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Robust Mechanism Design and Robust Prediction in Games

Periodic Reporting for period 2 - ROBUST (Robust Mechanism Design and Robust Prediction in Games)

Reporting period: 2018-06-01 to 2019-11-30

The main objectives of the projects are two-fold: (i) to develop new theoretical methodology of robust mechanism design and apply it to various economic problems; and (ii) to study robust predictions in game theory and assess its economic significance. Conceptually, the robustness in these projects are achieved by imposing much less assumptions on the behaviors of economic agents in predicting their behaviors. This is an important direction of the economics researches, since the analyses under ``too strong'' assumptions have been criticized for long time. It would provide more sensible and relevant analyses of economic problems both in economic theory and application, whereby contributing to the society.
Significant results have been obtained in a number of the projects in my proposal:

(i) Revisions requested in peer-reviewed journals:
``On the foundations of ex post incentive compatible mechanisms'', with Shuguang Zhu, by Journal of Economic Theory. (Finally rejected, and now under revision for another journal)
This is one of the sub-projects included in the original proposal, but with more advanced results than described in the proposal.

``Divergent Interpretation and Divergent Prediction in Communication'', with Shintaro Miura, by Games and Economic Behavior. (Finally rejected, and now under revision for another journal)
This is one of the sub-projects included in the original proposal, but with more advanced results than described in the proposal.

``Revenue-capped efficient auctions'', with Nozomu Muto and Yasuhito Shirata, by Journal of European Economic Associasion. (Now accepted and ready for publication)
This is not in the original proposal. However, it is related to ``Application 1.2'' of the original proposal: in an application of this paper, we consider competing (finitely many) auction designers, and partially analyze its effect on the efficiency. This would be directly related to approximate efficiency question in ``Application 1.2'' of the original proposal.

``Asymmetric information allocation to avoid coordination failure'', with Fumitoshi Moriya, by Journal of Economics and Management Science. (Now accepted and ready for publication)
This is one of the sub-projects included in the original proposal, but with more advanced results than described in the proposal.

``Order on types based on monotone comparative statics'', with Takashi Kunimoto, by Journal of Economic Theory. (Revision in the second round)
This is one of the sub-projects included in the original proposal, but with more advanced results than described in the proposal.

(ii) New working papers ready:
``Revenue guarantee in auction with a (correlated) common prior and additional information''.
This is one of the sub-projects included in the original proposal, but with more advanced results than described in the proposal.

``Optimal public information disclosure by mechanism designer''.
This is one of the sub-projects included in the original proposal, but with more advanced results than described in the proposal.

``On the Veil-of-Ignorance Principle: Welfare-Optimal Information Disclosure in Voting'' (with Karine Van der Straeten)
This is related to one of the sub-projects included in the original proposal.

``Large mechanism design with moment-based allocation externality''.
This is related to one of the sub-projects included in the original proposal.