The Politicised Regulatory State: Rationing Public Service Provision in Advanced Democracies

Project Information

POLREG

Grant agreement ID: 101029233

DOI

10.3030/101029233

Project closed

EC signature date 30 April 2021

Start date 1 April 2022

End date 29 June 2024

Funded under

• EXCELLENT SCIENCE - Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions

Total cost

€ 184 707,84

EU contribution

€ 184 707,84

Coordinated by

FONDATION NATIONALE DES SCIENCES POLITIQUES
France

Periodic Reporting for period 1 - POLREG (The Politicised Regulatory State: Rationing Public Service Provision in Advanced Democracies)

Reporting period: 2022-04-01 to 2024-03-31

Summary of the context and overall objectives of the project

Over the last few decades independent regulatory agencies have proliferated across the world. While scholars have debated whether independent regulators are compatible with democracy, we know less about how regulators evolve over time after their creation and whether and how these bodies withstand the pressure to ‘politicise’ the issues after their creation. Without examining the conditions under which regulators are consolidated or rolled back, our understanding of their impacts on democratic politics remains limited.

To address this gap, the POLREG project provided a systematic comparative analysis on when and how independent regulators prove unstable and when they prove stable. It focused on rationing, i.e. the restriction of public service provision, a crucial test for the durability of regulators facing political pressures. The project developed a theoretical framework for understanding political struggles over the maintenance of regulatory institutions. It assessed such a framework through a comparative cross-national research design. In doing so, POLREG sought to advance a more nuanced understanding of the relations between independent regulators and democratic politics.

Work performed from the beginning of the project to the end of the period covered by the report and main results achieved so far

The researcher developed a novel theoretical framework for understanding political struggles over regulatory institutions, by bringing together different literatures in public policy, comparative politics, political economy, sociology, and public administration. Through a comparative research design and process tracing, the researcher found previously underexplored mechanisms where the institutional arrangements around regulatory agencies shaped subsequent politcisation as well as policy responses and institutional change. The results also show how different institutional, political, and contextual factors conditioned the trajectories of independent regulators.

The project resulted in a book manuscript for a major university press and published peer-reviewed journal articles as well as article manuscripts in progress. In the process of developing and publishing these outputs, the researcher presented the project at international conferences, workshops, and seminar talks. The researcher also disseminated the results through blog posts and seminar talks targeting policy actors.

Progress beyond the state of the art and expected potential impact (including the socio-economic impact and the wider societal implications of the project so far)

Previous studies on independent regulators focused on the conditions behind the creation of regulators. The project advanced the knowledge in the field of regulation, by examining when and how regulators evolved over time and whether and how they withstand political pressures. The results show that, instead of following a linear trajectory where regulators reinforce themselves, they followed divergent pathways. These pathways were conditioned by institutional, political, and contextual factors. The findings are important in understanding political and societal drivers behind pressures on independent regulators. They have implications for both how policymakers can respond to pressures and when and how societal actors as well as citizens can influence regulatory policymaking.

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