Dynamic Mechanisms

Project Information

DYNMECH

Grant agreement ID: 714147

DOI

10.3030/714147

Project closed

EC signature date 5 December 2016

Start date 1 January 2017

End date 30 June 2023

Funded under

• EXCELLENT SCIENCE - European Research Council (ERC)

Total cost

€ 1 321 625,00

EU contribution

€ 1 321 625,00

Coordinated by

UNIVERSITY OF ESSEX
United Kingdom

CORDIS provides links to public deliverables and publications of HORIZON projects.

Links to deliverables and publications from FP7 projects, as well as links to some specific result types such as dataset and software, are dynamically retrieved from OpenAIRE .

Publications

Peer reviewed articles (9)

Payoff implications of incentive contracting

Author(s): Daniel F. Garrett
Published in: Theoretical Economics, Issue 16/4, 2021, ISSN 1555-7561
Publisher: Society for Economic Theory
DOI: 10.3982/te4293

Ready to trade? On budget-balanced efficient trade with uncertain arrival

Author(s): Daniel F. Garrett
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior, Issue 138, 2022, ISSN 0899-8256
Publisher: Academic Press
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.12.007

Oligopoly under incomplete information: On the welfare effects of price discrimination

Author(s): Daniel F. Garrett; Renato Gomes; Lucas Maestri
Published in: International Journal of Industrial Organization, Issue 79, 2021, ISSN 0167-7187
Publisher: Elsevier BV
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2021.102735

Optimal Technology Design

Author(s): Daniel F. Garrett, George Georgiadis, Alex Smolin, Balázs Szentes
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory, Issue 209, 2023, ISSN 0022-0531
Publisher: Academic Press
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105621

Dynamic mechanism design: Dynamic arrivals and changing values

Author(s): Daniel F. Garrett
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior, Issue 104, 2017, ISSN 0899-8256
Publisher: Academic Press
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.005

Relational Contracts: Public versus Private Savings

Author(s): Francesc Dilmé, Daniel F. Garrett
Published in: Econometrica, Issue 91/3, 2023, ISSN 0012-9682
Publisher: Blackwell Publishing Inc.
DOI: 10.3982/ecta18742

RESIDUAL DETERRENCE

Author(s): Francesc Dilmé and Daniel F Garrett
Published in: Journal of the European Economic Association, Issue 17/5, 2018, ISSN 1542-4774
Publisher: Oxford University Press
DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvy034

Competitive Screening Under Heterogeneous Information

Author(s): Daniel F Garrett, Renato Gomes, Lucas Maestri
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies, Issue 86/4, 2018, Page(s) 1590-1630, ISSN 0034-6527
Publisher: Blackwell Publishing Inc.
DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdy072

Fake Sales: A Dynamic Pricing Perspective

Author(s): Daniel F. Garrett
Published in: The Japanese Economic Review, Issue 70/3, 2019, Page(s) 375-382, ISSN 1352-4739
Publisher: Blackwell Publishing Inc.
DOI: 10.1111/jere.12239