FINAL REPORT

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Executive Summary

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Four Southeast Asian and five European institutions made up the consortium that ran the project SEATIDE (2012-2016), funded under the European Commission’s FP7 programme to do research on Integration in Southeast Asia: Trajectories of Inclusion, Dynamics of Exclusion.

National, transnational and regional integration were studied from the perspectives of diversity (political and cultural identities in national and regional frameworks), prosperity (frameworks and practices of mobility and work), knowledge (localisation of imported technology and models of development) and security (the impact of interdependence of political communities on human security). Qualitative and quantitative research was conducted in several disciplines of the social sciences and humanities (anthropology, economics, history, international relations, political science, sociology), and distinguished political integration (ASEAN and other state-led frameworks) from grassroots integration (non-state initiatives). Working in eight countries of the region (Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam), the project’s 50 researchers’ main concern was to identify the exclusions that necessarily accompany processes of integration. These were analysed at different ‘sites of interaction’: city, small town, village, peri-urban area, cultural region, border, government office, school. Offering historically informed analysis of contemporary Southeast Asia, the research reveals a region characterised by unprecedented change, with deep consequences for rural and urban populations alike.

These results were discussed in research workshops, shared with stakeholders and policymakers at dissemination workshops and policy forums, and published as policy briefs, online papers and academic articles. A synthesis of SEATIDE’s main findings is presented in this Final Report, with conclusions, recommendations for policymakers, and appendices detailing the project’s meetings, publications and researchers.

The Final Report was written by Andrew Hardy, who gratefully acknowledges input from all members of SEATIDE as well as contributions and comments from Chayan Vaddhanaphuti, Yves Goudineau, Volker Grabowsky, Tim Harper, Elisabeth Lacroix, Pietro Masina, Michael Montesano, Muhadi Sugiono, Franciscus Verellen and Silvia Vignato.
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EXECUTIVE BRIEF

Southeast Asia (SEA), a politically pivotal and economically vibrant region of 600 million people, is pursuing an ambitious regional integration experiment through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The differences between Europe and SEA are multiple, yet both have much to learn from the other. Europe’s knowledge of SEA, however, does not reflect that region’s geopolitical importance.

This was the context for the launch in 2012 of SEATIDE (Integration in Southeast Asia, Trajectories of Inclusion, Dynamics of Exclusion), a project funded by the European Commission’s 7th Framework Programme as part of its ‘Europe in the World’ research focus in the Social Sciences and Humanities. Its aim was to do research on national and regional integration sited in specific localities and accompanied by geopolitical analysis.

Objectives, consortium, methodology

A grassroots approach was adopted to avoid reproducing generalised studies of ‘regional integration’, often emblematic of globalisation economic integration agendas. Challenging these, the project investigated how integration processes were effecting social, economic and political transformations on the ground. The project had 2 objectives.

Objective 1: Research on integration, in case studies framed by a concern with marginalisation and its risks to human development/security. This motivated the project’s Research Question: ‘in processes of integration, who is excluded?’

Objective 2: Creation of a research network, to strengthen the European Research Area’s capacity on SEA. Coordinated by the École française d’Extrême-Orient, the consortium consisted of institutions in five EU member states – Estonia, France, Germany, Italy, UK – and four ASEAN member states – Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam.

The research was multidisciplinary, with expertise in anthropology, history, economics, sociology, international relations and political science. SEATIDE’s methodology stemmed from its premise that understanding integration requires knowledge of specific groups in specific places. Qualitative and quantitative data were gathered in field survey and analysed in case studies within a Research Framework focused on four strategic issues.

1. Diversity. Focus on national/transnational identities. Can integrated identities cope with multi-centred political/economic systems and ethnic/religious/cultural diversity?
2. Prosperity. Focus on national/transnational circulation of people and goods. Does increased circulation contribute to national and regional development?
4. Security. Focus on national/transnational political integration and the role of ASEAN. Does increased interdependence of political communities contribute to human security?

Workshops were held to plan and discuss research and publications. Seminars were held at partner institutions; panels were organised at conferences (see Appendix 1). These framed the research as it progressed and were crucial to SEATIDE’s networking success.

Research findings

In this report (Part 2), SEATIDE’s findings are surveyed in an approach foregrounding sites of integration (cities, peri-urban areas, small towns, villages, uplands), as well as sites of interaction both imagined (cultural regions) and institutional (borders, government offices, schools). This showcases the research’s empirical basis, with real processes ongoing in real time at real places: the case studies cover eight countries of ASEAN (all but Brunei and Singapore). They form the basis for the project’s Conclusions (Part 3):
1. SEATIDE noted the impact of history on SEA, with colonial legacies, fallout from the Cold War and the survival of ancient kingdoms in the form of cultural regions.

2. The region’s diversity, with cultural regions and ethnic/religious identities, raises the issue of assimilation, adopted as the model of national integration throughout SEA’s mainland. Assimilation policies pursued since independence enjoyed varying degrees of success, but failed in Myanmar. The political transition there is an opportunity to experiment with a non-assimilative model, for which examples exist in SEA’s ancient past.

3. SEA’s borders used to be liminal spaces characterised by the military, smuggling and refugees. They are now constructed as sites of connectivity, with roads and special economic zones assisting flows of capital, commodities, people and information. The official border narrative thus aligns itself to grassroots border practice. But the inadequacy of regional regulatory frameworks, notably for migrant labour, poses risks for human security.

4. Labour mobility is normal in SEA. Informal sector workers lack contracts, but migrants in the factories of the globally integrated mainstream accept that marriage, health and security pertain to other places: the villages they left and must later return to. By promoting cultures of permanent mobility and migrations leading to suspended living and gendered injustices, integration creates exclusions, dislocates families and encourages low pay.

5. Many factories are based in SEA because labour is cheap, capital circulates freely and models hold that integration promotes growth and reforms help avoid ‘middle income trap’. SEATIDE posits instead an ‘uneven development trap’ caused by blocking technology transfer. The emergence of an alternative paradigm in Thailand (‘sufficiency economy’) contrasts with the continued sway of neo-liberal ideologies in the Philippines and Vietnam.

6. Global integration models, China’s connectivity policy and non-state nationalisms challenge the centrality of the SEA state. Yet the state remains dominant: exclusions from national political processes make this an era of ‘integration without participation’. At the same time, meaningful regional integration is impeded by the ‘ASEAN integration conundrum’, as a body designed to frame nationalism is now asked to frame regional integration. Placing human security at the ASEAN Community’s core contradicts its principle of non-interference, yet ASEAN can still contribute to building a SEA identity.

7. SEA’s ‘integration/exclusion nexus’ produces many types of exclusion (suspension, displacement, environment, assimilation), which are not inevitable but result from development models and government policies. Research on integration has allowed the project to produce a new, historically informed, empirically grounded, thematically focused view of contemporary SEA. In its portrayal of this nexus in the areas of diversity, prosperity, knowledge and security, SEATIDE shows how grassroots integration is part of SEA modernity and how the formal structures of political integration struggle to frame it.

**Dissemination and impact**

To facilitate access by scholars, the public and policymakers, SEATIDE’s research is published on a website (www.seatide.eu), in academic forums, in documentary films, and through dissemination to stakeholders and policymakers. Dissemination Workshops were held with stakeholders in Europe and SEA, while a policy-focused dialogue was established with the Southeast Asia division of the European External Action Service in Brussels, with the organisation of Policy Forums and a series of EEAS Southeast Asia Briefings.

The project had three types of impact, as follows:

1. **SEATIDE created an effective, integrated and durable EU-SEA research network.**

2. **SEATIDE disseminated research to policymakers, stakeholders and the public.**

3. **SEATIDE produced ground-breaking multidisciplinary research** offering innovative empirical and theoretical perspectives on integration/exclusion in SEA and on the contemporary state of the region. The project’s publications are listed in Appendix 1.
PART 1. PROJECT DESCRIPTION

1.1. Rationale

Southeast Asia, a politically pivotal and economically vibrant region home to 600 million people of diverse languages and cultures, is made up of 11 countries, 10 of which are pursuing an ambitious regional integration experiment in the framework of ASEAN. The differences between Europe and SEA, particularly in terms of integration model, are multiple: yet both have much to learn from the other. Europe’s knowledge of SEA, however, does not reflect that region’s geopolitical importance. Few European universities produce research on SEA or disseminate knowledge of SEA into public awareness. Research on SEA continues to be led by institutions in North America, Australia and Japan.

This was the context for the launch in 2012 of the project SEATIDE – Integration in Southeast Asia, Trajectories of Inclusion, Dynamics of Exclusion. Coordinated by the École française d’Extrême-Orient (EFEO), the project was funded by the European Commission’s 7th Framework Programme as part of its ‘Europe in the World’ research focus in the Social Sciences and Humanities. The goal of its consortium of five European and four SEA institutions was to conduct research on integration processes at two levels, national and regional, that was grounded in specific localities and accompanied by analysis of their broader geopolitical significance.

This grassroots approach was vital to the project’s aim to avoid reproducing generalised, macro-level studies of regional integration, framework building and the institutions of ASEAN, on which much research has already been produced by universities, think tanks and other research bodies. In these contexts, the term ‘integration’ has become emblematic of a globalisation agenda urging SEA countries to ever greater integration into the wider economy. Challenging these perspectives, the consortium planned to use its knowledge of the region’s cultures and languages and its long experience of field survey in SEA to investigate how integration processes were effecting social, economic and political transformations on the ground. Our ambition was to obtain historically and geographically informed knowledge of specific groups of people, and produce a deeply empirical portrayal of contemporary SEA and the agencies and impacts of integration there.

1.2. Historical Context

This ambition was considerable, given SEA’s historical development as a space of vast intra-regional diversity and multiple international connections. As we wrote the project, we were conscious of the fact that no common cultural tradition united the region’s inhabitants, as Christianity did in Europe. Instead, a bewildering diversity of population, language, ethnicity, religion and culture formed the indigenous basis for localisation of influences from overseas. The region’s centrality to long-distance trade and responsiveness to outside faiths and ideas meant that many parts of SEA were marked by flows of merchandise, migration and information, forging links to India and China, Japan and Korea, Arabia and Africa. Whether writing theoretically or empirically, all scholars of SEA must come to terms with this internal and international diversity.

SEA’s clearest geographical distinction – mainland/maritime – is reflected in its main imported cultural differences. The arrival of Islam and Christianity emphasises the divide between Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia where these religions dominate, and the countries of the continent where the Hindu-Buddhist substrata that formerly gave religious unity to the entire region continue to prevail. On its north-eastern edge, Vietnam remains culturally in the Chinese world of Confucianism and ‘greater vehicle’ Buddhism.

The region’s international porosity relied, in turn, on the vitality of its intra-regional linking and localisation mechanisms. Across the region, maritime export networks drew forest goods from the hinterlands, sold by hill people to coastal traders down the valleys that served as arteries for overland communication. Without dense intra-regional networks, international forces could have had little influence. As a result, SEA has long operated as a melting pot in its adaptation to and adoption of outside influences, hosting important diasporas and, more recently, sending
diasporas to other parts of the world.

In this respect, colonial rule operated a hiatus. Southeast Asians’ integration into European imperial frameworks disrupted intra-regional connections. Territories under British rule (Burma, Federated Malay States) and influence (Siam), or governed by the French (Indochina) and Dutch (Dutch East-Indies) connected with their metropole to a greater extent than with each other.

After 1945, these divisions were perpetuated by the Cold War, with the creation of a US-supported anti-communist alliance (SEATO, 1954) to oppose Chinese/Soviet influence over Indochina’s decolonisation. The cleavage fell away only in the 1990s with the adherence to ASEAN of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam. Those nations’ conversion to the market economy gave a new unifying perspective to SEA, that of a great single market, inspired by the European example to defend its members’ interests in the global economy.

This reading of the region’s historical development informed the project’s research ambitions. We did not deny SEA’s modern reality as an organised group of nation states, but were aware that this is a recent development. Looking beyond its fragmentary surface, we saw that SEA had long been a theatre of circulation that transcended today’s national borders. In the course of history, those movements resulted in the emergence of a range of different political and economic groupings within the region’s geographical space. The contemporary relevance of those historical processes was to become central to the project.

1.3. Objective 1 – Research: political integration and grassroots integration

SEATIDE set out to achieve two objectives: to do research on integration and disseminate its results, and to create a network to do the research. How these objectives were achieved is described in the following pages.

Objective 1 was to investigate processes of national and regional integration in SEA. To do this, we asked the following question: in processes of integration, who is excluded? Our central concern was the marginalisation of specific groups and the risks it presents in the fields of human development/security. This aim – to study SEA integration from the perspective of inequality, foregrounding the issue of exclusion – is conveyed in SEATIDE’s subtitle: Trajectories of Inclusion, Dynamics of Exclusion.

Our definition of integration reflects this emphasis. At its heart lies the notion of convergence, understood as movement within a common space towards a common set of values and interests, but also as a capacity for the management of difference through the creation of spaces of peaceful disagreement. History can be interpreted as a series of movements leading human beings to ever greater communality, with globalisation as its latest manifestation. Yet many organisations resulting from convergence – from the foundation of cities to the emergence of civilisations – do not follow linear or peaceful processes of formation and do not contribute to the welfare of all participants. History is shaped by conflict, divergence and ‘disintegration’ too: communities break up, cultures disappear, nations fall apart.

The project paid attention to the connecting forces that drive integration. Some integration is politically motivated. Convergence arises from the development of networking instruments by authorities according to deliberate projects: we call this ‘political integration’ or ‘framework integration’. Alternatively, convergence may stem from accumulations of actors’ movements and gestures with no political initiation: this is ‘grassroots integration’. The two may coincide; they may form contradictory impulses. This binary – framework integration/grassroots integration – proved a key analytical tool in the framing of our research.

Empirical studies on grassroots integration, and on how integration played out at different levels were preferred to research focusing solely on the frameworks of political integration: individual ASEAN member states’ nation-building and the ASEAN project itself. The most recent developments in what is normally thought of as regional integration – the ASEAN Community, SEA countries’ Free Trade Agreements signed with the EU and other partners, the Trans-Pacific Partnership – are not foregrounded here. Much research has already been done on these
projects. Our investigations took them into account only in so far as we investigated the social, economic and political realities created by integration projects and by forces of integration acting independently of them: the perspective is from the grassroots.

This gave us a way to approach the elusive issue of ideologies of integration. When used in international contexts, ‘integration’ has become a mantra of globalisation, a slogan of trade liberalisation. In other contexts too, the term is widely used and misused, and usually implied to be a positive force, a harbinger of added value and condition of general prosperity. The focus on grassroots realities may be observed in many SEATIDE case studies as serving to test the particular ideology of integration at play.

The grassroots perspective was well suited to our main research concern: the study of exclusion. Our premise was that no integration process is socially, economically or politically neutral: integration excludes even as it includes. Convergence towards a centralised space implies loss of autonomy on that space’s margins. Adoption of ‘shared’ cultural values means abandonment or subordination of other values. Circulation of goods undermines and transforms local production. Integration involves socio-economic choices with hard political ramifications and disastrous consequences for particular groups of people.

The project aimed to deliver empirical observations in real places and among specific groups on the way these and other types of exclusion operated in processes of integration. Research was conducted in all of the member states of ASEAN except Brunei and Singapore, with particular strengths on Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam. This Final Report presents an overview of the results of this work. It also allows readers to assess the project’s achievement of a further research aim. This was to provide a portrait of the historical change in SEA ongoing at the present time – a snapshot of the region taken in the second decade of the 21st century.

1.4. Objective 2 – Networking: from project consortium to research network

Objective 2 was to bring together people and institutions with the capacity to do the research, with a view to strengthening the European Research Area in Asian studies and building European research capacity in Southeast Asian studies. Coordinated by the École française d’Extrême-Orient, a consortium was assembled, consisting of institutions from five EU member states – Estonia, France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom – and four ICPCs (non-European countries) in SEA – Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam. This Final Report presents an overview of the results of this work. It also allows readers to assess the project’s achievement of a further research aim. This was to provide a portrait of the historical change in SEA ongoing at the present time – a snapshot of the region taken in the second decade of the 21st century.

The European partner institutions were as follows:

The **École française d’Extrême-Orient (EFEO)**, founded in 1900, specialises in classical and contemporary Asian studies and has a unique network of 10 field centres in SEA. As founder of the European Consortium for Asian Field Study (ECAF) network and coordinator of the FP7 project *Integrating and Developing European Asian Studies*, EFEO is at the heart of a European network of international partner institutions in Asian studies.

The **Asien-Afrika-Institut (AAI), University of Hamburg** (inaugurated 2000) hosts the 6 departments and 20 professorial chairs of the former Faculty of Oriental Studies. It has broad research and teaching coverage of Asia, with Sinology, Indology, Japanology, Korean, Thai, Vietnamese and Indonesian/Malay Studies.

The **Centre for History and Economics (CHE), Magdalene College, University of Cambridge** (established 1991) does research and education in fields of importance for historians and economists, encouraging them to address issues of public importance. With its counterpart centre at Harvard, the Cambridge Centre undertakes research projects and organises seminars and exchanges of faculty and graduate students.

The **Estonian Institute of Humanities (EIH), Tallinn University** has been furthering the tradition of Estonian Asian Studies for 25 years. It does research and teaching on East Asia and SEA and works closely with colleagues in anthropology, philosophy and cultural theory. Since 2010, EIH has led an Estonian universities’ joint interdisciplinary module “Asian Societies, Economy and Politics” on Asian politics, society, geopolitics and economies.
At the **University of Milano-Bicocca (UNIMIB)**, the Department of Human Science for Education 'Riccardo Massa' (founded 2000) organises undergraduate and graduate schools in education, intercultural communication and anthropology. Anthropology of SEA is taught at postgraduate level with a focus on Indonesia, Vietnam and Thailand.

The SEA partner institutions were as follows:

**Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM)** (founded 1969) in Penang is one of the foremost universities in Malaysia, the first to be accorded APEX University status and one of four designated research universities. Its Schools of Humanities and Social Sciences are leading centres in their respective disciplines, both possessing strengths in the study of Asia and SEA.

The **Center for Southeast Asia Social Studies, University of Gadjah Mada (CESSAS UGM)** (established 1985) in Yogyakarta is a centre for inter-disciplinary social sciences and humanities that does research, training and consultancy on social, political, cultural and historical issues related to globalisation, politics, human rights, governance and sustainable development in SEA.

**Chiang Mai University (CMU)** (founded in 1964) is among Thailand's top three universities, offering 60 international courses, 3 international undergraduate and 23 international postgraduate degrees in 20 faculties. It has strong research capacity on Asia, especially in the anthropology and sociology of mainland SEA, through its Regional Center for Social Science and Sustainable Development (RCSD) which is SEATIDE’s main partner at CMU.

The **Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences (VASS)** (founded 1953) and its 35 institutes specialise in research in the social sciences and humanities, provision of data for policymaking and development consultancy. SEATIDE’s main partner is the Institute for European Studies (former Centre for CIS and Eastern Europe Studies), which has extensive experience of cooperation in the study of Europe and Vietnam.

In Europe, the consortium embraced institutions from countries with a strong presence in SEA studies (France, Germany, UK), as well as others with expertise that is less visible or emerging, and needs support. This is the case for Italy, possessing a strong profile in European associations such EUROSEAS, but limited research capacity at home, despite the appearance of a new generation of doctoral students. It is also true for some new EU member states, notably those from the former Eastern bloc with a long and currently reviving history of research on Asia. In Estonia, the University of Tallinn’s participation in the consortium brought a specific ‘eastern’ view of SEA.

As the project proceeded, it became clear that the Italian and Estonian teams shared similar profiles: both were led by senior scholars who had almost single-handedly trained a number of young researchers and brought this under-funded and isolated team into the project. The research resources and opportunities for exchange and debate with colleagues provided by SEATIDE is matched by the quality of these teams’ scientific production and the enthusiasm of their embrace of the highest standards of social science practice.

The 4 SEA countries represented in the consortium possess contrasting social, economic and political conditions, yet face similar internal and regional issues of sustainable integration. Geographically, two are on SEA’s mainland and two in its maritime region (with Malaysia straddling both environments). Since independence, all four countries have built up scientific communities, active in international exchange/cooperation. The research institutions in the consortium possess long traditions of working with European partners in the social sciences, which have been developed and deepened with the experience of SEATIDE. They are all top-ranking institutions in their country, although only one of the four is located in a capital city.

The partnership’s effectiveness was demonstrated before SEATIDE’s start, as the project was written using a bottom-up methodology, through discussion by consortium members. In addition to enhancing its intellectual quality, this democratic approach to the project’s design
had two lasting benefits. On the one hand, it raised the commitment to SEATIDE among participants at these planning meetings, who saw their own ideas included in the fabric of the project.

On the other hand, it inaugurated a culture of collective intellectual leadership. The project’s initial design established a Steering Committee consisting of representatives of the nine consortium partners and SEATIDE’s Project Management Team (PMT). Meeting on the margins of the project’s events, it monitored its progress through the successive Milestones. This was SEATIDE’s main formal instrument of administrative and scientific policy.

In 2014, a second more informal institution of collective leadership was created with a more scientific focus. The Work Package (WP) Leaders met with the Scientific Coordinator and Project Manager to decide on research orientations, workshop themes, publications policy and, last but not least, the content of this Final Report. These meetings enhanced the conversation among members of this core group pursued through the project by email, skype and one-to-one meetings.

This collective leadership and the operational autonomy given to WP Leaders meant that the WP Leaders were the project’s main on-the-ground leaders. It was at this level that decisions were made on research, publication and other operational matters.

In particular, it was usually the WP Leaders who decided on the involvement of researchers who were not members of the SEATIDE consortium. Most were senior scholars who attended workshops to comment on methodology, research orientation and results. Only when external specialists were invited to make presentations at dissemination events and policy forums was the decision made by the PMT. The same was true of the Advisory Board, several of whose members contributed to project meetings. Indeed, this was the PMT’s main responsibility: the organisation of meetings, workshops and dissemination events. These are detailed below and in the Appendix, but it is worth noting here that these meetings were researchers’ main opportunity to meet and, as such, were crucial to the success of SEATIDE’s networking ambition.

Consortium members’ research was thus conducted with minimal reference to SEATIDE’s leadership. Likewise, in the publication of results, the Scientific Coordinator played only a coordinating and advisory role to WP Leaders. SEATIDE’s grassroots governance strengthened its networking capacity, which depended on initiatives from below.

As a project and consortium, SEATIDE closed on 31 March 2016. But the SEATIDE research network still exists, in the relationships it created and the habits of collaborating it

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2 The PMT was made up of the Coordinator (Franciscus Verellen until February 2014, then Yves Goudineau), Scientific Coordinator (Yves Goudineau until February 2014, then Andrew Hardy) and Project Manager (Elisabeth Lacroix). After February 2014, Franciscus Verellen remained in the PMT as Special Advisor.

3 SEATIDE’s 4 Milestones were the Kick-Off meeting (1 February 2013), the production of the Analytical Frameworks (December 2013), Research Workshop 2 (3-5 February 2015) and the Final Conference (18-19 September).

4 The Steering Committee met 6 times, Chiang Mai, 1 February 2013; Lisbon, 2 July 2013; Chiang Mai, 12 February 2014; Penang, 19 September 2014; Hanoi, 5 February 2015; Yogyakarta, 17 September 2015.

5 WP Leaders’ meetings were held at Plattestein, Brussels on 28 April 2014, 3 June 2015 and 17 February 2016; and Chiang Mai University on 30-31 March 2016.

6 Examples of external specialists include Andrée Fellard and Antonella Diana, who presented at Policy Forum 1, Michael Montesano, author of Online Paper 11 (‘Praetorianism and ‘the People’ in Late-Bhumibol Thailand’) who presented at Eeas Southeast Asia Briefing 3; Michelle Ford (University of Sydney) and Michael Parnwell (University of Leeds), discussants at Research Workshop 1; Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem (University of the Philippines Diliman), who presented at Research Workshop 1 and Eeas Southeast Asia Briefings 1 and 2; Sok Udom Deth (Zaman University, Cambodia) at Dissemination Workshop 1; Jürgen Rüland (University of Freiburg) at Dissemination Workshop 3; Makarim Wibisono (former executive director ASEAN Foundation) and David Camroux (Centre de Recherches Internationales) at the Final Conference; Concepcion Lagos (University of Asia and the Pacific, Philippines) who contributed to one of WP3’s books; Andrew Gibbs (Henderson Rowe, London) who presented at Eeas Southeast Asia Briefing 3.

7 Joachim Bitterlich was a discussant at Policy Forum 1 on ‘the EU and Southeast Asia, Eeas, Brussels, 28 November 2013; Pierre-Yves Manguin presented on ‘Maritime Connections in Southeast Asia’s History’ at Dissemination Workshop 3 on ‘Maritime Southeast Asia: Conflicts and Cooperation’, Embassy of Indonesia in Brussels, 4 June 2015; Wang Gungwu made a presentation on China in the geopolitics of Eurasia since the Tang in his role as discussant at the SEATIDE Final Conference, UGM, 18-19 September 2015.
The opportunity for European and SEA scholars to form intercontinental relationships and working habits is a significant achievement. It is not, however, original: all consortium members had prior experience of Europe-Asia bilateral relations. What sets SEATIDE apart is the opportunity it also gave Europeans to work with colleagues in other European countries and Southeast Asians to work with colleagues in other SEA countries, and for all these relations to be set within a multilateral framework that formed an international academic community. No one needed to forge relationships for themselves: they were created for our use by SEATIDE.

The existence of this network had, in turn, a direct impact on member institutions, through its fostering of the mobility of consortium members, the emergence of a generation of young scholars and other forms of strengthening of research capacity. This was most specifically noticeable among the Italian and Estonian members of the consortium. The following initiatives sprang from relationships formed within the SEATIDE network. In February 2016, as the project drew to a close, Italian colleagues invited members of SEATIDE to the 3rd conference of the Italian Association of Southeast Asian Studies, Naples, June 2016. Pietro Masina was appointed in March 2016 as visiting fellow for his sabbatical year at the University of Cambridge. Chayan Vaddhanaphuti and Muhadi Sugiono will join Vietnamese colleagues in a network-building meeting on humanitarian action studies in Hanoi, April 2016, an initiative stemming from their joint visit to Mae Sot in March 2015, part of a relationship of cooperation being built between UGM and CMU. Muhadi Sugiono and Do Ta Khanh are discussing the establishment of a Southeast Asian Association of European Studies, and plan to hold a conference in July 2016 in Hanoi. Manoj Pothaphon and Tomas Larsson are discussing applying for grants to study water issues in Thailand.

In Italy, young scholars based at the University of Milano-Bicocca and the University of Naples-Orientale figure prominently in the research activities of SEATIDE, as reflected in the strength of their contribution to its published results. In Estonia, SEATIDE drew attention at the University level to the value of channeling resources into research/teaching on SEA, as opposed to other areas, in times of cutbacks everywhere. This took concrete expression in a vacancy announcement, circulated in April 2016, for the newly created position of associate professor in Southeast Asian Studies at Tallinn University. Here, SEATIDE helped lay the foundations of SEA studies in a very specific sense.

1.5. Methodology and research framework

SEATIDE’s methodology stemmed from its starting assumption, that understanding integration in SEA requires knowledge of specific processes among specific social groups. Obtaining local knowledge was thus the project’s central ambition. To achieve it, SEATIDE researchers conducted field surveys and presented their results in case studies.

The research was multidisciplinary, bringing together disciplines in the social sciences and humanities, as the consortium possessed expertise in anthropology, sociology, economics, history, international relations and political science. Qualitative and quantitative data were gathered and analysed in the project’s respective case studies.

To give focus to this multidisciplinary endeavour, several framing devices were used. The first, as discussed above, was SEATIDE’s Research Question: in processes of integration, how do exclusionary dynamics operate?

The second was a Research Framework to break this question down into manageable thematic blocks. At the project’s outset, four strategic issues related to integration were identified: diversity, prosperity, knowledge, security. These issues were used to frame the project’s four research Work Packages, that each sought answers to an overarching question.

1. Diversity. Focus on national/transnational identities: can the formation of integrated identities cope with multi-centred political/economic systems and ethnic/religious/cultural diversity? (WP2)

As its central theme, WP2 asked how national integration copes with regional diversity. Many ethno-linguistic, ethno-religious, and ‘cultural’ identities in present-day SEA are much older than the nation-state. It is imperative to understand the interactions among these plural identities. The

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8 The following initiatives sprang from relationships formed within the SEATIDE network. In February 2016, as the project drew to a close, Italian colleagues invited members of SEATIDE to the 3rd conference of the Italian Association of Southeast Asian Studies, Naples, June 2016. Pietro Masina was appointed in March 2016 as visiting fellow for his sabbatical year at the University of Cambridge. Chayan Vaddhanaphuti and Muhadi Sugiono will join Vietnamese colleagues in a network-building meeting on humanitarian action studies in Hanoi, April 2016, an initiative stemming from their joint visit to Mae Sot in March 2015, part of a relationship of cooperation being built between UGM and CMU. Muhadi Sugiono and Do Ta Khanh are discussing the establishment of a Southeast Asian Association of European Studies, and plan to hold a conference in July 2016 in Hanoi. Manoj Pothaphon and Tomas Larsson are discussing applying for grants to study water issues in Thailand.

9 In Italy, young scholars based at the University of Milano-Bicocca and the University of Naples-Orientale figure prominently in the research activities of SEATIDE, as reflected in the strength of their contribution to its published results. In Estonia, SEATIDE drew attention at the University level to the value of channeling resources into research/teaching on SEA, as opposed to other areas, in times of cutbacks everywhere. This took concrete expression in a vacancy announcement, circulated in April 2016, for the newly created position of associate professor in Southeast Asian Studies at Tallinn University. Here, SEATIDE helped lay the foundations of SEA studies in a very specific sense.
cost-benefits of nation-building are analysed by addressing a range of wider issues such as economic development, national culture, citizenship rights, centralisation processes and competing nationalisms. We examined both how dynamics of old and new trans-border and multi-centred identities challenge nation-state hegemonic discourses, and how transnational ethnic groups and networks perpetuate plural identities. The politics of managing national cultural diversity were investigated, looking at relations between governments and local actors, and majority populations with ethnic and religious minorities.

2. **Prosperity. Focus on national/transnational circulation of people and goods:** does increased circulation contribute to national and regional development? (WP3)

Although mobility has been crucial to SEA since pre-modern times, in recent decades it has increased in scale and changed in type. Today, vast migrations and micro displacements are central elements in the region’s transformation and integration into world systems. WP3’s hypothesis is that the quest for prosperity through mobility to obtain work, safer surroundings, knowledge or access to goods must be seen as a creative drive of self-improvement and social transformation that invariably interacts with local, national or global social orders. However, those orders are often rooted in the subjects’ very exclusion from the prosperity they are looking for. The WP describes such social orders in terms of their historical constitution and specific deployments. It also describes the subjects of mobility/exclusion, and the production/circulation of goods that are fundamental in their quest for prosperity. It found that that marginality and exclusion are not merely temporary effects of a general mobility towards a prosperous integration into world economic and social systems, but are often a consequence of it.

3. **Knowledge. Focus on national/transnational exchange of information:** does exchange of information improve national and regional governance? (WP4)

WP4 shows how transnational exchanges of information contribute to social, economic and environmental sustainability in SEA. It explores how ideas travel across and beyond SEA and how they change in the process. It transcends the national and institutional frameworks, focusing on networks of people, as well as texts, objects and symbols that circulate.

WP4 is multidisciplinary but its participants share an interest in mapping out long-term patterns. It has three integrating strands. The first looks at networks and models of developmental and environmental thinking, with case studies on development ‘models’ and ‘conservation’ in SEA, and ideas and the experience of technocracy in SEA. The second is models of regional integration and emerging legal frameworks, on the circulation of legal practices and their impact over the long duration. The third is patterns of intellectual and educational exchange. A key question will be the relationship between the formal and non-formal sectors (including Islamic education) over the long duration: how has unequal access to economic opportunities shaped intellectual and educational exchanges?

4. **Security. Focus on national/transnational political integration and the role of ASEAN:** does increased interdependence of political communities contribute to human security? (WP5)

ASEAN has politically constructed the region in ways that reflect the idea of a community, of SEA as a single political, economic and social space. Although it is not identical with SEA, it is hard to talk about SEA without referring to ASEAN. But ASEAN is but part of the SEA story. While its leaders project SEA as a single, integrated community, other narratives exist. Many people are marginalised, even excluded, in the discourse and practice of regionalism throughout ASEAN. Non-state actors seek roles in constructing SEA. ASEAN framework building has motivated civil society groups to advocate for a more integrated SEA but emphasise people-oriented rather than institutional or elitist frameworks. In addition, business communities act to bring SEA people closer together. WP5’s central theme is the respective roles played by ASEAN and grassroots movements in integrating SEA.

It should be noted that the project’s structure also included two non-research Work Packages, for Management (WP1) and Dissemination (WP6).

To orient their fieldwork, researchers selected case studies relevant to the respective issue.
Within each WP, the case studies were structured by a Common Analytical Framework centred on the project’s four main SEA countries but not restricted to those countries, as the project was framed with a common focus on transnational issues. This framework was established in the form of Analytical Framework Reports, produced at the end of the project’s first year (2013). Its purpose was to harmonise the case studies and lay down common ground for researchers as they did their field work in the second year (2014).

1.6. Research workshops

Workshops were organised over the duration of the project, to frame the research as it progressed. The project’s main research meetings were as follows:

Kick-Off meeting, 1-2 February 2013, Chiang Mai. The first day was spent on finance and administration issues: participants learned about European rules on research funding. The second day was devoted to scientific issues: the distribution of researchers between thematic WPs, the creation of a Steering Committee and the agenda for project events.

Research Workshop 1, 13 February 2014, Chiang Mai. In panels organised by WP, the analytical frameworks were presented; orientations for each researcher’s investigations and planning for field survey were discussed. This was a key framing event for each WP, setting the direction it would follow for the rest of the project.

Publications Workshop, 19-20 September 2014, Penang. After a session by the host partner (USM), the first morning was spent on SEATIDE’s agenda of deliverables to the European Commission and scientific publications strategy. The afternoon sessions focused on the project’s Online Papers. The next day, discussions were held in small groups.

Symposium, 3 February 2015, Hanoi. Research Workshop 2 was preceded by a symposium showcasing research on the host country’ integration experiences (Andrew Hardy’s study A History of the Vietnam – European Union Relationship 1990-2015) followed by discussion led by representatives of relevant EU projects in Hanoi.

Research Workshop 2, 3-5 February 2015, Hanoi. The meeting was plenary and cross-WP, as participants wished to learn about other WPs’ work. Papers were circulated in advance, increasing the time available for discussion. The meeting focused on 12 case studies, with in-depth discussion of each paper presented. In the final session, two SEATIDE films were shown and discussed.

Final Conference, 18-19 September 2015, Yogyakarta. The first session – ‘Integration Frameworks, Integration Practices’ – addressed SEATIDE’s theme, with 4 panels on grassroots integration contextualised with analysis of framework building. The 2 panels of the second session – ‘Integration in Southeast Asia: Notes from the Field’ – focused on SEATIDE’s methodological specificity, case studies in diverse contexts, offering a strong historical perspective on grassroots and framework integration. The meeting closed with a round table on ‘Southeast Asian Studies in Asia and Europe: Academic Networks and Institutional Cooperation’ and a panel on ‘Media and Research’, with the screening and discussion of two SEATIDE films.

Other smaller meetings were organised on the initiative of WP leaders. These include:

SEATIDE workshop on ‘Ideas and Mobility’, 13 October 2014, Cambridge, held for joint

10 See the SEATIDE website: http://www.seatide.eu/?content=activitiesandresults&group=1.
14 The panels were: ‘Religious Networks on the Margins’; ‘Dilemmas of National Integration’; ‘Labour Migration and its Unintended Consequences’; ‘Politics of Standards and Management’; ‘Managing Mobilities and Resources’; ‘Regional Integration and the South China Sea’. The films were My Dreams Will Vanish Again, Women Workers of Thang Long Industrial Park (on Vietnamese factory workers) by Parsifal Reparato, and Inside the Fence (on Karen refugees) by Karen News.
15 See the SEATIDE website, http://www.seatide.eu/?content=showdetail&id=1100&type=1.
16 The films are Michael’s Anecdotes from the Rohingya Diaspora, and REZEKI: Gold and Gem Mining in Aceh.
research planning and discussion between researchers in WP3 and WP4.

SEATIDE workshop on ‘Work, Access to Work and Circulation of Workers across Southeast Asia’, 12 November 2014, Milan, held by WP3 to discuss fieldwork results with invited expert Johan Lindquist (University of Stockholm) and prepare them for publication.

SEATIDE Academic Seminar on ‘Religion, Citizenship, Tourism and Trade in the Process of Integration’, 15 December 2014, Chiang Mai, held by researchers based at Chiang Mai University to discuss their research with colleagues.

SEATIDE panels were organised at international conferences. They include:

A panel convened by Vanina Bouté and Vatthana Pholsena entitled ‘New Centrality at the Margins of the Indochinese Peninsula: the Making of Local Elites’ at the 7th Conference of the European Association for Southeast Asian Studies (EuroSEAS), 2-5 July 2013, University of Lisbon.

A panel convened by Yves Goudineau and Chayan Vaddhanaprida entitled ‘Regional integration in Southeast Asia viewed from the grassroots. A presentation of the SEATIDE Project’ at the conference of the Asia Pacific Sociological Association (APSA), 15-16 February 2-14, Chiang Mai University.

Each WP took their own route from research idea to published result. An example of one such route (from WP3) illustrates the use of workshop discussion sessions to merge individual case studies into thematic publications:

After debating core themes at a joint seminar (WP3-WP4) (Cambridge, October 2013), and planning research in the light of the WP’s analytical framework at Research Workshop 1 (Chiang Mai, February 2014), researchers studying work and mobility in SEA did their fieldwork. On their return to Italy, they held a workshop (Milan, November 2014) to discuss their first data with an external expert and plan their publication (including a call for outside contributions). Written by members of the WP3 team plus one invited author, the chapters of the book Work, Access to Work and Circulation of Workers across Southeast Asia are currently under review, awaiting to submission to the publisher, Silkworm Books.17

1.7. Publications

A central aim of the project was the creation of a knowledge base on integration permitting better analysis of and improved policy sensitivity towards situations of exclusion within the overall dynamics of inclusion. To facilitate access to that knowledge by scholars, the public and policymakers, SEATIDE’s research is published in several media: on the internet, in conventional academic forums, in film, and through dissemination to stakeholders and policymakers.

The website (www.seatide.eu) was conceived as a publishing platform and archive for the project’s reports and early research results. For the WPs, these include individual Analytic Framework Reports and Research Workshop 1 Reports (see footnotes on the preceding pages). Thematic Reports,18 reports on SEATIDE’s meetings and dissemination events, and summaries of individual researchers’ case studies are also available here.

The project’s first research results were published on the website in an original format: a short working paper consisting of a ‘thesis’ followed by a response written by a colleague that developed the ideas in the thesis in different directions. SEATIDE’s 12 Online Papers are listed in Appendix 1 and available at: http://www.seatide.eu/?content=activitiesandresults&group=3.

Publishing in conventional academic forums took three forms. Individual researchers placed

17 For each case study, the route from research idea to published result may be followed in the footnotes to Part 2.
their work as they chose. WP Leaders chose two channels for the Thematic Publications of their findings, some preferring academic journals, others the SEATIDE collection of books published in Chiang Mai by Silkworm Books. All contributions are listed in Appendix 1; individual contributions are cited where appropriate below in Part 2.

SEATIDE made five documentary films.\textsuperscript{19} The visual tool was an integrated part of the research, as anthropologist Anne Guillou stresses in a methodological note,\textsuperscript{20} observing how the encounter between the languages of academia and film engaged both filmmaker and researcher in a constant effort of explanation and interpretation, giving specific depth to their work. During filming, anthropologists Silvia Vignato and Giacomo Tabacco remarked on the challenge of explaining their field site to someone who had never been there before.

These researchers noted that the post-production phase was no less challenging. Watching filmed material of what they already knew helped them improve existing ideas, questions and data: footage of the film on Indonesia was shown at a seminar held at the International Centre for Aceh and the Indian Ocean Studies, Banda Aceh; and SEATIDE researchers’ reactions to the films – after their screening at Research Workshop 1, Hanoi and the Final Conference, Yogyakarta – confirmed the value of associating research with film. Film also proved an excellent instrument for the public dissemination of research results, shown in the circulation at academic conferences and international film festivals the films are enjoying (see Appendix 1).

1.8. Dissemination to stakeholders and policymakers

A key objective of the project was dissemination to stakeholders and policymakers. One model adopted was the Dissemination Workshop. Attendance was high, between 40-50 people at each event; press coverage – particularly at the Hanoi event – was extensive; the audience and host partners’ response was enthusiastic. Three were held:\textsuperscript{21}

\textbf{Dissemination Workshop 1, ‘Dynamics of Integration and Dilemmas of Divergence in Contemporary SEA’}, Lone Pine Hotel, Penang, 18 September 2014. Organised by WP2, presentations were made in panels on ‘Settling the Region’s Borders’ and ‘Coping with Religious Diversity in SEA’. NGO representatives, university faculty and journalists attended the workshop. It closed with a roundtable discussion on ‘Fractures and Predicaments in Southeast Asian Identities’.

\textbf{Dissemination Workshop 2: ‘Economic Integration, Mobility, and Work in Southeast Asia’}, Museum of Ethnology, Hanoi, 2 February 2015. Organised by WP3, presentations were made in two panels on ‘Industrialisation, Labour and Poverty’ and ‘Work and Small Scale Mobility’. Officials of Vietnam’s Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs, labour organisations and European embassies attended the workshop. It closed with a roundtable discussion on ‘How Can Southeast Asia and Europe Cooperate to Promote Access to the Labour Market and Better Working Conditions?’ The workshop resulted in invitations for Pietro Masina to present research on Middle Income/Uneven Development Trap to diplomats in Hanoi and officials in Brussels.\textsuperscript{22}

\textbf{Dissemination Workshop 3, ‘Maritime Southeast Asia: Conflicts and Cooperation’}, Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia to Belgium and the European Union, Brussels, 4 June 2015. Co-organised by WP4 and WP5, presentations were made in two panels on ‘Historical Contexts’ and ‘Contemporary Developments’. SEA, European and US diplomats and stakeholders attended.

SEATIDE additionally accumulated valuable expertise in the dissemination of research results

\textsuperscript{19} Listed in Appendix 1 and available for viewing on the website: \url{http://www.seatide.eu/?content=media5}.
\textsuperscript{20} See ‘Film and Anthropology. Note by Anne Guillou’. \url{http://www.seatide.eu/?content=media5}.
\textsuperscript{21} Reports for each are available at \url{http://www.seatide.eu/?content=activitiesandresults&group=6}.
\textsuperscript{22} Pietro Masina gave talks organised by the EU Delegation in Vietnam on ‘Middle income or uneven development trap? Industrialization, labour and poverty’ to development counsellors at EU member state embassies (21 April 2015) and EU member state ambassadors (23 April 2015). He also presented the research as part of a policy dialogue event ‘Trade, Sustainable Development and Human Rights in EU-Vietnam Relations: Roundtable for discussion with EU stakeholders’ European Commission, Brussels, 12 May 2015, with speakers including the EU Trade Commissioner.
to policymakers at the European External Action Service (EEAS) in Brussels.

Policy Forum 1, ‘The EU & Southeast Asia: EEAS – DG RTD joint policy seminar’, Southeast Asia Division of the EEAS, Brussels, 28 November 2013. Topics included the middle income trap, ethnic conflict in Vietnam and Myanmar, Islam and the state in Indonesia, the new Chinese presence in mainland SEA, nation-building in Malaysia and Singapore, and democracy and national integration in Indonesia.

Representatives of EEAS and the Directorate-General for Research and Innovation (DG RTD) concurred in finding the programme’s content informative and relevant, and this interest was reflected in the quality of the discussion. The meeting’s success launched a conversation between SEATIDE’s PMT and the EEAS’s Division of Southeast Asia allowing both sides to explore suitable formats for their future communication.

The conversation took a new turn with the conference ‘Research meets diplomacy: Europe as a Global Actor’ organised by the European Commission in Brussels on 5 June 2014, attended by SEATIDE’s PMT. Meeting afterwards, the two sides agreed to discuss the details of SEATIDE’s dissemination activities at the EEAS in advance of the briefings, and that the sessions – now renamed EEAS Southeast Asia Briefings – should be short. Three of these were hosted by the EEAS’s Southeast Asia Division:

EEAS Southeast Asia Briefing 1, ‘Patterns of Authoritarianism in Southeast Asia’, 11 May 2015, Brussels. Topics included historical and contemporary influences on authoritarianism, capital punishment and state violence in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines.

EEAS Southeast Asia Briefing 2, ‘The Emerging Middle Class in Southeast Asia’, 12 May 2015, Brussels. Topics included middle class politics in mainland Southeast Asia and democratisation in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines.

EEAS Southeast Asia Briefing 3, ‘The Crisis in Thailand in Long-term Perspective’, 18 February 2016, Brussels. Topics included the current political crisis, the demographic challenge to Thailand’s economic development, and the issue of refugees.

Written dissemination of the project’s research results also targeted an audience of policymakers, in the form of the project’s 7 Policy Briefs. Other dissemination activities included a stand at the 3rd EU-ASEAN STI Days ‘Showcasing Science, Technology and Innovation’, Hanoi 10-12 May 2016 (SEA-EU.NET II project, funded by EC-FP7).

1.9. Impact

The project has had three types of impact. First, it led to the establishment of an international and multidisciplinary research network linking scholars in Europe and SEA. This network is durable, thanks to SEATIDE’s creation of relationships between researchers and promotion of habits of working together.

Second, it saw the dissemination of research results to policymakers, stakeholders and the general public. In particular, an innovative and effective model was developed through discussion with EEAS diplomats. The supply-side character of many forms of dissemination was avoided thanks to conversations established with target audiences, notably at the Southeast Asia Division of EEAS, the Vietnamese Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs and the Indonesian Embassy in Brussels.

Finally, it resulted in the production of ground-breaking multidisciplinary research

23 See the SEATIDE website, http://www.seatide.eu/?content=showdetail2&id=1&type=11.
24 We take this opportunity to express our thanks to Ranieri Sabatucci, head of the Southeast Asia Division at EEAS for his commitment to this conversation, and to Philippe Keraudren, of DG RTD, for facilitating it.
offering innovative empirical and theoretical perspectives on integration in SEA. The results of this research, which currently being prepared for publication in academic books and journals, are summarised in Part 2 below.
PART 2. PRELIMINARY SURVEY OF THE RESEARCH RESULTS

As they come in, SEATIDE’s research results are striking for their geographical range and their empirical depth. This means that their full theoretical implications will progressively become apparent with continuing comparative analysis. The following pages review the materials produced by the project and the theoretical directions its results are taking.\(^{28}\)

As noted above, the results reflect SEATIDE’s focus on grassroots perspectives and on the exclusionary effects of integration. We set out to analyse certain groups’ inclusion or exclusion, caused by or occurring in spite of processes of national or regional integration. To do this, we sought local knowledge in specific places.

This raises a key question: “what is the local?” Specifically, what are the sites of the interactions that shape processes identified as integration? Which groups benefit; who is excluded; who suffers in other ways from integration-related marginalisation? What institutions mediate these processes – implement the including and excluding, the integrating and marginalising. We focus on the sites and institutions of integration.

Our gaze extends beyond the local, so a second question follows. When an integration process is identified at a particular site, networks of different types necessarily connect people there with people elsewhere. Our research results thus additionally allow us to reflect on how networks act at the grassroots level to include or exclude.

At the same time, not all networks belong to the grassroots: many are operated by states and by regional and international organisations and corporations responding to integration agendas set by political and economic leaders. A third result of the research allows assessment of the impact of such integration framework at specific sites. It offers answers to the question of how national and transnational frameworks of integration interact with the lives and projects of local communities and grassroots networks. The data thus allow us to develop three inter-related levels of analysis: on sites of interaction, grassroots networks and integration frameworks.

The following typology of the sites of integration has been made for several reasons. First, we hope to convey a sense of emerging place in SEA. The geographically specific knowledge acquired by the project offers a site-specific perspective on historical and contemporary changes and the emergence or transformation of particular types of place. Second, this way of presenting our results allows us to showcase the empirical basis for our findings about networks and frameworks of integration at grassroots, national and regional levels. The sites and institutions here may be real places, or they may be imagined, virtual or symbolic.

Finally, this is a way of overcoming the lack of precision that often accompanies talk of integration. If we mention integration, or connectivity – what does that mean? what is happening? to whom? where? Grounding our findings in specific locales and framing them in a typology of places allows SEATIDE’s research to avoid generalisations about processes ‘in Southeast Asia’.

It should be noted, finally, that the following survey is, first and foremost, a guide to the research conducted by SEATIDE. It frames the project’s case studies by site or institution, and does not purport to summarise research on villages, cities, etc. in SEA.

2.1. Cities, as sites of integration convergence and divergence

Cities have always been prime sites of convergence for people, ideas and goods, and must occupy a focal position in any study of integration. In contemporary SEA the point is especially valid, as cities have grown exponentially here both in physical size and in the extent of their reach.

\(^{28}\) For reasons of time, it was not possible in the Final Report to engage with or cite other recent research on SEA. In the following survey of SEATIDE’s research, some case studies may be mentioned more than once but referencing of the presentation and publication of their results is done only once in the footnotes.
as magnets for migration, hubs for real and virtual connectivity, centres of education and knowledge, places of cultural influence and symbols of regional identity. Convergence, as SEATIDE research underlines in different contexts across the region, also implies divergence.

A city visited by several SEATIDE researchers was Georgetown, the port city of Penang, in Malaysia. Studies were produced on its colonial history, on contemporary developments in tourism, property, housing and work, on the implications of its possession and use of heritage, and on changes in the identity and ethnicity of one of its immigrant minorities. SEATIDE research here thus formed a cross-disciplinary study offering a microcosm view of an island city, with historical and ethnic dimensions. Both dimensions are essential to understanding the city’s contemporary economic growth and social cohesion; they are also closely related.

A hub in the Indian Ocean and Malacca Straits trading system, the port city’s early growth is seen (by Ooi Keat Gin)\(^{29}\) as a function of its integration in administrative and commercial frameworks established by British imperialism. Through immigration from China, India and SEA, those frameworks fostered the emergence of a multicultural society. The complex present-day legacy of the ethnic networks thus created is shown in a study (by Shakila Abdul Manan)\(^ {30}\) of a community of Pakistani origin and its gradual linguistic and religious merger into the indigenous Malay population.

The frameworks of colonial rule and the immigrant communities it attracted left their mark on the city’s landscape in the form of public and private architecture built by the government and different ethnic groups, which form a legally protected body of heritage listed by UNESCO since 2008. Stemming from a local activist movement, Penang’s heritage is managed by “a complex web of bodies, some closely linked to state and federal governments” and represents a powerful motor for economic growth (as studied by Tim Harper).\(^ {31}\)

In the late 20\(^{th}\) century, this heritage coupled with the island’s coastal environment gave rise to a specific modern form of development, based on the construction and sale to non-local buyers of luxury real estate – ‘flats with views’ of the sea (as described by Silvia Vignato).\(^ {32}\) As the sea acquired commercial value as landscape, the site’s kampong residents – factory workers in the island’s vibrant manufacturing sector – relocated into cheap flats in newly built estates. In this city of heritage, development turns out to mean building sites, contractors, cement, houses and streets. In their search for modernity, the workers found themselves excluded – some hidden from view, moving into low-cost concrete housing, others relocating to the cheaper mainland. Disappearing too is the seascape that the condominiums were built and branded to consume.

An example of successful SEA integration turns out, as Silvia Vignato notes, to imply “some people’s definitive exclusion from the prosperity they contributed to create”.\(^ {33}\) Penang’s merchandised vision of itself as a cultural city contains the seeds of such danger for its citizens.

Penang’s cultural identity is built on its past as a port and colony, and the dilemmas of its present bear the imprint of the networks and frameworks of its historical integration. A similar sense that integration processes have unpredictable futures emerges from other studies of grassroots networks of mobility across the Indian Ocean. Historically, the study of keramat – graves of charismatic holy men – traces the networks of 16\(^{th}\)- to 18\(^{th}\)-century Muslim trade in ports such as Cape Town, Colombo, Penang, Singapore and Jakarta. The approach adopted (by Sumit

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\(^{33}\) Silvia Vignato, ‘A Flat with a View’, p. 2.
Sumit Mandal)\textsuperscript{34} explores the shrines’ contemporary local significance, and the development dilemmas posed by their location on prime urban real estate. Historically serving as institutions for the localisation of reverence of outsiders (many of the holy men were strangers in these ports), the shrines’ present-day significance differs from site to site. Central to the trajectories of this heritage is the diversity of the transformations that occur during incorporation of the foreign into the local.

The unpredictability of integration futures is visible in the region’s diasporas too, as research on the outcomes of colonial-era migration shows. Port cities and hinterland towns are the sites of a study (by Natasha Pairaudeau)\textsuperscript{35} of intermarriage between Indian immigrants and local women in Burma and Vietnam, with analysis of colonial legal frameworks – personal status, paternity, inheritance, etc – and their post-colonial legacies. After independence, mixed Asian populations became a source of nationalist anxiety in both countries. Then, as Vietnam emerged from its post-war isolation, the mixed community became a useful symbol of historical links with the subcontinent, mobilised to forge new economic and diplomatic ties. Myanmar’s emergence from isolation after 2010 had the opposite effect: long excluded from citizenship, Muslim traders in Rhakine – whose migrant origins are a source of controversy – became subject to violence by Buddhist extremists. In 2013 extremists petitioned the government to curb interfaith marriages: under legislation they propose, a Buddhist woman would need official consent to marry a Muslim man, who would be required to convert to Buddhism.

The extremists legitimate their position by claiming parallels with today’s embattled relations between western powers and Islamist militants. Assisted by world media, an old ethnic clash between migrants and locals is reshaped into a religious conflict (see Jacques Leider’s research below). Thus, for reasons linked to local circumstances, regional integration led to the minority’s exclusion in Myanmar, and its greater inclusion in Vietnam.

Governments try, of course, to ensure that futures are not only predicted but also designed: the planning of environmentally successful cities as key sites of modernity and integration remains a major challenge of the region. For a case study on this, a smaller Indonesian city was chosen, Balikpapan in East Kalimantan, as a site for research (by Monica Arnez)\textsuperscript{36} on interactions between national, regional and local interests in the design and implementation of urban futures.

An oil city with economic growth, industrialisation and harmonious in-migration, Balikpapan ranked top of Indonesia’s Most Liveable City Index (2014), performed well in surveys of education, housing, income distribution and life satisfaction, and was honoured with the ASEAN Environmentally Sustainable Cities Award (2014). The city is spotlighted as an exemplary success in the region’s integration into frameworks of global modernity, particularly with regard to the environment.

Yet this narrative is contested by NGOs, academics and other locals, who highlight policy

\textsuperscript{34} Sumit Mandal, ‘Muslim Shrines: Sacred Geographies of the Malay World’, presented at the Final Conference in Yogyakarta, 18-19 September 2015.


shortfalls on environmental issues and companies’ manipulation of regulations. The research showcases controversy over a new industrial region, KIK Kariangau in Balikpapan, cited as a ‘heaven for investment’ for its infrastructure and jobs, but known too for mangrove forest depletion, biodiversity reduction and water, air and soil pollution. Here, conservation areas are sites of a contest between stakeholders – including policymakers, companies, NGOs and local communities (environment boards, fishing villages, Dayak minorities, schools) – over the planning, implementation and regulation of urban development.

Some of the region’s most successful urban development is located in its most constricted space – on islands like Penang, Singapore and Hong Kong – where, despite limited land and expensive reclamations, cities were able to perpetuate the maritime prosperity of imperialism into the post-colonial period. But much of SEA’s urbanisation has been of the mainland sprawl variety. Several SEATIDE researchers collected data on integration processes in these cities, which expand – sometimes with planning, sometimes without – onto surrounding farmland and where working lives are hidden neither by colonial heritage nor by tropical views.

Regarding sprawling cities as sites of work and marginality was the approach adopted by these researchers, and is amply illustrated in the case of Surabaya, East Java, Indonesia. As conurbations expand, even as they create opportunities for employment, they open up new spaces for instability, insecurity and criminality.

The opportunities and downsides presented by city working life are the focus of a study (by Bambang Purwanto)37 of Surabaya’s urban poor during the colonial period through to the New Order, focusing on the integrative nature of the migration experience at the level of national identity. The themes of poverty, social integration and insecurity are reiterated in the results of ethnographic methodology conducted (by Matteo Alcano)38 at the city’s ever-present construction sites. In the latter study, the work-related mobility of young short-term workers is analysed in parallel with their circulation of illegal substances, the impact of the street gangs on neighbourhoods’ welfare and security, and the ‘export’ of organised crime to Bali.

Children and youth in the slums is the approach adopted by a study (by Giuseppe Bolotta) focused on migrant quarters in Bangkok, Thailand. Migrant children’s frequenting of care organisations, charities and NGOs has given them – and through them, their parents – a powerful voice in the public political arena. They appear as cultural, economic and political brokers at the intersection between the rural home of their parents and grandparents, and their own urban ‘global’ world, which was the dream that originally drove their parents to migrate.

Here the issue of insecurity is studied at the micro level, but has a broader dimension. Violence is often visible in city neighbourhoods and this raises questions about the vulnerability of marginalised groups, and the terms of their quest for integration. It does so, not only from their point of view but also from the perspective of public opinion and the municipal authorities. Marginality is imagined, reiterated, dealt with and reworked; policies are made, implemented, fail and revised.

Understanding the gendered qualification of urban spaces is an essential part of SEATIDE’s analysis of grassroots networks in the city (as reported by Matteo Carlo Alcano, Giuseppe Bolotta, Alessandra Chiricosta, Giacomo Tabacco). 39 The research explores

39 Matteo C. Alcano, Giuseppe Bolotta, Alessandra Chiricosta, Giacomo Tabacco (2015), ‘Gender at work in Southeast Asia: Norms, expectations and local manipulations’, Online Paper 5,
networking practices of young men in Indonesia, showing the importance of male sociability: in Surabaya, what men call berkumpul is a form of socialisation involving information exchange: when men hang out, drink and gamble, they exchange goods, money and information about opportunities.

Those opportunities sometimes concern the opposite sex, yet the authors observe that “transition to masculine adulthood is complete only when men are able to draw together the considerable financial and cultural resources required to marry a woman from the community and to provide well for their wife, family and extended kinship network”. Despite delays in marriage and experimentation with non-traditional lifestyles, attachment to marriage and married life is part of a common cultural horizon, though not always fulfilled.

Precisely because of their tendency to marginalise and their tolerance of deviance, urban spaces are cast as sites of gendered social integration in a study of human trafficking victims (by Runa Lazzarino). After leaving female shelter facilities, Vietnamese escapees from situations of forced sex work or marriage in China, found the anonymity of urban life preferable to a return to their home village. Urban spaces offered success in job placement and salary, as well as liberation from traditional gender positioning. Yet subtler aspects of post-shelter life maintained a level of exclusion from full social and economic integration: the infantilising and normalising after-effects of shelter residence; the persistence of marginality and threat of social stigma; the separation from family affection and networks.

SEATIDE research also examined the normalising and gendered nature of institutions, in Vietnamese factories. For the electronics sector at Thang Long Industrial Park (Hanoi), ‘skill’ is a gendered concept and most employees are women hired for their ‘nimble fingers’. Gender stereotypes are reinforced even as a reduction in gender inequality is achieved: in the past, migrant labour here was mainly male. But contracts are temporary and the precarity of life in the “no-men’s-land” environment of factory hamlets and dormitories creates an effect of suspension, with women physically located far from their village of origin but mentally still within it.

The way such ‘moves without migration’ forge new types of integration at the grassroots is underlined by the arrival of large numbers of grandmothers in the factory hamlets, where they support young mothers and build hamlet-wide networks of mutual assistance. In this environment of migrants from throughout Vietnam’s northern region, family- and village-type social relations have to be built up from scratch and is done by the grandmothers, who find often themselves enjoying life outside the patriarchal rules of family structures.

2.2. Peri-urban areas, as sites of marginalised living in the global economic mainstream

The grandmothers in the Vietnamese factory hamlets play a role in an integration process taking place on an entirely different scale: at a social level, they enhance the conditions of the labour force used in the global integration of Vietnam’s economy. In the late 1990s, Vietnamese public discourse adopted a new term – hội nhập, or integration – and as research (by Andrew Hardy) suggests, “no one really knew what it meant, but all knew it was something international and that somehow it heralded a new era.” A key finding of the researchers at Thang Long Industrial Park is that this ‘era of integration’ created a new type of space, using former farmland on the outskirts of cities. The research underlines the centrality of peri-urban areas as sites of


the integration of labour into the global economy.

As (Alessandra Chiricosta’s)\textsuperscript{42} idea of focusing on grandmothers illustrates, the peri-urban is socially far closer to the workers’ villages of origin than to the city where it is located. When grandmothers do not come to the hamlets, moreover, the workers’ children live back to village. Life at the industrial parks is thus marginal to both the urban and the rural. This marginality is puzzling at first glance, given the factory workers’ privileged position as mainstream beneficiaries of global economic integration. Qualitative and quantitative research by a Vietnamese-Italian team (Michela Cerimele, Pietro Masina, Nguyen An Ha, Do Ta Khanh, Nguyen Xuan Trung, Bach Hong Van)\textsuperscript{43} found it to be a function of the terms of labour established by SEA’s model of integration into the world economy, described as an ‘uneven development trap’.

Uneven development trap is the term preferred (by Pietro Masina)\textsuperscript{44} to the World Bank idea that some countries – Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam – face a ‘middle-income trap’. The World Bank used this idea to explain the East Asian Miracle model’s failure to deliver fast economic growth in SEA, and called for greater global economic integration, stronger industrial specialisation and deeper scale economies. It thus ignored the hierarchical nature of specialisation networks that limit technology diffusion to companies/countries at lower echelons in the regional division of labour, and oppose states’ use of policy to increase technology absorption, invest in innovation and shelter infant-industry. This integration model was transposed into the work place through policies of flexibilisation (in terms of employment, work process and job structure). The resulting precarisation of labour was the object of research at Thang Long and Khai Quang Industrial Parks.

A central finding is the structural transience of labour: workers quit or are laid off in their thirties as their health, productivity, earning power and ability to comply with discipline diminish. State welfare formerly provided to Vietnamese workers, such as housing, education and health care, is no longer available. As the state withdraws, employers’ requirement for a permanently young, single, productive workforce matches a traditional notion of the ‘life cycle’ of a woman, who reaches an age when she goes home, marries, has children and works in the fields.

The peri-urban area is the site of workers’ integration into the global economy. Here,


Industrialisation has reduced absolute poverty and created jobs for rural migrants. However, they are included in the formal economy on terms described as the ‘informalisation of the formal’, resulting in circulatory migration between factory and village before a final return to the village. Industrialisation has reduced poverty only by delaying these workers’ entry into the farm sector.

This research underlines the complexity of what is called ‘urbanisation of the rural’ which has concerned the whole region over the past twenty years. This type of industrialisation drives no rural-to-urban transition, no rise of any welfare system. Instead of an irreversible and life-transforming migration, it produces vulnerability, structural transience, exclusion. It is the institution of a suspended condition. In Michela Cerimele’s words, this is “industrialisation without industrial civilisation”.45

2.3. Villages, as places of migration and return

What is the impact of these changes on the countryside? In the Vietnamese case studies cited above, field study has yet to yield in-depth data on the effects of the women’s absence. A film commissioned for SEATIDE highlighted the returning workers’ sense of thwarted aspiration.46 This point is potent, as noted at a SEATIDE workshop,47 as many Vietnamese migrants are motivated by the idea expressed in the word đổi đời (to ‘change life’, fortune seek). At the heart of this is the ambition to do any work at all other than the rice farming one’s mother did.

This ambition was the focus of research undertaken in West Aceh (by Silvia Vignato and Giacomo Tabacco)48, with a focus on villagers’ practices of exploitation of locally available resources. It came down, this research found, to a choice between slow money (in sectors like rubber, fish, rice) or fast (from mining gold or gems, dealing drugs), with varying factors of risk.

For these villagers in Aceh, integration manifested itself through small-scale mobility (to small towns and nearby hills, respectively) for the purpose of resource seeking. In recent decades, however, many rural Southeast Asians have adopted habits of mobility over vastly greater distances and across national borders. In-depth data on the socio-economic effects of migration on sending villages has been gathered for a case study undertaken in Cambodia. The survey (by Anne Guillou)49 examined the post-1979 reconfiguration of a village through two events of out-migration: of former Khmer Rouge cadres after their defeat, and of temporary workers in textiles (Phnom Penh) and construction/agro-industry (Thailand) since 2010.

The result was a mixture of stability and change. Stability, because the Khmer Rouge cadres’ departure made peace possible, and because – in the recent context of economic globalisation and the monetarisation of Cambodian rural society – migrant workers’ remittances allow villagers to continue growing rice and maintain elements of ‘traditional’ life (small peasant property, matri-locality, rice-based religious systems). Change, in social relations because most migrants find their own spouse, with implications for the kinship system, and in agriculture because manpower shortages led to abandonment of the seedlings replanting phase, with implications for production, self-sufficiency and religious systems.

This is evidence that instead of being ‘problematic’ or even an accelerator of social change, migration is a factor of social stability. The observation may be especially appropriate in Cambodia, where migration – voluntary or forced, permanent or temporary – has strengthened the social resilience of a society hit by war (1970s) and by economic and cultural globalisation (since the early 2000s). Without it, for lack of cash, villagers must sell their fields: the village is empty yet ‘village life’ – including religion and culture – is maintained. This study’s implications could be tested in the home villages of workers at Thang Long Industrial Park in a fruitful extension of the research related above.

45 Personal communication.
47 WP3 & WP4 Workshop on Ideas & Mobility, Cambridge University, 5 October 2013.
48 References to Silvia Vignato and Giacomo Tabacco’s research may be found below, in sections 4 (Small Towns) and 5 (Upland Areas) respectively.
49 Anne Guillou, presentation at the Final Conference, Yogyakarta, 18-19 September 2015.
A strong Southeast Asian sense of self celebrates the contrast between the region’s modernising urban powerhouses and ‘timeless’ village repositories of traditional values. This identity calls on a range of social and economic realities and imaginings, in which the village as an institution of social and economic organisation occupies a central position. Yet the village, real or imaginary, does not appear often in these case studies. The Aceh and Cambodia studies related above, and the study of a Lua village in Thailand reported below (section on Upland Areas), are exceptions to a rule whereby villages are distant places people migrate from, back to or between, not objects of enquiry in themselves. Here, ‘the village’ is no longer the region’s main social, cultural and economic unit and no longer isolated or associated with the past. The village is a space of connections, and village studies are enjoying a new turn that recognises the growing symbolic and economic importance of the rural world as a resource for the future.

At the same time, a middle register between the national capital and the rural community occupies the foreground of SEATIDE research, embracing a range of intermediate sites of relevance to contemporary integration processes. One, as we have seen, is the peri-urban space. Another, which attracted the attention of several researchers, is the small town.

2.4. Small towns, as interfaces of integration in the countryside

Several studies see the small town as a front-line site in the integration of rural SEA into global modernity. The practice there of experimental migration associates the town with a complex set of hopes and fears. As studies of northern Laos and Aceh show, Vietnamese migrants have no monopoly on the aspiration to change one’s fortunes.

Parents in Aceh villages often ask school-leaver daughters girls to work in town and send money home. The girls stay in boarding houses with strict rules and use sibling affiliations as an alternative to kin. In some cases, villages build premises in town for students and ‘quiet’ students (who are actually working), offering young people the security of symbolic proximity to the village, but implying a discourse, if not a practice, of control.

There are plenty of low-paid jobs, but few perspectives, beyond marriage or some other form of dependence on men. Remitting money is not easy. In a study of Banda Aceh and the towns of Bireuen and Lhokseumawe, the girls came and went between village and town, before falling into what they call dunia gelap, ‘a dark world’. As their credibility as job-seekers fades, they are drawn into illegal migration to Malaysia and drug smuggling. For some, prison becomes an inevitable destination.

This research (by Silvia Vignato)\(^{50}\) on young women’s ideas and practices of work, life projects and dreams of prosperity is conducted against the backdrop of Aceh’s dual legacy of civil conflict and post-catastrophe reconstruction. The option of micro-criminality for in-town migrants is linked to an increase in domestic and international connectivity since the tsunami: the girls’ exclusion from mainstream society results from the region’s inclusion in mainstream networks of integration. In this respect, Aceh is becoming just an ordinary province of Indonesia.

In Laos, regional integration similarly forms the context for peasant migration to towns. Research focuses on this issue at both the point of departure, commonly located in upland areas, and the point of destination. A study of spatial and religious integration of Austro-Asiatic minorities in the borderlands of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam (by Yves Goudineau)\(^{51}\) focused on

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\(^{50}\) Silvia Vignato & Azhari Aiyub, ‘The quest for jobs in post conflict Aceh’, paper presented at Research Workshop 1, Chiang Mai, 13 February 2014. Silvia Vignato, ‘Looking for a job, looking for an income: small scale mobility as a resource or a trap for unskilled labourers, with a focus on Aceh’, paper presented at Dissemination Workshop 2, Hanoi, 2 February 2015, anda chapter forthcoming in, A Place for Work: Small-scale Mobility in Southeast Asia, Silvia Vignato & Matteo C. Alcano (eds), Chiang Mai, Silkworm Books. Aulina Adamy (PhD student, Universiti Sains Malaysia, Penang) contributed to the research.

the conditions of integration of highlanders whose villages are characterised by a circular layout with a community house in the centre. This model is very ancient in the region. But today, many such villages have been resettled and obliged to reorganise their habitat to conform with ‘national culture’, i.e. a non-circular layout. At the same time, nation-states have banned buffalo sacrifices in the name of Buddhism and other values. Through a systematic inventory of known circular villages and a comparative study of buffalo sacrifices, the research analysed this resilient trans-border cultural identity, with its shared ‘circular’ ideology and sacrificial practices. It also examined the modes of national integration of these villages in the context of southern Laos and documented the impact of the regional promotion of ethnic minority heritagisation.

The adhesion of Laos to ASEAN, the inflow of foreign investment, and the resettlement to lowland areas of highland villagers has led to rural-urban migration and development of small towns. Owing to a shortage of arable land at resettlement destinations, resettled highlanders move into town and switch to non-farm employment: the forced displacements of highlanders in the 1990s thus snowballed into voluntary migrations to the roads and district towns. The towns are new and job options are limited, mainly to Chinese plantations and factories, or self-entrepreneurship.

Analysis of the socio-economic trajectories of landless farmers in emerging towns allows a case study on northern Laos (by Vanina Bouté)\textsuperscript{52} to chart migrants’ mindset changes “from rice in mountains to money in cities”. At the heart of this monetisation is the price of land: early migrants bought it cheaply, recent arrivals pay ruinous prices and civil servants profit from its privatisation, through sales to Chinese entrepreneurs and the creation of plantations.

The border’s proximity means that provincial capitals like Phongsaly and Oudomxay, and the towns studied here, Boun Taï and Nateuil, are better linked to neighbouring countries than to Vientiane. They offer a laboratory for the study of a process of integration in emergent communities that involves confrontations but also innovative forms of exchange and solidarity between migrants and locals, local authorities and Chinese companies.

These towns’ emergence across Laos suggests that an integration process is taking place at the national level, and it seems at this stage that the group most at risk of exclusion at this level is the Lao state itself. Twenty years ago, its resettlement programme supported a national integration policy aimed at bringing the highlanders down off remote mountain slopes into the reach of central state governance. The displaced population now live in towns, but the towns’ transnational economies and remoteness from the capital gives them a high degree of autonomy, allowing them to develop as small regional centres. Key beneficiaries are local officials: political position and cross-border networks give them economic and political resources, which they use in their own interests as much as those of the state they serve.

In the future, the Lao state may enact new national integration policies to reverse this trend towards disintegration, although it is likely that the tug-of-war between national policy, local power and transnational influences will persist for some time.

2.5. Upland areas, as contested sites of ideologies and resources of integration

The 21\textsuperscript{st} century is seeing the retreat of the remote. As the study of Laos shows, SEA connectivities mean that few places stand apart from national and global processes of integration.

Several research clusters looked at sites that, until the 20th century, remained peripheral or beyond the reach of state and other integration frameworks and which have recently become economically and politically significant places of interaction and contestation. These include the uplands.

The uplands are sites of contested ideologies of integration. Research in Thailand (by Amalia Rossi) examines the impact of a contract-farming regime and natural resource conservation policies on an upland landscape. Drawing on fieldwork with Lua and Tai-Lue ethnic groups in Nan province, it identifies friction between export-oriented agricultural policy and environmental conservation. Even as the state integrates land and farmers into global regimes of industrial agriculture (based on contract-farming), it protects agricultural and forest biodiversity with one of the strictest conservation regimes in SEA. Farmers are caught in a trap: on one side, state and corporate incentives induce them to grow corn, for sale to livestock factories in the central plain and ethanol producers abroad; on the other, when they grow corn they are blamed for encroaching forest land.

Both sides of the conundrum are rooted in Thailand’s global integration: one in export-led economic growth; the other in international norms of forest protection and ecological good practice. These jostle with home-made models drawing on eco-Buddhist teachings and economic ideas (setakit popiang, sufficiency economy) promoted by the king in the 1990s. The land is mostly owned by the state (national parks, forest reserves), large owners related to the aristocracy, or urban-based speculators. There is little room here for the ecologically integrated systems of farm production and forest management/conservation practiced by locals in the past.

Integration into national and international markets, enforcement through state-corporate regulations and the engagement of the Sangha and military/aristocratic elites (after state actors promoting the ‘sufficiency economy’ paradigm linked up with eco-Buddhist activists) thus serve as overlapping nets: nature is nationalised and labour joins the national and global economy. Moreover, these processes of integration exert disintegrative pressure on highlanders’ ethnic identity. Pushed into seasonal or circular migration to earn cash to pay their way in the modern economy, highlanders must perform Thainess in mainstream society: in doing so, they suffer structural ‘ethnic vertigo’. This is a way of expressing their feeling that they will never be properly Thai, yet cannot remain simply highlanders, a status that exposes them to ridicule as uncivilised and – as we saw in research by Mukdawan Sakboon and her colleagues reported above – exclusion from Thai citizenship.

These experiences underline an ancient truth in SEA about the role of the highlands as an economic resource for lowlander and international prosperity. Whatever the form of the outsider’s presence in the hills – state, corporate, merchant, migrant or other – upstream-downstream relations are framed by desire for extraction. These relations have been studied by SEATIDE researchers working in Thailand and Indonesia, examining the issue from the point of view respectively of migrant workers, highlanders and the state.

The mining of gold and gems is the subject of a case study (by Giacomo Tabacco) focusing on


54 Giacomo Tabacco, ‘Gold mining in Aceh’, presentation at WP3 & WP4 Workshop on Ideas & Mobility, Cambridge, 5 October 2013; Giacomo Tabacco, ‘After the gold rush: opportunities and disillusion among gold miners in West Aceh’,
on migrant workers from Java at artisanal and small-scale mines in the hills of West Aceh. A prime but far from unique form of 21st-century SEA fortune-seeking, the miners may be compared to other migrants doing work that is intended to be life-changing (workers in peri-urban Hanoi, school-leavers in Aceh towns, ex-farmers from the Lao highlands).

The research explores the gamble inherent in their choices: does the work enrich them, and at what cost to their physical and spiritual health? The complexity of this socio-economic environment is highlighted by the study’s gaze beyond the miners, as gold digging and trading involves a range of characters (investors, technicians and middlemen), as well as the mobility of the mineral itself and of mining materials (grinding cylinders, mercury and cyanide reagents) through local and global markets.

The perspective is reversed in a study using quantitative and qualitative data on international tourism in the northern Thai uplands (by Olivier Evrard, Manoj Potapohn and Karnrawee Sratongno), focusing on the trekking industry. Here the hills’ inhabitants are under scrutiny. The study investigated the realities behind the pursuit of an ideal of sustainable management of natural and human resources, balanced with wealth creation through economic development. It tested two contrasting hypotheses: 1) that trekking is exploitative, and 2) that trekking is good for highland village economies.

The data indicated that trekking brings benefits to a tiny minority of villages (as treks follow a small number of itineraries) and, in each village, to a minority of inhabitants. For the families that receive them, however, the benefits of inclusion in this commercial network offer a safety net, a second income that would otherwise have to be sought through circular or seasonal labour migration to distant towns. The case study made recommendations to the public and the private sectors to mitigate the inequalities observed between and within villages and to make the trekking economy more sustainable, both economically and socially.

This study highlights highlanders’ participation in this extractive activity: whatever its terms, it remains a relationship of exchange. The same point is made in a historical case study (by Amnuayvit Thitibordin) of the teak trade in Thailand (1880-1919), which employed a surprising range of ethnic groups and had unintended consequences for the northern region’s integration into the nation of Siam.

By the 1880s, disorders related to British companies’ teak extraction fostered resentment of British influence within the Siamese state, which acted by annexing the northern principalities and nationalising the lucrative forests. This action had several consequences. Economically, for over three decades the Siamese state made vast profits from the British-run export of teak to global markets; territorially, the northern principalities were absorbed into Siam; demographically, migrants from neighbouring countries arrived to seize employment opportunities in timber extraction, including Burmans and Shan from Burma, Khmu and Lamet from Laos.


The geopolitics of resource extraction were not everywhere so swiftly resolved. The study of an ongoing conflict in Myanmar shows the present-day relevance of the overlap between foreign business interests’ competition over resources and nation-states’ claims over territory. The ‘local princes’ here – the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) – imported modern techniques of nationalist organisation to build an ethno-nationalist vision for a homeland, a quasi-state to implement it, and an army to fight Burmese nation-building ambitions over the same territory.

The involvement of outsider business interests in this context of competing nationalisms was studied (by Laur Kiik)\(^\text{57}\) at a particularly sensitive site, a dam under construction on the upper Irrawaddy River. The foreign economic player was China, whose companies’ vast interests in northern Myanmar centred on the Myitsone hydropower project, built for the export of electricity. Its 2011 cancellation is commonly framed as a pivotal moment in Myanmar’s reform process, the cooling of China-Myanmar relations, and US-China geopolitical rivalry in the Asia-Pacific. This research shows that the failure stemmed neither from international geopolitics nor contested economics. It was, rather, the casualty of China’s involvement in a local political situation which it was ill-equipped to understand, owing to a development model based on cooperation with foreign governments on resource extraction in exchange for infrastructural investment, and non-interference in domestic politics.

The heart of the matter is Kachin environmental subjectivity, based on long experience of resource grabs and the merging of environmentalist and nationalist ideologies. The Chinese project was implemented with no reference to the Kachin, and yet – despite its avowed non-interference in domestic politics – inevitably strengthened the Myanmar government’s power in this contested territory. When awareness grew among the Kachin that the dam posed an existential threat to their nation, and when the Kachin quasi-state came to share that awareness, a showdown was inevitable. After China ignored a protest letter from the KIO in May 2011, war started between the Kachin and Burmese armies. Protests then spread to lower Myanmar where the public uproar generalised the dam into an existential Chinese threat to Myanmar itself, a lightning rod for disquiet over Chinese dominance in the Burmese economy. In September 2011, the project was cancelled.

This case study offers an innovative grassroots insight into underlying reasons for the breakdown of China-Myanmar economic cooperation. Ultimately it is about the 20th-century failure of Burmese national integration, resulting in the balkanisation of the country’s peripheral and mountainous regions. Contested territories, whether valued for their teak or their electricity, thus emerge as sites for reflection about the relationship of national and transnational framework building: they suggest that a strong framework of national integration is essential for the success of transnational/regional integration.

### 2.6. Cultural regions, as sites of alternative allegiance and identity

The problem may, on the other hand, be turned around: what approach should a national and regional frameworking take to SEA’s cultural regions? The question of the place of cultural

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regions within integration frameworks and the impact of cultural regions on transnational networking was addressed by SEATIDE in several contexts. The term ‘cultural region’ denotes cultural differences that define a specific region rather than a distinctive people: implying the association of an identity with a territory. These of course are not a physical ‘sites’ – the sense of place is always a product of cultural imagination. Yet research findings here have real implications for national integration processes and for thinking about future regional frameworks.

A study of ethnic conflict in Myanmar’s Rakhine State examines the local and historical roots of the Rohingya crisis and its transnational and contemporary dimensions. Rejecting one-dimensional explanations, the research (by Jacques Leider)58 highlights the Rohingya minority’s use of modern networking tools – world media, international Muslim networks – to shape the narrative of the conflict in its own interests. Underlying this again is the context of Burma’s 20th-century failure of nation-building.

In Rakhine, this failure took two forms. For the Muslim community, no framework allowed their inclusion: classified as immigrants, the Rohingyas were excluded from citizenship. For the Rakhine Buddhists, no framework maintained the integration of their cultural region within the nation. The historical perspective here is essential: after the conquest of Arakan (1785), the Burmese used decapitation to integrate it, taking away king, court and Brahmans to remove the will to recreate the kingdom. But the 20th-century failure to create an all-inclusive Burmese identity meant they could not get rid of Arakenese nationalism. The study underlined the historical roots of cultural regional identities and their contemporary potency as a political force for the disintegration of the national framework.

The Rohingya case underlines a further point regarding the integration of sub-regions, which is that centrifugal forces are strengthened at times of deep political change. This theme is explored in two historical studies on Vietnam. Both examine an empire just before its disintegration, and seek in the seeds of its unravelling lessons about the ‘integrating mechanisms’ that held it together in the first place.

The first is a study (by Andrew Hardy)59 of the kingdom of Champa. Up to the 15th century, international networks – trade in high-value goods and circulation of cosmological, artistic and political ideas through the ‘Sanskrit cosmopolis’ – provided economic and ideological resources for the integration of multiple localities inhabited by diverse ethnolinguistic groups within a framework of royal rule. The paramount’s integrating mechanism operated through regularly repeated investments in vassal principalities and at symbolic temples (Mỹ Sơn, Pô Nagar). Contradictions were inherent within the framework, because the political centre was in constant tension with its constituent units. This was not a unitary but a segmentary state; its segments required perpetual integrating.

When the 1471 Vietnamese invasion overthrew the paramount-vassal framework, local chieftains built up power bases in the principalities and called on outside resources (Vietnamese military force, Chinese legitimation) to rebuild the kingdom. But the Vietnamese proved too destabilising. The equilibrium created by Champa’s integrating mechanisms could not be restored and its segments – reduced now to rump territory status – entered the 16th century in a state of terminal fragmenation.


59 Andrew Hardy, ‘Champa: Integrating Kingdom’; Andrew Hardy & Nguyễn Tiến Đông, ‘The Peoples of Champa: Evidence for a New Hypothesis from the Landscape History of Quang Ngai’, forthcoming in Champa: Territories and Networks of a Southeast Asian Kingdom, Andrew Hardy, Arlo Griffiths & Geoff Wade (eds), Paris, EFEO.
The unravelling of integration frameworks are examined in a study of 9th-century Vietnam and China, on the career of Gao Pian, a talented general who did the groundwork for the Vietnamese breakaway from the Chinese empire. The challenge of growing regional autonomy to the integrity of the Tang empire led to the dynasty’s collapse and the emergence of new kingdoms, including the Vietnamese. The role of regional leaders in balancing the political centre and its sub-regions is emphasised, as the tensions of that relationship were played out in Gao Pian’s decisions: his perceived treachery – or the rebalancing of his loyalties between court and sub-region – contributed to the Tang’s defeat.

This study was presented (by Franciscus Verellen) during the Final Conference in the perspective (developed by Wang Gungwu) of the geopolitical significance of the Tang collapse. As the Song restored imperial rule, it found that more was lost than mere territory. The independence of the Vietnamese, Dali and Nanzhao kingdoms in the south and defeat by the Mongols in the north had demolished the empire’s ideology of integration: Tianxia, or ‘all under heaven’, that placed the imperial capital at the centre of the world. The Tianxia political model now gave way to a multipolar system where China co-existed with other states that were equal – or even, with the Mongols, more powerful. The empire’s consequent northern landward orientation lasted a millennium, ending when 19th-century Anglo-American naval power effected a maritime turn and modern China came to depend on seas kept open by American fleets.

These observations shifted the discussion from the historically specific context of the 9th century onto the international and contemporary development of China’s model of governance and relations with its neighbours. Framed in this way, the story of Gao Pian, the fragmentation of the Tang and the foundation of Vietnam serve as a reminder that processes of integration and disintegration require diachronic explanations grounded in both local and geopolitical realities.

Contemporary challenges to national integration frameworks take the form of historically informed tensions between sub-regional, national and transnational loyalties, according to a case study (by Pantipa Chuenchat) on Thailand. Sites of these tensions include monuments and temples whose historical symbolism has taken on contemporary significance.

Memorial sites consecrated to historical leaders of ethno-regional significance were examined in a study of the northern region. The monuments are remembrance sites for three local “heroes” – Queen Camadevi, who introduced Buddhism (first millennium CE), King Mangrai, founder of Chiang Mai and Lan Na (13th century), and King Kawila, who allied with the Siamese and defeated the Burmese (18th century). In the late 20th century, these sites and their legends were used by politicians to build a cultural region identity around the memory of the Lan Na kingdom.

Receiving military or royal funding and prominently located in city centres or at army camps, the monuments were originally built to co-opt local historical symbols in support of national integration. Recently, however, the monuments and the emerging ethno-regional identity they embody have been into the fray forced into the fray of Thailand’s national political conflict – with both sides competing to associate themselves with the monument.

In March 2010, a blood-pouring ceremony at the Kawila Monument, held to show disdain for contemporary politics and seek the intervention of Kawila’s spirit, was followed by a counter-ceremony repudiating the blood-pouring. On other occasions, demonstrations were held at these monuments in protest against the government. Thailand’s north is the heartland of former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra and the ‘Red Shirt Movement’, whose more radical segments

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demand autonomy for old Lan Na. In Thailand’s political maelstrom, attempts are thus made to rework the Lan Na identity to contest or support Bangkok-centred schemes of national integration.

The disputed temple of Preah Vihear is the site of a different challenge to Bangkok’s nation-building – one that, through mobilisation of xenophobic feeling against Cambodia, risks undermining the domestic nationalist project. The conflict resulted from the hardening of what was previously an ambiguous border, when UNESCO approved Cambodia’s unilateral application for world heritage status for the temple (2008). UNESCO’s action ignited strong nationalist responses on both sides of the border, with politicians’ using populist rhetoric to support partisan domestic agendas. There were exchanges of fire and a number of deaths.

Research (by Volker Grabowsky) identifies four standpoints in the Thai political arena on the potential outcomes. Mainstream standpoints reflect nationalist positions that are respectively hard-liner (uncompromising) and moderate (negotiating). Outlier views reflect anti-nationalist positions. One, articulated by historian Charnvit Kasetsiri, rejects ethnic Thai nationalism, campaigns to change Thailand’s name to Siam, and renounces Thai claims to the temple. The other, held by archaeologist Sisak Vallibhotama, refutes exclusive Thai or Cambodian ownership, denounces elites’ interest in the temple, and anchors any solution on the interests of local people.

In contrast to Charnvit, Sisak is interested in a decentralised Thailand based on the rediscovery of regional cultures, rather than any deconstruction of ‘thainess’. The local people here are the Kui (Thai: Suai), whose cultural region extends through southern Isan and northern Cambodia, straddling the Dongrek mountain range. The temple dispute could be interpreted as nation-states (Cambodia and Thailand) attempting to integrate a cultural region into their respective national realms, reinforcing nation- and state-building to the detriment of a once coherent (pre-national) cultural region. If so, the strategy has high costs and the potential to backfire. In one proposed solution, local identities become the basis for an agreement, taking the shape – in the ingenious idea of a German lawyer – of an Andorra-style future for the temple and its vicinity.

Neither anti-nationalist view has gained public support, nor is expected to do so soon. Their significance lies in debate. A solution must eventually be found to the dispute, and that solution will require acknowledgement of de jure and de facto Cambodian ownership of the temple and suzerainty over the promontory of Preah Vihear. It will require a stepping down of nationalist rhetoric. The entry of deconstructed and decentralised positions into public discourse marks a new challenge to Thailand’s national integration process, and also represents an imagining of the routes its reversal might take.

It is a sign of the potentially perverse effect of hardline rhetoric on national integration. Such effects may be expected when the integration impulse is no longer inclusive, working for a set of values, but has an exclusionary logic, being targeted against a neighbouring population.

Cultural regions’ disintegrative potency are not limited to national frameworks. In southern Thailand, research (by Chris Joll) on the institutional organisation of Sufi practice shows the

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fracturing effect of regional identities on a powerful transnational current of Islamic practice and belief. The case study identifies three sites of localisation of Sufism: in the central plains among Thai-speaking Muslims, in the upper south among Thai-speaking Muslims, and in the far south among Malay-speaking Muslims. Each of these areas developed its own Sufi order on the basis of a charismatic founder and the sacred site of his tomb.

Thus the Sufi orders did not extend beyond their founder’s cultural/linguistic milieu. The exception to this rule is the Shazuliyyah, based in the central plains but with a large following in the Southern Thai-speaking upper south where the founder’s son migrated and was buried. The exception is significant for this personal link – the founder’s son presence was essential to the order’s successful localisation in the new milieu. Resonating with the study of kemarat graves in Indian Ocean ports (see above), the cultural geography of the Sufi orders here shows the fragmenting action effected by local identities during the incorporation of the foreign.

The cultural region, the study shows, is a strong source of allegiance, which may cooperate or compete when interacting with agents of national frameworks or transnational networks.

Examples of cultural regions’ outright rejection of the central state abound in the historical and contemporary landscape of SEA. The politicisation of ethnic identities has been effective in Myanmar, as we saw in the case of the Kachin. Research (by Teresa Tadem) has also reported how, in the southern islands of the Philippines, ideologies of ethnic and religious separateness became linked to political dynasties and local despots: conflict between provincial warlords led to the 2009 Maguindanao massacre of 58 people in Mindanao. The connections maintained by the perpetrators of this crime with senior central government figures underline the weakness of Philippine frameworks of national integration in the mitigation of local cultural allegiances.

At the same time, cooperation between a cultural region allegiance and a national integration project is observed in a case study (by Vatthana Pholsena) made in the borderlands straddling Laos and Vietnam. The Vietnam War served as a crucible for the integration of nine highland counties (châu or meuang) along Highway 9 by the two countries’ communist state structures. But this integration was achieved on the basis of pre-existing political territories and the ethnic dynamics that ran through them, which the Communists perpetuated. Here, a hill society’s historical experience of relations with lowland societies, aided by circumstances of wartime solidarity, assisted a process of peaceful merger.

Such mergers are not always to the inhabitants’ advantage – and the exclusionary tendencies that accompany cultural regions’ and ethnic minorities’ integration into state structures have a long history in SEA. In this respect, the findings of this research are counter-intuitive. Fieldwork shows the road brought economic integration (a source of prosperity, though not for all) but also a sense of exclusion from the modern benefits of the state framework: recognition of land title, access to drinking water and health care, citizenship and participation in local government: “some of these villagers, in some instances, even ask for stronger, not weaker, state intervention so as to be better equipped to survive in an environment where a subsistence economy is being relentlessly subsumed by market-based livelihoods”.

Central to this analysis is its long-durée perspective. The study shows how for centuries the nine counties’ inhabitants moved back and forth over the border, fleeing war or high taxes in Laos, seeking land in Laos, or – in their latest venture – prosperity and modernity in Vietnam. On the


64 Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem, ‘Patterns of Authoritarianism in Southeast Asia: Perspectives from the Philippines’, presentation at EEAS Southeast Asia Briefing 1, Brussels, 11 May 2015;
basis of this long experience, the Bru-Van Kieu “engage with state territoriality…” and “manoeuvre within state space”, to negotiate the terms of their inclusion in the framework.

The issue of minor polities’ absorption into larger units, and the strategies of resistance, accommodation and negotiation they adopt, is at the forefront here. The study of a community in northern Laos engages this debate by positing a third, more dynamic dimension to this understanding of national integration. Hill societies were rarely alien to lowland polities but acted as ‘internal margins’ – trading and maintaining political relations with symbiotic forms that could lead to full integration. Historical research (by Vanina Bouté)\(^6\) reveals how the Phounoy people of Phongsaly were gradually attached to the kingdom of Luang Prabang, and how this transformed their political and social systems.

For the Phounoy the outcome was political privilege, as border guards of the king of Luang Prabang, allies of the French and, later, administrators of the province. They adopted lowland cultural practices, notably Buddhism. They thus gradually created their own territory, developed a specific political and cultural entity unique in northern Laos, and set themselves up as intermediaries between the central state and neighbouring hill tribes. The Phounoy did not distance themselves from the state but actively pursued integration while carving out a new space for local political manoeuvre. Benefiting from transnational relations with China, their descendants are using this space to enhance their autonomy as a regional centre.

A point that emerges from many of the case studies is the importance of the transnational dimension. The construction and politicisation of an ethnic or ethno-regional identity depend not only on historical antecedents, although the foregoing analysis underlines the importance of these. The identity may also be shaped by the siting of the border. When a religion, ethnicity, language or some other group identity straddles a national border, then a transnational dynamic is created that can destabilise national integration processes, especially on the side where that identity forms a minority. It is influenced too by connections from further afield, as when groups that belong to a world religion connect with global media or other international networks: this point was made in the case of the Rohingya.

And yet, despite the transnational dimension, despite their potentially destabilising role, despite minority agency, *ethnic and cultural region identities are products of framework-building processes at national level*. Research (by Vatthana Pholsena)\(^7\) on mainland SEA emphasises ethnic identification as a mechanism of national integration, characterised above all by majority-minority politics. Rulers in Vietnam, Thailand, Laos and Cambodia have favoured a particular ethnic group – Kinh, Thai, Lao, or Khmer – in pursuit of homogenisation policies, while labelling and assimilating and/or marginalising other groups as ‘minorities’.

In the socialist states of Vietnam and Laos, nation-building was based on ethnic classification influenced by Soviet ‘nationalities’ policy. With small territories and complex ethnic mosaics, neither country created autonomous districts on the Soviet or Chinese model. Instead, the nation-building project relied on assimilation by marginalisation, assisted by migration – of majority people into minority areas (Vietnam) or of minorities into majority areas (Laos) – environmental destruction and modern economic and cultural development.

In Siam, meanwhile, the colonial threat led to the adoption of a Western European ‘logic of race’, which founded *nationhood on possession of a single language, culture and race*. The country’s disparate peoples were absorbed by merging the terms ethnicity (*chon chat*), race (*chat, chüa chat*) and citizenship (*sanchat*) into a single umbrella concept (*chat*). By the 1980s most inhabitants, with the exception of the hill tribes (discussed above), had ‘become’ ethnically Thai and nationals of Thailand. Yet, the Thai ethnic group (speakers of standard, central and southern

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Thai, but not Sino-Thai or Thai Muslims) makes up only half the population. Ethnic and ethnoregional minorities do exist but are not officially named.

In Cambodia, minorities were similarly assimilated through reclassification as Khmer: Muslim Cham were renamed Khmer Islam and hill tribes were called Khmer Loei (Mountain Khmers). While SEA state policies towards minorities are not always effective, ethnic categorisation has proved a powerful nation-building tool. This is illustrated in Vietnam, where requests for ethnic reclassifications have never resulted in a change of the number of groups. Many administrative and academic interests are vested in the idea of a multiethnic community made up of 54 ethnic groups: indeed, it appears that this number 54 has itself become part of Vietnam’s national identity.

National integration required the use of multiple framing devices, of which ethnicity was just one. Three other such mechanisms – territory, administration and education – and the sites of interaction they inhabit – the border, the district office and the school – were the object of several case studies on the institutional dimensions of integration conducted by SEATIDE’s researchers.

2.7. Borders, as sites of national integration and disintegration

Borders were taken for granted in the nationalist perspective that informed the decolonisation of Asia and were reinforced by Cold War polarities and the core values of ASEAN. The colonial origins of ‘the border’ is a particularly SEA trope, with the proliferation of theories like the mandala used to explain the relationship of the traditional state to the land over which it ruled. As we observe the ‘porosity’ and ‘opening up’ of the region’s contemporary borders, these readings of its past political systems remind us of the apparently borderless world inhabited by Southeast Asians of the pre-colonial era.

In this context, the controversial nature of the idea of the border in SEA is highlighted by research on the Long Wall of Quang Ngai (Vietnam). This was a physical barrier built (in 1819) between the Kinh and Hrê ethnic groups that offers a contrasting perspective on the historical use of boundaries to frame territory. A study (by Andrew Hardy)\(^\text{68}\) sheds light on the role of the border as a tool for the structuring of difference to allow peaceful inter-zone interactions.

Viewed in this way, the rampart (measuring 127 km, built of earth and stone, with a ditch, a bamboo hedge and many forts) is no longer just a physical structure, but appears rather as an apparatus: its roads, gates and the markets where salt and fish were sold for rice and corn are elements in an integrated frontier system. It was built to exclude (Kinh migrants from Hrê land, Hrê raiders from Kinh villages), but the exclusions were mutual, and in effecting them, the wall established the security necessary for the two communities’ economic integration. However, it did not suffice for the maintenance of security: other instruments, such as knowledge, surveillance, trade policy and cross-border dialogue contributed to that end. And these tools were essential to cross-border relations elsewhere in Vietnam, where no wall was built.

Commentary on this research (by Muhadi Sugiono)\(^\text{69}\) stressed the contribution of the ideological and political role of SEA’s borders in the region's security. According to this view, the establishment of ASEAN (1967) helped transform an area “characterized by


underdevelopment, conflict and instability into a region known for its stability and dynamism”, but was also “an effort to build borders to separate non-communist nations from the threat posed by communist governments”. Borders were integral to ASEAN, whose central tenets are non-interference and respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Yet these principles have come under attack amid developments within ASEAN member countries, with conflicts in Mindanao (Philippines), in Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat (Thailand), in Papua, Maluku and, earlier, Aceh (Indonesia) and in Myanmar. The principles limit ASEAN countries’ ability to respond to these problems, which often stem from non-state nationalisms, have transnational dimensions, and become controversial as countries democratise. It is no longer taboo among ASEAN member state officials to discuss the principles in public.

The importance of borders, however, reduced after the Cold War. Former threats such as Vietnam and China, as well as great powers beyond Asia, were no longer seen as enemies to be excluded. Instead, they were invited to join ASEAN, in the case of Vietnam, or to be part of wider regional mechanisms (ASEAN Regional Forum and ASEAN Plus Three). At this time ASEAN changed its conception of security from negative to positive, abandoning the idea of security as ‘secure from’, defining it now as ‘secure with’. As a result, the role of borders as instruments of security diminished.

Rethinking of borders has taken place elsewhere, most progressively in Europe with the Schengen countries’ commitment to border abolition and the free movement of people. But the logics underlying such rethinking in ASEAN and the EU differ. While the EU’s expansion is governed by the Copenhagen criteria accession framework, ASEAN does not apply criteria for membership: the criterion is geographical. As this research suggests, “instead of building a community of countries with a common identity, ASEAN is building a common identity out of the differences between its members”.

Identity articulates integration at many levels, including some, excluding others, and drawing distinctions in the process. When identity distinctions coincide with national borders, cross-border disagreements may lead to conflict, especially if public discourse is shaped by nationalist politicians courting domestic audiences, as in the Preah Vihear dispute. For this reason, developing a common regional identity could contribute to strengthening security. This conclusion emerged from analysis (by Bela Pertiwi) of border disputes in the region, including ten ongoing unstable disputes, eight of which are maritime.71

The study models relations between four variables – territoriality, economic interdependence, domestic visibility and territorial stability – as explanatory tools for each dispute’s status: stable, unstable, dormant or peacefully settled. It concludes that explanations must account for the domestic visibility of the disputes. Most significantly, it concludes that domestic politics plays a greater role than economic interdependence in affecting the dynamics of territorial stability.

This finding has implications for SEA’s regional project. It suggests that countries should invest in developing resources for the construction of a SEA identity. This implies a rebalancing of the ASEAN Economic Community (currently the ASEAN Community’s most developed pillar), with the ASEAN Socio-cultural Community (the least developed pillar). The point is to enhance a sense of community among the people of disputing states and reduce the traction of nationalist rhetoric sometimes used by political leaders in territorial conflicts as a diversionary strategy.

As Makarim Wibisono remarked at SEATIDE’s Final Conference: “The main requirement is not only a political process generated by charters and resolutions, but also a social process to engage the people, to get a commitment among all actors to be together. An ASEAN feeling: a desire to be together”.72

A SEA identity would also serve the region well in its relations with its powerful northern neighbour. Yet in the construction of such a regional identity, Southeast Asians could not afford the deployment of exclusionary policies and antagonistic rhetoric directly targeted at China, which in other circumstances could enhance the social integration of the region’s population. Unlike the countries of post-Cold War central Europe in the shadow of Russia, SEA does not have a European Union at its back. The economic and geopolitical vulnerabilities of individual countries are inhibitive of identity-building initiatives.

This is shown at the political level from a study (by Nguyen An Ha) that notes how China’s rise as a superpower and its pursuit of ambitious overseas projects, such as ‘one belt one road’, have led some ASEAN member states to prioritise ties with China over links with other members. Mechanisms of loose cooperation and the principle of consensus have left ASEAN unable to forge regional unity in its relations with China: thus for the first time in its history, at the 45th ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting (AMM45) in Cambodia in 2012, no joint statement was made. These developments do not generate optimism among people who would see joint action by regional partners on issues of common concern.

Indeed, transnational identities rarely embrace the whole ASEAN region. More often they take local bilateral forms outside political frameworks, as when a territory inhabited by an ethnic group happens to be divided by a border. As borders have opened up to multiple forms of mobility since the 1990s, local and long-distance connections developed across borders have engendered new dynamics at sub-regional level. Research on these grassroots connections shows that their effects may either converge or diverge with the aspirations of national and regional framework builders. Much SEATIDE research focuses on this crucial sub-regional level of integration. It is nowhere more relevant than along the region’s borders, particularly in the uplands.

Convergence is observed at a site on the Laos-Vietnam border, where research (by Vatthana Pholsena) underlines the challenge presented by local upland networks on the state’s territorialising (that is, its capacity to classify, direct and exploit resources and people over a geographical area). All states struggle to control political borders and people moving across them: the Lao and Vietnamese administrations of Hương Hóa and Sepon districts are no exception. The area is characterised by two elements of transnationality. One, as discussed above, is the historical experience of interaction accumulated by local populations (Bru, Phuthai, Lao and Kinh). The other is the presence of a strategic road linking the Mekong with the coast: Highway 9.

At an economic level, the increased connectivity created by the road has had varied effects, connecting some, while excluding others from its benefits: higher mobility has brought new opportunities from cross-border trading, but has negatively impacted on some livelihoods – notably those of shopkeepers at the Lao border town of Densavanh, due to declining numbers of traveller stops now that the road is in good condition. At the same time, Highway 9 constitutes a


strong economic and attractive symbol of modernity. Politically, some upland residents—borderland chiefs, minority powerholders—and state agents have developed a socio-political space, a 'middle ground' where dialogue is more common than confrontation, and flight. The outcomes of this research in a frontier region illustrate the transnational dynamics of integration from below whereby upland peoples of ethnic minority origins seek integration into the state in order to benefit from modern services.

This process is also observed along the East Kalimantan/Sarawak border. Highly militarised during Indonesia’s Confrontation with Malaysia (1963-1967), this line is now the site of cross-border migration. Here, SEATIDE’s grassroots perspective (adopted in research by a team led by Karin Dean)75 highlights the importance not of the linear border, but of the regime difference it defines. In this case, the difference has economic ramifications: to enjoy better access to goods and facilities, ethnic Dayaks from Indonesia cross to work on palm oil plantations in Malaysia, settle there and take Malaysian citizenship. While Dayaks’ traditionally define territory with natural boundaries such as rivers and mountains, today they make equally effective use of the resources available within the borders of the nation-state.

The theme of divergence, on the other hand, emerges from research (by Karin Dean)76 among the Kachin in the borderlands of Myanmar, China and India. In this contested region, the Kachin Independence Organisation defends its territorial sovereignty while demanding autonomy for Kachin State within a federalist structure, while war causes people to flee to land controlled by the government or the KIO—a choice which has implications for access to aid. Some Kachin mobilities are shaped by the construction of paved roads and enforcement of border controls, but uncontrollable dynamics—war, modern technology—have changed their routes, conduits and logics of circulation. Social networks are mobilised for moral, medical and material support and operate with scant regard for nationally defined space and borders.

The study highlights how historical and contemporary forms of cross-border circulation have undermined attempts at nation-building by the Burmese state by making national borders ineffective. As an instrument of territoriality, the national border has not so much been replaced as subverted and disabled by the state’s inability to direct circulation on the ground.

Deteritorialisation of a different kind is recorded by research (by Kwanchewan Buadaeng,)77 at sites on Myanmar’s border with Thailand. Less successful than the Kachin in defending their land, the Karen people are confronted by the choice between life amidst disruptive state development projects and a protracted war on the Myanmar side of the border, or existence as refugees in Thailand. Their rejection of Myanmar rule has left them deteritorialised: many have left their territory and their traditional way of life.

Yet Karen identity does not simply disintegrate. Excluded from their homeland, they re-categorise their territory, adjust their religious practices or adopt new religions, and use modern and traditional networking technologies in communication, transportation and fund-raising to connect their members in different locations and maintain a sense of belonging. Charismatic leaders mobilise Thai and Karen contributions to the construction of religious buildings, including a spectacular site on the sacred peak of Mount Tamo. Meanwhile Buddhist refugees and border-crossers from Myanmar found migrant-run monasteries and erect Burmese stupas and buildings in Thai temples, highlighting the limits to the control exercised by central Thai Sangha and state over foreigners’ activities of construction, residence and worship. The exclusions laid down by formal frameworks are undermined in a thousand acts of local dialogue and accommodation.

These inscriptions of imported identity on the landscape of Thailand are symbolic of the negotiated nature of national integration in its remoter confines, where nominally immobilised actors are empowered by ethno-regional, borderland and transnational dynamics. The derritorialisation of the Karen has fragmented their religion but also opened fresh connections and mobilised new resources, equipping them to avoid integrative forces. In Thailand, the exclusions they face are multiple, but they also self-exclude. Here, a marginal borderland people is not assimilated into new official socio-economic, cultural and religious structures but successfully strives to build, maintain and adapt its own ethnic and religious identities.

The informality of many cross-border connections was apparent in an image of a site of integration, reported (by Muhadi Sugiono) to SEATIDE's Final Conference, of a bridge on the Myanmar-Thailand border. The crossing was notable for the low level of traffic on the bridge (where you need proper documents), and the high volume of passage under the bridge (where no documents are required). This is an image of people’s integration, integration not initiated by the state and entirely avoiding the state.

Yet efforts are made to upgrade state management of borders and border areas, and these have become more strenuous since the coup d’etat of 2014. The dilemmas of Thailand’s contemporary predicament, including its political, economic and humanitarian dimensions, was the subject of a research project (by Michael Montesano). As part of this, a case study (by Chayan Vaddhanaphuti) focused on the issue of refugees. The Thailand-Myanmar border is dotted with camps where, since the late 1980s, more than 200,000 people have lived, ethnic Burmans from the cities and plains, Karen and others from contested areas on the border and Rohingya refugees from Rakhine on the coast. This is a crisis, but – as the preceding study of Karen and Burmese construction of religious buildings suggests – a long-term one that both government and society in the borderlands have had to learn to live with. It operates in response to complex dynamics, both at the level of state immigration policy and grassroots integration.

The refugees are not officially refugees, but are classified as displaced persons and illegal migrants (meaning if they leave the camps, they can be deported). The only refugee registration took place in 2005, and used three categories: refugee, asylum seeker, and pre-screening. In their management of the refugees, the Thai state holds many lists, including lists of people

eligible for food rations. Refugees need cards (UN card, Thailand minority card, ‘ten year’ card) some of which make them eligible for Thai citizenship. Without a card, they are illegal immigrants.

During research, a woman said “they see us as vulnerable and dependent”. But the camps are networked spaces: they are not closed but are porous, people come and go, as migrant workers and for training. Most have phones, use the internet and participate in religious networks. Indeed, some come to the camps for their schools: educational quality here is high while their home areas are heavily militarised. Yet the refugees’ legal status is always problematic, as one stated: “Everything I do – drive, fish, cut a tree – is illegal”.

The refugee experience of living with statelessness in situations of fragile stability is addressed in two films. One explores the feeling of mental imprisonment in a Karen refugee camp, applied not by fences but through laws on refugee and citizen status and regulations on residence, travel and work. The other contrasts the experiences of two Rohingyas: citizenship brings one a life outside the camp, the other tries to acquire a legal status from inside, and both struggle to maintain their Rohingya identity.

This research called for a rethinking of the refugees, accompanied by recommendations that the humanitarian approach should be replaced with a developmental approach. Current policy constructs refugees as war victims to be fed, housed and confined on the borders. Instead, it should see them as agents of their own – and the country’s – development, and implement measures for their integration in Thailand/reintegration in Myanmar. Specific plans include regularisation of their legal status, creation of a special economic zone in Mae Sot, the agricultural development of border areas, and investment in education.

In SEA, statelessness is not just an issue for refugees. In the 21st century, the stateless includes a group of migrant labour, men and women who cross international borders hoping to benefit from the economic opportunities arising from ASEAN integration. Some travel illegally, some carry passports, some have legal status and work contracts, but after crossing the border they find themselves de facto stateless. This is because mechanisms of control and conditions of employment render ineffective the normal protections that the state offered at home, which should now theoretically be available through diplomatic channels. The insecurity of effectively stateless migrant workers has increased as SEA has become more integrated.

This exclusion arose as framework integration failed to keep pace with the massive development of grassroots integration. This study uses grassroots research to highlight inadequacies in the region’s political frameworks. Judged on the basis of ASEAN’s goals (reflected in the 1967 Bangkok Declaration), the regional group has been very successful. If security means conflict resolution, territorial integrity and respect for sovereignty, ASEAN has undoubtedly improved security in SEA. But if we change perspective and view security at the grassroots, we find that many groups benefit do not benefit from ASEAN regional integration. ASEAN makes little difference to their security, being more concerned with the security of states than that of people.

The issue of human security is shown to have implications for political framework building. It raises the question ‘What does ASEAN mean for Southeast Asians?’ At issue is the fact that the ASEAN Charter, on which the ASEAN Community is built, may be seen to consist of contradictory principles. On the one hand, it refers to human rights and democracy as key values of the ASEAN Community. At the same time, the Charter keeps the principles of non-interference and respect for sovereignty and national integrity intact.

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81 On the Karen, Inside the Fence by Karen News: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=roKsslucDCU. On the Rohingya, Michael’s Anecdotes from the Rohingya Diaspora, by On the Loose and Chiang Mai University’s Regional Center for Social Science and Sustainable Development.

82 This was the approach adopted by the EU in a ground-breaking 1990s project investing in the repatriation of 100,000 Vietnamese boat people, described in Hardy, A History of the Vietnam – EU Relationship, pp. 28-38.
The place of human security within ASEAN was the object of research (by Benny Teh)\(^3\), which found that top-down security cooperation, with limited involvement of the people, adversely affected the construction of a regional identity that ASEAN leaders aim to achieve. Human security should instead be placed at the core of ASEAN Community. The policies of a people-centred institution would protect and empower people through regional processes (involving civil society organisations, the ASEAN Peoples’ Forum, etc). At the institutional level, the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on a People-Oriented, People-Centred ASEAN (2015) may serve as a roadmap. This means that all three pillars of the ASEAN Community, not just the socio-cultural pillar, should be informed by a people-first approach that transcends national interests and achieves good regional governance.

Research on grassroots integration in SEA’s borderlands underlines the difficulty of this project. For people excluded from the benefits of national and regional frameworks, like refugees, and people working at the forefront of regional economic integration, like migrant labour, the relevance of ASEAN remains a question. As the political and intellectual resources for a SEA regional identity are developed, the way the question – ‘how does ASEAN make a difference to the lives of Southeast Asians?’ – is answered in the cities and villages of the region is likely to take some very practical forms.

2.8. District offices, and other sites of administrative and ideological interaction with government

In this respect, people’s relationship with the state is a central concern. How does ASEAN make a difference to the refugee’s dealings with camp authorities? How does ASEAN affect the migrant’s access to consular services? How does ASEAN influence the policies that direct the decisions of these and other local agencies? When viewed at specific sites of interaction with government and in the light of day-to-day transactions, the relevance of the question becomes quickly relative. This was the perspective adopted by several SEATIDE case studies, which examined the relationship of integration and governmentality at a number of sites, some of local import, others of national, regional and global reach.

Research highlights the pivotal role of the district office in the effectiveness of national integration. As agents of a state body sited at a key interface in policy implementation, district officials in SEA are observed implementing, but also reworking, diverting, sidelining and blocking directives of the central state. They may use their power opportunistically, for the purposes of rent-seeking, or in response to a particular bureaucratic identity or set of concerns. The latter motivation is mobilised to explain the behaviour of local officials implementing Thailand’s highlander integration policy, according to research done among Akha, Hmong, Karen, Lahu, and Tai Lue ethnic groups in Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai, Mae Hong Son, Phayao, and Tak provinces (by Mukdawan Sakboon, Prasit Leepreecha and Panadda Boonyasaranai).\(^4\)

The central state aimed to use citizenship, education and Buddhism to turn highland minorities into full Thai citizens. Successive governments enacted specific policies to this end, which recognised full Thai citizens with official ID cards and several categories of non-Thai citizen aliens. Regulations were established by which minorities could obtain legal status on the basis of an application.

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However, transnational influences – illicit trade, especially in narcotics, and illegal immigration – impacted on the way local authorities implemented the policy. In the past, official marginalisation of minorities was driven by their association with communism. Primarily motivated in recent times by cross-border security concerns, although not averse to receiving informal payments, district authorities have developed a bureaucratic identity that consciously sought to delay or deny applications for citizenship. The technique they used is the administrative ‘labyrinth’.

The applications procedures and bureaucratic documentation took on Dickensian proportions, entailing material artefacts like survey records, identity cards, numbers, signatures, fingerprint, witness affidavits and registration files, and intangible requirements such as Thai language ability and identification with Thai culture. Errors of translation and officials’ unfamiliarity with ethnic languages caused mistakes; verification took time and cost money; the remoteness of the minorities’ villages increased their reluctance to travel back and forth to the district office; they lost trust in officials and gave up.

The result is estimated at 103,759 highlanders who have no Thai citizenship or other legal status (2014). Without papers, they cannot access the rights and benefits of citizenship, including title to own land, voting rights, education, health care and job opportunities. Citizenship application procedures, meant to foster national integration, have been effectively employed instead as the tools of a population’s exclusion.

Power may concentrate in the localities at the expense of the central state; power in the localities may not always be held by state officials. Increasing connectivity, opening of borders, expanding transnational movements and the difficulties central authorities face in maintaining effective control of borderland areas explain the de facto gains in autonomy made by some border areas located far from national capitals. Places on the margins, far from central norms and controls, are sites of experimentation and transformation. Officials of the district office forge alliances with new types of powerholder.

Research aimed to identify local political and economic actors who play a determining role in the development of autonomous spaces and local level power relations, including the study of networks. The results were reported in a SEATIDE panel at the EUROSEAS Conference held in Lisbon on 2-5 July 2013, entitled “New Centralities at the Margins of the Indochinese Peninsula: the Making of Local Elites”. It consisted of ten papers focusing on rural sites in mainland SEA and addressing the transformation in local institutions of power and the emergence of new elites. Specific sites were selected for studies on emerging political and economic entrepreneurs, traditional networking practices of highlander leaders, the resurgence of economic networking based on ethnic relations resulting from the opening of borders, and the compromises and adaptations made by officials of the central state in their relations with highlander minorities.

Growing limitations in the central state’s regulatory capacity have implications for integration processes across SEA, not only in the localities. In a comparative study of government institutions in Thailand and the Philippines, the officials under scrutiny are not in the districts but at national level, where their job is to control modern technological knowledge. Research (by Tomas Larsson) into states’ ability to absorb/adapt outside knowledge, or prevent its use within their territory, reveals the institutionalisation of scientific knowledge and the role of trust in technocracy in integration processes.

The study examines the two countries’ divergent responses to technologies associated with

85 The programme is reported in Appendix 2.
genetic engineering of crops. Agricultural biotechnology and ‘genetically modified organisms’ (GMOs) present great opportunities or threats, depending on whom you believe, to the future of farming and food security in SEA. While the Philippines emerged as a regional leader in this second Green Revolution, Thailand rejected the new technologies (although some of its papaya farmers obtained GMO seeds on the global market). Why did their proponents succeed in making the cultivation of GM crops politically acceptable in the Philippines and fail in Thailand?

Explanation for GMO policy divergence in Thailand and the Philippines was found in the respective transformations in political and ideological landscapes caused by the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The crisis empowered opponents of agricultural biotechnology in Thailand, but not, or much less so, in the Philippines. In Thailand it produced a developmental paradigm – the sufficiency economy – that viewed ‘globalisation’ and its complicated ‘foreign’ technologies as a danger which the institutions of the Thai state could not be trusted to manage well.

Trust in the state and its capacity to manage global, regional and national integration stands out as a critical factor determining whether the circulation of ideas – in this case, biotechnological advances, embodied in seeds – is met with political support or opposition. Such trust determined the two countries’ respective integration and exclusion from this circuit of global knowledge, and yet was shaped by historical experiences that have nothing to do with agricultural biotechnology.

The state’s management capacity, and the role of its technocratic and bureaucratic agencies, is examined in the context of natural disaster, studied (by Naila Maier-Knapp) in Thailand during the 2011 floods. The floods came at a time of high political crisis, and engaged the responsibility of eight agencies/ministries with roles in early-warning, relief and response to flood-related disaster.

The Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation within the Ministry of the Interior was the country’s lead coordination centre for national disaster relief, management and prevention through its Bangkok headquarters and network of local offices. A chronological study of the events of 2011 showed the action of this and other agencies constrained as a result of inter-agency competition; posturing and suspicion in domestic politics; the principle of subsidiarity in decision-making – by local (tongtin) district (amphoe) or province (jangwad) authorities – and the practice of centralised control; and management issues – dams, sluices, information, etc. – at a technocratic level.

The failure to achieve an integrated national response is explained as resulting from a hierarchical bureaucratic/technocratic divide between the centre and the provinces, and intra-agency and inter-agency tensions due to diverging interests, approaches, allegiances and mandates. Even as the political arena was paralysed by competition between red/yellow shirt support for populist/institution-based political movements, the floods revealed technocrats in open or latent conflict with bureaucrats and raised doubts about the competence of both.

SEATIDE research on sites of interaction with power thus highlighted a central dilemma of integration at the national and global levels: in situations of contested expertise and divided technocracies, who is to be believed? In our case studies, issues of trust loomed large. Adopted government positions are challenged at different levels, involving anti-GMO activist attacks on field trials of ‘Golden Rice’ in the Philippines, and the surreptitious adoption of biotech crops, most notably of virus-resistant papaya, by farmers in Thailand.

One specific and useful area of comparison was the nature and standing of the ‘technocrat’. The biotechnology case study underlined the varying powers of leverage technocrats possess within SEA societies. Relevant issues include the multiple ways ‘technocracy’ may be understood at national levels, the varying degrees of institutionalisation of scientific and development expertise – e.g. within state bureaucracies, universities, national academies of science, professional bodies –, and the relationship of such expertise to national political forces and global

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currents of modern knowledge and technology.

The question of the relationship of international and domestic political forces to technocratic knowledge is addressed in the Philippines in research (by Teresa Tadem) on economic development models. It looks at the nexus of technocracy, politics and international organisations expressed in debates over the development theories adopted since the 1950s, when the Philippines ranked next to Japan as Asia’s best performing economy.

By consequence of authoritarian rule in the 1970s, the country became known as the region’s ‘basket case’. It never joined the elite New Asian Tigers (Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia). After the dictator’s fall (1986), some believed that corruption had caused this poor performance and good governance could now address it. However, NGOs and other members of an emerging social movement held that stagnation was caused by the political elite’s pursuit of a neo-liberal economic model, supported by multilateral agencies like the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, and mediated by powerful technocrats.

The 1980s Asian economic boom strengthened the IMF-WB neo-liberal paradigm and attracted a spectrum of opinion including officials, business leaders and university economists as well as some NGOs. Known as ‘free marketeers’, their admiration for the market combined with criticism of crony capitalism. Unlike the martial law era technocrats, this 1990s coalition advocated reducing the state’s role in the economy. It blamed economic collapse on the Marcos regime which had intervened in the market for the personal gain of a few.

The new policies espoused liberalisation, privatisation and competition, which intensified in the era of globalisation. The model brought prosperity to the Philippines, including the region’s highest growth rate in 2013. The problem was that poverty incidence did not change and the gap between rich and poor increased. Opposition to the model was thus voiced by civil society actors allied with ‘reformist’ technocrats within the bureaucracy. Their efforts were given impetus with the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the 2008 global economic crisis.

Yet landed elites still prevent agrarian reform and engage in corruption and rent-seeking through policies such as privatisation. The neo-liberal development paradigm still dominates, insulating technocratic policy-making from public pressures. The left has failed to offer a feasible alternative paradigm, but continues to contest the country’s economic development model and the complex of power, wealth and technocratic knowledge that underpins it.

This analysis was tested in research on the impact of the Philippines’ adoption of this model on the country’s industries. A case study (by Concepcion Lagos) on shoe manufacturing at Marikina city probed the paradox of advances in the Philippines’ integration into international trade regimes that, contrary to their architects’ expectations, led to factory closures and an increase of informal sector employment.

After the Philippines’ admission to the WTO (1995), global competition, trade liberalisation and rising production costs weakened the domestic shoe sector. The loss of protectionist measures drove shoemakers out of business: by 2003, four of the six large sports shoe manufacturers had gone. Many workers fell back on home production of shoe parts, creating obscure assembly lines held together by personal contacts rather than registered companies and legal contracts. While materials are sourced and products sold in the formal economy, they earn their living from

informally organised processes. Their precarious prosperity thus depends on exclusion from the structures of integration that were intended to enrich them.

As they adapt, the shoemakers are assisted by a different model of development, operating at city level. This is Marikani’s cultural trajectory. The city’s 20th-century growth and pride in its shoemaking tradition proved fertile ground for identity-building initiatives: over the past 15 years, a museum, a giant statue, annual festivals and a footwear academy have all reinforced the city’s self-definition as the ‘city of shoes’. In this, the local authorities have played a key role. Their support to the industry is not motivated by rent-seeking, and may not represent the city’s optimal economic orientation, but is given for the political legitimacy offered by shoe symbolism. There is evidence, even, that this has distracted technocratic attention from more urgent issues, such as investment in the software – technical knowledge and education – and hardware – modern technology and machinery – that Marikina needs to keep abreast of the new globally integrated shoe manufacturing environment.

2.9. Schools, and the localisation of knowledge in a globalising world

The importance of technical and other forms of knowledge as a factor in integration processes appears in much SEATIDE research, as the above examples from the Philippines illustrate. In this respect, education systems and their prime site of interaction – the school – are the subject of several case studies, focusing mainly on Indonesia.

The school is revealed as a key implementation site for national integration policy and for challenges to nationalist instrumentalising of education in research (by Agus Suwignyo) on the teaching of world history. A diffusionist approach was used to trace – through the colonial, post-independence and post-1965 periods – how this subject was taught to further the integration of a country known for its geographical spread, archipelagic character and ethnic diversity.

The concept of diffusionism implies a centred world: one with a permanent centre and a permanent periphery. In this context, people derived their sense of oneness as a nation from belonging to a state. Under Dutch rule, there was the colonial state, the imperial state, then the world; in the post-colonial era, there were the citizens and territory of an independent state, then the world. During the colonial era, world history teaching articulated views of the Netherlands. In the post-colonial period, it became an instrument of ‘nation’ and national feeling (1950s-1960s), and then a mere addendum to Indonesian history (since 1965).

The ideas taught were neither robust nor sophisticated. This world history is inward looking, makes no mention of the Opium Wars (not relevant to Indonesian nationalism), offers no sense of ‘global history’, but simply covers the history of a few parts of the world (French Revolution, Industrial Revolution, Russian Revolution) without interaction between them, even on Islam.

Yet the world’s imagined centre has shifted. The world is still seen in nationalist terms and its history is supposed to build a feeling of oneness, integrate Indonesia and define it within and against the world. But as it is actually taught in school, Indonesia finds no place at all in the currents and networks of world history. Because it is not connected to world trends, Indonesia is excluded or – at best – on the sidelines. In the early days of nation-building, this may have been an acceptable trade-off. Today, as Indonesian democracy matures and ASEAN seeks to develop a sense of SEA identity, this inadequate nationalist vision must be revisited and challenged.

Institutionally, where might such a challenge come from? A lessening of the state’s control over education is observed in several contexts: case studies register the opening up avenues for the articulation of alternative views and new perspectives, including ideas from overseas. Non-state education providers and knowledge sources are increasingly influential. This openness has the potential to re-energise the vision that Indonesians have – and are taught – of themselves,

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linking them with global knowledge frameworks and closing up the disconnected inherited from 20th century nationalist imperatives.

In the 21st century, institutions of public education are under pressure from the private sector, the internet and regional networks, according to research on universities (by Hermin Indah Wahyuni) focusing on the teaching of media and communications science.

The 21st-century growth of private campuses has introduced an element of business competition, challenging the monopoly of public institutions. This may hamper the production and circulation of ideas, but has also motivated investment in facilities and the establishment of links with overseas universities.

The internet has overcome barriers and cut geographical boundaries, time constraints and costs. Distance learning is possible by means of teleconference; technology offers access to books and journals; research is published through department and university portals.

At the same time, opportunities for SEA networking are growing. In the field of media and communication science, the Asia Media Information and Communication Center (AMIC) connect practitioners, lecturers and activists across the region. These open new spaces for regional exchange: in the case of AMIC, for example, Thailand launched several forum initiatives to facilitate discussion of media ethics in ASEAN.

The provision by religious organisations of non-nationalist educational models is examined in research (by Monika Arnez) that focuses on environmentalism in Koranic schools in Kalimantan and Java. This study examines the eco-pesantren, Islamic boarding schools that combine economic and environmental approaches and attract pupils from many Indonesian provinces. The schools reflect the growing environmental awareness among global Islamic authorities, where, especially since the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002, the idea of Islamic sustainable development has taken hold. Indonesian Muslim leaders have also contributed their own responses to climate change.

In application of these ideas, the mass organisation Nahdlatul Ulama founded schools where revered teachers (kiai) implement a philosophy of education based on preserving ‘good things from the past’ and embracing modernity through entrepreneurship, environmentalism and Muslim education. They teach Islamic jurisprudence, mysticism and the sayings of the prophet Muhammad, and practical knowledge about recycling, composting, fish ponds, trees and vegetable crops.

Their success allowed them to build close relations with the Indonesian state, which aimed to address climate change and strive for sustainable development. The Ministry of Environment has regularly sought the cooperation of religious leaders, converted 90 ordinary pesantren into eco-pesantren (2009), and awarded prizes to schools that develop innovative ecological ideas.

This study highlights the relevance of the findings of a broader historical comment on Muslim education in SEA (by Sumit Mandal and Tim Harper) that offers a survey – through the pre-colonial, colonial and post-independence periods – of the different forms of Islamic schooling. These include the pondok in the Malay Peninsula and the pesantren in Java, sites where pupils gather around well-known scholars; and the madrasah, a 20th-century urban introduction teaching a hybrid curriculum of European languages and subjects as well as Islamic subjects.

The study notes that transnational interactions in education have often been underplayed, even viewed with suspicion by colonial empires and nation-states. Yet

transnational routes were a resource for local transformations via Muslim education well before today’s globalising currents. Then and now, Muslims have sought education and intellectual inspiration from regional and transregional sources. Then as now, these efforts have been frequently viewed as a potential threat to national and international security. Far from a security threat, contemporary Muslim schools continue to be sites of educational innovation, serving significant social needs.

The case of the eco-pesantren confirm three of SEATIDE’s initial hypotheses on education. The first is the continuing importance of grassroots education traditions. The second relates to education as an arena of transnational exchange: before the nation-building period after 1945, cosmopolitanism was at the heart of SEA education. Both these patterns are resurgent at the present time, for reasons related to our third hypothesis. This is that education offers a fascinating insight into the localisation of knowledge over the long duration and a crucial window on processes of integration. After independence, states harnessed education to their projects of national integration and resisted innovation from the grassroots. In the 21st-century, the new multiplicity of education providers and public institutions’ diminished sense of their own authority and capacity have induced states to be less wary of community initiatives and foreign ideas.

A final case study (by Rémy Madinier) investigated the localisation of imported religious ideology in a different context: that of the political arena of Indonesian democracy. This finds that, in a context of increasing Muslim piety and orthodoxy in Indonesian society, Islamist parties inspired by extremist Middle Eastern models and groups like the Muslim Brotherhood have consistently encountered a “glass ceiling” at the ballot-box.

The poor performance of radical Islam, and its inability to benefit from the opportunities of democracy since 1998, is analysed historically. Placed at the explanatory forefront are such factors as the Islamic movement’s instrumentalisation by the heirs of the New Order regime, its political parties’ failure to unify or form coalitions, revelations of their leaders’ corruption, and the borrowing of Islamic platforms by secular parties. Social and cultural contexts (mosques, shopping malls) are found to be where devout Indonesians express their shared Islamic identity.

The tendency to fragmentation during the localisation process of imported ideas is something we have encountered elsewhere, not least in the absorption along cultural regional lines of Sufist practices in Thailand discussed above. It is not a problem specific to SEA, but is encountered often here as the diverse contexts of ‘the local’ presented in these pages indicate. How to cope with the disintegrative power of the local – or to put a positive turn on the question, how to harness local energies in the building of frameworks and identities – was the challenge faced by the nation-builders of the post-1945 period. The architects of the regional integration frameworks of the 21st century will ignore it only at the peril of their projects.

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PART 3. CONCLUSIONS

The above survey is a summary of SEATIDE’s research on processes of integration in SEA and corresponding forms of exclusion. Its view is as geographically broad as it is historically deep, ranging across the region to record national, regional and global integration processes as they manifest themselves at local levels. The challenge now is to look beyond the trees and consider the forest. What is this data telling us?

Part 2 foregrounded sites (cities, peri-urban areas, small towns, villages, uplands) at which integration processes were recorded, as well as sites of interaction both imagined (cultural regions) and institutional (borders, government offices, schools). The point of this approach was to showcase the empirical basis of the research, with real processes ongoing in real time at real places. At the same time, it had the effect of flattening the project’s thematic perspectives. Now in Part 3, we may conclude by returning to the themes of SEATIDE’s original research framework: diversity, prosperity, knowledge and security.

Before doing so, however, we should examine a dimension of the results that falls into no single theme, but cuts across all of them. This is the presence of history in SEA’s present.

3.1. Southeast Asia’s past in Southeast Asia’s present

Many legacies impacting on contemporary processes of national and regional integration date from the period of colonial rule. Through the 19th to mid-20th centuries, SEA was connected to Europe and other parts of Asia in imperial frameworks; hard borders and other barriers between its countries were drawn; transformative in-migrations took place from China and India; economic and administrative modernity fuelled vast growth in the reach of the state. From this period, we may date the arrival of the nation as the region’s main political idea, and the emergence of Southeast Asia as its name.

Geopolitical and socioeconomic vestiges of Europe’s past presence turned up in SEATIDE research at many sites. On the borders, the conflict over Preah Vihear is a case of raw friction between past and present. Thai nationalist readings of colonial border arrangements posit a mapping error that placed the temple in Cambodia. Yet in 1930, in the shadow of the French tricolor, Siam’s archaeologist Prince Damrong allowed scholar Henri Parmentier to show him around the temple. In 1962, the International Court of Justice found that by not objecting to the flag Damrong had tacitly consented to the 1908 border. What was not said during this colonial encounter and how that silence was later interpreted had consequences for the contemporary security and development of nationalism in both countries.

In the cities, Penang offers insights into the ‘colonial present’ at several less evenementiel, more structural levels. The economic importance of historical heritage is one: the displacement of workers from coastal kampons was caused not by the proximity of a nice beach, but by the beach’s proximity to a nice city with colonial buildings. The social integration of colonial-era migrants is another: a certain nostalgia is the main effect of Pakistani communities’ merging into the Malay majority. At a third level, the end of empire did not destroy the administrative and commercial frameworks of integration created in Penang: they were reworked rather than replaced. The inclusions and exclusions here are multiple and complex; many of their roots are colonial.

At the level of state development, continuities were noted across SEA: the colonial inheritance – states’ embrace of technologies and ideologies of rule, modern bureaucracies, and patterns of authoritarianism imported from Europe – is manifest. Yet, these points made, the colonial era is

95 Note that the footnotes to Part 3 contain references only to citations and work not mentioned in Part 2 above. For other work, refer to the relevant sections of Part 2 and the Appendix 1.
only one of SEA’s pasts. SEATIDE found other legacies too: from the experience of the Cold War, and histories dating from the centuries before European conquest.

The Cold War exposed the region to new ideologies possessing unprecedented power to penetrate and integrate populations and institutions. This is particularly true of mainland SEA where, as the theatre of a major proxy war, the lines were starkly drawn.

Upland areas took on a new geopolitical centrality as, home to international borders and strategically vital forested hills, the terrain and the ideological loyalties of its inhabitants were hotly contested. SEATIDE recorded legacies of this at several sites. In the uplands of Laos and Vietnam, a study was made of the Bru-Van Kieu minorities’ integration into state-framed modernity. Shared wartime experiences, habits of cooperation and social mobility facilitated this transition, giving minority leaders and officials – men in power today who spent their youth on the same side in the war – a common language for dialogue.

In northern Thailand, by contrast, such transitions were hindered by Cold War ideological legacies. Research explored the assimilation into mainstream Thai society of the Lua minority, through their resettlement in the valleys or the development of their land in the hills. This was an anti-insurgency policy, at the heart of which was the historical reality that the Lua took part in a Maoist insurgency in Nan province (1967-1990). Today, integration is pursued for other reasons, but research reveals its obstruction by the agents of its implementation. There are no insurgents now, yet official suspicions of highlanders’ loyalty persist. Residual fears of communism and habits of discrimination mingle with contemporary security concerns with a transnational dimension to prevent the national integration that the central state aimed to achieve.

The resulting situation is a hybrid set of exclusions, with a cleavage between land – integrated into national/global regimes of resource exploitation – and people – who seek integration, despite its cultural cost, yet find it eludes them. As SEATIDE research found, “Policies for the integration of minorities subject to Communist influence have indeed deeply marked the life trajectories of thousands of hill dwellers, and the situation of the Lua minority is a direct outcome of such policies”.

Down in the plain, research on migration was done in Cambodian villages, where a transition was observed from late 20th-century war-related out-migration – of people associated with the Khmer Rouge – towards today’s development-related mobility, linked to resource seeking and monetisation. Previously an extreme example of the Cold War’s impact on ordinary people, Cambodia’s experience today reflects regional trends: legacies of war that impinge directly on individual lives are diminishing.

Yet the Cold War’s influence is still felt in national frameworks, owing to its intensity during the mid-20th century when the region’s political models took shape. Depending on their alignment, SEA states borrowed Western or Soviet frameworks of national integration. In particular, SEATIDE research noted how states’ use of ethnicity to classify, control and integrate ethnic groups shows divergences influenced by Cold War alignments.

The socialist states of Vietnam and Laos adopted strategies influenced by Marxist-Leninist ideas on nationalities and ethnic groups. But in Thailand, notions of nation, ethnicity and identity were shaped by the appeal of Western European ‘civilisation’ and the threat of French colonialism; most groups were assimilated to the majority Thai but the Cold War framed a set of exclusions for non-Thai hill tribes. Cambodia’s neutralist Sihanouk regime followed Thailand’s suit, with Muslim Chams denoted Khmer Islam and highlanders Khmer Loei (Upland Khmer) in arrangements that persist today. These assimilation policies were inherited from Europe, with colonial and Cold War influences.

Among all SEA’s political models, however, the most striking debt to the Cold War is owed by the regional integration model itself. ASEAN’s foundation, as a successor organisation to SEATO,

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was a direct consequence of the global conflict's manifestations in the region, particularly the threat perceived from Vietnam. As Muhadi Sugiono noted, “it is difficult to regard ASEAN's establishment during the Vietnam War, with increased threats of communist insurgencies in all five founding countries, as a coincidence”.  

The timing of ASEAN's 1990s expansion further proves this point, as does the association's concern with inter-state security and the principles of non-intervention and respect for national sovereignty. One of its major achievements – peace in the context of post-Cold War restructuring of international relations – should be read in this light. If Cold War fear first led the group to form ASEAN, the vanishing of Cold War fear led to ASEAN's enthusiastic embrace of the later entrants. At the level of security, after the USSR's fall, ASEAN's members could see countries that remained outside the framework as posing a greater threat than countries – whatever their political regime – that were included.

The pre-colonial legacies in SEA are multiple, and it was to highlight some of these that one of the sites listed in Part 2 is ‘imagined'. This is the cultural region (see section 2.6 above). As elsewhere, many cultural regions in SEA are vestiges of ancient political formations, which may – through the political manipulation of identities and symbols – stage potent contemporary resurgences. Cultural regions are key sites of SEA's past in SEA's present, and take us to the heart of the issue of the region's diversity.

3.2. Diversity: national integration and the question of assimilation

SEATIDE research investigated cultural vestiges of ancient principalities at sites in Thailand (Lan Na), Laos (Phongsaly) and Myanmar (Rakhine). Elsewhere, as in Myanmar (Kachin) and among the Kui of the Thai–Cambodian borderlands (around Preah Vihear), the mobilising factor is ethnicity. The relation of ethnicity to the cultural region is a matter for debate, notably in cases of deterritorialisation (such as the Karen in Myanmar and Thailand). A broader finding of SEATIDE is that it is fruitless to attempt too precise a definition of cultural region – whether on the basis of language, ethnicity, religion or history. Matters of identity are fluid.

This fluidity becomes all the more apparent when one considers the political manipulation of historical symbols recorded by this research. It is clearest in the case of Lan Na, where all sides in Thailand’s national contested politics staked claims at monuments to ancient queens and kings: these local symbols are political tools available to Thai nationalists and Lan Na secessionists alike. The symbols’ versatility is, in turn, a factor of the success of Thailand's assimilation policies. Since the teak companies first set up here, the Bangkok state's nation-building achievements in the northern territories have been notable, especially if compared with neighbouring Burma.

The task of constructing national identities amidst such diversity presented a formidable challenge. Study of the integration processes it required raises the question of assimilation at a fundamental level. Can the national integration of religious, ethnic and other groups and territories be conceived only in terms of assimilation? When SEA states borrowed Europe's notion of the nation and its practice of assimilation, they effected a rupture with the political models of the pre-colonial past. In pre-modern SEA, integration did not necessarily involve assimilation. It formed interethic, interreligious, often hierarchical social structures, in which all components preserved their specific identities by accepting a shared cosmological system.

These arrangements created multiethnic, multireligious societies that proved stable over long periods. Two such models were discussed by SEATIDE's historians. One was the Sanskrit cosmopolis, studied in the context of the segmentary kingdom of Champa and its integration of politically and ethnically diverse principalities. The other was the Chinese ideology of Tianxia – ‘all under heaven’ – that underpinned the empire’s tributary system into which SEA states were

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integrated. Both systems mixed soft and hard power but relied on strong ideological foundations to frame situations of vast diversity.

At the same time, SEATIDE research finds that European-style assimilation is not always an optimal strategy from the minorities’ point of view – involving losses of identity and culture – or even that of the state, for which the aspired-to national unity must always be more discursive than real.\(^99\) On the ground, the social realities of modern SEA are examined in terms of relations between nation-state and cultural region. They show conflicting trends. For minorities, transnational movements connect members of the same ethnic groups, even as the economic and social opportunities offered by nation-states in a globalised world exert strong attractions.

Two points emerge from this analysis of assimilation. One concerns the emergence of non-state nationalism. If it is true in many areas inhabited by ethnic or religious minorities that “post-colonial national governments are sometimes obsessed with the idea of control and inclusion of these territories and populations into the nation state dominated by the language and culture of the majority population”,\(^100\) this does not mean that minorities always lack options. Political mobilisations based on cultural regions and ethnic identities have been observed in the southern Philippines, pre-tsunami Aceh, many parts of Myanmar, Vietnam’s Central Highlands. If European experiences are any guide, inroads into the centrality of the state and progress in regional integration will vitalise the politics of autonomy and secession. Movements of self-exclusion from national frameworks are the unavoidable ‘other side of the coin’ of the assimilative model of nation-building.

The second point relates to a country where the assimilative nation-building project has manifestly failed: Myanmar. The current political transition presents risks and opportunities for state-minority relations. Among the risks, SEATIDE research suggests, is that democracy’s new responsiveness to local interests will unleash tensions – both intercommunal and non-state nationalist – that for decades have been dormant, repressed by military rule. This appears to have happened in the case of the Rohingya.

Yet the situation offers the opportunity that, in dialogue with the old assimilation model, a framework may be developed that will allow the peaceful integration of ethnic groups, the conservation of their identities and cultures, and their participation in political processes. Myanmar may become the site of an experiment in non-assimilative national integration. If Myanmar’s nationalism is to succeed, it must not be exclusively a political expression of ethnicity.

In this, it may seek inspiration from Malaysia, the site of a long-standing attempt to build a modern nationalism that is not based on the ethnic identity of the numerically and politically (but not economically) dominant ethnic group: the Malays. Introduced in 1991 Mahathir’s Vision 2020 included a scheme to create a ‘ Malaysian identity’ encompassing all ethnic groups in the country while not antagonising ‘Malay nationalism’, grounded in the primacy of the Malay language and Islam as the state religion. The result is a never-ending process of negotiation and balancing between two seemingly mutually exclusive concepts of nationalism: Malay versus Malaysian.

Negotiations in Myanmar will centre on giving real political and cultural autonomy to the ‘ethnic states’ which have existed for decades, though mostly on paper: Shan, Karen, Kachin, Mon, etc. This would imply central government acknowledgement of these groups as separate nations and legitimize their respective nationalisms. It would also imply acknowledgement by the federated states of their own ethnic and religious heterogeneity, to avoid situations like that of Rakhine and the tensions between majority Buddhists and minority Muslims there.

The challenge is to find a common idea, value or narrative that can hold Myanmar together and avoid antagonising the sensitivities of the majority Burmans. Part – but only part – of the solution might be Buddhism, which could serve as an integration tool among most ethnic groups.

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\(^99\) This issue is discussed in detail in *Ethnic and Religious Identities and Integration in Southeast Asia*, Volker Grabowsky & Ooi Keat Gin (eds), Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, forthcoming.

(Shan, Rakhine, many Karen, Mon) but not all. For the integration of non-Buddhists other ways must be explored. A regionalisation of neighbouring Thailand, with more autonomy granted to outer regions (such as Lan Na), might help to create larger regional entities (such as the Salween-Upper Mekong region) encompassing present-day nation-states and encouraging cooperation between Myanmar and her neighbours, particularly Thailand.

Whatever the solution adopted, it will require investment and support from its neighbours, ASEAN and the international community.

3.3. Regional integration: borders, transnationalism and connectivity

From the late 18th century, under the impetus of colonial rule, borders were created as principalities were absorbed into larger polities embracing multiple languages, ethnic groups and identities. Nations developed institutions, centralised administrations and promoted popular identification with the state through education, festivals, military service and law. Fixed borders and national territories became part of the ideological foundations of nationhood.

As a border project, the Long Wall of Quang Ngai was an exception that twice proved the SEA rule. First, it separated two ethnic groups: in modern SEA, state boundaries and linguistic, religious and ethnic groups rarely coincide. Second, it was a SEA construction: most of the region's linear borders were colonial. At the same time, analysis of the wall as apparatus reminds us that, even here, borders consist of more than just barriers and checkpoints. As sites of intersection between territory controlled by one regime and another, they are places where exchange, dialogue, trade and mobility develop in response to historical circumstances.

In the early decades of independence, the border was mainly construed in security terms. It was a militarised place on the periphery, remote in jungle or far out to sea, criss-crossed by refugees, smugglers, armed insurgents and other threatening marginals. Some of the refugees are still there, in camps along the Burma-Thailand border. But with this exception and that of the Rohingya boat people, SEA is no longer associated with refugees as it was in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. A security rethink took place after the end of the Cold War – with security framed now as 'secure with' rather than 'secure from' – and heralded a set of transformations in the border's role.

These transformations set the border at the heart of SEA's ambitions for regional integration. International development organisations, the ASEAN Community and SEA's powerful neighbours – especially China – increasingly recommend something called 'connectivity'. Connectivity means more capital, commodities (including electricity), people and information flowing freely across borders. The border is no longer conceived as a space for national security and smuggling. It is an arena for economic opportunity, a hub for the connection of economies, and a stage post on the road linking former frontiers to the global market.

The above paragraphs describe the border as it is officially constructed by nation-states' border policies. Alongside it, we must consider another narrative. We may call it a parallel story of SEA's borders, encapsulated in the image of 'under-the-bridge' cross-border traffic observed on the Thai-Burma border.\(^{101}\) This grassroots narrative of frontier travel interacts with the official narrative but has its own dynamics. Local Southeast Asians do and always have freely 'transgressed' the border. Some are doubtless unaware even of transgressing. More commonly, however – as case studies on several borders (Thailand-Myanmar, Laos-Vietnam, Malaysia-Indonesia on Borneo) show – people consciously navigate the structuring devices of national administrations, and cross in full knowledge of the resources available among the state-framed modernities existing on either side.

This grassroots narrative, moreover, describes vast quantities of SEA's transnational connections. Borders were laid down without respect to language, ethnicity or identity, nor paid attention historical the routes and practices of circulation and trade, and regional

\(^{101}\) As reported by Muhadi Sugiono, see section 2.7 above.
transnationalisms are by consequence many and varied. Global transnationalisms – entailing media connections with the Rohingya, Middle Eastern Islamic influences on Indonesian politics or education, to mention two examples – are similarly carried by grassroots conduits. Indeed, many official projects of transnational connectivity – Highway 9 linking Laos and Vietnam is an example – draw ancient grassroots networks into today’s official narrative of integration.

This example illustrates a fundamental dynamic of contemporary regional integration. At the Laos-Vietnam border at Lao Bao, the official narrative of the frontier has changed. A border that used to close two territories is now equipped with roads and special economic zones to assist connectivity between them. What we are observing is a realignment of the official narrative on the grassroots narrative. Today’s container trucks are the direct descendants of the Lao ox-cart and Bru Van-Kieu elephant caravans that crisscrossed the passes to the end of the 19th century. The colonial, Cold War and nation-building periods turn out to be a historical anomaly, a 20th-century hiatus when the roads were closed.

Not all were closed, of course. The colonial period saw the region divided into territories ruled by half a dozen European powers, with few links between them but strong ties to a metropolitan power and its colonies in China, India and elsewhere. An unprecedented Asian ‘age of mobility’ from the late 19th century thus created individual men and families with meaningful ties in multiple locations. The movement stopped on independence, as SEA divided along Cold War lines and border barriers rose as its nations – and their guarantor, the ASEAN regional project – came into being. Meanwhile the 21st century is seeing its own ‘age of migration’, a more feminised one, placing new demands on family life, as official barriers are removed, state borders are losing their function as physical and mental barriers, and the region becomes increasingly borderless.

This account links past and future in a celebration of SEA as unbounded space. But celebration may be premature if the project fails to account for the fact that borders are not only barriers, but also consist of knowledge, surveillance, dialogue, trade, ideological frameworks, legal systems and other instruments. Consider the ID card, and the use in Thailand of this artefact of citizenship to facilitate integration, but also to exclude minorities. Or the vulnerabilities of legal passport- and contract-holder (‘on-the-bridge’) migrant workers from Indonesia to Malaysia. If diplomatic missions do not uphold the rights of citizens working abroad, then boundaries between nations still exist despite the disappearance of borders.

SEA’s unbounded space thus raises a question of regulation. Colonial-era mobility was assisted by transnational conduits of imperial legal regulation, but the region’s current age of migration is bereft of such frameworks. Unregulated travel, particularly travel for work, is not free travel and poses risks for human security. This is a key interface between SEATIDE’s two types of integration: political and grassroots. To provide security for grassroots integration, political integration must create instruments to flatten distinctions between national territories. The ASEAN Community acknowledges this, but is far from achieving it. Until it does, the celebration of a borderless SEA will continue to enliven official integration discourse, grassroots integration will continue to develop, and migrants will continue to move and work at considerable personal risk.

These unspectacular developments in the conception and use of borders shape the long-term evolution of SEA’s integration and impact on many members of its population. For many observers, however, they are obscured by the geopolitical theatrics of the border dispute in the South China Sea.

This is not to downplay the concerns raised by China’s claims in these waters: the sea is part of a shipping lane that passes through other maritime areas and connects the region with the rest of the world: only four SEA states are directly involved (Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, Vietnam), but countries such as Indonesia, Singapore, Japan, the USA and EU member states all have a strategic interest. Geopolitically, the sea has become the site of a contest between China and the

\[102\] The terms ‘age of mobility’ and ‘age of migration’ are Natasha Pairaudeau’s from her forthcoming article, ‘The legal regulation of Asian migrant family life in colonial Cochinchina’, for submission to Sojourn.
US, a manifestation of China’s growing awareness of its dependence on a maritime connectivity hitherto secured by American naval power, and a dimension of China’s expansion of supremacy in its ‘backyard’. It has also had the effect of revealing the weakness of ASEAN regional cooperation.

At the same time, the exclusive focus of international and ASEAN attention on this particular sea is made to the detriment of both other seas in SEA and the region’s maritime sphere as a whole. Issues are neglected – including maritime security in the Malacca Strait and the challenge of piracy; the development of the eastern sector of SEA’s maritime region (eastern Indonesia and Philippines); and the construction of a regulatory framework that will govern SEA’s increasingly integrated regional space to the benefit of its travelling citizens.

3.4. Prosperity: mobility, gender and a new moral economy of work

One of the aims of an integrated, borderless SEA is prosperity. The city centres of contemporary SEA are already remarkable for their prosperity and its consumption by a middle class that is growing in numbers, confidence and political significance. But questions arise over the inclusiveness of the new prosperity. These were addressed by SEATIDE in research focused on people whose labour creates the region’s wealth. The study of mobility and its relationship to work served as an analytical tool allowing close examination of the human dimensions of SEA’s economic integration.

The research started from the idea that the quest for prosperity through mobility to obtain work is a positive, creative drive for self-improvement and social transformation. At the same time, this quest leads people to interact with local, national or global orders that affect people’s exclusion from the prosperity they were seeking. The research shows that these exclusions are not just temporary side-effects of mobility and integration into world economic and social systems, but are often a permanent consequence of it.

The type of mobility studied was small-scale. SEATIDE did examine transnational mobility, but looked mainly at near-to-home, to-and-fro types of movement that do not count as migration, and might be seen by long-distance migrants as forms of immobility. Amid the wide differences in work systems that exist across the region, the focus on short distances was adopted in an attempt to gain a sense of work normality as experienced in contemporary SEA.

The case studies show that work is gendered and gendering. Local gender roles are not swept away on a tide of globalisation, but are reworked to comply with the demands of modernity. This was observed at the construction sites and mines of Indonesia. These are male spaces where illicit behaviour (alcohol, drugs, paid sex), high personal risk and dreams of fast money articulate a masculinity which is external or parallel to homes and parenthood, suspended from the expected norms of adult life.

In Hanoi’s electronics industry, meanwhile, operators embody a new femininity: the young body exists for intensive work, not reproduction. Working mothers in industrial parks find their own childcare solutions, like their mothers’ migration to the factory hamlets. Conversely, the informal environment of Bangkok’s slums is dangerous, yet enables women who cannot get wage work to earn a living (as vendors, recyclers) and – for some at least – to live with their husband and children. Migrant girls working as laundry employees in Banda Aceh, on their side, are seen as perpetual children to be lodged, guarded and poorly paid. Islam plays a role in structuring these infantilised lives, although exchanges of information embolden individuals to make unexpected moves: overseas migration, quick marriage, second wife status or drug-dealing.

Contemporary SEA men and women must do paid work and the working couple is a trope in official discourses of modernity throughout the region. Yet this remains a middle class ideal to

103 This issue of SEA’s middle classes and their political significance was addressed in SEATIDE EEAS Southeast Asia Briefing 2 on ‘The Emerging Middle-Class and Democratisation in SEA’, EEAS, Brussels, 12 May 2015.
which unskilled labour is increasingly unable to aspire. And no hierarchical distinction is made between the ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ sectors: on this count, slum dwellers fare better than contract holders, as they can plan a more integrated life. Migrant workers enter spaces where marriage, health and personal security pertain to other universes: the homes, villages and kinship ties that they have left behind. Deeply gender-insensitive, SEA's integration brings separation of men from women and long-term exclusions from family life.

The practice of mobility operates other exclusions. SEATIDE research records migrants leaving village environments to seek cash, noting that when they leave, they neither sever themselves from home nor resettle away, but live instead suspended in a precarious condition. This option is particularly attractive for migrants to proximate destinations, which offer the illusion of safer spaces than those reached along long-distance transnational routes.

Some – like the Cambodians making the short illegal crossing into Thailand to work in agribusiness – leave as circular migrants, intending to return. However, this does not mean that they do go back to their home village: migration is leading Cambodians to adopt new habits of marriage, which finally settle them elsewhere, modifying traditional matrilocal practices. In Thailand, political marginalisation and criminalisation forces the Lua ethnic group to enter unsafe employment by agribusiness companies. Others sign contracts that set them at the heart of ‘best practice’ globalised labour relations at Thang Long Industrial Park, yet trap them into a non-urban/non-rural situation centred on functional dormitories and the prospect, ten years later, of a return to the farm. With the pace of land-use transformation in Vietnam’s rural areas, however, the farm is often no longer there: the land has been turned into a factory.

In the archipelago, these trends take on variant configurations. The Javanese construction workers studied by SEATIDE are urban-to-urban movers, a human commodity allocated where needed by brokers of work. As they travel, they complain about their job – dangerous, precarious, tiring and ill-paid. Former Acehnese miners react differently to the challenge of mobility: they handle their movement around the region and across the Straits to Malaysia in a historical way, voicing the idea of merantau that defines males as wandering. Young Acehnese women displaced by catastrophe cannot adjust to rural life and seek solutions in town, where they find low-paid jobs, illegal activities or unplanned pregnancies: they handle all these through and in mobility. Local traditions adapt quickly to new social realities: the traditional Indonesian idea of migration as a source of knowledge and income for men – “I want to have an experience” – has now become a motto for moving women as well.

The studies show that small-scale mobility has become a stable, generalised condition throughout the region and not a phase to pass through before attaining a more prosperous way of life. The culture of permanent mobility is experimental but also socially acceptable. The idea of living ‘on the go’, impermanently, for at least part of the year, or for a big part of one’s life, is now important feature of SEA modernity. It is SEA’s precarious new sojourning.

Living in this suspended way is now an option for many. What does this mean for SEA’s future? If we regard an integrated society as a landscape of healthy and safe working families, when we encounter situations where danger and dislocation are structural, we must see those situations as marginal. As the borders lose their peripherality, new types of margin are emerging in peri-urban areas and other connected places where mobile people travel to work. By promoting the suspension-creating type of mobility, integration has been creating exclusions – and in the long term these will deeply dislocate social and family life.

In SEA’s villages, meanwhile, poverty has been reduced. But a new function is now added to their role as producers of farm products: villages have become providers of young workers for ‘integration’ and – in some countries – of the welfare resources that states and companies have decided not to afford. As SEA’s industrialisation proceeds, different phases are observed in different places: in Vietnam, the employment model operated by firms and authorised by the state fails to invest in the creation of an industrial civilisation, while in Thailand that civilisation is created in some places, not in others. Villages thus assume responsibility for the work and well-
being of the ex-workers after they turn thirty and their stint as integrated subjects ends. For the idea that village communities are automatically enriched by industrialisation, empirical evidence is found wanting.

Workers complain, but not in these terms. Conversations across the region reveal little concern with the difference between contractualised employment and informal work. They distinguish, rather, between jobs which enable them to act in moral compliance with their society and those which do not. There is something more than hypocritical correctness when jobseekers, in Aceh, say they would accept any job “as long as it is not impure” (asal halal).

The amount people are paid is relevant in this ‘moral economy of work’. Workers feel they have no real ties when their wage does not allow them to live decently. They know they are commodified, bought and sold. Whether or not this leads them to increase their income through illegal activities, bad work and low pay is another form of marginality and suspended living. It contains multiple risks, for the individual and for society. And yet, while all agree that it is immoral and unacceptable to treat workers badly, throughout SEA a vast array of jobs exist only because they are very poorly paid and there are people willing to come and do them.

3.5. Knowledge: flows of technology, models of development and the environment

It is on these jobs, moreover, that SEA’s current quest for prosperity through global integration is founded: the factories are here because labour is cheap. SEATIDE’s findings form the basis for a new understanding of the ‘middle income trap’ identified as limiting SEA’s economic growth. Doubts about the current arrangements’ ability to improve livelihoods lead to a questioning of the models adopted for the region’s development and integration into the global economy.

Analysis of thirty years of SEA’s inclusion in the regional production system suggests that outcomes are less positive than expected. Most SEA countries have achieved industrialisation, but production remains confined in low-value adding operations, relying on cheap labour as the competitive factor. Urban jobs are created for rural people and absolute poverty is reduced. But the reliance on export-led and foreign-invested industry puts pressure on labour in terms of salary, welfare and rights. Why is this?

A prevailing view argues that integration in the Japan-led regional production system allowed industrial development and technology diffusion in East Asia, while SEA’s failure to benefit is ascribed to national blockages defined as a lack of market reforms. This view is promoted by the World Bank and mainstream economists as the ‘middle-income trap’, a key concept in the neoliberal development paradigm since 2008. SEATIDE research counters this, showing that the first wave of inclusion in the regional system allowed South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore to receive technology transfer, while the second wave since the 1980s took place in a less generous international environment. FDI flows became a substitute, not a facilitator of technology transfer. Integration operated at the level of capital and merchandise, but the flow of knowledge was blocked: foreign firms organised their production to prevent technology spillover.

Empirically, this was studied at the new ‘frontier’ of the regional division of labour, Vietnam. This country is emerging as a manufacturing hub in electronics and garments that benefits from rising labour costs in China (where state-led industrial policy is pushing firms to invest in technology-intensive production). But at the grassroots, integration has resulted in new exclusions: in labour-intensive production skills are low, so workers are easily replaced; low wages push them into a restless search for better jobs; industrial employment is a temporary phase in a person’s life trajectory. This contrasts with Thailand and Malaysia in the years before the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, where movement to industry and urban life was permanent and inclusive, and led to the formation of an industrial civilisation.

The Vietnamese case may indicate that the regional division of labour – in line with world

105 This is how Silvia Vignato frames the findings of this strand of SEATIDE’s research – see her thematic report, ‘The Unexpected Consequences of SEA Integration: Structural Marginalities and Original Solutions in Mobility, Work and Life Planning’, http://www.seatide.eu/?content=activitiesandresults&group=2.
trends, including in EU countries – is placing stronger pressure on labour. Ultimately this model of global integration and industrial development allows an escape from poverty neither to the young industrial workers nor to the countries which rely on it to catch up with more economically advanced economies. For this reason, the term ‘uneven development trap’ is preferred to ‘middle income trap’.

This term acknowledges the fact that, by excluding SEA from global flows of technical knowledge, the current model structurally inhibits the region’s development.

Models and notions of development and the environment were investigated by SEATIDE as arenas for economic competition and political contestation. Taking grassroots perspectives on interactions between local actors, the state and global forces, research showed how models and paradigms are used by elites to promote, inhibit or channel flows of technical knowledge, and how these ideas are contested.

In the Philippines, the effects of integration into global trade regimes on its shoe industry were revealed in Marikina: a weakened domestic sector with increasingly informal labour relations. This is not news to many in the Philippines, where there is a long tradition of challenging the neoliberal development paradigm, led by social movements supported by local and transnational alliances. Coordinated protests contested the hegemony of neoliberalism in areas like agrarian reform, market liberalisation, and privatisation. Some gains were made, but overall success was hampered by the movement’s inability to provide a coherent alternative paradigm, and by its political marginalisation. Local elites retained their dominance in country’s political economy, making no concession that would compromise the hegemony of the neoliberal model.

In Thailand, an alternative paradigm did emerge. After the Asian Financial Crisis, the king’s idea of a ‘sufficiency economy’ rose to hegemonic position, allowing the state to co-opt ‘radical’ activist networks and promote new models of natural resource management. Research into one such network – the eco-Buddhist movement in northern Thailand, now allied with the state – shows how the battle of ideas continued to rage at local levels. In the implementation of a royal project to restore the Nan River’s hydro-geological balance, ethnic minority farmers became targets of a new moralised vision of rural landscape: not surprisingly, they resented and resisted the Buddhist ecological paradigm prescribed by the state and allied movements.

Comparison of the Philippines and Thailand brings these threads together with a focus on the dynamics of contestation over modern agricultural biotechnology. While both countries were eager biotech pioneers in the mid-1990s, the Asian Financial Crisis undermined faith in ‘globalisation’ in Thailand, but not in the Philippines, and this undermined support for GM crops. In Thailand, the new ‘sufficiency’ paradigm became the keystone of official economic nationalism, and NGOs opposed to the gene revolution forged alliances with state actors to halt the (official) commercialisation of biotech crops. In the Philippines, opponents of GMOs were never able to challenge the dominance of the pre-crisis developmental paradigm, according to which globalisation and technology were seen as boon rather than bane for the country’s farmers.

The model is Pietro Masina’s – see section 2.2 above.


These models also intrude on the prerogatives of SEA’s states. Indeed, the era of integration is a period of challenge from many quarters to the self-confidence and centrality of SEA’s states.
With the World Bank and IMF development models, moreover, the intrusion is permitted—sometimes welcomed—by political elites. In other cases, challenges are met with resignation or resistance. SEATIDE research identified several quarters from which they came.

The neoliberal paradigm’s influence is rising across the region. Since SEA nations joined the World Trade Organisation, Singapore and Vietnam have concluded Free Trade Agreements with the European Union, the Trans-Pacific Partnership has entered its final negotiating stages and other regimes of trade liberalisation and economic integration will follow. These reduce state centrality directly, in ways laid down in the respective agreements, and indirectly, in ways that include the legitimation of state withdrawal from welfare provision and the creation of marginalised workforces, as noted above.

Regional powers, especially China, also challenge the centrality of the SEA state. This is dramatically illustrated by research on the Myitsone dam, where the local conflict of nationalisms (Burmese/Kachin) provoked by the project led Myanmar to rethink its reaction to its resource-hungry neighbour’s intrusions, pivoting from resignation to resistance. This is one example of Chinese ‘one belt, one road’-type projects for regional integration. Its overseas development model is based on exchanging resource extraction for infrastructural investment and non-interference in domestic politics, but the rising superpower’s sway is such that while non-interference is formally respected, such exchanges have tangible political impacts. No SEA state today can afford not to take China into account.

With investment in the transport sector, Chinese infrastructural projects make additional inroads. Roads, railways and airports carry Chinese development aid and public investment, but are also used by Chinese visitors, settlers and businesspeople—economic actors with no link to the Chinese state, whose impact is all the greater for their apparent political irrelevance. This grassroots integration process is manifest in Laos, and there are signs of its extending further south. SEATIDE research found that “the economic activeness and activity of Chinese small businesses and traders in Laos enables China to stretch its ‘state-space’ into the everyday lives and activities of Laotians. While Chinese entrepreneurs and petty traders act as economic agents creating new power dynamics and linkages, they also unintentionally become instrumental for China to negotiate its ‘state-space’ and power deep into SEA without making any territorial claims.”

China’s proximity means that the development of grassroots regional connectivities have deep political implications for the region’s states.

The state’s centrality is challenged too from within: from non-state nationalisms, localised transnational forces and sub-regional centres. Internal disputes make up the majority of the region’s live conflicts, in the southern Philippines, southern Thailand and Burma. In the era of integration, the capacity of local forces to challenge the state or to carve out spaces of autonomy is strong, as several SEATIDE studies record. In Burma, ethnic groups (Rohingya, Kachin) make skilful use of global resources. In Laos, officials in border provinces (Phongsaly, Luang Namtha) develop transnational linkages in their own interests, not those of the state.

These are examples of a tug-of-war between national policy, sub-regional centres and transnational influences that shows no sign of diminishing. The Lao state’s vulnerability is well-known, yet its neighbour Thailand is a spectacular case of democracy collapse: a decade of stand-offs between urban elites and rural electorates was followed in 2014 by a military coup and protracted constitutional crisis. The two cases are extremes in a matrix of the challenged present-day SEA state: weak capacity, cautious decision-making and authoritarian reflexes.

In the era of integration, state logics are no longer the only logics. The state is no longer the only player—and the other players’ moves amount to something that resembles what we call

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108 This was the theme of EEAS Southeast Asia Briefing 3, ‘The Crisis in Thailand in Long-term Perspective’, Brussels, 18 February 2016.

109 This was the theme of EEAS Southeast Asia Briefing 2, ‘The Emerging Middle-Class and Democratisation in Southeast Asia’, Brussels, 12 May 2015
‘integration’. Yet the state, for all its vulnerabilities, remains the dominant player. It is influential and often highly intrusive in the lives of ordinary Southeast Asians, challenged yet unassailable, and still enjoying unstinting support from the structure it created to protect itself: ASEAN. From many of SEATIDE’s case studies emerges a sense of integration’s challenge to the centrality of the state – along with the persistence of state centrality.

This has implications for the political construction of regional integration which – if frameworks are to be meaningful in their enactment – requires the participation of strong, self-confident and politically inclusive member states. Unfortunately, the low level of inclusion of much of SEA’s people in the national political process and their vulnerability to authoritarianism means that the era of integration is also the era of integration without participation.

On the frontline of these regional implications is ASEAN, a regional body founded in the context of the Cold War to facilitate problem-solving dialogue between member states and thus avert intervention by outside powers. As its principle of non-interference indicates, ASEAN was built to uphold the national framework – not to operate as a supranational engine of integration.

Yet it is precisely this institutional role that ASEAN is now asked to take up, with its latest manifestation the ASEAN Community and its three ‘pillars’ holding up the roof of a regional cooperation project involving political and security engagement (political-security pillar), a single market with circulation of goods, services, capital and labour (economic pillar), and a platform of social, cultural, educational and environmental aims (socio-cultural pillar).

In line with its informal dialogue-based style (‘ASEAN Way’), it has already shown a capacity for pragmatic response (‘flexibility’) to the realities of global and transnational integration and the challenges these present for SEA’s nations. Yet until it develops new core values reflecting its new mission in the 21st-century context, it remains a body that was designed to frame nationalism that must now frame regional integration. This is the ASEAN integration conundrum, and how it plays out over the coming years will determine the success – or rather the quality – of political integration in SEA.

That quality can only be measured at the grassroots. Resolving the ASEAN integration conundrum means adding to the existing mission of safeguarding the security of states a new mission of safeguarding the security of humans (becoming ‘People-Oriented, People-Centred’). The new mission will have to be equipped with ideals about people’s welfare and with the capacity to achieve results. But this is a conundrum: placing human security at the ASEAN Community’s core contradicts the framing principle of non-interference. Even resolving it at the rhetorical level will be hard. The rhetoric can only be done with a fudge using notions like ‘flexibility’. Flexibility is of course a euphemism for divergence from the nationalist framing principle, and cannot serve to reduce the ideals deficit in SEA’s regional integration project.

SEATIDE research throws light onto specific areas of the ASEAN framework, where future thought and construction efforts could usefully be deployed. These areas share a common factor: all founder on the shoals of the ASEAN integration conundrum.

With regard to migration, research identified areas where forms of grassroots integration are already taking place but no regional framework exists to regulate them. This was observed among transnational migrant workers, observed as effectively stateless after crossing a border, despite doing so in full legality, with passports, work permits and labour contracts. The failure here lies, first and foremost, with ASEAN’s nations, whose states have not developed the will or capacity to protect their citizens when outside the national territory. Yet the lack of a regional framework setting standards for migrant labour means that human security is jeopardised.

The lack of a regional framework is similarly regretted in the case of refugees. This applies to the Rohingya boat people, for whom the regional response was slow, and to the extended crisis on Thailand’s land border with Burma, where registration and day-to-day management of refugees lacks is done by different agencies, without the unifying policy that a regional approach would offer. Yet in these cases, weaknesses within the nations concerned inhibit resolution.
Neither Thailand nor Burma have the capacity to offer citizenship to all their inhabitants: any ASEAN framework on statelessness and refugees would have to address this issue, possesses relevant instruments that could allow it to do, and yet it cannot, owing to the principle of non-interference.\textsuperscript{110}

As for regional disputes, the inadequacy of ASEAN’s response to the bilateral Preah Vihear issue, and its inability to forge regional unity over the more complex issue of China’s actions in the South China Sea are also raised. A multilateral approach to the maritime dispute was inhibited after member states prioritised national interests – bilateral ties with China – over the regional framework.\textsuperscript{111} Over Preah Vihear, politicians’ nationalist rhetoric for domestic audiences blocked dialogue. This finding is confirmed in other contexts by research identifying domestic politics as a significant factor in the resolution of intra-regional disputes and suggesting that, by reducing the traction of nationalism, a common regional identity could help strengthen regional security.

Obstacles to regional framework-building initiatives are thus placed by the member states themselves. These obstacles, moreover, owe much to states’ economic and geopolitical vulnerabilities, as the above cases suggest. Research shows that, in the light of these realities and of challenges to state centrality, to assign the task of building a political framework for the region to ASEAN – a small body designed for other tasks – is to ask a great deal. This does not mean that it should not be attempted, only that expectations for the early delivery of concrete results cannot be high.

To judge ASEAN, however, solely on the basis of its delivery of concrete results would be to miss the regional organisation’s main strength. ASEAN is already delivering something more intangible but no less valuable: through joint statements at diplomatic meetings or by offering a focus for “ASEAN feeling” among ordinary Southeast Asians, it offers a sense of SEA identity. For Muhadi Sugiono, “ASEAN has been instrumental in making the region more dynamic and more visible. It has been relatively successful in politically constructing the region in ways that reflect the notion of an ASEAN community. This notion most clearly represents conceptions among ASEAN’s leaders of Southeast Asia being a single political, economic and social space.”\textsuperscript{112}

The ASEAN framework is not the whole story or only narrative of integration in the region – and demonstrating the relevance of the grassroots is one of SEATIDE’s aims. ASEAN's role in the construction of a SEA identity is a essential part of the region’s future integration at the grassroots level.

### 3.7. Southeast Asia and the integration/exclusion nexus

In a study\textsuperscript{113} of preparations for the European Union’s 2005 eastward expansion, the term ‘integration/exclusion nexus’ was coined to describe a temptation observed in the EU to use exclusionary rhetoric against Russia to ease the inclusion of central European states. It noted that this – “the EU’s supranational temptation” – represented a borrowing from nationalism, the strengthening of one identity through the exclusion of others.

This idea, that integration is relational, and by definition involves exclusions, is similar to the one – described in section 1.3 above – that SEATIDE used to guide its research. The results allow us to extend the application of the term ‘integration/exclusion nexus’ beyond the

\textsuperscript{110} Muhadi Sugiono, ‘ASEAN and Statelessness in Southeast Asian’, presented to Research Workshop 2, Hanoi, 3-5 February, 2015; Muhadi Sugiono, ‘ASEAN and Statelessness in Southeast Asian’, forthcoming in Regions and Cohesion, special issue on ‘Human Security and Regional Cohesion in Southeast Asia’ (Muhadi Sugiono, ed.).


construction of regional political frameworks to some of the other forms of integration investigated by the project and reported on the above pages.

We observed **suspension-type exclusions** resulting from integration, when the options of people working in the mainstream globally-integrated sector, like peri-urban Vietnam’s electronics and garment industries, require men and women to live apart, and workers to leave the village without any prospect of settling somewhere else.

We saw **displacement-type exclusions**, whereby development negatively impacts on people living and working on land required for the project: the *kampong* inhabitants of land used to build coastal residences on Penang, the shopkeepers at the Densavanh rest-stop on Highway 9 between Laos and Vietnam where the vehicles no longer stop.

We studied **environment-type exclusions** resulting from economic integration, as when the pollution arising from the development of Indonesian cities such as Balikpapan reduced local communities’ access to mangroves and other natural resources; or when integration processes had contradictory impacts on the same land, with the simultaneous promotion of export-oriented industrial agriculture and eco-Buddhist conservation policy in the landscape of Thailand’s Nan province; or when Kachins saw land loss associated with the Myitsone dam as an existential threat to their nation.

There are **assimilation-type exclusions** stemming from attempts to link cultural integration with administrative integration. Thailand’s highlanders policy made administrative inclusion (citizenship) dependent on cultural assimilation, but in some cases achieved neither. In Myanmar, meanwhile, failure to make a place for Rohingyas in the national framework ultimately had disastrous consequences. The majority/minority model of national integration followed on SEA’s mainland is particularly liable to cause this form of exclusion.

The integration/exclusion nexus takes these and other forms. Each has its own consequences, some unforeseen, some measurable. Each is the result of choices, usually linked to a development model, government policy or administrative decision – or combination of these. Some of these exclusions are the normal and necessary result of social and economic transformation – like the shopkeepers on Highway 9 – and one may only hope that new opportunities arise from development that compensates the loss of original livelihood. But it is important to stress that few of these situations of integration/exclusion are either inevitable or neutral: other choices could have been made but, for many reasons, were not.

The integration/exclusion nexus is not the only narrative of integration in SEA: indeed, it stands as a counter-narrative to a global integration discourse that exerts considerable power in the region today. Promoted by international development organisations, this discourse favours pro-growth and inclusive policies on condition that the global economic integration agenda is not questioned. Unfortunately, as much of this research shows, processes of exclusion often result from policies, such as trade liberalisation, that the prevailing discourse says should be part of the solution.

The many forms of the integration/exclusion nexus is the main finding of SEATIDE research, but the project has achieved more than this. The multidisciplinary work done by fifty researchers with deep knowledge of the region has produced a new view of SEA, a portrait made at a particular point of time, which scholars and other practitioners of the region will recognise as pioneering. SEA has changed immensely over past quarter century, the pace of its transformation has been breath-taking, and SEATIDE offers a new updated vision.

This change is especially striking when viewed from the grassroots. People no longer live where they are and no longer stay where they were. Mobility and migration are the new norm. New types of space are emerging that are neither rural nor urban. The village is now the place you grew up in – and may return to, or maybe not. And if a factory has not been built on its land, the new SEA farm may be planted with rice, papaya and other crops grown from first Green Revolution grains or from second Green Revolution seed bought on the global GMO market.

SEA’s borders were never very relevant to people who lived near them, but as barriers and
ideological framing devices they appeared mighty and meaningful to the rest of the population. This is no longer true. Crossing SEA’s borders in the post-Cold War era of integration continues to entail risk, but has become part of normal life for ordinary Southeast Asians, both under-the-bridge and on-the-bridge.

The grassroots perspective similarly highlights the dysfunctional, challenged yet dominant presence of the state, the lasting power of allegiances to cultural regions and minority identities, and SEA’s unending openness to transformations driven by foreign ideas and external powers. These continuities manifest themselves at the local level, which gives the grassroots level of analysis adopted across the region by SEATIDE’s researchers its relevance and perceptiveness of insight. At the same time, new social and economic forms are coming into being, new modes of work, ways of moving, types of connection and interaction, many of them operated by grassroots actors without reference to political frameworks.

Scholars working in SEA Studies keep up with many of these trends. What the joint EU and SEA research effort mobilised by SEATIDE has achieved collectively is a new panorama, a historically informed, empirically grounded and thematically focused vision of 21st century SEA. Through a multidimensional portrayal of the integration/exclusion nexus in the areas of diversity, prosperity, knowledge and security, it has shown – from Kachin State to Marikina City, from Surabaya to Phongsaly – how grassroots integration is an inescapable part of SEA modernity and how the formal structures of political integration increasingly struggle to frame it.
PART 4. RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 The foundations of federalism in Myanmar. As it negotiates a viable framework for peace, the challenge faced by Myanmar is not primarily a matter of politics, as goodwill exists for the new democratic government among the country’s ethnic groups, as well as a desire for settlement. It is rather a matter of political science, as it centres on the identification of a non-assimilative model for Burmese nationalism to replace the moribund Burman-centred framework of past decades. For this, the social sciences are relevant: research on historical and contemporary contexts of federalism in SEA and elsewhere is needed to provide Myanmar with resources to develop the necessary foundations for a compromise framework.

(See above, section 3.2. Diversity: national integration and the question of assimilation)

4.2 Regulating regional connectivity and transnational circulation. The increasingly unbounded space created by SEA’s regional integration and its increasing use by non-state actors in integration processes raises the question of regulation. SEA’s current connectivity and transnational circulation is bereft of the regulatory frameworks necessary to reduce risks posed to the safety of travelling citizens, environmental hazards posed by unfettered resource exploitation, etc. Up to now, ASEAN member states have preferred to adopt bilateral solutions to transnational problems. However, certain issues – drug smuggling, human trafficking, haze, terrorism, river management – cannot be dealt with bilaterally. We recommend that, to provide security for grassroots integration, agencies of political integration – that may mean ASEAN but could also be other bodies – create specific multilateral regulatory instruments and legal frameworks that bridge national differences and embrace grassroots participation.

(See above, section 3.3. Regional integration: borders, transnationalism and connectivity)

4.3 Welfare for women. As SEA countries experience different phases and models of industrialisation, it is vital that systems of welfare are developed to enable workers to plan various moments in their lives without further burdening traditional settings. This is particularly important for women, for whom modernity has brought not fewer but more burdens and challenged, linked to the precarity of their lives, particularly during child-bearing years. Individual rights to health and safe self-determined sexuality are particularly necessary for women, regardless of their residence and working status.

(See above, section 3.4. Prosperity: mobility, gender and a new moral economy of work)

4.4 Decentralised models of development. SEA countries differ in the capability of their institutions to promote the adoption and production of knowledge and technologies to provide a basis for environmentally sustainable and economically inclusive models of development. The EU and international organisations have historically played an important role in efforts to strengthen such capabilities at regional, national, and local levels across SEA, and they should continue to do so. But they need to be designed with the risks of elite capture in mind, and emphasis should therefore be placed on the search for models that are as decentralised as possible and built around diverse knowledge networks.

(See above, section 3.5. Knowledge: flows of technology, models of development and the environment)

4.5 ASEAN and nationalism. The centrality of the nation-state drove integration in SEA after independence, but in recent years has become increasingly at odds with the region’s dynamics of integration. Many problems between states require multilateral solutions, but the emphasis on national sovereignty makes such solutions hard to achieve. As for SEA’s people, the ‘ASEAN integration conundrum’ has prevented ASEAN from benefiting them. Many Southeast Asians are disadvantaged as a result of integration. ASEAN can play an effective role in framing SEA’s security and prosperity in future processes of ever-increasing integration. Awareness is growing among SEA elites that the time has come for ASEAN to redefine its relationship with nationalism. We recommend that the next step in this redefinition be taken through practical measures to strengthen ASEAN member states’ commitment to the notion of responsibility to protect as an international norm within the idea of national sovereignty.
4.6 Refugees (Thailand, Myanmar). Regarding refugees located on the Thai-Burma border, SEATIDE researchers recommend that the EU and international community call for 1) the wishes of individual refugees be respected regarding repatriation; 2) the education system in the camps be accredited by the Myanmar and Thailand Ministries of Education; and 3) that a ‘participatory development’ approach be substituted for the current humanitarian approach, to make best use of the human potential on the border.


4.7 Natural Resources in the Mekong Region. Regarding community access to natural resources in Thailand and other countries of the Mekong Region (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam), SEATIDE researchers recommend that the EU and international community play a more active role in monitoring the problem of human rights, supporting environmental conservation and environmental justice, as well as strengthening local communities and the legal measures needed to deal with China’s investment in the region.

(See Policy Brief, ‘Natural Resources Management and Agriculture in Border Areas: Northern Thailand and the Mekong Region’, by Amalia Rossi).

4.8 Political intelligence. The risks presented by SEA’s diversity, highlighted by the Preah Vihear dispute and Rohingya refugee crisis, lead SEATIDE researchers to recommend that the EU and international community invest in gathering political intelligence and analysis of ‘thick contexts’. Misunderstandings arise from nationalist and other discourses that conceal communal frictions and lingering grievances with a basis in local politics and history. They should be countered on the basis of local political and historical knowledge, best obtained through increased academic cooperation in research.

(See Policy Brief, ‘Dilemmas of Diversity in Southeast Asia’, by Jacques Leider).

4.9 Maritime security and economic development. The South China Sea dispute has impacted negatively on SEA in recent years, partly as a rule-based solution remains elusive, partly for the weaknesses it has revealed in ASEAN, and partly because it detracts from other maritime areas. Promotion of the capacity of SEA states to manage their waters is a region-wide priority. So too is the development of regional and local maritime connectivity. Effective promotion of these priorities will benefit human security in the region, through reduction in piracy, human trafficking, smuggling and refugees, and through increases in legal forms of circulation. This progress in human security will have a significant knock-on effect on security between states.


4.10 SEA research networking. Since the Cold War, academic institutions and research have been central to the emergence of the idea of SEA. But too often this has taken the form of conceptualisations of the region from outside. The scholarly landscape has changed dramatically in recent decades, with the emergence of SEA Studies and the growing circulation of academics. What is needed now are new scholarly alliances between the EU and SEA that reflect this new architecture and fresh research agendas. Indeed, this has been a central goal of SEATIDE, with its field-based, bottom-up methodology, close partners in SEA and sustained dialogue with EU institutions. At the level of policy, a framework needs to be developed to place these arrangements on a more sustainable footing.
APPENDIX 1 – SEATIDE PUBLICATIONS

Online Papers
Available at http://www.seatide.eu/?content=activitiesandresults&group=3


3. Volker Grabowsky, ‘Heritage and Nationalism in the Preah Vihear Dispute’ (response by Sok Udom Deth: ‘Voices from Cambodia: Discourses on the Preah Vihear Conflict’).


10. Michael J. Montesano, ‘Praetorianism and ‘the People’ in Late-Bhumibol Thailand’.


Policy Briefs
Available at http://www.seatide.eu/?content=activitiesandresults&group=4

Jacques Leider, ‘Dilemmas of Diversity in Southeast Asia’.

Amalia Rossi, ‘Natural and Human Resources in border areas: Northern Thailand and the Mekong Sub-Region’.


Muhadi Sugiono, ‘Maritime Southeast Asia & Regional Integration: Potential and Challenges’.


Matteo C. Alcano & Runa Lazzarino, ‘Gender and Mobility: Displacements, Borders, Social Values’.


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Thematic Reports
Available at [http://www.seatide.eu/?content=activitiesandresults&group=2](http://www.seatide.eu/?content=activitiesandresults&group=2).

Silvia Vignato, ‘The Unexpected Consequences of SE A Integration: Structural Marginalities and Original Solutions in Mobility, Work and Life Planning’.

Tim Harper, ‘The Place of Knowledge and the State of Knowledge in Southeast Asia’.

Thematic Publications
Three books are forthcoming at Silkworm Books, Chiang Mai: the first was submitted to the publisher in February 2016; the other two are currently at review and production stage respectively. Special issues are in production for publication in the journals Regions and Cohesion and Sojourn.


Part I – Ethnicity and Identities
Amalia Rossi, ‘Lua resettled Communities in Northern Thailand: Between Ethnic Disintegration and National Integration’.

Part II – Religion and Identities
Rémy Madinier, ‘The Refreshing Paradoxes of Indonesian Political Islam’.
Chris Joll, ‘Thailand’s Muslim mosaic between Central Plains and Far south: Perspectives from the Sufi margins’.

Part III – Integration and Identities
Ooi Keat Gin, ‘Separatism from Within and Without: Penang’s Colonial Experience, 1786–1941’.
Volker Grabowsky, ‘Heritage and Nationalism in the Preah Vihear Dispute’.
Pantipa Chuenchat, ‘Regional Identities Challenging National Integration: Hero Cults in Lan Na (Northern Thailand)’.

*Work, Access to Work and the Circulation of Workers in Southeast Asia* – Silvia Vignato & Matteo Carlo Alcano (eds). (Currently at review stage).
Vignato, Silvia, ‘What is the Solution, Miss? Small Scale Mobility as a Resource or a Trap for Unskilled Labourers in Indonesia’.
Giacomo Tabacco, ‘Rethinking Mobility in the Midst of Decline and New Opportunities in Gold-Rich West Aceh’.
Matteo Carlo Alcano, ‘A Site for Workers: Construction Sites, Circuits of Immobility and Danger in East Java’.

Michela Cerimele, ‘‘Urban’, ‘Formal’ and ‘Better Off’? Vietnamese Internal Migrant Workers at Thang Long Industrial Park (Hanoi, Vietnam)’.


Vanina Bouté, ‘Experiencing Working for Others – Trajectories of Lao Peasants from the Highlands to Lowland Cities on the Border with China’.


_Giuseppe Bolotta, ‘Fighting mothers and Victimised Children: Designing Political Challenge through Institutional Mobility in the Slums of Bangkok’. _

_Runa Lazzarino, After the Shelter: the Nuances of Reintegration of Human Trafficking Returnees in Vietnam’. _

_Amalia Rossi & Na-Nam Sakkarin, ‘Neo-liberalism and the Integration of labour and Natural Resources in Northern Thailand’. _

_Olivier Evrard, Manoj Potapohn, Kamrawee Sratongno, ‘Integration and Marginality in the Tourist Economy: the Geopolitics of Trekking in a Few Mountain Villages of Chiang Mai Province’ _

_Silvia Vignato, Matteo Carlo Alcano, ‘Signs of Poverty: a Cognitive Approach to Two Marginal Indonesian Contexts’ _


Articles are currently in production for a special issue on ‘Human Security and Regional Cohesion in Southeast Asia’ (Muhadi Sugiono, ed.). in _Regions and Cohesion_, the journal of the Consortium for Comparative Research on Regional Integration and Social Cohesion.

_Muhadi Sugiono, ‘Introduction’. _

_Nguyen An Ha, ‘Nguyen An Ha, Nguyen Xuan Trung and Hoang Khac Nam (forthcoming), “ASEAN Way and the Settlement of Maritime Sovereignty Dispute between Vietnam and China”’. _

_Sukmawani Bela Pertiwi, ‘Territorial Disputes as Potential Challenges to Regional Political Integration in Southeast Asia’. _

_Chayan Vaddhanaphuti, ‘Re-Integration Processes of Refugees from Myanmar: The Role of Civil Society Organisations’. _

_Muhadi Sugiono, ‘ASEAN and Statelessness in Southeast Asia’. _

_Films _

_Available at [http://www.seatide.eu/?content=media5](http://www.seatide.eu/?content=media5). _

On the Loose, & Chiang Mai University’s Regional Center for Social Science and Sustainable Development (2015), *Michael’s Anecdotes from the Rohingya Diaspora* (40 mins).115

Parsifal Reparato, with Silvia Vignato & Giacomo Tabacco (2015), *REZEKI: Gold and Stone Mining in Aceh* (52 minutes).116


Jean Mathis, with Anne Guillou, *What is left. Untold stories about memory in Cambodia* (provisional title), a film on how a village in West Cambodia integrates those who died or left the village during the genocide (in post-production).

**Other books, chapters and articles (published and forthcoming)**


Arnez, Monica (2014), ‘Shifting Notions of Nature and Environmentalism in Indonesian Islam’ in *Environmental and Climate Change in South and Southeast Asia: How are local cultures coping?*, Barbara Schuler (ed.), Leiden, Brill, pp. 75-104.


115 *Michael’s Anecdotes from the Rohingya Diaspora* was screened at 2nd AGITPROP International Film Festival on People’s Struggle, Manila, Philippines, 12 November 2015; ‘Hope of ASEAN’, by ASEAN-China International Studies Program and Film Kawan, Bangkok, Thailand, 10 November 2015; ASEAN Film Festival 2015 ‘All about Love’, Srinindhorn Anthropology Centre, Bangkok, Thailand, 15 August; 19th Thai Short Film Festival by Thai Film Institution (1st Runner-up in the Duke Award – Thai Documentary); and is scheduled for screening at the Inter Congress of IUAES (International Union of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences), Dubrovnik, Croatia, 4-9 May 2016; 5th Southeast Asian Studies Symposium, University of Oxford, UK, 15 April 2016; Ethnografilm 2016 Festival, Paris, France, 29 March-2 April 2016.

116 *REZEKI* will be screened at the Lund University’s Centre for East and South-East Asian Studies workshop on ‘Scholars, activists and filmmakers: The multiple roles of film in and on Asia’, 2-3 May 2016, Lund, Sweden; the 14th European Association of Social Anthropologists conference, ‘Anthropological Legacies and Human Futures’, University of Milano-Bicocca, 22 July 2016, Milan, Italy; and submitted to Association Filmer le Travail, Poitiers, France, for its 2017 festival.


——, ‘Myanmar: Shifting from Geopolitics to the Geoeconomic?’ in Asia Pacific Studies: New Perspectives, Natalia Chaban, Martin Holland & Vlad Vernygora (eds), forthcoming: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.


Maier-Knapp, Naila, Southeast Asia and the European Union: non-traditional security crises and cooperation, Abingdon: Routledge, September 2014

——, ‘Relating Regional Crises and Political (In) Cohesion from an ASEAN and EU-ASEAN Perspective’, in production.


Pietro Masina & Antonio Angelino, ‘L’industria malese nella trappola del medio reddito’ [Malaysian Industry in the Middle Income Trap], L’industria, XXXVI (3) 2013, pp. 549-562


Nguyen An Ha, ‘China’s One Belt One Road strategy and its impact on EU, (forthcoming in Vietnamese in European Studies Review (Hanoi), No. 3, 2016).


Paiiaudeau, Natasha, ‘The Indian Dimension’ in David Chandler, Li Narangoa and Robert Cribb, (eds.), The End of Empire, 100 days in 1945 that Changed Asia and the World, Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2015 (and online at www.endofempire.asia/?s=paiiaudeau).

——, ‘Fraudulent recognition of paternity among Asian migrants in French Indochina’, for submission to Citizenship Studies.

——, ‘Migrants and naturalisation decrees in colonial Southeast Asia’ for submission to Modern Asian Studies.


Teh, Benny, ‘Can Malaysia Shape ASEAN Beyond 2015?’ The Diplomat (http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/can-malaysia-shape-asean-beyond-2015/).

——, ‘Time for a Reevaluation of ASEAN's Role’ The Diplomat (http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/time-for-a-reevaluation-of-aseans-role/).


APPENDIX 2 – PROGRAMMES OF SEATIDE MEETINGS

For reports on SEATIDE’s meetings, see www.seatide.eu under ‘Activities and Results’.

SEATIDE Project Kick-Off Meeting
The first day was spent on financial and administrative matters, and participants learned about European rules on research funding. The second day was devoted to scientific issues: the distribution of the researchers among the thematic WPs, the creation of a Steering Committee and the agenda for project events.
1-2 February 2013, Chiang Mai University and EFEO centre, Chiang Mai, Thailand

Morning: Launch of the FP7 project SEATIDE
‘Welcome words’, Prof Niwes Nanthachit, President of Chiang Mai University
‘Presentation of SEATIDE Consortium’, Franciscus Verellen
‘Scientific cooperation between EU and ASEAN’, Philippe Keraudren, DG Research, European Commission
‘Presentation of SEATIDE project’, Yves Goudineau & Chayan Vaddhanaphuti
‘Presentation of participants’, Karin Dean, Volker Grabowsky, Tim Harper, Nguyen An Ha, Ooi Keat Gin, Muhadi Sugiono, Silvia Vignato.
‘Comments by EU diplomats’
‘Closing words’, Representative of European Union

Kick-off Meeting: administration issues
‘Welcome words’, Chayan Vaddhanaphuti
‘Introduction’, Franciscus Verellen
‘SEATIDE scientific agenda’, Yves Goudineau
‘Expectations from the EC and policy briefs’, Philippe Keraudren
‘The deliverables calendar’, Elisabeth Lacroix
Session: Organization of dissemination of results (WP6), RCSD, CMU & EFEO; workshops; website; online papers, journal articles; press releases; publication of SEATIDE book collection.
Session: SEATIDE management, EFEO; budget; contracts, timesheets; reporting; audits.
General discussion

Kick-off Meeting: academic issues
‘The SEATIDE approach (case studies and fieldwork)’, Yves Goudineau
‘Work Package profiles and possible transversal research’, by thematic WP leaders
Group discussions by thematic WP
General discussion and conclusion

Research Meetings

SEATIDE Panel at the 7th Conference of the European Association for Southeast Asian Studies (EuroSEAS)
‘New Centralities at the Margins of the Indochinese Peninsula: the Making of Local Elites’
2-5 July 2013, University of Lisbon, convened by Vanina Bouté and Vatthana Pholsena
‘Emergence of local entrepreneurs in new urban centres – Northern Laos’, Vanina Bouté
‘Art, identity and local elites: A case study of the influence and motivation of the narrative of Queen Camadevi on the population in Lamphun Province, (Northern Thailand)’, Pantipa Chuenchat
‘Tai Lü identities in the age of globalization: glimpses from mulberry paper manuscripts’, Volker Grabowsky
‘A State without a State: Elite Networking among the Hre, a Stateless People in Highland Quang Ngai Province (1871-1945)’, Andrew Hardy
‘Emergence and evolution of a local elite in Sekong Province’, Vatthana Pholsena
‘Effects of a communist policy on ethnic minorities’ integration, and the merging of a new local elite. Case study of Phongsaly Province, Lao PDR’, Grégoire Schlemmer

WP3 & WP4 Workshop: ‘Ideas & Mobility’,
13 October 2014, Centre for History and Economics, Magdalene College, Half Moon Yard, Cambridge

Introduction. Tim Harper
Panel 1. Work and Mobility I
‘Introduction: work and mobility in Southeast Asia, a matter of scale’, Silvia Vignato
‘What is work? Where is it? The quest for jobs and money in post-conflict Aceh’, Silvia Vignato
‘Staying or going? Restless and anxious youth in a gold mining area of West Aceh (Indonesia)’, Giacomo Tabacco
Panel 2. Ideas and Mobility II
‘The political economy of ‘alternative’ agriculture in contemporary Southeast Asia’, Tomas Larsson
‘Chasing ideas in the South Seas, 1900s-1950s’, Rachel Leow (University of Cambridge)
‘Transnational family life in colonial Southeast Asia’, Natasha Pairaudeau
Panel 3. Work and Mobility II
‘Informal work and circuits of mobility/immobility in Surabaya, East Java’, Matteo Alcano
‘New rice growing-cultures and upland lowland circularities in Northern Thailand’, Amalia Rossi
‘Reintegrating into what? The impact of aid services on post-trafficking life among female returnees of human trade in northern Vietnam (Hanoi city and Lao Cai province)’
Panel 4. Ideas and Mobility II
‘Mapping the Asian Underground, 1900s-1940s’, Tim Harper
‘Queer histories of Chinese migration, c.1850 to the present’, Andrew Diver (University of Cambridge)
‘Postal exchange and networks of circulation: India and the British Empire’, Devyani Gupta (University of Cambridge)

Research Workshop 1: Integration in Southeast Asia: Trajectories of Inclusion, Dynamics of Exclusion
Work Package Sessions
13 February 2014, EFEO centre, Chiang Mai, Thailand
Plenary Session
14 February 2014, Chiang Mai University

Work Package 2 - Diversity
Keynote address. ‘Cultural heritage across national borders’, Paritta Chalermpow Koanantakool (Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn Anthropology Centre, Bangkok)
Panel 1. The making of national identities and the national management of cultural diversity
‘State Emergence in Times of War and Revolution: Insights from a Border Region in Laos’ Vathana Pholsena
‘Hero Cults and Identity in Lan Na: Narratives, Local art and Hero Worship’, Pantipa Chuenchat
‘Identity and Belonging: The Case of Penang, Malaysia from Within and Without Southeast Asia: Some Preliminary Thoughts’, Ooi Keat Gin
‘School education and national integration: Contesting the State’s policy and local diversities’, Agus Suwignyo
Panel 2: Regional dynamics of ethnic and religious identities
‘Sociology of the new urban localities in Northern Laos’, Vanina Bouté
‘Jesuits, Javanese Catholics and Islam during the interwar period: towards an alternative nationalism’, Remy Madinier
‘Insights on Islamic Identities, Religious Diversity and Muslim Marginality from Thailand’s Sufi Movements’, Christopher M. Joll
Panel 3: Transnational/cross-border networks as a support for local identities
‘The Strategic Terrace. Vietnamese Communist Penetration of the Three Border Triangle during the First and Second Indochina Wars’, Jörg Thomas Engelbert
‘Assemblage of Thai and Karen Charismatic Monks: Constructing a Utopia across National Boundaries’, Kwancheewan Buadaeng
‘Tai Political Systems’, Grant Evans
‘Nationalism, environmental conservation and the ontological theorisation of ‘nature”’, Laur Kiik

Work Package 3: Small scale mobility: a useful analytical tool for the analysis of a changing Southeast Asian human landscape
Opening. Introduction on the cognitive aspects of the idea of mobility, Silvia Vignato & Matteo Alcano
Panel 1. Margins and borders.
‘Borders, circulation, discussing the notion’, Tallinn University research team
‘Eco-tourism 1: a process of inscription into political orders’, Olivier Evrard’s team
‘Eco-tourism 2: hidden and patent economics’, Olivier Evrard’s team
‘Ethnic-based circulation in countrysides’, Amalia Rossi
Discussant, Michael Parnwell (University of Leeds)
Panel 2. Work and small scale mobility
‘The quest for jobs in post conflict Aceh’, Silvia Vignato & Azhari Aiyub
‘Gold mines as poles of microcirculation in Aceh’, Giacomo Tabacco
‘Urban job seekers in Surabaya’, Matteo Alcano
Discussant, Michele Ford (University of Sydney)
Panel 3. ‘Cities, villages and the space in between’
‘Circulating in slums in Bangkok’, Giuseppe Bolotta
‘Urban to plantation migration in East Java’, Bambang Purwanto
‘Loving God and the countryside in the eco-pesantren’, Monika Arnez
‘Villages as welfare reservoirs for industrial workers in Northern Vietnam’, Alessandra Chiricosta
Discussant, Anne Guillou

Work Package 4 - New models of development and conservation in Southeast Asia
Opening, Tim Harper
‘Contemporary contestations over models of economic development: The Philippine experience’, Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem
‘The political economy of GM agriculture in Southeast Asia’, Tomas Larsson
‘Nuclear power and risk politics in Southeast Asia’, Sulfikar Amir (Nanyang Technological University)
‘Sufficiency economy and the institutionalization of eco-Buddhist approaches in northern Thailand: the case of Phid Tong Lang Phra Royal Project in Nan province’, Amalia Rossi
‘Cacophonies of mutual ignorance: the environment in Malaysia’, Lye Tuck-Po
‘The Shan Civil Society’s Engagement in Myanmar’s Development Process’, Triinu Püvi

Work Package 5 - National/Transnational Integration and the Role of ASEAN
Opening, Muhadi Sugiono
Panel 1. ‘ASEAN: Identity, Power and Agency’
‘The Preah Vihear temple dispute and its national and regional dimensions’, Volker Grabowsky
‘The Long Wall of Quang Ngai. A Framework for Border Security, Trade and Taxation (First Reading of the Vietnamese Royal Archives)’, Andrew Hardy
‘ASEAN Way and the resolution of maritime sovereignty dispute between Vietnam and China’, Nguyen An Ha & Nguyen Xuan Trung
Panel 2. ‘ASEAN and Southeast Asians’
‘Dynamics of Integration from Below from the Lao-Vietnamese Border Region’, Vatthana Pholsena
‘ASEAN and Statelessness in Southeast Asia’, Muhadi Sugiono
‘ASEAN and Human Security: Towards a People-Oriented Regional Institution’, Benny Teh Cheng Guan

Plenary session
Panel 1. ‘Review of the results of the 4 workshops (1)’
‘General reminder of SEATIDE themes and objectives’
‘Assessment by WP of ongoing case studies and fieldwork’
‘Cross work package themes: identification and discussion’
‘Links and interaction between WPs’
Panel 2. ‘Organisation of results’
‘Online papers scheduled in 2014: distribution of authors per WP - Articles, monographs, etc. – SEATIDE collection - Preparation of 2nd series of research workshops - SEATIDE website maintenance and updating’
Panel 3. ‘Management’
‘Reminder of EU rules: management issues by institution, deliverables, etc.’
‘Miscellaneous questions/discussion of potential problems’

**SEATIDE Panel at the Asia Pacific Sociological Association (APSA) conference on ‘Transforming Societies: Contestations and Convergences in Asia and the Pacific’**

*15-16 February 2-14, Chiang Mai University*

‘National and Transnational Exchange of Information in Southeast Asia’, Tim Harper
‘National and Transnational Identities in Southeast Asia’, Volker Grabowsky
‘National and Transnational Circulation of People and Goods in Southeast Asia’, Silvia Vignato
‘ASEAN and the Integration of Southeast Asia’, Muhadi Sugiono
‘Integration, Exclusion and the Long Wall of Quang Ngai as a Framework for Military and Territorial Security’, Andrew Hardy
‘The Legal regulation of migrant families in Southeast Asia’, Natasha Pairaudeau

**SEATIDE Publications Workshop: ‘Online papers: discussion, coordination’**

*19-20 September 2014, Lone Pine Hotel, Penang, Malaysia*

Introduction. Andrew Hardy
Session 1. USM panel
‘Language, Culture and Identity: A Case Study of Diasporic Ethnic Pakistanis in Multilingual Penang’, Shakila Abdul Manan
‘Human Security and the ASEAN Community’, Benny Teh
Session 2. SEATIDE in 2014-2015
‘SEATIDE publications strategy’, Andrew Hardy
‘Calendar of SEATIDE events, website’, Elisabeth Lacroix
Session 3. SEATIDE Online papers (WP5 and WP4)
‘ASEAN Way’, Muhadi Sugiono and Andrew Hardy:
‘Intellectual and educational exchange’, Sunil Amrith (Birkbeck, University of London) & Sumit Mandal
‘Environmental thinking’, Tomas Larsson
Session 4: SEATIDE Online papers (WP3 and WP2)
‘City’, Silvia Vignato
‘Cross-border circulation’, Laur Kiik
‘National and transnational heritage’, Volker Grabowsky
‘Religious integration’, Rémy Madinier
20 September: unstructured discussion in small groups


*12 November 2014, Ore 11 Aula Polivalente IV Piano – Dipartimento di Scienze Umane per la Formazione “Ricardo Massa”, UNIMIB, Milan*

‘Migration Infrastructure: Brokerage and Labor Recruitment in Transnational Migration from Indonesia’, Johan Lindquist (Stockholm University)
‘Looking for a job in Aceh: unemployment in post-war economic boom’, Silvia Vignato
‘Rethinking one’s expectations amid the decline of goldmining in West Aceh’, Giacomo
Tabacco
‘Circuits of immobility: in and around the construction sites of Surabaya, East Java’, Matteo Carlo Alcano
‘The uneven development trap in Southeast Asia – a critique of neoclassical mythology’, Pietro Masina
‘Urban’, ‘formal’ and ‘better-off’? The case of Vietnamese internal migrant workers at Thang Long industrial Park, Hanoi, Vietnam’, Michela Cerimele

SEATIDE Academic Seminar: ‘Religion, Citizenship, Tourism and Trade In the Process of Integration’
15 December 2014, Chiang Mai University

Introduction. Chayan Vaddhanaphuti
‘Business and Labor Migration in Thai’s Teak Business, 1880s-1920s’, Amnuayvit Thitibordin
‘Trekking Tour Industry in Chiang Mai: Economic and Anthropological Perspectives’, Manoj Pothaphon
‘Religious Movements among the Karens in Thailand-Burma Borderlands: Prophets and Anti-structure Communities’, Kwanchewan Buadaeng
‘Religion and Development in Aceh: Implementing Islamic Law in a Post-disaster/Post-conflict Context’, R. Michael Feener

Symposium: ‘Integration, A Model for Prosperity? A Perspective on Vietnam’
3 February 2015, Army Hotel, Hanoi, Vietnam

Introduction. Yves Goudineau, Andrew Hardy, Richard Linning (EU Public Diplomacy and Outreach in Vietnam project, Hanoi)
Presented by Franciscus Verellen. Discussants: Michela Cerimele, Do Ta Khanh (VASS), Claudio Dordi (EU-MUTRAP technical assistance project, Hanoi), Riza Faisol (expert, Indonesia Ministry of Labour), Andrew Hardy, Pietro Masina, Nguyen An Ha, Muhadi Sugiono, Silvia Vignato.

Research Workshop 2: ‘Discussion of Circulated Papers on National & Regional Integration’
3-5 February 2015, Army Hotel, Hanoi, Vietnam

Session 1. ‘Religious Networks on the Margins’
‘Between Central Plains and Far South: Grounded Perspectives from the Sufi Margins’, Chris Joll
‘A Karen Charismatic Monk and Connectivity Across the Thai-Burma Borderland’, Kwanchewan Buadaeng

Session 2. ‘Dilemmas of National Integration’
‘Lua Resettled Communities in Northern Thailand: Between Ethnic Disintegration and (Inter) National Integration’, Amalia Rossi
‘Business and Labour Migration in Thai Teak Business, 1880s-1920s’, Amnuayvit Thitibordin
Session 3. ‘Labour Migration and its Unintended Consequences’
‘ASEAN and Statelessness in Southeast Asia’, Muhadi Sugiono
‘Legal Regulation and Social Dynamics of Asian Migrant Family Life in Colonial Cochinchina’, Natasha Pairaudreau

Session 4. ‘The Politics of Standards and Management’

Session 5. ‘Managing Mobilities and Resources’
‘Becoming Indonesian for Better or Worse: The Rise of Transnational Labour Among the East Java Urban Communities’, Bambang Purwanto
‘Treking in Mountain Villages of Chiang Mai Province: Locals’ Perceptions as a Management Tool’, Olivier Evrard & Manoj Potapohn
‘Natural Resources and Sustainability in Balikpapan Bay’, Monika Arnez

Session 6. ‘Regional Integration and the South China Sea’
‘ASEAN Way and the Resolution of Maritime Dispute between ASEAN Countries and China’, Nguyen An Ha
‘Territorial Disputes as Potential Challenges to Regional Political Integration in Southeast Asia’, Sukmawani Bela Pertiwi

Film Session. Projection and discussion of SEATIDE Videos 1 and 2:
‘My Dreams Will Vanish Again, Women Workers of Thang Long Industrial Park’, Parsifal Reparato
‘Inside the Fence’, Karen News

Plenary Session. SEATIDE in 2015.
‘Calendar of events and deliverables’, Elisabeth Lacroix:
‘Publications strategy’, Andrew Hardy

Final Conference: ‘The Integration of Southeast Asia: Frameworks and Practices’
18-19 September 2015, Half Amarta Ballroom, Melia Purosani Hotel, Yogyakarta, Indonesia

Session 1. Introduction. Paripurna (Vice-Rector UGM), Yves Goudineau
Session 2. Southeast Asia: Integration Frameworks, Integration Practices
Panel 1. ‘Grassroots Integration: Analysis of SEATIDE Results I’
‘WP2 – Diversity’, Volker Grabowsky, WP2
‘WP3 – Mobility’, Silvia Vignato
Panel 2. ‘Grassroots Integration: Analysis of SEATIDE Results II’
‘WP4 – Knowledge’, Tim Harper
‘WP5 – Security’, Muhadi Sugiono
Panel 3. ‘Political Integration: the ASEAN Framework’
‘Framework Building in SEA in Historical Perspective’, David Camroux
‘The Integration Challenges of the ASEAN Community’, Makarim Wibisono
Panel 4. ‘Interplay of Political and Grassroots Integration Processes’
‘ASEAN Way of Dealing with Refugees’, Atin Prabandari (UGM)
‘Re-Integration Processes of Refugees from Myanmar: The Role of the CSO’, Chayan Vaddhanaphuti
Session 3. Integration in Southeast Asia: Notes from the Field
Panel 5. ‘Transnational Networks of Education and Knowledge’
‘Diffusionism in World History Teaching in Indonesia’, Agus Suwignyo
‘Muslim Shrines: Sacred Geographies of the Malay World’, Sumit Mandal
Panel 6. ‘Southeast Asia in the World Order: Historical Perspectives’
‘China and Vietnam in the 9th Century: a Change of Model’, Francis Verellen
‘Burma/Myanmar Since the Early Modern Period: Regional Connections, Expansive Drive and the Challenges of Multi-Ethnicity’, Jacques Leider
Discussant: Wang Gungwu (National University of Singapore)
Session 4. Closing Session
Round Table: Southeast Asian Studies in Asia and Europe: Academic Networks and Institutional Cooperation. Yves Goudineau, Bambang Purwanto, Suratman (Vice-Rector, UGM), David Camroux, Jacques Leider, Pietro Masina, Muhadi Sugiono, Chayan Vaddhanaphuti.
Panel 7: Media and research. Screening and discussion of films.
‘Rohingya refugees: Michaels’
‘Mountains of Fortune: Gold and Stone Mining in Aceh’

Dissemination Events

Dissemination Workshop 1: ‘Dynamics of Integration and Dilemmas of Divergence in Contemporary Southeast Asia’
18 September 2014. Lone Pine Hotel, Penang, Malaysia

Introduction. Yves Goudineau, Andrew Hardy, Ooi Keat Gin
Panel 1. ‘Settling the Region’s Borders’.
‘Cambodia/Thailand: Heritage and Nationalism in the Preah Vihear Dispute’, Volker Grabowsky & Sok Udom Deth
Panel 2. ‘Coping with Religious Diversity’
‘Islam in contemporary Indonesia’, Rémy Madinier
‘Buddhism in contemporary Myanmar’, Jacques Leider
‘Christianity in the highlands of contemporary Vietnam’, Jörg Thomas Engelbert
Roundtable ‘Fractures and Predicaments in Southeast Asian Identities’. Yves Goudineau, Volker Grabowsky, Sunil Amrith, Muhadi Sugiono, Silvia Vignato, Franciscus Verellen
‘Presentation on George Town, Penang’,
‘From Colonial Outpost to Cosmopolitan Centre: Issues of Integration and Identity in the City’, Ooi Keat Gin

Dissemination Workshop 2: Economic Integration, Mobility and Work in Southeast Asia

Introduction. Nguyen Quang Thuan, Yves Goudineau, Alejandro Montalban-Carrasco (Head of Cooperation, EU Delegation in Vietnam)
Panel 1. ‘Industrialization, Labour and Poverty’

‘A critique of regional economic integration in East and Southeast Asia: middle income trap or uneven development trap?’, Pietro Masina

‘Urban’, ‘formal’ and ‘better-off’? The case of Vietnamese internal migrant workers at Thang Long industrial Park, Hanoi, Vietnam’, Michela Cerimele

‘Industrial work and Vulnerability: results of field studies in three northern provinces of Vietnam’, Do Ta Khanh

Panel 2. ‘Work and Small Scale Mobility’

‘Looking for a job, looking for an income: small scale mobility as a resource or a trap for unskilled labourers, with a focus on Aceh’, Silvia Vignato

‘A site for workers: building sites, mobility and danger in East Java’, Matteo Alcano

‘After the gold rush: opportunities and disillusions among gold miners in West Aceh’, Giacomo Tabacco

Roundtable. ‘How can Southeast Asia and Europe cooperate to promote access to the labour market and better working conditions?’ Franciscus Verellen, Nguyen Lan Huong (Institute of Labour Science and Social Affairs, Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs, Vietnam), Pietro Masina, Nguyen An Ha, Silvia Vignato, Vu Quang Tho (Institute for Workers and Trade Unions).

Dissemination Workshop 3: ‘Maritime Southeast Asia: Conflicts and Cooperation’

4 June 2015, Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia in Belgium, Boulevard de la Woluwe 38 1200 Brussels, Belgium

Introduction. Ignacio Kristannyo Hardojo (Deputy Chief of Mission, Indonesian Embassy), Yves Goudineau

Panel 1: Historical Contexts

‘Maritime Connections in Southeast Asia’s History’, Pierre-Yves Manguin (EFEO)

‘Southeast Asia: The Making of Maritime Borders’, Tim Harper

Panel 2. ‘Contemporary Developments’

‘Southeast Asia’s Maritime Environment: The Long View’, Sunil Amrith


‘ASEAN and South China Sea Disputes’, Jürgen Rüland, (University of Freiburg)

Closing Remarks. Andrew Hardy, Silvia Vignato

Policy Forum 1: ‘The EU and Southeast Asia. EEAS – DG RTD joint policy seminar’

28 November 2013, DG RTD COV2 room 9/183 16 Place Rogier, Brussels, Belgium

Panel 1. ‘Bridging the gap between EU foreign policy and research on Southeast Asia’.

Discussion by Ranieri Sabatucci (Southeast Asia Division, EEAS), Franciscus Verellen

Panel 2. ‘The future of SEA regional integration and related opportunities for European Foreign Policy’

‘SEA from illusory miracle to middle income trap’, Pietro Masina

Discussant: Joachim Bitterlich (ESCP Europe, Paris, former Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany)

Panel 3. ‘China's influence on Southeast Asia’

‘The new Chinese presence in (mainland) Southeast Asia: an anthropological perspective’, Antonella Diana (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)
Panel 4. ‘Nation-building and the challenges of ethnic and religious diversity in SEA (1)’
‘Myanmar’s current challenges: Ethnic tensions and their impact on the political process’, Jacques Leider
‘Ethnic Relations in Local Perspective: the Long Wall of Quang Ngai (Vietnam)’, Andrew Hardy
‘Nation-building, 50 years on: Malaysia, Singapore and their Region’, Tim Harper
Panel 5. ‘Nation-building and the challenges of ethnic and religious diversity in SEA (2)’
Islam and the State in Maritime Southeast Asia: some historical reflexions, Rémy Madinier
‘Are democracy and national integration compatible in Indonesia? A first appraisal of the Reformasi Era’, Andrée Feillard
Closing remarks. Ranieri Sabatucci, Philippe Keraudren (Social Sciences and Humanities unit, DG RTD, EC)

Policy Forum 2:
EEAS Southeast Asia Briefing 1: ‘Patterns of Authoritarianism in Southeast Asia’
11 May 2015, EEAS Building, room LOI 02/3729A, Rond Point Schuman, 1000 Brussels, Belgium

Introduction. Ranieri Sabatucci, Zoltán Krasznai (Social Sciences and Humanities unit, DG RTD, EC)
‘Power and History in Indonesia and Malaysia’, Sumit Mandal
‘Patterns of Authoritarianism in SEA: Perspectives from the Philippines’, Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem

EEAS Southeast Asia Briefing 2: ‘The Emerging Middle-Class and Democratisation in Southeast Asia’
12 May 2015, EEAS Building, room LOI 04/372, Rond Point Schuman, 1000 Brussels, Belgium

‘Middle class politics in Mainland Southeast Asia’, Tomas Larsson
‘The Shape of Democracy in Indonesia and Malaysia’, Sumit Mandal
‘Democratization and the Emerging Middle Class in Southeast Asia: The Philippine Experience’, Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem
Closing remarks, Ranieri Sabatucci, Zoltán Krasznai

EEAS Southeast Asia Briefing 3: ‘The Crisis in Thailand in Long-term Perspective’
18 February 2016, EEAS Building, room LOI 02/372, 9A Rond Point Schuman, 1000 Brussels, Belgium

Introduction, Ranieri Sabatucci, Philippe Keraudren, Andrew Hardy
‘The NCPO Junta's Project: How might it crumble, and who will be left to pick up the pieces?’, Michael Montesano (ISEAS – Yousof Ishak Institute, Singapore)
‘The Seven Ages of Man: Policy Options for A Rapidly Ageing Asian Society, Andrew Gibbs (Henderson Rowe, London)
‘The Refugee Crisis on Thailand's Borders’, Chayan Vaddhanaphuti
Closing remarks, Ranieri Sabatucci
APPENDIX 3 – LIST OF SEATIDE RESEARCHERS

SEATIDE Project Management Team
Goudineau, Yves – École française d’Extrême-Orient, France (Coordinator, Leader of WP 1)
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Lacroix, Elisabeth – École française d’Extrême-Orient, France (Project Manager)
Verellen, Franciscus – École française d’Extrême-Orient, France (Special Advisor)

SEATIDE Work Package Leaders
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Harper, Tim – Centre for History and Economics, University of Cambridge, UK (WP 4)
Sugiono, Muhadi (UGM) – Universitas Gadjah Mada, Indonesia (WP 5)
Vignato, Silvia – University of Milano-Bicocca, Italy (WP 3)

SEATIDE researchers
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