Basically the objectives of this project are to analyze the impact and influence that the presence of agents with veto power has in a process of collective decision. That is, can these agents force the choice of some alternatives or at least to ensure that some of them are not chosen?, what is the relation between the social choice set and the choice set of these individuals?. Positive results are expected with respect to this point.
Moreover, we analyze the question of whether the results which ensure t existence of this kind of agents in variable agenda contexts when economic environments are considered remain or not in the fixed agenda context. We focus on the fixed agenda framework since we consider it more realistic and appropriate to analyze particular economic problems of social choice (voting, location problems,...). In this case the expected results will probably be similar to those of the variable agenda case.
The aim of this project is to promote a knowledge transference between both countries within the area of Social Choice Theory in order to contribute towards a bigger European cohesion which is a plan with top priority within the European Community.