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Existence and pareto properties of general equilibrium allocatons with asymmetric information

Objective



I will study the questions of existence, local uniqueness, and constrained Paretz optimality of competitive equilibria, for multicommodity economies with asymmetric information and partial or complete observability of financial trades. The tax reform problem will be also studied for these economies, and the attention will be focused on the relationships between constrained efficiency and the inequality of the distribution of resources among agents.
Finally, I will explore whether asymmetric information phenomena allow the introduction of money in a general equilibrium set-up a la Arrow-Debreu, and which role the monetary policy can have in this context.

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Coordinator

CENTRE NATIONAL DE LA RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE
Address
Boulevard jourdan 48 ecole normale supérieure
75690 Paris
France

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