Final Activity Report Summary - EASTPART (Europeanisation of East-Central European party systems)
Thanks to the fellowship there has been a very productive period, publishing four articles, nine book chapters, and submitting three further articles. Research has been done on party identification, party organisation, and cleavages, but the primary concern was the impact of European integration on domestic party politics. Here are summarised some of my main findings:
In East Central European party politics the logic of national competition overrides the impact of European integration. Still, a number of relevant phenomena can be traced back to the integration process. Most importantly: the constrained nature of the policy-space of party competition; the adoption of Western European ideologies and identities; the spread of certain organisational techniques (e.g. gender quotas); the incorporation of the European level into the party hierarchies and the appearance of European carrier options; the ostracisation of certain parties; the campaign support coming from sister parties and Europarties; and the regulation of party finance, mainly following the decisions of the Council of Europe.
The issue of European integration failed to turn into a central divide, but in a few cases one could witness an increasing polarisation along this issue. In Poland Eursokepticism became a decisive factor in party competition. Across the whole region the parties are rapidly developing complex attitudes on the issue, and increasingly provide a pro-European critique of the integration project. The attitude to European integration is typically a more integral part of the principal dimension of competition than in the West. As a result, the accuracy of representation (the congruence between party elites and voters) on the integration issue is somewhat better than in Western Europe.
In the framework of the Europeanisation process it is important to distinguish between two different stimuli: the 'typical' Western European national party politics and European Union politics. While Western European nation states tend to have a more clear left-right polarisation than the new member states, the European Union is characterised by a non-partisan decision-making logic. The lack of a clear trend in the polarisation of an East Central European shows the contradictory impulses coming from these sources.
The accession process constrained the coalition alternatives in the region. Many parties moderated their position in order to become more electable and acceptable for the EU. But these tendencies have largely stopped after acquiring membership status. European actors continued to make attempts at influencing coalition formulas, but these attempts often failed (cf. Poland and Slovakia).
The party systems of East Central Europe became markedly less fragmented during the last decade. This has happened largely independently of the integration process, but in a few cases the merger of parties was directly facilitated by Europarties or Western European politicians. On the other hand the EP elections injected extra volatility into the CEE party systems, triggering a number of government collapses and reshuffles.
No new parties came into being because of the integration. Only in a few cases did tensions rise between various wings of the parties due to the differing positions towards integration. But in some instances one could detect an indirect impact: that ideological conflicts common hitherto in Western Europe started to cause divides within Eastern European parties as well.
Contrary to expectations, party relations have not become more consensual. The accession process has infused some degree of cooperation, but the style of competition has actually become more confrontational after 2004.
To sum up, East Central European party systems have largely followed their original trajectories. The consequences of integration are not as as robust as expected. But the detected implications are still wide-ranging, particularly as far as elite interactions are concerned. By influencing coalition-making strategies and facilitating ideological reorientation of some of the actors European integration has contributed to changes in the mechanics of the party systems.
In East Central European party politics the logic of national competition overrides the impact of European integration. Still, a number of relevant phenomena can be traced back to the integration process. Most importantly: the constrained nature of the policy-space of party competition; the adoption of Western European ideologies and identities; the spread of certain organisational techniques (e.g. gender quotas); the incorporation of the European level into the party hierarchies and the appearance of European carrier options; the ostracisation of certain parties; the campaign support coming from sister parties and Europarties; and the regulation of party finance, mainly following the decisions of the Council of Europe.
The issue of European integration failed to turn into a central divide, but in a few cases one could witness an increasing polarisation along this issue. In Poland Eursokepticism became a decisive factor in party competition. Across the whole region the parties are rapidly developing complex attitudes on the issue, and increasingly provide a pro-European critique of the integration project. The attitude to European integration is typically a more integral part of the principal dimension of competition than in the West. As a result, the accuracy of representation (the congruence between party elites and voters) on the integration issue is somewhat better than in Western Europe.
In the framework of the Europeanisation process it is important to distinguish between two different stimuli: the 'typical' Western European national party politics and European Union politics. While Western European nation states tend to have a more clear left-right polarisation than the new member states, the European Union is characterised by a non-partisan decision-making logic. The lack of a clear trend in the polarisation of an East Central European shows the contradictory impulses coming from these sources.
The accession process constrained the coalition alternatives in the region. Many parties moderated their position in order to become more electable and acceptable for the EU. But these tendencies have largely stopped after acquiring membership status. European actors continued to make attempts at influencing coalition formulas, but these attempts often failed (cf. Poland and Slovakia).
The party systems of East Central Europe became markedly less fragmented during the last decade. This has happened largely independently of the integration process, but in a few cases the merger of parties was directly facilitated by Europarties or Western European politicians. On the other hand the EP elections injected extra volatility into the CEE party systems, triggering a number of government collapses and reshuffles.
No new parties came into being because of the integration. Only in a few cases did tensions rise between various wings of the parties due to the differing positions towards integration. But in some instances one could detect an indirect impact: that ideological conflicts common hitherto in Western Europe started to cause divides within Eastern European parties as well.
Contrary to expectations, party relations have not become more consensual. The accession process has infused some degree of cooperation, but the style of competition has actually become more confrontational after 2004.
To sum up, East Central European party systems have largely followed their original trajectories. The consequences of integration are not as as robust as expected. But the detected implications are still wide-ranging, particularly as far as elite interactions are concerned. By influencing coalition-making strategies and facilitating ideological reorientation of some of the actors European integration has contributed to changes in the mechanics of the party systems.