Periodic Reporting for period 1 - DE-CONSPIRATOR (Detecting and Countering Information Suppression from A Transnational Perspective)
Reporting period: 2024-01-01 to 2024-12-31
Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) is an escalating threat to the European Union, as foreign actors deliberately exploit digital platforms to distort democratic debate, erode trust in institutions, and influence international perceptions. These operations go beyond traditional disinformation, combining narrative suppression, coordinated influence, and emotional manipulation. The DE-CONSPIRATOR project addresses this challenge by integrating political science, behavioral research, computational methods, and legal-policy analysis.
The project aims to (1) analyze how actors like Russia and China design and deploy FIMI strategies; (2) identify domestic networks in the EU that enable or amplify these efforts; (3) create a multi-country event database of FIMI cases; (4) understand the psychological and social mechanisms that make individuals or groups vulnerable to FIMI; and (5) evaluate existing policy, legal, and regulatory responses while offering practical improvements.
By combining field research, archival analysis, network mapping, experimental psychology, and policy review, DE-CONSPIRATOR is generating new insights and tools for early warning, regulatory adaptation, and public resilience. Its findings are aimed at supporting EU institutions, member states, civil society, and digital platforms in recognizing and mitigating foreign manipulation, particularly in the face of rapidly evolving technologies and cross-border threats.
The project aims to (1) analyze how actors like Russia and China design and deploy FIMI strategies; (2) identify domestic networks in the EU that enable or amplify these efforts; (3) create a multi-country event database of FIMI cases; (4) understand the psychological and social mechanisms that make individuals or groups vulnerable to FIMI; and (5) evaluate existing policy, legal, and regulatory responses while offering practical improvements.
By combining field research, archival analysis, network mapping, experimental psychology, and policy review, DE-CONSPIRATOR is generating new insights and tools for early warning, regulatory adaptation, and public resilience. Its findings are aimed at supporting EU institutions, member states, civil society, and digital platforms in recognizing and mitigating foreign manipulation, particularly in the face of rapidly evolving technologies and cross-border threats.
DE-CONSPIRATOR has made significant progress in advancing the theory, evidence base, and policy relevance of Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) research.
On the conceptual front, the project has developed a standardized taxonomy of FIMI-related tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), helping align academic, regulatory, and platform-level terminology. A comparative review of Russian and Chinese strategic doctrines has revealed divergent approaches: Russia favors high-tempo, crisis-driven disinformation, while China prioritizes long-term narrative control through media partnerships and diaspora influence. These insights have been validated through expert workshops with stakeholders from NATO, the EEAS, and EU institutions.
Empirically, the project has begun mapping domestic amplification networks in Europe, including influencers, fringe media, and coordinated bot activity across platforms such as Telegram, X (Twitter), and YouTube. A multi-national FIMI event repository—now comprising over 100 documented cases—provides metadata on key actors and the flow of influence narratives.
Behavioral research is underway to understand societal vulnerability to FIMI. A psychometric tool, the “DisinforMeter,” has been designed and tested to measure individual susceptibility, while cross-country surveys examine trust in media and public reactions to influence operations.
On the policy front, the project has launched consultations with over 50 stakeholders—including regulators, tech platforms, and legal experts—to inform a regulatory toolbox aimed at improving platform transparency, legal accountability, and safeguards against AI-driven FIMI.
On the conceptual front, the project has developed a standardized taxonomy of FIMI-related tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), helping align academic, regulatory, and platform-level terminology. A comparative review of Russian and Chinese strategic doctrines has revealed divergent approaches: Russia favors high-tempo, crisis-driven disinformation, while China prioritizes long-term narrative control through media partnerships and diaspora influence. These insights have been validated through expert workshops with stakeholders from NATO, the EEAS, and EU institutions.
Empirically, the project has begun mapping domestic amplification networks in Europe, including influencers, fringe media, and coordinated bot activity across platforms such as Telegram, X (Twitter), and YouTube. A multi-national FIMI event repository—now comprising over 100 documented cases—provides metadata on key actors and the flow of influence narratives.
Behavioral research is underway to understand societal vulnerability to FIMI. A psychometric tool, the “DisinforMeter,” has been designed and tested to measure individual susceptibility, while cross-country surveys examine trust in media and public reactions to influence operations.
On the policy front, the project has launched consultations with over 50 stakeholders—including regulators, tech platforms, and legal experts—to inform a regulatory toolbox aimed at improving platform transparency, legal accountability, and safeguards against AI-driven FIMI.
1. Advancing FIMI Conceptualization and Detection
- Help improving the first EU-wide standardized taxonomy of FIMI tactics, leveraging existing models such as DISARM, OPENCTI and STIX2, improving threat identification and response strategies in light of new technologies and through a deeper analysis of Russian and Chinese strategic doctrines,
- Mapping the evolution of Russian and Chinese disinformation strategies, uncovering long-term patterns of influence operations.
2. Innovative Empirical Approaches to FIMI Analysis
- First transnational longitudinal large-N dataset of FIMI-related amplification networks in the EU, tracking narrative diffusion from fringe platforms to mainstream media.
- Advanced network analysis techniques for identifying hidden coordination strategies among actors spreading FIMI content within the EU
3. Behavioral and Psychological Insights into FIMI Susceptibility
- DisinforMeter: First Micro-Level Psychometric FIMI Vulnerability Analysis Tool
. Measures cognitive biases and trust factors influencing FIMI receptivity.
. Enables targeted media literacy and intervention strategies.
. First Multi-Country Behavioral Analysis of FIMI Impact
. Identifies cross-cultural differences in vulnerability to influence operations.
. Supports personalized counter-FIMI interventions at the societal level.
4. Strengthening EU Policy and Governance Against FIMI
- DSA Compliance Recommendations: Provided guidelines to improve platform accountability in countering algorithmic amplification of FIMI.
- AI-Generated Disinformation Monitoring Review: Regulatory suggestions for ethically deploying AI for tracking and mitigating deepfake-based influence campaigns automatically, within GDPR compliance limits.
- Cross-Border Policy Coordination: Improving coordination options and toolkit between NATO and EU institutions to align FIMI response strategies across member states.
- Help improving the first EU-wide standardized taxonomy of FIMI tactics, leveraging existing models such as DISARM, OPENCTI and STIX2, improving threat identification and response strategies in light of new technologies and through a deeper analysis of Russian and Chinese strategic doctrines,
- Mapping the evolution of Russian and Chinese disinformation strategies, uncovering long-term patterns of influence operations.
2. Innovative Empirical Approaches to FIMI Analysis
- First transnational longitudinal large-N dataset of FIMI-related amplification networks in the EU, tracking narrative diffusion from fringe platforms to mainstream media.
- Advanced network analysis techniques for identifying hidden coordination strategies among actors spreading FIMI content within the EU
3. Behavioral and Psychological Insights into FIMI Susceptibility
- DisinforMeter: First Micro-Level Psychometric FIMI Vulnerability Analysis Tool
. Measures cognitive biases and trust factors influencing FIMI receptivity.
. Enables targeted media literacy and intervention strategies.
. First Multi-Country Behavioral Analysis of FIMI Impact
. Identifies cross-cultural differences in vulnerability to influence operations.
. Supports personalized counter-FIMI interventions at the societal level.
4. Strengthening EU Policy and Governance Against FIMI
- DSA Compliance Recommendations: Provided guidelines to improve platform accountability in countering algorithmic amplification of FIMI.
- AI-Generated Disinformation Monitoring Review: Regulatory suggestions for ethically deploying AI for tracking and mitigating deepfake-based influence campaigns automatically, within GDPR compliance limits.
- Cross-Border Policy Coordination: Improving coordination options and toolkit between NATO and EU institutions to align FIMI response strategies across member states.