In cryptographic protocol theory, we consider a situation where a number of entities want to solve some problem over a computer network. Each entity has some secret data it does not want the other entities to learn, yet, they all want to learn something about the common set of data. In an electronic election, they want to know the number of yes-votes without revealing who voted what. For instance, in an electronic auction, they want to find the winner without leaking the bids of the losers.
A main focus of the project is to develop new techniques for solving such protocol problems. We are in particular interested in techniques which can automatically construct a protocol solving a problem given only a description of what the problem is. My focus will be theoretical basic research, but I believe that advancing the theory of secure protocol compilers will have an immense impact on the practice of developing secure protocols for practice.
When one develops complex protocols, it is important to be able to verify their correctness before they are deployed, in particular so, when the purpose of the protocols is to protect information. If and when an error is found and corrected, the sensitive data will possibly already be compromised. Therefore, cryptographic protocol theory develops models of what it means for a protocol to be secure, and techniques for analyzing whether a given protocol is secure or not.
A main focuses of the project is to develop better security models, as existing security models either suffer from the problem that it is possible to prove some protocols secure which are not secure in practice, or they suffer from the problem that it is impossible to prove security of some protocol which are believed to be secure in practice. My focus will again be on theoretical basic research, but I believe that better security models are important for advancing a practice where protocols are verified as secure before deployed.
Fields of science
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