Description du projet
Sémantique de la vérité déflationniste
La vérité est cruciale dans tous nos discours. Mais l’étudier aujourd’hui sur les bases traditionnelles de la philosophie et de la sémantique, fondées sur la relation entre la vérité et la réalité qui la sous-tend, met en évidence de nombreux paradoxes. L’alternative la plus prometteuse serait d’adopter l’approche déflationniste de la philosophie moderne, qui s’appuie sur les assertions de la vérité prédiquée d’un énoncé et non sur l’attribut de «vérité». La sémantique de la théorie de la preuve peut offrir une explication inférentialiste du déflationnisme. Cependant, les recherches sur la compatibilité de la sémantique de la théorie de la preuve avec cette approche de la vérité font actuellement défaut. Le projet Truth in PTS, financé par l’UE, entend combler cette lacune en fournissant une nouvelle sémantique probo-théorique pour la vérité déflationniste. Il se concentrera sur les logiques intuitionnistes et intermédiaires pour soutenir le déflationnisme, en épurant ses implications et son contenu.
Objectif
Truth plays an important role in our everyday discourse. However, the philosophical study of truth has proven challenging. The semantics of truth is complicated both by questions of the nature of truth and by the paradoxes naïve theories generate. Traditional views about truth hold that a statement is true if it corresponds to reality. These views require positing a correspondence relation between reality on the one hand and language on the other; spelling out the details of such an account has fallen prey to vicious circle arguments and other accusations of triviality. Deflationism about truth, in contrast, assumes that the meaning of “true” can be explained with reference only to its linguistic and logical role. As such, it is natural to try and clarify the content of deflationism by offering an inferentialist explanation of deflationism. Proof-theoretic semantics brings precision to inferentialism. Hence, if the truth predicate can be given a proof-theoretic semantics, we will finally be able to state precisely what deflationism amounts to. The main objective of this project is to assess to what extent proof-theoretic semantics is compatible with the deflationist conception of truth and to deploy proof-theoretic semantics in elucidating what it means for truth to be a metaphysically light notion. This is important because it has been argued that no proof-theoretic semantics can be given to truth. However, the argument is based on a naïve, classical, inflationary notion of truth. Deflationism opens up a non-classical, non- naïve approach to truth. There is no research on whether proof-theoretic semantics is compatible with this approach to truth. This project will provide a proof-theoretic semantics for deflationary truth, focusing on intuitionistic and intermediate logics, and thereby give strong support to deflationism and clarify its implications and contents.
Champ scientifique
Programme(s)
Régime de financement
MSCA-IF - Marie Skłodowska-Curie Individual Fellowships (IF)Coordinateur
BS8 1QU Bristol
Royaume-Uni