Autocracies – non-democratic political systems, also often referred to as dictatorships – make up the vast majority of political systems, historically, and still rule about half of the countries in the world. Decisions made by autocratic leaders or other actors in autocracies from China to Russia shape the global economy and security environment, and understanding autocratic systems and policy-making is of utmost importance, also to decision-makers living in democracies. Yet, our knowledge about these political systems remains limited, at least when compared to our knowledge about how democracies work. This, inter alia, makes it more difficult for policy-makers, non-governmental organizations, academics and others to identify autocratic threats to current democracies or spot opportunities for liberalization or even democratization in existing autocracies.
In order to improve our understanding of how autocracies function, ELDAR will investigate three aspects of autocratic politics: 1) how autocracies emerge; 2) policy-making in autocracies, and 3) how autocratic regimes break down. ELDAR offers a comprehensive perspective that highlights connections between these three aspects and studies them jointly in one integrated framework.
While also considering institutions, and how they vary across autocracies, ELDAR to a large extent concentrates on vital actors in autocracies: the leader, regime support groups, and mobilized opposition groups. By theorizing and studying the preferences as well as power resources and strategies of these actors, ELDAR team members aim to identify how policies (in various areas) are selected and shaped, and further how these policies influence or are influenced by regime change and survival.
To investigate such questions empirically, ELDAR collects data on the numbers, social identity and other features of groups that support and oppose regimes. The two ELDAR-financed data collection efforts on these actor-characteristics yield unprecedented opportunities for statistical studies of autocratic emergence and demise. Three other datasets that are collected by ELDAR focus on policy-making in particular areas, namely education, infrastructure, and pensions, and these datasets also open up for more detailed and pioneering empirical studies on autocratic policy-making and implementation in core policy areas.
The project is divided into three working packages (WPs):
In WP1, the ELDAR team investigates why, and under which circumstances autocratic regimes emerge. We will investigate gradual transitions to autocracy, such as the ongoing transformation of the Hungarian political system by the Orban regime, as well as abrupt transitions, such as the US-backed military coup that put an end to Chilean democracy in 1973. Using recently collected data on different types of regime change, as well as original data collection on regime opposition and support groups in ELDAR, we will, in particular, consider processes of self-coups by democratically elected incumbents.
WP2 revolves around the central question of why autocratic regimes implement the policies that they do. By gathering extensive data on infrastructure, education, and social welfare policies, ELDAR will substantially increase our understanding of what policies autocracies implement, and how they differ from their democratic counterparts. Further, using this original data, we will be able to gain new insights into the determinants of policy adoptions in autocracies, as well as the effects these policies have on regime survival and a broad range of other outcomes.
In WP3, the ELDAR team explores why some autocratic regimes endure while others die quickly. One common motivation of many autocrats – albeit not the only one – is to avoid regime breakdown for as long as possible. WP3 will therefore study whether the policies studied in WP2 are effective in helping autocrats to survive in office. Further, we want to study the numerous ways in which autocracies die, and which regimes replace them. While several studies have concentrated on popular revolutions and coups d’état, autocratic regimes can die in several other ways. One particular type of regime change that we will study are incumbent-guided regime transitions, where autocratic incumbents are, at least partially, responsible for directing the regime change. the regime change.
