we don't want anything to do with institutions now."
>
> I'm thinking about the situation of public actors of this story among the street gangs: some are in prison for transporting drugs because they didn't have the money to pay back a debt and now they don't have papers; others always worked in hotels and bars and lost their jobs because of the crisis and don't have papers either, and the brother who we just heard of does not have a job or papers either. These were the leading actors of that policy launched by public institutions, and didn't get anything… What type of State's left hand was that? They were talking about promoting the groups in order to transform them from the inside. Eight years after the groups are fragmented because of that policy, and the subjects of that desired normalisation by the State are in prison, with penal problems and paper problems, jobless. Like many from the edges of society, live alternating precarious work, crime and welfare. (Field diary, July 2012)

The policies of *gangs in* and *gangs out*, in a period of almost ten years from the first appearance of the phenomenon, could not end the gang scenario that started with the first family regrouping of Latin American immigrants, and became a structuring element within the young, urban and mestizo proletariat. Their resistance to be

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[46] When I got back to Madrid in February 2013, I found many of my informants who were street educators unemployed, fired by their companis, victims of the cutbacks.

transformed into clients, treated by contemptuous state devices, whatever the sign of such contempt, is the innovative element of interest in this story, beyond an approach in terms of heritage, of a baroque and stale Hispanic legacy. This is what we call *gang autonomy* confronting the State, its right hand, its left hand.

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Annex 1 – List Of Interviews and Key Informants

Table 1 – List of key informants and interviews realized in Catalonia. January-December 2012

	Gender	Field	Position in the field	format
1	M	media	journalist	Recorded interview. Field notes
2	M	media	journalist	Recorded interview. Field notes
3	M	church	priest	Recorded interview. Field notes
4	M	church	priest	Field notes
5	M	Barcelona City Council. Prevention department	Head of department	Recorded interview. Field notes
6	M	NGO	Director youth programs	Recorded interview. Field notes
7	F	NGO	Director youth programs	Recorded interview. Field notes
8	F	Barcelona City Council. Social policies department	Head of department	Recorded interview. Field notes
9	M	Barcelona City Council. Social policies department	Coordinator of gang unit	Recorded interview. Field notes
10	M	Barcelona City Council. Social policies department	Member of gang unit	Recorded interview. Field notes
11	F	Barcelona City Council. Social policies department	member of gang unit	Field notes
12	F	Barcelona City Council. Social policies department	High officer	Field notes
13	F	Barcelona City Council. Social policies department	Head of department	Field notes
14	M	Barcelona City Council. Migration policies department	Head of department	Field notes
15	M	Barcelona City Council. Youth policies department	Head of department	Field notes
16	F	NGO	Street-worker	Field notes
17	F	prison	High officer	Recorded interview. Field notes
18	F	criminal justice	judge	Recorded interview. Field notes
19	M	school	Head of Department	Recorded interview. Field notes

20-21	F	school	teacher	Field notes
22	F	school	teacher	Field notes
23	M	university	Director gang unit research program	Recorded interview. Field notes
24-25	M	police	Director gang unit	Recorded interview. Field notes
26	M	police	Member of gang unit	Field notes
27	M	police	Member of gang unit	Field notes
28	M	police	Member of gang unit	Field notes

Table 2 – List of key informants and interviews realized in Madrid – May 2012

	Gender	Field	Position in the field	Format
1	M	police	Director analysis unit on gangs	Field notes
2-3	M	police	Director and member of gang unit	Field notes
4	F	Madrid City Council. Social policies department	Head of Department on youth and family violence	Recorded interview. Field notes
5	F	Madrid City Council. Migration policies department	Head of Department	Recorded interview. Field notes
6-7	M-F	prison	Director and Vice-Director of Agency for criminal youth reintegration	Recorded interview. Field notes
8-9	M-F	university	Directors gang unit research program	Recorded interview
10-11	M-F	NGO	Directors youth programs	Field notes
12-13	F-F	NGO	Directors youth programs	Recorded interview. Field notes
14	M	NGO	Director youth programs	Field notes
15	F	NGO	Director youth programs	Recorded interview. Field notes

Table 3 – Focus groups realized. January - December 2012

	n.	field	Position in the field	Format	Place
1	20	prison	Educators in Catalan prison system	Field notes	Barcelona
2	10	Social policies	High officers in City Council Barcelona	Field notes	Barcelona
3	5	School and social work	Teachers and social workers	Field notes	Barcelona
4	15	Social policies	High officers in City Council Barcelona	Field notes	Barcelona
5	5	Youth policies	High officers in City Council Lleida	Field notes	Lleida
6	10	Social policies	High officers in City Council Madrid	Field notes	Madrid
7	7	Social work	Street educators and social workers	Field notes	Madrid
8	15	Social work and social services	Social workers, educators, and public officers	Field notes	Madrid
9	8	Police, social work, policy makers	High officers of Barcelona, Madrid, Milan, Genova City Council	Field notes and filmed session	Génova

Table 4 – Interview realized in the gang scene. December 2011 – July 2013

	Gender	Position in gang field	Format	Place
1	M	Latin King leader	Filmed interview – field notes	Badalona (Catalunya)
2	M	Latin King leader	Filmed interview – field notes	Rubi (Catalunya)
3	F	Latin King leader	Filmed interview – field notes	Barcelona
4	M	Latin King leader	Filmed interview – field notes	Barcelona
5	M	Ñeta Leader	Filmed interview – field notes	Rubi (Catalunya)
6	M	Dominican group Leader	Filmed interview – field notes	L'Hospitalet (Catalunya)
7	F	Dominican group member	Filmed interview – field notes	L'Hospitalet (Catalunya)
8	F	Dominican group member	Filmed interview – field notes	L'Hospitalet (Catalunya)
9	M	Dominican group member	Filmed interview – field notes	L'Hospitalet (Catalunya)
10	M	Dominican group member	Filmed interview – field notes	L'Hospitalet (Catalunya)
11	M	Ex – Leader Mara Salvatrucha	Filmed interview	Madrid
12	M	Ex - Leader Latin King	Filmed interview – field notes	Barcelona
13	F	Latin King leader	Filmed interview – field notes	Alicante
14	F	Latin King member	Filmed interview – field notes	Alicante
15	F	Latin King member	Filmed interview – field notes	Alicante
16	F	Dominican group member	Filmed interview	L'Hospitalet (Catalunya)
17	F	Ex member Latin Queen - Barcelona	Filmed interview – field notes	Barcelona
18	M	Leader Latin King	Field notes	Barcelona
19	M	Leader Latin King	Field notes	Barcelona
20	M	Leader Latin King	Field notes	Barcelona
21	M	Ñetas Leader	Filmed interview – field notes	Barcelona
22	M	Latin King member	Field notes	Madrid
23	F	Latin Queen member	Filmed interview – field notes	Badalona (Catalunya)
24	F	Latin Queen member	Filmed interview – field notes	Badalona (Catalunya)
25	M	Leader Ñeta	Field notes	Terrasa
26	M	Ex leader Latin King in USA	Filmed interview – field notes	Stockholm
27	M	Ñeta member	Filmed interview – field notes	Barcelona
28	M	Ñeta member	Filmed interview – field notes	Barcelona
29	M	Mara salvatrucha member	Filmed interview – field notes	Barcelona

30	M	Ex Leader Black Panther	Field notes and recorded interview	Prison (Catalunya)
31	M	Leader Latin King	field notes	Prison (Catalunya)
32	M	Leader Ñeta	Field notes	L'Hospitalet
33	M	Ñeta member	Field notes	L'Hospitalet
34	M	Ex Trinitarios member	Recorded interview	Badalona (Catalunya)
35	M	DDP member	Field notes	Madrid
36	M	Ex Trinitarios member	Field notes	Madrid