Objectif Mechanism design is the engineering side of economics. Research findings in this field have helped governments and practitioners worldwide design better institutions: auctions that are more profitable or efficient; labour markets that improve the match between employees and employers; and better ways to assign students to public schools. The cornerstone of mechanism design is the revelation principle, which provides a canonical class of mechanisms and turns the mechanism-selection problem (which a priori may appear unmanageable) to a constrained optimization problem. The standard mechanism design paradigm relies on three fundamental assumptions: 1. The designer of the institution—the principal—does not have any privileged information. 2. The principal chooses the mechanism and commits to it once and for all. 3. There is no interrelationship of the mechanism with outside markets. In addition, almost the entire mechanism design literature assumes that private information is unverifiable (soft). These assumptions often fail in today’s “big data” world: Firms (online retailers, insurance companies, banks) do have privileged—and often certifiable—information that may affect contractual terms they propose. Also, they interact repeatedly with the same agents and, as they learn about them, they attempt to change the terms by making personalized offers. Finally, often a mechanism—e.g. a government insurance program—interacts with private insurance markets. The proposed research aims at providing methods and foundations to design optimal mechanisms at precisely those highly relevant situations: 1. mechanism-design by an informed principal, 2. design of mechanisms and their transparency when the principal lacks commitment, 3. mechanism-design when an intervention interacts with markets. The latter part of the project aims to employ these cutting-edge tools to revisit the design of insurance markets. Champ scientifique natural sciencescomputer and information sciencesdata sciencebig datasocial scienceseconomics and businesseconomicsproduction economicssocial scienceseconomics and businessbusiness and managementcommerce Mots‑clés Mechanism Design Limited Commitment Informed Principal Certifiable Information Programme(s) H2020-EU.1.1. - EXCELLENT SCIENCE - European Research Council (ERC) Main Programme Thème(s) ERC-CoG-2015 - ERC Consolidator Grant Appel à propositions ERC-2015-CoG Voir d’autres projets de cet appel Régime de financement ERC-COG - Consolidator Grant Institution d’accueil UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON Contribution nette de l'UE € 1 644 774,00 Adresse GOWER STREET WC1E 6BT London Royaume-Uni Voir sur la carte Région London Inner London — West Camden and City of London Type d’activité Higher or Secondary Education Establishments Liens Contacter l’organisation Opens in new window Site web Opens in new window Participation aux programmes de R&I de l'UE Opens in new window Réseau de collaboration HORIZON Opens in new window Coût total € 1 644 774,00 Bénéficiaires (1) Trier par ordre alphabétique Trier par contribution nette de l'UE Tout développer Tout réduire UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON Royaume-Uni Contribution nette de l'UE € 1 644 774,00 Adresse GOWER STREET WC1E 6BT London Voir sur la carte Région London Inner London — West Camden and City of London Type d’activité Higher or Secondary Education Establishments Liens Contacter l’organisation Opens in new window Site web Opens in new window Participation aux programmes de R&I de l'UE Opens in new window Réseau de collaboration HORIZON Opens in new window Coût total € 1 644 774,00