Periodic Reporting for period 4 - ETI (Epistemic Transitions in Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science: From the 12th to the 19th Century)
Période du rapport: 2021-03-01 au 2021-08-31
The project investigates how post-classical (roughly, twelfth-century CE and thereafter) Islamic philosophers, theologians, and scientists thought about crucial questions related to knowledge and science. Why did they think knowledge was important? What did they think are valid means of acquiring knowledge? Is knowledge derived from sense perception, from rational thinking, from divine revelation, or from a combination of such sources? Finally, what does knowledge consist in: is it a set of propositions that amounts to a theory, or is it rather something like informed experience of the world?
This kind of research is important, because it allows to critically reassess claims according to which Islamic intellectual history is a story of stagnation determined by a religion that is hostile to human reason and critical investigation. Our research shows that the post-classical Islamic tradition should be understood as a tradition of discussion and debate instead of imitation and repetition. By the same token, it shows that we should not think of Islam, or any other major intellectual tradition, in monolithic terms. Providing a historically and philosophically sound understanding of the plurality within the Islamic tradition is important, because Islam is presented as a monolith out of various political interests, including right-wing Islamophobes and jihadist fundamentalists.
Our overall objective is simple: to provide important foundational research in the direly understudied history of post-classical Islamic philosophy, theology, and science.
This kind of research is important, because it allows to critically reassess claims according to which Islamic intellectual history is a story of stagnation determined by a religion that is hostile to human reason and critical investigation. Our research shows that the post-classical Islamic tradition should be understood as a tradition of discussion and debate instead of imitation and repetition. By the same token, it shows that we should not think of Islam, or any other major intellectual tradition, in monolithic terms. Providing a historically and philosophically sound understanding of the plurality within the Islamic tradition is important, because Islam is presented as a monolith out of various political interests, including right-wing Islamophobes and jihadist fundamentalists.
Our overall objective is simple: to provide important foundational research in the direly understudied history of post-classical Islamic philosophy, theology, and science.
Throughout the project, we have conducted research in the areas of post-classical philosophy, theology, and Sufism. In all of these areas, the work of Avicenna (Ibn Sina, d. 1037 CE) provides the decisive impetus for development.
In philosophy and theology, our focus has been on critiques of the metaphysical foundations of Avicennian theory of science, especially its robust essentialism and realism about universals. We have identified the following topics to be of particular relevance.
(1) The critique, nascent in the twelfth century CE, of the method of definition as the way in which we know essences. This critical debate continues in the subsequent centuries, but it is not entirely clear whether the theological critics are mainly trying to undermine the philosophical theory of science or offering a genuine alternative. It is quite frequent that one and the same author, in different parts of his corpus, both endorses and criticises the Avicennian theory. In this regard, we have arrived at two hypotheses: either (1) the authors begin to segregate between approaches and do not even attempt to find a resolution between them (an epistemologically flexible, but philosophically unambitious solution), or (2) the authors recognise that no neutral resolution is available, because the alternatives meet contradicting intuitions that may be equally defensible, albeit on different grounds. The latter approach, of which we have found initial evidence in some of the most prominent authors, such as Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (d. 1210 CE), amounts to a sophisticated view of the limits and possibilities of philosophical argumentation. However, further research is needed to find out whether such an awareness pervades the theological tradition at large.
(2) Intimately related to the first topic is the charge that the key concepts of Avicennian metaphysics (such as essence, existence, substance, or the modal concepts) are merely mind-dependent notions and thus fail to latch on to reality. Interestingly, however, this critique rarely seems to result in a straightforward denial of these concepts, but instead gives rise to rethinking the nature of the science of metaphysics. We have found out that concepts like realism and nominalism, borrowed from the history of European philosophy, are not entirely accurate to characterise this development. The critique of Aristotelian essentialism and realism in the Islamic context, while parallel to that in European medieval philosophy, must be explicated in its own terms, and this is one of the tasks we are presently engaged with. In this regard, the PI's forthcoming monograph on the critical philosophy of Shihab al-Din al-Suhrawardi (d. 1191 CE) will be the first profound attempt at systematically dealing with the status of these concepts in post-classical Islamic philosophy.
(3) The metaphysical question concerning the principle of sufficient reason is not only theologically loaded (does God create the world out of free will or coerced by His essence), but it also has important epistemological consequences concerning what we can know (or what is explicable by way of causes). Here we find the same puzzling situation as in topic (1), and mutatis mutandis, we have formulated similar hypotheses to guide further research.
(4) A theological question of major epistemological importance is God knows particular things. Although many Islamic authors tend to highlight the difference between things divine and human, most of them also insist that when concepts like knowledge are applied to human beings and God, this should be in one and the same sense. Thus, the question of God's knowledge is at the same time a question of what can be known in principle.
In the Sufi literature, we have observed and studied two interesting further developments, both of which mainly take place in the tradition of commentaries on the major twelfth-thirteenth-century innovator, Ibn 'Arabi (d. 1240 CE). The first of these is a consistent attempt at carving a niche for Sufism in the framework of the Aristotelian theory of science. More research needs to be conducted on this topic, but it seems that the Sufi commentators argued that the special knowledge of the Sufis is not incompatible with philosophy, but a foundation for a science complementary to philosophical metaphysics. Secondly, parallel to topic (4), we have found that the Sufi tradition is witness to the emergence of an interesting new approach to the question of the relation between God's atemporal knowledge and human temporal knowledge.
In concrete terms, we have organised two thematic workshops, and the proceedings of both have been published. The first came out as a special issue of Oriens, one of the oldest and most respected journals in Islamic studies. The second was published as a bilingual (English and Turkish) special issue of Nazariyat, an open access journal that has rapidly become a central forum in Islamic philosophy.
In philosophy and theology, our focus has been on critiques of the metaphysical foundations of Avicennian theory of science, especially its robust essentialism and realism about universals. We have identified the following topics to be of particular relevance.
(1) The critique, nascent in the twelfth century CE, of the method of definition as the way in which we know essences. This critical debate continues in the subsequent centuries, but it is not entirely clear whether the theological critics are mainly trying to undermine the philosophical theory of science or offering a genuine alternative. It is quite frequent that one and the same author, in different parts of his corpus, both endorses and criticises the Avicennian theory. In this regard, we have arrived at two hypotheses: either (1) the authors begin to segregate between approaches and do not even attempt to find a resolution between them (an epistemologically flexible, but philosophically unambitious solution), or (2) the authors recognise that no neutral resolution is available, because the alternatives meet contradicting intuitions that may be equally defensible, albeit on different grounds. The latter approach, of which we have found initial evidence in some of the most prominent authors, such as Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (d. 1210 CE), amounts to a sophisticated view of the limits and possibilities of philosophical argumentation. However, further research is needed to find out whether such an awareness pervades the theological tradition at large.
(2) Intimately related to the first topic is the charge that the key concepts of Avicennian metaphysics (such as essence, existence, substance, or the modal concepts) are merely mind-dependent notions and thus fail to latch on to reality. Interestingly, however, this critique rarely seems to result in a straightforward denial of these concepts, but instead gives rise to rethinking the nature of the science of metaphysics. We have found out that concepts like realism and nominalism, borrowed from the history of European philosophy, are not entirely accurate to characterise this development. The critique of Aristotelian essentialism and realism in the Islamic context, while parallel to that in European medieval philosophy, must be explicated in its own terms, and this is one of the tasks we are presently engaged with. In this regard, the PI's forthcoming monograph on the critical philosophy of Shihab al-Din al-Suhrawardi (d. 1191 CE) will be the first profound attempt at systematically dealing with the status of these concepts in post-classical Islamic philosophy.
(3) The metaphysical question concerning the principle of sufficient reason is not only theologically loaded (does God create the world out of free will or coerced by His essence), but it also has important epistemological consequences concerning what we can know (or what is explicable by way of causes). Here we find the same puzzling situation as in topic (1), and mutatis mutandis, we have formulated similar hypotheses to guide further research.
(4) A theological question of major epistemological importance is God knows particular things. Although many Islamic authors tend to highlight the difference between things divine and human, most of them also insist that when concepts like knowledge are applied to human beings and God, this should be in one and the same sense. Thus, the question of God's knowledge is at the same time a question of what can be known in principle.
In the Sufi literature, we have observed and studied two interesting further developments, both of which mainly take place in the tradition of commentaries on the major twelfth-thirteenth-century innovator, Ibn 'Arabi (d. 1240 CE). The first of these is a consistent attempt at carving a niche for Sufism in the framework of the Aristotelian theory of science. More research needs to be conducted on this topic, but it seems that the Sufi commentators argued that the special knowledge of the Sufis is not incompatible with philosophy, but a foundation for a science complementary to philosophical metaphysics. Secondly, parallel to topic (4), we have found that the Sufi tradition is witness to the emergence of an interesting new approach to the question of the relation between God's atemporal knowledge and human temporal knowledge.
In concrete terms, we have organised two thematic workshops, and the proceedings of both have been published. The first came out as a special issue of Oriens, one of the oldest and most respected journals in Islamic studies. The second was published as a bilingual (English and Turkish) special issue of Nazariyat, an open access journal that has rapidly become a central forum in Islamic philosophy.
The project has produced important new research on authors on whom there have been practically no prior studies, such as Sadr al-Shari'a al-Mahbubi, Yusuf Qarabaghi, and Abu Nasr Qursawi. The joint expertise has enabled the group members to provide new and historically more securely grounded perspective into already recognised figures, like Avicenna, Shihab al-Din al-Suhrawardi, and Ibn 'Arabi. Some of these results have already been submitted and/or published, and obviously, much more ground will have been covered by the end of the project. Obviously, many of the papers produced in the project will continue to appear after the project's expiration.