Problems to be solved
Strategies of the EU in international negotiations on carbon emission reductions will be analysed in this project. A decision support tool will be developed to help European policymakers to design the long-term EU climate policy. The decision support tool will be built in form of an integrated assessment model. A major innovation is intended to be achieved by applying the integrated assessment model in a dynamic-sequential game framework. Therein, the actual and complex nature of the negotiation process is specifically addressed by considering the incentives of each big player of the world economy. In addition to the modelling activity in the centre, the project also includes a literature review and intensive policy analyses. The project will address the following questions:
(1) Which are likely scenarios beyond Kyoto in the long-term, in particular concerning the policies implemented by non-Annex B countries and non-EU countries?
(2) Which is the best strategy of the EU with respect to the different scenarios for climate change negotiations in the next few decades?
Scientific objectives and approach
The proposed project will be conducted through the implementation of several work packages. A literature review of theoretical and empirical models of international climate negotiations will be done first. The main task then is to develop the decision support tool and to demonstrate its usefulness for policy analysis. The decision support tool will be built in the form of an integrated assessment model (IAM). Given the multi-disciplinary nature of the climate change issue, the model has its foundation not only in economic theory, but also in climate-related science, such as meteorology and geophysics. The model will represent reality by simplifying to a large extent complex relationships into simple aggregated relationships. The model will be elaborated within alternative methodological assessment frameworks: the traditional cost-benefit approach, on the one hand, and the new tolerable windows approach, on the other hand.
Over the long-term, international negotiations on climate change will likely be shaped in a series of periodic negotiation rounds. Therefore, in this study the model implementation will be based on a dynamic-sequential game approach that explicitly takes into account delayed reactions of each player to the counterpart's move. Within the policy analyses to be conducted, implications of strategic behaviour as well as fair burden sharing will be addressed.
Call for proposalData not available
Funding SchemeCSC - Cost-sharing contracts