Objective The objective of this proposed project is to analyze certain aspects of corruption, when such contractual relationships have to be self-enforcing. The sustainability of a self-enforcing corrupt relationship depends on the amount of information the involved parties have about each other. Hence, when evaluating the effectiveness of anti-corruption policies one should consider how they affect the flow of information between the involved parties, i.e. they might facilitate or garble informational flows. Such considerations might be important especially when the informational flows generated by the interactions among corrupt parties are localized, while the implemented policies affect uniformly the entire population. Moreover, corruption may create inertia that hinder the adoption of beneficial organizational innovations, especially when the agents of an organization can not be forced to implement them. To the extent that such innovations reduce corruption opportunities, their adoption might meet opposition which is too costly to "buy-out". Fields of science social sciencessociologysocial issuescorruption Programme(s) FP4-TMR - Specific research and technological development programme in the field of the training and mobility of researchers, 1994-1998 Topic(s) 0302 - Post-doctoral research training grants TS15 - Microeconomics Call for proposal Data not available Funding Scheme RGI - Research grants (individual fellowships) Coordinator INSTITUT D'ECONOMIE INDUSTRIELLE Address Place anatole france - universite des sciences sociales 31042 Toulouse France See on map EU contribution No data Participants (1) Sort alphabetically Sort by EU Contribution Expand all Collapse all Not available Greece EU contribution € 0,00 Address See on map Other funding No data
