Final Report Summary - GAME-DYNAMICS (Game Theory: Dynamic Approaches)
The general framework of this project is that of _dynamic games_, with multiple participants (“players”) that interact repeatedly over time (the players may be people, corporations, nations, computers—even genes). The purpose is to study dynamic processes, to understand their induced behavior, and to relate them to appropriate static solutions (such as Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, Walrasian equilibria, Pareto outcomes).
We have advanced this research along different lines, among them: studying specific classes of dynamics of interest in various models; showing the limitations imposed by natural conditions (such as “simplicity” restrictions on the computations and the on information processing that are required) on the equilibria that may or may not be reached; studying the limiting solutions and their properties (such as correlated equilibria and evolutionarily stable strategies). Additional work has been devoted to models of decisions under risk and uncertainty and their long-run implications, to multiple goods mechanism design (including novel work on simple approximations), to incomplete information in interactive and repeated interactions, and to applications to the economics of information and communication.
We have advanced this research along different lines, among them: studying specific classes of dynamics of interest in various models; showing the limitations imposed by natural conditions (such as “simplicity” restrictions on the computations and the on information processing that are required) on the equilibria that may or may not be reached; studying the limiting solutions and their properties (such as correlated equilibria and evolutionarily stable strategies). Additional work has been devoted to models of decisions under risk and uncertainty and their long-run implications, to multiple goods mechanism design (including novel work on simple approximations), to incomplete information in interactive and repeated interactions, and to applications to the economics of information and communication.