Periodic Reporting for period 1 - BJW (When saying the world is just backfires: elites' expression of the belief in a just world, perceived immorality, moral outrage and punishment wishes)
Reporting period: 2018-09-14 to 2020-09-13
The unstable financial and economic situation that Europe went through during the financial crisis starting in 2008 ultimately derived from continuous malpractices by various members of the financial elite, many of whom have not been even prosecuted. Some authors say that the decisions made by the political elite to counter the effects of that crisis, such as austerity measures, worsened the situation. Others say there was no other way to address it.
Regardless, the fact is that during their implementation of austerity measures, both the financial and the political elites justified them by resorting to moralizing and professorial narratives. One of these narratives was that some countries had “lived beyond their means”, which explained why they were then living difficult times and had to experience those allegedly unavoidable measures. Through this moralizing narrative, some populations, not their elites, namely southern European ones, were portrayed as lazy and irresponsible. Those measures and their negative consequences for those populations (for instance, unemployment) were thus presented as just and as a lesson. The targeted populations, however, felt these measures and the narrative(s) justifying them were unfair, and a number of outraged demonstrations against the measures, the narratives and the elites expressing them ensued.
In this project, my main goals were to answer the following questions: Do narratives about justice, which are judged as moral when enacted by ordinary individuals, become judged as immoral when enacted by elite members? Do they make individuals more prone to wish various sorts of punishment targeting those elite members? What is the role of emotions in this process, namely moral outrage?
Populations need elites. But elites also need the support of populations. With this research programme I aimed to show that elites'use of moralizing discourses targeting whole populations is a strategy that must be used carefully and sparingly (if at all), not only for their own good, but also to minimize reactance. Also, we must take into account that populism is on the rise. Although populists also resort to moral discourses, they target devalued minorities and elites, not whole populations, which promotes adhesion to their agendas. In sum, the use of moralizing narratives can backfire and contribute to democracy weakness.
Regardless, the fact is that during their implementation of austerity measures, both the financial and the political elites justified them by resorting to moralizing and professorial narratives. One of these narratives was that some countries had “lived beyond their means”, which explained why they were then living difficult times and had to experience those allegedly unavoidable measures. Through this moralizing narrative, some populations, not their elites, namely southern European ones, were portrayed as lazy and irresponsible. Those measures and their negative consequences for those populations (for instance, unemployment) were thus presented as just and as a lesson. The targeted populations, however, felt these measures and the narrative(s) justifying them were unfair, and a number of outraged demonstrations against the measures, the narratives and the elites expressing them ensued.
In this project, my main goals were to answer the following questions: Do narratives about justice, which are judged as moral when enacted by ordinary individuals, become judged as immoral when enacted by elite members? Do they make individuals more prone to wish various sorts of punishment targeting those elite members? What is the role of emotions in this process, namely moral outrage?
Populations need elites. But elites also need the support of populations. With this research programme I aimed to show that elites'use of moralizing discourses targeting whole populations is a strategy that must be used carefully and sparingly (if at all), not only for their own good, but also to minimize reactance. Also, we must take into account that populism is on the rise. Although populists also resort to moral discourses, they target devalued minorities and elites, not whole populations, which promotes adhesion to their agendas. In sum, the use of moralizing narratives can backfire and contribute to democracy weakness.
I conducted nine experimental studies in three different countries (Portugal, Spain and Italy). Although the fellowship has already ended, more studies will be conducted in 2021. The main results obtained were:
- Political elite and, especially, financial elite members are judged as immoral people (and more so than members of the artistic elite and middle class citizens);
- Of three moralizing narratives (1. “People get what they deserve”; 2. “People live beyond their means”; 3. “People are not competent”), number 1 is judged as the least moral;
- Finance elite members are judged as more likely saying that people get what they deserve and that people live beyond their means than the opposite;
- A small trend for individuals who identify as more right-wing to judge the narratives as more moral than left-wing counterparts;
- The more (a fictitious) elite member is judged as immoral, the more individuals wish them higher negatives events (including death) and the lower they wish them positive events (for example, being happy). Sociodemographic (participants gender, age, educational level) and socio-psychological variables (political ideology, how people compare themselves to other in terms of status, sexism) have no to little impact on the abovementioned patterns. Gender of the elite members and individuals’ sexist attitudes do not influence those judgments;
- Moral outrage predicts wishes of higher negatives events and the lower they wish them positive events. In a study conducted in Italy in 2018 during an institutional conflict between the then Italian Government and the European Commission, individuals who felt more moral outrage also tended to judge the European Commission and their decision (to reject the Italian budgetary draft for 2019) as more immoral. Moral outrage was the strongest variable followed by an alleged justification for the decision based on justice matters. That is, individuals who read that the Commission had allegedly decided to reject the budgetary draft because that was the fair thing to do judged them as more immoral than individuals who did not read that piece of information.
I disseminated my research to academic audiences by publishing one scientific article and communicating some of the results in four scientific meetings, one of which in a symposium by invitation.
I had one communication accepted to the 2020 Congress of the International Society of Justice Research, but this even has been postponed to 2021 due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
I also disseminated my project to the public at large by participating with a video at the 2020 European Researchers’ Night in Madrid. I had planned to take part in the “Science Week” and “A Pint of Science” in Madrid but these events were cancelled due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
- Political elite and, especially, financial elite members are judged as immoral people (and more so than members of the artistic elite and middle class citizens);
- Of three moralizing narratives (1. “People get what they deserve”; 2. “People live beyond their means”; 3. “People are not competent”), number 1 is judged as the least moral;
- Finance elite members are judged as more likely saying that people get what they deserve and that people live beyond their means than the opposite;
- A small trend for individuals who identify as more right-wing to judge the narratives as more moral than left-wing counterparts;
- The more (a fictitious) elite member is judged as immoral, the more individuals wish them higher negatives events (including death) and the lower they wish them positive events (for example, being happy). Sociodemographic (participants gender, age, educational level) and socio-psychological variables (political ideology, how people compare themselves to other in terms of status, sexism) have no to little impact on the abovementioned patterns. Gender of the elite members and individuals’ sexist attitudes do not influence those judgments;
- Moral outrage predicts wishes of higher negatives events and the lower they wish them positive events. In a study conducted in Italy in 2018 during an institutional conflict between the then Italian Government and the European Commission, individuals who felt more moral outrage also tended to judge the European Commission and their decision (to reject the Italian budgetary draft for 2019) as more immoral. Moral outrage was the strongest variable followed by an alleged justification for the decision based on justice matters. That is, individuals who read that the Commission had allegedly decided to reject the budgetary draft because that was the fair thing to do judged them as more immoral than individuals who did not read that piece of information.
I disseminated my research to academic audiences by publishing one scientific article and communicating some of the results in four scientific meetings, one of which in a symposium by invitation.
I had one communication accepted to the 2020 Congress of the International Society of Justice Research, but this even has been postponed to 2021 due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
I also disseminated my project to the public at large by participating with a video at the 2020 European Researchers’ Night in Madrid. I had planned to take part in the “Science Week” and “A Pint of Science” in Madrid but these events were cancelled due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
This research project was novel from its onset. Originally, I intended to show that:
- elite members, namely the financial elite, who engage in one specific moralizing narrative (“the world is a just place where people get what they deserve and deserve what they get”) would be judged as more immoral than their counterparts who say the opposite;
- people who judged them as more immoral, would also report feeling higher outrage;
- people who felt higher outrage, compared to those who felt lower outrage, would finally wish elite members be targets of negative events to a higher extent and positive events to a lower extent;
This model (see Figure 1) was novel in itself and aimed primarily at showing elite members that adopting a moralizing narrative aimed at the common citizen was not a good idea, one which would divide and polarize society and put the common citizen against them. This project thus ultimately aimed at rising awareness among elite members of the negative societal (and economic) consequences likely to be risen by moralizing narratives aimed at common citizens and whole populations (especially when those narratives tend to spare elites themselves). Such narratives, perceived as commonsensical when said by the average citizen, are felt as unfair and hypocritical when engaged by the elites. This, in turn, digs a metaphorical deeper hole between common citizens and elites.
Indeed, there was an unexpected result in my research: regardless of what participants read about the (finance) elite members, they were judged as equally immoral in various studies. Although these results prevented me from getting evidence for the proposed model, they are very relevant. Indeed, they show that the common citizen judges elite members harshly by default. So, how can the former trust the latter?
Furthermore, unplanned studies which tried to show the impact of what elites say on their perceived immorality, have allowed me to further progress beyond the state of art by showing that immorality judgments are highest towards the financial elite but are closely followed by those towards the political elite. This research, which will be continued in 2021, will also aim at systematizing the perceived immorality of other moralizing narratives.
- elite members, namely the financial elite, who engage in one specific moralizing narrative (“the world is a just place where people get what they deserve and deserve what they get”) would be judged as more immoral than their counterparts who say the opposite;
- people who judged them as more immoral, would also report feeling higher outrage;
- people who felt higher outrage, compared to those who felt lower outrage, would finally wish elite members be targets of negative events to a higher extent and positive events to a lower extent;
This model (see Figure 1) was novel in itself and aimed primarily at showing elite members that adopting a moralizing narrative aimed at the common citizen was not a good idea, one which would divide and polarize society and put the common citizen against them. This project thus ultimately aimed at rising awareness among elite members of the negative societal (and economic) consequences likely to be risen by moralizing narratives aimed at common citizens and whole populations (especially when those narratives tend to spare elites themselves). Such narratives, perceived as commonsensical when said by the average citizen, are felt as unfair and hypocritical when engaged by the elites. This, in turn, digs a metaphorical deeper hole between common citizens and elites.
Indeed, there was an unexpected result in my research: regardless of what participants read about the (finance) elite members, they were judged as equally immoral in various studies. Although these results prevented me from getting evidence for the proposed model, they are very relevant. Indeed, they show that the common citizen judges elite members harshly by default. So, how can the former trust the latter?
Furthermore, unplanned studies which tried to show the impact of what elites say on their perceived immorality, have allowed me to further progress beyond the state of art by showing that immorality judgments are highest towards the financial elite but are closely followed by those towards the political elite. This research, which will be continued in 2021, will also aim at systematizing the perceived immorality of other moralizing narratives.