Final Report Summary - EUTUR (Enlargement and EU Funded projects : The case of Turkey)
My first objective was to assess the role played by the EU Financial Assistance (FA) within the EU-Turkey enlargement framework. The study of the programming process reveals a disconnection between FA and Enlargement framework, and the autonomy of FA.
No link between FA and negotiations. Data analysis doesn’t reveal any systematic correlation between the implementation of projects and opening of chapters. The contraction of chapters that remain openable has not been followed by a reorientation of the programming. On the other hand, vetoed chapters have not lead to the suspension of the FA in the related fields.
This non-link is first related the structural mismatch between the two frameworks of negotiations and of FA. Negotiations are held by the EU member states. The process of opening chapters is not linked to the degree of compliance but more to windows of opportunities. On the contrary, FA is related to an administrative process that is all the more long and rigid because of the specificity of the decentralised system with non-member countries. The two frameworks are related to two very different worlds. Beside the conjectural time of crisis, FA is not subject to politicization. At the project’s implementation level, interviewees don’t show a specific professional interest for negotiations. There are even interviewees who are not aware of the negotiation’s benchmarks, some of them do not even know the number of the chapter related to their field or whether it was open for negotiation.
No real connection between FA & enlargement priorities: With the transformation of the enlargement policy and thus the pre-accession one, there has been a change in role given to FA: the aim is to escape from the former logic of preparing candidates countries to use EU structural funds, and to focus on the linkage between FA and progress towards enlargement. However, the official evaluation of first period of IPA (2007-14) has pointed out, as one of the main criticisms, that enlargement priorities do not get the highest percentage of EU FA.
The lack of link can be explained first by the structural effect of the financial policy tool. More than a neutral technical tool used to meet pre-accession goals (narrative), the tool has its own logic, which impacts the content of the FA. Specific programs (environment, transport, competitiveness, human resources) have been developed under the different components of IPA and funds have been provided for these programs. Doing that, FA framework has empowered specific Turkish administrations (Ministry of EU affairs but also Ministries of Environment & Urbanisation, Transport; Science, Industry & technology; Labour & Social Security). These five ministries are more aware of EU assistance, have developed more capacities, and are more under the pressure of the programming. Regardless of the link of their field with priorities axis, these administrations attract more EU funds. The lack of link also results from a contradiction between various logics. The strategic approach is based on a top-down logic: priorities axis are designed at the top of the enlargement framework and should be then reflected in FA programming. This logic is more difficult to carry out with the slowing down of negotiations. It is also in total contradiction with the ideal model of “governance by project”, based on the bottom-up logic of appropriateness: a “beneficiary” is keener to implement a project when s/he comes up with the idea of the project. Of course the idea of the project must be linked to the Acquis, but it is not necessarily related to “enlargement priorities”. The weakness of the Turkish administration devoted to EU affairs reinforcesthe non-connection between FA and enlargement frameworks
Conclusion 1. One can assess that FA is going well. The financial tool has been well integrated, and institutions are now getting ready for the next stage (end of ex-ante control). If one considers the FA as a tool to prepare the candidate country to act as a EU member state, there is a real process of Europeanisation that is still going on. The autonomy of the FA from the enlargement issue might be a reason of its success. One could be sorry for this reality, considering the fact that the non-politicization of the FA blurred the normative impact of the EU. But one must keep in mind that EU is not only norms, but also procedures.
My second objective was to highlight the effects of the EU FA on the Turkish governance. I have focused neither on the content of the projects nor on the targeted people but on the actors involved as beneficiaries or as implementing organisations. The analysis reveals that FA first reinforces the Turkish administrative centralization. Even if a large number of implementing actors are involved, they are not much affected by the FA. However, FA has triggered the rise of a very specific field of consultancy which plays a key role in the FA.
Beneficiaries of Projects: there is an overrepresentation of central administration as beneficiary bodies, both in terms of number of organisations that have benefited from contracts (24 Ministries, 21 Governemental Boards, Agencies, Companies, 10 other state bodies, 10 local government, 13 Non State organisations) and in terms of number of contracts they get. There is only one non central administration in the top 10 list of beneficiaries (ISKUR, Turkish Labour Agency). Centralisation is of course a characteristic of the Turkish Governance. But, in this case, is reinforced by the FA tool: the Ministries which play a key role in the FA are all ranked in the top 10 list of beneficiaries. Other organisations do not have enough capacity, they are also more reluctant to benefit from a project. There is a monopolisation of the « governance by project » by the central administration and the key actors of the financial framework. This challenges the idea of “appropriateness”: projects are not necessarily designed and implemented at the more appropriate level (Civil Society issue is a very good example of this discrepancy).
The implementing actors that get Grant, Work and Supply contracts: the study shows that a wide range of Turkish actors has been involved in FA framework, with no concentration on a certain type of actor. However, this diversity goes together with a low exposure to IPA governance. Between 68% and 85% of the organisations have only got one contract. This means that the experience of the EU ways of doing has remained low. Research has shown that repetition of experience and long term exposure is fundamental for social learning. In this case, the experience of EU funded projects remains superficial.
The implementing actors who get Service contacts: the picture is quite different in this case. The percentage of Turkish organisations is significantly lower than those in other types of contracts. There is an overrepresentation of consulting firms (which can be explained once more by the structure of the instrument itself). This rise of a consultancy field devoted to EU affairs is not specific to Turkey or candidate countries and seems to be a characteristic of the EU system. 68% of the organisations have only obtained one contract. The global consultancy firms which have opened a subsidiary in Turkey are the companies the most awarded. Unlike the other types of contracts, the small number of organisations which have obtained more than 5 contracts make up a large proportion (30,4%) of the overall service contracts market. This phenomenon of concentration is even higher for some components of IPA since sectorial ministries have been accredited for the management (tendering, contracting and payment) of the projects. Even if Service contracts are less numerous than Grant and Supply contracts; even if the number of awarded organisations is also lower, the power of consulting firms involved in several Service contracts is quite important.
Conclusion: FA is going well in Turkey despite the slowing down of the negotiations. It is possible to speak about a process of Europeanisation, but not sufficient to bring a deep social change in Turkey. This process does not involve large range of Turkish actors in the EU governance. It has not triggered a large redefinition of ways of doing, interests and identities of Turkish actors. It is more related to the emerging of an EU-oriented, narrow, specific, professional field of expertise. This sector is rather isolated from the Turkish society but very well connected with the European delegation. It reminds us of Brussels governance of “technocratic copinage” (Majone 1996). However, in Turkey, this specific governance takes place in a political system which is not the one of the European Union...
No link between FA and negotiations. Data analysis doesn’t reveal any systematic correlation between the implementation of projects and opening of chapters. The contraction of chapters that remain openable has not been followed by a reorientation of the programming. On the other hand, vetoed chapters have not lead to the suspension of the FA in the related fields.
This non-link is first related the structural mismatch between the two frameworks of negotiations and of FA. Negotiations are held by the EU member states. The process of opening chapters is not linked to the degree of compliance but more to windows of opportunities. On the contrary, FA is related to an administrative process that is all the more long and rigid because of the specificity of the decentralised system with non-member countries. The two frameworks are related to two very different worlds. Beside the conjectural time of crisis, FA is not subject to politicization. At the project’s implementation level, interviewees don’t show a specific professional interest for negotiations. There are even interviewees who are not aware of the negotiation’s benchmarks, some of them do not even know the number of the chapter related to their field or whether it was open for negotiation.
No real connection between FA & enlargement priorities: With the transformation of the enlargement policy and thus the pre-accession one, there has been a change in role given to FA: the aim is to escape from the former logic of preparing candidates countries to use EU structural funds, and to focus on the linkage between FA and progress towards enlargement. However, the official evaluation of first period of IPA (2007-14) has pointed out, as one of the main criticisms, that enlargement priorities do not get the highest percentage of EU FA.
The lack of link can be explained first by the structural effect of the financial policy tool. More than a neutral technical tool used to meet pre-accession goals (narrative), the tool has its own logic, which impacts the content of the FA. Specific programs (environment, transport, competitiveness, human resources) have been developed under the different components of IPA and funds have been provided for these programs. Doing that, FA framework has empowered specific Turkish administrations (Ministry of EU affairs but also Ministries of Environment & Urbanisation, Transport; Science, Industry & technology; Labour & Social Security). These five ministries are more aware of EU assistance, have developed more capacities, and are more under the pressure of the programming. Regardless of the link of their field with priorities axis, these administrations attract more EU funds. The lack of link also results from a contradiction between various logics. The strategic approach is based on a top-down logic: priorities axis are designed at the top of the enlargement framework and should be then reflected in FA programming. This logic is more difficult to carry out with the slowing down of negotiations. It is also in total contradiction with the ideal model of “governance by project”, based on the bottom-up logic of appropriateness: a “beneficiary” is keener to implement a project when s/he comes up with the idea of the project. Of course the idea of the project must be linked to the Acquis, but it is not necessarily related to “enlargement priorities”. The weakness of the Turkish administration devoted to EU affairs reinforcesthe non-connection between FA and enlargement frameworks
Conclusion 1. One can assess that FA is going well. The financial tool has been well integrated, and institutions are now getting ready for the next stage (end of ex-ante control). If one considers the FA as a tool to prepare the candidate country to act as a EU member state, there is a real process of Europeanisation that is still going on. The autonomy of the FA from the enlargement issue might be a reason of its success. One could be sorry for this reality, considering the fact that the non-politicization of the FA blurred the normative impact of the EU. But one must keep in mind that EU is not only norms, but also procedures.
My second objective was to highlight the effects of the EU FA on the Turkish governance. I have focused neither on the content of the projects nor on the targeted people but on the actors involved as beneficiaries or as implementing organisations. The analysis reveals that FA first reinforces the Turkish administrative centralization. Even if a large number of implementing actors are involved, they are not much affected by the FA. However, FA has triggered the rise of a very specific field of consultancy which plays a key role in the FA.
Beneficiaries of Projects: there is an overrepresentation of central administration as beneficiary bodies, both in terms of number of organisations that have benefited from contracts (24 Ministries, 21 Governemental Boards, Agencies, Companies, 10 other state bodies, 10 local government, 13 Non State organisations) and in terms of number of contracts they get. There is only one non central administration in the top 10 list of beneficiaries (ISKUR, Turkish Labour Agency). Centralisation is of course a characteristic of the Turkish Governance. But, in this case, is reinforced by the FA tool: the Ministries which play a key role in the FA are all ranked in the top 10 list of beneficiaries. Other organisations do not have enough capacity, they are also more reluctant to benefit from a project. There is a monopolisation of the « governance by project » by the central administration and the key actors of the financial framework. This challenges the idea of “appropriateness”: projects are not necessarily designed and implemented at the more appropriate level (Civil Society issue is a very good example of this discrepancy).
The implementing actors that get Grant, Work and Supply contracts: the study shows that a wide range of Turkish actors has been involved in FA framework, with no concentration on a certain type of actor. However, this diversity goes together with a low exposure to IPA governance. Between 68% and 85% of the organisations have only got one contract. This means that the experience of the EU ways of doing has remained low. Research has shown that repetition of experience and long term exposure is fundamental for social learning. In this case, the experience of EU funded projects remains superficial.
The implementing actors who get Service contacts: the picture is quite different in this case. The percentage of Turkish organisations is significantly lower than those in other types of contracts. There is an overrepresentation of consulting firms (which can be explained once more by the structure of the instrument itself). This rise of a consultancy field devoted to EU affairs is not specific to Turkey or candidate countries and seems to be a characteristic of the EU system. 68% of the organisations have only obtained one contract. The global consultancy firms which have opened a subsidiary in Turkey are the companies the most awarded. Unlike the other types of contracts, the small number of organisations which have obtained more than 5 contracts make up a large proportion (30,4%) of the overall service contracts market. This phenomenon of concentration is even higher for some components of IPA since sectorial ministries have been accredited for the management (tendering, contracting and payment) of the projects. Even if Service contracts are less numerous than Grant and Supply contracts; even if the number of awarded organisations is also lower, the power of consulting firms involved in several Service contracts is quite important.
Conclusion: FA is going well in Turkey despite the slowing down of the negotiations. It is possible to speak about a process of Europeanisation, but not sufficient to bring a deep social change in Turkey. This process does not involve large range of Turkish actors in the EU governance. It has not triggered a large redefinition of ways of doing, interests and identities of Turkish actors. It is more related to the emerging of an EU-oriented, narrow, specific, professional field of expertise. This sector is rather isolated from the Turkish society but very well connected with the European delegation. It reminds us of Brussels governance of “technocratic copinage” (Majone 1996). However, in Turkey, this specific governance takes place in a political system which is not the one of the European Union...