Final Report Summary - FORENSICIDFRONTIERS (Forensic Identification Frontiers)
The use of forensic intelligence is growing among security, border, and law enforcement agencies, while rapidly evolving efforts to tackle trans-national crime entail the exchange of forensic intelligence across jurisdictions and state borders as well as the'linking'of forensic databases of differing provenance. The international utilisation and exchange of forensic intelligence is then becoming an expectation, with international cooperation increasing in frequency and complexity. In addition to the international automated exchange of fingerprints and DNA via the INTERPOL DNA Gateway and the partially implemented European Union Prbm Treaty, there are increasing numbers of bi-lateral agreements to exchange forensic intelligence held by domestic law enforcement agencies. However, as technologies become more sophisticated, there is a risk that technology progresses faster than the law, social and political systems can regulate it. Such regulation is essential not only in maintaining quality standards, but in ensuring that practice is legitimate, and does not cross ethical boundaries.
This fellowship addressed dimensions of forensic bioinformation that have hitherto been neglected, filling gaps in theoretical knowledge as well as providing advice on guidelines. It should enhance the ability of law enforcement agencies to secure the integrity of their forensic information and intelligence operations. A central thread running through the research was extensive engagement with both agencies and academics and those involved in forensic intelligence operations, aiming to produce theoretically and practically informed principles for ensuring the integrity of forensic intelligence. Interviews as well as documentary analysis to ensure the contextualisation of data and the opportunity to assess future policy and aspirations were undertaken, mapping current provisions for fingerprinting and DNA profiling across the European Union and Australia; the databasing and exchange of bioinformation; the governance of individual profiles and collections of bioinformation data and the potential for'linkage'with other databanks. A critical account of current arrangements facilitated a future-scanning exercise and provided an evidence base for policy recommendations.
There are multi-faceted challenges at the frontiers of forensic identification. For example, there remain doubts over the legitimacy and acceptability of the harmonisation of bioinformation systems and the viability of uniformity across jurisdictions with differing policing and judicial systems. There are clear imperatives that the utility of forensic databases is maximised at the same time as risks of abuse or harmful effects mitigated. There then needs to agreement upon pre-requisites for integrity: what needs to be ensured to gain and maintain trust in forensic intelligence?
Viability:
Ensuring harmonious technical systems and processes is critical: data and intelligence must be intelligible to those receiving and acting upon the data, with no room for error (both false positives and negatives), or misinterpretation. Exchange of DNA and dactyloscopic data under Prum arrangements have already struck difficulties with harmonisation of technologies and problems raised by'near matches'or mis-typing of DNA. Many European Union and other countries are experiencing serious economic pressures, with limited resources to dedicate to the creation and sharing of standardised forensic data. With no internationally accepted standards for DNA, and even fewer standards for other data formats, the collation of data from multiple sources with varying formats simply exacerbates risk of errors, with the lack of standardisation rendering data transmitted worthless. Efforts at standardisation and uniformity have commenced, with the'Swedish Initiative'of 2009, which states that all forensic laboratories must have ISO17025 accreditation by 2014 (police agencies by 2015). While welcome, the Decision arguably places too much reliance upon the ISO17025 standard. As things stand, enormous disparities in national modes of data production and intelligence generation, coupled with markedly discrepant regulatory regimes, conduces to an extremely complex environment.
Legitimacy: There should be no question that the instruments that permit the creation of forensic intelligence, and the exchange of data must be legally binding and authoritative. Frequently, the introduction of powers to gather, store, manipulate, and share forensic data, precedes laws regulating such activity. Even when such laws exist, the diversity of legal instruments across nations, and the interpretation of international treaties and national laws implementing treaties differ, leading to the obstacle of'legal problems'in exchanging information. Again, it should be indisputable that governing legal instruments will be human rights compliant, but this again, is not always the case. The introduction of DNA profiling in a country has frequently preceded laws regulating such activity. Technological development has often outstripped other considerations, with politicians and police having to be reminded that effectiveness is not the sole criterion upon which to base public policy decisions.
Acceptability: With trust in the institutions responsible for forensic intelligence creation, retention and exchange, citisens can expect that respect for human rights and the democratic process remain. However, securing and maintaining trust requires independent oversight. Citisens must have access to sufficient, reliable, public information in order to trust, but this information is scarce. There are no significant bodies with oversight powers to scrutinise intelligence. The absence of institutions with either the resources, or the authority to foster greater coordination and collaboration over'ethical'or social issues, provides no confidence that risks are being monitored. In the UK, the National DNA Database Ethics Group recommends that the newly created post of'Commissioner for the Retention and Use of Biometric Material'should check a sample of subject profiles being shared internationally, to ensure that they were based upon the following principles: a) there must be a policing purpose; b) exchange has to be subject to proper legal controls; c) the use must be proportionate; d) it should meet certain scientific standards and e) ethical considerations should be factored in.
Inconsistencies in independent oversight are significant and while there is limited oversight of'quality'measures,'social'issues are left to Parliament, tasked with'balancing'individual rights with societal interests. In a time of austerity, there must also be attention paid to costs and effectiveness. National policing budgets are under strain, and forensic budgets are easy to cut, being. Investment in forensic intelligence will have to (quickly) be able to demonstrate its cost-effectiveness and be cost-efficient if it is to attract funding or be sustainable. However, it remains unknown what the parameters of'success'or'failure'are (does excluding a suspect early on in an investigation count as a'success'or just a conviction?), nor what data is collected to even measure'effectiveness'could it be agreed what'success'was. Such limitations seriously threaten the ability of forensic intelligence to demand the resources required for it to be done to the highest standards with the requisite checks and balances.
For the integrity of forensic intelligence to be established, critical attention must be paid not only to the viability of forensic intelligence, but also to its governance and legitimacy. The type of data, and the manner in which they are used, gives rise to a range of social and legal concerns. Efforts to better understand the potential benefits and impacts of forensic intelligence are incomplete without a careful consideration of these dimensions. Yet those developing and utilising the technology rarely understand the complex inter-relationship between trust, confidence, control and security. Policy in this area is developing rapidly and is highly ambitious: there remains a need to harness the power of forensic intelligence, at the same time as ensuring it is viable, legitimate, and acceptable. There are increasing demands for evidence of efficacy in all quarters of the criminal justice system, particularly in an era of severe budget constraints.
This fellowship addressed dimensions of forensic bioinformation that have hitherto been neglected, filling gaps in theoretical knowledge as well as providing advice on guidelines. It should enhance the ability of law enforcement agencies to secure the integrity of their forensic information and intelligence operations. A central thread running through the research was extensive engagement with both agencies and academics and those involved in forensic intelligence operations, aiming to produce theoretically and practically informed principles for ensuring the integrity of forensic intelligence. Interviews as well as documentary analysis to ensure the contextualisation of data and the opportunity to assess future policy and aspirations were undertaken, mapping current provisions for fingerprinting and DNA profiling across the European Union and Australia; the databasing and exchange of bioinformation; the governance of individual profiles and collections of bioinformation data and the potential for'linkage'with other databanks. A critical account of current arrangements facilitated a future-scanning exercise and provided an evidence base for policy recommendations.
There are multi-faceted challenges at the frontiers of forensic identification. For example, there remain doubts over the legitimacy and acceptability of the harmonisation of bioinformation systems and the viability of uniformity across jurisdictions with differing policing and judicial systems. There are clear imperatives that the utility of forensic databases is maximised at the same time as risks of abuse or harmful effects mitigated. There then needs to agreement upon pre-requisites for integrity: what needs to be ensured to gain and maintain trust in forensic intelligence?
Viability:
Ensuring harmonious technical systems and processes is critical: data and intelligence must be intelligible to those receiving and acting upon the data, with no room for error (both false positives and negatives), or misinterpretation. Exchange of DNA and dactyloscopic data under Prum arrangements have already struck difficulties with harmonisation of technologies and problems raised by'near matches'or mis-typing of DNA. Many European Union and other countries are experiencing serious economic pressures, with limited resources to dedicate to the creation and sharing of standardised forensic data. With no internationally accepted standards for DNA, and even fewer standards for other data formats, the collation of data from multiple sources with varying formats simply exacerbates risk of errors, with the lack of standardisation rendering data transmitted worthless. Efforts at standardisation and uniformity have commenced, with the'Swedish Initiative'of 2009, which states that all forensic laboratories must have ISO17025 accreditation by 2014 (police agencies by 2015). While welcome, the Decision arguably places too much reliance upon the ISO17025 standard. As things stand, enormous disparities in national modes of data production and intelligence generation, coupled with markedly discrepant regulatory regimes, conduces to an extremely complex environment.
Legitimacy: There should be no question that the instruments that permit the creation of forensic intelligence, and the exchange of data must be legally binding and authoritative. Frequently, the introduction of powers to gather, store, manipulate, and share forensic data, precedes laws regulating such activity. Even when such laws exist, the diversity of legal instruments across nations, and the interpretation of international treaties and national laws implementing treaties differ, leading to the obstacle of'legal problems'in exchanging information. Again, it should be indisputable that governing legal instruments will be human rights compliant, but this again, is not always the case. The introduction of DNA profiling in a country has frequently preceded laws regulating such activity. Technological development has often outstripped other considerations, with politicians and police having to be reminded that effectiveness is not the sole criterion upon which to base public policy decisions.
Acceptability: With trust in the institutions responsible for forensic intelligence creation, retention and exchange, citisens can expect that respect for human rights and the democratic process remain. However, securing and maintaining trust requires independent oversight. Citisens must have access to sufficient, reliable, public information in order to trust, but this information is scarce. There are no significant bodies with oversight powers to scrutinise intelligence. The absence of institutions with either the resources, or the authority to foster greater coordination and collaboration over'ethical'or social issues, provides no confidence that risks are being monitored. In the UK, the National DNA Database Ethics Group recommends that the newly created post of'Commissioner for the Retention and Use of Biometric Material'should check a sample of subject profiles being shared internationally, to ensure that they were based upon the following principles: a) there must be a policing purpose; b) exchange has to be subject to proper legal controls; c) the use must be proportionate; d) it should meet certain scientific standards and e) ethical considerations should be factored in.
Inconsistencies in independent oversight are significant and while there is limited oversight of'quality'measures,'social'issues are left to Parliament, tasked with'balancing'individual rights with societal interests. In a time of austerity, there must also be attention paid to costs and effectiveness. National policing budgets are under strain, and forensic budgets are easy to cut, being. Investment in forensic intelligence will have to (quickly) be able to demonstrate its cost-effectiveness and be cost-efficient if it is to attract funding or be sustainable. However, it remains unknown what the parameters of'success'or'failure'are (does excluding a suspect early on in an investigation count as a'success'or just a conviction?), nor what data is collected to even measure'effectiveness'could it be agreed what'success'was. Such limitations seriously threaten the ability of forensic intelligence to demand the resources required for it to be done to the highest standards with the requisite checks and balances.
For the integrity of forensic intelligence to be established, critical attention must be paid not only to the viability of forensic intelligence, but also to its governance and legitimacy. The type of data, and the manner in which they are used, gives rise to a range of social and legal concerns. Efforts to better understand the potential benefits and impacts of forensic intelligence are incomplete without a careful consideration of these dimensions. Yet those developing and utilising the technology rarely understand the complex inter-relationship between trust, confidence, control and security. Policy in this area is developing rapidly and is highly ambitious: there remains a need to harness the power of forensic intelligence, at the same time as ensuring it is viable, legitimate, and acceptable. There are increasing demands for evidence of efficacy in all quarters of the criminal justice system, particularly in an era of severe budget constraints.