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Dynamic Markets with Information Asymmetries: Strategic and Non-Strategic Information Transmission

Project description

Analysing competition in dynamic markets with asymmetric information

The ERC-funded DynamicInfoAsym project aims to gain insight into dynamic markets by examining information transmission by strategic agents and algorithms. Its primary objective is to analyse competition in dynamic markets with asymmetric information, taking into account both positive and normative analysis. To do so, the project will first develop a strategic workhorse model that allows for thorough assessment of policy impact and regulatory decisions on consumer welfare and market efficiency. It will apply the model to investigate decisions made by strategic agents and those made by algorithms across different markets, and draw comparisons. Finally, it will assess how the resulting insights can inform policy debates on regulation, particularly within the framework of the EU AI Act.

Objective

This proposal aims to advance our understanding of information transmission in dynamic markets by examining two specific scenarios: (i) information transmission by strategic agents and (ii) information transmission by algorithms. Its core focus revolves around the analysis of competition in dynamic markets with asymmetric information. The proposal encompasses both positive and normative analyses, offering insights into the ongoing discourse on predatory and algorithmic pricing.

The project comprises three ambitious tasks:

The first part develops a state-of-the-art theoretical workhorse model. Unlike the previous literature, it does not follow the “reputation” approach, which assumes the existence of a type committed to playing specific behavior. Instead, it adopts a fully strategic model, which, in turn, enables a thorough examination of the impact of policy and regulatory decisions on consumer welfare or market efficiency in a variety of markets since the equilibrium predictions do not depend on the endogenously specified behavioral types.

The second part showcases the applications of the tools developed in Part 1 across different environments and how the resulting insights can inform policy debates on regulation. When applied to dynamic limit pricing, the model reveals a novel tradeoff: strategic delay. Entrants may opt to delay their entry decisions to gather more information about market conditions, which potentially could lead to a decrease in consumer welfare. This suggests that antitrust policies should also consider strategic delay, rather than solely focusing on the occurrence of entry when deciding whether limit pricing negatively affects consumers or not.

The final part of the project examines decisions made by algorithms rather than strategic agents and draws comparisons with Part 2. This part holds the potential to contribute significantly to the regulation of Artificial Intelligence, particularly within the framework of the EU AI Act.

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Programme(s)

Topic(s)

Funding Scheme

HORIZON-ERC - HORIZON ERC Grants

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Call for proposal

(opens in new window) ERC-2024-STG

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Host institution

LUISS LIBERA UNIVERSITA INTERNAZIONALE DEGLI STUDI SOCIALI GUIDO CARLI
Net EU contribution
€ 1 136 046,00
Address
VIALE POLA 12
00198 Roma
Italy
Region
Centro (IT) Lazio Roma
Activity type
Higher or Secondary Education Establishments
Links
Total cost
€ 1 136 046,00

Beneficiaries (1)