Periodic Reporting for period 1 - LINSEC (The Logic of Informal Security Cooperation: Counterterrorism Intelligence-sharing in Europe)
Reporting period: 2020-09-01 to 2022-08-31
The Logic of Informal Security Cooperation: Counterterrorism Intelligence-sharing in Europe
In this age of terrorism and insecurity, it is crucial that countries work together to address common threats. How do states begin cooperating, what logic drives the sustainability of security partnerships, and what role do informal networks play in counterterrorism cooperation? These questions have so far primarily been researched either with a theoretical focus in the fields of IR and security studies, or in international history with specific case studies of short-term cooperation during moments of crisis. This MSCA research project on the Logic of Informal Security Cooperation (LINSEC) combines these research fields through the University of Southern Denmark’s (SDU) expertise in security studies, Dr Aviva Guttmann’s research experience in history and intelligence studies, and her recently obtained unprecedented access to over 30,000 intelligence records from 1971 to 1979. These records are from a counterterrorism intelligence-sharing framework called the Club de Berne, which is still today’s main cooperation platform for informal intelligence-sharing on terrorism. The main goal of LINSEC is to understand the logic of informal counterterrorism cooperation.
Given the highly secret and sensitive nature of intelligence as a quintessential national product, traditional statist practice has been to protect intelligence, not share it. While on the official level governments are indeed hesitant, a different regime applies to individuals working in intelligence agencies. Intelligence agencies are not bound by the same restrictions and enjoy a certain degree of freedom. If need be (such as when combating a terrorist threat) they can share intelligence directly with counterparts from other states; especially if these exchanges are guaranteed to remain secret. Thus, understanding the logic of informal security cooperation is important given that it does happen in the international sphere, but we know very little about.
LINSEC’s overarching research question is: What drives and sustains informal counterterrorism cooperation? To answer this question, the LINSEC analyses four different aspects. (1) The prerequisites: what internal and external factors determine whether policymakers seek informal security cooperation. (2) Cooperation mechanism: how agencies react to terrorist threats and adapt their habits and modes of security cooperation. (3) Formal versus informal: the conditions under which these actors prefer informal over formal security cooperation, and how informal counterterrorism cooperation ties in or comes into conflict with formal alliances. (4) Continuity over time: what made informal counterterrorism cooperation effective in the 1970s and what makes it effective today?
The results of LINSEC will lead to pathbreaking new conclusions on how and why informal networks are used by the intelligence community to counter international terrorism. Providing a better understanding of the factors that enhance interstate security cooperation will benefit scholars, security professionals, and policymakers alike.
In this age of terrorism and insecurity, it is crucial that countries work together to address common threats. How do states begin cooperating, what logic drives the sustainability of security partnerships, and what role do informal networks play in counterterrorism cooperation? These questions have so far primarily been researched either with a theoretical focus in the fields of IR and security studies, or in international history with specific case studies of short-term cooperation during moments of crisis. This MSCA research project on the Logic of Informal Security Cooperation (LINSEC) combines these research fields through the University of Southern Denmark’s (SDU) expertise in security studies, Dr Aviva Guttmann’s research experience in history and intelligence studies, and her recently obtained unprecedented access to over 30,000 intelligence records from 1971 to 1979. These records are from a counterterrorism intelligence-sharing framework called the Club de Berne, which is still today’s main cooperation platform for informal intelligence-sharing on terrorism. The main goal of LINSEC is to understand the logic of informal counterterrorism cooperation.
Given the highly secret and sensitive nature of intelligence as a quintessential national product, traditional statist practice has been to protect intelligence, not share it. While on the official level governments are indeed hesitant, a different regime applies to individuals working in intelligence agencies. Intelligence agencies are not bound by the same restrictions and enjoy a certain degree of freedom. If need be (such as when combating a terrorist threat) they can share intelligence directly with counterparts from other states; especially if these exchanges are guaranteed to remain secret. Thus, understanding the logic of informal security cooperation is important given that it does happen in the international sphere, but we know very little about.
LINSEC’s overarching research question is: What drives and sustains informal counterterrorism cooperation? To answer this question, the LINSEC analyses four different aspects. (1) The prerequisites: what internal and external factors determine whether policymakers seek informal security cooperation. (2) Cooperation mechanism: how agencies react to terrorist threats and adapt their habits and modes of security cooperation. (3) Formal versus informal: the conditions under which these actors prefer informal over formal security cooperation, and how informal counterterrorism cooperation ties in or comes into conflict with formal alliances. (4) Continuity over time: what made informal counterterrorism cooperation effective in the 1970s and what makes it effective today?
The results of LINSEC will lead to pathbreaking new conclusions on how and why informal networks are used by the intelligence community to counter international terrorism. Providing a better understanding of the factors that enhance interstate security cooperation will benefit scholars, security professionals, and policymakers alike.
LINSEC has significantly advanced our understanding of the international relations of intelligence agencies in three core areas:
1) While a common threat was the most determining factor for the creation of security cooperation, a shared mentality fostered increased counterterrorism cooperation.
2) I have analysed how agencies reacted when a new threat emerged: Libyan supported terrorism in Europe. I have published the results and demonstrated how cooperation served as force multiplier:
• Aviva Guttmann. “Turning Oil into Blood: Western Intelligence, Libyan Covert Actions, and Palestinian Terrorism (1973-74),” Journal of Strategic Studies, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2020.1868995
3) I have demonstrated how intelligence cooperation can overcome diplomatic crises:
• Aviva Guttmann. “Covert Diplomacy to Overcome a Crisis: German and Israeli Intelligence after the Munich Olympics Attack,” forthcoming in the Journal of Cold War Studies.
1) While a common threat was the most determining factor for the creation of security cooperation, a shared mentality fostered increased counterterrorism cooperation.
2) I have analysed how agencies reacted when a new threat emerged: Libyan supported terrorism in Europe. I have published the results and demonstrated how cooperation served as force multiplier:
• Aviva Guttmann. “Turning Oil into Blood: Western Intelligence, Libyan Covert Actions, and Palestinian Terrorism (1973-74),” Journal of Strategic Studies, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2020.1868995
3) I have demonstrated how intelligence cooperation can overcome diplomatic crises:
• Aviva Guttmann. “Covert Diplomacy to Overcome a Crisis: German and Israeli Intelligence after the Munich Olympics Attack,” forthcoming in the Journal of Cold War Studies.
The findings of the project will contribute to a better-informed public debate about the role of formal and informal cooperation in the fight against terrorism. Considering the practical implications of this research for policymakers and security professionals, LINSEC communication activities target three groups: (1) practitioners in intelligence; (2) policymaking circles; and (3) the public in Denmark and internationally.
Communication with practitioners working in intelligence
Practitioners workshop: Part of LINSEC will be a practitioners workshop in Brussels with the goal of cross-fertilising academic expertise with the experiences of practitioners working in national security. Aim: The topic of the workshop will be to discuss, based on the results of LINSEC and the practitioners’ experiences, how one can improve conditions for successful counterterrorism intelligence-sharing in Europe. Approach: The workshop is conceived as a two-way knowledge transfer. I will prepare an input paper based on LINSEC objective 4’s core recommendations on what factors increase counterterrorism effectiveness. Intelligence practitioners will discuss to what extent and how the recommendations can be implemented. Communication objective: Thus, the workshop’s distinct goal is to define actionable and realistic policy measures.
Communication with security professionals and policymaking circles
Policy brief, PB: After the workshop, I will synthesise the most important insights of LINSEC and of the workshop into a policy brief. Aim: The goal of the policy brief is to provide the workshop participants with “take home” conclusions from the workshop and to make them available for relevant governmental bodies in the EU. The policy brief will be available in English, German, French (I am at native-speaker level in all three languages), and Danish, uploaded on the LINSEC webpage, and disseminated through CWS’ newsletter and social media channels. A number of printed copies will be sent to policymakers as well as national and international policy-oriented research institutes and organisations. Communication objective: The PB will be useful to European policymakers as they will gain a better understanding of the benefits and risks of informal security cooperation and what it means from a EU supranational perspective.
Communication with the wider public
My communication strategy for the wider public consists of the following parts: (1) Communication through a project webpage, containing a project description, links to academic publications, press releases, the policy brief, Social Network Analysis illustrations, book reviews, reports of conferences and of the practitioners workshop. (2) Communication of results in the Danish and international (especially German- French- and English-speaking) news media and electronic media (Facebook, blogs, twitter). The media article will summarise the workshop findings taking into consideration socio-political implications of enhanced counterterrorism intelligence-sharing. (3) I will give at least one research-led public lecture that relates to current affairs. Communication objective: Through these outreach activities, the wider public will be informed about the latest research results on counterterrorism, intelligence, cooperation, and the broader societal implications of these issues.
Communication with practitioners working in intelligence
Practitioners workshop: Part of LINSEC will be a practitioners workshop in Brussels with the goal of cross-fertilising academic expertise with the experiences of practitioners working in national security. Aim: The topic of the workshop will be to discuss, based on the results of LINSEC and the practitioners’ experiences, how one can improve conditions for successful counterterrorism intelligence-sharing in Europe. Approach: The workshop is conceived as a two-way knowledge transfer. I will prepare an input paper based on LINSEC objective 4’s core recommendations on what factors increase counterterrorism effectiveness. Intelligence practitioners will discuss to what extent and how the recommendations can be implemented. Communication objective: Thus, the workshop’s distinct goal is to define actionable and realistic policy measures.
Communication with security professionals and policymaking circles
Policy brief, PB: After the workshop, I will synthesise the most important insights of LINSEC and of the workshop into a policy brief. Aim: The goal of the policy brief is to provide the workshop participants with “take home” conclusions from the workshop and to make them available for relevant governmental bodies in the EU. The policy brief will be available in English, German, French (I am at native-speaker level in all three languages), and Danish, uploaded on the LINSEC webpage, and disseminated through CWS’ newsletter and social media channels. A number of printed copies will be sent to policymakers as well as national and international policy-oriented research institutes and organisations. Communication objective: The PB will be useful to European policymakers as they will gain a better understanding of the benefits and risks of informal security cooperation and what it means from a EU supranational perspective.
Communication with the wider public
My communication strategy for the wider public consists of the following parts: (1) Communication through a project webpage, containing a project description, links to academic publications, press releases, the policy brief, Social Network Analysis illustrations, book reviews, reports of conferences and of the practitioners workshop. (2) Communication of results in the Danish and international (especially German- French- and English-speaking) news media and electronic media (Facebook, blogs, twitter). The media article will summarise the workshop findings taking into consideration socio-political implications of enhanced counterterrorism intelligence-sharing. (3) I will give at least one research-led public lecture that relates to current affairs. Communication objective: Through these outreach activities, the wider public will be informed about the latest research results on counterterrorism, intelligence, cooperation, and the broader societal implications of these issues.