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Embodied Approaches to Social Cognition: Empathy and Perception

Final Report Summary - EASCEP (Embodied Approaches to Social Cognition: Empathy and Perception)

EASCEP - Embodied Approaches to Social Cognition: Empathy and Perception
Marie Curie Actions- Intra-European Fellowship
(FP7-PEOPLE-2011-IEF, project no. 298633)
Summary of project:
How do we understand other people? For decades this question was only investigate by discussed by considering the so-called Theory of Mind-ability, an intellectual ability to understand others beliefs, desires and hopes by observing their behavior. This project starts with the presupposition that social cognition, including the whole range of abilities to understand others, is essentially embodied. Furthermore, social perception (e.g. seeing that the other is angry or happy) as well as practicing empathy are core aspects of human social cognition which we need to investigate for a better understanding. In the project the core role of perception for social understanding could be confirmed and worked out in detail: What we see is the other person's intentions as they are embodied and thereby become visible. Furthermore, empathy plays a central role in social cognition.

Webpage: http://www.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/philosophy/embodied-sc/

The project titled “Embodied Approaches to Social Cognition: Empathy and Perception” proposed to discuss the following research topics:
The central hypothesis of the project is that there is an immediate form of understanding other minds by understanding the others’ embodied intentionality that draws upon one’s own interaction abilities. To explore the hypothesis the project focused on two intertwined themes, namely, the phenomenon of empathy and the role and mechanisms of perceptual cognition in enabling an immediate understanding of the other’s embodied intentionality. The project combines philosophical analyses with discussions of empirical studies primarily in psychology and neuroscience to address the themes.
The project realized two main aims, namely,
i) Uncover the nature of the phenomenon of empathy as an immediate form of experiential access to other minds by understanding the other’s embodied intentionality, identify the possible cognitive mechanisms underlying one’s immediate understanding of the other as a “minded” being, and specially focus on cognitive mechanisms of action-understanding drawing on one’s one interaction abilities
ii) Understand the significance of one’s perceptual knowledge of the other’s embodied intentionality for attributing mental states to the other with particular focus on unravelling the mechanisms of perception-action coupling underlying one’s perceptual grasping of the other’s embodied intentionality.
The project has accomplished the above aims and addressed the research issues via the following research activities including dissemination of research in top-level publication outlets, organisation of international conferences and presentation at international research events. Thus the project could realize the research plan with very good results:
1) Peer-reviewed publications by Dr. N. Gangopadhyay:
Journal articles
(a) Bohl, V. & Gangopadhyay, N. (2013) “Theory of mind and the unobservability of other minds”, Philosophical Explorations
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2013.821515
Abstract: The theory of mind (ToM) framework has been criticised by emerging alternative accounts. Each alternative begins with the accusation that ToM’s validity as a research paradigm rests on the assumption of the ‘unobservability’ of other minds. We argue that the critics’ discussion of the unobservability assumption (UA) targets a straw man. We discuss metaphysical, phenomenological, epistemological, and psychological readings of UA and demonstrate that it is not the case that ToM assumes the metaphysical, phenomenological, or epistemological claims. However, ToM supports the psychological UA as a claim about cognitive processes responsible for mindreading. The latter can be interpreted as a claim that (a) neither the other’s ‘mindedness’ in general nor the other’s particular mental states are observable (i.e. apprehended perceptually); (b) particular mental states are unobservable, whereas some aspects indicative of ‘mindedness’ are observable; (c) some mental states are unobservable but some are also observable. Whereas the critics tend to attribute (a) to ToM, most ToM accounts actually take positions (b) or (c). We conclude that the allegations against ToM for positing UA are seriously misdirected. We further bring out an important stipulation of any account of observability of mental states: mental states are not observable in the same way as the sensory properties of physical objects.
(b) Gangopadhyay, N. (2014). “Introduction: Embodiment and Empathy: Current Debates in Social Cognition”, Topoi, Vol. 33, issue 1. (DOI 10.1007/s11245-013-9199-2) http://link.springer.com/journal/11245/33/1/page/1
Abstract: This special issue targets two topics in social cognition that appear to increasingly structure the nature of interdisciplinary discourse but are themselves not very well understood. These are the notions of empathy and embodiment. Both have a history rooted in phenomenological philosophy and both have found extensive application in contemporary interdisciplinary theories of social cognition, at times to establish claims that are arguably contrary to the ones made by the phenomenologists credited with giving us these notions. But this special issue is not about defending any philosophical tradition or theoretical stance against all others. It is about understanding some central aspects of the nature of our experience of other people.
(c) Gangopadhyay, N. & Miyahara, K. (2014). “Perception and the problem of access to other minds”. Philosophical Psychology http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2014.895935
Abstract: In opposition to mainstream theory of mind approaches, some contemporary perceptual accounts of social cognition do not consider the central question of social cognition to be the problem of access to other minds. These perceptual accounts draw heavily on phenomenological philosophy and propose that others’ mental states are “directly” given in the perception of the others’ expressive behavior. Furthermore, these accounts contend that phenomenological insights into the nature of social perception lead to the dissolution of the access problem. We argue, on the contrary, that the access problem is a genuine problem that must be addressed by any account of social cognition, perceptual or non- perceptual, because we cannot cast the access problem as a false problem without violating certain fundamental intuitions about other minds. We elaborate the fundamental intuitions as three constraints on any theory of social perception: the Immediacy constraint; the Transcendence constraint; and the Accessibility constraint. We conclude with an outline of an account of perceiving other minds that meets the three constraints.
(d) Gangopadhyay, N. (forthcoming). Introduction: The Future of Social Cognition – Paradigms, Concepts and Experiments. Synthese.
(e) Gangopadhyay, N. (under review): “Knowing how to see other minds”.
Abstract: Some recent theories of knowing other minds propose that in some cases we have perceptual knowledge of others’ mental states. However, there is an ambiguity in the proposal. According to some perceptual theories, mental states known by perception are radically embodied such that perceptually knowing another’s mental state is the same epistemic process as perceiving expressive behavior (the bodily extension of a mental state). Let us call this the Perceptual Hypothesis of Radical Embodied Mind (P-REM). P-REM contrasts with another group of perceptual theories which propose that perception delivers knowledge of another’s mental state but the perceptual representation of mental states is not identical to the perceptual representation of the sensory properties of expressive behavior. Let us call the second group of theories Perceptual Hypothesis (PH). I defend PH over P-REM and claim P-REM, neither on its own nor as part of a larger ‘Interaction Theory’ (IT), satisfactorily answers the challenge for perception, without the aid of traditional ‘theory-of-mind’ processes, to provide the grounds for knowing that we see mental states and not merely behavior. I further claim that the type of social interaction that may act as an epistemic access to another’s mental states is grounded in a form of know-how that supports PH but not P-REM.
Edited Volumes:
(f) Gangopadhyay, N. (2014). “Embodiment and Empathy: Current debates in social cognition” Topoi, Vol. 33, issue 1. http://link.springer.com/journal/11245/33/1/page/1
(g) Gangopadhyay, N. (forthcoming). “The Future of Social Cognition: Paradigms, Concepts and Experiments”. Synthese.
2) Presentations in Conferences and Workshops by Dr. N. Gangopadhyay:
2013: Invited talk presented at workshop on “Seeing and Understanding Others in Social Interaction” (Satellite workshop of the Tokyo Conference on Philosophy of Psychiatry), University of Tokyo, Japan (20th – 23rd September 2013).
2013: Invited talk presented at workshop organized by the College of Arts, Rikkyo University, Tokyo, Japan (24th September 2013).
2013: Invited talk presented at the international conference “Problems of the Self: Debates in Consciousness, Subjectivity and Otherness”, Center for Philosophy, School of Social Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University New Delhi, India (23rd -25th January 2013).
2013: Invited commentary presented at the conference “Phenomenal Mindreading”, Ruhr-Universität Bochum (21st -23rd November 2013).
2013: Talk presented at the international conference “Emotion: Nature, Recognition and Culture”, Ruhr-Universität Bochum (17th -19th October 2013).
2014: Invited talk presented at the Guest Lecture Series, Department of Philosophy, University of Bergen, Norway (23rd January 2014).
2014: Talk presented at the international conference “The Future of Social Cognition: Paradigms, Concepts and Experiments”, Ruhr-Universität Bochum (12th – 14th June 2014).
3) Organization of Conferences by Dr. N. Gangopadhyay:
2013: International conference on “Emotion: Nature, Recognition and Culture” in collaboration with Prof. Albert Newen and Dr. Luca Barlassina, Ruhr-Universität Bochum (17th -19th October 2013)

Summary: Since William James asked the question ‘What is an emotion?, philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists have disagreed about the answer. Indeed, even though almost everybody accepts that emotions are typically associated with conscious feelings, bodily changes, action tendencies and propositional attitudes, disagreement looms large as to which of these constitute the emotion. The international conference on "Emotions: Nature, Recognition and Culture" aims to address some of the most controversial issues in the interdisciplinary study of emotions. The meeting is divided into three interconnected sections: i) the nature of emotions, ii) emotion recognition, and iii) the role of culture in the study of emotions.
http://www.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/philosophy/emotion2013/
2014: International conference on “The Future of Social Cognition” in collaboration with Prof. Albert Newen, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, (12th -14th June 2014)
Summary: Since the publication of Premack and Woodruff’s classic paper introducing the notion of a ‘theory of mind’ (Premack & Woodruff 1978), interdisciplinary research in social cognition has witnessed the development of theory-theory, simulation theory, hybrid approaches, and most recently interactionist and perceptual accounts of other minds. The challenges that these various approaches present for each other and for research in social cognition range from adequately defining central concepts to designing experimental paradigms for testing empirical hypotheses. But is there any approach that promises to dominate future interdisciplinary research in social cognition? Is social cognition witnessing a gradual paradigm shift where hitherto grounding notions such as ‘theory of mind’ are no longer viewed as explanatorily necessary? Or have we simply lost our way in attempting to devise adequate experimental setups that could sway the debate in favour of one or another contending account? The conference proposes to bring together leading researchers in the field for debating on the future of research in social cognition. We aim to organise the discussion along the following two interconnected sections: 1) Theoretical discussion of central concepts and paradigm shifts and 2) Core experimental paradigms for interdisciplinary research in social cognition.
http://www.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/philosophy/future/
4) Summary of project outputs so far:
The project has resulted in a number of publications in top-level, peer-reviewed outlets. The publications reflect extensive international collaborations. For example, the edited volume on “Embodiment and Empathy: Current Debates in Social Cognition” includes contributions from some highly renowned, internationally respected researchers in social cognition. Moreover, the co-authored papers result from similar international collaborations, including with Asian institutions such as the University of Tokyo and Rikkyo University. The presentations of talks at international events, for example in Japan and India, have greatly helped in strengthening research exchanges with academics in these countries and promises future fruitful collaborations. Also, the organization of international conferences with presentations by leading researchers in the field serves to disseminate the research conducted within the project. The research activities of the project have also enabled the development of collaborative research activities within the host institution and its current research partners. For example, the conference “Emotion: Nature, Recognition and Culture” resulted from active collaboration between two research projects at the host institution, namely, the Marie Curie Project (Dr. Nivedita Gangopadhyay) and the Humboldt Fellowship Project (Dr. Luca Barlassina). Similarly, collaborative research activities between Ruhr-Universität Bochum and University of Cologne (research group led by Prof. Kai Vogeley) have been fostered and enhanced. Prof. Vogeley has actively collaborated in the research events organized by the project, for example in the conferences organized within the project as well as in international events such as the Tokyo Conference on Philosophy of Psychiatry.
The conference “The Future of Social Cognition: Paradigms, Concepts and Experiments” included talks some of the most renowned and senior researchers in the field as well as by younger researchers. The conference attracted a large audience. It has also resulted in a special issue (forthcoming) of the journal Synthese (currently ranked 1 in Google Scholar Metrics for Philosophy journals). The organization of the conference was facilitated by student assistants who helped with a number of relevant administrative tasks.
Due to the project, I could in cooperation with the Center for Mind, Brain and Cognitive Evolution in Bochum invite a number of short-term research visits by international scholars who contributed to the progress of the project:
Prof. Mark Rowlands (University of Miami), an expert in the domain of theories of embodied cognition, visited in June 2013.
Prof. Bence Nanay (University of Antwerp), an expert in philosophy of perception and currently working in social perception, visited two weeks in April 2014.
Prof. Somogy Varga (University of Memphis), working in the domain of social cognition visited in June 2014 and also gave a talk at the conference “The Future of Social Cognition: Paradigms, Concepts and Experiments”
Prof. Shogo Tanaka (Tokai University), working in the field of social cognition and phenomenology, was invited for a guest lecture on February 6th 2014.
The research visits and talks enabled the Institut für Philosophie II and the Center for Mind, Brain and Cognitive Evolution to foster and enhance international research networking, between researchers as well as between students and experts.