Periodic Reporting for period 2 - CRIMGOV (Production, Trade and Governance: a New Framework for the Understanding of Organized Crime)
Reporting period: 2023-04-01 to 2024-09-30
There is a consensus that organized crime (OC) is harmful and its profits are immense. Yet the concept of OC itself lumps together people engaging in very different activities—from peasants in Colombia to international drug traffickers to mafiosi in Italy—, and scholars in the field rely on limited empirical evidence, generally of poor quality. Our overall objectives are to establish this field of study on solid analytical grounds and to produce high-quality data. We develop a framework that distinguishes three key activities of OC groups: Production, Trade, and Governance. We theorize that while some OC groups specialize in either the production or transport and exchange of illicit goods, others seek to establish authority over a territory and/or a market, governing interactions and exchanges within these domains. We ask: How do groups engaging in (criminal) Production, Trade or Governance differ from each other? Do they each have a different organizational structure and members with different ‘professional’ profiles and skills? To what extent is there an overlap between them? Finally, under which conditions would one group specializing in Production or Trade evolve into a Governance-type OC group?
The project covers a broad range of organized crime in depth: cybercrime, the international trade of drugs from Colombia to Europe, and the emergence of criminal governance inside and outside prisons in countries as diverse as the UK, Georgia, Russia, and Japan. The project is producing high quality data sets that are hard to collect and time-consuming to code. Such data sets include the World Cybercrime Index, the Russian mafia database, and additional, curated databases on internal drug trafficking and the use of violence, crime in the city of Nottingham, gangs in London, and the effects of the Japanese yakuza on the local economy. CRIMGOV breaks traditional disciplinary boundaries between the social sciences and adopts a global outlook, producing substantial new findings and data, speaking to scholars across different disciplines.
CRIMGOV is important to society because it offers the analytical tools to distinguish key functions within organized crime: peasants tolling the fields in Colombia are very different from international drug traffickers, who in turn are very different from local mafia families. The first engages in production, the second in trade, and the third aspires to govern territories. By distinguishing these key functions, policies for fighting organized crime can be tailored to the activities undertaken by each type of offender/crime group. This perspective also allows us to identify those who are victims as opposed to perpetrators.
The project covers a broad range of organized crime in depth: cybercrime, the international trade of drugs from Colombia to Europe, and the emergence of criminal governance inside and outside prisons in countries as diverse as the UK, Georgia, Russia, and Japan. The project is producing high quality data sets that are hard to collect and time-consuming to code. Such data sets include the World Cybercrime Index, the Russian mafia database, and additional, curated databases on internal drug trafficking and the use of violence, crime in the city of Nottingham, gangs in London, and the effects of the Japanese yakuza on the local economy. CRIMGOV breaks traditional disciplinary boundaries between the social sciences and adopts a global outlook, producing substantial new findings and data, speaking to scholars across different disciplines.
CRIMGOV is important to society because it offers the analytical tools to distinguish key functions within organized crime: peasants tolling the fields in Colombia are very different from international drug traffickers, who in turn are very different from local mafia families. The first engages in production, the second in trade, and the third aspires to govern territories. By distinguishing these key functions, policies for fighting organized crime can be tailored to the activities undertaken by each type of offender/crime group. This perspective also allows us to identify those who are victims as opposed to perpetrators.
The CRIMGOV project has successfully achieved its key objectives during this reporting period. First, we are producing high quality data. The World Cybercrime Index (WCI) survey was successfully deployed in 2021, and the results collected, analysed, and published in a paper for PlosONE in 2024. As of now, the WCI has been mentioned in 241 news reports (https://plos.altmetric.com/details/162161306/news(opens in new window)) and the paper is already cited. We completed the second wave of expert interviews for the WCI (February-December 2023) and started planning publications around the new data. We expanded, curated, and polished a dataset on the vory-v-zakone criminal fraternity (Russian mafia), which stands at n=6,332 and includes some 30 variables (e.g. basic demographics, prison history, criminal history). The dataset is now ready for team members to use in academic publications. We also collected and curated a data set of 81 official communications (progony) by members of the Russian mafia, also to be used in publications. We also collected, coded, and prepared papers for publications on the use of violence in international drug trafficking in Europe and Asia, the effects of yakuza on the local economy in Tokyo, cybercrime in China, and criminal governance in the city of Nottingham (the relevant paper appeared in Nature Cities) and gangs in London. Overall, this work aims to test key elements of the CRIMGOV framework.
Second, we have started testing hypotheses on the data collected. Some of the key findings of the project so far are: -the presence of the yakuza in neighbourhoods has a positive effect on local employment; -a gang in Nottingham involved in local governance was able to reduce the level of ordinary crime compared to a most similar neighbourhood where there was no such gang; -governance-type gangs in London are more likely to emerge the highest the distance from local services; -prisons in Russia where the vory-v-zakone are present experience less overall violence than prisons run by state officials; -there is no violence in international drugs trade; -Trade-type and Governance-type OC groups have different network structures.
Third, we disseminated our results. We organized the yearly CRIMGOV Workshops, held in Oxford (November 2023 and 2024), two research events in Paris (December 2023 and March 2024), two conferences in Japan (October 2024), and two in Oxford (August 2022 and November 2024), and attended and presented at major international conferences. Due to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia, we have decided to conduct fieldwork in the Republic of Georgia, which took place from August to October 2024. We also updated the project website in order for scholars and practitioners to access our research and contact us.
Second, we have started testing hypotheses on the data collected. Some of the key findings of the project so far are: -the presence of the yakuza in neighbourhoods has a positive effect on local employment; -a gang in Nottingham involved in local governance was able to reduce the level of ordinary crime compared to a most similar neighbourhood where there was no such gang; -governance-type gangs in London are more likely to emerge the highest the distance from local services; -prisons in Russia where the vory-v-zakone are present experience less overall violence than prisons run by state officials; -there is no violence in international drugs trade; -Trade-type and Governance-type OC groups have different network structures.
Third, we disseminated our results. We organized the yearly CRIMGOV Workshops, held in Oxford (November 2023 and 2024), two research events in Paris (December 2023 and March 2024), two conferences in Japan (October 2024), and two in Oxford (August 2022 and November 2024), and attended and presented at major international conferences. Due to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia, we have decided to conduct fieldwork in the Republic of Georgia, which took place from August to October 2024. We also updated the project website in order for scholars and practitioners to access our research and contact us.
The project has gone beyond the state of the art in several ways. First, we have developed an Index of Cybercrime which distinguishes five distinct activities: the production of technical products/services (e.g. malware coding, botnet access, access to compromised systems, tool production); Attacks and Extortion (e.g. DDoS attacks, ransomware); Data/identity theft (e.g. hacking, phishing, account compromises, credit card compromises); Scams (e.g. advance fee fraud, business email compromise, online auction fraud); Cashing out/money laundering (e.g. credit card fraud, money mules, illicit virtual currency platforms). These five types have been validated with experts, and then combined in an Index which places such activities in a given country. We have now two waves of the survey. This instrument promises to become the standard Index in the field for years to come, similar to the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index. No such Index existed before CRIMGOV. The expected results include papers to be written testing various hypotheses on the geographical location of cybercrime using the Index as the dependent variable.
Second, we collected unique data sets on the Russian mafia, its members as well as their written communication. Such data sets also did not exist. We have coded data on the use of violence in local, regional and international drug trafficking, crime in Nottingham, and yakuza offices and their impact on the local economy in Japan. We have conduced ethnographic interviews with prison population in Georgia, as well as members of the civil society and demobilised armed groups in Colombia. A significant achievement has been to map the gang’s landscape of the city of London. We mapped gangs according to whether they were involved in criminal governance beyond illegal markets and controlled communities (or not) and explored why are likely to emerge. The results will be published shortly in an academic paper.
Besides the production of original data sets, the project has progressed well beyond the state of the art by introducing a novel framework that is being tested in a variety of studies (also by scholars beyond the CRIMGOV research group) and using the data collected. The expected results of CRIMGOV are to delineate and empirically validate the differing features of OC groups involved in either (criminal) production, trade, or governance and outline the cases where there is overlap among the three functions. Such a perspective will have transformative consequences, allowing those who fight OC to tailor their policies depending on the activities undertaken by groups.
Second, we collected unique data sets on the Russian mafia, its members as well as their written communication. Such data sets also did not exist. We have coded data on the use of violence in local, regional and international drug trafficking, crime in Nottingham, and yakuza offices and their impact on the local economy in Japan. We have conduced ethnographic interviews with prison population in Georgia, as well as members of the civil society and demobilised armed groups in Colombia. A significant achievement has been to map the gang’s landscape of the city of London. We mapped gangs according to whether they were involved in criminal governance beyond illegal markets and controlled communities (or not) and explored why are likely to emerge. The results will be published shortly in an academic paper.
Besides the production of original data sets, the project has progressed well beyond the state of the art by introducing a novel framework that is being tested in a variety of studies (also by scholars beyond the CRIMGOV research group) and using the data collected. The expected results of CRIMGOV are to delineate and empirically validate the differing features of OC groups involved in either (criminal) production, trade, or governance and outline the cases where there is overlap among the three functions. Such a perspective will have transformative consequences, allowing those who fight OC to tailor their policies depending on the activities undertaken by groups.