Seventh Workshop on Formal and Computational Cryptography, Paris, France
30 June 2011 - 30 June 2011
France
The Seventh Workshop on Formal and Computational Cryptography will take place on 30 June 2011 in Paris, France.
Since the 1980s two approaches have been developed for analysing security protocols and systems that rely on cryptography. One of the approaches is based on a computational model that considers issues of computational complexity and probability. The other approach relies on a symbolic model of protocol execution in which messages are modelled using algebra and cryptographic terms which are treated as perfect 'black-boxes'. Each of the two approaches, however, has analytical difficulties and problems.
The event will focus on approaches and project results that combine and relate symbolic and computational protocol analysis. One set of results establish correspondence theorems between the two models, in effect showing that, for a certain class of protocols and properties, security in the symbolic model implies security in the computational model. In other work, researchers use language-based techniques such as process calculi, type systems, and protocol logics to reason directly about the computational model. There is also work being done which looks at ways of mechanising computationally sound proofs of cryptographic mechanisms.
The workshop will take place in coordination with the Computer Security Foundations Symposium 2011.For further information, please visit: http://www.cs.ut.ee/~unruh/fcc2011/(opens in new window)
Since the 1980s two approaches have been developed for analysing security protocols and systems that rely on cryptography. One of the approaches is based on a computational model that considers issues of computational complexity and probability. The other approach relies on a symbolic model of protocol execution in which messages are modelled using algebra and cryptographic terms which are treated as perfect 'black-boxes'. Each of the two approaches, however, has analytical difficulties and problems.
The event will focus on approaches and project results that combine and relate symbolic and computational protocol analysis. One set of results establish correspondence theorems between the two models, in effect showing that, for a certain class of protocols and properties, security in the symbolic model implies security in the computational model. In other work, researchers use language-based techniques such as process calculi, type systems, and protocol logics to reason directly about the computational model. There is also work being done which looks at ways of mechanising computationally sound proofs of cryptographic mechanisms.
The workshop will take place in coordination with the Computer Security Foundations Symposium 2011.For further information, please visit: http://www.cs.ut.ee/~unruh/fcc2011/(opens in new window)