Competition policy and vertical foreclosure

Objective

Research objectives and content
In the last years a special attention has been devoted by competition policy to vertical integration and exclusive dealing as a way to create a market dominant position. My research project is directed to identify a number of robust conclusions on the possibility and desirability (both social and private) of market foreclosure. In particular I conjecture that the following can be proved: when consumers prefer to concentrate their purchases with a single supplier a vertical agreement that broaden the product line is likely to create a dominant market position and have anticompetitive effects. The effect on consumers' welfare, however, may not be negative because the retailer's monopoly power is offset by a larger variety of products. I'm also interested in providing a general framework to analyze the effects of vertical agreements unifying the literature on mergers and exclusive contracts and providing general conditions for a merger outcome to be replicated through contractual relations.
Training Content (objective, benefit and expected impact)
I expect an essential progress of my thesis, being the . University of Toulouse one of the leading centers where research on industrial organization and especially on vertical integration is developed. Links with industry / industrial relevance (22)
My research project has important links- with the european competition policy and especially with the activity of the European Commission in regulating mergers.

Programme(s)

FP4-TMR - Specific research and technological development programme in the field of the training and mobility of researchers, 1994-1998

Topic(s)

Call for proposal

Data not available

Funding Scheme

RGI - Research grants (individual fellowships)

Coordinator

UNIVERSITE DE TOULOUSE 1, SCIENCES SOCIALES

Address

Allte de brienne 21 manufacture des tabacs batimen
3100 Toulouse
France

EU contribution

€ 0,00

Participants (1)

Not available

Italy