The objective of the project is to analyze the connection between corporate ownership structures and financial contracts, using standard tools from economic theory such as game theory and various forms of optimization methods. It is my intention to use the results in my Ph.D-Thesis which is titled Modelling the Firm in Economic Theory.
The focus of the project is on the consequences of separating ownership and control in firms, and how financial contracts such as equity and debt can be used to overcome or amend these problems.
The first area/idea I am trying to analyze is the connection between the use of different types of equity and the trade-off between control and liquidity. The second area/idea I am trying to pursue is to explore who should monitor management - large shareholders or banks, and how the choice between debt and equity and the trade-off between control and liquidity might be connected.
To my knowledge both of these ideas are new and unexplored. With respect to the first idea I hope to gain a better understanding of the reasons for using equity with different voting rights. With respect to the second idea I hope to gain a better understanding of the reasoning behind capital structure choices in modern corporations. I hope that the results measured in amounts of literature will be 2 articles that are suitable for publication in international economic journals. d