Europeanization in Turkey: In Search of a New Paradigm of Modernization

Alper Kaliber

This study suggests that for the countries of Southern and Eastern Europe, that is, ‘the semi-periphery of Europe’ (Turkey, Greece, Portugal and the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs)), Europeanization/modernization runs at the deeper sphere of the societal and in direct relation to the change in the nature of domestic politics. In those countries, Europeanization corresponds to a quest for a new paradigm of political modernity. This paper also reveals some inexorable methodological and epistemological parallels between the modernization theory of the 1950s and the current Europeanization literature. The aim is to reveal how the essentialist, top-down, universalist and evolutionist approach to development and social change adapted by the modernization school has been reproduced by the current scholarship on Europeanization.

Introduction: Two Historical Ruptures, Two Literatures

The end of the Second World War, where one way to modernization—fascism—was overwhelmingly delegitimized and eliminated, marked the emergence of fierce global competition between the other two ways to modernization: communism and capitalism. The gradual collapse of the colonial era triggered this bipolar rivalry and turned the Third World into a battlefield, on which each pole could impose its own project of development and modernization. On the capitalist side, the agenda of policymakers to provide economic aids to developing countries received a strong backing from the non-Marxist wing of American scholarship. Both the academic and political discourses of the 1950s and 1960s were targeting the Third World nations ‘flirting with undesirable elements, i.e. the USSR. If modernisation theory was planted in Parsonian soil, it was intended in a political climate dominated by the Cold War.’

The 1950s witnessed the occurrence of a voluminous literature on modernization inspired by the positivism and evolutionism of 19th-century sociology. Extensive empirical and theoretical studies from different disciplines, sociology, anthropology and psychology, to name a few, have all contributed to the consolidation of an evolutionist theory of social change relying on a fictitious dichotomy between ‘the traditional’ and ‘the modern’.

© 2014 Taylor & Francis
A few decades later, this time the fall of the communist bloc gave an unprecedented momentum to European integration towards Eastern and Central Europe. The European Union (EU) created ‘powerful tools to shape institutions’ and political structures in the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) through the mechanisms of conditionality, financial aid and other instruments which were directly associated with accession to the EU. Therefore, the EU found the opportunity to impose its conception of modernity and development through accession; modernity ‘legitimated around a collective identity based on liberal norms of capitalist democracy’. After the South European enlargements in 1981–86, the EU once more appeared as the external modernizing subject and ideal model to emulate for the countries undergoing deep transformation. The political and economic models of its core members ‘were seen as normatively superior and readily transferable to displace inferior models in candidate countries’.

The last wave of the EU enlargement ran in parallel to the rapid increase of research and literature on Europeanization dedicated to understand the domestic impact of the EU in the member and candidate countries. This study reveals that both the modernization school of the 1950s and the current scholarship on Europeanization are guided by a positivist and evolutionist understanding of social change and development. In order to explore and conceptualize social/political change in societies, they operationalize a similar conceptual architecture in historically and politically different contexts. Among frequently used terms of this architecture are convergence, adaptation, progress, diffusion and modernization. They have all ushered developing countries to the path to be stridden, the end stage of which is associated with Western European democracies. The compelling dichotomy between the traditional and the modern in the modernization theory is replaced this time by a more sophisticated continuum on which the societies, their legal, institutional, political structures are differentiated according to their relative degree of Europeanness. The modernization school largely ignoring the specificities and complexities of the non-Western societies was short-lived. Yet, the orientalist biases that it has planted on academic soil have haunted various literatures of social sciences.

This paper reveals some methodological and epistemological parallels between the modernization theory and the Europeanization literature (for a different view on the Europeanization–Westernization relationship, see Güney and Renda in this issue). Doing this, the aim is to reveal how the essentialist, top-down, universalist and evolutionist approach to development and social change adapted by the modernization school has been reproduced by the current scholarship on Europeanization. As in the case of the modernization school of the 1950s, the Europeanization literature often understands modernization as an institutional/technical process of adaptation to the more developed West. Modernization, therefore, is either reduced to the update and liberalization of the domestic institutions and policies in order to align with the EU model or a natural and inevitable corollary of this alignment. This determinist approach to modernization and Europeanization is far from capturing how deep domestic changes these two
create in different and particularly non-Western societies and in what ways they interact with each other.

Europeanization in non-Western societies does not function merely as a technical/institutional domestic process of adaptation to the EU which may better be conceptualized as EU-ization. Rather, it is experienced as a socio-political and normative context which is shaping and shaped by their centuries-old political modernization. Therefore, to comprehend better socio-political transformations induced by Europe, a new theoretical move is needed: a move associating the implications of Europeanization in societies with their political modernity in a wider historical context. This study suggests that in the countries where modernization has emerged and developed as a state-sponsored project, Europeanization/globalization opens up new spaces for a paradigmatic shift in their modernity, that is, transition from a state-centric, monolithic modernization to a more pluralistic, inclusive and participatory paradigm. When conceptualized in this manner, for the countries of South and Eastern Europe, Europeanization/modernization runs at the deeper sphere of the societal and in direct relation to the change in the nature of domestic politics. In those countries, constituting ‘the semi-periphery of Europe’, such as Turkey, Greece, Portugal and the CEECs, Europeanization corresponds to a quest for a new paradigm of political modernity.

It is a widely accepted conviction that the West European model has extensively influenced modernization and nation-building processes in South European states including Turkey since the 19th century. When the Ottoman–Turkish modernization started at the inception of the 19th century and when modernization became the fundamental property of the Turkish Republic in 1923, Europeanization constituted the main normative/political context for the modernizing elite to define and justify their vision of state and society. The West European norms and values deeply influenced Ottoman–Turkish intellectuals and their reflections on the direction and substance of modernization from the late 19th century onwards. Yet, Europeanization—Westernization has meant too much for the radical and moderate critiques of Ottoman, and later Kemalist, modernization as well. For them, Europe was either a civilizational other or a context representing a system of values alien to Turkey’s statist/monolithic modernization.

Against this background, the current study will seek to relocate the phenomenon of Europeanization into the project of political modernity by making a particular emphasis on Turkey. It will first point out some basic assumptions of the modernization school of the 1950s to compare its conception of social change and development with that of current scholarship on Europeanization. It will secondly seek to posit that the current scholarship on Europeanization suggests for the societies of Europe a similar evolutionary and linear sequence of development and modernization defined mainly as a process of technical adaptation to the EU model. The study will then move on to redefine the Europeanization/modernization relationship with a particular reference to the South European and the Turkish cases.
The Modernization Theory: The Neo-evolutionist Turn in Social Sciences

The roots of theoretical and empirical studies on modernization in the 1950s and 1960s can be found in the ‘intellectual tradition which originated with the emergence of industrial societies in Western Europe’. A myriad of authors including Immanuel Kant, Adam Ferguson and Adam Smith, inspired by the two Western European revolutions, namely, the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution in England, perceived the modern society as a hiatus in history. Their analyses on modernization and modern society were further developed by the fathers of classical sociology, for example, Durkheim, Marx and Weber. The central concern of classical sociology, traditionally thought as the genesis of all social sciences, was to understand modern society, its differences from traditional life and order and the nature of social change and development toward modernization. The fathers of sociology strove to understand, within a linear and evolutionary interpretation of history, the conditions of transition from ‘the traditional’, presumed as relatively inferior, to the modern, accepted as ‘the highest known forms of civilization’.

The concept of modernization became ‘fashionable’ soon after the Second World War in tandem with the subsequent declarations of independence coming from the ‘Third World’ states. Works of such American social theorists as Lerner, Lipset, Parsons, Levy and Rustow, mostly inspired by positivist assumptions of classical sociology, initiated the neo-evolutionist turn in social sciences. Albeit their various differences, the common denominator of the theorists of modernization was ‘to construct contrasting ideal types of tradition and modernity’ and using ‘that contrast to make contingent generalizations about the transition from one to the other’. For the modernization school, characterized by Euro-centric and ahistoric essentialism, only the West was progressive, rational and capable of modernity. Non-Western societies by contrast, were irrational, traditional and stagnant. The students of modernization were suggesting a post-ontological research agenda in the sense that it was not an issue for them at all if there existed such phenomena as tradition and modernity and an evolutionary transition in global scale from the traditional to the modern. The theoretical ambition of neo-evolutionists was ‘to explain and predict’ the structural conditions and evolutionary steps of this transition in the ‘Third World’, ‘already experienced in the West’. The gist of the scholarly consensus has seen modernization as a more or less uniform pattern of social change applicable to the whole non-Western, underdeveloped world within the same modalities. For those societies, modernization meant the incorporation of the Western model of development based on such factors as economic efficiency, technological development, industrialization and urbanization, positivist and rationalist spirit.

Therefore, modernization, largely assumed as natural, inevitable and, once started, irreversible, has become synonymous with Westernization. Modernization, for traditional societies, was mainly a matter of technical adaptation to the institutions and ‘evolutionary universals’ of modernity (i.e. social stratification, bureaucratic organization, money and market) innovated in the West. Parsons defines evolutionary universal as ‘a complex of structures and associated processes’ increasing ‘the long-run adaptive capacity of living systems’.
all societies were similar in that they were all adaptive systems aspiring to survive. The only secure way for the developing societies to become modern was but to emulate their more advanced counterparts. Their relative degree of success in replicating Western institutions was supposed to determine their position in the evolutionary scale of development and modernization. In this evolutionary scale, needless to say, Western modernity, imbued with normative superiority, represented the most developed and globally relevant.

The Ottoman–Turkish reforms, seemingly confirming the main tenets of the modernization theory, were a well-studied and frequently cited success story for the students of modernization. ‘Ottoman and Turkish modernisation was seen to be succeeding as an elite driven, consensus based, institution building process’ inspired exclusively by the Western experience. Such scholars as Lerner and Lewis often referred to ‘Turkey’s apparently successful adoption of Western norms, styles and institutions’ as ‘testimony to the viability of the project of modernity, even in an overwhelmingly Muslim country’. They did not avoid praising the Turkish project of modernity as an appealing model to be replicated by other Islamic–Eastern societies.

Bendix was amongst the critics of the modernization theorists as they were giving ‘an oversimplified view of traditional societies, of modern societies and of the transition from the one to the other. Oversimplification resulted from ideological interpretations of the contrasts between tradition and modernity and from undue generalizations of the European experience.’ The strong ethno-centrism in Parsons and his contemporaries is clearly manifest in their idealization of the North American and West European model of development, the roots of which are found ‘in the Judaeo-Christian tradition’ seen ‘as the hallmark of modernity’. This largely prevented the neo-evolutionists from questioning the West’s colonial past and strengthened ‘the risk of projecting Western experience onto the Third World as a mono-causal, uniform and inevitable process’. Having concisely pointed out the basic tenets of the modernization school, I will now turn to the Europeanization literature and its conceptualization of change, which display remarkable similarities.

Redefining the Europeanization/Modernization Relationship

This section of the study is dedicated to relocate Europeanization into the project of political modernity. Before doing this, it will be relevant to pin down how social change is imagined in the current ‘fashionable but contested’ discourses of Europeanization. For the Europeanization literature, domestic change and modernization in the EU member or applicant states is contingent upon the ability of ‘rational, goal-oriented’ domestic pro-EU actors to use opportunities and constraints emerging from Europeanization at the expense of their rivals. Domestic change occurs when the actors holding social and political capital learn and internalize European rules, norms and institutions so as to redefine their identities and interests. Domestic actors are often ‘only considered as mediators’ of top-down pressures coming from Europe and no real political role and discretion are recognized of them. The existence of domestic elites backing and mediating Europeanization is
a necessary condition for any impact of Europe, which is explored through the concept of ‘hegemony’ by Alpan in this issue.

This is a phenomenon observed in the modernization theory of the 1950s as well, emphasizing the particular importance of the modernizing elite who will successfully lead reforms in traditional societies. As I have argued elsewhere, in both modernization theory and Europeanization literature, change refers to a linear, empirically observable and testable process, the success of which mainly depends on the adaptational ability and learning capacity of the developing societies.\textsuperscript{35} It is a teleological process of progress toward ‘the more European’ and ‘the more modern’ embodied in the core Western members of the EU. The literature on Europeanization often departs from the core Western-centric analyses,\textsuperscript{36} where other European countries are covertly or overtly perceived as ‘Europe, but not quite Europe’.\textsuperscript{37}

Research and scholarly reflection on Europeanization are mostly informed by the experiences of the current Western European member states of the EU and, more specifically, of the North-Western European core of founder member states. It is, in other words, the North-Western world of Europeanization that provides the template for the study of Europeanization experiences in other parts of Europe.\textsuperscript{38}

Methodologically, the scholarship on Europeanization is dominated by the institution-focused cross-national comparative approaches, whereby societies are denied agency and imagined as nationally bound entities identical to the state.\textsuperscript{39} ‘Deterministic and conservatist bias inherent to “simple” institution-based explanations’\textsuperscript{40} renders the literature vulnerable to the criticism that it analytically ignores the historicities and specificities of distinct cases, and hence, overlooks possible deviances and discontinuities in absorbing Europeanization. This is a criticism levelled also against the modernization theory ‘confined to official and institutional realms’\textsuperscript{41} and marginalizing society as the subject and object of change. National institutions largely imagined like-units and homogenous entities are thought to be subject to similar laws of change and adaptation under the impact of Europeanization/modernization processes. Powerful domestic actors, that is, bureaucratic apparatus, legislatures, political figures, though not the society, are seen as responsible agents enjoying the capacity of responding to the EU for the removal of misfits between the domestic and European institutions.

The current literature on Europeanization and the modernization school draw on a similar notion of development and social change. In both, modernization is mainly a matter of technicality and institutional adaptation which is realized stage by stage through the import of Western institutions into the domestic structure. In this sense, modernization is taken to mean liberalization and update of domestic institutional settings and policies to achieve greater efficiency, transparency, responsibility and accountability. Europeanization is at times construed as a means to moderate an ossified economic and political system and to adjust it to the neo-liberal rationale of the EU norms, procedures and institutions. Both modernization school and Europeanization literature strongly imply a struggle between tradition and modernity and a duality and in some cases even binary opposition between the domestic and the imported.
The term ‘Southern Europeanization’ was used and comprehensively examined in a volume edited by Featherstone and Kazamias. As the authors suggest, several (i.e. religious, ethnic and linguistic) differences can be registered amongst the societies of the region of South and Eastern Europe. Yet, it is also possible to pin down some common patterns characterizing the historical evolution of political modernization in those societies. These can be cited as top-down reformist movements, state-centric conception of modernity, the endurance of authoritarian regimes and even military dictatorships, relatively recent development of autonomous civil society in comparison to Western Europe.

As to the modernization of South European countries through Europeanization, the relevant literature often embraces a holistic approach. Modernization is coined as a ‘package of economic, social and political reforms defined by their liberalizing character.’ To this logic, the adaptational pressure generated by misfit between the domestic and EU levels forces the domestic actors to modernize the national institutions and policies. Then, Europeanization is straightforwardly meant to be a pathway leading these societies to the end-stage of modernization. This approach implies that once ‘European-wide’ norms, rules and procedures get diffused and the institutional and policy misfit between the domestic and EU level is eliminated, these countries will have completed their process of modernization. Consequently, Europeanization and modernization are presumed as coterminous processes running hand in hand or they are used as synonymous terms or at times even interchangeably with each other.

However, as Laffan suggested in the context of the sister literature on European integration, the emphasis on the economic and instrumental dimensions of integration ignores the importance of the European project to states and their peoples as a symbol of their place in the world and as part of national modernisation projects. As I will attempt to demonstrate with respect to the Turkish case, the Europeanization/modernization relationship is far more complex than is assumed in the current scholarship. Particularly in socio-political contexts where the domestic paradigm of order has been built upon traditions different from West European experience, this relationship is not confined to the straitjacket of policy harmonization and institutional goodness of fit. The implications of Europeanization and the debates it has triggered in non-Western settings, that is, the southern periphery of Europe and the CEECs, need to be historicized in the modernization of these societies.

The South European case testifies Malmborg and Strath’s observation on European societies that ‘Europe has been a dimension of national identity construction long before the emergence of the EU. But its significance has differed widely.’ The meaning of modernization is surely contested. In this study, it is defined as a project of political modernity, as a ‘potentially liberating historical condition’ transforming and democratizing the whole aspects of socio-political and economic relations in a given society. It is a possibility of social critique, an ongoing process of transformation maintaining its liberating, destructive and emancipatory ideals.
This paper argues that in the countries where modernization has emerged and developed as a state-sponsored project, Europeanization/globalization opens up new spaces for a paradigmatic shift in their modernity, that is, transition from a state-centric, monolithic modernization to a more pluralistic, inclusive and participatory paradigm. Europeanization in those societies often leads to the ‘redefinition of boundaries between the state and society’ and widens the domestic political space in favour of civil society. It triggers public discourses and actions problematizing the state centredness of political modernization and paves the way for calls for democratization and decentralization. The demands for major socio-political transformations are justified through the discourse of Europeanization if there exists a strong will to be part of European integration at the elite and society levels. As Ioakimidis states with respect to the Greek case, pro-European elites tend to view Europeanization as ‘integral components of the modernisation process’ for their societies.

It is fair to suggest that in state-centric socio-political structures, Europeanization impacts upon the nature of the domestic order, that is, consolidating democracy and political stability, strengthening external security and the modernization of the socio-economic system. To Majone, for instance, ‘the European integration process was an important reinforcing factor in transforming Portugal from an authoritarian to a democratic governance system’. Some scholars propose that the impact of Europe is more visible and transformative in statist regimes where the state authority is highly centralized and imbued with absolute autonomy from civil society. As Schmidt argues:

the EU’s quasi-federal institutional structures have had a greater impact on member states with unitary institutional structures, by altering the traditional balance of powers among branches and levels of government, than to those with federal institutional structures, where the traditional balance of powers has been largely maintained.

For instance, to Ioakimidis, when Greece applied for EU membership, Greek politics was characterized by a ‘gigantic’ and ‘over-centralized’ state apparatus prevailing over ‘practically every aspect of Greek society’. To the author, the net result of Europeanization reforms has been ‘enhancing the civil society’, ‘loosening the state’s grip on the social institutions and reinforcing the latter’s autonomy’ in Greece. To him, Europeanization also facilitated interest groups to participate more in policymaking processes and weakened ‘the dominant position of the party system in Greek society’, ‘diminishing the role of the traditional patronage system as a factor shaping state–society relationships’. Even if this approach, taking state and society as monolithic and mutually exclusive structures, is somewhat problematic, it tells something about the pervasive consequences of Europeanization on Greece’s statist modernization.

Yet, Europeanization may also trigger more loud articulations of counter-demands where Europe appears as a threat to the old paradigm and to the fundamentals of the domestic regime and national identity. In parallel to the deepening of the EU–
Turkish relations in the post-1999 era, Europeanization opened up spaces for its critiques as well. Turkey, in that period, witnessed the rise of political/societal actors ‘defending a very rigid interpretation of Turkish nationalism, authoritarian state ideology and militant secularism’. The increasing involvement of the EU and other European institutions in Turkish politics was instrumentalized by these actors to create a sense of urgency premised on the idea that the EU has been ‘concocting a grand and elaborate project of splitting up Turkey’. The penetration of European norms, policies and institutions into the domestic political structure was perceived by them as something threatening the fundamental pillars of Turkey’s Kemalist modernization, which are Turkish nationalism and secularism. The next section of this paper is dedicated to a closer look at Turkish modernity through the lenses of Europeanization.

**Turkey: Europeanization as a Quest for a New Paradigm of Modernity**

_We cannot transport Turkey into a new era with a nation offended by the state, with a system that views the society as a threat, with a bureaucracy that belittles the citizen, with a republic that ousts the citizen, and with a political system that is impotent in the face of these adversities._

Students of Turkish modernization converge on the idea that the Ottoman polity was characterized by the lack of Western-type civil society or any other mechanism to stand vis-à-vis the state authority. The modernizing reforms introduced by the state elite both in the late Ottoman and Republican eras have reproduced and even consolidated the traditional hierarchy between the state and society in Turkey. The Kemalist elite of the new Republic—founded in 1923—vehemently aspired to keep the whole economic, socio-political and cultural life under its tutelage. Since, they believed that this is the only way of securing the configuration of the new ‘man’ and an all-encompassing transformation towards ‘European civilization’ (Europeanization). Then, it was the highly centralized bureaucratic authority which held together and defined the limits of society as a whole. The massive expulsion of the ethnically differentiated Ottoman bourgeoisie had already left the bureaucratic elite unrivalled in ‘directing and controlling the state-centred socio-economic transformation’.

This statist modernization, ‘despite its explicit and frequent evocations of the “people”, was permeated by lack of trust in the latter’. The exclusion of peripheral groups from the political centre ‘gave rise to concentration of political power in the hands of the westernized’ elite and triggered the growth of mutual suspicion between them and substantial segments of the society in Turkey. As I have mentioned elsewhere:

all civil initiatives were confronted with distrust and suspicion on the part of the state elite and were securitized as a menace to their modernizing programmes. There thus emerged a purely statist project of modernization, the political, cultural and the ethical limits of which were inscribed by the modernizing elite itself.
The social diversity and pluralism and the emergence of an autonomous public sphere where this diversity crystallized were seen as ‘disintegrative sapping the strength of the nation’.68

The Europe of the inter-war period was not a symbol of plural democracy if it was not emblematic of massive social engineering programmes and authoritarian regimes. For that reason, Europeanization was easily embraced and instrumentalized by the central authority to justify comprehensive reforms for state-sponsored and state-controlled modernization in Turkey. This statist paradigm of modernization achieved to reproduce itself in so far as domestic and international political balances were appropriate. It was even consolidated through the institutionalization of power and autonomy of the military top brass in Turkish politics by a series of military coups in the period between 1960 and 1997. Authoritarian modernization and highly securitized cold war politics recognized an exceptional manoeuvring space for Turkish military ‘claiming to be the embodiment of the state and the nation’.69 Throughout the cold war years, Turkey was surely a ‘security provider’ for the West for which insecurities emanating from the global bipolar rivalry often prevailed over democratic and pluralist concerns. In this period, international society did not pose a challenge to the dominance of the bureaucratic apparatus and its statist–developmentalist project of political and economic modernization.

This started to change with the onset of the 1980s when Turkish modernization evolved into an authoritarian and repressive regime which denoted a traumatic experience for all politicized sectors of the society. The military junta dissolved the parliament, banned all political parties, labour unions and civil associations, and drafted a new constitution displaying the state’s traditional ‘distrust to national will as expressed’70 by the political elite. The 1982 constitution and the law of political parties of 1983 substantially restricted the manoeuvring space for parties which should operate ‘in loyal to Kemalist principles and reforms’.71 ‘Europe, throughout the 1980s became an albeit thin political/normative context for groups (most notably socialist left, human rights activists and Kurdish groups) who were seriously monitored and prosecuted.’72 Some European institutions most notably the European Parliament criticized anti-democratic practices and human rights violations by Turkish security forces. Yet, a substantive paradigmatic change occurred in the 1990s, when the political regime in Turkey came to lose its immunity from ‘the intense penetration of modern globalized artefacts and ideas’.73 ‘As part of the general assessment of Turkey’s status in the modern world, the Kemalist program of modernisation—including its economic policies, secularist tenets, and ethnonationalist foundations—came under close scrutiny and received increasingly vocal criticism.’74 The increasing critique of ethnicist and secularist tenets of the state’s modernization project was accompanied by demands for recognition of Kurdish and Islamist identities.

Turkey’s relations with the EU have taken a reinvigorated drive in the aftermath of the Helsinki Summit of December 1999, where Turkey was granted candidacy status. In October 2001, the Turkish Parliament passed 34 constitutional amendments expanding democratic rights and liberties. The Copenhagen European Council in December 2002 clearly linked the EU’s prospective decision to open accession talks
with Turkey with the performance of the government to democratize the state–society relations in Turkey. Then, Turkey witnessed a sweeping wave of reform processes where several legal ‘harmonization packages’ and a further set of constitutional amendments were passed particularly in the years 2003 and 2004. The adoption of successive reform packages by the Turkish National Assembly to meet the Copenhagen Criteria has placed the EU at the forefront of the democratization agenda in Turkey. Among these radical reforms are the abolition of State Security Courts, the narrowing of the jurisdiction of military courts over civilians, the abolition of the death penalty, enhancing the exercise of the right of freedom, expression and assembly, and the abolition of the ban on broadcasting and teaching in languages other than Turkish.

As such, EU-ization/Europeanization has turned out to be the main normative and political context of the democratic transformation of the state-centred nature of Turkish political modernity. Large segments of society tended to see Europeanization as ‘synonymous to democratization or pressure to enhance and deepen liberal democracy, and to activate appropriate citizenship rights’. For instance, Turkey’s strengthening EU perspective in Helsinki has opened up:

new prospects for various ethnic, religious, social and political groups. Kurds, Alevi, Islamists, Circassians, Armenians and a number of religious and ethnic groups in Turkey have become true advocates of the European Union in a way that affirms the pillars of the political union as a project for peace and integration. The EU then appeared to be the major catalyst in accelerating the process of democratization in Turkey, or in other words, a light house enlightening Turkey’s road to modernisation and liberalization. 

In the period, when EU membership was explicitly backed by almost all social groups, the EU-induced reforms made ‘an enabling effect on civil society’. Put differently, the EU ‘has provided an external anchor’ for civil societal demands to question the authoritarian/statist aspects of Turkish political modernity and its fundamental premises. Above all, these reforms have represented the beginning of a new era in Turkish politics characterized by at least a quest for a paradigmatic shift in Turkish modernity: a shift for a more pluralist and participatory paradigm.

However, the post-2005 period has been marked by the retreat of Europeanization as a normative/political context affecting Turkish politics and policy. This retreat manifests itself not only in the ‘significant slowdown in the reform agenda’ as observed by the European Commission, but also in some legal amendments crippling Turkey’s ‘diminutive democracy’. In particular, the anti-terror law, amended in 2006, operationalizes a substantially vague and all-encompassing definition of terrorism and terrorist activities. The law allows the criminalization of public demonstrations and other acts that are normally considered within the context of freedom of expression in democratic societies. For many, widespread prosecution of political activists, lawyers and journalists and extensively used pre-trial detentions symbolize the return of authoritarian and repressive policies. ‘Outdated terrorism legislation meant that one
third of all the world’s terrorism arrests made between 2001 and 2011 were in Turkey, including several thousand non-violent Kurdish activists placed in preventive detention.\textsuperscript{79} Human rights activists in Turkey underline that ‘in parallel to the deterioration of EU–Turkey relations there has been a decrease in human rights standards and a sharp increase in human rights violations, which has crippled their effectiveness and ability to influence policy.’\textsuperscript{80} In the World Press Freedom Index prepared by Reporters Without Borders, Turkey occupies the 154th place ‘compared to around 100th in the mid-2000s’.\textsuperscript{81} The backlashes and reversals in the EU-required reform process certainly cast a long shadow over the prospects of grounding Turkish political modernization on a more pluralist, participatory and emancipatory basis.

Conclusion

This study departed from the notion that there exist inexorable methodological and analytical commonalities between the current literature on Europeanization and the modernization school of the 1950s. They both assume development and modernization mainly as a matter of institutional and policy adaptation, the success of which is contingent upon the capacity of domestic societies to emulate the superior model. Modernization and Europeanization are understood as evolutionary and top-down processes furthering stage by stage and experienced by all societies in similar modalities. In both theoretical frameworks, society is marginalized as an object of analytical inquiry, since solely the political/bureaucratic elite is assumed as the responsible and capable agent for political change. Decoding these commonalities is crucially important not only to reveal reductionism and essentialisms of the current theorizing on Europeanization, but also to deduce some lessons from the failures of the modernization theory. As Eisenstadt proposes ‘the actual developments in modernizing societies have refuted the homogenizing and hegemonic assumptions’\textsuperscript{82} of the modernization theory and its West-centric epistemology: an observation largely attributable to the studies on Europeanization as well.

The paper also suggested that in the countries where modernization develops as a state-led project, Europeanization/globalization opens up new space for the actors demanding a paradigmatic shift in modernity. This often translates into a transition from a state-centric, monolithic modernization to a more pluralistic, participatory paradigm. This is the case particularly in South and Eastern European countries, where modernization has been both materialized and instrumentalized for political domination by a very strong bureaucratic class.

As shown elsewhere, deepening of Turkey’s integration into European institutions rendered Europe an integral part of modernity debates in Turkey. Parties of this debate while defending different models of modernization consistently articulate their imagination about Europeanness and its norms as well.\textsuperscript{83} Turkish modernity was not initiated as a pluralist project where different claims to identity could be voiced. However, it is currently evolving into a more pluralistic structure similar to that of Western societies. Yet, this transformation falls short of being incorporated into the public sphere in the form of organized and well-articulated societal demands. EU-ization/Europeanization created new spaces for the actors demanding transition
from an exclusionary, state-oriented modernization to a more inclusive and pluralist paradigm of modernity through the integration of different social groups, that is, ethnic, religious and political minorities. It has widened the political space for the actors demanding the erosion of statist and elite-directed characteristic of Turkish modernity in favour of a modernization ‘as a self-generating societal process.’

Yet, this transitional process is far from being unproblematic and irreversible. The increased impact of Europeanization/globalization has also inflamed ‘reactionary nationalist’ and even xenophobic tendencies in tandem with calls for returning to the statist paradigm. It would suffice to point out the rise of chauvinistic nationalism in Turkey, increasing alienation of Kurds, intensifying attacks on the members of Christian communities, widespread pre-trial detentions and convictions of political activists, lawyers and journalists, and the murder of Hrant Dink, editor of Armenian-Turkish weekly newspaper Agos in January 2007. Freedom of press, expression and assembly are still not fully guaranteed for all Turkish citizens. The use of disproportionate force by the police against protestors and demonstrators, criminalization of some publications and certain forms of political activism have increasingly become part of daily practices in Turkey. The successive resignations and redundancies of columnists critical of the government’s policies as well as major capital handovers have nearly closed Turkish media outlets to opposing views. All these recent developments have substantially eroded the democratic credentials of Turkish modernization and contracted the legitimate boundaries of politics in the country.

The Turkish case affirms Winn and Harris’s observation in the context of post-communist transition that building formal institutions, rules and procedures is easier than ‘to change historically evolved practices, norms and collective identities.’ Yet, I am convinced that the course of Turkey’s complex relations with Europe and particularly with the EU will help to answer the question whether Turkey could build a new modernity with a more pluralistic and participatory paradigm. Along with other domestic dynamics, Turkey’s European vocation can function as leverage beneath the democratic transformation of state–society relations in the country. Hence, the real merit of Europe for Turkey lies in its potential contributions to the construction of a political order where all social groups can freely express themselves and be organized to influence public policy. It is this transformative capacity of Turkey’s integration into Europe that makes it a unique and integral part of Turkish modernization history.

Acknowledgements

This paper is based on Dr Kaliber’s research ‘Europeanisation of Public Debates and Civil Society in Turkey’ (EUROCIV) funded by the Marie Curie Career Integration Grant under the 7th Framework Programme of the European Commission (Contract No.: CIG10-GA-2011-294307EUROCIV).

Notes


[4] Ibid.


[6] It appears that there is a need for a clearer distinction between the processes of modernization experienced by societies and the academic discourse on modernization. Throughout the paper the term paradigm is used to mention deep transformations or changes observed in the modernization processes of South European countries and particularly in Turkey. When the study refers to the academic discourse on the issue, the terms modernization theory and modernization school are used interchangeably.


[16] Ibid., p. 313.


[22] Hulme and Turner, op. cit., p. 36.


[24] Ibid., pp. 340–341. Among evolutionary universals of modernization cited by Parsons are social stratification, cultural legitimation, bureaucratic organization, money and market, technological progress and universalistic legal system.


[26] Lerner, op. cit., p. 46.


[52] Ioakimidis, op. cit.
[54] Ioakimidis, op. cit.
[58] Ioakimidis, op. cit.
Ibid.


[67] Alper Kaliber, ‘How Europe affects’, op. cit., p. 188.


[81] Pope, op. cit.


Alper Kaliber works as a Marie Curie research fellow at European Institute, Istanbul Bilgi University and conducts a research project titled ‘Europeanisation of Public Debates and Civil Society in Turkey’. His areas of interest include Critical Security Studies, European security, the Cyprus conflict, Europeanization, Turkish politics and modernization. Among his recent publications are ‘Contextual and Contested: Reassessing Europeanisation in the Case of Turkey’, in International Relations; ‘Turkey’s Cyprus Policy: A Case of Europeanisation’, in Turkey and the European Union: Processes of Europeanisation by Çiğdem Nas and Yonca Özer (eds) (Ashgate, London, 2012); and ‘Human Rights, Civil Society and Conflict in Turkey’s Kurdish Question’, in Civil Society, Conflicts, and the Politicization of Human Rights by Raffaele Marchetti and Nathalie Tocci (eds) (United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 2011).

Address for correspondence: İstanbul Bilgi University, European Institute, Dolapdere Campus, Hacıahmet Mahallesi, Pir Hüsamettin Sokak No. 20, Beyoğlu 34440, Istanbul, Turkey. Email: alper.kaliber@bilgi.edu.tr